澳门六合彩

In the new European security environment that has emerged since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many European nations and political parties have found themselves radically re-evaluating their stance on Russia. But with the results of Sunday鈥檚 parliamentary elections, it seems Austrian voters are instead opting to double down in the opposite direction. By voting the far-right, Russia-friendly Austrian Freedom Party (FP脰) into the top spot for the first time in history, the impact of these results is likely to be felt not just in Austria but in Ukraine, Brussels, and beyond.

To understand Austria鈥檚 right-wing turn, it is essential to grasp the Austrian policy of neutrality after World War II. In many ways, Austria鈥檚 approach resembled that of other neutral nations during the Cold War. Like Sweden, who had been militarily non-aligned long before WW2, and Finland, which treaded a fine line toward closer relations with the west without provoking the Soviet Union, Austria used its neutral status as a tool for easing tensions between the eastern and western blocs, actively being involved in the formation of the OSCE and eventually hosting its headquarters in Vienna. But behind the scenes, there was an important divergence that kept growing as the Soviet Union collapsed. Whereas Sweden, and especially Finland, continued to be wary of the Russian threat they had spent the Cold War actively deterring against, Austria saw new opportunities.

For Austrians, neutrality gradually transformed from a necessity into an essential part of their national identity. This particular brand of neutrality did not, however, prevent the country from scoring deals in cheap Russian gas and accepting by Russian oligarchs, despite the fact that these ties hardly can be described as politically non-charged. Similarly, joining the EU was seen first and foremost as an economic opportunity, which was perceived not to interfere with the continuation of military neutrality and close relations to Russia. Membership in NATO, meanwhile, was never seriously .

Behind the scenes, there was an important divergence that kept growing as the Soviet Union collapsed. Whereas Sweden, and especially Finland, continued to be wary of the Russian threat they had spent the Cold War actively deterring against, Austria saw new opportunities.

By the time the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine took place, this mindset of self-serving neutrality without considerations for the long-term reliability of trading partners had made Austria dangerously entangled in Russia鈥檚 web of influence. Even two years after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Austria is still dependent on Russia for and the country鈥檚 second biggest bank is to curb its significant ties with Russia. But despite the continued problematic relation and the numerous well-documented war crimes committed by Russian soldiers in Ukraine, the support for continued military non-alignment . This shows just how deeply ingrained neutrality has become among the Austrian people: to date, only the minor liberal NEOS party officially supports changing the constitution to enable entry into NATO, with the rest clinging to military neutrality even in times of armed conflict in Europe.

The Freedom Party has spent the last few years capitalizing on this mindset. Whereas many European far-right parties have distanced themselves from Russia since the full-scale invasion, the FP脰 has refused to unequivocally come out against Putin. Instead, in an election where inflation has among voters and dissatisfaction with the ruling coalition is prevalent, the FP脰 has seized the opportunity to blame both as well as for citizens鈥� economic woes, while simultaneously claiming they violate neutrality. And that strategy seems to have worked, with FP脰 reaching its best results ever in a parliamentary election.

Whether or not the FP脰 will be able to form a cabinet is still unclear. This is largely up to the center-right People鈥檚 Party (脰VP), which is the FP脰鈥檚 only realistic coalition partner. While the 脰VP has taking part in a government under party leader Herbert Kickl, who is perceived to be significantly more radical than his predecessors, they have not ruled out governing with the FP脰 altogether. However, so far Kickl has shown no willingness to step aside. While the parties are largely aligned on certain policy areas such as immigration and taxes, negotiations will likely stretch out as neither side is likely to want to give in on their starkly contrasting views regarding the influence of the European Union, Russia, and support for Ukraine. On the other hand, the 脰VP could try to hold on to the prime ministership by forming a together with the Social Democrats and the liberal NEOS, sidelining the FP脰 altogether.

By the time the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine took place, this mindset of self-serving neutrality without considerations for the long-term reliability of trading partners had made Austria dangerously entangled in Russia鈥檚 web of influence.

If the FP脰 does manage to form a cabinet, though, the implications for the rest of Europe are clear. An FP脰 government will likely its two neighbors, Hungary and Slovakia, to form a regional triangle of dissent on EU policy both regarding Ukraine and more broadly. Add the Netherlands to the mix, with its most right-wing government to date, and together their ability to water down, potentially block legislation, or use blackmail tactics on the rest of the EU will be hard to ignore, especially in the European Council.

In addition, an FP脰-led Austria poses a very real security risk in itself. FP脰鈥檚 ties to Russia run exceptionally deep: after the annexation of Crimea, the party signed a with Putin鈥檚 United Russia Party. Last time the FP脰 was in government, during the first Kurz administration from 2017 to 2019, the country鈥檚 intelligence agency was considered so that Austria was from Europe鈥檚 intelligence networks. The minister of the interior at the time, who ultimately controls the agency, was current party leader Kickl. In 2019, the 聽government鈥檚 tenure was cut short after FP脰鈥檚 then-leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, was trying to sell political influence to someone he believed to be the niece of a Russian oligarch. Karin Kneissl, the foreign minister at the time, to work for a Kremlin-aligned think-tank. Since then, nothing points toward these relationships weakening, and their depths are unknown. On the contrary, the Russian spy presence in Vienna has since 2022, cementing the city鈥檚 status as an important base for Russian clandestine intelligence and hybrid operations in the EU. A government led by the FP脰 is unlikely to address this threat in any meaningful way, posing significant challenges to European security.

Overall, regardless of the structure of the coming cabinet, there is likely to be uncertainty ahead. Whether the head of government comes from FP脰, 脰VP, or outside of politics altogether (like in the Netherlands), any coalition that can be formed based on Sunday鈥檚 results is likely to be ripe with internal power struggles, contentious differences on policy positions, and a general sense of instability. More broadly, Austria鈥檚 unwillingness to face the new political reality and preference to instead dig its head further into the sand will not just affect its domestic situation but also the security of Ukraine, the EU, and the rest of Europe. While Austrian neutrality has long been an obstacle to a robust European policy on Russia, the rise of the FP脰 is likely to complicate things even further.