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Romania and the Warsaw Pact: 1955-1989



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Preface

Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1989

This publication of documents on Romania and the Warsaw Pact, accompanied by the CWIHP Working Paper No. 43 by Dennis Deletant and Mihail Ionescu, is the result of cooperation between the Parallel History Project (PHP) and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP). It appears simultaneously on their respective websites.

The cooperative venture dates back to 2002, when the PHP took the initiative by obtaining previously classified documents from Romanian archives selected by a group of Romanian historians¹ under the aegis of the Romanian Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, headed by Mihail Ionescu. The CWIHP provided for the facsimile publication and partial translation of those documents in two volumes, edited by Mircea Munteanu.

The volumes became available for the conference on “Romania and the Warsaw Pact,” organized in Bucharest on 3-6 October 2002 by the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History and co-sponsored by the PHP jointly with the CWIHP.

The CWIHP subsequently funded the translation of the remaining documents from the two volumes by Cornel Ban and Mircea Munteanu while the PHP funded the translation of additional documents, obtained through the good offices of Marius Oprea, senior researcher at the Romanian Institute for Recent History, translated by Viorel Buta and edited for publication by Dennis Deletant. The credit due to the respective translators is indicated on each document.

The documents themselves are preceded by two introductions. The first, by offering an overview of political and economic policy in Romania under Communist rule, provides background for the analysis in the second of Romania’s trajectory within the Warsaw Pact.

In the translation of the documents, words or punctuation marks enclosed in [...] have been added by the editors.

¹ Alexandru Dutu, Mihail Ionescu, Costin Ionescu, Corneliu Mihai Lungu, Camelia Moraru, Alexandru Osca, Petre Out, Adrian Pop, Dumitru Preda, Carmen Răjnovceanu, and Mihai Retegan.

Introduction

Romania, 1948-1989

An historical overview

Dennis Deletant

Romania was cemented into the Soviet bloc from a military point seven years before the

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was re-elected Secretary General and Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Teohari Georgescu as the other three members of the secretariat. Emphasis was now given to the elite character of the Party and stricter membership requirements were introduced. Prime importance was attached to ideological training, which not only helped to reinforce the sense of belonging to an elite, but also inculcated loyalty to the Party and cocooned its members from insidious external influences. The feeling of elitism and

The collectivization of agriculture required extensive coercion. Resistance to collectivization resulted in some 80,000 peasants being imprisoned for their opposition; 30,000 of them were publicly tried. Collectivization was completed in 1962 and its results put 60 percent of the total 15 million hectares of agricultural land in collective farms, 30 percent in state farms, and left 9 per cent in private hands. The latter was upland whose inaccessibility made it impractical to collectivize. [this might be a good place to at least en passant compare Romania with the other soviet satellites.]

A new secret police, the *Securitate*, was set up by the Communist Party. Its role, defined under its founding decree no. 221 of 30 August 1948, was 'to defend the democratic conquests and to ensure the security of the Romanian People's Republic against the plotting of internal and external enemies'.² Defence of the 'democratic conquests' meant the maintenance of the Communists in power and thus the new Romanian People's Republic officially certified itself a police state. The top leadership of the *Securitate* were all agents of the Soviet security police, their activities supervised by counsellors from the Soviet Ministry of State Security.

At the time of its emergence in the politics of postwar Romania, the Communist Party leadership fell into three groups, categorized to whether they had stayed in the country, or in Moscow during the War, and, if the former, then whether they were in gaol or were

associates included Vasile Luca (Laszlo Luka), Leonte Rautu (Lev Oigenstein), and Valter Roman (Ernst Neulander). The third group was made up of veteran Communists who had remained in Romania and acted clandestinely. Its leading members were Stefan Foris, a Hungarian who was confirmed as secretary general of the RCP by the Comintern in 1940, Remus Koffler, Constantin Pârvulescu, Iosif Ranghet, Constantin Agiu, and Lucretiu Patrascanu. These three factional divisions to a large extent mapped out the targets for the purges.

Dancing to Stalin's tune eventually allowed Gheorghiu-Dej the chance to consolidate his faction's hold on the Party by removing the principal members of the 'Moscow bureau', Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, from the leadership. Yet Gheorghiu-Dej would not have been able to do this without his consummate ability to create options for action as insurance against Stalin's next move. Pauker's downfall was linked to the drive to 'verify' Party membership, which was designed to eliminate Iron Guard elements. The

from Stalin and/or an internal power struggle within the Romanian Party leadership was responsible for the attacks on Luca, Pauker and Georgescu at a Central Committee plenum held on 29 February and 1 March 1952 which resulted in their eventual purge, still resides in the realm of speculation.

The struggle for power within the Romanian Communist Party

Gheorghiu-Dej's pre-eminence in the Romanian Party was sealed by his appointment, on 2 June 1952, as President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister), a post which he combined with that of Secretary General of the Party. He thereupon intensified the attack on Luca, Pauker and Georgescu. In a speech delivered on 29 June, he blamed Luca for 'retarding the development of heavy industry', for protecting thousands of kulaks by disguising them as middle peasants, and for encouraging capitalism and profiteering.

Romania, like the other East European satellite states, continued to imitate the Soviet Union. Gheorghiu-Dej showed himself to be both cunning and cautious in handling the repercussions of the Soviet political succession. By continuing with the trials of 'spies' and 'terrorists' he could arm himself against possible criticism of relaxing 'vigilance' against 'imperialist' enemies and earned himself some time to see which way the wind was blowing in Moscow.

It became clear that separation of power was to be the order of the day when Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in September 1953 and Georgi Malenkov was made Prime Minister. Yet this very separation of power in the Soviet Union gave Gheorghiu-Dej more room to manoeuvre, and he resisted Soviet pressure to separate his own powers as General Secretary and Premier by introducing collective leadership until April 1954. Before doing so he took perhaps the most cynical decision of a career littered with shameful deeds of repression. In order to eliminate a possible rival to his personal power whom he anticipated might receive the support of the 'reformist' Soviet leadership, he ordered the trial of Lucretiu Patrascanu, who had been held in custody since 1948, to be finally staged. Patrascanu was found guilty of 'espionage' in favour of Britain and the United States and executed in April 1954.

A clear sign that there had been no concession to Khrushchev's sanitized socialism was Gheorghiu-Dej's reassumption of the position of First Secretary and the reelection at the Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party in December 1955 of the same figures to the Political Bureau as had been chosen in May 1952 when the purge of Pauker and Luca had taken place.³ Two new members were added, Ceausescu and Draghici, thus confirming the parallel rise of the two up the Party ladder. It was not long, however, before Gheorghiu-Dej had to face the implications of another reappraisal of the Stalinist legacy by the new Soviet leader.

Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 threw Gheorghiu-Dej completely off balance and it took

³ M.E. Fischer, A Study in Political Leadership, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1989, p.51.

him a month to regain his composure. Gheorghiu-Dej had led the Romanian delegation to the Congress (the other members were Iosif Chisinevski, Miron Constantinescu, and Petre Borila) and his first comment on the Congress was made on 23 March in a report of the Romanian delegation to an enlarged plenum of the RWP Central Committee which was only published in abridged form in *Scînteia*, six days later. Gheorghiu-Dej admitted only that Stalin had soiled his reputation by indulging in the personality cult and by allowing the security police to use terror; he added that Stalin's 'departure from the Marxist-Leninist concept of the role of the personality' had a 'negative influence'. Nothing was said about Khrushchev's secret speech.⁴

Gheorghiu-Dej tried in his report to anticipate and deflect criticism of his own allegiance to Stalinism by pointing to, although not naming, Pauker, Luca and Georgescu as the real Stalinists in the Party. Since the dismissal of these leaders the Party, he alleged, had taken decisive steps to democratize itself, citing the second Party Congress of December 1955 as the beginning of the new phase by which collective leadership and internal democracy had been reintroduced. In an allusion to the use of terror by the security police, he recognized that although the security forces had achieved great successes, especially in unmasking Western spies, they had gone beyond the bounds of legality during, it was implied, the period of Georgescu's office. The only way to counter this was to consolidate Party control of the *securitate*. Draghici emerged unsullied but ironically the arguments marshalled by Ceausescu twenty-one years later to denounce Draghici and to call for a return to legality by the Ministry of the Interior were startlingly like those presented at this plenum by Gheorghiu-Dej.

Gheorghiu-Dej's vulnerability over the indictment of Stalin was exposed by the attack made on him during the plenum by two other delegation members, Constantinescu and Chisinevski, who accused him of following Stalinist principles and employing Stalinist methods. The convergence of their opposition to Dej brought the two together. Chisinevski was perhaps driven by his friendship with Ana Pauker upon whose shoulders Gheorghiu-Dej was attempting to place the burden of past mistakes. Chisinevski himself

⁴ G. Ionescu, *Communism in Romania, 1944-1962*, c

was heavily implicated in the Patrascanu affair, as was Constantinescu. Constantinescu possibly saw the Khrushchev speech as an opportunity for discussion on the need for liberalization in the Party and country.⁵ For Gheorghiu-Dej, on the other hand, the demolition of Stalin's personality cult was most unnerving in view of his pliancy in the hands of the Soviet dictator, and he did his best to play it down, reserving it, as a US source remarked, as 'matter for party cabal and not for public discussion.'⁶

Gheorghiu-Dej's caution in this respect is shown by his convocation of a secret meeting at the Floreasca sports' hall at the end of March 1956, only a few days after the Central Committee plenum. The audience of three thousand represented the Party elite. The meeting was chaired by Gheorghiu-Dej and it was announced that note-taking was forbidden. He read out a shortened version of Khrushchev's secret speech to the Soviet

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fidelity to the Soviet Union. The revolt began with a massive popular demonstration in Budapest on 23 October 1956 during which the Stalin monument was destroyed and the national flag hoisted with the emblem of the People's Republic removed. The repercussions were soon felt in Romania. On 27 October, there were student and workers' demonstrations in Bucharest, Cluj, Iasi and Timisoara. The emphasis of the student

demonstrations in an address to the Moscow *Komsomol* on 8 November 1956 when he said that there were 'some unhealthy moods' among students 'in one of the educational establishments in Romania' and he congratulated the RCP on having dealt with them quickly and effectively.⁹ On 30 October, the Timisoara, Oradea and Iasi regions were placed under military rule as Soviet troops were brought in across the Romanian border in the east and concentrated on the frontier with Hungary in the west. To placate the workers the government announced on 29 October that the minimum wage would be raised, and special concessions were given to railwaymen in the form of free travel. On 2 November, Gheorghe Apostol addressed a railwaymen's meeting and promised help. Gheorghiu-Dej, himself a railwayman, stayed away.¹⁰

Convergence of interest with the Soviet Union and not just slavish obedience determined the stance adopted by Gheorghiu-Dej and his colleagues. They had two main concerns: a successful revolt in Budapest against Communist rule might spread to the two-million strong Hungarian community in Transylvania, thus sparking an anti-Communist rising in Romania; and a non-Communist Hungary might lay claim to parts of Transylvania. Their fears had been fuelled by the participation of Hungarian students and workers in demonstrations in Cluj, Timisoara and the Autonomous Magyar Region. Khrushchev and Malenkov paid a secret visit to Bucharest on 1 November 1956 to discuss the Hungarian crisis with Romanian, Bulgarian and Czechoslovak leaders and, according to some Western reports, Khrushchev demanded that Romanian troops be used to crush the Budapest revolt. Gheorghiu-Dej and Bodnaras allegedly replied that, owing to a large Hungarian minority in the Romanian army and general sympathy for Hungary, the army could not be relied upon for such an operation.¹¹ Romanian reluctance to play a direct military role could also have been attributed to the fear of irreparably antagonizing the Hungarian minority in Romania, but such a stance is contradicted by the memoirs of Khrushchev who claimed to have received offers of military assistance from the Romanian and Bulgarian leaders.¹²

⁹ G. Ionescu, op. cit., p.272.

¹⁰ G. Ionescu, op. cit., p.269.

¹¹ Observer, 25 November 1956, quoted from S. Verona, Military Occupation and Diplomacy. Soviet Troops in Romania 1944-1958, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1992, p.103.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.103.

One thing is clear. Gheorghiu-Dej and Bodnaras pushed for firm military intervention against Imre Nagy's government and the Soviet troops based in Romania had been among the first to cross the Hungarian border on 26 October to reinforce the Soviet presence. A key figure in the Romanian Party's support for Soviet intervention in Hungary was Emil Bodnaras. During the uprising, he was appointed Minister of Transport and Communications and in this capacity he supervised the widening of roads of strategic importance to Soviet troops for their transit through Romania. He was probably instrumental in making arrangements for the detention of Imre Nagy in Romania for on 21 November he and Gheorghiu-Dej paid a visit to Janos Kadar, the new First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, and on the following day Nagy was abducted by KGB officers and flown to Bucharest where he was granted what the Romanian Foreign Minister Grigore Preoteasa termed 'asylum'. In fact, he was held, along with other members of his government, in a *securitate* safe house in a locality just north of Bucharest, where their interrogation was coordinated by Boris Shumilin, chief KGB adviser 'for counter-revolutionary affairs', and not allowed the visits from UN officials promised by Preoteasa to

away. Hungarian-language instruction began to be moved from single-language schools to dual language ones.¹⁵ This effectively blurred the distinct status of the language and was carried to its logical conclusion with the merger of the Bolyai university in Cluj with the Romanian-language Babes university in the same city in 1959.

Romania was the Soviet Union's most active ally during the Hungarian crisis. Its support of the Soviet Union went beyond beyond the political arena into the domain of practical assistance and open encouragment. Gheorghiu-

the Soviet leaders; and the senior position he occupied (he was one of the three vice-premiers). Khrushchev records that Bodnaras justified the subject by pointing out that there was little threat to Soviet security interests because Romania was hemmed in by other Socialist countries and that there was 'nobody across the Black Sea from us except the Turks.'¹⁸ To suggest such a move so soon after Stalin's death was certainly extremely bold and may imply, as Sergiu Verona writes, 'some sort of clairvoyance and possibly even some political gambling.'¹⁹ The international situation in 1955 did not permit the Soviet leader to act on the idea straightaway but the idea of withdrawal had been planted in his mind and he used it at the time he regarded most appropriate.

That judgement had to be made firstly, in the context of a wider scenario composed by Khrushchev for his policy of a new opening towards the West, and secondly, with regard to the Romanian Party's ability to ensure internal security. The key foreign policy element was the unilateral Soviet move to withdraw a limited number of troops from Eastern Europe as a whole which, Khrushchev hoped, might prompt a similar response from NATO. It was no coincidence that the Soviet announcement of the withdrawal from Romania was made on the same day, 24 May 1958, as that of Soviet troop cuts of 119,000 in Eastern Europe. Romania's strategic position, flanked as it was by other Warsaw Pact states, made it a safer proposition for the Soviet Union on security grounds for a troop withdrawal, and any fears about Romania's reliability as an ally had been dispelled by its actions during the Hungarian revolution. By the same token, the precautionary measure of keeping a large number of Soviet troops in Hungary after the revolution allowed Khrushchev to partially offset any overall reduction of Soviet troops in the area.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Op. cit., p.85. The résumé of the Romanian politburo meeting of 3,4,6 and 12 April 1956 corroborates Khrushchev's account. Much of this meeting was taken up by an attack on Gheorghiu-Dej launched by Miron Constantinescu who accused the party leader of ignoring the opinions of other politburo members. Constantinescu based his charge on, amongst other things, Gheorghiu-Dej's 'failure' to carry out a decision of the politburo in August 1955 to raise the question of Soviet troops in Romania. Constantinescu claimed that Gheorghiu-Dej made Bodnaras raise the issue with Khrushchev 'against his will' ('Arhivele secrete si istoria comunismului românesc,' Sfera Politicii, no.25 (February 1995), p.18). In interview given to the review Lumea Magazin, (no.8, 1994), Paul Niculescu-Mizil, a senior Communist under Ceauşescu, stated simply that Gheorghiu-Dej instructed Bodnaras in 1955 to propose to Khrushchev the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania.

On 25 July 1958, the last of the 35,000 Soviet troops left Romania. The most significant impact of Soviet withdrawal upon the Romanian leadership was its psychological one. Romania was still tied firmly within the Soviet bloc. Soviet air and naval bases remained on Romanian territory, and Soviet divisions in southern Ukraine and across the Prut in the Moldavian Republic could descend at once in an emergency. Nevertheless, whatever the Soviet motives for the withdrawal, Gheorghiu-Dej could regard it as a concession wrought from the Soviets and with the confidence thus gained could embark, albeitly cautiously, on policies which placed Romanian above Soviet interests.

A New Period of Terror

To compensate for the Soviet withdrawal, and to allay Soviet fears that it might demolish the underpinning of the Romanian regime Gheorghiu-Dej approved the immediate introduction of stringent internal security measures in order to maintain the Party's control. Amendments were made to the penal code which were even more draconian in their remit than the provisions for the death penalty enacted in 1949. Under decree 318 of 21 July 1958 new crimes attracting the death penalty were defined. Article 9 of the code imposed the death penalty on any Romanians contacting foreigners to perpetrate an act 'which could cause the Romanian state to become involved in a declaration of neutrality tempted by the example of Imre Nagy in Hungary, during the 1956 revolution, proclaimed his country's neutrality and thus, implicitly, its withdrawal from the Warsaw

force. The definition of 'economic sabotage' was enlarged to include theft and bribery, as was that of so-called 'hooligan' offences committed by juveniles. By the autumn of 1958 the first death sentences for the new crimes were applied.²⁰ The application of these new measures, especially that of decree no. 89 of 1958 which ordered the arrest of former

rise in December of that year to 10,125, and in January 1960 to 17,613.²¹

A further decree of 1958 signalled another wave of purges from government employment of former officers in the royal army, former landowners, persons with a record of 'political' crime, and children of all the above. On a much more petty scale, divulging the location of Romanian archives also attracted the death penalty.²² It was not just the exceptional severity of these new measures which sent a clear signal to the Romanian people that the regime of terror was not to be relaxed; the failure to publicize them in the press or on the radio (the provisions were merely printed in the *Monitorul Oficial*) generated uncertainty about the legislation and so amplified the fear inculcated into the population. The apparent randomness in the legislation's application by the instruments of the police state served perfectly to enhance the regime's control by terror at, ironically, the moment when the most public Soviet symbol of power, the Red Army, was withdrawn.

Autonomy from the Soviet Union

Behind the irony lies the explanation: Gheorghiu-Dej was making a distinction between the Soviet model and the Soviet Union. In opting for the former, Gheorghiu-Dej took his Party and the country on a new course of autonomy from his Soviet overlord by refusing to accept for Romania the role within Comecom of 'breadbasket' for the industrialized members such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia. There is also a paradox here, as Michael Shafir has pointed out. Gheorghiu-Dej's commitment to the Leninist-Stalinist values of industrialization turned him into a 'national communist.'²³ Furthermore, this same consistency as a Stalinist eventually led to a diminution of institutionalized terror.

The rift with Moscow was produced gradually and unevenly, with fluctuations in its development. The campaign to establish Romania's new course was at once active and reactive. It was not only in furtherance of Gheorghiu-Dej's aim to distance Romania from the Soviet Union, thereby gaining greater popularity for his party, but it was also a

reaction to two major developments which posed a threat to Romania's new course. The first was Khrushchev's plan, presented in Moscow on 3-5 August 1961 to members of Comecon, to give the body a supranational planning role which, if accepted by Romania, would have obliged her to remain a supplier of raw materials, and to abandon her programme of rapid industrialization, thus risking economic chaos at home. Such a move would have made the country susceptible to further economic exploitation by the Soviet Union, which was precisely what Gheorghiu-Dej had sought to avoid by embarking on the policy of industrialization.

The second major development was the Sino-Soviet rift, which first emerged at the Eighth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in June 1960. Gheorghiu-Dej used the Chinese formula of equality of all socialist states to justify his own autonomous policies towards the Soviet Union and received Chinese backing for his rejection of the Comecon plan.²⁴ The rift was indispensable to Gheorghiu-Dej's challenge to Khrushchev²⁵, but the Romanian leader was careful to preserve neutrality in the dispute. In an effort to mediate in the conflict a Romanian delegation visited Peking in February 1964 but it returned empty-handed and this led only to further arm-twisting by Khrushchev to bring the Romanians back into line. One source states that Khrushchev formally, but not publicly, raised the question of territorial revision in Transylvania during the Romanians' stopover in Moscow on their return from China, and even indicated a willingness to hold a plebiscite in Bessarabia as well as in Transylvania.²⁶ This linkage of the Transylvanian issue with the Sino-Soviet conflict unnerved the Romanians and pressure from Moscow was stepped up in the same month when a plan to create an economic region encompassing much of the Moldavian SSR, half of Romania, and part of Bulgaria was launched in the Soviet capital. Known as the Valev plan after its author who was a professor of economics at Moscow university, it met with a hostile response from the Romanian government which publicly condemned it in the Romanian media.

²⁴ R.R. King, 'Rumania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict', Studies in Comparative Communism, no.4, 1972, p.375.

²⁵ Stephen Fischer-Galati, The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967, pp.78-103.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.101.

These signals from Khrushchev, coupled with the realization that the Chinese were unable to help the Romanians economically, drove the Romanians into a public declaration of their autonomy which, apart from pre-empting any move by the Kremlin, would also stake a claim to Western political and economic support against Moscow. The Romanian policy was formally legitimized in the *Statement on the Stand of the Romanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working Class Movement*

services became the first such agencies of a Warsaw Pact country to get rid of its Soviet counsellors, and, as regards the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, the DGIE, the only foreign intelligence agency in the Eastern bloc to enjoy this privilege down to the collapse of Communism in 1989. This did not mean, of course, that it ceased to collaborate with the KGB.

Gheorghiu-Dej's rift with Moscow, by striking the chord of deep anti-Russian sentiment felt by most Romanians, attracted some support for his regime. Drawing on the inherent anti-Russian sentiment offered Gheorghiu-Dej a simple way of increasing the regime's

1952, remained a constant reminder of the past and a threat to the future.

In late January 1965, the first signs of serious illness appeared in Gheorghiu-Dej. He was treated for cancer of the lungs but despite this the disease spread to his liver and foreign doctors were called in. On the afternoon of 19 March, the party secretary lapsed into a coma and died. Three days later, on 22 March 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu emerged as the first secretary of the Romanian Communist Party.

The Rise of Nicolae Ceausescu

The party was still inextricably linked with the terror of Romania's post-war history. Born the third of ten children, on 26 January 1918, into a poor peasant family in the north-east of Oltenia, Ceausescu himself could point to a youth spent on the wrong side of authority. After leaving home at the age of eleven to find work in Bucharest, he joined the Communist Party as a teenager and went to gaol on four separate occasions between 1933 and 1938 for his political convictions (since 1924, the Party had been outlawed). By 1936 he was a secretary of a regional committee of the Union of Communist Youth and two years later was promoted secretary of the UCY's Central Committee. In September 1939 he was tried *in absentia* and sentenced to three and half years in gaol. He continued to work underground until July 1940, when he was finally caught.²⁹

During the war Ceausescu was held in various prisons until, in August 1943, he was moved to the internment camp at Târgu Jiu where he remained until the overthrow of Antonescu in August 1944. It was here that he met senior members of the Romanian Communist Party, among them Gheorghiu-Dej, Chivu Stoica, who became president of the Council of State when Ceausescu was later elected first secretary, and Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who served as prime minister under both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu. After release Ceausescu occupied a number of party posts before being made regional secretary for Oltenia in November 1946 in preparation for the general election due that month. Ceausescu's experience of local Party work undoubtedly made him particularly useful to Gheorghiu-Dej as the planks in the platform of Communization of Romania were put into

²⁹ Mary Ellen Fischer, Nicolae Ceausescu. A Study in Political Leadership, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1989, p.2.

place. When the programme for the collectivization of agriculture was announced in March 1949, Ceausescu was moved to the Ministry of Agriculture as a deputy minister. In the following year, he was transferred to the same position in the Ministry of Armed Forces, with special responsibility for the 'Higher Political Directorate of the Army', the party body set up to bring into being a People's Army. It was in this capacity that Ceausescu served an invaluable apprenticeship for ensuring his complete control of the armed forces when he later acquired dictatorial power.

When Gheorghiu-Dej purged his major rivals in May 1952, he promoted Ceausescu to full membership of the Central Committee, and after the execution of Patrascanu in April

Hungarian interest was once again mirrored in the strong criticism which both governments levelled at Ceausescu for condemning the invasion. Fears that unrest among the minorities might be used as an excuse by the Soviet leaders to intervene in Romania led Ceausescu to make a rapid tour of the major urban areas with significant Hungarian populations at the end of August. His speeches in the two Hungarian counties of Covasna and Harghita were concessionary: ten major enterprises would be built there during the current five-year plan, for 'there can be no true equality of rights, the national question cannot be considered solved, if material conditions are not ensured.'³² Two telegrams from groups of Hungarian and German intellectuals in support of the party's attitude over Czechoslovakia were widely published.³³ In September, Ceausescu visited the counties bordering Hungary and Yugoslavia, obviously to nip any possible ethnic problems in the bud and to consolidate his position as a leader of all the peoples of Romania. Ceausescu's fear of an outbreak of minority discontent was probably exaggerated: the Hungarian contribution of troops to the invasion of Czechoslovakia aroused as much disapproval amongst Hungarians in Hungary as it did amongst the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, and a common fear of the Soviet Union helped to improve relations between the ethnic groups in Transylvania. This improvement was reflected in increasing the number of radio and television programmes in Hungarian and German, and in extending the print-runs of minority language publications. Greater representation of Hungarian and German interests was suggested by the establishment in 1969 of separate Hungarian and German Nationality Workers Councils.

c u r r e n t f i v

Ceausescu's denunciation of *securitate* abuses and the reforms of 1965-1968 created an atmosphere of optimism and an expectation of even broader liberalization. The events in Czechoslovakia during the 'Prague Spring' elicited a sympathetic response from the party since they conformed with the Romanian advocacy of the view that each Communist regime was entitled to determine its own policies without outside interference, explicit since the Comecon clash. In public statements and speeches, such as that made by Ceausescu at the plenary session of the Central Committee of in March 1968, this view was reiterated: 'No one can claim a monopoly of absolute truth as regards the development of social life; and no one can claim to have the last word in the realm of practice as well as in social and philosophical thought.'³⁷

However, one must be cautious not to draw too close a parallel between the Czechoslovak and Romanian experience of early 1968. None of the internal reforms emanating from the party in Romania, for example, the return to the pre-Communist division of the country into counties and the restructuring of education, weakened to any degree its leading role. This is not to deny that a measure of 'liberalization' was admitted by the Party. Indeed, Ceausescu in the same March speech invited intellectuals to participate in a discussion about political life in Romania in which they should not show 'the slightest apprehension or reserve in public debates about internal politics.'³⁸ Of equal importance for writers and intellectuals was the plenary meeting of 25 April of the Central Committee at which Lucretiu Patrascanu, executed in 1954, was rehabilitated and the abuses of the Minister of the Interior at the time, Alexandru Draghici, condemned.

At the same time, on the economic level, Romanians were beginning to enjoy the rise in living standards which the whole of Eastern Europe, except Albania, experienced in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. Car ownership increased significantly as the Romanian version of the *Renault*, christened *Dacia*, began to roll off the assembly lines at a newly-built factory in Pitești; the number of cars sold annually jumped from 9,000 in 1965 to 25,000 in 1970, and 45,000 in 1975. Sales of television sets, refrigerators and

³⁷ Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Partei und Literature in Rumänien seit 1945, Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1975, p.148.

³⁸ Ibid.

The Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968)

The stifling of the technocracy left the intellectuals in the forefront of public life. Ironically, it was the Warsaw pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 which allowed Ceausescu to discover that appeals to national sentiment were an efficient mechanism of social control and personal dictatorship. It persuaded him of the rewards to be gained by giving emphasis to national symbols and to his own importance. The huge rally in Bucharest on 21 August and its acclamation of Ceausescu's denunciation of the invasion proved to be his finest hour. It left an indelible mark upon him and whetted an appetite for the excesses of the personality cult. Significantly, Ceausescu's defiance on that day also prompted several prominent writers to join the Romanian Communist Party. Their action shows how superficial it would be to dismiss all postures of writers as being dictated by opportunism or self-interest.

The most forceful affirmation of independence from Soviet dictates was Ceausescu's refusal to participate in, and condemnation of, the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In view of the Romanian party's policy of 'non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another state', propounded in 1964 during its rift with the Soviet Union, Ceausescu's refusal to join the other East European members of the Warsaw Pact in their invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August was hardly surprising; his denunciation

militarily on Romania by using the lever of Warsaw Pact exercises on Romanian soil. By insisting in spring 1970 that such exercises take place *only* on the basis of a bilateral convention between Romania and the Soviet Union⁴³ – no such conventions had existed heretofore – Ceausescu sought to circumscribe the Soviet Union's military assumptions regarding its junior Warsaw Pact partner whilst at the same time erecting a legal obstacle to any Soviet-led use of force against Bucharest.

The Paradox of Foreign Policy

Ceausescu's reaction to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia drew its political justification from the Romanian Central Committee declaration of 1964. This declaration remained throughout the period of Ceausescu's rule the fundamental premise upon which Romanian autonomy within the Warsaw Pact and Comecon was based. Romanian foreign policy under Ceausescu thus showed a continuity after 1968 which, by contrast, domestic policy lacked. In foreign policy, Ceausescu demonstrated the same skill, sensitivity and resourcefulness that had been displayed by Gheorghiu-Dej and Maurer in taking Romania on its autonomous course. In domestic policy, he showed the opposite, becoming tyrannical and insensitive to the needs of the population.

A fellow Communist who shared a cell with Ceausescu before the war detected in him, even at this early age 'an unlimited confidence in himself which was nurtured by his equally unlimited lack of confidence in everyone else and especially in those to whom he was professionally subordinated.'⁴⁴

was most manifest in the preposterous personality cult which was generated around her husband and which, in the course of the 1970s, encompassed her as well as she began to assume more of her husband's powers. Inconsistency, unpredictability, capriciousness and obtuseness became the hallmarks of Ceausescu's rule. It not only humiliated the Romanians, but robbed them of their dignity in their everyday lives and reduced them in the 1980s to an animal state, concerned only with the problems of day-to

of political-educational activity', an emphasis on 'the great achievements recorded by the Romanian people - builder of socialism', the improvement of ... forms of political and ideological training of the Party cadres and members', ' a more rigorous control ... to avoid publication of literary works which do not meet the demands of the political-educational activity of our Party, [of] books which promote ideas and conceptions harmful to the interests of socialist construction'. In the repertoire of 'theatres, operas, ballet and variety theatres', stress was to be laid 'on the promotion of national productions having a militant, revolutionary character'.⁴⁸

President of the Republic

Yet another sign of the degeneration of Ceausescu's rule had been Ion Gheorghe Maurer's decision to retire in 1974. It was Maurer who, above all, gave an element of style and

Economic decline

It was failure in the economic field that was the principal reason behind Romanians' disillusionment with Ceausescu. To a certain extent, he became a victim of the regime's economic achievements of the 1960s. Expectations of an ever-brighter economic future were raised by the increasingly availability of consumer goods in the late 1960s and when cut-backs became the order of the day in the 1970s and 1980s, these hopes were rudely shattered. In the light of Ceausescu's admiration for Stalin, it is not surprising that economic policy should have been characterized by the former's obsession with industrialization and total opposition to any form of private ownership.⁵⁰ He was, therefore, all the more irritated that the champion of economic reforms in the Eastern bloc in 1985 should be the new Soviet leader, Mihail Gorbachev, and his implacable opposition to change was expressed at the November 1985 Central Committee meeting.⁵¹

This ideological fossilization did not mean that Ceausescu left the economy untouched. In fact, quite the reverse was true. He constantly intervened in economic matters, and his attention was typified by his 'working visits' to enterprises in which he would give 'valuable advice' (*indicatii pretioase*). This advice was dutifully recorded by party officials in a ritual of note-taking which characterized such visits and was faithfully implemented, but its application meant that continual adjustments were being made to economic policy and practice which left managers and workers in a daze and merely had the opposite of the desired effect by increasing inefficiency.⁵²

Ceausescu had turned to the West for loans but the country's creditworthiness had been assessed on over-optimistic estimates of its ability to repay through exports since these proved to be of poor quality. Not only did the exports fail to generate the anticipated income, but the energy-intensive heavy industry plants became increasingly voracious

⁵⁰ In an interview with *Newsweek* given four months before his death, Ceausescu displayed his admiration for Stalin: 'In twenty years, Stalin raised Russia from an undeveloped country to the second most powerful country in the world.....He won a war. He built nuclear weapons. He did everything a person should do in his job.' (Quoted from Mark Almond, *The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu*, London: Chapmans, 1992, p.67).

⁵¹ *Scântea*, 21 November 1985.

⁵² Ceausescu's increasing distrust of innovation is reflected in his criticism of the reliance upon electronics in the Romanian defence industry and his claim that old technology was more reliable; see his comments in the Stenogram of the Meeting of the Defence Council of 31 May 1989 (document 31 in this volume).

due to inefficient running. In the mid-1970s Ceausescu expanded Romania's oil-refining capacity in excess of the country's own domestic output, and in 1976 was forced to begin the import of crude oil. When the price of oil soared on the international market in 1978 Romania was caught out and soon faced a major trade deficit. Her problem was exacerbated by the revolution in Iran, a chief supplier to Romania of oil, which put a halt to deliveries.

Nature was also against the régime. A severe earthquake of 1977, followed by floods in 1980 and 1981, disrupted industrial production and reduced the exports of foodstuffs which Ceausescu now looked to in order to pay off the foreign debt incurred through industrialization. In late 1981, the country's foreign debt rose to \$10.2 billion (in 1977 it stood at only \$3.6 billion) and Ceausescu requested its rescheduling. On the recommendation of the IMF imports were reduced and exports, especially of machinery, equipment and petroleum products, increased. The implications of this reduction of imports were not fully appreciated by foreign analysts at the time; since in 1981 Romania had a net importer of food from the West (food imports from the West in that year totalled \$644 millions and exports \$158 millions).⁵³ In the same year, Soviet statistics show that Romania exported 106,000 tons of frozen meat to the Soviet Union. Cutting back on food imports, while at the same time continuing to export meat to the Soviet Union, forced Ceausescu to introduce meat rationing.

More importantly, the very act of having to accept conditions from the Western banks was a great blow to the Romanian leader's inflated pride. On its heels came political isolation which made him less dependent on the support of foreign governments that might have exercised some influence in persuading him to moderate his policies towards his people. He declared defiantly in December 1982 that he would pay off the foreign debt by 1990, and to achieve this introduced a series of austerity measures unparalleled even in the bleak history of East European Communist regimes. Rationing of bread, flour, sugar and milk was introduced in some provincial towns in early 1982, and in 1983 it was extended to most of the country, with the exception of the capital. The monthly personal

⁵³ A.H. Smith, 'The Romanian Enterprise', in Industrial Reform in Socialist Countries, ed. by I. Jeffries, London: Edward Elgar, 1992, p.204.

rations were progressively reduced to the point where, on the eve of the 1989 revolution, they were in some regions of the country one kilo of sugar, one kilo of flour, a 500-gram pack of margarine, and five eggs. At the same time, heavy industry was also called upon to contribute to the export drive, but because its energy needs outstripped the country's generating capacity drastic energy saving measures were introduced in 1981, which included a petrol ration of 30 litres per month for private car owners. Other strictures stipulated a maximum temperature of 14 degrees centigrade in offices and periods of provision of hot water (normally one day a week in flats). In the winter of 1983, these restrictions were extended, causing the interruption of the electricity supply in major cities and reduction of gas pressure during the day so that meals could only be cooked at night. During the severe winter of 1984-85 it was calculated from medical sources in the capital's hospitals that over 30 children had died as a result of unannounced power cuts affecting incubators.

Public Opposition

The miners' strike of 1977 in the Jiu Valley was the most important challenge posed by a group of workers to Communist power in Romania since the spate of protests in Bucharest, Iasi and Cluj triggered by the Hungarian uprising of 1956. The failure of the Romanian media to report the Jiu valley strike characterized its total subservience as a tool to be manipulated by the regime, and illustrated the blackout tactics used by the authorities throughout the postwar era to stifle the passage of potentially 'harmful' information to the populace. Access to information is just as essential for the individual to defend himself against authority as is manipulation of it for the government to protect itself. This control of the media and the 'sanitizing of news' was very effective in containing protest and in inculcating a sense of isolation and frustration amongst protestors, and played a self-fulfilling role: if no opposition to the regime was reported, then most of the public not only assumed that there was none, but, guided by this assumption, questioned the point in displaying any.

Despite this negative attitude, there were courageous yet spasmodic attempts by groups of manual workers to challenge authority. In January 1979, a group of fifteen workers from the naval yards in the Danube port of Turnu Severin approached a Dr Ionel Cana, a

general practitioner who had worked in Olt county amongst workers and had recently moved to Bucharest. Dr Cana had acquired a reputation for helping workers to draw up petitions complaining about labour conditions and he agreed to the men's proposal to set up S.L.O.M.R, the 'Free Trade Union of the Working People of Romania'. The founding declaration was broadcast over Radio Free Europe on 4 March 1979 by Noel Bernard, the head of the Romanian section, and the union attracted more than 2,400 signatures of support from workers in towns such as Ploiesti and Constanta, and Hungarian workers in Târgu Mures and Timisoara. The dissident Orthodox priest Gheorghe Calciu offered to be a spiritual adviser. The group circulated a manifesto calling for the legalization of unofficial trade unions and observance of the right to free association. In April the union, in an open letter to Ceausescu, protested against the arrest of its members, among them Cana and an economist, Gheorghe Brasoveanu, the latter being confined to a psychiatric institution in March. Cana's successor as chairman, Nicolae Dascalu, was sentenced in June to 18 months in prison for allegedly passing state secrets to Amnesty International.

The growing economic hardship imposed on the country by Ceausescu sparked off more strikes in the early 1980s. Miners in seven metal mines in the Maramures region of northern Transylvania went on strike in September 1983 in protest at wage cuts introduced under a new wage law. Security police were sent in to break up the strike. Following a reduction of the daily bread ration to 300 grams per person and pay cuts of up to 40% for failure to fill output targets, Romanian and Hungarian workers went on strike in November 1986 at the Heavy Machine Plant and the Refrigeration Plant in Cluj, and at the glass factory in Turda. Leaflets in both languages demanding 'meat and bread' and 'milk for our children' circulated in Cluj, thus demonstrating inter-ethnic solidarity. Party officials rushed food to the factories and promised to meet the workers' grievances, whereupon the strikers returned to work, but just as in the Jiu valley in 1977 the *securitate* launched an investigation into the organization of the strike and several workers were moved to other areas.

Within three months unrest had spread to the east of the country, encompassing for the first time in decades both workers and students. Once again, wage cuts imposed for failure to meet production targets and food supply problems were the trigger. On 16

February 1987, some 1000 employees at the Nicolina rolling stock works in the Moldavian capital of Iasi marched on the Party headquarters protesting at the pay cuts. Their demands were quickly met. On the following day, in what appears to have been an uncoordinated action, several thousand students from the university and polytechnic marched through the centre of the city in protest at the power and heating cuts imposed in

lorries and tractors was largely for export, and whose workers were formerly amongst the best-

Eastern bloc allies, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and East Germany, while Hungary went even further and joined the resolution's sponsors. The resolution highlighted the rural resettlement (systematization) plan and the country's treatment of its ethnic minorities, drawing attention to the many thousands of Hungarian refugees who had fled Transylvania in the preceding months.

These moves taken by the international community coincided with the growing disaffection with Ceau]escu within senior political circles. On 10 March 1989, an open letter to the President was made public by the BBC bearing the signatures of six veteran figures in the Party. Three of them were former members of the Political Executive Committee (Politburo): Gheorghe Apostol, First Secretary of the Party from April 1954 to October 1955; Alexandru B[rl]deanu, the Party's leading economist who played a key role in charting Romania's autonomy from the Soviet Union; and Constantin P[arvulescu] who was a founding member of the RCP in 1921 and one of its secretaries for a brief period from April 1944 until 1945. The other signatories were Silviu Brucan, Corneliu Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1961 to 1972 and President of the UN

confirmed by the dismissal on 17 March 1989 of the poet Mircea Dinescu from the Party and from the editorial staff of the literary weekly *România literara* and his placement

the opening national anthem applause broke out amongst the 3,308 delegates, and to the accompaniment of rhythmic clapping chants of 'Ceausescu re-elected at the 14th congress!', 'Ceausescu, RCP!', 'Ceausescu and the people!', 'Ceausescu, Romania !', and

such was the case with the decree requiring the registration of typewriters with the police which was revived in a decree which came into force in April 1983, and with a provision of Gheorghiu-Dej, introduced in 1958, which made failing to report a conversation with a foreigner a criminal offence (decree no. 408 of December 1985). Photocopying machines were a rarity, and the few that were available in national libraries were closely supervised and special permission was required for their use. The materials and number of copies made were carefully recorded by a librarian.

The degree of Ceausescu's interference with the lives of individuals was most potently illustrated by measures of family planning. Abortion on demand had been legalized in 1957 and became the principal means of family planning. When the 1966 birth rate dropped to 14 per thousand people (much the same as in Britain), thereby heralding a decline in the workforce and a threat to the pace of the country's industrialization, the law was adjusted to allow abortion only to women over 40, mothers of four or more children, victims of rape and incest, and in cases of possible foetal abnormality. After the 1966 law went into effect, the abortion-related mortality rate among Romanian women increased to a level ten times that of any other European country. Since contraceptives, while not illegal, were virtually unobtainable, many women used abortion as the main method of birth control and were forced to obtain it illegally.

From a peak of 21 per thousand people in 1969 the birth rate showed an annual decline thereafter, due both to the increase in the number of illegal abortions and the fall in living standards in the late 1970s. Figures for 1981 showing the birth rate at 6 per thousand people led Ceausescu to insist that steps be taken to reverse this trend. Prime Minister Constantin Dascalescu took up this theme in a speech in September 1983. In March 1984,

conduct monthly examinations of factory women in Bucharest and to ask each one of them if she was pregnant, and if not, why not. In fact they consistently falsified records in

worth the price. The question was put even more frequently after Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet party leader in March 1985. By the time Gorbachev visited Romania in May 1987, a remarkable one hundred and eighty degree turn had occurred in Romanians' perception of the Soviet Union and its relationship to Romania. This change in attitude hinged on the evolution of Ceausescu himself: if in 1965 Ceausescu presented a young, dynamic face of Communism compared with the ageing, reactionary Brezhnev, now, thirty years later, it was Gorbachev who had assumed Ceausescu's mantle and the latter that of Brezhnev. In a speech broadcast live during his visit to Bucharest on 26 May

that Reagan would grant MFN treatment without the Jackson-Vanik but in doing so completely failed to appreciate how negative his image had become in Congress as well the constitutional impediments facing the US president.⁶⁹

Systematization

Of the thousands of exhortations made by Ceausescu to the Romanian people none was seized upon with more alacrity by the international media than his call, made in the name of 'systematization', that 'we must radically reduce the number of villages from about 13,000 at present to

in terms of attracting media attention, and in providing moral support to the Romanian people, was *Opération Villages Roumains*.

This movement recommended that European villages 'adopt' Romanian ones. Tens of thousands of letters addressed to the mayors of Romanian villages proposing 'adoption' were sent from European communities to Romania as the numbers of adoptive villages grew: by the beginning of May 1989, 231 communes in Belgium, 95 in France, and 42 in Switzerland had adopted Romanian villages. The British campaign, mounted in June with the backing of HRH The Prince of Wales, who in an unprecedented political intervention by a member of the Royal Family had condemned the systematization programme in a speech delivered on 27 April 1989, had secured 52 adoptions by September. As soon as a village in the West adopted a Romanian one the news was broadcast by the Romanian services of the BBC and Radio Free Europe and visitors returning from Romania reported the gratitude expressed to them by Romanians for the outside support. In the autumn of 1989, children throughout Belgium built 250,000 small paper houses as a symbolical present to the children of Romania and exhibited them in the village of Floreffe. One year later the exhibition occupied the vast floor of the 'House of the Republic', Ceausescu's former 'House of the People'.

Through his plans for systematization Ceausescu succeeded in imprinting Romania upon the consciousness of Europe for only the second time in his career. The first occasion had

apartment blocs in Otopeni. In the case of Buda and Odoreanu, in the county of Giurgiu, these were evacuated to make way for a large reservoir being constructed as part of the Bucharest-Danube canal.

Whether the international campaign eventually led Ceausescu to temper his policy of bulldozing homes in the summer and autumn of 1989, as some foreign diplomats alleged, is an open question, but at least we have no evidence that it was accelerated, as was the case with the works to complete the presidential complex in the centre of Bucharest. What the campaign did achieve was to let the Romanian people know that their villages would not, as one campaigner has written, borrowing a line from the poet Dylan Thomas, 'go silent into that dark night', forgotten by the rest of Europe.⁷¹ What no one associated with the campaign could have foreseen was that the links established between communities throughout Europe and the villages in Romania provided the perfect springboard for humanitarian aid to be channelled to an identifiable destination after Ceausescu's overthrow. The full enormity of the dictator's rule and the suffering it caused prompted adoptive communities in Europe to target their own Romanian villages as recipients of food, clothing, medicines, and practical aid. Hospitals and children's homes in the area became the special focus of attention. Thousands of ordinary European citizens travelled overland in convoys to their own adopted village with aid supplies and having assessed the needs of the Romanian community, made return visits.

Systematization under Ceausescu was not just a planning process; it was an attempt at social engineering. It threatened to destroy traditional skills, a way of life linked with the land, and the individuality of the village and its inhabitants. Ceausescu's obstinacy procured a success, in his terms, for his plan but its execution trampled on the moral being of his citizens. The plan, like so many of his other infamous edicts, such as the abortion decree, eventually provoked a reaction in that moral being which led to the dictator's downfall. Few localities in Romania do not show the mark of systematization; the suffering that the plan caused is less easy to identify.

⁷¹ J. Loraine, 'Operation Ursoaia': Porlock's Village in Romania, privately printed in 1990.

A protest which sparked off a revolt

Among the persistent critics of the Communist Party's interference in the affairs of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Transylvania were Istvan Tokes, a former deputy bishop, and his son Laszlo, a pastor, who had initially been appointed to a parish in the Transylvanian town of Dej. Laszlo was a contributor to *Ellenpontok*, a clandestine Hungarian-language journal produced in Oradea in 1981 and 1982, and amongst his articles was one on abuses of human rights in Romania, which led to his harassment by the *securitate*. He and his friends were followed and eventually Tokes was dismissed from his parish in Dej by order of bishop Nagy and assigned to the village of Sânpietru

pastor's safety.

Parishioners continued to smuggle in food and firewood for Tokes to the sacristy of the church, despite the attention of *securitate* agents. On 28 November, Tokes was informed

Furiously the mayor stormed out of the flat, to the jeers of the crowd. At noon he returned, complaining angrily to Tokes that the protesters had not left. Tokes took the mayor to the window and invited him to address the people. The mayor gave an assurance that Tokes would not be evicted but to no avail. Some in the crowd accused the pastor of collaborating with the authorities. 'We want it in writing', they cried, and added to their demand a retraction of the decision to transfer Tokes to Mineu, and confirmation of his appointment as pastor in Timisoara.

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On 18 December, industrial workers in Timisoara staged peaceful protests in their tens of thousands within the factory gates but on 20 December these overflowed into the streets and effectively brought an end to Communist rule in the city. The crowds proclaimed Timisoara a free city and this two days before Ceausescu fled from Bucharest. On the streets of Timisoara there were chants of 'Today in Timisoara, tomorrow throughout the whole land', and the fervour there was gradually transmitted to all those who had been waiting for years for the end of the dictatorship. Romanians learned from Western radio stations details of the number of dead in Timisoara. The figures given were exaggerated but nevertheless it was clear to the audience that grave events were taking place in the city.

Despite the gravity of the situation, Ceausescu made a brief visit to Iran, leaving his wife and Manea Manescu in charge at home. On his return on 20 December, he made a series of tactical errors, which led to his lightning downfall. In a televised address to the nation that evening, he completely misjudged the mood of the people by displaying no hint of compassion for the victims of Timisoara - rumoured by this time to number tens of thousands -, and by dismissing the demonstrations as the work of 'fascists' and hooligan elements', inspired by Hungarian irredentism.

His second mistake was to convene a public meeting of support on the next morning in Bucharest. To his bewilderment, his speech was interrupted by cries of 'We are not hooligans' by a protester whose proximity to the microphones caused them to be heard by sections of the crowd. Those around him panicked for fear of being identified by the *securitate* as accomplices in the cries and dropped their banners of support for Ceausescu which were trampled under foot. The sound of cracking produced by the breaking of the wooden poles carrying the banners resembled gunshots and led the crowd to flee. The sound of the commotion was heard in the background of the live television and radio coverage of Ceausescu's speech and the broadcast was cut for several minutes. When he resumed his speech, Ceausescu attempted to placate the crowd by announcing salary and pension increases, but this stratagem only angered them further. At the end of his speech, large groups of young people remained in the city centre and, encouraged by the mild, unseasonal weather, lingered into the evening, and formed a barricade in University

Square. During the night they were fired upon by units of the army and of the *securitate* troops, and many were shot dead.

On the following morning of 22 December, a communiqué was broadcast on television in which the demonstrators were dismissed as 'hooligans', 'Fascists' and 'foreign agents' ; at the same time, it was announced that Defence Minister Vasile Milea was a traitor and had committed suicide. Senior army commanders, on learning of Milea's death, ordered the units in front of the Central Committee to withdraw. At the same time, waves of protesters were coming in the other direction from all parts of the city. They assembled in front of the central Committee building and began to chant: 'Ceausescu should be judged for the bloodshed', and 'Yesterday in Timisoara, tomorrow throughout the whole land'. When Ceausescu appeared briefly at the window of the balcony of the Central Committee, stones were thrown and he was hustled inside.

suspects. By whom is not yet clear.

We should bear in mind that mass demonstrations against Ceausescu occurred only in a small number of Romania's cities and that in the majority there was a relative calm. The greatest anti-Ceausescu demonstrations before 22 December were in Timisoara, Bucharest, Cluj, Arad, and Sibiu, but in the majority of towns in Moldavia and Wallachia there was an uneasy calm. The violent manner of Ceausescu's demise set Romania's experience of political change apart from that of the other Central European states and was itself an indication that in Romania the peaceful overthrow of dictatorship was impossible. Whereas Ceausescu succeeded in uniting Romanians in opposition to him, his fall threw them into confusion. The legacy of totalitarian rule in Romania was therefore markedly different from that elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION

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leadership to participate in the repression of the Hungarian revolution.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders did not consider ally participation in invasion necessary.

Pushing for rapid intervention, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was acting at the time as an “Orthodox communist.” In a meeting of the Romanian Workers’ Party Central Committee (CC RWP) Politburo, December 1st, 1956, he told the other members of the Romanian leadership that he considered Romanian participation “a necessary international duty.”⁸² His position can be primarily understood as influenced by the fear that the events in Hungary could spill over into neighboring Romania. The Bucharest authorities watched very closely the population’s mood, dealing harshly with any manifestations considered “counter-revolutionary.”

The evolution of events in 1956 had placed Dej in a very complex situation. On one hand he felt threatened by the destalinization process promoted by Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at the 20th CPSU Congress which partly revealed Stalin’s crimes and abuses. The rapidity and radicalism of the Hungarian uprising hinted at the fragility of the East European communist regimes. As a consequence, the political survival of the Bucharest regime and its leaders was dependent upon Moscow’s support.⁸³ An important consequence of this insecurity was Romania’s attitude within the Warsaw Pact during the early years. Primarily, it prompted Bucharest to offer its unconditional fidelity to Soviet political directives aimed at repressing any attempt by Hungary and Poland to take advantage of the destalinization process for their own ends.

The decision to withdraw the Soviet troops from Romania in May 1958 represents a strong argument supporting this interpretation. Their legal status had been radically changed after the conclusion of the State Treaty with Austria (May 1955). The legitimacy

signing of the treaty, Bucharest's acquiescence to the presence of Romanian territory was decisive for Moscow's ability to continue the occupation.

The interpretations of historiography related to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania vary. Many Romanian historians emphasized, before and after 1989, the role played by the Romanian communist leadership, in allegedly persuading Khrushchev to order the withdrawal. There is little doubt that the initiative belonged to the Romanian leadership, especially to Defense Minister and Politburo Member Emil Bodnarus. It was Bodnarus who asked Khrushchev in 1955 for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, Bodnarus request was firmly rejected by the Soviet leadership.⁸⁵ In the end, however, Khrushchev finally agreed to withdraw the Soviet troops from Romania, in part for reasons independent of Bucharest's desires. The historiographical cliché of Romanian national-communist, suggesting that Bucharest had succeeded in "forcing" the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Romania still lacks documentary support.

Other interpretations of the Soviet Army's withdrawal from Romania underlined the firm interest Moscow had in carrying out this unprecedented step.⁸⁶ At the time, the Soviet leadership sought to reduce military expenses in order to redirect the freed resources toward the civilian field. It was in the late 1950's that the Kremlin had begun a process of redistributing Soviet capital toward the production of consumer goods. The power struggle between Khrushchev and the Molotov group had begun, among other causes, due to divergent concerns on prioritizing the investments. Still other historians argued that the idea that the withdrawal was one proof of the emergence in the Kremlin's leadership of the idea of establishing a policy of peaceful coexistence.⁸⁷ Still others argue that the "relative strategic insignificance" of Romania influenced Moscow's decision to withdraw.⁸⁸

Romania's unconditional political support for Moscow's policy, support Bucharest had demonstrated on numerous previous occasions, played an important role in

⁸⁴ see, among others, Paul Niculescu Mizil, *O istorie traita. Memorii*, vol. I, Bucharest, 2002, pp. 102-103, 111; Lavinia Betea, *Maurer si lumea de ieri. Marturii despre stalinizarea Romaniei* (Interview with Gheorghe Apostol), Arad, 1995, pp. 263-264; Ioan Scurtu, *Romania si retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, Bucharest, 1996, pp. 41-44; Khrushchev, *op. cit.*, 481-482

⁸⁵ Khrushchev, *op. cit.*, p. 482

⁸⁶ Florin Constantiniu, *op.cit.*, pp. 491-492

⁸⁷ Ioan Scurtu, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 49-50

⁸⁸ Ana Locher, *op.cit.*, p.14.

the Kremlin's final decision. That aspect of Romania's foreign policy was well understood outside the Socialist camp. An intelligence report dated October 1958 of the United States Army Headquarters, Europe, (G2) underlined that, even as the Warsaw Pact had announced the reduction of 55,000 men in the Romanian armed forces at the same time as the withdrawal of the Soviet military forces from Romania, there was little evidence of a possible change in the nature of the Soviet system.⁸⁹ While the report suggested that "in view of the Soviet troops withdrawal, we anticipate continued but unsuccessful efforts to align the Romanian military forces with the Warsaw Pact concept" it added that "Romanian regime [had] instituted a new series of repressive measures."⁹⁰

Romania's opposition toward Soviet hegemony, arguably begun sometime between 1962 and 1964, included an event which remains unclear. The Cuban Missile Crisis brought into question Bucharest's attitude regarding the fulfillment of its obligations as a member of the Warsaw Pact in case of a war with NATO. The Crisis centered on Khrushchev's decision to install Intermediate Nuclear Missiles in Cuba, one of the most controversial decisions of the Soviet leadership. The escalating tension in the region brought mankind to the edge of a nuclear war.

Historians have outlined two hypotheses to explain the decision taken by Kremlin. The first suggested that the Soviet move was defensive, seeking to establish nuclear parity with the United States of America, since Washington possessed nuclear weapons and their vectors of transport in Turkey. Khrushchev, they argue, wanted to make a similar move, installing missiles in Cuba, in the close proximity of the United States.⁹¹ Other historians have argued that Khrushchev's move was driven by his desire to pressure Washington in making concessions over Berlin.⁹²

Regardless of which explanation is correct one thing remains certain: Moscow had acted unilaterally, without consulting its Warsaw Pact allies. Especially critical was the fact Moscow, acting in the name of the alliance, took measures such as increasing combative capacity of Joint Warsaw Pact Armed Forces (JWPAF) without informing their respective national governments. Romanian President of the Council of Ministers,

⁸⁹ *Periodic Intelligence Report 3- 5823*, 1 October 1958. Headquarters US Army Europe, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Excerpts, National Archives, Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, boxes 115-1156, file 9, on the website <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php>

Indeed, Corneliu Manescu's report given to the leadership on his return to Bucharest remains silent in this regard.⁹⁸ He underlined that he had met Dean Rusk at the latter's request – this fact is consistently emphasized, as if someone had to be convinced that he, Manescu personally, could not have had something to communicate to his interlocutor—

interests represents a firm position, not a circumstantial one.”¹⁰⁰ Dej, referring to the difference with the Soviet Union, pointed out that it was clear that Romania’s attitude gave Western countries the impression that “there are some people who oppose Moscow” in the Bucharest. “Objectively,” Dej continued, “this is the case. And we do not have to be shy about recognizing that there are divergences.”¹⁰¹

Further documentary evidence for these divergences could be presented but they do not go so far as to prove that Romania adopted the position of neutrality indicated by Romania’s foreign minister in October 1963 mentioned above in front of his American counterpart.

Nevertheless, the subsequent attitude of Bucharest confirms, indirectly, Raymond Garthoff’s statement on Romania’s early disassociation with the Warsaw Pact. The 19 February 1969 discussions between Nicolae Ceausescu and Marshal I. I. Yakubovski, Commander-in-Chief of the JWPAF and V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy of the USSR’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, provides us with some valuable documentary evidences. The Romanian side asked for the insertion of the word “all” in article 12 of the Warsaw Pact Statute which referred to the rights of the Commander-in-Chief of the JWPAF and evaluation of the degree of danger of war by the allies of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet part supported the exclusion of this word from the content of the article.¹⁰²

The Romanian side emphasized that the word “all” must be included in order to express the will of all Warsaw Pact’s members. As Ion Gheorghe Maurer stated:

The situation is clear: in such a problem, which could unleash the military mechanism of the Warsaw Treaty, not all of us might be of the same opinion. But you are right that such a word could mean a veto and some countries, for instance six of the seven member states could ask themselves: why can’t we, six countries, act in accordance with our common opinion just because the seventh country doesn’t agree with us?

¹⁰⁰ *Stenogram of the meeting between Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej and Mircea samev5could m413 Tc 1.n3y0:810.2741 M*

This doesn't mean that this seventh country must accept the decision taken by the other six countries.¹⁰³

What the Romanian side was asking for was that, in the event of conflict, a possible position of dissidence would be recorded in the status of the working mechanism of the Warsaw Pact and thus, such dissidence would become legal. What is especially surprising is Soviet opposition toward Bucharest's request, despite a lack of arguments in order to support this opposition.

It is clear that part of the reasoning for such a request from Bucharest developed after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Nicolae Ceausescu alluded to this event: "I'd like to tell you sincerely, openly and not diplomatically; there were meetings to which Romania has been neither invited nor consulted."¹⁰⁴ The decision to invade came as a surprise to the Romanian leadership. Shortly thereafter, Bucharest sought to deny Moscow any pretext of legality for the military intervention, and acted to prevent Warsaw Pact authorities from contacting subordinate structures in Romania, i.e. the Ministry of National Defense.

Yet, Bucharest's insistence on the inclusion of unanimous appreciation of the danger of war and, implicitly, the decision to launch it, could also be viewed in a different light. More precisely, the Romanian position could be seen as an attempt to gain legal support for

For the Bucharest leadership, this position was not conflicting with its proposals for concomitantly dissolving the Warsaw Pact and NATO. “For the Soviets”, Bodnaras added, “NATO serves as the sole remaining justification for maintaining the Red's Army's occupation troops in Eastern Europe.”¹⁰⁶ The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Romanians seem to argue, would have led to the disappearance of the Soviet “hegemony” in Eastern Europe and would have invalidated the decisions made at the 1945 Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers, highlighting “that Eastern Europe was not the exclusive province of one great power.”¹⁰⁷ It was US president Richard M. Nixon's visit to Romania in 2-3 August 1969 through which the Romanians, Bodnaras asserted, had hoped to show just that.

There is other circumstantial evidence that could be cited in support of Garthoff's thesis, i.e. the legal challenge of the Warsaw Pact opened by Romania in 1963. Although fleshing out Romania's stand regarding Soviet domination and its effort to increase its own freedom of action in the international arena, this evidence should not lead to the conclusion that in October 1963 Corneliu Manescu had effectively suggested to Rusk that Romania was adopting a status of neutrality vis-à-vis the United States. Questioned on this issue in 1997, Manescu declared that he was trying

to make Dean Rusk understand that Romania is not a country of war, that Romania is not an enthusiastic partner of the Warsaw Treaty, that we do not support the war between the two opposite military pacts, that we could adopt a reasonable stand, regardless of the problem in discussion.¹⁰⁸

Is it possible that Bucharest did not realize the fact that the USA would consider Manescu's communication as a “declaration of neutrality” in the case of a war between USSR and USA, and consequently between NATO and the Warsaw Pact? The evidence suggests that the answer to this question is affirmative.

In the history of Communist Romania, “The April 1964 Declaration,” known then as the “Declaration on the position of the Romanian Workers Party regarding the

¹⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 166

¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 169

¹⁰⁸ Mircea Suci, *Criza rachetelor din Cuba si apropierea romano-americana*, in “Dosarele Istoriei”, nr. 6/1997, p. 30

problems of the international communist and workers' movement adopted by the enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party of April 1964," and referred to as the "1964 Declaration of Independence," represents another turning point.¹⁰⁹ Many Romanian historians consider it as being the most important public act of autonomous provenience for laying the foundation of the future anti-hegemonic, and implicitly anti-Soviet, orientation of Romania foreign policy.

It was the April 1964 Declaration that marked the beginning of the public process of steadily increasing the distance between Moscow and Bucharest, of Romania's adoption of an autonomous position in the international arena--especially as it related to the International Communist Movement—and the beginning of a new course in the foreign policy that later brought to Romania a nickname of "rebel ally" or "maverick ally" inside the Warsaw Pact. It would be difficult to minimize the --e the

example.¹¹¹ Bucharest's refusal to Romania's economic accept subordination to Moscow's whims, especially with regard to economic matters, is another.¹¹² Other measures included the closing of the Soviet bookshop Cartea Rusa [Russian Book], the Romanian-Russian Museum, the "Maxim Gorki" Russian Language Institute, the Romanian-Soviet Institute, ceasing the publication of the Timpuri Noi [New Times] Review, as well as changing the former Russian names of streets, institutions and towns, etc., all actions aimed at reducing the visibility of Soviet opinion in Romania.¹¹³

Recently declassified documents from the Romanian archives allow us to propose a new vision of the "April 1964 Declaration." On 18 March 1964, the CC of the RWP Politburo met to discuss the results of the Romanian delegation to China and North Korea. That same delegation had stopped in the Soviet Union on its way back to Bucharest and had met Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership. The delegation, led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Emil Bodnaras, Chivu Stoica and Nicolae Ceausescu visited China between 2 and 11 March, and North Korea between 12 and 13 March, meet the Soviets at Pitzunda Gagra on 15 March 1964. The minutes of the Politburo meeting came after an initial report forwarded by Maurer to Dej after the delegation returned home.¹¹⁴ During the meeting, Maurer suggested that

During the talks we had, Khrushchev expressed his opinion and told us that maybe it would be an appropriate thing that Romania, as a country having the initiative related with ceasing the polemic [with the Chinese Communist Party], should propose the signing of an appeal by both

Moreover, Khrushchev and the members of the Romanian delegation discussed even the text of the envisaged appeal. “We reached the conclusion” Maurer continued, “that launching such an appeal would not be a bad thing, of course, provided its form be

find out about the declaration only after it was issued, exactly what Khrushchev had asked the Romanians to do. The declaration was intended to force a Chinese refusal of the dialogue while showing the openness of the Soviet side for negotiation and mutual understanding. In acquiescing to Khrushchev's request, Bucharest played Moscow's card.

Khrushchev also made an additional suggestion of indisputable importance in the genesis of the declaration: to award the Dej the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The nature of this proposal by Khrushchev is significant: "if we agree with, we should tell [Khrushchev] so that he could make this news public, and if we do not, to tell him also, whispering in his ear, so that he does not follow it through."¹²⁰ On Dej's insistence, CC RWP Politburo decided that Khrushchev should award Dej the Soviet Union's highest prize, the Lenin Order and prize, which in their opinion would seem more appropriate than the title of hero of the Soviet Union, usually given to Soviet citizens.

Why is the "April 1964 Declaration" and its genesis so important when analyzing the issue of Romania's relation with the Warsaw Pact? As mentioned before, the declaration was the turning point of Romania's *public deviation* in its foreign policy. From then on, relations with the West were to be developed in the perspective of a kind of balance with the unilateralism and hegemony of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the trend of the internal evolutions aimed at renouncing the hard Stalinism of the previous period. However, these changes did not bring about an authentic liberalization of Romanian society.

Furthermore, the declaration's importance emerges from the ample debate within Romania's foreign policy. The declaration was made inside the Tw () Tj 0 -20.9302 29 0.053Tj 10 0.3655 Tw

that the criticism directed at the Soviet leadership was intended by the RWP leadership in order to acquire legitimacy based on a public support.

An important document both on internal and international levels, the April 1964 Declaration was issued following Khrushchev's suggestion. Only subsequently was the Declaration "exploited" to serve important but hidden objectives benefiting the Bucharest regime. One of Bucharest's primary objectives was to distance itself from Moscow's hegemony—while coercing Moscow into publicly supporting the action by stating its agreement with the issuing of such a document and its willingness in editorially contribute to the declaration's final version.¹²¹

If the "Declaration" induced among the general public a particular state of mind, no longer justifying the presence of the country inside the Warsaw Pact, did the communist regime react accordingly? The simple answer is that they did not. Romania was not interested in leaving the Warsaw Pact—that is to take full advantage of its supposed independence from Moscow, an issue that came up during the public debates following the publication of the document.¹²²

Foreign policy, however, was not the only field in which the Romanian leadership sought to challenge Soviet dominance. The RWP challenge was also extended to Communist intra-bloc policy. In this case, the directions had been already established through Romanian opposition of economic integration within Comecon¹²³ and politico-military integration within the Warsaw Pact in order to increase her autonomy at the international level. Romania's attitude toward the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and toward the Soviet led attempt to include the Mongolian People's Republic in the Warsaw Pact in 1963 are just two examples of Bucharest's reticence to follow the Soviet line. Ion

¹²¹ The document underlined that the communist countries "established as a base for the (international – *our note*) relations among them the principles of national sovereignty and independence, equal rights, reciprocal advantage, comrade-like mutual help, non-interference in the internal affairs, respect of territorial integrity, principles of socialist internationalism". Such principles had been already written down in many documents issued by the international communist authorities, but the "Declaration" underlined that they represented "an objective necessity" and "any wrong action related with them cannot but bring sources of misunderstandings and dissent", by affecting "the cohesion of a community of independent states".

¹²² The author of these lines remembers himself how the text of the "April 1964 Declaration" was explained to the pupils from a college in Ploiesti (a town near Bucharest). From each class of the town's high schools a number of pupils were selected to take part to the meeting with a representative of the Romanian Workers Party, sent from the "Center". Of course, the inevitable question about "when will Romania leave the Warsaw Pact?" came from audience. The representative of the party sent from Bucharest tried to utter several phrases as an answer, and then the meeting was unexpectedly closed.

¹²³ Mihai Retegan, *Razboi politic in blocul comunist....*, passim. See also Paul Niculescu Mizil, *op. cit.*, passim

Gheorghe Maurer's statements in 1964 concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis reveal the tense situation inside the Warsaw Pact.

Missiles were sent to Cuba. We did not know about that. For the moment, we do not bring any charges upon this case and we pose no problem to anyone. The existence of these missiles in Cuba brought some tension in the international relations /.../. Within this tension, at a certain moment, a certain policy occurred. The unique or supreme Command and Control of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty issued an order for all the armies taking part in this group of military forces to be placed in a state of alert. There is an article 3 in the text of the Warsaw Treaty binding all the signing countries to consult among themselves in regard with the most important political international issues. I am asking: wouldn't these problems require such a consultation? Or at least the order to place in a state of alert the armies of the member states, wouldn't it require a previous consultation? Here are the problems?...? These orders are issued, these actions are put in practice, and no one is consulted. At least, we were not.¹²⁴

Practically, after 1964 the Bucharest leadership opened a large front for acquiring its liberty of action at international level and for limiting interference from the Soviet Union. Its actions aimed both at defying the Soviet monopoly concerning the issues of the international communist and workers movement, and at avoiding the economic integration promoted by Moscow, as a means of consolidating autonomy on the international stage.

In January 1965 the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact was held in Warsaw. At this meeting Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej qualified Moscow's demand for the exclusion of Albania from the Pact as being "illegal," arguing that the exclusion should be repealed.¹²⁵ The Romanian leader further rejected the suggestion that the PCC make a connection between condemning the proposal for the creation of NATO's Multinational Nuclear Forces (MNF) by NATO and the Warsaw Pact proposal of a draft of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Archival documents are still missing, preventing a clear picture of why the Romanians adopted that position. A

Romanians argued, was what happened during the 1961 Berlin Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, forcing the national armed forces to conform to JWPAF orders without the ability of the national governments and national commands to discuss the situation.

Raising the specter of the Berlin crisis, the Romanian delegation suggested that "the Commander-in-Chief, without consulting [the Romanians], asked for a mobilization of several battalions and divisions (*unitati si mari unitati*), temporary raising the number of Romanians under arms by about 12,000 men. He also asked for military exercises with or without combat troops to be performed and suggested the deployment of some battalions and divisions outside their permanent garrisons, etc, etc."¹³⁰ During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the same procedure was employed, the delegation stated. Once again, without having consulted the national defense ministers and without having secured the approval of member-states' governments, the Commander-in-Chief "gave orders for the enhancement of the combat capability of all troops composing the Joint Armed Forces."¹³¹ In such a way, the delegation charged, "[Warsaw] Pact member-states were faced with the possibility that they would be entering a war without the expressed decision of the party [leadership] and government--the supreme organs of state power."¹³²

The Romanian delegation submitted a series of proposals aimed at preventing the transformation of Warsaw Pact military structures of the Warsaw Pact into "supra-state" organizations, capable of defying the independence and sovereignty of member states removing the need for any "consultation" with their political leadership. These proposals initially suggested that "the Statute and all the other documents, which provide regulations for the work of this Command, should be based on the idea that only the party and the government of each state are responsible for the leadership, the structure, the procurement activities and the training of all their armed forces, whether in time of peace or war."¹³³ The Romanian side also requested that the establishment of a Military Council of the Command, as a deliberative organ, to take decisions on the basis of unanimity. The

¹³⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 5-6

¹³¹ *Ibidem*, f. 6. See also *Memoranda of Army General Leontin Salajan, Minister of the Armed Forces, forwarded to Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the CC of the RCP, regarding the discussions of 3 May 1966 with Army General, M.I. Kazakov, Chief of Staff of the UAF of the Warsaw Pact, 9 May 1966, R.M.A., Fund V2, vol. 3, File no. 8/61, f. 8-9*

¹³² *The position of the delegation of the Romania's Ministry of the Armed Forces during the Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Warsaw Treaty member states, February 1966, Moscow, R.M.A., Fund V2, File 4/34, f. 6*

¹³³ *Ibidem*, p. 7

Military Council should examine all the matters within its attributes. It will consist of the Commander-in-Chief, as president, his deputies and the chief of the General Staff, as

proposals on the coordination—not commanding - role of the JWPAF Command, the subordination of troops committed to JWPAF to their national military command, the proportional representation of the officers of member states within the JWPAF General Staff, and the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief of the JWPAF Command.

Council, the method of appointing the Chief of the JWPAF General Staff and the deputies of Commander-in-Chief for anti-aircraft defense and procurement, the subordination of the troops taking part in the JWPAF to their national command and the proportional representation in the JWPAF command structure of the participating troops were implemented, other concerns voiced by Bucharest had been rejected outright.¹⁴³ Of particular concern to Bucharest was the right attributed to the JWPAF Commander-in-Chief to command all troops, irrespective of their nationality, once the JWPAF had been committed to a joint action. The ministry of defense concluded that:

a) the wide prerogatives attributed to the PCC by the proposal were contradicting the role of a consultative structure established by the Warsaw Treaty;

b) the draft of Joint Command Statute had stipulations “contradicting the principles of mutual cooperation and assistance on the basis of observance of national sovereignty, independence, and non-interference in the internal affairs, provided by the [Warsaw] Treaty.” These stipulations, the analysis concluded, “affect the essential attributes of the participant states.”

c) the Statute of the Military Council of the JWPAF provided that half plus one of the members’ votes would be necessary to adopt recommendations or proposals. The Romanian experts considered that such a principle “cannot be applied in the relations among states and parties. Enforcing such a practice in the international relations is unacceptable.”

d) adopting the Statute of the Unified Air Defense System “would practically lead to the subordination of all [national anti-aircraft systems] to the Warsaw Pact’s Unified Air Defense System Commander.”¹⁴⁴

In conclusion, the Romanian experts suggested, “a change in position of the Soviet part, regarding the provisions introduced within the documents, giving to the Commander-in-Chief, the General Staff, and the Warsaw Pact Unified Air Defense Commander the right to command and to exert their control over all the troops committed for joint action by the signatory states of the Warsaw Treaty” was apparent.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ *Ibidem*, f. 3-4

¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 4-9

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 9

The Romanian Armed Forces Ministry asked the leadership to extend its negotiating mandate to a) to uphold its own point of view, previously approved by the party leadership in 1966; b) to agree with the draft of the Statute of the Military Council, with the provisional condition that the recommendations and the proposals of the Military Council be adopted unanimously; and c) to maintain that the draft Statute of the integrated anti-aircraft system be adopted in accordance with the same principles, previously supported by the Romanian side.

Understanding consequences of their proposal, Defense Minister Ion Ionita wrote in his report that „it would be very possible that the point of view of the delegation of the Ministry of Romanian Armed Forces be rejected.”¹⁴⁶ If the proposal was rejected, General Ionita continued, the different position adopted by the Romanian delegation be included in a protocol, “stating that [Romania] will not work in accordance with the provisions” of the documents, because it believes “[the documents] contradict the principles of the equality between all the states of the alliance, of national independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in the internal affairs, thus transforming the Political Consultative Committee and the JWPAF Command into supra-state organs.”¹⁴⁷ In the end, the report by General Ionita reached a amazingly candid political conclusion; “On the basis of such a position, the Socialist Republic of Romanian *is de facto positioning itself outside the joint military structures of the Warsaw Treaty*, without declaring it is leaving the [Warsaw] Treaty.”¹⁴⁸ (emphasis added) The report, dated June 1968, was the result of analysis carried out by the Romanian Armed forces command, and mirrored the obstinate and uncompromising road taken for reaching the objectives established by the April 1964 declaration. Less than three months later Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia. The Communist leadership in Bucharest, having excluded itself from the decision process in the alliance found out about the military action from a TASS communiqué.

Ceausescu and his immediate entourage were very surprised by the action and about not being informed in advance about its imminence.¹⁴⁹ It is possible that, as he was

¹⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 10

¹⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 11

¹⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 11

informed by the invasion, Ceausescu understood he was teetering on the brink. On 21 August 1968 he had practically reached a crossroad: continued on the previous road of obstinate guarding of Romanian sovereignty in accordance with the political line assumed in 1964, or cave in to the pressure exerted by Soviet actions and begin compromising. The events imply that Ceausescu postponed a decision in adopting a clear choice. Instead, the Romanian leader chose a middle path between the two, continuing the “April 1964 orientation,” while making it more flexible through ad-hoc compromises.¹⁵⁰

At first, a hardening of the Romanian position was more visible. The public condemnation of the invasion and the public statements of Romania’s determination to resist militarily against any similar action against Romania fell were part of Bucharest’s gamble.¹⁵¹

Arguably, the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries could not have easily been capable of addressing the costly and uncertain risk resulting from two concomitant military operations. International public opinion would have had an explosive reaction to any additional action similar in nature. Even more so, the Warsaw Pact, having involved itself in Czechoslovakia, had limited military capabilities at disposal in order to carry out similar action. The pretext used in Czechoslovakia, that of a military exercise could not be applied in the case of Romania, and it’s the country’s communist leadership was monolithically opposed to the Soviets.¹⁵² Under such circumstances, an intervention similar with the one made in Czechoslovakia would have been the equivalent of a nude aggression, and would have immediately been brought before the United Nations.

One of the reasons Ceausescu and the RCP leadership reacted in such vitriolic manner to the Warsaw Pact invasion was in order to capitalize on international support

¹⁴⁹ *Stenogram of the common meeting of the CC of the RCP, State Council and Government of the RSR on 21 August 1968 regarding the military intervention of some socialist countries’ armed forces in Czechoslovakia*, C.H.N.A., Fund CC of RCP, Chancellery Section, File 249/1968, f. 14-15. See also Alexandru Osea, Vasile Popa, *Inghet in plina vara. Praga, August 1968*, Bucharest, 1998, pp. 23-25

¹⁵⁰ Corneliu Manescu, *Romania nu a fost niciodata un partener entuziast al Pactului de la Varsovia* in “Dosarele Istoriei”, nr. 11/1997, pp. 25-31 (Interviewed by Mircea Suci)

¹⁵¹ Mihai Retegan, *1968, din primavara pâna-n toamna. Schita de politica externa româneasca...*, pp.69-72. See also *Stenogram of the common meeting of CC of the RCP, State Council and Government of the RSR on 21 August 1968*, C.H.N.A., Fund CC of the RCP, Chancellery Section, File 249/1968, f. 13-30

¹⁵² *Stenogram of the meeting between Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the CC of the RCP and*

and to prepare a strong shield for the future reactions of the Soviets. At the same time however, Bucharest made compromises in order to avoid a final divorce with the Warsaw Pact. Emil Bodnaras, vice-president of the State Council, in the discussion with US Ambassador Harry G. Barnes, 17 May 1974 in Bucharest, reinforced that point. Bodnaras stated that:

“Romania gave some thought to withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact as the Albanians had done in 1968 but had concluded that it was better to stay inside the Pact’s councils where, although without any influence in running the Pact’s military affairs, Romania could at least ask questions and try to keep informed.”¹⁵³

The compromises from Bucharest, were short to follow. By the end of September in the same year Bucharest was visited by the Commander-in-Chief of the JWPAF,

the defense ministers held in Moscow in October 1968, the Romanian representative acted accordingly.¹⁵⁵

The 19 February 1969 meeting between Marshal Yakubovski with Ceausescu and Premier Maurer, constituted a new opportunity for Bucharest to emphasize its position on the necessity of adopting the unanimity principle in decision-making for military matters at all levels inside the Pact.¹⁵⁶

A good part of the discussion concentrated on the Romanian proposal of including “all” in Article 12 of the JWPAF Statute; Article 12 concerned the assessment of a situation of danger of war facing the Warsaw Pact. When Marshal Yakubovski replied that accepting the Romanian suggestion would mean the introduction the right of veto for any one member country over the action of the Pact, Maurer replied that:

The issue is very clear. So, what we must do is to find out a formula giving the right to declare [a state of danger] to those who consider that a state of danger exists, while the Commander-in-

I want to make this clear to you! We want to be an active part of the Treaty, for better or for worse. If the case would be to commit our military forces, we want to know why; we want to know why we should send our people to die. We put our signature on the paper of the Treaty. We will sign these documents too, but only if our proposal is accepted... We do want to sign a document, which stipulates binding provisions for all. This document must have clear stipulations. We do not insist upon our formula, we insist upon the essence of the issue.¹⁵⁹

Bucharest's position was substantiated during the same year by postponing a joint military exercise with troops and by replacing it in the next year with another training exercise made by small groups of staff officers from Romania, Bulgaria and USSR using maps, without the participation of combat troops deployed on the field. When hearing about this decision of the Romanians the chief of JWPAF General Staff was surprised and said that such a change would elicit "comments and speculations about serious breaks inside the Warsaw Pact."¹⁶⁰ Bucharest, however, remained unmoved. The Romanian leadership told the Soviets that the training exercise could only take place if "a convention is concluded" among all the participant states; in Romania's case, such a convention was to be approved by the supreme legislative body, namely the Grand National Assembly.¹⁶¹

A Romanian military delegation, led by Chief of the General Staff, went to Moscow between 3 and 4 March 1970 to discuss the necessity of concluding a bilateral convention between the Romanian and the Soviet governments as a condition of having the exercise take place. Now it was the moment for the Soviets to speak frankly. Army General Shtemenko said that "during the last months" the Romanians had adopted "a negative stance." The Romanian absence from the military exercise to be carried out on Hungarian territory of Hungary in July 1970, the lack of an agreement for drafting a joint document concerning necessary measures for maintaining classified information secret, and the delay in sending the data related to the protocol for the future development of the

¹⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 17

¹⁶⁰ *Report of General Colonel Ion Gheorghe, prime-deputy of the minister of Armed Forces and Chief of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces forwarded to Ion Gheorghe Maurer, president of the Ministers Council regarding the discussions with General M. S. Shtemenko, Chief of Staff of the Unified Command of the UFA held in Moscow on 9 September 1969, R.M.A., 10 September 1969, Fund V2, vol. 3, File 14/3, f. 77*

¹⁶¹ *Ibidem*, f. 78

armed forces during the interval 1971-1975 were indicative examples of Bucharest's attitude.¹⁶²

Despite Soviet pressures, the training exercise did not take place. The episode follows the line chosen by Bucharest post-August 1968: a continuous balance between the continuation of the "April 1964 orientation," and the line of compromise. An objective of this policy was the desire to show that, as Bondaras told Barnes, "Eastern Europe was not the exclusive province of one great power" and that the "Yalta agreement was dead."¹⁶³ This was the general explanation given by E. Bodnaras when he commented on the agreement given for the official visit in Romania of US President Richard M. Nixon.¹⁶⁴ Hence, generally speaking, there was a daring policy taken by the leadership of Bucharest at that time, and especially after the invasion in Czechoslovakia.

Nixon's visit to Bucharest, caused much annoyance in Moscow and, followed by other similar episodes—such as the one related in the lines above—was meant as a signal to the Soviets that Romania was determined to maintain its desire to be considered a state equal in rights with all the other international actors.

Newly declassified evidence from the Romanian archives shed new light on the factors influencing the decision making process in Bucharest. On 15 January 1969, the Romanian military attaché in Athens sent a report to Bucharest regarding a discussion with his West German counterpart. The report was immediately forwarded to Ceausescu.¹⁶⁵ The Romanian officer reported that during the discussion, he was told that western sources suggest that "joint military exercise with Warsaw Pact troops [are] planned to take place in March-April." In case of such an event, the West German officer said that "if such exercises with troops belonging to countries of the Warsaw Pact will take place on Romanian soil, the Soviet leadership will target, as it did in Czechoslovakia, the maintaining of Soviet troops in place, and also [attempt] replace

¹⁶² Report of General Ion Ionita, Minister of Armed Forces forwarded to Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of CC of the RCP regarding the discussions between General-Colonel Ion Gheorghe, prime-deputy of the minister of Armed Forces and Chief of Staff and Marshall Y. Y. Yakubovski, Supreme Commander of UAF, held in Moscow, between 3 and 4 March 1970, R.M.A., 7 March 1970, Fund V2, vol. Bodnaraf the Amb841ador Har toG. Barh asJr0.2489 0 693 and 4 March 1970fTD 0.11 Tf 0.07regarding 047hars1ated in 6.697

several high officials of the party and state, who oppose in one way or another the Soviet line.”¹⁶⁶ In case the first plan failed, the report continued, “the Soviet leadership would have a contingency plan providing for the implementation of diversions among [Romania’s] population and the establishment of pro-Soviet groups to oppose the measures taken by the Romanian governments, both at internal or external levels.”¹⁶⁷ Eventually, the Soviets goal was to replace the Romanian leadership—the RCP CC Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu, the President of the State Council Ion Gheorghe Maurer, and the minister of Defense Ion Ionita.¹⁶⁸

At the same time, Warsaw Pact military leaders openly threatened Romanian officers. On 11 February 1970 Major General Florian Truta, the Romanian deputy of the chief of JWPAF General Staff in Moscow reported home that during his talks with Soviet Army General M. S. Shtemenko on 9 February, Gen. Shtemenko made certain remarks deserving closer attention. When Truta spoke about the Romanian demand regarding the conclusion of a convention on the issue of deploying the military troops of the Pact, during the military exercises on Romanian soil, his Soviet counterpart replied:

We know that you have passed a law on 21 August 1968, in connection with the events from Czechoslovakia. In the Statute signed in March 1968 there are no provisions about concluding conventions as a basis for performing military exercises. *Laws, laws, laws! But if troops would be on the field, would they ask about laws? Dubcek had his laws also, and who asked him about that?*¹⁶⁹

In such a climate, when Bucharest received a constant flux of information suggesting that Moscow intended to change the Romanian communist leadership, including through military means, the decision of taking a harsh course in the bilateral relations between the two countries becomes understandable. Framed in the general continuous balance between firmness and compromise, Nicolae Ceausescu thought that in this period a more inflexible attitude would be more profitable both for the political survival of the Romanian communist leadership, and for preserving the liberty of action already gained at international level. This is the period when Nicolae Ceausescu played

¹⁶⁶ *Ibidem*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibidem*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibidem*

¹⁶⁹ *Report of Major General Florian Truta, Romanian deputy of the Chief of the UAF General Staff, in Moscow regarding the discussions with the Soviet Army General, M.S. Shtemenko on 9 February 1970, 11 February 1970, R.M.A., Fund 467, File 11/ 1970, f. 85-86; emphasis added.*

the role of mediation between China and USA, and meanwhile tried to be accepted as a mediator in the Vietnam War.¹⁷⁰

As détente continued and the CSCE negotiations started of the CSCE in 1969, Bucharest slowly softened its position toward the Soviets. Several reproaches made by Leonid Brezhnev to Nicolae Ceausescu in May 1970 at Moscow, during an official meeting, might have played an incentive role, too.¹⁷¹ It was during that meeting that Brezhnev accused Ceausescu of having the intention to leave the Warsaw Pact, and connecting itself with the West.¹⁷²

Bucharest officials were aware of the fact that the negotiations in the framework of CSCE limited their liberty of action. According to the analysis made by the Romanian communist leadership, détente meant the genesis of a new danger, respectively a new Yalta-

organs of the country. In accordance with this important law, the national defense field was separated from the Warsaw Pact, while indirectly Romania showed that it was determined not to send any troops outside the national borders.¹⁷⁵

After Romania had excluded herself from the invasion in Czechoslovakia, Bucharest became a prisoner of its own April 1964 political orientation. This became most obvious in the military field. As the August 1968 events, and the subsequent thinly veiled Soviet warnings, reinforced Bucharest's temptation to continued on its own, independent, path. The military field represented the domain where Romanian intransigency towards Soviet hegemonic designs was most visible. Step by step, the military link between Romania and the Warsaw Pact weakened. By the late 1970s, Moscow believed that Ceausescu, who at first might have just desired to get out of the alliance, was now attempting to usurp Soviet influence in the Balkans. Documents to further illuminate this issue are not yet declassified, what such action would have meant remains debatable. One thing remains clear; Bucharest's desire to maintain a double approach to policy towards the Soviet Union (and implicitly the Warsaw Pact) did not deceive the Soviets. Moscow's careful watch aimed to prevent a Romanian defection

socialist community.”¹⁷⁹ As a result, the resolution called for accelerating the military preparation of the armed forces of the member state, to reach readiness by 1985. These preparations required increasing procurement, reaching interoperability of the main categories of weaponry for all the allied armies up to 70-100 percent, creating new division, etc. As related with the Statute of JWPAF in wartime, the main proposals in the memorandum of principles referred the unique command of the Commander-in-Chief during war, and called for the creation of “regional commands” for each theater of action, overseeing the allied military forces within the area.¹⁸⁰

“we are against the decision, so our vote will be against”.¹⁸⁴ Having contested the legitimacy of the resolution, he nevertheless assured his counterparts that the discussions at the PCC meeting respectively, Romania’s opposition, would be kept secret from public ears.¹⁸⁵

Upon the delegation’s return to Bucharest on 24 November, a Politburo session was held in order to inform the party leadership of the delegation’s stance and the conclusions of the meeting. The speakers talked there about “the Soviet militarist circles”, the right of “the Romanian people for independence and liberty,” about “the stimulation of armament race,” “the serious infringement towards norms and procedures,” “the degree of domination and integration that contravene the principles of 1955,” and some “military-like,” if not “Stalinist or dictatorial” practices. Things went even to the contestation of the “viability” of the Warsaw Pact, as long as the principles established since its foundation were not respected.¹⁸⁶ The Politburo decided to inform all the members of the communist party and to control the press releases in order to emphasize the issues concerning the disarmament and détente.

What is surprising was that, in order to justify their position, the Romanian communist leaders invoked primarily the old principles agreed upon when the Warsaw Pact was founded, the same principles they themselves subsequently contested. Bucharest appealed less or not at all the principles affirmed by the main documents issued by the Romanian Communist Party (e.g. “April 1964 Declaration” or the “Resolution of the IXth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party. Despite of the promise made in Moscow, the Romanian position at the PCC was 80614 TJWPA and Stare’s was the of the 014182

agreement, and the request made by the constitutional organisms of that state. Regarding the Commander of the Regional War Theater, he should be named from among the generals or marshalls of the allied army having most forces deployed in the area.¹⁸⁷

The Romanians had not forgotten the “lesson” learned back in August 1968. Not

should be addressed “by the Poles themselves.”¹⁹⁰ However, in parallel with this position, the analysis of his speech easily unveils his Stalinist reflex, abruptly reborn once a contestation of communism had arose. Ceausescu’s speech at the Moscow’s meeting represents an example of rigid and dogmatic view of the events occurring by that time in Poland. Such events, Ceausescu suggested, had been generated by the lack of close links between the Communist party and the working class, and also by the unhealthy character of some “elements,” which either remained undefined, or were called as being “anti-socialist” and “counter-revolutionary.” Ceausescu expressed his surprised at “the genesis of so-called independent trade unions”, and he put stress on the imperative for a resurrection of the “workers revolutionary spirit.” He called “all the members of the

the present circumstances, the leadership of the Polish communist party must be overtaken by a man belonging to the working class.”¹⁹³ Yet the mending relations with the working class did not include, in Romanian leaders’ opinion, a dialogue with “Solidarity.” Rather, they proposed a close union between the communist party and “peasants and workers.”¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, it was openly stated that “Socialism cannot be built with the help of the Holy Cross!” Following these words, it was assessed that the intervention of the party in Poland was belated, and “this thing, which is occurring right now [martial law] must have been occurred last summer.” Ceausescu even went as far as to suggest that there might be need for “foreign help” though he suggested that appealing for foreign help would run the risk of “estrangement from the popular masses.”¹⁹⁵ Symptomatic of Ceausescu’s thinking, the Romanian leader continued:

The Hungarians do not want to go [to Poland]. For instance, during the recent ordinary meeting of the Military Council of the defense ministers from Warsaw Treaty member states, the Hungarians refused to sign an Appeal... We have already discussed it in the meeting of Permanent

opinion—intervention was the solution. Just prior, the Romanian leader had stated that the Poles could have solved alone, by force, their problems in the summer of 1980.

of course, it's a positive thing that [the Poles] want to solve by themselves this problem. It is bad that it happens now, this should have been done in the summer of 1980; that was the time when they had had to do it. Appealing to foreign help would estrange the popular masses /.../ However, the only ones remaining are the Soviets, and this will raise new problems.¹⁹⁷

At the respective moment, in December 1981, the situation had become worse, and a foreign intervention would give birth to new difficulties as the Soviets alone were capable of sending troops in Poland. Yet the Poles would find such invasion unacceptable. The “new problems” Ceausescu referred to, in fact referred to the possibility of armed resistance by the Poles. In 1981, Nicolae Ceausescu was, at the very least, a passive supporter of a military intervention against the Polish “Solidarity.” In order to save communism, the Romanian leader began to agree on the core rationale at the foundation of the Warsaw Pact: to establish a guardian of communism and Soviet domination within all satellites states.

using all means to prevent the end of communism in Poland,” including, if not openly stated, military action.¹⁹⁸

The officials in Budapest learned “in consternation and with disagreement” about such a proposal, while from Warsaw the message came that “we cannot either accept or recognize the motivation of the considerations and conclusions which had been made.” In both capitals the officials were surprised when seeing the new position taken by the Bucharest communist leadership, a position that totally contradicted the traditional one, known since 1968. For instance, from Warsaw a message was sent to Bucharest stating that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states had been always strongly defended by Romania and “a non-equivocal case was represented in this respect by Romania’s absence in the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia.” In Budapest’s message the whole linear evolution of the policy promoted by Romania until that moment was underlined, by stating that the “Romanian point of view cannot be understood when taking into account especially the systematic public support given by Romania to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, of sovereignty and independence in the relationship between the communist countries. The present stance goes against the angle of view expressed by the above principles, which represented the basis for establishing Romania’s policy in 1968 related with the events occurring in Czechoslovakia.”¹⁹⁹

Ceausescu and the communist leadership in Bucharest were thus closing in August 1989, only few months before its final extinction, a full circle of their relationship with the Warsaw Pact. This cycle had begun through a public contestation of the super-state character of the political-military alliance, by unveiling the fact that it was actually a tool for preserving the Soviet hegemony. It ended in 1989, after almost three decades, with the acceptance of this feature of the alliance.

Being to a greater extent something more than a simple expression of turnings into policy, the contradictions give testimony to the fact that Romania’s policy of defying Yalta and the Soviet hegemony, promoted by the communist leadership from Bucharest

¹⁹⁸ Dumitru Preda, Mihai Retegan, 1989. *Principiul dominoului*, Bucharest, 2000, pp. 164-167, 170-171, passim

¹⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, passim

Bucharest understood Moscow's tendency of changing the role of the Warsaw Pact and took steps to oppose it. Whether regarding the statutes of the different components of the Pact proposed by Moscow ever since 1966, whether regarding the establishment of new structures for standardizing the allies' positions, Romania constantly placed itself in a unique position. It's inability to compromise at the right time resulted in its auto-isolation within the communist bloc.

Gradually, after the Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia, the communist leadership in Bucharest became bolder, yet more nuanced in its opposition. After Ion Gheorghe Maurer retired in 1974, Ceausescu implemented several reversions to the previous position of the Romanian leadership. Thus, on the occasion of the initiation of martial law in Poland in December 1981, Ceausescu was thinking of the utility of using the Pact in maintaining the unity of the "communist camp," while in 1989 he became the very champion of an intervention of its troops as an instrument of intra-block management. It was in this context that Ceausescu opposed Soviet Leader Mikhael Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* after March 1985. Facing major changes, Ceausescu was concerned with the possibility of losing power, and thought that an alliance with the conservative members of the Pact against Gorbachev's "new way" was solution to maintaining his political survival.

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1. 3 April 1963

Note regarding the discussions which took place at the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party with I.A. Andropov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

2. 4 July 1963

Stenogram of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party concerning the declaration made by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party about future talks between fraternal parties.

3. 18 January 1965

Memorandum of discussions which took place on 18 January 1965 at the residence of the Romanian delegation in Warsaw between the leaders of the Romanian Communist Party and the Polish delegation, led by Wladislaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party.

4. 26 July 1965

Stenogram of discussions with the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party which attended the proceedings of the ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party.

5. 4-9 February 1966

Report on the meeting of the Chiefs of the General Staff of the Armies of the Warsaw Pact, 4-9 Feb. 1966. Doc. No. 2796

Note dated 1 October 1968 of discussions of 28 September 1968 between Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and President of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Marshal I.I. Jakubovsky, Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and Army General S.M. Stemenko, Chief of General Staff of the Unified Armed Forces.

10. 11 March 1969

Memorandum dated 11 March 1969 of discussions at a dinner hosted by Corneliu Manescu, the Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic Romania (SRR), on 20 February 1969 in honour of Marshal of the Soviet Union I.I. Jakubovsky, supreme commander of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty.

11. 18 March 1969

Stenogram of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 18 March 1969.

12. *Undated report drawn up by the Romanian Foreign Ministry for the period 1 January 1968-15 March 1969 on the main features of Romania's bilateral relations with the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Democratic Republic.*

13. 10 September 1969.

Letter of General Ion Ionita, Minister of Romanian Armed Forces, to Nicolae Ceausescu, on discussions held in Moscow on 9 September 1969 with General S.M. Stemenko, Chief of General Staff of the Unified Command, on Warsaw Pact exercises scheduled to take place in Romania in October 1969.

14. 7 March 1970

Letter dated 7 March 1970 of General Ion Ionita, Minister of the Armed Forces, to Nicolae Ceausescu about planned Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in April 1970.

15. 8 December 1970

Letter dated 8 December 1970 of George Macovescu, Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, to chiefs of mission informing them of proceedings of the Warsaw Pact Consultative Political Committee meeting held in Berlin on 2 December 1970.

16. 25 June 1971

Stenogram of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party with regard to the visit of a Romanian delegation led by Ceausescu to China, North Korea, Vietnam and Mongolia.

17. 10 January 1972

Telegram dated 10 January 1972 of George Macovescu, Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, to the Romanian Ambassador in Moscow, 10 January 1972.

18. 11 January 1972

Reply of Romanian Ambassador to Moscow to George Macovescu, 11 January 1972.

19. 15 January 1972

Note on Soviet proposals for European Security for the Prague Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact, 15 January 1972.

20. 1 June 1972

Letter from General Marin Nicolescu, Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, to Deputy Foreign Minister Vasile Gliga, 1 June 1972.

21. 24 May 1974

US State Department Memorandum of Conversation between Emil Bodnaras, Vice President, Romanian Council of State, and Harry G. Barnes, American Ambassador to Romania, US Embassy, Bucharest.

22. 20 November 9 4186 Tw8.7907 TD0.14 Tc 0.4186 Tw () Tj -419.4419 TD0.14 TD /F3 10.0465 T