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Opposition Divided over History Leading to Putin

Maxim Trudolyubov

It was Russia鈥檚 president Boris Yeltsin and members of his circle who made the crucial mistakes and engaged in intentional acts of corruption that put Russia on its present aggressive trajectory. This, in a nutshell, is the message of a聽 (in Russian, with English subtitles) written and presented by Maria Pevchikh, the head of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF).聽

The film is a recent installment in Russia鈥檚 soul-searching about the reasons for the Kremlin鈥檚 turn toward repression domestically and aggression abroad. The first episode of the film, focusing on Boris Yeltsin鈥檚 inner circle, has stirred controversy within Russia鈥檚 independent and opposition circles, particularly along generational lines.

The documentary aims to carry on the legacy of Alexei Navalny, the ACF's founder, who died aged forty-seven under suspicious circumstances in a remote penal colony. Many of Navalny鈥檚 supporters believe his death was聽 by Putin鈥檚 regime.

Navalny鈥檚 View of the 1990s聽

Introspection into Russia鈥檚 post-Soviet trajectory was something Navalny focused on during his final years. Last August he wrote a piece titled聽 that was devoted to Russia鈥檚 elites of the 1990s, those public officials, business leaders, and talking heads who dominated the era and called themselves 鈥渞eformers,鈥 鈥渄emocrats,鈥 and 鈥渋ndependent journalists.鈥

鈥淚 hate the con artists whom we, for some reason, used to call reformers,鈥 Navalny wrote, naming among his targets Boris Yeltsin;聽, the father of the 1990s controversial privatization program;聽, the former editor in chief of the now-defunct Echo of Moscow; and聽, a socialite and 2018 spoiler presidential candidate.聽

Navalny鈥檚 stance was at the time viewed as extreme because the people he held responsible for Russia鈥檚 ultimate moral catastrophe were counted among Russia鈥檚 progressives. Nobody idealized them, but they were deemed the only ones available to steer Russia toward some level of democracy and peaceful economic development.聽

Yet Navalny kept saying in his聽 before his 2021 arrest and in his notes from prison that the roots of the current dictatorship were planted during the years when Russia was still expected to join the democratic world. 鈥淭hey have wasted our democratic future for villas on the island of St. Barts for Tania and Valia,鈥 Navalny聽, referring to Yeltsin鈥檚 daughter聽 and her husband,聽, the author of Yeltsin鈥檚 two-volume autobiography.聽

The Film鈥檚 Portrayal of the 1990s

Maria Pevchikh, the current head of the ACF, doubled down on this reading of Russia鈥檚 post-Soviet history and focused on Yumashev,聽, and聽, among others, as the main villains of the 1990s.

One important feature of Navalny鈥檚 reasoning was that he did not exclude himself from those he blamed for Russia鈥檚 failure. Navalny admitted that he used to support Yeltsin, the first democratically elected leader in Russia鈥檚 history. Navalny said he did everything he could to ignore 鈥渢he fake presidential election of 1996,鈥 in which Yeltsin, sick and ineffective, was reelected. 鈥淣ow we are paying for the fact that in 1996 we thought that election fraud was not always a bad thing. The end justified the means,鈥 Navalny wrote.聽

Maria Pevchikh鈥檚 reading of Russia鈥檚 recent history has little humility of that kind. In her depiction, things turned sour during Yeltsin鈥檚 first steps as president and have been going south ever since. Yeltsin chooses a residential building on the outskirts of Moscow to house himself and his closest colleagues. He agrees that the country鈥檚 most watched television channel鈥擮RT, the future Channel One鈥攆alls into the hands of a Kremlin-connected businessman because the unpopular Yeltsin wants to get reelected. He approves of the loans-for-shares scheme that gets some funds for the cash-strapped government but gives up chunks of Soviet assets to well-connected insiders.

Each of these actions could be viewed with varying degrees of reprobation. The Yeltsin people鈥檚 dealings with Channel One probably constituted fraud even under Russia鈥檚 then chaotic legislation. The loans-for-shares scheme was聽, and, of course, the 1996 election outcome was heavily affected by massive funding violations and a campaign of PR pressure on the voters.

Hindsight Is 20/20

If we were discussing the 1990s from the comfort of a democratic and peaceful Russia, we would probably treat those events as growing pains. Yeltsin鈥檚 choosing an unfinished construction project for himself and his friends would be seen as an awkward holdover from the nomenklatura past, not a harbinger of things to come. Similarly, the Channel One incident would be deemed disgraceful, but in the context of a reformed Russia,聽complete with truly independent media, it would be seen as a relic of the totalitarian grip on the media.聽

Writing in 2010, the political scientist Daniel Treisman presented a聽 of the loans-for-shares affair. In his view, the scheme was indeed corrupt in its execution. Yet Treisman stressed the fact that during the late 1990s, the loans-for-shares companies performed far better than similar companies that remained state owned. 鈥淭he聽dramatic output increases of the oligarch firms helped fuel Russia鈥檚 impressive growth after 1999,鈥 Treisman聽.

The 1996 presidential election鈥攖he first ever to take place in a sovereign Russia (in 1991, Yeltsin won his post in a Russia that was still part of the Soviet Union)鈥攚as marred by significant irregularities. Independent Western observers highlighted pervasive pro-Yeltsin bias in the Russian media. Massive campaign funding violations and administrative pressure on other candidates were reported too. 鈥淵et that election appeared largely 鈥榝ree and fair鈥 in regards to the administration of voting and vote-counting,鈥 Graham Allison and Matthew Lantz of the Kennedy School of Government聽 at the time.

Reevaluating these events from the perspective of a more democratic Russia would likely yield a different understanding. That election could be seen as Russia鈥檚 first step on a stairway to democracy, not the first step on its descent into corruption and aggression.

History Written by the Aggrieved

The film caused a heated debate among Russia鈥檚 independent community, whose members enjoy freedom of speech mostly by virtue of being abroad. Many of those who were active in the 1990s and early 2000s expressed their disagreement with the choice of facts presented as crucial for Russia鈥檚 democratic failure. 鈥淭he filmmakers did not falsify anything. They have flattened the picture.鈥 It鈥檚 a flattened, one-dimensional view,鈥 the journalist Sergey Parkhomenko聽 on his social media.

The writer Viktor Shenderovich聽 an important observation: 鈥淭his is a view from those who were children during the 1990s [the film鈥檚 author, Maria Pevchikh, was born in 1987].鈥 Yes, they have shown only one aspect of the story, Shenderovich continued, but dismissing the author鈥檚 position because she did not really witness the events is wrong. This is that generation鈥檚 general view of what our generation has wrought (Shenderovich was born in 1958). 鈥淭he results are obvious. A crushing defeat. We don鈥檛 have to agree with their view but we must accept their right to hold it,鈥 Shenderovich said.

In the 1990s, Russia was an institutional desert. Few constraints existed that would have prevented insiders from rigging the system to their advantage. Those who became known as oligarchs maximized their profits by any means possible. These were human as well as institutional failures. The next generation鈥檚 task was to create an independent judiciary, to make sure elections were free and fair, to reform the penitentiary system. Under Putin, these crucial reforms were purposefully stalled.

The question is to what extent the events of the 1990s predetermined Russia鈥檚 aggressive pivot under Putin. The kind of reading of history that the film relies on is defined by where we stand now. The adage 鈥渉istory is written by the victors鈥 captures only a fraction of the biases in historical narratives. Often, history is written by those who see the events of the past as necessarily leading to a specific outcome鈥攊ncluding those aggrieved by this outcome. In those cases, it is not quite history but more of a pamphlet on the past.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

About the Author

Maxim Trudolyubov

Maxim Trudolyubov

Senior Advisor; Editor-in-Chief, Russia File;
Editor-at-Large, Meduza

Maxim Trudolyubov is a Senior Fellow at the Kennan Institute and the Editor-at-Large of Meduza. Mr. Trudolyubov was the editorial page editor of Vedomosti between 2003 and 2015. He has been a contributing opinion writer for The International New York Times since the fall of 2013. Mr. Trudolyubov writes The Russia File blog for the Kennan Institute and oversees special publications.

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Kennan Institute

The Kennan Institute is the premier US center for advanced research on Eurasia and the oldest and largest regional program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Kennan Institute is committed to improving American understanding of Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the surrounding region though research and exchange.  Read more