澳门六合彩

Upon commissioning this report on the cobalt supply chain, the Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition at the
Wilson Center stressed the need for practical recommendations for US Government action that (a) would have a
meaningful impact and (b) are well-within the realm of the possible. There is no shortage of policy reports stating, for example, 鈥淭he preponderance of global cobalt is mined the Democratic Republic of Congo鈥� and 鈥淢ost global cobalt is 鈥榩rocessed鈥欌�攈owever defined鈥攊n China.鈥� If these were the core takeaways from this work, then it would have failed.

Instead, cobalt is a tale of two markets: the 鈥淲est鈥� and the People鈥檚 Republic of China. In the former, we find
almost five decades of government and industry inertia, which has only recently begun to shift. In the latter, we find an industry-government dynamism deliberately aimed to leap-ahead of the incumbency advantages of the former. In short, cobalt is one chapter in this century鈥檚 sharp-elbowed geopolitical marathon, in which the West and China are simultaneously supplier, customer, competitor, investor, innovator, and security challenge.
Some portions of this cobalt story are unlikely to change, such as the near-centennial dominance of cobalt production in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the prevalence of security themes in US Government cobalt policy鈥攆rom 1970s-era regulations on superalloy production to more recent ones on 鈥渇oreign entities of concern鈥�. In other areas, such as critical mineral diplomacy or investment program execution, the initiative rests exclusively with the US Government.

With that in mind, this work provides an overview of cobalt market, how and by whom it is produced as well as
where and why it is consumed. This is followed by an evaluation of the role of industrial policy and price volatility in the cobalt market, highlighting China, Indonesia, and the United States. These data serve as the foundation for ten (10) recommendations, each of which has an Executive Branch component that may be implemented immediately, with follow-on supporting actions for the Congress in future authorization and appropriation cycles:

Recommendations
1. Maintain Long-Term Stability in Minerals Policy
2. Keep 鈥淣ational Defense鈥� Broad to Achieve Genuine Resilience
3. Integrate Government Incentives towards Industrial Outcomes
4. Attract Highly Qualified Foreign Talent to 鈥淣ational Priority Projects鈥�
5. Increase Cobalt Stockpiling to Ensure Emergency Access
6. Position the US Government on One Side of the Transaction
7. Leverage Trade Actions to Expand Access to Resilient Supply
8. Amend Reliable Sourcing Rules to Support Domestic Production
9. Embrace Joint Action with Allies
10. Explore a 鈥淟ease-to-Recycle鈥� Model to Reduce EV Adoption Cost