

Brazilian Economic Outlook

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
Four questions


- 1) Why economic growth decelerated?
- 2) Why inflation accelerated?
- 3) What happened to fiscal policy?
- 4) What's next for the economy?

Why economic growth decelerated?

- For statistical reasons, economic growth would have slowed anyway in 2011
- But the economy slowed down more than expected because of a combination of adverse factors
 - Excessively restrictive macro policy in 2011
 - Adverse changes in the international scenario
 - Generalized fall in private investment and delays in public investment







Reduction in investment


- Commodity producers: slowdown in global mining and comprehensive reevaluation of Petrobras's investment plan
- Capital goods: adverse product cycle in trucks and buses and delays in government programs (PSI)
- Residential construction: deceleration in construction due to the transition in the governments' housing program (MCMV 1 and 2)
- Infra-structure: reduction in public investment in transports, uncertainty about government regulation and delays in the government concessions' program


Investment-GDP ratio

Why inflation accelerated?

- Sequence of adverse exogenous shocks, domestic and international, pushed prices up
- Demographic trends and government's policies resulted in very low unemployment rates, which in turn kept services' inflation high
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Brazilian Consumer-Price Inflation (IPCA)







What happened to fiscal policy?

- Excessive fiscal restraint in 2011 eroded the sustainability of high primary surpluses in 2012 and 2013
- The government adopted a series of tax cuts to accelerate growth and control inflation
- Many policies were based on financial incentives rather than on primary expenditures to avoid reducing the primary balance further (increase in gross debt)
- The result was a declining net public debt, but with a very high implicit interest rate (increase in the “neutral” primary surplus)

Brazilian primary budget in % of GDP: the increase in the federal primary expenditures was concentrated in income transfers to families, through social-security benefits (indexed to the minimum wage) and cash transfers to the poor (Bolsa Familia).






Markets' vs People's Demands

- The economy cannot return quickly to its pre-crisis primary balance
- Society's demands on the state require new tax cuts and/or an increase in some expenditures (health, education, public transportation, etc)
- But market agents recommend a more restrictive fiscal policy (the expansionary fiscal contraction one more time)
- The short-run solution lies in more transparency and accountability rather than on more austerity
- And the lower primary balance can and should be compensated by slower growth of financial operations and gross debt


What's Next?

- Despite the recent macroeconomic results, Brazil still has a favorable growth potential
 - Commodity production (food, mining and oil)
 - Expansion and modernization of infra-structure
 - Expanding middle class and residential investment
 - Urban development (mass transport, water and sanitation)
- The main challenge is to combine the above domestic “growth avenues” with product diversification and innovation in a more adverse international scenario, in which ER appreciation can no longer help inflation targeting



Clear and Immediate Problems

- **Repressed inflation**: fuel prices, electricity prices and tariffs on public transportation have been kept constant for too long
- **Gross debt**: the increase in financial operations through state-controlled banks (Caixa and BNDES) blocks the reduction in the net financial cost of public debt
- **Exchange-rate realignment**: high current account deficits and changes in the terms of trade indicate that the BRL will have to depreciate further before stabilizing at a new value



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The government's response

- Improvements in the **communication** of macroeconomic policy
 - FX interventions with no commitment to a specific value of the ER
 - Lower but more realistic fiscal targets
 - Back to inflation targeting through changes in the SELIC rate
- Reduced **intervention** in regulated markets
- Reduction in financial loans to **state banks**
- Adjustment of **fuel prices** in the near future (?)

Eppur si muove

- Despite the markets' perception that reforms have stalled after 2005, many important initiatives have been implemented in recent years
 - **2009**: new regulation for housing finance
 - **2010**: new private financial instruments (LF and project bonds)
 - **2011**: PRONATEC, new antitrust law and new credit rating system
 - **2012**: new savings deposits and FUNPRESP
 - **2013**: concessions in infrastructure and ABGF

What to expect in 2015-18?

- **Monetary policy:** price liberalization will generate a temporary increase in inflation, which will slow or even stabilize real interest rates in the near future



What are the main challenges?

- **Social security**: labor unions demand changes in the current system (“fator previdenciário”), which are not sustainable in the long run
- **Labor regulation**: need of modernization must be matched by an increase in Union participation
- **Reindustrialization**: increase industrial density and product diversification of the economy (more innovation and