澳门六合彩

When it comes to the future of Russia,聽one聽set of聽questions聽bothers people both within the country and beyond. It聽boils聽down to these:聽Will聽Russia聽curb its expansionist ambitions? Will the empire fall apart?聽Will Russia stop being a threat to the world?

Stopping聽Russia鈥檚聽war聽of aggression against Ukraine聽is a necessary step in order to get a yes on all three, but hardly sufficient.聽

The聽imprisoned聽opposition聽leader聽Alexey Navalny聽wrote an聽聽on the subject. Garry Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, exiled politicians, published their own聽s聽on the same theme. Even before the invasion, Leonid Gozman, a politician who was聽briefly聽imprisoned and聽subsequently聽left Russia,聽聽at length the importance of dismantling Russia鈥檚 imperialistic foreign policy. Countless聽Russian 茅migr茅s in the聽former Soviet republics (essentially former聽colonies),聽and dissidents聽who remain in Russia聽talk about聽it聽all the time (although not enough,聽according to their neighbors from the former聽republics).聽



There is a pattern to this聽response. Only emigrants, who are safely beyond the grasp of the regime, and dissidents, who are within its grasp but choose bravely to defy it, can discuss聽a future post-imperial Russia out loud and聽without self-censorship. For that reason,聽emigrants and dissidents聽are ones whom foreign media most often approach for interviews. After all, they are the only Russians willing to speak at all.聽They are also perceived as representative of another Russia, a benign聽and聽forward-looking聽version of the country.聽

My聽problem is that聽I doubt that聽this聽other Russia exists.聽Or,聽to put聽it differently, it聽is too early to聽tell聽whether聽Russia is capable of genuine change.

Inherent Imperialism?

Many emigrants, of course, are experts in their respective fields, while some are experts in Russian studies. They are good at communicating knowledge.聽But hands-on knowledge of Russian politics and society is rapidly dwindling owing聽to a lack of access. And emigrants鈥� judgment is often clouded:聽they聽look at their country through glasses tinted by ideological preferences, possibly bitterness, and,聽frequently,聽the聽expectations of聽the聽host聽society.

What about those who remain in Russia yet have spoken out on the subject? Alexey Navalny is deservedly the best known among them,聽but he聽is not the only one. These courageous people every day save聽the聽faces of all the rest鈥攖hose who have fled and those who keep silent. Unlike the emigrants, they聽have some chance聽to actually affect Russian politics one day, which is why the outside world pays attention to whatever they have to say.

As a Russian, I immensely admire Navalny鈥攏ot only for his courage but for his incredible ability to change. His writings, his behavior, and his intonations today bring to mind Nelson Mandela. In his latest ,聽Navalny reiterated that his strategic goal was to build a Russia that is unwilling to start wars and finds no profit in waging them. He聽went聽on to say that a future Russia must recognize the borders of Ukraine as they were designated in 1991. That includes Crimea and all the other Ukrainian territories currently occupied by Russia. Navalny also said that聽a future Russia must pay reparations and make amends. 聽

Yet many politicians from聽Russia鈥檚 former colonies do not trust him. He was known for nationalist views, they say, and he was once ambiguous on the question of Crimea. According to them, he is just another incarnation of the same imperialistic evil in a new wrapper. The disagreement聽over Navalny (and the possibility of聽a聽nonexpansionist Russia at all) comes down to the question,聽has he truly changed?鈥攁聽question that is notoriously impossible to answer about anyone, anywhere. Whatever admiration I personally have for Navalny, his critics have聽a point.

There were at least two cases in Russian history when legacy regimes fell and the country completely changed. In 1917聽the聽Romanovs were replaced by the Provisional Government and then by Bolsheviks, all聽within a span of seven months. In 1991聽the Soviet Union fell. What happened to expansionist reflexes after opposition figures replaced their predecessors?

The short answer is,聽nothing. The聽Provisional聽Government quickly became the main warmonger in an empire fed up with war. Aleksandr Kerensky聽became聽head of the聽Provisional聽Government by literally advertising the war. It took Vladimir Lenin, who came to power on the promise of unconditional peace, just a few years to restore the empire almost to its full extent. Boris Yeltsin was sponsoring the war in Abkhazia just a few months after he co-signed the聽document聽dissolving聽the USSR. It seems that whoever slays the dragon quickly grows his own scales.聽

The Myth of Two Russias

This observation is not mine. I first聽encountered聽it in an article by the Georgian historian Otar Janelidze. Aptly titled聽鈥�,鈥澛爄t offers an outside view on the question that bothers so many people in Russia too. Is there another Russia? Janelidze observes that聽at聽almost聽any point in the history of Georgian-Russian relations, there was a sizable fraction in Georgia that sought to find a friendly counterpart in Russia. If a governor was bad, then perhaps the emperor might prove benevolent. If the emperor was senseless, maybe聽the聽intelligentsia could be an ally. Surely the revolutionaries could be relied on to share Georgians鈥櫬爈ove聽of聽freedom! But every time, the hope was in vain. Governors colluded with the court, the intelligentsia didn鈥檛 give a damn about Georgian freedom and culture, and revolutionaries quickly turned into oppressors. Whatever happened in the metropole, the colonies just kept suffering.

It was true throughout the empire. At a demonstration in Warsaw during the 1830鈥�31 Polish uprising, people carried banners with the words 鈥淔or our freedom and yours.鈥澛營t was written in both Polish and Russian and was meant, in part, to extend support to the Decembrists鈥攎embers of the Russian upper class who rebelled against the tsar and were hanged or sentenced to hard labor in Siberia. You聽get your freedom聽and we get ours, they seemed to say. But the nice gesture was far from mutual. Even聽though many exiled Decembrists supported the Polish cause, the majority of liberal-minded Russians took pride in Russia quelching the uprising. For the next many decades, the only people to support the independence of Poland聽were either emigrants (like Aleksander聽Herzen) or prisoners. This pattern does not change in Russia.聽

Whoever is actually involved in Russian politics, if and when this war is lost, will have聽to deal with a host of internal problems:聽a聽crumbled economy, reparations,聽the聽veterans鈥櫬爈obby, rising crime, and elusive public support. Ending imperialism would not be a high priority, even for the most anticolonial types. So it is too early to believe even the most honest Russian politician predicting that 聽Russia will genuinely change.

But if the world cannot believe the emigrants and the dissidents, and聽the rest are silent, who聽can be聽believed? If Russia is going to聽truly聽change, the answer is pretty obvious. We will know it聽is changing when the ideas about Russia鈥檚 future start to come from new sources. Not just from Moscow or Berlin聽but from聽the republics within聽Russian Federation鈥檚聽current borders,聽from their separatist politicians, as well as from聽the聽former Soviet republics, demanding聽a聽revision of history.聽And from聽the聽politicians who do聽not want to take office in Moscow because Moscow, in their opinion, should be abroad. When聽the聽Kremlin,聽with its good or bad inhabitants, ceases to be the guarantor of the security of the conquered people.聽

Judging from what I see, it is already happening.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.