

Working with NGOs in Post-Conflict Settings


**Some Lessons from Afghanistan
and their Implications Elsewhere**

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
Outline

- ÿ Afghanistan background
 - ÿ Afghanistan experience of working with NGOs
 - ÿ Summary of Lessons Learned and Implications
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Afghanistan had high U5MR in 1960 and remains decades behind other countries



Inequalities are very serious, MMR much worse in rural and remote areas



2002-Reasons to Worry

- ÿ Very poor country
 - ÿ Little physical infrastructure
 - ÿ Health workers afflicted by the “3 wrongs”
 - > wrong gender
 - > wrong skills
 - > wrong location
 - ÿ Little coordination of NGO activities
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Distribution of NGO Health Centers was Chaotic

Results of the Chaos

- ÿ Obvious inefficiencies:
 - › Lack of clinics in under-served, remote areas
 - › Difficult to hold anybody accountable, no clear catchment areas
 - › Focus on clinics rather than the community
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Approaches to Working with NGOs and MOPH - WB

- ÿ MOPH recognized the advantage of contracting with NGOs – wanted to steward the sector & recognized own limitations
 - ÿ MOPH signed performance-based partnership agreements (PPAs) with NGOs
 - › Initially covered 8 whole provinces
 - › Clear objectives and 10 indicators
 - › Performance bonuses worth 10% of contract
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Approaches to Working with NGOs and MOPH - WB

- Y Established MOPH-Strengthening Mechanism (MOPH-SM) in 3 provinces near Kabul
- › Envelope budget spent through GOA system
 - › Procurement done by agent of GOA
 - › Able to pay similar salaries through “PRR” process
 - › Recruited local consultants to work with MOPH Provincial Health Directors
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
DIGRESSION: Quality of Care - Health Facility Assessment

- ÿ JHU competitively selected and contracted by MOPH as independent evaluator
 - ÿ Worked extensively with stakeholders to develop a health facility assessment
 - ÿ Carried out annually country-wide, every 6 months in WB and EC financed provinces
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
Quality of Care - Health Facility Assessment

- ÿ Formulated a “balanced score-card” (BSC) that rated facilities on a scale of 0-100
 - ÿ BSC looked at 27 areas of care including: patient satisfaction; availability of drugs, equipment, & staff; knowledge of providers; quality of patient-provider interaction, patient load
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
BSC Scores in PPA and MOPH-SM Provinces



Antenatal Care Coverage – MICS (2003) and HMIS



TB Case Detection Rates (%) in PPA & MOPH-SM Provinces





Reasons for Success

- Y Number of health centers increased 66% & 41% in PPA/MOPH-SM provinces
 - Y % of facilities with trained female staff increased from 24.8% nationwide in 2002 to 85% in PPA areas & 72% in MOPH-SM
 - Y Friendly competition, focus on results
 - Y MOPH-SM guided by very talented manager
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Approaches to Working with NGOs and MOPH - USAID

- ÿ USAID \$60M+ program of grants to NGOs
 - › Administered by MSH
 - › Modest involvement of MOPH
 - › Cost about \$21M to administer
 - › Started with small grants where NGOs decided where they would work
 - › Evolved to larger grants with pre-determined catchment areas
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
Approaches to Working with NGOs and MOPH - EC

- ÿ EC gave grants to NGOs
 - > administered by EC, modest involvement of MOPH
 - > Not performance-based, NGOs contributed 10-20% of costs
 - > Whole provinces or clusters of districts
 - > No clear indicators, little monitoring
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Similarities in Approaches

- Y All based on the MOPH's Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS)
 - › A series of preventive and curative services including vaccination, maternal care, TB
 - Y National salary policy put cap on health worker wages to avoid wage inflation
 - Y MOPH had bilateral donors choose provinces to coordinate and ensure accountability – used WB financing for rest
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Change in BSC score (%) 2005 – 2004, Cost per capita per year



How have the different approaches evolved?

- ÿ EC in process of coursing funds through MOPH, MOPH responsible for monitoring
- ÿ USAID coursing funds through intermediary (WHO) to MOPH
 - › larger catchment areas
 - › more competitive, more contract than grant
 - › now called performance-based partnership grants (PPGs)
- ÿ WB financing “holes” in BPHS coverage
- ÿ BPHS now covers 90% of country

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Summary of Lessons Learned

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Summary of Lessons Learned



Sustainability and Replicability of Contracting with NGOs

- ÿ Providing PHC costs about \$4 per capita per year in low income countries
 - ÿ Community doesn't much care who is delivering services – they want services
 - ÿ The biggest threat to using NGOs are:
 - › politicians want jobs for supporters
 - › control – MOH officials want the power
 - › overcoming resistance to a new way of working
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Possible Lessons for USAID in Fragile States

- ÿ Do more, and more systematic, contracting with NGOs
 - ÿ Continuous and sustained financing
 - ÿ Focus on outputs and outcomes, not inputs à lump sum contracts rather than re-imbursement
 - ÿ Each NGO contract should be large (significant economies of scale)
 - ÿ Consider performance-based bonuses
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Possible Lessons for USAID

- ÿ Geographic division of responsibilities is helpful and avoids confusion
 - ÿ Follow the government's lead and course money through government
 - ÿ Reduce dependence on external TA, hire local talent to work in the MOH
 - ÿ Decentralize procurement to NGOs
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