

gime of people's democracy. In this way, said Gheorghiu-Dej, we want to test Imre Nagy." See "Informatsiya," 27 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, Ll. 16-17.

<sup>190</sup>This refers to the manner in which Imre Nagy and his aides were arrested. A bus had been brought alongside the Yugoslav embassy, supposedly to transport the officials and their families to their apartments. It turned out that the bus was merely part of an elaborate plot devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials to lure Nagy from the embassy. A Soviet military officer was sitting in the bus, and others quickly approached. Two Yugoslav diplomats who were accompanying the Hungarians were forced out of the bus, and the remaining passengers were placed under arrest, contrary to the assurances that Kadar's government had given to the Yugoslavs. This episode is recounted in detail in the note of protest that Yugoslav foreign minister Koca Popovic sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on 24 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D.

Some particular items in the Special Committee's documentary collections deserve special mention. Besides



3. Designate: C[omra]de Zernov P.M., Transport Machine Building Deputy Minister, as KB-11 Chief with release from his current Ministry duties;

Professor Khariton Yu. B. as KB-11 Chief Designer on jet engine prototype designing and manufacture.

4. Adopt the proposal by Commission composed of Vannikov, Yakovlev, Zavenyagin, Goremykin, Meshik and Khariton on location of KB-11 on the base of Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building Plant No. 550 and adjoining territory.

5. Assume the following as necessary:  
a) involve USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics (Director Academician Semenov N. N.) in computations on orders by Laboratory No. 2 (Academician Kurchatov) relating to designing of jet engines, measurements of needed constants, and preparation and conduct of principal jet engine tests;

b) arrange at USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics development of theoretical issues for nuclear explosion and combustion and their application in engineering.

In this connection transfer all main forces of USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics to accomplishment of the above tasks.

6. Charge the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers (Mr. Vannikov) with [responsibility for] material and technical support of KB-11 and USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics.

7. Entrust Mr. Vannikov with consideration and solution in conjunction with Mr. Zernov of all the issues relating to adjustment of Plant No. 550 for KB-11.

8. Entrust Messrs. Vannikov (convocation), Zernov, Kurchatov, Khariton, Semenov, Pervukhin, Ustinov, and Zavenyagin with consideration of Academician Semenov's proposals on the measures to support the works with which the Institute of Chemical Physics is charged and within 5 days to develop and submit the draft decision on this issue.

Stamp: USSR Council of Ministers General Office Management of USSR Council of Ministers Affairs.

[Source: Archive of the President, Russian

Federation (APRF), Fond 3, Opis 47, Delo 29, Listy 105-106].

**Document II: USSR Council of Ministers Resolution of 21 June 1946 on Development of Soviet Atomic Weapons**

Keep in cipher

Top Secret  
(Special dossier)

USSR Council of Ministers Resolution  
No. 1286-525ss/op of 21 June 1946.  
Kremlin, Moscow

On the plan of promoting the works of Design Bureau No. 11 (KB-11) of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No.2

USSR Council of Ministers ORDERS:  
Accept the following proposals submitted by Cdes. Kurchatov, Khariton, Vannikov, Pervukhin, and Zernov on the Orders for Design Bureau No. 11 of USSR Academy of Sciences and the plan of promoting the works of the above Bureau:

1. That Design Bureau No. 11 (Messrs. Khariton, Zernov) be charged with:

a) development of two versions of "Jet engine [atomic bomb] S" ("RDS" in abbreviated form) under the scientific leadership of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No.2 (Academician Kurchatov): with heavy fuel utilization (version S-1) and with light fuel utilization (version S-2);

b) submission of the first verified and manufactured S-1 and S-2 versions of RDS, 1 copy of each version, to state tests in stationary conditions: for the version S-1 by 1 January 1948, for the version S-2 by 1 June 1948;

c) submission of the first verified and manufactured S-1 and S-2 aerial design versions of RDS, 1 copy of each version, to state flight tests: for the version S-1 by 1 March 1948, for the version S-2 by 1 January 1949.

2. That to secure accomplishment of the tasks stated in item 1, entrust Design Bureau No. 11 (Cdes. Khariton and Zernov) to be empowered to carry out the following works: a) development of the tactical and technical task orders for versions S-1 and S-2 of the RDS design by 1 July 1946; b) development of the design of the main RDS units in versions S-1 and S-2 by 1 July 1947; c) manufacture of RDS prototypes without

fueling stated in item 1a in versions S-1 and S-2, 5 copies for each version, and submit them for testing by 1 September 1947.

3. That the following proposals of Cdes. Kurchatov, Khariton, Vannikov, Pervukhin, and Zernov to conduct the following preparatory works for RDS versions S-1 and S-2 according to the task orders of KB-11, at Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building NII-6, NII-504, KB-47, USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2, Ministry of Armaments KB-88, Ministry of Transport Machine Building Kirov Plant KB (Chelyabinsk) and USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics be accepted:

a) at the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building Research Institute No. 6 (leader of the works Cde. Zakoshchikov, NII-6 chief):

- development of synchronous spark plug operation principles and design—by 1 October 1946;

NII-6 task orders for .333 TD 0.002 Tc 0.125 Tw (- c

AT , NII-504, KB-47, USS10.002 038 Tw (enc

tem—by 1 March 1947;

- refinement of the timing issues as applied to the version S-2—by 1 January 1947;

f) at the Ministry of Armaments Plant No. 38 Design Bureau (leader of the works Cde. Kostin, Chief Designer):

- development of the “gun” design—by 1 January 1947;

- refinement of the timing issues—by 1 January 1947;

g) at USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics Special Sector (the leader of the works Academician Semenov):

- carrying out the theoretical and computational works on the task orders of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2.

That Ministers: of Agricultural Machine Building Cde. Vannikov, of Armaments Cde. Ustinov, of Transport Machine Building Cde. Malyshev, Director of USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics Academician Semenov, [and] Chief of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 Academician Kurchatov be empowered to accomplish the works listed in item 3 within the stated dates and monthly report about the progress of works to the Special Committee of USSR Council of Ministers.

4. That Design Bureau No. 11 be authorized to establish the following laboratories within the Design Bureau (on the base of Plant No. 550 of the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers):

-primarily: Laboratory No. 1 (for fuel), Laboratory No. 2 (X-ray metering), Laboratory No. 3 (for studying strains), Laboratory No. 4 (for studying performance);

-secondarily: Laboratory No. 5 (for physics), Laboratory No. 6 (for plugs), Laboratory No. 7 (for metallurgy and treatment), Laboratory No. 8 (for studying physical and mechanical properties of fuel), Laboratory No. 9 (for quality control of initial materials), Laboratory No. 10 (for prevention of accidents).

That the dates be fixed for spreading the works of the primary laboratories from September to December 1946 and the secondary laboratories from January to June 1947.

5. That the measures be approved on preparation and organization of the works of KB-11 and measures for USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Building Directorate No.

88 in conformity with Annexes Nos. 1 and 2.

6. That Messrs. Kurchatov, Zernov and Khariton be entrusted with monthly reporting about the progress of works of Design Bureau No. 11 to the Special Committee of USSR Council of Ministers.

Stamp: USSR Council of Ministers General Office Management of USSR Council of Ministers Affairs..

[annexes:]

Top Secret  
(Special dossier)

USSR Council of Ministers Resolution  
No. 1286-525ss of 21 June 1946.  
Kremlin, Moscow

#### Annex No. 1

##### Measures

on preparation and arrangement of KB-11 works

USSR Council of Ministers ORDERS:

1. That USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Cdes. Kruglov and Komarovskiy) be empowered to carry out the construction and assembling operations for Design Bureau No. 11 and that be USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs be empowered to complete by forces of Glavpromstroy the construction and assembling operations of the first series by 1 October 1946 and of the second series (all of the operations) by 1 May 1947.

That USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Cde. Kruglov) be authorized to establish Building Directorate No. 880 within the Glavpromstroy system to accomplish the above task.

2. That the first series building amount for Design Bureau No. 11 proposed by Cdes. Vannikov, Pervukhin, Kurchatov, Zavenyagin, Khariton, and Zernov, a total of 30 million rubles, and the list of building over the facilities, according to Annex No. 3, be approved and that Cdes. Zernov and Komarovskiy be empowered to approve the priorities for building and restoration of the first phase facilities within the above list.

3. That Cde. Volkov V.V. be placed in charge of Deputy Chief of Design Bureau No. 11 of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 in building and Chief of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Building Direc-

torate No. 880 and that he be relieved of other work for Ministry of Military and Navy Building.

4. That GSPI-11 of the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers carry out the design operations on building for Design Bureau No. 11.

5. That the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs be empowered to occupy the area up to 100 square kilometers for Building Directorate No. 880 in the Mordovia State reserve and up to 10 square kilometers of land south of the Balykovo village, Gorky region.

That Cde. Rodionov, Chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers, by agreement with Cdes. Zernov and Komarovskiy, be entrusted with determination of the alienation borders of the above lands within ten days.

6. That USSR Minister of Internal Affairs be empowered to carry out the construction and assembly operations for Building No. 880 without approved project and estimated costs. Payment due should be made on the basis of actual expenditures.

7. That Plant No. 550 be transferred to the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers from the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building under Statement of assets and liabilities as of 1 May 1946.

8. That Cdes. Abakumov (convocation), Kruglov, Vannikov, and Zernov be obligated to develop within 2 weeks and approve the safeguard and security system for facility No. 550.

That their direction be reported to Special Committee.

9. That Cdes. Vannikov, Kurchatov, and Zernov be obligated to approve KB-11 staff.

That Cdes. Vannikov, Kurchatov, Zernov, and Komarovskiy be charged with submission of the amount of construction and schedule of the construction and assembly operations of the first phase for KB-11 for 1946: no later than on 15 August 1946 to be approved by USSR Council of Ministers.

10. That KB-11 be released from recording the staff in financial agencies.

That a total of 25 million rubles of advance allocations be approved for KB-11 for

tures.

That the USSR Ministry of Finance (Mr. Zernov) be charged with allocation of the above funds to the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers.

11. That the wages, salaries, and all types of food-stuffs and goods provision established for USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 be extended to KB-11.

12. That the following be determined:

a) salary rates for the workers assigned to work at facility No. 550 should be increased during their stay at facility No. 550 from 75 to 100% and the persons performing multiple tasks of KB-11 should be paid additional salary amounting from 50 to 75% of relevant salary established for workers of KB-11 of Laboratory No. 2;

b) all leading, scientific, engineering, technical, administrative and economic workers of facility No. 550 should be provided on site with three meals a day in norms according to Annex No. 4 and ration according to the letter "A" limit for leading and scientific workers and to the letter "B" limit for other workers.

13. That the USSR Ministry of Trade (Cde. Lyubimov) be charged with:

a) allocation by request of Cde. Zernov of all needed foodstuffs for arrangement of three meals a day for all leading, scientific, engineering-technical, and administrative-technical workers of facility No. 550 in norms according to Annex No.4 and ration of letter "A" for leading and scientific workers, of letter "B" for other workers;

b) allocation to facility No. 550 beginning from June 1946 of 50 food-stuffs limits 300 rubles each monthly and 50 goods limits 750 each quarterly in addition to those allocated for scientific workers.

14. That 50 personal payments up to 3000 rubles for KB-11 be established.

15. That the following mechanism of provision and funding of KB-11 of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 be established:

a) all KB-11 provision and funding should be through the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers by requests of Cde. Zernov;

b) funding of all KB-11 works should be through the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers. The financial accounting for KB-11 should be submitted only personally to Chief of the First Main Directorate. The same person is authorized

to approve estimated costs and actual expenditures for KB-11;

c) authorize Chief of the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chief of KB-11 to have a group of workers up to 5 persons at the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers for preparation of requests and realization of KB-11 material supply funds.

16. That KB-11 (Cde. Zernov) be empowered to arrange their library at Design bureau which should be later on referred to as Library No. 11.

In order to provide this:

a) charge RSFSR OGIZ (Cde. Yudin) with inclusion of Library No. 11 into the list for receiving of an obligatory paid copy of literature on physics, chemistry, mathematics, and fiction;

b) charge Committee on Cultural and Educational Establishments Affairs of USSR Council of Ministers (Mr. Zuyev) with allocation by 1 August 1946 of literature from the State Stock for Library No. 11 composed of up to 5000 books on physics, chemistry, engineering, and mathematics and organization of a movable technical and fiction library by request of Mr. Zernov;

c) allocate 5000 dollars additionally for years 1946-1947 to the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers for subscription of books, journals, and magazines for Library No. 11.

17. That Cdes. Kuznetsov A. A. (convocation), Vannikov, Zernov be entrusted with selection of staff for Design Bureau No. 11 within one month.

18. That in July 1946 by direction of the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers equipment, instruments and devices according to Annex No. 5 be allocated and shipped, the delivery being in the order established by Resolution of USSR Council of Ministers of 9 April 1946 No. 806-328ss.

19. That materials and equipment to the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers, according to Annex No. to tw (req -0.ing to )72and devicuiipmenfun-ey0(. Zernov;)]Tsar

tory No. 2 with the right of coupling to fast, passenger and other trains by requests of Cde. Zernov; the allotment duration should be agreed upon by Cde. Zernov.

27. That the USSR Ministry of Forest Industry (Mr. Saltykov) be obligated to fill the order for furniture at the expense of the market fund for the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers by the specification and distribution list of Cde. Zernov P.M. in quarters II and III, 1946, the sum total amounting to 800 thousand rubles, including 400 thousand rubles for individual suites, with delivery amount being 100 thousand rubles in the 2nd quarter and 700 thousand rubles in the 3d quarter.

28. That for the workers of Design Bureau No. 11 and Building No. 880 the dwelling space occupied by them and their families by the time of their going to work

Soviet policy. On 14 December 1959, six days after his memorandum was drafted, it was approved by the Presidium; four days later, on December 18, a conference of the military elite convened to work out practical measures to implement the proposal; and eight days after that, on December 26, the Plenum rubber-stamped it. Despite Khrushchev's strong position, he could not help worrying about the political fallout of such a radical revamping, which constituted a *de facto* replacing of the Soviet military machine; hence the memorandum's rather long and (for Khrushchev) elaborate argument. It is interesting that Khrushchev regarded his initiative as a direct follow-up to his proposal on General and Complete Disarmament which he made to the U.N. General Assembly on 18 September 1959. He presented his initiative to his colleagues as a means to boost the level of discussion at the specially-appointed United Nations "Committee of Ten" countries, set up to study disarmament questions, which was scheduled to start its deliberations in February 1960.

The memorandum reveals Khrushchev as a convert of the nuclear revolution; he was convinced that no power could threaten a Soviet Union armed with nuclear missiles. In the same breath the Soviet leader poses as an exuberant romantic and bluffer, this time not before the outside world, but in front of his own, much less informed colleagues. Most important, he boldly but falsely claims that "we are in an excellent position with [regard to] missile-building" and that the USSR has already set in motion assembly lines capable of serial production of "an assortment of rockets to serve any military purpose." In fact, as was known to the tiny group of military and missile designers who reported directly to Khrushchev as the head of the Defense Council, the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) had not yet begun and there were only four unwieldy R-7s on a launching pad near Plesetsk in northern Russia. The first test of the next-generation ICBM of the Yangel firm was still nine months away.

At the core of Khrushchev's reasoning was his belief that from then on

the Cold War would be decided by the outcome of economic competition between the United States and Soviet Union. With the great optimism characteristic of the times, he explained to the Politburo members that if the West did not reciprocate to Soviet cuts, so much worse for it, since the burden of military budgets would drag its economies down. And the romantic Khrushchev firmly believed that once "workers, but also peasants, petit bourgeois elements," saw the USSR's determination to disarm, they would shed their anti-Soviet fears and move "to neutral positions, and then would develop sympathies toward our country." Thus, Khrushchev repeated the disarmament dictum of the Soviet diplomacy of the 1920s and early 1930s, but, unlike his predecessors, did not intend to use it merely as a smoke-screen for Soviet build-up, but, on the contrary, as a rationale for a unilateral build-down.

The point where Khrushchev's imagination reached record-breaking heights was in plotting an army of the future. On one hand he was primarily moved by his conviction that the construction of communism would require maximum military demobilization. He was attracted by the reforms of the 1920s carried out by Mikhail Frunze, when more of the Red Army conscripts would be trained not in "the cadre army" but in territorial militia formations; this, in his mind, could keep young manpower in local economies instead of diverting it to unproductive military drills. He even spoke of keeping officers simultaneously in military schools and industrial jobs!

On the other hand, Khrushchev had no patience with or respect for the professional military. He lacked experience with military reform, but specifics did not bother him. Like many crucial turns in Soviet foreign policy in 1958-62, this disarmament initiative sprang full-blown from his mind. This is made clear by his own admission that he still needed to discuss the proposal with the Defense Ministry and General Staff, including how deep the proposed cuts should be ("perhaps a million or a million and half") and how quickly they should be carried out ("no more than

two years"). This perception, incidentally, was disastrously unrealistic and contradicted Khrushchev's avowed concern with the future of demobilized officers. What also catches the eye is





should take into account so that the defense capabilities of our country would not diminish, but increase. The burden of maintaining armies would be smaller, and the political position domestically, as well as internationally, would grow stronger, since we would free the resources that are sapped by the maintenance of a huge army and armament. And we would conquer even more [ground] in our favorable position in the international arena in the struggle for peace, the prestige of our country would grow even further. And all this would promote our Marxist-Leninist ideas, our teaching, our struggle for peace, because not only workers, but also peasants, petit bourgeois elements would become more sympathetic to us with every new year. Their sympathies would grow. They would move first from fear to neutral positions, and then would develop sympathies toward our country. This I take to be natural, and we should work to achieve it.

When I am saying that one perhaps should have not only a cadre army, but also in part territorial, militia forces, in doing so we essentially, to some extent, repeat what Lenin did after the October [1917] revolution, but in a different situation and somewhat in another way, since back then we had no other option, we had no army; and today we have both resources and armaments, we have an army. And we cannot be left without an army and we do not want to be. But we should build this army in such a way, that it would be reasonable, without excessive frills [*bez izlishestv*], so that it would be combat-ready and meet the needs of national defense.

Of course, we would have to revise the system of military schools: their profile and number. Perhaps, if we switch to a new system, we should also establish such military schools where officers would be trained without leaving their jobs in industries. This is also of great importance.

All these measures will undoubtedly take the burden off the national budget. We have big opportunities for implementation of the proposals I have outlined on a unilateral reduction of our armed forces.

A couple of words about our military schools. When we created our multiple military schools, we did not have a sufficient number of trained people in our country. Today all young people have education, and therefore it is possible to enlist enough

people for military schools who will work, will train cadres without denying them to industrial economy, and will prepare officer cadres for all branches of the military. These commanders will be of the kind that will be even closer to the people, will be free of the so-called caste spirit that is emerging as a result of better material supply for students of military schools.

On the other hand, it would make sense and the costs would be less expensive.

These are the questions that I would consider necessary to offer for deliberation at the CC Presidium.

N. KHRUSHCHEV

8 December 1959

**Document 2: CC CPSU Presidium decision, 14 December 1959**

*Proletarians of all countries, unite!*  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

#P253/P

Top Secret

To com. Khrushchev.

Excerpt from protocol no. 253 of meeting of the CC Presidium of 14 December 1959

About further steps in the struggle for reduction of international tension.

1. To approve the proposals laid out in the note of com. Khrushchev N.S. to the CC Presidium about the unilateral implementation by the Soviet Union of measures directed at the reduction of international tension.

The question about the unilateral implementation of measures directed at the reduction of international tension, should be put on the agenda of a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

2. To commission the Ministry of Defense (com. [Rodion] Malinovsky) to introduce concrete proposals on this issue for deliberation of the CC CPSU, while taking into account the exchange of opinions that took place at the meeting of the CC Presidium.

3. To convene in the CC CPSU on 18 December this year a conference of commanders, chiefs of staffs, and members of

military councils of military districts for discussion of practical measures in the army, related to the proposals com. Khrushchev N.S. outlined in [his] note to the CC Presidium.

To entrust the chairmanship of the conference to com. Khrushchev N.S.

SECRETARY OF CC

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**Document 3: CC CPSU Plenum protocol, 26 December 1959**

*Proletarians of all countries, unite!*  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

# Pl. 15 Top Secret  
Special Dossier

Excerpt from protocol no. 15 of meeting of Plenum CC of 26 December 1959

About the measures of the Soviet Government aimed at the reduction of international tension.

To approve the measures aimed at the reduction of international tension, outlined in the note of com. Khrushchev N.S. of 8 December 1959 and in his report to the CC Plenum.

SECRETARY OF CC

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[Source: Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), f. 2, op. 1, d. 416, ll. 1-11; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

*Vladislav M. Zubok, a research fellow*