澳门六合彩

Disinformation Manipulates Discontent听听

Francophone West Africa鈥檚 since 2020 were underpinned by in the region. The coups鈥攖wo in Burkina Faso (both in 2022), two in Mali (2020 and 2022), one in Guinea (2021), and the most recent in Niger (2023)鈥攈ave often been celebrated by local populations, despite elected leaders in some instances being forcefully replaced. While citizens may prefer democracy, they also desire governments that address legitimate frustrations. Democratically elected governments in West Africa have failed to support citizens and enabled some officials to build riches from corrupt practices. Leaders claim to be democratic to maintain legitimacy but act in their self-interest to consolidate power and manipulate electoral systems, making their countries democratic in name only. Moreover, West African populaces have increasingly grappled with the insecurity of militant Islamist insurgencies that threaten lives and livelihoods, as well as more than a decade of unsuccessful domestic and international鈥攏amely French鈥攎ilitary interventions in response.听听

In this light, for coups can be understood. Citizens celebrate new hope for long-overdue and much-needed change while their immediate security needs trump overarching democratic values. What makes less sense, however, is the sustained support for coup leaders鈥攅ven as security and economic conditions worsen under junta leadership鈥攁nd how this support lends itself to further approval of Russia鈥檚 destabilizing actions across the region.听听

Russian disinformation operations across West Africa have led to an unprecedented rise in popular support for Russia, citizen demands for Russian interventions, and, in some cases, new military partnerships between African countries and Russia.

Burkina Faso is an illustrative example. In 2014, the country emerged from a 27-year authoritarian government. Since then, Burkina Faso experienced and democratic gains. Until recently, Reporters Without Borders the country 鈥渙ne of Africa's success stories regarding freedom of the press.鈥� Then, in 2022, the security situation proved too difficult for Burkina Faso鈥檚 democratic institutions to handle, and the country experienced two coups in nine months. The coups followed demanding democratically-elected President Kabor茅鈥檚 resignation and holding him accountable for the country鈥檚 deteriorating security. Traor茅鈥攖he second and current post-coup leader鈥攈as suspended the country鈥檚 constitution and implemented a , which cannot be revised without his approval.听听

Both post-coup leaders justified their takeovers by they had acted to respond to the preceding leader鈥檚 failure to address a strengthening jihadist insurgency. Both promised to restore security. Instead, the security and humanitarian situations in Burkina Faso have greatly . The number of people killed by jihadist groups has nearly tripled since the coup, and Burkinabe have been forcibly displaced. Approximately are not operating, increasing the vulnerability of young Burkinabe who already face an uncertain future. Adding to the jihadist threat to civilians, Burkina Faso鈥檚 military has also faced credible accusations of human rights abuses, such as and a of at least 156 civilians. Traor茅 issued an allowing him to take any necessary measures to counter the insurgency, including requisitioning people and restraining civil liberties. Since then, he has been accused of , civil society activists, and opposition party members.听

However, Traor茅 has not yet faced widespread backlash despite a worsening security situation under his rule. Instead, popular calls have been supportive of the coup leaders and, in general, in support of authoritarianism: 鈥�.鈥澨�

Complexly situated in this backdrop of domestic and French military failures against jihadist insurgencies, poverty, underdevelopment, and legitimate unanswered citizen grievances, Russia has effectively seized opportunities to manipulate citizen frustrations through disinformation campaigns. Russian disinformation operations across West Africa have led to an unprecedented rise in popular support for Russia, citizen demands for Russian interventions, and, in some cases, new military partnerships between African countries and Russia. In Burkina Faso, Russian-generated disinformation has encouraged democratic backsliding, fostered coups, and increased support for repressive regimes (domestically and abroad) regardless of their human rights records.听听

听...there are well-documented examples of Russian disinformation campaigns across West Africa and the continent.听听

Russia鈥檚 disinformation campaign in Burkina Faso builds off the legitimate fears and frustrations of the Burkinabe population while reaffirming their concerns. Disinformation manipulates discontent, blaming France for Burkina Faso鈥檚 challenges, presenting Russia as a savior, and embracing authoritarian leaders like Traor茅 who stand ready to partner with Russia.听听

This disinformation takes a variety of identifiable forms. Russian operatives employ and pretend to be Africans with a genuine interest in Burkina Faso. These accounts play on common frustrations and place blame on France鈥檚 military failures and the West more broadly. They , overstate the successes of the Wagner Group, and between Burkina Faso and Russia. Burkinabe supporters of these accounts are invited to join that spread more radical propaganda that authorities might otherwise censor as disinformation. In early Russian disinformation campaigns, Russia struggled to make its content look legitimate. Over time, however, Russia has recruited to form and legitimize messaging, making campaigns more credible and resonant with local populations. Russian operatives have further developed to spread disinformation or impersonate or buy legitimate accounts to ensure a spread of information favorable to Russia.听

In some cases, disinformation campaigns have also sought to delegitimize dissent. In response to journalists鈥� unfavorable investigations into Burkina Faso鈥檚 military, for example, accounts and sites associated with the Wagner group to discredit them and halt their work. Unfortunately, Burkina Faso is not alone, as there are examples of Russian disinformation campaigns across West Africa and the continent.听听

Russia鈥檚 successful disinformation campaigns have resulted in greater citizen support for Russia in Burkina Faso, which is increasingly vital for Russia and the coup leaders as they move the Burkinabe-Russian partnership from rhetoric to reality, as seen with the recent in Burkina Faso, the arrival of , and Russian-sponsored plans to build a . Russian disinformation and its influence empower leaders like Traor茅 because it helps legitimize coup leaders in places where the West and the United States will not engage local leadership. Instead, it is Russia that provides aid, military support, and even to coup leaders.听听

While this is not to argue that the United States should provide material and political assistance to leaders like Traor茅, it does illuminate a fundamental problem: the US response to coup leaders cannot be simply silence and sullenness. Such a response leads Traor茅 and the citizenry into the hands of Russia, pushing the country further from the path of democracy building and into humanitarian and insecurity crises that threaten the entire region. While Russian disinformation may play up citizen grievances, the Russian partnership does not prioritize Burkinabe citizens nor adequately address the country鈥檚 worsening security situation. Russia鈥檚 primary goal is to extract resources and spread influence and military power in the region. It is not interested or capable of addressing the underlying causes of Burkina Faso鈥檚 economic malaise and instability.听听

Values-based US Policy听听

A 2021-2022 by Afrobarometer in 36 African countries showed that two-thirds of Africans polled prefer democracy over any other system of government, and 80% rejected one-man rule. However, only 38% of respondents said they were satisfied with how democracy works in their country. These results indicate a growing perspective of skepticism toward democracy in Burkina Faso and across the continent. While most Africans want democracy, they have yet to see their countries鈥� current democratic systems delivering on what is expected of them.听 听

Suppose the United States is to counter Russia鈥檚 growing and nefarious influence in Burkina Faso and across Africa. In that case, the United States must focus on these shared values and aspirations with Africans: democracy, human rights, and the ability and vision through development efforts to support communities in addressing their root causes of instability and conflict. After all, these root causes of citizen discontent are also the basis through which disinformation takes hold.听听

听...the US response to coup leaders cannot be simply silence and sullenness.

This analysis is not to oversimplify the complexities and difficult circumstances that countries like Burkina Faso face. Instead, its goal is to underscore the way out of crisis and instability and away from actors like Russia who are fueling it. Through creative, adaptable, innovative solutions that address the underlying causes of extreme poverty and instability, the United States will succeed in these efforts. US policy must focus on root causes and prioritize people. Such an approach benefits from sustainable partnerships between the United States and local communities in ways that empower citizens and increase their resistance to jihadist recruitment. Success requires greater and longer-lasting investment in civil society organizations and social services development to improve the resilience, opportunities, and well-being of people throughout the country.听听

Moreover, an independent, free press will be key to directly addressing disinformation. Increased support for independent media should be a foreign policy priority, considering the key role of reliable information and transparency in functioning democracies. In the short term, the United States can support local media through political support and help them develop in response to disinformation. In the long-term support of local media, capacity building, economic security, legitimacy, and empowerment are vital. This could include public diplomacy efforts that engender democratic values and build local media capacity.听

Torianna Eckles is the communications intern with 澳门六合彩 Africa Program. Previously, she was a staff intern (Director's Office) with the Stafford Capacity Building Internship with the Africa Program for the Fall 2023 term. She is a senior at The George Washington University, double majoring in Peace and Conflict Resolution and Political Science.听听

The opinions expressed on this blog are solely those of the authors. They do not reflect the views of 澳门六合彩 or those of Carnegie Corporation of New York. 澳门六合彩's Africa Program provides a safe space for various perspectives to be shared and discussed on critical issues of importance to both Africa and the United States.听

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