澳门六合彩

CWIHP e-Dossier No. 55

• Introduction by Enrico Fardella

• List of Documents

 Negotiating Sino-Italian Normalization, 1968-1970 

Enrico Fardella

This e-Dossier introduces a selection of newly obtained and translated documents declassified by the Italian Foreign Ministry. The documents shed new light on the dynamics of Sino-Italian negotiations for diplomatic recognition in 1969 and 1970 and the influence of structural changes of the Cold War system on that process, namely the transformation of Chinese foreign policy vis-脿-vis Moscow and Washington.鈥�[1]

After the establishment of the People鈥檚 Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Italian government repeatedly tried to open diplomatic relations with the new leadership in Beijing, but the outbreak of the Korean War and the PRC鈥檚 exclusion from the United Nations (UN) led to the end of these early Italian initiatives. From 1950 until the beginning of 1960s, there continued to be little potential for the relationship, as Italy linked recognition to the resolution of the issue of admission of the PRC to the UN.

At the beginning of 1960s, three new factors emerged which would eventually facilitate Sino-Italian engagement: the opening of the Sino-Soviet split; de Gaulle鈥檚 courageous initiative towards Beijing; and the beginning of the center-left government in Italy. In particular, the new Italian government had a positive outlook towards the PRC and revised Italy鈥檚 previous policy, considering that any recognition of the PRC would have to come before鈥攁nd not follow鈥攁dmission to the UN in order to have any value for Beijing (See ).

In 1964, these factors led to the opening of reciprocal commercial offices in Rome and Beijing that functioned as de facto embassies, though they were not enough to achieve proper normalization between the two countries. China鈥檚 role in Indochina obstructed that possibility, and Washington did not allow the government in Rome to formally recognize a country that was confronting American soldiers in Vietnam.

At the end of 1968, however, the deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict prompted Beijing to revise its foreign policies towards Vietnam and the West.  Italian diplomats perceived these changes as a new window of opportunity for Sino-Italian normalization, and promptly reported their optimistic views to the home government ().

There were also changes in Italy that facilitated a new round of Sino-Italian exchanges. The Italian Foreign Minister and Socialist leader, Pietro Nenni, believed that the recognition of PRC could bring his party the electoral support of those frustrated by the American and Soviet interventions in Indochina and Czechoslovakia, and he publicly declared on January 1969 that he intended to recognize the PRC.

Secret talks between Italy and China shortly began in Paris, and Beijing, stimulated by Nenni鈥檚 eagerness to achieve normalization, initially proposed an ambitious set of conditions to the Italians: first, Italy would recognize the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China; second, Italy would recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan; and third, Italy would break off of relations with Taipei and support Beijing's position in the United Nations ().

A few weeks later, the rising tensions at the border with the Soviet Union and the parallel demise of the Cultural Revolution improved Beijing鈥檚 willingness to achieve a compromise with Italy, as proven by the return of key diplomat Huang Zhen to Paris ( and ).[2] Nenni, however, could not take advantage of these new events: a government crisis in July 1969 replaced him with Aldo Moro, a prominent leader of the Christian Democrats.

Moro was much more concerned than his predecessors about Washington鈥檚 reactions to Italian initiatives and their impact on the United Nations (). He, moreover, believed that Nenni had conceded too much to the Chinese ( and ). In order to give to the Italian position greater traction vis-脿-vis Beijing and Washington, Moro decided to coordinate the negotiations with the Canadians, who had also started diplomatic contacts with the Chinese ( and ).

Between the end of 1969 and summer 1970, the Chinese softened their position in the negotiations and simply asked for the recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, without any stance on the part of Italy on Chinese rights over Taiwan.  At the same time, however, the Canadians shied away from concerted action with Italy, and in October unilaterally recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China, while 鈥渢aking note鈥� of Beijing鈥檚 鈥減osition鈥� over Taiwan.

As Moro himself wrote to the Italian President Saragat, to his dismay, this left the government in Rome 鈥渨ithout cover and with no real freedom of choice as to the timing and conditions for recognition鈥� ( and ). The Chinese negotiators immediately asked Rome for the same conditions conceded by Ottawa, but the Italian diplomats managed to relax their request by taking note in the joint communiqu茅 of November 6, 1970, of the Chinese 鈥渄eclaration鈥濃�攊nstead of 鈥減osition,鈥� as in the Canadian communiqu茅鈥攁bout the PRC鈥檚 rights over Taiwan ().

It was probably a meager consolation, but sufficient enough to demonstrate Italy鈥檚 desire to obtain a more advanced compromise than Ottawa. 鈥淲e ignore the problem of Beijing鈥檚 territorial competence,鈥� the Italian ambassador Ortona wrote to the Italian desk of the U.S. State Department, 鈥渁nd simply declare that China depends on Beijing鈥檚 government and nothing else. Consequently, nothing is compromised as for possible developments towards Taiwan.鈥�[3]

If de Gaulle鈥檚 opening towards Beijing in 1964 anticipated a new era of 鈥渟ocialization鈥� between China and the West, the timing of the Italian diplomatic initiative at the end of 1968 proved to be almost as prescient: Mao鈥檚 fight against revisionism during the Cultural Revolution and its impact on the unity of the socialist bloc created the conditions for a new diversification in the international system. As noted by the Italian diplomats at the time, in fact, the emergence of China as an ideological and political force, coupled with the beginning of European political and economic unification, worked to mark the end of the bipolar era. Sino-Italian normalization anticipated this historical process and sowed the seeds of the multipolar world we live in today.[4]

Enrico Fardella is currently Bairen Jihua Research Fellow at the History Department of Beijing University  Research Associate at the Torino World Affairs Institute (TWAI), Research Scholar of the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA), and Global Fellow with 澳门六合彩.

List of Documents 

Document No. 1

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 2

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 3

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 4

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 5

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 6

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 7

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 8

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 9

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 10

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 11

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 12

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 13

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

Document No. 14

[Source: Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Joe Cali貌.]

[1] Some of these documents have already been published in Italian and Chinese in a volume edited by Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo on behalf of the Italian Senate. See: Di Nolfo, Ennio. La normalizzazione delle relazioni diplomatiche fra l鈥檌talia e la Repubblica Popolare cinese (The Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Italy and the People鈥檚 Republic of China) Collana Storia e documenti del Senato della repubblica. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010.

[2] Due to his prestige Huang Zhen had recently been appointed to the Central Committee of the CCP by the IX CCP Congress.

[3] Olla Brundu correctly noted that the Chinese were probably willing to concede more to the Italians in order to send Washington a message of flexibility on the formula of recognition. Olla Brundu, Paola. 鈥淧ietro Nenni, Aldo Moro e il riconoscimento della Cina comunista.鈥� Le Carte e La Storia 2 (2004):  44. See also Ortona, Egidio. Anni d鈥橝merica: la cooperazione, 1967-1975. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989: 259.

[4Olla Brundu correctly noted that the Chinese were probably willing to concede more to the Italians in order to send Washington a message of flexibility on the formula of recognition. Olla Brundu, Paola. 鈥淧ietro Nenni, Aldo Moro e il riconoscimento della Cina comunista.鈥� Le Carte e La Storia 2 (2004):  44. See also Ortona, Egidio. Anni d鈥橝merica: la cooperazione, 1967-1975. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989: 259.]