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At the beginning of 2021, where is ISIS most active in Syria? And Iraq? And what are its targets—people, places, institutions, governments, what else?Ìý

ISISÌýis struggling to maintainÌýoperationsÌýalong the Kurdish-Arab ethnic fault lines in Iraq as well as along the EuphratesÌýRiverÌýin northeast Syria.ÌýIn both areas it is engaging inÌýlow-level insurgencies, withÌýaÌýlimited ability to hold terrain or launch complex attacks. ISISÌýis more significant inÌýtheÌýgovernment-held areas of Syria, especiallyÌýinÌýthe BadiyaÌýdesert south of the Euphrates andÌýeast of Palmyra.ÌýIt intermittently holdsÌýsome terrain thereÌýand is frequently able to cutÌýoff localÌýcommunications.ÌýIts main targets are local tribal and community leadership and local security forces. Aside from attacks, its main activities are intimidation and financial shakedowns of local merchants and farmers.ÌýIt isÌýalso trying toÌýdevelopÌýinternational capabilities, such asÌýtraining and dispatching terrorists beyond Syria and Iraq. ISIS isÌýalso very difficult to totally annihilate, given both sympathy from andÌýitsÌýintimidation ofÌýtheÌýlocal Arab populations.

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How strong is ISIS and who are its members—what percentage is local and what percentage is foreign fighters? Where do those foreign fighters come from? And is ISIS still able to recruit foreigners and get them across borders? ÌýÌý

ISIS leaders view all of Iraq and Syria as one front. People, weaponsÌýandÌýfunds flow fairly easily throughout the area.ÌýISIS is estimated to have between 8,000 andÌý16,000 fighters, but little is known about whetherÌýthey areÌýfull-time or part-time.ÌýThe vast majority are localsÌýfrom the former caliphate,Ìýor from elsewhere in Iraq or Syria.ÌýThe percentage of foreign fighters in ISIS isÌýway down from theÌýperiod betweenÌý2013Ìýand 2016. The flowÌýofÌýforeign fighters hasÌýdropped partlyÌýbecause of a shortage of supplyÌýandÌýpartlyÌýbecause of better policing by TurkeyÌýof the routesÌýinto Syria.

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How has ISIS adapted its recruitment tactics since the fall of the caliphate? How is ISIS financing its operations, especially since many earlier sources of revenue, such as Syrian oil, have been cut off?Ìý

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ISISÌýstill has highly sophisticated social media platforms. Its appeal to potential recruits appears similar to the period of theÌýcaliphate. ItÌýisÌýdistinguishedÌýfrom al Qaeda by the emphasis onÌýacting inÌýthe here-and-now and jihadist writings that serve the ISIS cause.

ItsÌýlocal recruitment in Iraq and Syria is also fueled by its anti-ShiiteÌýideology and opposition to theÌý(apostate) government in Damascus andÌýthe (Shiite-dominated) government in Baghdad. Funding is primarily generated by local shakedowns, smuggling and other economic activity by ISIS cells.

What is known about the new ISIS leader, Muhammad Said Abdal Rahman al Mawla? How is he different from Abu Bakr al Baghdadi? Does he have the same authority? Is he a tactical mastermind or a symbolic religious emir? Where is he? Who are his top lieutenants?

Very little is knownÌýabout him.ÌýThe general assumption in theÌýcampaign to defeat ISISÌýis thatÌýtheÌýtop leadership is much weakerÌýsinceÌýal Baghdadi’s death in 2019. But the organization still generates sufficientlyÌýmotivated andÌýexperienced mid-level lieutenants to sustainÌýoperationsÌýat current levels.

How does ISIS operate now that it is dispersed and entirely underground? Is its Shura Council still operating? Does al Mawla rule by edict or does ISIS make decisions by consensus of the Shura? Ìý

There is some sort of Shura Council, but its roleÌýis obscure. It does have a strategic plan,ÌýwithÌýan emphasisÌýon operations alongÌýthe Iraq-Syria frontÌýand inÌýparticular inÌýDiyala provinceÌýinÌýIraq.

Whither jihadism? There have been roughly three generations of transnational jihadi fighters: Afghanistan in the 1980s, Al Qaeda in the 1990s-2000s and the Islamic State and its affiliates in the 2010s. Each has been more militant, recruited more widely, and had deadlier goals. What worries you about jihadism next? And where? Ìý

This is both a sociological question and one for terrorism experts. ISIS, orÌýDaesh,Ìýwas aÌýbyproduct of both the ArabÌýSpringÌýin 2011ÌýandÌýtheÌýfailure of traditional security mechanisms to stopÌýthe expansion ofÌýIranÌýand ShiiteÌýIslamÌýinto Sunni Arab areas. There may be no fourth generation, given the current situation—relative stability throughout the region compared toÌýthe period betweenÌý2011ÌýandÌý2020;Ìýrelative containment of Iranian advances in the Arab world;ÌýandÌýgreater limits on theÌýdissemination ofÌýjihadist ideology, influence and resources out ofÌýthe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

What was the most difficult challenge that you faced in the campaign against ISIS? Ìý

The resiliency of the organization—both the level of fighting forces andÌýitsÌýroots in local communities. Both were not insurmountable but required both time and extraordinary military and other resources.

What are the top challenges that the Biden administration faces on ISIS and jihadism more broadly? Ìý

There are four obvious challenges and one wild card: First,ÌýISIS and al Qaeda inÌýWest Africa;Ìýsecond,ÌýISIS and al Qaeda in Afghanistan;Ìýthird,ÌýISISÌýstrength in the government-controlled areas of Syria;Ìýand fourth,ÌýtheÌýperpetual risk inÌýtheÌýSunni Arab areas of Iraq of an outbreak of jihadi resistance against the Shiite-dominated government and Iran’sÌýinfluence.ÌýThe wildÌýcardÌýis a mass casualty event—masterminded or launched by ISIS or al Qaeda—outside ofÌýthe Middle East.

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