澳门六合彩

Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an聽and Vladimir Putin, both shunned by the West, are working on major weapons and nuclear energy deals that might grow into a long-term partnership between the two nations, Russia and Turkey.

Russian president Vladimir Putin paid an official two-day visit to Ankara, Turkey, on April 3, 2018. Presidents Erdogan and Putin blessed the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) project at the official groundbreaking ceremony on April 3. The Akkuyu project, scheduled to be completed by 2023, will be Turkey鈥檚 first nuclear power plant. The Russian state nuclear company is in charge of the funding, construction, and operation of the project. The Akkuyu NPP is 搁辞蝉补迟辞尘鈥檚 first project under the 鈥淏uild, Own, Operate鈥� scheme. So Russia will own and operate the plant, and effectively sell power to Turkey. The $20 billion Akkuyu NPP, with a capacity of 4,800 MW, is expected to provide of Turkey鈥檚 electricity needs.

搁辞蝉补迟辞尘鈥檚 in nuclear power projects has been turning into a viable tool to drive Russian influence abroad. In contrast to the oil and gas exports used by Russia to serve foreign policy objectives mainly in Europe, the powerful nuclear power industry enables the Kremlin to pursue its goal globally, from Latin America to Africa and elsewhere. In that context, along with the complex details and major commercial nature of the , the Akkuyu project represents a long-term strategic engagement between Russia and Turkey. Indeed, the plant鈥檚 period of service is 60 years, extendable by another 20 years.

Vladimir Putin thanked Turkey for granting the project strategic investment status. Yet, as part of the project, Russian academic institutions are providing field-specific and higher education to Turkish students, who will work for the Akkuyu project specifically and the nuclear industry in general. Furthermore, although Ankara had officially pursued developing its nuclear industry with the signing of an agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy with the United States in 1955, little progress had been made until the deal with Russia. And Turks have the United States and other countries as the most significant obstacle to Turkey鈥檚 nuclear ambitions rather than a partner in achieving them. It is in this context that President Putin summed up the significance of the Akkuyu project by , 鈥淚n聽fact, today we are not simply present at聽the聽construction of聽the聽first Turkish nuclear power plant, we are witnessing the聽laying of聽the聽groundwork for聽Turkey鈥檚 nuclear industry. We are creating a聽new industry.鈥�

A partnership between the two countries has also emerged in the sphere of defense technology. Putin and Erdogan have on the early delivery of Russian-made S-400 air defense systems to Turkey, as early as October 2019, rescheduled from the initially planned 2020. Ankara and Moscow finalized the $2.5 billion Russian-Turkish agreement on the purchase of S-400s in 2017. Under the , Turkey is to pay 45 percent of the cost up front, while Russia is to provide a loan to cover the remaining 55 percent. A striking point of the deal is that the loan will be issued in Russian rubles, not U.S. dollars鈥攖he first time Turkey has taken such a step, to Erdogan. The S-400 deal has raised among the United States and other members. However, NATO members and Bulgaria have purchased S-300 systems, an earlier version of the S-400s.

A key aspect of the S-400 deal is that Turkey seeks to ensure domestic production of the systems. This means a certain level of transfer of related technologies or know-how to Turkey. Moreover, Russia offers a more flexible deal than Turkey could realize on NATO or U.S. defense systems, which impose on where the equipment is to be deployed and against what kind of targets it can be used, and limitations on access to specific security codes. Overall, the S-400 agreement epitomizes Ankara鈥檚 plans to diversify its defense capabilities away from NATO. Therefore, the deal also foreshadows a long-term Russian-Turkish partnership in the military sphere.

In another example of Turkey acting outside the usual province of established Western institutions, the Iranian, Russian, and Turkish presidents held trilateral talks in Ankara on April 4 as part of the Astana process to try to resolve the Syrian conflict. Though the meeting was hosted by Turkey, a long-term NATO ally of the United States, it was not held under the auspices of the UN or the EU. 鈥淭his is the first time since the Second World War that a meeting like this was held without the approval of the UN. They are determining Syria鈥檚 future without any American representative,鈥� Israeli defense minister Avigdor Liberman said, astounded.

The new relations rest somewhat uneasily. Though Ankara has partnered with Moscow and Tehran in leading the Astana process, controversies and disagreements persist among the three governments. Indeed, a few days after Putin鈥檚 visit to Turkey, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov that Ankara should hand over control of Syria鈥檚 Afrin region, which is currently controlled by the Turkish armed forces, to Damascus. Erdogan immediately slammed the idea. Moreover, Erdogan unambiguously the recent U.S.-led strikes against Syria while Moscow staunchly them, charging they demonstrated 鈥渂latant disregard for the international law.鈥�

Therefore, the future of Russian-Turkish relations may be hobbled by where each country ends up in the Syrian conflict. But for now, Turkey鈥檚 noninstitutionalized relations with Russia are burgeoning, whereas its institutionalized relations with the West are deteriorating. And that is taking place because of the will of Putin and Erdogan to find compromises to problems that impede progress in bilateral relations.

During the Cuban crisis, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Raymon A. Hare described Turks as people who 鈥渄on鈥檛 understand the concept or process of ,鈥� characterizing 鈥渢his Turkish quality as the greatest asset to the U.S. and to the West.鈥� That perception appeared to change radically with Erdogan鈥檚 of apology to Putin following the downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkish defense forces. Two factors must be considered, however, in understanding that change and Ankara鈥檚 strategic pivot toward Moscow. On the one hand, from Ankara鈥檚 perspective, the U.S.-led West takes for granted Hare鈥檚 鈥渦ncompromising nature鈥� of Turks. Indeed, the West鈥檚 position on Turkey鈥檚 EU membership bid and on the Kurdish dimension of the Syrian conflict has flown in the face of Ankara鈥檚 interests. On the other hand, Vladimir Putin to understand Turkey鈥檚 sensitivities on such matters, and moves accordingly to attract Ankara.