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NKIDP Working Paper #7

The Origins of North Korea-Vietnam Solidarity: The Vietnam War and the DPRK

Benjamin R. Young

February 2019

During the 1960s, the Vietnam War captured the international spotlight. Despite Pyongyang鈥檚 geographic distance from this conflict, North Korea鈥檚 founding leader Kim Il Sung felt a special connection to the Vietnamese struggle and often voiced his support for the Vietnamese communists.

The Vietnam War allowed Kim Il Sung to improve his international reputation as a man of direct action and militant vigor. By directly assisting the Vietnamese struggle, Kim enhanced his credentials as a world revolutionary leader uninhibited by the petty divisions of the Sino-Soviet split. Kim also used the Vietnam War for domestic reasons as a way to politically mobilize citizens at home and create certain favorable domestic environments for the regime. He presented the image of an embattled Vietnam as an increasingly likely future for the citizens of the Democratic People鈥檚 Republic of Korea (DPRK) if they did not rally around the leadership in Pyongyang and send military forces to stop US aggression in Southeast Asia. To borrow historian Toni Weis鈥� phrasing, the DPRK government鈥檚 solidarity with Vietnam became a means for North Koreans to affirm their support for the political system.[1] Finally, Kim also saw the war in Vietnam as a mirror image of the Korean situation and pragmatically used the conflict to gain intelligence on the South Korean military and test his pilots in wartime combat for a future conflict on Korean soil.

Despite intense scholarly interest in the Vietnam War and North Korea鈥檚 militancy, scholars have insufficiently researched Pyongyang鈥檚 Vietnam War solidarity campaign. Although many scholars have tried to tie North Korea鈥檚 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo to the Vietnam War, few have explored the vast network of ties established between the Korean Workers鈥� Party and the Vietnamese communists prior to this incident or the intense mobilization campaign undertaken domestically in the DPRK by Kim Il Sung鈥檚 regime.[2] Using North Korean state-run media, multinational archival documents, and secondary sources, this Working Paper investigates the North Korean regime鈥檚 use of the Vietnam War as a tool for mass mobilization that in turn strengthened the Kim family鈥檚 grip on domestic power.

***

Despite domestic political and economic struggles after the Korean War, Kim Il Sung remained dedicated to aiding the international revolutionary movement. When Soviet ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov met with Kim on 1 August, 1957, he told the North Korean leader that Moscow had agreed to provide North Vietnam with one billion rubles for flood aid. Not wanting to be outdone by Moscow, Kim announced that the DPRK would also provide flood assistance to Hanoi. Although North Korea鈥檚 amount of aid鈥�5,000 rubles鈥攑aled in comparison to the large Soviet aid package, Kim showed that even during times of economic difficulty his government would assist allies, especially guerilla fighters, during their times of need. Kim Il Sung told the Soviet ambassador 鈥渢hat the population of North Vietnam needed to be helped.鈥�[3] Kim remained dedicated to helping the Vietnamese communists after 1957 and later offered North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh military assistance during the Vietnam War. However, Kim Il Sung鈥檚 Vietnam War policy was not purely motivated by grand notions of international revolution. The Vietnam War proved useful in mobilizing the North Korean people, distracting them from domestic problems, and consolidating Kim Il Sung鈥檚 absolute authority within the DPRK鈥檚 political system.

From 28 November to 2 December, 1958, Kim Il Sung visited North Vietnam after a short trip to China. Ho Chi Minh welcomed Kim Il Sung to Hanoi on a very warm day and purportedly said, 鈥淲e give you the heat of our country as a gift because brotherly friendship is always warm.鈥� At a mass rally in Hanoi, Kim ended his speech by saying a few phrases in Vietnamese: 鈥淟ong live the unification of Vietnam! Long live the unification of Korea! Long live socialism! Long live world peace!鈥� The seemingly impressed Vietnamese crowd 鈥渞esponded at the top of their voices.鈥� During his trip to North Vietnam, Kim visited the Namdinh textile factory, an agricultural co-op on the outskirts of Hanoi, and the Vietnamese Military Officers鈥� School.[4] Kim鈥檚 visit to North Vietnam proved valuable for fostering close ties between the two nascent communist states.

On 27 March, 1965, the front page of the Rodong Sinmun featured the headline, 鈥淭he Korean people will provide any kind of support, including weapons, to the Vietnamese comrades and upon request will send volunteer forces.鈥� This headline was labeled as a 鈥済overnment statement.鈥�[5] This was the first time that Kim Il Sung explicitly offered military support to a foreign leader and it began a month-long cycle of articles in the Rodong Sinmun recruiting volunteers for the Vietnam War. This little known episode of North Korean internationalism proved important for Kim鈥檚 domestic and foreign policies. On one hand, Kim used the Vietnam War and the threat of a US invasion as a way to mobilize his countrymen. The recruitment efforts for Vietnam War 鈥渧olunteers鈥� were reminiscent of the Chinese volunteers for the Korean War. Just as Mao used the Korean War to push his strategy of 鈥渃ontinuous revolution,鈥� Kim Il Sung used the Vietnam War in a similar vein.[6] On the other hand, Kim demonstrated his commitment to world revolution by visibly offering Ho Chi Minh his military services. Ho covertly agreed to allow the North Korean air force to fight in the war, albeit disguised as Vietnamese aircraft.[7] Thus, the Vietnam War reflects the intersection between the domestic and foreign policies of Kim Il Sung鈥檚 regime.

Pyongyang used the Vietnam War as a way to reaffirm the North Korean peoples鈥� support for socialist internationalism. In April 1965, the North Korean press featured a barrage of letters from mass organizations, such as the Korean Unified Farm Workers鈥� Association, to the Korean Workers鈥� Party supporting the call to arms for their Vietnamese allies. The regime in Pyongyang brought the conflict in Vietnam to the front steps of North Korean factories, farms, and other work places via its print media. A 6 April, 1965, headline in the Rodong Sinmun proclaimed, 鈥淟et鈥檚 actively support the Vietnamese peoples鈥� struggle!鈥� while statements from North Korean steel mill workers and coal miners in the same section respectively announced, 鈥淪ocialist countries have the right and duty to support the Vietnamese people鈥� and 鈥淲e are all prepared to run into South Vietnam at any time.鈥� A group of workers and students from Kaesong were even more fanatical in their support for their Vietnamese comrades as they signed a pledge to assist 鈥渢he fighting Vietnamese people鈥� as a volunteer force.[8]

The DPRK鈥檚 state media also brought the Vietnam War into the North Korean home. On 7 April, 1965, the first vice chairman of the Korean Democratic Women鈥檚 Union, Kim Ok-sun, declared in a Rodong Sinmun column, 鈥淜orean women will send their husbands, sons, and daughters, as volunteer forces to support the Vietnamese people.鈥�[9] Kim Ok-sun urged the North Korean leadership to send their 鈥渂eloved husbands, sons, and daughters鈥� to the Vietnamese front 鈥渋n order to support the South Vietnamese people and women who are fighting the US imperialists.鈥� A few months later, after ROK President Park Chung Hee decided to send another division of South Korean soldiers to Vietnam, Kim Ok-sun released a statement in which she said, 鈥淭he more the US aggressors step up their dirty war machinations in Vietnam, the firmer the Korean women will stand by the heroic Vietnamese people and women and give active support and encouragement to their struggle.鈥�[10] In this case, the North Korean mother, represented in the DPRK鈥檚 propaganda as the most revolutionary female archetype, sacrifices for the collective wellbeing of the international revolutionary movement.[11]

The Korean Democratic Women鈥檚 Union proclaimed solidarity with Vietnamese women. The Vice-Chairman of the of Korean Democratic Women鈥檚 Union Choi Geum-ja traveled to North Vietnam in the mid-1960s and visited factories, mills, farms, schools, and hospitals. Choi said she was particularly moved by the 鈥渉eroic struggle of Vietnamese women.鈥� She explained, 鈥淭he women of Vietnam are unfolding an extensive Three Ready鈥檚 Movement. It is a movement to engage themselves in productive labor in place of their husbands, brothers, and sons who have gone to fight, take good care of the family members of service members, and get themselves ready to fight when necessary.鈥� Choi proudly recalled stories of selfless Vietnamese women assisting the Vietnamese struggle. For example, she fondly remembered the female workers of the Namdinh textile factory raising their production quotas despite attacks from the 鈥淯S air pirates鈥� and a 53-year old woman in Quangdinh province who secretly ferried munitions across a river forty-five times in three days despite heavy bombing.[12]

The Korean Democratic Women鈥檚 Union also sent telegrams to the South Vietnamese Liberation Women鈥檚 Union and praised 鈥渢he South Vietnamese women for taking an active part in the heroic anti-US national salvation struggle with the entire people.鈥�[13] Despite their seemingly genuine attempt to promote the importance of women in the Vietnamese struggle for national liberation, the Korean Democratic Women鈥檚 Union couched their support in language that emphasized the traditional maternal role of women during wartime. Rather than encourage Vietnamese women to take up arms, the North Koreans noted the significance of women in non-combat roles, such as in the home and the workplace. North Korea鈥檚 focus was on liberating Vietnam the nation, not the women of Vietnam.

This outpouring of support from the North Korean masses for the Vietnamese struggle, as represented in the DPRK鈥檚 state media, indigenized the threat of a US invasion and propagated the notion that Washington was intent on destroying Third World socialism. As the domestic mobilization campaign for the Vietnam War effort intensified in the DPRK, petitions to join a 鈥渧olunteer force鈥� frequently appeared in the Rodong Sinmun. On 10 April, 1965, the Rodong Sinmun reported on the continuation of petitions to fight in the Vietnam War by the people of Hyesan and Wonsan.

The mobilization campaign led up to a visit by a delegation of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front in May 1965. According to the Czechoslovak ambassador to the DPRK, the delegation 鈥渞eceived a grandiose welcome鈥� and huge gatherings were organized in Kaesong, Wonsan and Pyongyang in honor of the delegation.鈥� The delegation鈥檚 leader, National Liberation Front Central Committee member Nguyen Van Hieu, also gave a speech at the Third Supreme People鈥檚 Assembly meeting in Pyongyang. In the speech, Nguyen said:

The entire South Vietnamese people and army always draw a lofty inspiration from the powerful, enthusiastic and active assistance, material and moral, that the government of the DPRK and the fraternal Korean people have rendered and will continue to render the South Vietnamese people in their just patriotic struggle for driving out the US imperialist aggressors, liberating South Vietnam, and achieving reunification of the fatherland.

Nguyen added that the North Korean peoples鈥� 鈥渓ofty internationalist spirit of resolutely defending the world people鈥檚 revolutionary struggle and national liberation鈥� serves as a valuable lesson for South Vietnam.[14]

The Czechoslovak ambassador to the DPRK commented on the domestic situation in North Korea during this period of close Vietnamese solidarity and said, 鈥淚nstead of mobilization to accomplish work goals, all attention is focused on foreign policy issues, combat readiness and unity of Asian and African countries.鈥� He said that his 鈥渇riends,鈥� most likely referring to other Eastern European diplomats stationed in Pyongyang, also noticed that this North Korean government-led campaign was intended 鈥渢o distract people from pressing economic problems and to drown internal difficulties in similar actions.鈥�[15] Diplomats of Eastern bloc countries believed the DPRK鈥檚 Vietnam War mobilization campaign was designed to distract North Koreans from domestic issues. As the East German Embassy in Pyongyang observed in June 1965: 鈥淭here is an increasing level of war psychosis among the [North Korean] people. For instance, one advises friends not to buy a table or a wardrobe since a war is imminent.鈥�[16] The North Korean government used the Vietnam War as a means to instill fear into North Korean society. This fear united North Koreans around their 鈥淒ear Leader鈥� who supposedly protected them from US aggression.

In the summer of 1965, Kim Il Sung met North Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi in Pyongyang.[17] During their conversation, Kim offered large amounts of North Korean assistance to the Vietnamese and explained, 鈥淲e are determined to provide aid to Vietnam and we do not view such aid as constituting a heavy burden on North Korea. We will strive to ensure that Vietnam will defeat the American imperialists, even if it means that North Korea鈥檚 own economic plan will be delayed.鈥�[18] Kim鈥檚 rhetoric was backed up by action, as the East German Embassy in Pyongyang soon thereafter reported that the DPRK government had started taking out 1,000 won from North Korean workers鈥� wages in order to support the war in Vietnam.[19] Kim Il Sung also offered advice to his Vietnamese ally based on his prior experience fighting the Americans during the Korean War and stressed the importance of building underground facilities. He said, 鈥淏ased on Korea鈥檚 experience, you should build your important factories in the mountain jungle areas, half of the factories inside the mountains and half outside 鈥� dig caves and place the factories half inside the caves and half outside.鈥� Kim extrapolated on the process involved in building caves and tunnels. He explained, 鈥淏uilding a factory in a cave, such as a machinery factory, will require a cave with an area of almost 10,000 square meters. It took North Korea from 1951 to 1955-1956 to finish building its factories in man-made caves, but today we can do the work faster.鈥�

Kim offered Nghi 500 North Korean experts and workers to help the Vietnamese build caves and tunnels. Kim noted that building caves for aircraft was far more cumbersome. He said, 鈥淏uilding caves for aircraft (a regiment of thirty two jet aircraft) is much more difficult, but we have good experience in this area, and our Chinese comrades who were sent here to learn how to do this have gone back home and have successfully built such caves.鈥� North Korea鈥檚 expertise in cave and tunnel building earned them a niche within the Eastern Bloc. Even superpowers, such as China, sought North Korean assistance on these matters. After meeting with Kim, Nghi concluded in his report, 鈥淭he North Korean leaders were very honest and open; they expressed total agreement with us; and their support was very straightforward, honest, and selfless.鈥�[20] While the Czechoslovak ambassador to the DPRK viewed the North Korean government鈥檚 mobilization campaign as motivated by self-interests, Nghi relayed the message back to Hanoi that the North Koreans were entirely 鈥渟elfless鈥� and dedicated to aiding the Vietnamese struggle against the Americans.

While it is unclear if the North Vietnamese ever took up Kim Il Sung鈥檚 offer to send ground forces, North Korea did send large amounts of construction materials, tools, and automobiles to North Vietnam via Chinese railways in Fall 1965.[21] North Korea鈥檚 Foreign Economic Administration organized this arrangement with the assistance of the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang. Beijing sometimes would not charge for the use of their railways or would say the North Vietnamese needed to pay only the shipping costs.[22] As the US embassy in Moscow aptly described in November 1967, Kim Il Sung felt 鈥渢hat one鈥檚 position on Vietnam is [a] touchstone for judgment on whether one is resolutely combatting imperialism and actively supporting [the] liberation struggle.鈥�[23]

In September 1966, North Korean request to send an air force regiment to Vietnam was finally approved by Hanoi. According to an official Vietnamese People鈥檚 Army historical publication, 鈥淭he request stated that their personnel [North Korea] would be organized into individual companies that would be integrated into our air force regiments, that they would wear our uniforms, and that they would operate from the same airfields as our air force.鈥�[24] A protocol agreement signed between the two communist governments stipulated that North Korea would send enough specialists to man a Vietnamese MiG-17 company in Fall 1966 and then later in the same year, would send another group of pilots to command a MiG-17 company. If Vietnam was able to gather enough aircraft, the North Koreans would send another group of specialists in 1967 to man a MiG-21 company.[25] According to a retired North Vietnamese major general who had worked with the North Koreans, a total of eighty-seven air force personnel from the DPRK served in North Vietnam between 1967 and early 1969.[26]

The deployment of North Korean pilots to aid the North Vietnamese was kept secret to the general public until 2000.[27] However, a high-ranking North Korean defector, who previously served as vice president for North Korea鈥檚 state run news agency, told the United Nations Armistice Commission in 1967 that Kim Il Sung had secretly sent around 100 pilots to Vietnam. The French Foreign Ministry, which kept close tabs on its former colony in Southeast Asia, said this information suggests 鈥淧yongyang is not content to just verbally support the opponents of the US in Vietnam.鈥� The French also noted that 鈥淢arshal Kim Il Sung himself repeatedly recommended the sending of volunteers to Vietnam by all socialist countries鈥� and that he declared in December 1966 that North Korea was going to bring 鈥渆ven more diverse forms of active aid to the Vietnamese people.鈥� However, the French concluded, 鈥淚t seems difficult, from these too few pieces of info, to speak of a true North Korean commitment to the National Liberation Front or North Vietnamese sides.鈥�[28] During the war, the DPRK鈥檚 relatively large amounts of assistance to the Vietnamese communists were kept relatively secret.

Nonetheless, North Korea did not escape the death and destruction of the Vietnam War. Fourteen North Korean Air Force personnel died in the conflict and were subsequently buried in the Bac Giang Province of Vietnam.[29] US bombs also reportedly damaged the North Korean embassy in Hanoi on 19 May, 1967. The North Korean ambassador showcased rocket shrapnel and photos of this 鈥淯S criminal act鈥� during a 20 May, 1967, press conference as evidence of further US barbarity in Vietnam.[30] In that same month, a Soviet report described the degree of cooperation between Hanoi and Pyongyang during the war. The Soviet memo said, 鈥淭he DPRK is developing active political, economic, and cultural ties with the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] and vigorously supporting and helping fighting Vietnam.鈥� The memo explained that the DPRK had sent around one hundred pilots to North Vietnam along with large amounts of free aid in 1966.

In addition, 400 North Vietnamese students were attending universities in the DPRK on North Korean government scholarships with an additional 200 North Vietnamese students expected to arrive soon. On 12 March, 1966, teachers and students at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang held a meeting in support of the Vietnamese struggle. A Vietnamese student studying at Kim Il Sung University gave a speech at the meeting in which he said, 鈥淭he Vietnamese people will fight resolutely until they drive the US aggressors out of South Vietnam and win a final victory.鈥�[31]

However, like other Eastern European socialist countries, the Soviets saw the DPRK鈥檚 active assistance to Hanoi as being primarily motivated by self-interest. As the May 1967 Soviet memo states, 鈥淚t should be taken into account that the Korean comrades view the Vietnamese events primarily from the point of view of their possible consequences for Korea.鈥� The memo continues, 鈥淚n their opinion, the security of the DPRK, an expansion of the aggression of the American imperialists in Asia, and the prospects for the revolutionary movement in South Korea depend to a large degree on the outcome of developments of the war in Vietnam.鈥�[32]

 This observation by the Soviets was not necessarily wrong, as Kim Il Sung had previously told the Chinese that he saw the failure of US actions in Vietnam as the beginning of the end to US imperialism in Asia. In August 1965, Kim bluntly told a visiting Chinese Friendship Delegation, 鈥淚f the American imperialists fail in Vietnam, then they will collapse in Asia.鈥� Kim then went on to say, 鈥淲e are supporting Vietnam as if it were our own war. When Vietnam has a request, we will disrupt our own plans in order to try to meet their demands.鈥�[33] Kim strategically used the Vietnam War as a way to weaken the US military presence in Asia, unite his fellow countrymen around an outside threat, and display his commitment to world revolution m thereby enhancing his prestige as a leading international communist figure. In addition, Kim believed North Korea served as a useful model for postwar Vietnam. As the US embassy in Paris reported in August 1967, 鈥淜im Il Sung offers his country鈥檚 rapid reconstruction as an example to the Vietnamese whom he urges to perform a similar feat after the United States is defeated.鈥�[34] In 1967, the North Korean leader was already predicting America鈥檚 defeat and planning the postwar development of a reunified Vietnam.

In addition, there is evidence that Kim Il Sung advocated for a greater North Korean military presence in Vietnam as a way to assess South Korea鈥檚 military capabilities. A delegate of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, Nguyen Long, told a Romanian diplomat in Pyongyang that 鈥渢he North Koreans had plenty of people active in South Vietnam.鈥� Nguyen Long continued, 鈥淭hey are active in those areas where South Korean troops are operating, so as to study their fighting tactics, techniques, combat readiness and the morale of the South Korean Army, and to use propaganda against the South Koreans.鈥� According to Nguyen Long, the North Koreans wanted to send more personnel to South Vietnam but language barriers impeded communications between North Koreans and the Vietcong.[35] In an effort to portray Seoul as an inherently aggressive force in the Third World, North Korean officials would tell African governments that South Korea sent troops to Vietnam in order to start World War III.[36] However, in actuality, the Vietnam War presented a unique opportunity for Kim Il Sung in evaluating South Korea鈥檚 military without directly engaging them in an all out war on the Korean peninsula. The Vietnam War served as a useful litmus test for the North Korean military and intelligence.

***

While the North Koreans contributed relatively large amounts of aid to the Vietnamese struggle, the harmonious relationship between Hanoi and Pyongyang only lasted until the end of that conflict. Hanoi would soon grow tired of North Korea鈥檚 rigid stances in international forums and collusion with the Chinese in ousting the North Vietnamese from positions of power within the Non-Aligned Movement. However, as this working paper describes, Kim Il Sung actively assisted the Vietnamese struggle as a way to further his own interests and contribute to the world revolution. Although Ho Chi Minh did not permit Kim Il Sung to send ground forces to Southeast Asia, the North Korean leader mobilized his citizens to defend Vietnam and called for volunteers to help fight the Americans in Vietnam. This Vietnam War mobilization campaign reinforced Kim Il Sung鈥檚 authority domestically and paved the way for the consolidation of his absolute autocracy.

The views expressed in this Working Paper are the author鈥檚 alone and do not reflect the viewpoints of the US Naval War College, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.

[1] In his article on East Germany鈥檚 relations with SWAPO, Toni Weis said, 鈥淪olidarity discourse [with Africa] also became a means for GDR citizens to affirm their support for the political system.鈥� See Toni Weis, 鈥淭he Politics Machine: On the Concept of 鈥楽olidarity鈥� in East German Support for SWAPO,鈥� Journal of Southern African Studies vol. 37, no. 2 (2011), 364.

[2] For those that have tied the DPRK鈥檚 seizure of the USS Pueblo with North Korea鈥檚 support of Vietnam, see Barry K. Gills, Korea versus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 1996), 110; Yongho Kim, 鈥淣orth Korea鈥檚 Use of Terror and Coercive Diplomacy: Looking for Their Circumstantial Variants,鈥� The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 2002), 8-9; Narushige Michishita, North Korea鈥檚 Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008 (London: Routledge, 2010), 22-23; Kook-Chin Kim, 鈥淎n Overview of North Korean-Southeast Asian Relations,鈥� in Park Jae Kyu, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak, eds., The Foreign Relations of North Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987).

[3] Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 1 August 1957,鈥� AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 165-192, translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg, accessible at .

[4] 鈥淎mid Warm Welcome of Chinese and Vietnamese Friends,鈥� Korea Today No. 33, 1959 (Pyongyang: DPRK Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959).

[5] 鈥淐hos艔n inmin怒n hy艔ngjej艔ng w艔llam inminege mugir怒l mod怒n p鈥檕hamhan hy艔ngt鈥檃e怒i chiw艔n怒l tahal k艔shimy艔 yoch鈥櫯弉gi iss怒l ky艔ngue chiw艔n鈥檊un怒l p鈥檃gy艔nhan怒n choch鈥檌r怒l ch鈥檞ihal k艔shida,鈥� 27 March, 1965, Rodong Sinmun.

[6] Jian Chen, Mao鈥檚 China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

[7] Merle Pribbenow, 鈥淣orth Korean Pilots in the Skies over Vietnam,鈥� Wilson Center NKIDP e-Dossier No. 2, < /publication/north-korean-pilots-the-skies-over-vietnam > (Accessed 26 July, 2017).

[8] 鈥淲艔llam inmin怒i t鈥檜jaeng怒l ch艔kk怒ng chiji s艔ngw艔nhaja!鈥� 6 April, 1965, Rodong Sinmun.

[9] 鈥淐hos艔n ny艔s艔ngd怒r怒n namp鈥檡艔n鈥檊wa ad怒lttalt怒r怒l nambu w艔llam inmin怒l chijihan怒n chiw艔n鈥檊un怒ro tt艔na ponael k艔shida,鈥� 7 April, 1965, Rodong Sinmun.

[10] 鈥淐all for Resolute Action: Kim Ok Sun,鈥� 29 July, 1965, The Pyongyang Times.

[11] Sonia Ryang explains, 鈥淎n interesting point to note is that a revolutionized female figure is not depicted as a woman as such in North Korea鈥檚 discourse, but as a mother.鈥� See Sonia Ryang, 鈥淕ender in Oblivion: Women in the Democratic People鈥檚 Republic of Korea (North Korea),鈥� Journal of Asian & African Studies vol. 35, no. 3 (2000), 336.

[12] 鈥淔ighting Vietnam, Heroic People,鈥� 17 March, 1966, The Pyongyang Times.

[13] 鈥淕reetings to South Vietnam Liberation Women鈥檚 Union,鈥� 17 March, 1966, The Pyongyang Times.

[14] 鈥淪. Vietnamese People Are Powerful Enough to Prevail Over US Imperialism,鈥� 27 May, 1965, The Pyongyang Times.

[15] 鈥淥n the Development of Situation in DPRK in May 1965: Political Report No. 8 ,鈥� 27 May, 1965, State Central Archive, Prague, translated by Adolf Kotlik, accessible at .

[16] 鈥淩eport about Information on North Korea from 24 June 1965,鈥� 28 June, 1965, SAPMO, translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer, accessible at .

[17] Pierre Asselin, 鈥淟e Thanh Nghi鈥檚 Tour of the Socialist Bloc, 1965: Vietnamese Evidence on Hanoi鈥檚 Foreign Relations and the Onset of the American War,鈥� CWIHP e-Dossier no. 77 (November 2016), /publication/le-thanh-nghis-tour-the-socialist-bloc-1965.

[18] 鈥淟锚 Thanh Ngh峄�, 鈥楻eport on Meetings with Party Leaders of Eight Socialist Countries鈥�,鈥� 1965, 8058 鈥� 鈥淏谩o c谩o c峄 Ph贸 Th峄� t瓢峄沶g L锚 Thanh Ngh峄� v峄� vi峄嘽 g岷穚 c谩c 膽峄搉g ch铆 l茫nh 膽岷 c峄 膼岷g v脿 Nh脿 n瓢峄沜 8 n瓢峄沜 x茫 h峄檌 ch峄� ngh末a n膬m 1965,鈥� Ph峄� Th峄� t瓢峄沶g, Vietnam National Archives Center 3 (Hanoi), obtained by Pierre Asselin and translated by Merle Pribbenow, accessible at .

[19] 鈥淩eport about Information on North Korea from 24 June 1965,鈥� 28 June, 1965.

[20] 鈥淟锚 Thanh Ngh峄�, 鈥楻eport on Meetings with Party Leaders of Eight Socialist Countries鈥�,鈥� 1965.

[21] 鈥淐able from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea to the Foreign Ministry, 鈥極n the Transportation of North Korea鈥檚 Material Aid for Vietnam鈥�,鈥� 2 November, 1965, PRC FMA 109-02845-03, 33, translated by Charles Kraus, accessible at .

[22] 鈥淐able from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, 鈥楽upplement to the Cable of 25 September 1965鈥�,鈥� September 26, 1965, PRC FMA 109-02845-01, 4, translated by Charles Kraus, accessible at .

[23] Telegram, From AmEmbassy, Moscow to SecState, Subject: North Korea, 14 November, 1967. Folder POL 7, KOR N, 1/1/67. Box 2262. RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Political and Defense, POL 7 KOR N to POL 7 KOR N. NARA II.

[24] 鈥淕eneral Vo Nguyen Giap鈥檚 Decision On North Korea鈥檚 Request to Send a Number of Pilots to Fight in Vietnam,鈥� 21 September, 1966, excerpt from The General Staff During the Resistance War Against the United States, 1954-1975: Chronology of Events, obtained and translated by Merle Pribbenow, accessible at .

[25] 鈥淪igning of a Protocol Agreement for North Korea to Send a Number of Pilots to Fight the American Imperialists during the War of Destruction against North Vietnam,鈥� 30 September, 1966, Vietnam Ministry of Defense Central Archives, Central Military Party Committee Collection, File No. 433, obtained and translated for NKIDP by Merle Pribbenow, accessible at .

[26] Pribbenow, 鈥淣orth Korean Pilots in the Skies over Vietnam,鈥� NKIDP e-Dossier No. 2.

[27] Pribbenow, 鈥淣orth Korean Pilots in the Skies over Vietnam,鈥� NKIDP e-Dossier No. 2.

[28] 鈥淧yongyang鈥檚 Attitudes Towards The Conflict in Vietnam,鈥� 7 June, 1967, Asie-Oc茅anie, Cor茅e du Nord P茅riode 1956-1967, s茅rie 11, Politique 茅trang猫re, Carton 11-23-1, vol. 4 (3), Politique 茅trang猫re: Fichier g茅n茅ral-Conflit du Vietnam, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Housed at National Institute of Korean History, Gwacheon, South Korea, Box MU0000540.

[29] Pribbenow, 鈥淣orth Korean Pilots in the Skies over Vietnam,鈥� NKIDP e-Dossier No. 2.

[30] 鈥淪avingram No. 19, North Korea: Summary of Recent Developments, May 1967,鈥� Canadian Dept. of External Affairs, Political Affairs - Policy and Background - Foreign Policy Trends - North Korea, Vol.2, 1966/09 / 14-1969 / 06/31 (File: 20-N KOR-1-3). Electronically housed at National Institute of Korean History, Gwacheon, South Korea.

[31] 鈥淧yongyang Students Support Vietnamese People鈥檚 Struggle,鈥� 17 March, 1966, The Pyongyang Times.

[32] 鈥淎 7 May 1967 DVO Memo about Intergovernmental Relations between the DPRK and Romania, the DRV, and Cuba,鈥� 7 May, 1967, AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 39-42, obtained by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg, accessible at .

[33] 鈥淩ecord of Conversation between Premier Kim and the Chinese Friendship Delegation,鈥� 20 August, 1965, PRC FMA 106-01479-05, 46-51, translated by Charles Kraus, accessible at .

[34] Airgram, From AmEmbassy, Paris to DeptState, Subject: Le Monde Series of Articles on Korea, 7 August, 1967. Folder Pol Kor N 1/1/67. Box 2261. RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Political and Defense, Pol 32-4 KOR/UN to POL KOR N. NARA II.

[35] 鈥淭elegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.247,鈥� 6 July, 1967, Romanian Foreign Ministry Archive, obtained and translated by Eliza Gheorghe, accessible at .

[36] Telegram, From AmEmbassy, Abdijan to SecState, Subject: None, 31 May, 1967. Folder POL 7, KOR N, 1/1/67. Box 2262. RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Political and Defense, POL 7 KOR N to POL 7 KOR N. NARA II.