A blog of the Kennan Institute
Having It Both Ways: Russians Both Support and Oppose War
Realistic assessments of scenarios for the Russo-Ukrainian war increasingly agree thatneither side is likely toachieveaclearmilitary victory.Twovariables will determinethe overall balance of power:the balance of forces on the battlefield and the ability of each side tomobilize resourcesandpersonnelto continue the war. Militarily, the West will try tocounteractRussia’s advantages so that Putin cannotwin.Each side’smobilizationsuccesswill remain keytoits ability to wage a war of attrition.
Putin’s resources seem superiorowingto Russia’s much greater populationand a relatively successful partialcall-up lastfall.Buton a closer look,this is not entirely true.Russia’s much-anticipated winter offensivedid not materialize.Russia’ssocialmediaare overflowing withcomplaintsfromthemobilized and theirrelatives. The gist of thoseappeals is simple: the mobilizedrefuseto go onanoffensive,citing high casualty rates andlack oftraining.
This brings usbackto theissueof theRussian citizenry’srealattitudes towardthe waragainst Ukraine.Isitchangingas the war rages on forover a year, as the populationbecomes more involved, and as the death toll rises? One year into the war, what, if anything, do we know about Russian public opinion?
ThePicture:Three Sources
Three independentpollinggroupsconducted surveysinRussiathroughout the war’sfirst year. The dataaresurprisingly comparable and consistent.According to these polls,public support forthewar rose in the spring of 2022, declined in late summer and fall, and rose again slightlyin early2023.
The LevadaCenter, Russia’s veteran independentpollster,foundthatrespondents whosaid yes tothe direct questionof whethertheysupportedthe war fluctuated between 74and76percentin April and August, declined to 71–74percentin September and December, andclimbed backto 75–77percentin January and February. The Chronicle, ayear-oldpollingstartup,saw support rise in the first months of the war from 59 to 66percent,thendeclineto51 percent,its lowest point,at the end of September.Support, according to the Chronicle,then returned to 59percent by February 2023.
The Russian Field, also a relative newcomer,sawa support level of about 60percentin the beginningthat later stabilized intherange of66–68percent. The difference can most likely beattributed tosurveydesign.TheLevadaCentermaintainsface-to-face polling, while the other twoorganizationsusetelephone surveys. The Chronicle project offersrespondents the option“I do not want to answer”in addition to theusual“undecided”option, whichhasreducedthe share ofboth warsupportersandwaropponents.
Limitations: ADistorting Mirror
In all surveys, when answering a straightforward question, the majority of respondents support the war.Yetthese responsesshould be treated with caution. The question“Can you freely talk about your attitude toward the actions of the country’s leadership, or are you afraid, feel uncomfortable?”whenposed to the respondents of theLevadaCenterpollsshowed that among those who approve of Putin, 42percentanswered yes, while7percentchose the answer“afraid, feel uncomfortable.”At the same time, among those who do not approve of Putin, 18percent saidyes,while every third respondent (31percent) chose the“I am afraid” option. In the Russian Field , among those who supportedthe“military operation,”one in six (16percent) said they were afraid to participate in polls,while43percentofthose who do not supportthe warwere afraid to be polled.
It is clearthat loyalists are more likely to agree tobesurveyedthanregime opponents.On the one hand, the data from the various independent polls are consistentandcapture the dynamics of the respondents’moods insimilarways.On the other hand, the distributions we see in the polls are highly likely to have a bias:loyal respondents are overrepresented and nonloyal respondents are underrepresented.
The Result:ThreeMajorities
Keeping these findings in mind,we canmove on toanalyzing the quality of support for the war among those who agreed to talk to thepollsters. In theChronicle’sdata, we looked at respondents’attitudes toward the war on two levels.
Answers to the direct question(“Doyou support the Russian army’s military operation in Ukraine?”)demonstrateddeclarative support. In the current repressive conditions, a negative answer to this question is almost a criminal act.Withthis in mind,the Chronicle’s survey askedrespondentsadditional questions designed to clarify their attitude toward certain political decisions and beliefs related to the war (“Are youready to support Putin’s decision to stop the warimmediately?,”“Do yousupport prioritizingmilitaryspendingoversocialspending?,”“Do youcondemn those who evade mobilization?”).
This analysis allowed us to divide respondents into several groups. Among the 60percentofthosewho said they supported military action, only slightly more thanhalfgave pro-war responsestoclarifyingquestions. This group,constitutingapproximately 35–38percentof all respondents,formsthecoreofthewar’ssupporters.This means that22–25 ofallrespondents,whileexhibitingdeclarativesupportforthewar,dosowith reservations (they wantit to be over soon, theywantmoresocialspending, they sympathize withmobilizationevaders).About two-thirds of thosewho, in the Chroniclepoll,said“Idon’t know”or“Idon’t want to answer”to the directwarquestiongravitated towardanantiwar stance inansweringtheclarifyingquestions.Finally, 10percentofallrespondents openly statedthey did not support the war.
In other words,alongsidethegroup ofcore supporters(35–38 percentof all respondents),there isamajoritygroupofroughly55 percentthatmaintains anonresistanceattitude toward the war. Theyeitherconveydeclarativesupport,butwith reservations(22–25percent),or shyaway from declarative supportaltogether(30percent).This nonresistance groupmaintainsa range of lukewarm attitudes toward the war,neither particularlysympathizingwith itnoropposingit.Asa result,whenever we deal with open and directattitudes of support or opposition,theblocof supporters of the war (the35–38 percentcoregroup)endsup beingthree to four timeslarger than theblocof those who openly oppose the war.This isexplained by the fact thatexpressing direct opposition to the war is muchmorecostlythanexpressing direct supportfor it.
We can glean a third majority from those same data.About55 percent of those who responded topollstersholdviewsthat cannot be described as pro-war. We can put together thisnon-pro-war groupfromthose who conveyeddeclarativesupportbut with reservations(22–25percent),those who didnot express anyview (20 percent),and those who openly opposedthe war (10 percent).
To wrap this up, the three majorities arethe group that expresses declaratory support for war(60 percent),thenonresistance group(about 55 percent),andthe non-pro-war group (about 55 percent).These three sets overlap.
TheNationof Half-Supporters
Finally,onemorestudy sheds light on the structure ofRussia’spublic opinion regarding the war. A group of independent sociologists from the Public Sociology Laboratory conducted in-depth interviews with respondents over the course of thispastyear. A total of about 300 interviews wererecorded. The latest waveof interviewsat the end of 2022 focused on the positions of those who are more likely to support the war.
Thedemonstrates that mass surveys (including those referred toabove) are unlikely to provideadefinitive answer to the question of whether Russians support the war. In-depth interviewsreveala large groupof people whosimultaneously support and do not support the war. Their attitudes toward the war areapatchworkofcontradictions,a mixed bagof narratives from both sides. In other words, it would be accurate to speak ofasignificant group of Russians whose attitude toward the war contains moresupportthan opposition to it and of a significant group of Russians whose attitude toward the war contains more opposition than support for it. As repeated interviews have shown,the ratios of support and opposition in these groupsare fluid: respondents do not change their views radically, but the focus on arguments of support or nonsupport may shift depending on the circumstances.Attempts to define clear-cut groups do not take us far.
This situationis notunusual. Amedianrespondent’s viewsare ofteninconsistent. In this case, however,this inconsistencyis associated with a high level of polarization of the two spaces—the official media and speakers insideRussia andtheindependent and antiwar media and speakers outside Russia. The antiwar rhetoric ofthose inthe secondspaceis imbued with the spirit of a total break with the regimeand is therefore unacceptable to people insidethe country, for whomadopting that spiritwould mean moving into a state of confrontation withtheregime.
One way or another, the most important conclusion to draw here is that while the Putin regime has managed to maintain an "imposed consensus" around the war in Russian public space, in reality,the "support for the war" of the median electorate is internally contradictory, unstable, and unconsolidated. Events can lead to unexpected shifts.
The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
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About the Author
Kirill Rogov
Political Analyst, Liberal Mission Foundation
Kennan Institute
The Kennan Institute is the premier US center for advanced research on Eurasia and the oldest and largest regional program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Kennan Institute is committed to improving American understanding of Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the surrounding region though research and exchange. Read more
