澳门六合彩

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can be effective vehicles for displaying听, or socially based reconstructions of the past that prioritize the needs of the present -over the veracity of the past and are frequently used by governments to promote nationalist agendas. Not only are public museums dependent on government funding, they also represent potent 鈥�,鈥� where memory ceases to be part of everyday experience and takes on a collective, physical form. Museums in the People鈥檚 Republic of China (PRC) are no exception.

Today, public museums in China are an important bellwether for gauging the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)鈥檚 legitimizing national narrative. Museums have attained such an important role in Chinese nationalism that, since 1982, they have been stipulated in successive versions of the People鈥檚 Republic of China (PRC)鈥檚听 as a type of 鈥渃ultural undertaking鈥� (wenhua shiye) of the state to 鈥渟erve the people and socialism鈥� (wei renmin fuwu, wei shehui zhuyi fuwu). The recent听 has been well-documented 鈥� as of 2022, according to Chinese historian Xu Jian, there were听, and the number continues to grow.

In the听, the CCP made the connection between museums and national identity even more explicit. 鈥淧atriotic education bases鈥� (aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi) such as museums would be established to 鈥渃ultivate patriotic sentiment among the youth鈥� (ba peiyang guangda qingshaonian de aiguo zhuyi ganqing). Museums on the War of Resistance against Japan (China鈥檚 World War II) continue to prevail among patriotic education bases. As political scientist Wang Zheng notes in his 2012 book听, when the听 were designated as 鈥減atriotic education bases鈥� in 1995,听 percent were about the War of Resistance.

The most famous Chinese museum commemorating the War of Resistance is the听. The site commemorates听, the horrific six weeks from 1937 to 1938 during which the Japanese military slaughtered several hundred thousand Chinese non-combatants.听 was designed by Chinese architect听 and purposefully built around a mass gravesite excavated in the early 1980s, ensuring its powerful function as a 鈥渟ite of memory.鈥� Skeletons of the victims remain half-buried in the ground beside placards that describe the methods of their demise. Initially opened on August 15, 1985, the Memorial Hall鈥檚 design, according to Qi鈥檚 1999 memoir, was intended to reflect the themes of tragedy, disaster, and death.

Phase Two of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, which was completed on December 10, 1997 for the 60th anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, included a new L-shaped entryway and several larger-than-life sculptures titled 鈥淎 Disaster for Jinling (the ancient name for Nanjing).鈥� Juxtaposed with Phase One, this phase focused more on the themes of current pain, hatred, and indignation, connecting the past to the present.

Closer to present, Phase Three (built in 2007), the first phase not听designed by Qi Kang, added an air of grandeur to the previous sentiments of solemn commemoration and fierce indignation. During its first two phases the Memorial Hall was barely visible from the street, but Phase Three added 20,000 square meters to the space, including a reflecting pool with sculptures of victims and an expanded hall with a dark 鈥溾�� and a ceremonial courtyard to be used for events, such as the annual commemoration of the Massacre.

The fourth stage of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall,听, is the most recent and most aptly reflects the contemporary narrative of 鈥渘ational rejuvenation鈥� under Xi Jinping. The Victory Exhibition Hall opened on December 7, 2015 and provides a comprehensive trajectory of the War of Resistance against Japan centered on the unconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire on September 2, 1945. In contrast with the earlier exhibits, the Victory Exhibition Hall appears designed to inspire听pride in China鈥檚 victory. For example, the museumgoer is confronted at the entrance with the 鈥淭hree Must Prevails鈥� (san ge bisheng) text in multiple languages: 鈥淩ighteousness will prevail, peace will prevail, and the people will prevail鈥� (zhengyi bisheng, heping bishen, renmin bisheng). Upon entering the building, the grand entryway, with pictures of celebrations of the end of World War II taking place worldwide, sets a jubilant tone听and places the Chinese victory against Japan in an international context.

The phased development of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall mirrors the evolution of the CCP鈥檚 legitimizing narrative, first from听 to听 and, under Xi Jinping, from 鈥渧颈肠迟颈尘鈥� to 鈥渞ejuvenation.鈥� In brief, during the Mao era, the 鈥渧ictor narrative鈥� that dominated the CCP鈥檚 portrayal of the War of Resistance against Japan emphasized that, without the CCP鈥檚 ostensible defeat of Japan, there would be no new China. This narrative was largely based on Marxist class struggle. The 鈥渆nemy鈥� was both the Japanese and the Chinese bourgeoisie, which was epitomized by the Guomindang (GMD). Thus, portrayals of the heroic sacrifice made by Chinese Communists, but not the GMD and others, dominated the narrative in the Mao era. This was important domestically and on the international stage as a show of strength for a fledgling nation-state still contending for international recognition.听

After the end of the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao in 1976, however, the victor narrative听 to a victim narrative. Particularly in the early 1990s, trends and events such as economic marketization, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Tiananmen Square Incident made it clear that Marxist ideology was defunct. The CCP needed a new legitimizing narrative, which came in the form of patriotic education centered on听 and Chinese victimization therein.

The greatest outrage of the Century of Humiliation was the War of Resistance against Japan, and the atrocities Japan inflicted on Chinese civilians. For China鈥檚 leaders, fostering public outrage against past imperialist aggressors fomented patriotism and redirected outrage that might otherwise have been directed at the CCP for its crimes against its own people. This new victim narrative no longer vilified the GMD, and the PRC finally recognized patriotic GMD soldiers in the war effort.

We can still see the victim narrative clearly in the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, particularly in Phase Two. However, with the museum鈥檚 Phase Four and the Victory Exhibition Hall, Xi Jinping has developed what I call the 鈥渞ejuvenation narrative,鈥� that incorporates elements of both the 鈥渧ictor narrative鈥� and听the 鈥渧ictim narrative.鈥� CCP history has been drastically rewritten so that the Party鈥檚 historical mission is not to abolish the past but rather restore it. Instead of promoting a universal version of Marxism-Leninism, the CCP instead glorifies traditional Confucian culture and 鈥渟ocialism with Chinese characteristics.鈥澨�

Under Xi, the Party stresses the heroic role of all patriotic Chinese in World War II as a way听 both domestically and globally. Domestically, stressing the CCP鈥檚 leadership in World War II underscores the Party鈥檚 claim that 鈥渨ithout the CCP, there would be no new China鈥� (mei you Gongchandang, jiu mei you xin Zhongguo). Importantly, this narrative also highlights China鈥檚 presence at the creation of the post-World War II international order. However, the CCP鈥檚 version of this history is a bit of sleight of hand, as the lion鈥檚 share of China鈥檚 contribution to World War II, both in terms of soldiers and material resources, came听.听

Xi鈥檚 motives for rewriting the history of the War of Resistance are not hard to guess. If, as Xi claims, the CCP comprised the 鈥渕ainstay鈥� (zhongliu dizhu) of the war effort against Japan, then it can also claim credit for ending the Century of Humiliation and Xi can justify his efforts to 鈥�.鈥� As Xi remarked in his听October 2017 speech to the 19th CCP National Congress:听

With a history of more than 5,000 years, our nation created a splendid civilization, made remarkable contributions to mankind, and became one of the world鈥檚 greatest nations. But with the Opium War of 1840, China was plunged into the darkness of domestic turmoil and foreign aggression; its people, ravaged by war, saw their homeland torn apart and lived in poverty and despair鈥ational rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people since modern times began. At its founding the Communist Party of China made realizing Communism its highest ideal and its ultimate goal and shouldered the historic mission of national rejuvenation.听

Xi鈥檚 speech makes several assumptions regarding 鈥渘ational rejuvenation鈥� (minzu fuxing) that need to be questioned. The first is that, because the CCP鈥檚 mission aligns with the 鈥済reatest dream of the Chinese people,鈥� the CCP alone is historically the true representative of the Chinese people. Domestically, this makes it easier for the CCP to justify its continual crackdown on those who听 and its ongoing project of 鈥�,鈥� particularly in autonomous regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia.

The second assumption is that China should return to its rightful role as 鈥渙ne of the world鈥檚 greatest nations.鈥� Again, Xi takes for granted that China and the party-state are one and the same. This claim has听 for the PRC鈥檚 imagined geobody and its听 to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The resolution of all three of these claims is closely intertwined with Xi鈥檚 鈥淐hina Dream鈥� (Zhongguo meng), and their 鈥渓osses鈥� are still firmly linked to the Century of Humiliation. Hong Kong is linked to the First Opium War and subsequent British colonization and Taiwan to the 50 years of Japanese colonization and the subsequent retreat of the GMD to the island during the Chinese Civil War. Although the PRC鈥檚 territorial claims are matters of international importance, the CCP frames them as purely 鈥渄omestic affairs鈥� in which the outside world should not interfere.听

Internationally, the CCP has grown more assertive as it pursues 鈥渘ational rejuvenation鈥� under Xi. China鈥檚 infamous 鈥溾�� features angry exchanges between Chinese diplomats and their foreign counterparts. According to Peter Martin, much of this posturing is related to China鈥檚 Century of Humiliation and the idea that Chinese diplomats should be proud of China and do not have to defend China鈥檚 way of doing things on the international stage. Although some analysts perceive in 鈥渨olf warrior diplomacy鈥� since the COVID-19 pandemic, aggression is still key to understanding China鈥檚 international behavior, particularly since there has been an increasing convergence between the bellicose tone of domestic and external propaganda (waixuan neixuan hua).

For the CCP, highlighting the Party鈥檚 role in World War II serves two seemingly contradictory purposes internationally. On the one hand, it can assuage the international community鈥檚 fears about China鈥檚 rise by characterizing China as peaceful. If China was a moral actor in World War II and helped create the international order post-1945, then surely we can trust it to uphold international norms today.听

On the other hand, this same narrative allows the CCP to selectively deviate from the international order, because 鈥渘ational rejuvenation鈥� demands China鈥檚 return to its historical leadership role. For example, Xi鈥檚 signature 鈥淏elt and Road鈥� Initiative has extended from Asia and Europe to Africa and Latin America, reflecting China鈥檚 desire to expand its听. Worryingly, China鈥檚 increased sphere of influence has facilitated its听 to countries like Ecuador, Pakistan, and even Germany. Moreover, China is increasingly involved in efforts to promote pro-Beijing policies in democratic countries, particularly through听targeting Chinese diaspora communities.听

In sum, for the CCP, historical narratives in museums and elsewhere are often employed to reflect the Party鈥檚 current policy agendas (a strategy that is, of course,听). This uncomfortable reality should not diminish the very real horrors of the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities of World War II. Rather, it should highlight that, in China and elsewhere, the most effective nationalist narratives are often based on kernels of historical truth. These kernels may be manipulated, but at their core they hold deep and real significance for the population. If we are to understand China today, we must therefore take seriously both the trauma of its history and how it is so often used to inform (and, at times, misinform) current attitudes towards the past.

The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or 澳门六合彩. Copyright 2024, Kissinger Institute on China and the US. All rights reserved.