澳门六合彩

Last week, Russian president Vladimir Putin declared that he would consider sending long-range weapons to unspecified countries that target Western interests and staged an unsettling public debate about a potential Russian preemptive nuclear strike on the West.聽

In a carefully scripted public conversation on the main stage of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Putin rejected the need for nuclear weapons use at this stage of the war. However, his interlocutor, Russia鈥檚 chief proponent of nuclear strikes, Sergei Karaganov, was given a unique platform to outline his doctrine to a large international audience.

Nuclear Talk as a Sign of Weakness

笔耻迟颈苍鈥檚 throughout last week鈥檚 forum were intended to articulate Russia鈥檚 response聽to the United States and several other Western nations allowing strikes with Western munitions within Russian territory. Indirectly, Putin has also been responding to the Russian army鈥檚聽 on the battlefields of Ukraine. After months of fighting and heavy casualties, Russian forces captured the eastern Ukrainian town of Avdiivka in February, but no breakthrough has been achieved since then. With fresh arms from the United States and Europe now arriving in Ukraine, Russia鈥檚 military advantage is beginning to wane.

笔耻迟颈苍鈥檚 response to the stalemate on the ground appears to be twofold. First, in practical terms, the Kremlin makes relatively restrained escalatory moves, such as聽 drills to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in May or聽 Russian warships for a port call in Cuba in June to remind the United States of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.聽

Second, as is his habit in uncertain battleground situations, Putin continues to use exaggerated rhetoric to keep Russia鈥檚 nuclear option ambiguously open. Additionally, he suggested last week that he would聽 long-range strike capabilities to adversaries of the West.聽

鈥淚f they supply to the war zone and call for the use of these weapons on our territory, then why do we not have the right to do the same, to respond in a mirror-like manner?鈥� Putin聽 while addressing the forum on Friday, reiterating his earlier statement. The United States and Germany recently聽 Ukraine to use US and German munitions to hit targets on Russian soil within a limited range solely to defend Kharkiv, Ukraine鈥檚 second-largest city.聽Last week reporters聽 that Ukraine had already used Western-supplied weapons under this new guidance.

Conversation with a Nuclear Hawk

Putin discussed the possible use of nuclear weapons at least twice during the forum. The second聽 was a colorful twenty-minute debate hosted by Karaganov, a political scientist and commentator with longstanding ties to Russia鈥檚 international relations community.聽 for a preemptive nuclear strike against Western targets has been his project for the past year. In June 2023, when Karaganov聽 his campaign, the Kremlin was reeling from continuous infighting within the Russian army and nervously anticipating a Ukrainian counteroffensive. During that same month Moscow made a major escalatory move by聽 tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. In September 2022, also at a moment of weakness following a major Ukrainian success in Kharkiv region, Putin聽 a nuclear threat and declared a partial mobilization.聽

鈥淭here used to be a nuclear safety mechanism that is now seriously weakened. This safety lock was the fear of nuclear weapons,鈥� Karaganov said, addressing Putin. Karaganov elaborated that to win this war, Russia, he thought, must climb the 鈥渓adder of nuclear escalation鈥� and be ready to use nuclear weapons.聽

鈥淚 am a hunter, I know how animals behave. If you are attacked by a pack of wild dogs or hyenas and you have a stick, you can beat them, and there is a chance that you will drive them away. But most likely they will rip your pants, your legs, and if you get tired, they will gnaw you. But if you have a chance to kill a couple, the rest will scatter, guaranteed.鈥�

鈥淵ou鈥檙e turning up the heat. They鈥檙e already scared,鈥� Putin responded. 鈥淚f, God forbid, it comes to strikes, everyone should realize that Russia has an early warning system for missile attacks. The US has it. Europe does not. They are more or less defenseless in this sense.鈥� Putin then went on to reiterate that Russia鈥檚 tactical weapons are several times more powerful than the bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and also several times more plentiful. 鈥淚f those with whom we exchange such strikes [cease to] exist, whether the Americans will get involved in this exchange at the level of strategic weapons I doubt very much. The Europeans should think about it. But I assume that it will never come to that. We don鈥檛 have that need. Our armed forces so vastly outnumber them in conventional weapons that there is no need. I would ask you not to mention such things in vain.鈥�

Normalizing Blackmail

However, two days before this exchange Putin聽 the West was wrong to dismiss Moscow鈥檚 threats to use nuclear weapons. 鈥淔or some reason, the West believes that Russia will never use it,鈥� Putin said when asked by Reuters about the risk of nuclear escalation. He then referred to Russia鈥檚 nuclear doctrine, which allows the country鈥檚 leaders to use all means at their disposal in case Russia鈥檚 sovereignty and territorial integrity are threatened.聽This meeting marked the first time in the two years of war that representatives from countries the Kremlin calls 鈥渦nfriendly,鈥� including Thomson Reuters鈥檚 Samia Nakhoul and the Associated Press鈥檚 James Jordan, were present at a meeting with foreign news agencies.

The significance of the St. Petersburg debate lies in the fact that the Kremlin has given Russia鈥檚 chief proponent of preemptive strikes a platform shared with Putin himself. The Kremlin鈥檚 media team is extremely picky about choosing people who appear alongside Putin in any public setting. The point of inviting Karaganov was to legitimize his calls for nuclear weapons use as something the Kremlin is listening to and keeps on the table.聽

As most game theorists would tell you, however, a player who reaches for an ultimate scare tactic too often loses credibility. Rose Gottemoeller, former NATO deputy secretary-general,聽 that Moscow鈥檚 repeated invocation of nuclear threats is atypical behavior for a nuclear power. Since the Cuban missile crisis, major nuclear powers have avoided such blackmail. The danger is that Moscow may be normalizing nuclear blackmail as a policy tool. Despite the Kremlin resorting to threats when it feels weak, Russia鈥檚 nuclear arsenal is real and has been undergoing modernization.聽

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.