澳门六合彩

Mexico's public security has been progressively moving towards militarization for at least eighteen years. The army's participation, previously reserved for war and exceptional junctures, has normalized. Andr茅s Manuel L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 presidential term has been the latest development in this ongoing process and threatens to tip the scales towards an already unbalanced civil-military relationship.

Throughout Mexican history, the armed forces have taken on various roles in serving the state, but their modern involvement in public security is usually traced down to former president Felipe Calder贸n (2006-2012) and the so-called 鈥渨ar on drugs鈥�. In his six-year term, Calder贸n massively deployed the military in Mexican territory without a constitutional framework, and the decision was appalling for security and human rights.听Homicide figures tripled in his presidential term,听lethality rates in fire-on-fire conflicts increased, and human rights complaints rose as military involvement in civil security responsibilities expanded1. Unsurprisingly, the military deployment raised both human rights and constitutional concerns.听

Article 129 of the Mexican Constitution clearly states that听鈥渄uring peacetime, no military authority may perform any functions other than those directly related to army training鈥�. However, a 1996 Supreme Court ruling softened this prohibition. In a landmark (and controversial)2 decision, the Justices argued that the military prohibition clause was not as absolute as the text suggested. The Court interpreted that the armed forces may act in peacetime if required or authorized by civilian authorities.3

With this case, the Court opened a window for the lawful involvement of military officials during ordinary times, but it also imposed restrictions, stating that any engagement must be explicitly mandated and under civilian control. Years later, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Alvarado Espinoza v. M茅xico added in this interpretation ruling that military involvement in Mexico should remain extraordinary and always subject to civilian oversight.4 Despite the constitutional and conventional safeguards placed on military involvement, the army's role in public security became normalized during the Calder贸n and Pe帽a Nieto administrations, while civilian constraints were consistently bypassed.

As a political opponent,听L贸pez Obrador denounced and rallied against the increasing militarization of public security. However, upon winning the presidency in 2018, he shifted course, making the armed forces his key allies. One of President L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 first constitutional changes was removing the federal police and replacing it with a new hybrid civil-military force deemed the 鈥淣ational Guard鈥�5.

Under L贸pez Obrador's original proposal, the National Guard was intended to fall under the Ministry of National Defense (Sedena), but Congress and the opposition rejected that idea and handed the command of the new security organization to the Ministry of Public Security (SSPC). This was not merely a structural change; it responded both to human rights and constitutional standards that require public safety to be under civilian control. 听

The National Guard was, therefore, constitutionally designed as a civilian entity, under civilian control, but that vision rapidly decayed. The institutions鈥� hierarchical structure gradually incorporated military rules, its integration increasingly relied on military elements, and its formation embraced the armed forces' education, training, professionalization and promotion system. As if that were not enough, studies show that 8 out of 10 elements in the National Guard have a military background6. With military elements and military training, the National Guard has been widely regarded as a military institution cloaked in civilian guise.7

As military influence grew, L贸pez Obrador pushed to transfer full control of the National Guard to the Ministry of Defense (Sedena). In 2022, the president鈥檚 political party, Morena, approved legal amendments that transferred the control and operation of the National Guard to military hands. The political opposition challenged the legality of that change and in a hard-fought 8-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled the legal amendment unconstitutional. At the heart of the Court's reasoning was the long-standing idea that public security should be under civilian, not military, control. 8听

While the Court鈥檚 ruling represented a major setback to militarization, L贸pez Obrador doubled down on his efforts to place security institutions in the army鈥檚 domain. Following Morena鈥檚 landslide victory in the electoral race of 2024, the ruling party now holds the necessary majority in the Lower House and is one vote short in the Senate of being able to amend the Constitution. One of the top-priorities in the Congress is to fulfill Obrador鈥檚 agenda and give full control of the National Guard to the Minister of Defense (Sedena). If Morena manages to place civil security institutions under military control it will mark a new (fatal) milestone on a seemingly irreversible path.听

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Daniel Torres Checa. Attorney at Law specialized in constitutional and human rights litigation. He has been involved in different trials involving militarization matters before the Supreme Court and Federal Courts.听

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References

1. INEGI, 2019. Nota Tecnica Homicidios a nivel nacional,听Ciudad de Mexico: INEGI; Silva Forn茅, C., P茅rez Correa, C. & Cano , I., 2019. Monitor del uso de la fuerza letal en America Latina.听Monitor Fuerza Letal ,听pp. 96-132
2. Juanes Laviada, R. & Torres Checa, Daniel, 2023. La militarizaci贸n ind贸mita: nuestra seguridad p煤blica a juicio.听Available at: https://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/la-militarizacion-indomita-nuestra-seguridad-publica-a-juicio/
3. SCJN听(1996) Accion de Inconstitucionalidad 1/96;听
4. Torres Checa, Daniel, (2020) Breve historia militar, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Naci贸n, (CEC).
5. Trevi帽o Rangel, et al., 2021. Deadly force and denial: the military's legacy in Mexico's 'war on drugs'.听The international Journal of Human Rights,听26(4), pp. 567-590
6. Giles Navarro, A., 2023. Elementos para la evaluaci贸n de la Guardia Nacional",听Ciudad de M茅xico : Instituto Belisario Dominguez.
7. International Crisis Group, 2024. The General's Labyrinth: Crime and the Military in Mexico.听Latin America Report,听Issue 106, pp. 1-44.
8. SCJN听(2023) Accion de Inconstitucionalidad 137/2022.听听

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