澳门六合彩

These days, Vladimir Putin can watch聽how fragile and fleeting聽authoritarian聽power is. He sees Turkey and Belarus on the brink of existential change.聽An election,聽in聽the first case,聽and聽illness,聽in the second,聽may聽bring聽down聽powerful bosses. And it does聽not matter if this comes聽now or happens later. This聽should聽give聽the聽Russian autocrat聽pause.聽He has already imprisoned or expelled everyone who opposed him, but can he feel safe?

鈥淩ussia will respect the choice of the Turkish people,鈥� said Dmitry Peskov, Putin鈥檚 press secretary. Moscow reacts to the political campaign in Turkey with restraint and limits itself to platitudes. In reality, the Kremlin does not consider it necessary to respect the will of any people, including its own. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, despite the fact that his interests may often diverge from those of Moscow, is a familiar actor to the Kremlin and, most importantly, he is anti-Western.



In September 2020, the Russian Foreign Ministry used similar wording about Belarus. 鈥淢oscow respects the choice of the people of Belarus,鈥� Maria Zakharova, the ministry鈥檚 spokesperson, said. That sounded cynical, given that the Belarusian authorities conjured an unrealistic 80 percent win for Aleksandr Lukashenko in the face of mass protests. Then, just like today, the Kremlin played the side of its friend: familiar and anti-Western.聽

In two weeks, Erdogan faces an unpredictable second-round runoff against an opposition candidate. Lukashenko apparently suffers from some health issues. This does not mean that the Kremlin鈥檚 longtime partners will disappear from the political arena tomorrow. But this means that Putin is nervous.



The Russian leadership does not like to see an autocrat fall, for three reasons. First, for the Kremlin autocrat, it is easier to deal with other autocrats than with accountable leaders. An autocrat is flexible, tends to bargain, and can be bribed. And, of course, an autocrat does not need to worry about his voters or public interest in general. Second, many autocrats profess anti-Americanism. Third, an autocrat鈥檚 defeat is an omen: the iron fist might fail. This has not happened to Lukashenko or Erdogan, yet. But both have looked into the abyss.聽

When聽Lukashenko鈥檚聽security forces聽beat and tortured聽Belarusians聽in a brutal crackdown聽on an聽unprecedented聽mass protest, Russia supported聽the dictator聽(I cannot call him president because聽his crudely rigged 鈥渆lection鈥澛燿eprived him of聽legitimacy). While聽Western聽leaders聽stopped talking聽to Lukashenko,聽Putin聽accepted聽his 鈥渨in鈥澛燼nd used聽it as an opportunity to聽bind聽Lukashenko to聽himself.聽By February 24, Lukashenko聽had no choice聽but聽to provide territory for聽Russia鈥檚 attack on Kyiv. No one asked the opinion of the Belarusians when the decision was made to deploy Russian nuclear weapons聽in聽their聽territory. This greatly increases the risk of聽receiving聽a retaliatory strike in the event of聽a聽radical聽escalation.

Putin may even succeed in pushing Lukashenko into providing troops for his invasion of Ukraine, a move that the Belarusian dictator has so far been able to avoid. This is a huge risk for Lukashenko, since it will be extremely difficult to sell to Belarusians on the idea of full-scale war under the pretext of defense against the West. But, of course, he will be left no choice. Lukashenko鈥檚 positions are weakening along with his health.

The press and analysts have been talking about the fact that his health is clearly bad since May 9. In Moscow, he could not walk a short distance on foot and used an electric car. He did not stay for Putin鈥檚 lunch. He did not make a speech upon his return to Minsk. And he missed the Day of the Flag, Emblem, and Anthem of Belarus. Nobody saw him in public for a week, starting with the parade in Moscow, where he appeared with a bandaged hand.聽

On May 16,聽a聽Telegram 褋hannel聽close to the Lukashenko administration published聽a聽photo and then聽a聽video of the boss.聽His聽hand聽was聽bandaged again, though聽it was聽the left one;聽the right one聽was bandaged聽at the Moscow parade. Most likely this聽means聽that聽a聽catheter聽is聽being聽changed. Overall, Lukashenko does not look聽good.聽

Russian State Duma聽member聽Konstantin Zatulin was the first to聽聽that聽Lukashenko聽was ill. In fact, no one knows what exactly is happening to him. After all, dictators do not seek to be accountable to voters.聽Therefore, in a completely natural way, the question of whether Lukashenko will die is at the center of a discussion. More precisely: what if Lukashenko dies?

There are two options. Either聽a聽Putin聽man聽is put in Lukashenko鈥檚 place, or a聽confrontation begins聽among elites on the inside. If that happens,聽the opposition in exile has a chance.聽It will聽need to quickly and effectively enter into negotiations. The office of Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya is preparing its proposals.聽

I would presume that,聽among other things, opponents of the聽current聽regime聽would聽suggest聽softening Western sanctions. Tikhanovskaya will easily receive (if she has not yet received) a green light from the European Union. After Lukashenko, political prisoners聽could be聽released,聽opponents of the regime聽might be able to return聽to the country,聽and聽elections,聽ideally, could be聽scheduled.聽

Is such a development imaginable? Absolutely. The only problem is that, unlike Lukashenko, Putin has no visible difficulties with his health. And with a high degree of probability, if Lukashenko disappears, big brother from Russia will take control of the situation in Minsk in a matter of seconds. Changes in Belarus will inevitably follow changes in Russia.

Putin鈥檚 main nightmare is聽a聽Maidan. The leaders who came to power on the wave of mass protest鈥攅specially in the countries of the former USSR鈥攁re聽absolutely聽rejected聽by聽the Kremlin, because they are seen as聽a聽threat聽and聽can serve聽as an example.聽This is why聽Putin did not find聽common ground with either the former聽president聽of Georgia,聽Mikheil Saakashvili, or with the current Armenian聽prime minister,聽Nikol Pashinyan, who both gained power as a result of the so-called聽鈥渃olor revolutions.鈥�

There are no revolutions in Turkey so far,聽just聽competitive elections, which causes bewilderment in the Kremlin. The leader of the Turkish opposition is not trusted there. A couple of days before the vote, Kemal K谋l谋莽daroglu said that Russia was trying to interfere with the political process in Turkey by publishing fake聽news and spreading disinformation on social networks. Russia was immediately indignant and denied everything,聽just like聽it did聽during聽and after聽the聽2016聽U.S.聽elections. However,聽even more interesting聽is the fact that the opposition candidate for the presidency of Turkey promises, in case of victory, to reorient Ankara鈥檚 foreign policy, strengthen the alliance with the West, and join the sanctions against Russia.

The second round of elections in Turkey聽will take place聽on May 28. It is not at all聽sure聽that K谋l谋莽daro臒lu will win. On the contrary, experts tend to predict his defeat,聽unless, of course, something happens that radically changes the mood. And if Erdogan remains in power, according to experts, repressions inside the country will intensify. This will be justified,聽as usual, as in聽the interest聽of national security. However, many politicians in the West聽are holding their fists, allowing themselves to hope.

I just returned from the Tallinn Lennart Meri conference聽where there were聽a record number of VIP guests from all over the world,聽mostly NATO member states. And there, almost every discussion,聽in one way or another,聽was聽about聽Turkey. What if Erdogan聽was聽gone? It would change a lot.聽

Lukashenko and Erdogan are聽both聽cunning and experienced聽actors.聽The final argument inside聽a聽country is always strength. In the聽authoritarian聽world,聽the one with the聽strongest grip聽wins.聽But any grip may weaken,聽and then the system crumbles聽quickly.聽Last week has shown that there聽may聽be some chance of this happening.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.