澳门六合彩

BY ANDRIAN PROKIP

Since late October, numerous Western media have been reporting on Russian troops gathering on the Ukrainian border and on the risk of a major attack on Ukraine (see or ). Initially, Ukrainian officials the reports, but recently official Kyiv the risk of a Russian military attack in early 2022. The Kremlin , saying instead it was expecting provocation from Ukraine. Contradicting this official posture, however, Russia鈥檚 Security Council head Nikolai Patrushev that fire might swallow Ukraine soon and lead millions of refugees to flee the country.

Everyone is guessing at Russia鈥檚 real intentions, but very likely the amassing of troops on the border is so much muscle flexing aimed at pushing Ukraine into negotiating with the Kremlin鈥攁nd the West into supporting such negotiations.

For the Kremlin, Kyiv鈥檚 pro-Western orientation and the weakening of pro-Russian political forces in Ukraine is a problem. Russia helped the unrecognized republics in the Donbas and threatened Kyiv with war to accept 鈥減eacemaking鈥� and the fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements, expected to yield political benefits for Russia in the near future.

In 2019 the Kremlin expected that Volodymyr Zelensky鈥檚 victory in the presidential elections would change Ukraine鈥檚 agenda, making peace in the Donbas a top priority. But contrary to expectations, President Zelensky has not shown any signs of making concessions to the Kremlin. And all his attempts to establish a ceasefire regime in the Donbas in 2020 ended up in the return of active military conflict since last February, while the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk has become less and less effective.

Zelensky鈥檚 recent imposition of sanctions against Viktor Medvedchuk, member of parliament and cochair of the political party Opposition Platform鈥攆or Life, was another step toward reducing the Kremlin鈥檚 presence in Ukraine. Medvedchuk was subsequently arrested on several charges, including high treason. Medvedchuk, whose child鈥檚 godfather is Vladimir Putin, appeared to be functioning as some sort of Kremlin ambassador to Ukraine.

Russia鈥檚 strong network of influence in Ukraine has led the Kremlin to persevere, however. Just as in early 2020, when the Security Service of Ukraine on the Russian footprint in the increasing public protests against rising gas prices and communal tariffs, the SSU today is Russian support of the anti-vaccination movement in Ukraine and public protests against the authorities. Russia has also started playing the card in Ukraine.

But these efforts are not enough to put Ukraine in Russia鈥檚 pocket. To gain at least partial control of Ukraine, the Russian authorities need to achieve two intermediate goals: to have stronger pro-Russian political forces in Ukraine and to weaken the West鈥檚 support for Ukraine.

The pro-Russian political opposition in Ukraine can start blocking pro-European reforms, so much disliked by the Kremlin. And implementation of the Minsk Agreements as they are currently designed could contribute to stalling reforms. The Minsk Agreements stipulate establishing a ceasefire and separating the opposing military forces, providing a special constitutional regime for the Donbas (with requisite amending of Ukraine鈥檚 constitution), and the holding of elections in the noncontrolled territories, with Kyiv thereafter to have control over the Russia-Ukraine border in the Donbas. In this way the Russia-backed separatists in the Donbas could become a political force in Ukraine, quite likely under the control of the Kremlin, with the chance of gaining representation in parliament and, eventually, executive power. This plausible evolution of affairs is risky for Ukraine. In particular, the stipulation that Ukraine should gain control of its state border with Russia only after elections in the Donbas is untenable, nor is there any guarantee of transparency of these elections for Kyiv. The quality of elections conducted under the Kremlin鈥檚 control was well demonstrated on the status of Crimea, when approved integration with the Russian Federation in a plebiscite held in the midst of a heavy Russian military presence.

Besides the potential political benefits to be realized with implementation of the Minsk Agreements, the Kremlin expects to solve an economic problem. Ukraine鈥檚 implementation of the Agreements would reduce Russia鈥檚 defense spending on the Donbas and decrease the financial burden for the Kremlin.

Another problem with the current design of the Minsk Agreements is legal: if implemented, the Agreements would violate the Ukrainian constitution and legislation. Viktor Shyshkin, an outstanding lawyer, the first general prosecutor, and a former member of the Constitutional Court, has many times as to why these Agreements are void. Among the core counterarguments to the Minsk Agreements is the need for any international accord to be approved by the Verkhovna Rada (this was not done since the Agreements were signed); further, amendments to Ukraine鈥檚 constitution cannot flow from an international agreement.

In short, implementation of the Minsk Agreements would violate Ukrainian law and most probably provoke mass protests comparable with the Euromaidan of 2013鈥�2014. Russia鈥檚 interventions in Ukraine stepped up considerably after the Euromaidan, on the excuse of Russia wanting to protect and . In the case of new mass protests, no one can be sure that the Russian government will not leverage the same reasons to invade Ukraine again.

The threat of a Russian attack on Ukraine appears to be an attempt to push Kyiv to implement the Minsk II Agreements. Moreover, the threat coincides with the start of winter, for which Ukraine鈥檚 energy sector is poorly prepared. Ukraine to stock the necessary supplies of coal before winter and may face energy shortages. So this winter Ukraine on electricity, coal and oil products from Belarus and Russia, and hence will be more vulnerable to energy blackmailing.

Certain in the United States believe their government should pressure Kyiv to follow the Minsk Agreements instead of making Russia pay for annexing Crimea and prosecuting the war in the Donbas. Such actions pose serious risks to Ukraine鈥檚 stability. Far from representing a solution, they could instead reopen a Pandora鈥檚 box of conflicts in Eastern Europe.

Both fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements and their nonfulfillment create huge risks for Ukraine. Both negative scenarios can be avoided by amending the Agreements. The amendments should include a refusal of Donbas autonomy and a change in the timeline of the Agreements鈥� implementation: the Ukrainian government should insist on first gaining control of the Russia-Ukraine border, and hold local elections only after peace and stability are achieved in the region. Tertium datur, actually: it just needs more diplomatic efforts.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.