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The political dynamics of Moldova’s recent  and the players involved in it reflect a larger picture of societies straddling the East-West divide. Countries like Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine find themselves at various stages of a quest for self-determination—against the background of bitter domestic debates and heavy international pressures.

Moldova, a country with an $18 billion economy and a population of 2.4 million in government-controlled territories (excluding the breakaway, effectively Russian-controlled region of Transnistria), may often stay off the front pages and daily TV news, but it stands as a crucial example of a struggling democracy. 

In last Sunday’s vote, current president Maia Sandu, a pro-EU and pro-West candidate, secured the most votes (42 percent) but not enough to claim an outright victory. A second round is scheduled in two weeks, and her chances depend on whether the fractured forces opposing her will unite against her.

Moldova’s Divides

The election also included a referendum to enshrine EU integration in the constitution of Moldova as a strategic national goal—a move designed to make the European path irreversible, following the precedent set by Ukraine and Georgia. However, support for the EU constitutional amendment was , with just 50.4 percent voting in favor.

Authorities and independent journalists have attributed the underwhelming support to an alleged influence operation led by Ilan Shor, a fugitive businessman facing corruption charges in Moldova and currently residing in Russia. Shor is believed to manage a network of paid supporters who voted for minor candidates and against EU integration, effectively diluting the pro-EU vote.

The existence of this interference operation was not lost on Moldova’s authorities. Two weeks before election day, anti-corruption prosecutors and police raided the offices of Shor’s point men in Moldova. “Persons affiliated with the criminal organization led by Ilan Shor, were instructed to recruit people to participate in the elections in exchange for money, to be notified on the eve of the elections through groups in the Telegram app about the candidate to be voted as well as to vote with the option ‘no’ in the Referendum,” the police .

“A president has never been elected in Moldova in the first round, and this time is no exception,”  Mikhail Sirkeli, director of the independent news site Nokta. “But this time massive voter bribery exacerbated the effect.” , before the elections, compensation and financial assistance were distributed to approximately 130,000 people in all, with $15 million distributed in September alone. These payments were facilitated through accounts at the Russian bank Promsvyazbank and other schemes. 

Sandu’s main opponent is Alexandr Stoianoglo, the former prosecutor general, who claims he was removed from office illegally. Stoianoglo, running as the Socialist Party’s candidate, won 26 percent of the vote—significantly more than the polls predicted. “Virtually all parties in Moldova, except for Maia Sandu’s PAS, have ties to either the Kremlin or local oligarchs, some of whom have Kremlin connections too,” Sirkeli . “Their representatives frequently travel to Moscow and engage with officials there, including those actively promoting the war against Ukraine.”

Fundamental Similarities

The challenges confronting Moldovan society are not unique to this nation. This landlocked country, a former Soviet republic, sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine, exemplifies the broader dilemmas faced by societies caught between Russia and the West.

A case in point is the South Caucasus republic of Georgia, which is a relatively small country too (3.7 million, GDP $33 billion). On the surface, Georgia’s situation appears different from Moldova’s. The current ruling party cooperates with the Kremlin, as evidenced by its sponsorship of foreign-agent legislation modeled after Moscow’s and its willingness to  to individuals undesirable to the Russian government. 

In contrast, Georgian society has been pivoting to the West for the past fifteen years, ever since the 2008 . According to a 2023 poll by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), nearly 80 percent of those polled  for Georgia’s accession to the EU. Support for joining NATO also remains strong, with 67 percent in favor, although this figure has declined from a high of 81 percent a decade ago. Georgia holds parliamentary elections later this week, where all of those issues will be on the ballot.

The two countries’ stories seem different, but they share fundamental similarities. The stakes, the choices a society faces, and the types of political actors involved are all comparable. In both cases a former communist country, effectively nonaligned, with extensive historical, political, and economic ties to Russia aspires to closer ties with the West. Both countries live with breakaway, Russian-controlled territories—Transnistria in Moldova’s case and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia’s. There is an elite, often closely connected to the Kremlin. There is a society that is navigating its own path, making difficult political and cultural choices as it evolves. 

This constellation of factors creates fertile ground for Russian intervention. Some of these factors—societal indecision, gradual evolution, generational divides, polarization along the East-West geopolitical divide, and economic challenges—are inherent in their historical and geographic circumstances. Others, such as the existence of estranged territories, corrupt and captured elites, and the influence of Russian state-controlled propaganda, are the Kremlin’s deliberate contributions to the uncertainty. 

All of these features of a society straddling the Russia-West divide have been present in Ukraine, but to a more extreme degree. The Kremlin has punished Ukrainian society’s struggle for self-determination with the annexation of Crimea and a full-scale invasion. The same polarization, generational divides, and historical ties to Russia that affect Moldova and Georgia have played out more violently in Ukraine, illustrating the severe risks and consequences these societies face when trying to assert their independence. 

A Way to Think about Russia’s Interventions

One way to approach this is to assume that Moscow will attempt to intervene in any country, but some will be more resistant than others. The most at risk and in need of support are former Soviet republics, such as Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and, of course, Ukraine. These countries have deep historical, political, and economic ties to Russia, yet they are also struggling democracies aspiring to strengthen their ties with the West. 

They grapple with Russian-controlled breakaway territories that Moscow uses as leverage to maintain instability. Some representatives of their political elites often have Kremlin connections and serve as Kremlin point men on the ground. Societal factors such as generational divides, polarization along the East-West geopolitical fault line, and pervasive corruption are features easy to amplify from abroad. Economic challenges and underdevelopment make these nations dependent on outside support, while Russian propaganda and media influence continue to shape public opinion. Together, these features make these countries particularly vulnerable to destabilization and manipulation. 

Countries with fewer of these vulnerabilities are less susceptible to Russia’s interventions. Those that have strong civil societies, functioning democratic institutions, control of corruption, and a clear commitment to the rule of law are better equipped to resist external meddling. When political elites are not entangled in corrupt dealings or influenced by Kremlin ties, they are more likely to prioritize national interests over external pressures. Furthermore, diversified international partnerships reduce reliance on any single foreign power, making these nations less vulnerable to manipulation. Ultimately, the strength of government and democratic institutions and the integrity of the political class are key factors that contribute to a country’s ability to withstand Russian interference.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.