澳门六合彩

This week Vladimir Putin was given a chance to address Western audiences from the comfort of his Kremlin office.听The American TV presenter Tucker Carlson听 with Russia鈥檚 president and circulated it through his social media.听Russia's state-run media made a spectacle out of Carlson's visit to Moscow, reminiscent of the events staged by Soviet propaganda during the visits of Western figures in the Stalin or Khrushchev eras.

The Gist of the Putin Interview

The conversation could be broken down into three major blocks. In answering Carlson鈥檚 question about any immediate threats that might have provoked his invasion of Ukraine, Putin launched into a twenty-minute lecture about his version of Russia鈥檚 and Ukraine鈥檚 history. There is of course a wealth of literature, both academic and popular, offering听 on the histories of the two countries. Carlson did not reference any of these alternatives and simply recorded Putin's well-rehearsed monologue.

In the second large chunk of the conversation Putin delved into his other favorite subject, the treachery of the West. He repeated his version of the 鈥渘ot one inch鈥� story, in which the West promises not to expand NATO into the formerly Soviet-controlled countries and then expands it anyway. This myth has been debunked many times, including in an听 based on declassified records of the conversations in question. Carlson did not challenge Putin鈥檚 presentation.

The third part of the interview mainly revolved around Putin鈥檚 account of Russia鈥檚 war against Ukraine, which, in his telling, is not Russia鈥檚 war at all. Putin reiterated that Russia is trying to stop the war launched against it by a Western-controlled Ukraine. The interviewer did not raise any obvious objections to this narrative.

Overall, Putin was given ample opportunity to lay out his talking points without opposition. He presented himself as a peacemaker opposed by warmongers of the West. He referred to Ukraine鈥檚 2014 Revolution of Dignity as a 鈥渃oup d'茅tat鈥� and claimed that Ukraine was effectively ruled by 鈥淣azis鈥� and听in need of 鈥渄enazification.鈥� He even mentioned the 鈥溾�� conspiracy theory, suggesting a global elite ruling the world with the aim of solidifying their power, accumulating wealth, and marginalizing or eliminating others.

Russia鈥檚 Official Coverage of the Carlson Visit

Carlson鈥檚 itinerary was covered widely in the Russian press, from his arrival at the airport to his attendance at the Bolshoi Theater鈥檚 Spartacus to eating breakfast. Video footage of his movements was published everywhere, including the feeds of the state agency TASS.听

Russia鈥檚 main state-run television channel, Channel One, has announced a special documentary series titled 鈥淭ucker鈥檚 Three Days.鈥澨�

The vast majority of Russians knew absolutely nothing about Carlson just a few days ago. A TV star, and an idol of American right-wing populists, he wields influence over both his audience and politicians鈥攊n the United States. That is why Putin is interested in him.听

Carlson鈥檚 interview with Putin was dubbed a historic event well before it was aired. The state agency RIA Novosti expressed the hope that this time, a dialogue with a Western journalist would not slide into accusations against Russia.听

This treatment would be familiar to those students of Soviet history who know about the overhyped visits to Moscow by friendly dignitaries, including the writers Lion听Feuchtwanger,听Romain Rolland, or Jean-Paul Sartre. Carlson鈥檚 way of covering Putin is also reminiscent of the work of New York Times 箩辞耻谤苍补濒颈蝉迟听, who in the early 1930s听 Stalin, did not notice the famines of the time, and defended the Soviet system鈥檚 necessity.听

Carlson鈥檚 History of Russia Coverage

The Kremlin鈥檚 embrace of Carlson is understandable. On February 22, 2022, two days before the full-scale invasion, Carlson declared the conflict a 鈥渂order issue鈥� and described Ukraine as 鈥渁 client of the U.S. State Department, a puppet of Washington.鈥� At the beginning of the big war, Carlson laid off making such remarks somewhat, but he soon resumed them. In March, Mother Jones听 that the Russian Presidential Administration, in its new manual for the media, strongly recommended quoting Tucker Carlson as often as possible.

In December 2022, Carlson got to work trying to destroy Volodymyr Zelensky. 鈥淒ictator鈥� and 鈥渄angerous authoritarian ruler鈥� were only some of the epithets he used on-screen. He became the most prominent critic of American support for Ukraine.听

Trump and Carlson together raised a wave of doubt about the financing of Ukraine, this distant Eastern European country that is part of Putin鈥檚 sphere of influence. So let Putin figure out the problem! What do American taxpayers have to do with it? Step by step, Carlson has been busy moving a simple idea into mainstream perception: Ukraine is not America鈥檚 problem. Let the EU be responsible for it.

Tucker鈥檚 main thesis in recent months: Zelensky is dragging America into war. The TV personality鈥檚 goal is to humiliate not only the Ukrainian leader but also the current American one.听

Mission Accomplished, Now Back to Facts

As Donald Trump barrels toward the Republican nomination and victory in the national election in November, it makes sense for the Kremlin to try to influence Americans through Tucker鈥檚 broadcasts and tweets to make them even more critical of Ukraine. It makes sense for the Kremlin to push its false message that it is merely engaged in 鈥渄emilitarization and denazification鈥� in Ukraine, a message that has been successfully instilled in millions of Russian minds.

Putin听is not alone among political leaders who exploit historical injustices to fuel their revanchist agendas. This political strategy is not exclusive to the Russian president; it is also employed by leaders in countries such as Cuba, China, Hungary, Iran, Serbia, Turkey, and Venezuela. They consistently lament past humiliations, the absence of international recognition, external hostility, and perceived unjust border demarcations.

All in all, Carlson鈥檚 mission should probably be qualified as a success for the purposes鈥攑olitical rather than journalistic鈥攈e may have had in mind before starting on this project. One can only hope that this sort of approach will not distract Western audiences from fact-based studies and expert-supported perspectives on Russia鈥檚 current leadership.听

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.