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THE CHALLENGES OF PROMOTING U.S. STUDIES IN BRAZIL

PAULO SOTERO·

Historically, the United States has been disproportionately more relevant for Brazil than Brazil has been for the United States. This asymmetry of interests, true for most countries in the world vis-à-vis the United States, could lead one to conclude that Brazilian scholars and intellectuals study U.S. realities closely in order to influence the debate and the shaping of public policies in Brazil. The opposite, however, appears to be true. U.S. Studies has only slowly emerged in Brazilian academic institutions since redemocratization in 1985, whereas in the last fifty years a growing crop of U.S. scholars has continued to study the largest nation in South America, despite its relatively modest impact on U.S. affairs. Know as "Brazilianists," these scholars have produced scores of scholarly papers and books on Brazil in the fields of history, economy, politics, and the social sciences. Translated into Portuguese, some of these works have become indispensable references for Brazilian Studies even in Brazil's universities.

On September 18, 2006, the Brazil Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Brazilian Embassy in Washington co-sponsored a conference to examine the state of U.S. Studies in Brazil and make recommendations on how to strengthen and deepen the academic field. This meeting marked the official launching of the U.S. Studies Project to be taken up by Brazilian academic institutions. The event, hosted by *Brazilian Ambassador Roberto Abdenur*, opened with a working breakfast at the embassy's residency with thirty scholars, representatives of key institutions, and former ambassadors, and concluded with a seminar at the Brazilian Chancery.

Ambassador Abdenur argued that, without detracting from the significant work conducted on the United States by Brazilian academics, U.S. studies in Brazil is in need of outside stimulation. While a healthy mutual curiosity exists between the two countries, advanced research on the topic in Brazil has been modest at best. It is of strategic importance that Brazil better understand the United States: how the U.S. decision-making process works, and how the United States views Latin America, perceives race relations, and regards foreign investment. The conference was thus a response to the relative lack of supply of research and analysis on the United States, given Brazil's high demand.

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In the working group session prior to the meeting, *Philippa Strum*, director of U.S. Studies at the Wilson Center, successfully proposed a change in nomenclature, arguing for the use of "U.S." instead "American," to avoid ethnocentrism. She also stressed the importance of taking an interdisciplinary approach to Brazil's advanced study and research of the United States. At the seminar, *Cynthia Arnson*, director of the Wilson Center's Latin American Program, highlighted the apparent ambivalence of Brazilian academics about studying the United States, and underscored the significance of research in fostering a better understanding. Knowledge of the United States is increasingly important for Brazil, given its recent insertion into the international system and the fact that Brazil is a more active international player than most other countries of its economic stature. Participants in the seminar included *Eliana Cardoso*, from the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, and *Carlos Pio*, from the University of Brasília. *Cristina Pecequilo*, from the State University of São Paulo, *Antonio Pedro Tota*, from the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, and *Jacques d'Adesky*, from the Cândido Mendes University, presented papers on Brazilian perspectives of the United States.

This bilingual report is a partial record of the conference and includes the works of other individuals who contributed to the initiative. Made possible by financial support from the Brazilian Embassy, the report opens with Ambassador Abdenur's assessment of U.S. Studies in Brazil and the need to find and invest more financial and intellectual capital in this field of research. "The United States has been far too significant a player in the international arena for Brazilians to be able to afford the luxury of ignoring or even failing to learn about it," he writes. The causes of Brazil's relative lack of interest in studying the United States, which occupied part of the discussion, are further explored by *Carlos Eduardo Lins 2-23(i)--5(l)-46(a)-46-49(e)-c(e)-9(d 3n)6H06(i*

ROBERTO ABDENUR[*]

With its vast geography, complex society and unique political life, the United States has always attracted the curiosity of scholars from all over the world. Among the first to analyze the recently liberated nation was Alexis de Tocqueville, whose vital work *Democracy in America* is still a reference for academics around the world. Among Latin American scholars, Domingo Sarmiento, José Martí, and José Enrique Rodó, the author of *Ariel,* also studied the country. Such interest also reached Brazil, as seen in the work of Hipólito José da Costa, writing before Brazil's independence, as well as in books and articles by Eduardo Prado, Joaquim Nabuco, Oliveira Lima, and Vianna Moog. Interest was even expressed by Brazilian Emperor D. Pedro II, who took a lengthy trip to the United States in 1876 (one of the first visits to this country by a foreign head of state), on the occasion of the centennial of U.S. independence, and for many years maintained correspondence with academics associated with Harvard University, such as naturalist Louis Agassiz and poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow.[1]

From early on, Brazilian interest in the United States has been matched by American curiosity about its large and unexplored neighbor to the south. Successive

made by certain elites of an "America delatinized by its own will…regenerated in the

since the mid-1970s. In fact, according to available data,[5] until then, the study of international topics received very little attention, especially when compared with other areas. In addition, the scarce academic production in the area was focused, for reasons that were understandable at the time, on topics related to South America, with special emphasis on the Prata River Basin.

This change in the way in which the topic was dealt, with diversification of areas of study and primarily its systematization, only occurred at the end of the first half of the 1970s. In 1973, the University of São Paulo (USP) and the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP) began to offer their first courses entitled "International Relations." In 1974, the University of Brasília (UnB) went one step

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Meanwhile, despite these worthwhile and substantive projects, there is no question

throughout Brazil. Most of them are of low academic quality and their motivations may be questioned. Even so, it is likely that from this copious universe of schools,

In order to achieve the task of better understanding the United States the Brazilian private sector must help build the appropriate mechanisms of interaction that are absent. This is how Mercosul was established: although political will was indeed essential to launching the idea, it was the vigor of investments, trade, and business deals between the private sectors of the four countries that made the common market grow so robustly during its best years.

While the same dynamic is not yet present in the economic relations between Brazil and the United States, it is necessary to foster some type of advocacy on the part of the many interested parties who are already convinced of the importance of this approach. Such advocacy should be pursued through mass media, governments, companies, universities, non-governmental organizations, labor unions, trade associations, think tanks, research institutions, and diplomatic entities.

ANTONIO PEDRO TOTA

often, however, it is seen as a paradigmatic and mythical force, capable of liberating and modernizing Brazilian society from cultural and economic lethargy.

To use Umberto Eco's terms to describe the attitude of intellectuals toward the impact of mass communication, both the "apocalyptics" and the "integrated" have contributed to keep up the lively discussion. But, they also have hindered a more substantial investigation of the nature of U.S. cultural influence through mass media. One cannot always blame the imperialism of the media for the influence and the superiority of other cultures over that of Brazil. By doing so one runs the risk of fetishizing this same media.[2]

From Fren

of popular dishes, and not from Scottish malt or Kentucky corn. The "Ai love iú" (I love you) rhymes with the Itapirú word, of Tupi-Guarani origin. In 1933, it was Noel Rosa's turn. Rosa was one of the most popular samba composers, who criticized foreign influence in Brazilian culture in a famous tune at that time. He attacked "Americanization" with the song, "Não Tem Tradução" (It Is Untranslatable), a samba that shows the tensions and resistance of popular culture at a moment when an increased use of foreign expressions was noticeable in the media.

O cinema falado	*The talking picture*
É o grande culpado da transformação	*Is the great culprit of the transformation*
[...]	*[...]*
Se eu fizer uma falseta,	*If I make a misrepresentation*
A Risoleta	*Risoleta*
Desiste logo do francês	*Soon gives up the French*
E do inglês	*and the English*
[...]	*[...]*
Depois o malandro⁴ deixou de sambar	*Afterwards the scoundrel stopped dancing samba*
Dando o pinote	*Jumping*
Na gafieira a dançar	*In the* gafieira (dance hall for popular music)
O fox trot	*To dance the fox-trot*
[...]	*[...]*
Da exibição	*Of the exhibition*
Não se lembra que o samba	*He does not remember that the samba*
Não tem tradução	*cannot be translated*
No idioma francês.	*Into French*
Tudo aquilo	*Everything*
Que o malandro pronuncia	*the scoundrel pronounces*
Com voz macia	*With a soft voice:*
É brasileiro:	*It is Brazilian*
Já passou de português...	*It is beyond Portuguese...*
Amor lá no morro é amor pra chuchu.	*Love back in the slums is intense love.*
E as rimas do samba não são I love you	*The rhythms of the samba are not I love you*
E esse negócio de alô	*and this business of "hello"*
Alô boy, Alô Jone,	*Hello boy, Hello John*
Só pode ser conversa de telefone.	*Can be only telephone chat*

Both Noel and Lamartine—each in their own way—criticn D4B .llnch

Pra que tanto veneno?
Eu posso lá ficar americanizada?
Eu que nasci com o samba
e vivo no sereno,
Nas rodas de malandros,
Minhas preferidas.
Eu digo mesmo eu te amo
E nunca I love you,
Enquanto houver Brasil.

So much poison?
Can I be Americanized?
I, who was born with the samba
and live in the fog,
In the circles of the malandros,
My favorite circles.
I really say te amo
and never

mands, of establishing permanent relations with those states and gradually filling their markets. The merchant of the United States could only forfeit these natural advantages if he were inferior to the European merchant; but he is superior to him in several respects. The Americans of the United States already exercise a great moral influence upon all nations of the New World. They are the source of intelligence, and all those who inhabit the same continent are already accustomed to consider them as the most enlightened, the most powerful, and the most wealthy members of the great American family. All eyes are therefore turned toward the United States: these are the models which the other communities try to imitate to the best of their power; it is from the Union that they borrow their political principles and their laws.

The Americans of the United States stand in precisedym[(U.i)-2765 Tm(-)T/T12mo 9-14(a)-28(n)4(1)

British and Yankee influences. Dunshee de Abranches, an outsider thinker, wrote in *A Ilusão Brasileira* (The Brazilian Illusion), "Germany, which after 25 years of wise and happy internal reconstruction, had changed from a third-ranked country to a *leading power*, was worthy of being imitated by us, who possess the most vast and productive territory in the New World."[7] Abranches emphasized that, compared with other European countries, Germany had shown superiority in all fields. He believed that Brazil, a country with even more resources, could do as well or even better than Germany by putting an end to the perennial extortion caused by the association with "Perfidious Albion," as England was termed by the Frenchmen.

In the United States, the formulation of Americanism was the ideology that explained the modernization of the nation in the New World. In Germany, through *Germanism*, the ideological justification for expansion and modernization was sought

If some masochistic Frenchmen were delighted by the Nazi victory, what is to be said about the population of Germanic origin from the south of Brazil? Could it be that in the eyes of Brazil's officers, German soldiers seemed to be more elegant and better fighters than the French with their khaki uniforms? For Susan Sontag, the Nazi soldiers were aesthetically more attractive. Especially the SS soldiers, with their well-cut uniforms, black boots that seemed to compel the soldiers to stand erect, and white gloves hiding their hands. This elegance made the American soldiers look like salesmen in civilian clothes, with their neckties and shoes with laces.[9] Thus, Brazil's aesthetic-military paradigm became Germany.

modernization of the Weimar age. In sum, Nazi Germany was based on the project of self-sufficiency. The ideological project was strengthened by a combination of traditional culture, racism, and enlightened rationalism.[11] Furthermore, one must add to all of this the idea developed at that time by an arsenal of war literature, the result of *Fronterlebnis* (war experience at the front), which portrayed Germany with a more masculine culture. A generation was forged capable of fighting *Amerikanismus,* which was seen as a "veritable plague" with its Taylorism, its mass production and consumption, and the rationalism of its industry, and as a threat to the German spirit. For the German right wing, *Fronterlebnis* produced strong souls to fight the American way of life and its escapism.

This formulation, which seemed to transform Nazi Germany into a significant world power, captured the attention of some Brazilian Army officers. General Pedro

Hip! Hip! Hoover! Poetical message to the Brazilian people

Some U.S. intellectuals began to criticize this superiority image, mainly after World War I. Those were the 1920s – the "splendid drunken twenties" of the United States. The years of nonconformism and flappers, as carefree, young women who liked to dance were known. The Brazilian term for flappers was *melindrosas.*

Frank and other intellectuals of that time believed that Latin America should not follow the steps of U.S. historical development, which had produced an excessively materialistic society. With the help of its intellectuals, Latin America should deepen its mystical sensitivity and help North Americans recuperate their lost spirituality, their pioneering past. In 1942, during a trip through Latin America, Waldo Frank spread such interpretations. It was not by chance that the Good Neighbor Policy was understood by some sectors in Latin America as the first phase of sincere relations with the United States.

These were the intellectuals that opened avenues to the U.S. government in order to create new ways of interpretations of the Latin American countries. The conditions that would be used as the basis for relations with Latin America were created during the government of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt with the Good Neighbor Policy.

From Anglo-Saxon America to Ibero-America

One of the tasks of the Good Neighbor Policy was to change the image that Latin Americans had of Anglo-Americans. This image was synthesized by the dictator of *El Recurso del Método* (Reasons of State), by Alejo Carpentier: "Por muy bien cortado que esté un frac, puesto sobre el lomo de un yanqui parece siempre un frac de prestidigitador" (A tuxedo – no matter how well cut – once put on the shoulders of a Yankee always looks like the tuxedo of a magician).

For public opinion on the subcontinent, U.S. citizens had always been associated with the arrogance, bad taste, and superiority of the Uncle Sam image with his Mephistophelian goatee: Uncle Sam was simultaneously a ridiculed, comical, and fierce figure with his flawless top hat threatening the Latin American peoples.

New times introduce new images. Already in 1938, arrogance was coming from German Ambassador Karl Ritter, who insulted Chancellor Oswaldo Aranha.[25] The old image of the unstylish U.S. mannerisms contrasted with the European elegance of

countries formed a commission that founded the Inter-American Economic and Financial Council. The U.S. representative also obtained approval for the formation of a neutrality zone of 300 miles around the two American continents. This measure proved ineffective: at the end of the year, the Prata estuary was scene of a naval battle involving the German ship Graf Spee and a British squadron.

After the Nazi army invaded Denmark in April 1940, U.S. foreign policy urgently

veloped in several long pan-American meetings and argued that the most efficient way to fight totalitarianism was to adopt measures that made the Latin American economy more competitive. The security of the United Sates depended on close economic and cultural cooperation with all the governments of the Americas. It would be possible to make a qualitative leap in the living conditions of Latin America's peoples with emergency measures such as the purchase of the agricultural and mineral production of the region. Rockefeller was putting into practice the experience he had gained during his trips with Rovensky to the Standard Oil fields. During these trips, he realized the urgent necessity to modify the relationship of the company with the inhabitants of the "host" countries. The objective of this *realpolitik* was to control anti-Americanism by peaceful means, because armed intervention by United States was not part of the plans of the Good Neighbor Policy promoted by President Roosevelt and his closest advisors.

The group's proposal had a big advantage over the others that came from government organisms: it was supported by Rockefeller's fantastic financial power and was independent of the bureaucracy.[29] The *Junta*unom bu45(n3[(J0$71(r)1(om)2o))-10(b9$79(om]-9(d 9(u)--15(e)-

to the connections cultivated by Rockefeller, he often came out on top against those who opposed his project. This was the case in the conflict between Rockefeller's Office and other information agencies of the Roosevelt government.

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION

Rockefeller's information service disclosed in a 1941 report that several U.S. businesses were represented in Latin America by Germans or Nazis sympathizers. Ironically, these representatives used advertising and propaganda by their companies to disseminate veiled anti-U.S. messages. Nelson believed that the future of these enterprises in Latin America not only depended on the sale of U.S. products, but also on the dissemination of the "American way of life." He was, therefore, conscious that success in the economy had to be rooted in a solid ideological base. Thus, for Rockefeller communications included the intelligence service. His friendship with J. Edgar Hoover, the feared head of the FBI, was not an accident.

the Nazi Germany. The Nazi government not only made constant use of the word, but its famous Popular Ministry of Education and Propaganda was one of its more important organs.

The propagandistic strategy of the Office included the publication of brochures, pamphlets and magazines. The most widely distributed among these was *On Guard*—published in Portuguese (*Em Guarda*), Spanish, and English—a magazine in the style of *Life*

situation. Because of the war, German films no longer reached South America, especially after the British blockade. Since American movies had no competition they reigned absolutely.

The OCIAA tried to consolidate the role of movies as a propaganda vehicle for the allied cause. The Motion Picture Division was considered one of the most important departments of the Office, even though it had a reduced number of employees, since a large part of the material arrived completed from Hollywood. In 1944, only forty people worked in its offices in New York, Washington, and California.

The films were divided into two branches: those intended for screening in movie theaters, and the non-commercial films presented in schools, clubs, or outdoors. The nerve center of the division was located in New York City and included three sectors. The production and adaptation section selected films produced by other departments and by Hollywood, and adapted them to Portuguese and Spanish. In this section scripts were also produced. The short-feature films section was responsible for newsreels, documentaries, and cartoons related to U. S. inter-American policies. Even though many of these materials were intended for Latin American countries, they were also screened in the United States with the objective of spreading a good image of Latin America. And, finally, there was a section that supervised the distribution of the 16-millimeters. The commercial circuit was in charge of the 35-millimeter films.

The non-commercial production was directed at educational institutions, clubs, churches, companies, unions, and rural organizations.[32] For example "Americans All," the black-and-white twenty-minute film on the work of youths in every country in the Hemisphere, was shown in Brazil, as was "Defense Against Invasion," a Disney animated film in color on the benefits of vaccination. On the other hand, U.S. viewers could see Brazil in an eleven-minute short feature in color of scenes from Rio de Janeiro, the Amazon rain forest, and the port of Santos. They also saw a ten-minute film telling the story of Brazil's fishing school, created by President Vargas. They saw "Brazil Gets News" a ten-minute film in color explaining the functioning of a big São Paulo newspaper. In addition, they saw films with Carmen Miranda, Charlie Chan, and Bette Davis, commercial Hollywood productions supposedly set in Brazil.

For obvious reasons, the Motion Picture Division had an important branch office in Hollywood, which was responsible for contact with big producers and assisted the main office in significant ways. It promoted the inclusion   idui. O0.5 0 0(u)2. -7(w)-286(a)-11Tf10.5 34

in Portuguese, and another actress uses castanets. The problem was that the film was set in Argentina, where there are neither rumbas nor castanets.[33]

For these and other reasons, Nelson Rockefeller sent "Jock" Whitney on a reconnaissance trip through Latin America. In August 1941, Whitney, who had traveled with Walt Disney, sent a report to Rockefeller from Rio de Janeiro, which stated:

> The trip appears to be a success and, therefore, seems justified…This is a fascinating land, very surprising in the majority of its aspects, with a dazzling and unreal landscape…the people of Rio de Janeiro are very friendly and hospitable, but also very critical. You feel that they want you to like them, afterwards they like you, and if this does not occur you are the culprit, which I find correct…Walt Disney's success as entrepreneur and celebrity is bigger than expected.[34]

The educational short feature films produced by Walt Disney became very popular. One of them on malaria,[35] for example, opens with a bald eagle, the symbol of the United States, followed by the credits: *a Walt Disney production – Filmed under the auspices of the OCIAA.*

The Radio Division

Although theoretically subordinated to the Department of Communications, the Radio Division – similar to the Motion Picture Division – enjoyed great autonomy. Initially, it was located in New York, but later on it was transferred to Washington. The Radio Division did not produce programs directly, but it contracted them from

Orchestra Concert, under the direction of the maestro Spartaco Rossi, with pieces from Brazilian composers, such as Nepomuceno, Mignone, and Carlos Gomes, interpreted by the soloist Christina Maristany. Its entire programming was sprinkled with economic and political updates. At 11:30 p.m. it aired the latest news and reports from Germany in Portuguese, and at 2:00 a.m. the same program in German.[37]

With a more ideological objective (they did not aim at immediate material results, as U.S. radio stations did), the German and Italian stations had specific programming

Rockefeller's familiarity with the big entrepreneurs facilitated the formation of this "alliance" between NBC and CBS, the two big rivals in the United States. The alliance was valid only for short-wave transmissions in Latin America. Some newspapers and magazines, among them

Andrew V. Corry, a mining engineer, was invited to be part of OCIAA's group of experts, as he was a distinguished strategic minerals expert. The modern phase of the exploration of natural resources of the Latin American countries started at this point. Without a doubt, there was an effort to fight expansion by the Axis, but also the bases for a systematic economic exploration had been launched in a peaceful world.

Signals of change in the worldwide situation were already noticeable in 1943. Nazi troops had lost the initiative after the defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk. North Africa was re-conquered. Italy was already out of the conflict, even though local Nazi forces resisted until 1945. This transformation in the international picture encouraged a change in U.S. policy for Latin America. Rockefeller knew how to adapt the objectives of his Office to this new reality.

6. See Ibid, loc. Cit. *Democracy in America, The Three Races in the United States*, p 445.

7. Dunshee de Abranches, *A Ilusão Brasileira* (justificação histórica de uma atitude), p 353.

8. See Jean-Paul Sartre, *La mort dans l'âme* (1949). Quoted by Susan Sontag, "Fascinante fascism", pp 59-83.

9. Ibid.

10. McBride, Joseph. *Frank Capra – The Catastrophe of Success*, p 446.

11. To the reactionary modernists — using the typical ideal concept created by Jeffrey Herf — a project for Germany would have to be based on the principle of inwardness (Innerlichkeit) added to modern technology. The big German paradox was the result of the combination of Volkische Kultur and Zivilisation, that is, the traditional culture of the race and rationalism. See Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich.* p. 15.

12. Ibid.

13. Frank D. McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance* — 1937-1945, p 153.

14. American newspapers from the beginning of the century published various caricatures in which Latin America was always represented as a women and the U. S. by the traditional Uncle Sam. See John J. Johnson, *Latin American in Caricature.*

15. Edgard Carone, *A Terceira República* (1937-1945), p 60.

16. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário*, vol. 2: 1937-1942, pp 319-20.

17. Ibid, p 320.

18. "I come to pay a call of friendship [...] I would wish to symbolize the friendly visit of one good neighbor to another. In our daily life good neighbors call upon each other as the evidence of solicitude for common welfare and to learn of circumstances and point of view of each, so that there may come both understanding and respect which are cementing forces of all enduring society." See Alexander de Conde. *Herbert Hoover's Latin American Policy*, p 18.

19. The Brazilians had prepared "a welcome such as few men ever received in Brazil [...] or in any other South American nation." The *New York Times*, December 22, 1928. See Alexander de Conde, op. cit., p 23.

20. A color line, which Mário de Andrade harshly criticizes in this "Nova canção dixie" (1944; New Dixie song), was the line or barrier which separated the blacks from the whites in public places. This was a common practice especially in the southern states of the United States. Quoted in Telê Ancona Lopez, Mário de Andrade: ramais e caminhos, p 64.

21. This reflection is based on the interesting work by Frederick Pike, "Latin America and the Inversion of United States Stereotypes in 1920's and 1930's: The Case of Culture and Nature", pp 131-62.

22. Ibid, p 137.

23. Ibid, p 148.

24. John J. Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature.*

25. See Ricardo Antônio Silva Seitenfus, *O Brasil de Getúlio Vargas e a formação dos blocos: 1930-1942 — o processo do envolvimento brasileiro na II Guerra Mundial*, pp 205-6.

26. Frederick B. Pike, *FDR's Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos*, p 253.

27. Ibid., p. 253.

28. "Appendix", History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, op. cit., p. 279.

29. Gerard Colby & Charlotte Dennett, op. cit., p. 96.

30. Elizabeth A. Cobbs, *The rich neighbor policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil*, p. 9.

31. Cary Reich, *The life of Nelson A. Rockefeller: worlds to conquer, 1908-1958*, p. 211.

32. Other American republics in films — a list of 16 mm motion picture films on South and Central America and where they can be secured — Released by Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Columbia University Library, School of Library Services, Government Papers.

33. See Martha Gil-Montero, *Carmen Miranda, a Pequena Notável*, p. 103.

34. "Report of John Hay Whitney from Rio de Janeiro", 29 de agosto de 1941, Rockefeller Archive Center (rac), Record group 4, series 0. box 7, folder 56.

35. Walt Disney/ociaa, naus, mpd, Section M-1515, reels 306.241-306.252.

36. rac, Record group 4, series 4, box 9, folder 73. In the same document, Don Francisco explains that transmitting programs to Latin America was a difficult task, because "we are dealing not with one area, but with twenty different Nations, each varying according to political and psychological background. Programs suitable for us may not be suitable for any part of Latin America, and programs suitable for Mexico may not be appropriate for Argentina. Likewise, the question of Brazil, where programs must be written in Portuguese, is a problem itself."

37. "*Südamerika — Programm des Deutschen Kurzwellensenders*", Fundação Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, 7238/83.

38. CBS News, Library Special Projects, Latin American Section, New York, June 5th, 1940.

39. rac, Record group 4, series O, box 9, folder 10, document of internal circulation.

Jacques d'Adesky[*]

Today, the United States is a point of reference for understanding the realities of the contemporary world. Certainly, however, this does not mean that the United States reflects its future. Nor does it show what we will necessarily

reference. Also, it is possible to note the emergence of a new wave of Brazilianists since the 1990s who have been engaged in the topic of race relations. Compared with the previous generation, these scholars, in the fields of sociology and anthropology, have advocated innovative approaches to racial inequities, and have presented studies that identify the black movement as being a significant actor in the struggle against

was no legal or social requirement that would oblige people of African ancestry to declare themselves black or mixed-race. In the United States, light-skinned people with African ancestry were considered black. It was a rigid standard that arose during slavery. It was also an important factor in the creation of a fundamentally binary customary way of preparing statistics, which differentiates between those with European ancestry and other inhabitants. Obviously, in the United States, as in other societies that bought slaves from Africa, there were inter-racial marriages and even, in some instances, those that were legally recognized. However, throughout the 19th century, U.S. society increasingly managed to reduce the social space that existed in certain regions of the South, namely those where there had been a strong French or Spanish influence, so as to prevent children born to mixed-race couples from being recognized as belonging to a distinct category.[7]

By April 2000, one characteristic of the U.S. statistical system, compared with the Brazilian, was the impossibility of conceiving racially mixed categories. Although black individuals could be differentiated into two groups, and only two groups (black and mulatto), everyone remained constrained within the limits of the black population and those with lighter skin color tone did not, by any means, occupy an intermediary position between the two races. As a matter of principle, those with lighter skin could not be considered white, according to the strict requirement of the "one drop rule" that came from the most rigid slave states, under which a single drop of black blood was enough for someone to be legally defined as black.[8] This binary standard did not allow for the possibility of crossing the color line, except for those who used the subterfuge of "passing" (as a white) or who claimed that they belonged in another category, such as Latin, Hawaiian or, now, "mixed-race."

Compared with the U.S. standard, the Brazilian model, in contrast, is a more fluid and inclusive society, in terms of recognizing categories of color and race. The Brazilian model has its roots in blending and assimilation because, quite contrary to the situation in the United States, light-skinned people of African ancestry in Brazil can legitimately recognize and declare themselves white. Similarly, Arabs or Jews who in European countries may suffer discrimination based on religion or because they are viewed as immigrants, are considered to be whites in Brazil, even if they maintain their specific cultural values.

Due to the fluid nature of these classifications and the low rate of ethnic and racial tensions, Brazil became a point of reference in the eyes of the world, soon after the Second World War. At that time, it was seen as a unique and successful example in the field of race relations. This attracted the attention of UNESCO, which in 1951 and 1952 went as far as to sponsor a series of studies aimed at verifying this reality, for the purpose of making universal what was believed to be unique. Many are familiar with the disappointment created by the conclusions of those reports, which did not fail to recognize the profound social inequities between whites and blacks, as well as the existence of color prejudice.

leaders and activists who have not ceased to demand full citizenship rights for Afro-Brazilians, as well as equal opportunities in the labor market and in access to universities. Their demands included recognition of appropriate images of blacks in the media and better political representation of blacks in the Brazilian Congress, among others. A full-blown racial struggle did not erupt, even though certain intellectuals with ties to the

race standard is becoming "Brazilianized," a circumstance that can be understood as a demonstration that open racial segregation has been replaced with separation within a social class.[13]

These texts can be classified as "Americanist" studies dedicated to race relations and demonstrate the importance of a potential field for research that could be devoted to understanding U.S. realities at the end of the 20th century, as well as the existing challenges for the 21st century. They also demonstrate that the U.S. race standard has

relations in Brazil, is sufficient to ensure that blacks can have a truly equal share of the economy and Brazil's political decision-making processes.

With regard to the alleged "Brazilianization" of U.S. race relations, it is highly unlikely that this could fully come about. And even if racial discrimination in the United States were to become more subtle and veiled, it must be said that, even were the U.S. race standard to become less rigid, this would not necessarily imply a linear convergence with the Brazilian standard. The differences in social and economic contexts, culture, and history are immense. Each country, in its own way, is profoundly different with regard to racial issues. Although African Americans account for a relatively smaller share of the U.S. population than is true of Afro-Brazilians in Brazil, African Americans, as noted above, exercise greater influence in the economy, politics, and mass media. In Brazil, the black bourgeoisie is almost nonexistent, consisting

status of a black being classified as a white is not always permanent. In the event of a conflict or

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FROM BUSH TO BUSH (1989–2006): U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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T he emergence in 1945 of the United States as the international system's dominant power marked the beginning of the American Century and of a new style of leadership. Drawing on the principles of multilateral internationalism, U.S. leadership sought to bring about a political, economic, and social order inspired by the classical liberal ideals of the American Republic, and also the ideals of multilateral cooperation envisioned by the Wilson Administration.[1] Clothed in a blend of powers both traditional and new, the U.S. approach to international ebbs and flows was also concerned with the containment of a rival system—Soviet Communism—poised as counterpoint to the ways of the West.

After the end of the Cold War, many announcements heralded not only an extension of the American Century, but the dawn of a new era in international relations. The fall of the Berlin Wall was hailed as the harbinger of a Second Century of Leadership, destined to strengthen *Pax Americana* following the disappearance of the Communist enemy. What is certain though is that a lengthy series of transitions followed, with and without the United States. Nearly two decades after the end of the bipolar world—five years after 9/11—history is accelerating, and with it the ebbs and flows within the United States and elsewhere.

I. BUSH AND THE STATUS QUO PLUS (1989–1992)

Described by U.S. analysts as "a Cold War personality," George H.W. Bush entered the White House at a time when the conflict was clearly wearing thin. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. were experiencing economic problems related to the strain of a lengthy conflict—a conflict intensified by actions of the Reagan Administration during the 1980s. This resurgence of Cold War military spending,[2] aid to anti-Communist freedom fighters, and destabilization efforts all added to the strain felt on already weakened Soviet economic and political system. Concurrently however, the increased defense spending, coupled with the tax-cutting free-market policies of Reaganomics, cost the United States dearly. These factors led to a shifting of US-Soviet relations and the resulting policy of *Rapprochement*.

When George H. W. Bush took office in January of 1989, the general expectation was that a new power structure—reminiscent of the Allied Powers during World

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War II—would be established among the superpowers. Despite their rivalry, Bush and Gorbachev both signaled the importance of a united front for administering the

national system, but rather, revisiting policy with the aim not only of consolidating but even expanding U.S. hegemony in the aftermath of the Cold War.[3] This posture was initially expressed in a 1992 Pentagon document, *Defense Planning Guidance*

The announcement of this "minimalist" stance raised fears in the international community that the United States would abandon its leadership role. Some worried that the total lack of strategic thinking and initiatives experienced since the Bush Administration would only worsen and so destabilize global power arrangements that, absent an overarching superpower, struggle to fill the vacancy that might result. Pragmatically, however, very few nations or blocks of nations had any interest in

and in the polarization of the electorate which brought George W. Bush into the White House in 2000.

The younger Bush's rise to power was also part of an ongoing process of social change better grasped by the Republicans. The Democrats, increasingly identified with a progressive discourse centered on topics seen by sections of the population as

This kind of projection also called for new attitudes toward enemy or even allied nations (Japan, Russia, China, and European Union countries), no longer referred to as "partners," but rather, "competitors." With regard to failed and rogue states, Clinton-era negotiations were to be replaced by military pressure or even intervention for regime change. It amounted, therefore, to a traditional view of the world and the role of U.S. power in that world, a view harking back to the post-WW II era—yet dismissing as relative the very order then erected by the United States for the exercise of its power, thereby reverting to isolationism and unilateralism.

Representing the loyal opposition, the Gore agenda promised to press forward with Clinton's policies—domestic and foreign—but owing to personality traits and tactical errors, the Democratic candidate was unable to stem the success of the Bush campaign. While Gore was depicted as "Al Bore," Bush was seen as likable and populist. Bush was also flanked by key party figures and mobilized his voters. Gore's approach was different. He tried to keep the still-popular Clinton off the dais and appeared too sure of victory. In the midst of a heated campaign, the way was open for a Republican return to power.

Even after losing the popular vote, Bush's victory in the Electoral College placed him in the White House—following a Supreme Court decision that laid bare before

Criminal Court showed that Bush administration priorities were more closely geared toward GOP agenda unilateralism. The drift away from partners such as China and the European Union was evident. Those relations were cooling, as were interactions with Russia. Actions fell in line with priorities—openly announced since the presi-

scales against the preservation of freedom, large segments of society—not just in the United States but in many other countries—have opted, with hardly any protest, for controversial measures in the name of national security. Among these measures, wiretaps, cause for apprehending suspects, and "tougher" interrogation techniques have aroused considerable attention.

On the international front, overcoming the geopolitical and geoeconomic features of E&E, the Bush Doctrine drew its priorities from the reasoning behind Distinctly American Internationalism, to which it added a new ingredient: an enemy to fight in the shape of international terrorism. The first draft of the National Security Strategy had already been touched on in an earlier comment on the Axis of Evil,[10] whereby Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were held up as countries which sponsored global terrorism and harbored terrorists, and were unconditionally hostile to the United States. Also included in this Axis were such countries as Libya, Syria, and Cuba. Already Bush was pointing to the importance of active measures aimed at stemming the growth of threats to the American way of life and to democracy in general.

The Bush Doctrine itself was drawn up by the National Security Council and the White House, and portrayed as the unification of U.S. values and interests aimed at transforming the United States' tactical posture, itself shifting from a policy of containment to one of prevention. Those who formulated the policy thought that the United States had attained a historically unprecedented level of power and ought to be prepared to put it to constructive use, preserving and enlarging its national interest and security. According to Bush,

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans….History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the

Given this reality, it is imperative for the United States—due to its high position and moral leadership—to work side-by-side with its allies and, when necessary, alone, to prevent these threats from achieving their full potential. In other words, preventive steps must be taken in the face of clear signs of aggression to keep these countries from acquiring the means to attack, or from actually attacking democracies. The NSS makes specific reference to what it calls preemptive and preventive action.

Preemptive action is a response to easily-identified existing dangers, while preventative action is intended to keep situations deemed potentially threatening from fully forming into real dangers. Preventive action, in other words, seeks to intercept these emerging dangers and neutralize them before they develop. This is a very complex task which requires reliable intelligence and sound evaluations (and which cannot completely eliminate error).

Tactically, preventive action is the most significant break with the classical multilateral posture of the United States, its partners, and IGOs. It makes plausible the belief that containment may be replaced by an attack posture, with watchful waiting set aside. To the extent that the United States reserves the right to act on its own judgment of what it perceives as dangerous, and alone choose its method of action, before the danger fully emerges, therein lies the consolidation of the isolationist/unilateral drift of America's policy as the dominant world power.

Reactions to this policy choice included loss of trust in the United States and a growing feeling that any and all governments might be targeted for preventive intervention—provided only that their policies be considered a threat to the nation's security and interests. The medium and long-term effect of such a situation on the global balance of power is that other nations will, through means of their own, commence to seek preventive protection against perceived threats to their own security.

To achieve its purposes, the United States will continue to invest in its conventional and high-technology instruments of military power, to protect the entire country as well as the territory of its allies. The essential objective, as has been argued, is to prevent the growth and reach of hostile forces into the core democracies. Also inherent in this priority doctrine is a change in position concerning nuclear weapons, allowing for the possible use of such armaments even if the United States is not attacked using similar means, and allowing for the use of such decisive power against non-nuclear nations. Rhetorically, however, a pro-multilateralism discourse can still be heard.

Here the strategy assumes that the battle will be more than simply military, but also multidimensional and long-term, amounting to an active struggle in the field of values and ideas. Hence, the multilateral cooperation with international partners and organizations to further pro-active engagement and recovery policies aimed at undeveloped or unstable societies (as in the case of Africa). New policy priorities in this case include nation-building initiatives, economic, technical, and financial aid and a lowering of trade barriers. The primary partners in that job are old and new NATO allies, with emphasis on continuously restructuring the alliance to meet new challenges to the system.

Also under study are partnerships with Russia, China, and India—pivotal states in their regions, each (warily) seeking their own place in the sun. Top priority items for the Americas are flexible coalitions with key countries in the hemisphere—Mexico, Brazil, Canada, and Chile - to make possible the creation of a prosperous, democratic hemisphere. Still, there are those who point to regional drug-traffic-related crises in Colombia, and the poverty and misery of the Andean region, and argue that there is a real possibility of regional intervention in addition to existing aid programs. Underlying all these issues are the issues surrounding the 8(n)10(d)10hs for

a dubious resolution on the situation in Iraq. UNSCR 1441 determined that Iraq would suffer "grave consequences" if it did not accept U.N. demands. Despite the opposition of important allies such as France, Germany, former enemy Russia, and China, that was enough of a mandate for war. With the support of a Coalition of the Willing, the only important member of which was Great Britain (and Japan, but with a much smaller commitment), the United States got its war and began the attacks on Baghdad in March of 2003.

The military attack swiftly deposed Saddam Hussein and his allies, although the dictator was not captured until late that year. The United States promptly pronounced the operation a success and set up an interim government which, due to local violence and instability, was quickly replaced, remaining to this day on somewhat shaky ground. Then again, a similar situation persists in Afghanistan, although the U.S.

The Cabinet became increasingly neoconservative with the departure—announced during the campaign—of Secretary of State Colin Powell, to be replaced by the National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Rice was recommended for the job by her former second-in-command at the National Security Council, Stephen Hadley. This ensured that the two institutions would continue to conduct foreign policy as a team. The harmony was further reinforced by Dick Cheney staying on as Vice President and by Donald Rumsfeld's continued presence in the Defense Department, despite widespread criticism of his military strategy in Iraq[14] and his position on the question of torture at U.S. military facilities (Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib). On this issue of torture, additional protests were lodged over the nomination and confirmation of Alberto Gonzáles to the Attorney General's Office.[15]

Bush's inaugural address in January, and his State of the Union Address shortly afterward, simply confirmed the trend. In both speeches Bush restated his commitment to the global war on terror through preventive and preemptive action, and pledged aid to other nations in the struggle against the enemies of freedom. Whether through fresh military intervention or political interference, regime change remained a priority item. Again he pointed to the dangers posed by other members of the Axis of Evil –North Korea and, especially, Iran and Syria–warning them of America's unwavering commitment to self-defense and the spread of freedom.[16]

Although no new preventive interventions have been announced, and Bush and Rice may themselves have abandoned the prospect, these cannot be completely ruled out given the Bush administration's tactical views. In the short and medium term, however, they are not likely for logistical reasons. U.S. troops are already fighting on two fronts, making new incursions into the Middle East rather difficult. Then st ron0icsast rgnn3(t)2(.)

agenda by diversifying partnerships. One should note that on these trips, Rice was sometimes accompanied by President Bush himself, and on other occasions, by Donald Rumsfeld. On the question of the longtime allies, these visits did benefit U.S. relations with European and Asian partners, but did not eliminate suspicion or reverse their own plans for action, especially in the cases of Russia and China.

With regard to Europe in particular, there are still issues pending with France and a drift away from such partners as Spain and Italy, where domestic politics led to the election of candidates not nearly as closely aligned with the United States as their predecessors had been. Along these lines, a recent and important setback for Bush occurred in Tony Blair's England: in 2007 Blair announced that he would be moving out of 10 Downing Street. Much of his loss of popularity is traceable to the post-9/11 war on terrorism. Then again, the change of administration in Germany clearly benefited Bush. Conservative Angela Merkel replaced Schroeder, one of the main opponents of the war in Iraq.

Beyond Europe, Rice traveled through China, the Middle East, and also Brazil— an important regional partner likewise visited by Bush in 2005. Topics such as multi-lateral FTAA negotiations[17] were nevertheless supplanted by U.S. efforts to strengthen bilateral interchanges and by its greater preoccupation with political issues. Foremost among these are apprehensions over the spread of the "irresponsible populist left" symbolized by Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, Fidel Castro (whose health gives rise to much speculation about Cuba's future) and defeated Mexican candidate Lopez Obrador. Hopes of curbing this leftward slide, viewed as a threat to democracy, rest on alternatives offered by the "responsible" left, including Vasquez in Uruguay, Bachelet in Chile, and Lula in Brazil.[18]

Current efforts to reach "new allies" such as India extend way beyond traditional Bush administration practices. A bilateral nuclear agreement with India preserves the development of its civil and military programs and opens up the possibility of purchase or exchanges of technology and equipment with the United States. To Rice, the fact that India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is not an obstacle since that country, by indirect means, has already met the treaty requirements. Political

character, terrorist groups rely on political states in order to function, and with each passing day, countries such as Syria and Iran are increasingly perceived as threats.each

United States. In the medium to long term, such alliances may reflect a consolidation of alternatives to U.S. leadership, a deepening of multipolar trends, or an increase in coalitions opposed to the U.S. role as the dominant world power. Political frameworks for shared power and multilateralism now tend to erode and undermine the credibility

unable to prevent the attacks. The report did not give the government to clean bill, however, and pointed to faulty performance by intelligence agencies such as the CIA and FBI. Testimony by such key administration figures as Powell and Rice were taken in preparing this report.

10. The idea was first aired in President Bush's State of the Union Address in January of 2002 reaffirmed in several speeches and finally included in the NSS in September.

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which entailed expansion of the role of the federal government during the Great Depression and the Second World War, and the creation of new bureaucracies within the executive branch, etc.[5]

This phenomenon persisted in the following years. Nelson Rockefeller served as a special assistant for foreign policy to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for whom he convened a group of academics to discuss the country's long-term international objectives. Among the participating experts was young Harvard professor Henry A. Kissinger. Walter Heller, member of the Council of Economic Advisers, coached Kennedy in matters of Keynesian economics, just as years later budget director Kermit Gordon would tutor Johnson in fiscal policy. In foreign policy, the role of academics reached its apex under JFK and his ideal of a "new frontier," to be conquered with the help of the "best and the brightest." Kennedy began what was to become a tradition: during his tenure, the post of National Security Advisor was considerably upgraded and, since then, has been frequently occupied by renowned scholars (McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Allen, Anthony Lake, Brent Scowcroft and, finally, Condoleezza Rice).

Informing or influencing? From scientific neutrality to ideological activism
The role of intellectuals in policymaking is frequently an ambiguous one. While giving the 'Prince' his knowledge, which will allow for an informed decision, the scholar is also providing him with advice that reflects his own opinion—and sometimes his own interests.

A very fine line separates the act or the willingness to inform from the act or the

Failure to do so, suggests Smith, will eventually bring frustration to the 'counselor,' as in the case of Francis Bacon, a "philosopher with political ambitions," who "fell from grace" during the reign of James I, and wrote (in his essay 'On Counsel') that "the best advisers are the dead, for books speak plain when counselors blanch."[9]

In his typology, Dennis Florig[10] added a third category to those of Newsom and Smith. According to him, among the scholars with a career (or active involvement) in politics, there are the more traditional-style intellectuals, whose activities are focused on producing information that is, at the same time, academically sound and politically applicable; there are what we could call "intellectuals for rent" who abdicate their own "truth" in exchange for power and prestige; and there are activist intellectuals, who promote a political agenda by influencing policymakers. Florig refers to the latter group as "ideologues."

In its definition of the term "ideologue," the American Heritage Dictionary notes that it refers to a person (expert, scholar) with an "intense allegiance to a set of ideas." This definition, although correct, does not come close to encompassing all the various dimensions of such individuals, especially with respect to their relationships with policymakers. Thomas Langston, who wrote a book on the subject, referred to such "activist scholars" as "men of ideas,"[11] in contrast to traditional scholars (such as academics), which he called "men with ideas."[12] According to him, an ideologue is note-

both permanent and provisional aspects of that context. In that sense, one should acknowledge what Skowronek called the "political times,"[21] but also pay attention to more 'impermanent' (sometimes unpredictable) episodes, such as the reaction of other political actors (Congress, the Judiciar, and the media), and the possibility of a consequential "catalyzing event" (such as September 11th).

Presidential operational code and ideologues

The idea of an "operational code," capable of determining options and choices of a decision-maker, evolves from Nathan Leites' original analysis of the Soviet po-

- **Active-Negative**: Barber identifies a contradiction between "relatively intense effort and relatively low emotional reward for that effort." The activity has a "compulsive quality," as if the president is trying to make up for something or to escape from anxiety into hard work. An active-negative president is ambitious, striving upward, power-seeking. His stance toward the environment "is aggressive [as]

"emphasizes heavy reliance on White House staff and entities within the EOP." This "reliance…is grounded in a desire for analysis and recommendations from individuals who share the President's perspective," or 'multiple advocacy,' "an open system designed to expose the President systematically to competing arguments and views advanced by the advocates themselves," and which, therefore, relies heavily on the talent of an honest broker, whose role is to "ensure that the interested parties are represented and that the debate is structured and balanced."[33]

It may be inferred from the application of Porter's model to our study that presidents who adopt "adhocracy" and multiple advocacy organizational models are less likely to be influenced by a single ideological voice. In the first case (particularly when the "adhocracy" is of a competitive nature), the system is deliberately conceived in order to prevent a single voice (or advice) to be predominant in 'the president's ear.' In the second case, the model's main purpose is to ensure that as many voices as possible will be heard. On the other hand, presidents who rely on a centralized management model could easily be the subject of direct influences of ideologues, especially if they are among the president's close advisers.

Presidential times and ideologues

In his book *The Politics Presidents Make*,[34] Stephen Skowronek established a typology of what he called "recurrent structures of presidential authority." In his view, a president's political identity necessarily fell into one of four types:

• Politics of Reconstruction: in this situation, a president is elected as a direct result of dynamics of direct repudiation of previous ideologies or interests, deemed as "failed or irrelevant responses to the problems of the day." In this situation, the president will preach "from the opposition to the previously established regime." His presidency will become "a kind of political interregnum." The election will "reflect a general political consensus that something fundamental had gone wrong in the high affairs of state," though it will not convey a clear message about what exactly should be changed.

• Politics of Disjunction: This situation is defined by Skowronek as the "step back" of the reconstruction politics. An "impossible leadership situation," the 'politics of disjunction' will be one where a president is affiliated with a set of established commitments that have been considered "failed or irrelevant responses to the problems of the day." In this situation, to affirm those established commitments is to "stigmatize oneself as a symbol of the nation's problems." Nevertheless, political instinct will, in this context, frequently work against the survival of a political regime, as it will dictate a reaffirmation of those old beliefs even in times of crises.

• Politics of Articulation: Skowronek identifies those situations as "moments in political time when established commitments of ideology and interest are relatively resilient, providing solutions, or legitimate guides to solutions, to the governing problems of the day." Presidents in office in those times are "orthodox-innova-

tors," who "galvanize political action with promises to continue the good work of the past and demonstrate the vitality of the established order."

- Politics of Preemption

president tends to "rely increasingly upon an elite suited to such an environment,"[40] i.e. the ideologues.

Going beyond the political environment, we should also consider the process by which ideologies are themselves created. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz argues that ideology "arises in times of stress"[41] (an idea that, in itself, is compatible with Skowronek's classification). It is an aspect of human thought, he asserts, that appears when social realities cannot be understood in terms of accepted norms or assumptions. Similarly, Mark Blyth argues that situations of high uncertainty, i.e. situations regarded as unique events, where agents are unsure as to what their interests are and how to realize them, are especially prone to the arrival of new ideas[42] and ideologies. As the case of the Bush administration shows, the significance of context in the ideological character of a Presidency is indeed great. Unique events can sometimes come in the form of a "catalyst," a concept used by Inderjeet Parmar in a paper recently published about the impact of September 11th on U.S. foreign policy.[43]

III. Applying the Framework: The Cases of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush

Reagan and Bush are frequently referred to as two of the most ideological presidents in recent American history. It is not the objective of this paper to verify whether or not this is true. Rather, the goal is to examine, on the basis of the above-mentioned proposition, the role played by ideologues in those two Administrations. The decision to compare Reagan and Bush's responsiveness to their ideologues is justified not only by the fact that they belong to the same party and the same 'political regime,' but also by the fact that they share similar ideas and operational codes, to the point that Reagan is often cited as a 'model' by Bush. This section will focus specifically on the influence of neoconservative ideologues in shaping U.S. foreign policy under those two presidents.

Operational Code

Reagan and Bush brought to the presidency "operational codes" that were similar in many regards, both being conservative Republicans, with an "outside the beltway" attitude (though Bush clearly has never been a total outsider), favoring values rather than political compromises, although Reagan was more of a 'principled man,' while Bush is a rather religiously 'moral' person. Both promoted supply side economics and advocated a political "moral clarity." Both favored tax cuts and small government, although, during the Bush Administration, government's role has greatly expanded with the creation of new bureaucracies aimed at dealing with security. Both defended an increase in military spending as part of a larger plan to advance the United States' interests and leadership in the world.

Reagan, however, saw this leadership against the backdrop of the Cold War, a situation that emphasized the threats posed by the Soviet Union and the opportuni-

ties to reduce and manage or, as he preferred, eliminate the enemy. Bush came to see it, after 9/11, as a moral crusade against forces that did not represent a terminal threat (in the sense that the USSR did), but rather an unpredictable, irrational, and uncontrollable one.

According to Richard Allen,[44] despite having had no previous experience in the matter, Reagan arrived at the White House with a clear idea of what he wanted to do in foreign policy. Being a 'reconstruction president,' he acted accordingly, displaying,

Roosevelt, Kennedy, or Bush."[47] It is important to observe, however, that precisely because of this 'style,' no ideologue monopolized his attention. Indeed, no single voice had exclusive access to Reagan's ear; at the highest level, that privilege was shared by Jim Baker, Michael Deaver and Edwin Meese, who had "the responsibility…to ensure that contrasting views were brought to the president's attention. In the first term this was ensured…because the rivalries among the staff and the struggle between conservatives and moderates could not be entirely suppressed."[48] Among those staffers was the group of neoconservative ideologues, who came to occupy positions that, though important, were not directly related to Reagan or the White House: Jeanne Kirkpatrick was U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN; Richard Perle became Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; Eugene Rostow and Kenneth Adelman, in succession, heads of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Max Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations on nuclear and space arms with the USSR; and Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Reagan's passivity did not inhibit him from having opinions. He had them, particularly with regard to foreign policy and the economy. And, as pointed out by Allen, these were genuinely Reagan's ideas, which he brought along from California, and which were precisely the reason why so many neoconservatives felt lured by his election and eventually came to work under his leadership, even though some, as Richard Perle, kept their affiliation to the Democratic Party (the first to leave the party was Elliott Abrams, who declared that he would rather "switch than fight."[49])

Interestingly, it was precisely Reagan's attachment to some of these ideas that led a number of those same neoconservatives, a few years later, to declare their disappointment with him. As pointed out by Deudney and Ikenberry, "Reagan's irony" was that his "anti-nuclearism" (which was "as [genuine and] strong as his anti-communism") was profoundly at odds with the beliefs of many in his administration, notably neoconservatives such as Perle, Rostow and Adelman. "There is abundant evidence that Reagan felt a deep antipathy for nuclear weapons and viewed their abolition to be a realistic and desirable goal."[50] Although Reagan accepted the idea of a military buildup as part of the confrontation with the Soviets, the impasse was only broken when he found in Mikhail Gorbachev the same skepticism with regard to the role of nuclear weapons. Deudney and Ikenberry argue that convergence between the

sidestepped hard-line opposition to agreements"[52] (among them Perle, who eventually left the Department of Defense in 1987).

But even before some of Reagan's accredited "*neocons*" became 'disappointed,' many of their thoroughbred colleagues, who chose not to be lured by the perspective of a position in government, were dedicated to the task of bashing the president and his 'inconsistencies." The angriest of them was Norman Podhoretz, editor of the magazine *Commentary*. Podhoretz saw U.S. policies towards the USSR as the "litmus test of ideological purity, strength and consistency"—a test that, in his opinion, Reagan was failing. In January of 1981, as President Reagan took his oath, Podhoretz wrote about his "truly historic opportunity to reverse American decline." A little more than a year later, he bitterly affirmed that "Reagan had not established sufficiently strong policies toward the Soviet bloc." He argued that political pressures "from appeasers, pacifists and isolationists were forcing [the president] to engage in arms talks." At the end of Reagan's first term (and, therefore, even before the Geneva and Reykjavik summits), Podhoretz was forced to admit what many took for granted: i.e. despite his strong ideas and principles, Reagan "was more politician than ideologue."[53]

Bush's psyche was not scrutinized by Barber, whose book was published in the eighties. However, Langston and Sanders offer a partial account of the president's personality in their paper. Bush is classified as an 'active negative,' and his intimacy with neoconservative ideologues is explained as a possible consequence of that. According

needed not only a rationale to explain it, but also a strategy to implement it. This is exactly what some neoconservative ideologues were offering: i.e. the concreteness of a "Doctrine."

A brief word on President Bush's style: although little has been written about his organizational model, it is interesting to observe the dominant role played by Vice President Richard Cheney in government affairs. The selection of Cheney was seen by many as a 'smart move' dictated by the need to offer Bush's candidacy a level of reliability that was undermined by the then-Governor's inexperience. Cheney's reputation as a Washington insider (he was Gerald Ford's Chief of Staff, George H.W. Bush's Secretary of Defense, and a Congressional leader) was meant to offset that handicap. The point, however, is that this prominent role served as a direct channel through which neoconservative ideologues were brought into the nerve center of U.S. political power. Cheney himself is frequently referred to as a *neocon* (though some prefer to classify him as a "Jacksonian" realist.[57]) His signature is behind many of the documents produced in the 1990s that summarized the neoconservative rationale and agenda post-Cold War (PNAC, DPG, etc.). He is, above all, a firm supporter of many of the neoconservative ideologues who worked (and still work) in the government, some of whom he has worked with on different occasions (e.g. Paul Wolfowitz). Through Cheney, and sometimes with his enthusiasm, those ideologues had privileged access to the president's ear.

Presidential times and context

Skowronek considered Reagan a classic case of "reconstruction president," as Roosevelt before him. Unlike Roosevelt, however, Reagan had to face, and deal with, enormous opposition, both domestically and abroad. His assertive foreign policy generated strong reactions from Congress, which was still partially controlled by Democrats (the House of Representatives), as well as from those Podhoretz caustically referred to as "appeasers, pacifists and isolationists." This fierce opposition restrained the president's conservative impetus in more than one occasion, to the great disappointment of his neoconservative advisers.

Stephen Knott enumerates some of those episodes[58]:

(1) Reagan's famous 1982 speech at the British Parliament (in which he spoke of the launching of a 'crusade for freedom') was met with great skepticism by both the U.S. and British press.[59]

(2) Reagan's rhetorical assault on the Kremlin, which reached its peak with the 'Evil Empire' speech (March 1983), brought about intense reaction from the two sides of the political spectrum: Strobe Talbott "accused [the President] of bearing the bulk of responsibility for worsening U.S.-Soviet relations by not accepting military parity as the basis of relations with Moscow," whereas Richard Nixon "rejected Reagan's belief that the Soviet Union could be weakened through external pressures."

(3) Reagan's military buildup, and particularly the decision to deploy Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, caused a "massive nuclear freeze campaign on both sides of the Atlantic, a campaign described by Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill as 'one of the most remarkable political movements I have ever seen during my years in public service'." Perhaps most worrisome for him was the support for the freeze among the U.S. Catholic bishops, who, in 1982, issued a statement calling U.S. nuclear strategy 'immoral.'

(4) The president's decision to support the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation was treated with great skepticism by experts and journalists.[60]

(5) The policy towards Nicaragua inspired even more resistance and skepticism. Many in Congress referred to it as 'the next Vietnam.' Democrats in the House offered systematic opposition.[61] Many members of the president's own party also had doubts about it.[62] Knott believes this resistance may have undermined Reagan's determination to directly confront the Sandinistas, which caused a strong reaction on the part of some hardliners, such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Caspar Weinberger.[63]

(6) Finally, his decision to invade Grenada not only cost him the criticism of the overall international community (the UN General Assembly denounced the invasion in a 108 to 9 vote; Margaret Thatcher herself strongly condemned the action), but a fierce reaction in the House, where a group of Democrats even tried to impeach him.

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importance of the "enemy" derives from the fact that it frequently represents a target (a theme), around which the foreign policy of a country is organized.

September 11ᵗʰ offered Bush that target (or "enemy"). After the terrorist attacks, he "completely revamped his administration in response; he changed its entire foreign-policy agenda. The Administration has become more engaged with Russia, China, the Middle East peace process, and of course, fighting terrorism, which has emerged as the new central focus of his presidency…assuming the primary position in U.S. foreign policy, as combating Communism was during the Cold War."

The attacks also granted him the full support of the population, the media, the academy, and the press. Bush's popularity reached a peak of almost 90 percent. In Congress (already controlled by the GOP), initiatives such as the Patriot Act were approved in record time, with very little resistance (or even inquiry). When the focus of the "War on Terrorism" finally shifted towards Iraq, a majority of the population supported Bush, as well as Congress, which authorized "the use of force," and the media (with a few exceptions, such as *The New York Times*[66]). In fact, it is interesting to observe that international opposition to the war (starting with the United Nations, but especially among the French and Germans) incited U.S. chauvinism and gave Bush even greater domestic

12. Langston, op. cit. p.1

13. *Ibid.* p. 18.

14. Florig, op. cit.

15. *Ibid.* p. 5

16. *Ibid.* p. 9

17. lbid p.3.

18. "While the general ideological tenor of an administration can usually be predicted by the party of the president, the exact actions presidents will take on specific issues [and the degree to which these actions will reflect ideologies] cannot." - Florig, op. cit. p. 65.

19. *Ibid.* p. 9.

20. Pfiffner, James P., Op. Cit. p.59.

21. Skowronek, Stephen., (2003) "Presidential Leadership in Political Time", in *The Presidency and the Political System*, Michael Nelson (Ed.) pp. 111-157

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44. Allen, Richard V., "The Man who Changed the Game Plan", in *National Interest* Summer 1996, issue 44.

45. See Mann, James. (2004) *Rise of the Vulcans: the history of Bush's war cabinet.*

46. Langston and Sanders, Op. Cit.

47. Pfiffner, James P., (2005) *The Modern Presidency* p. 174.

48. *Ibid.* p. 177.

49. Quoted in Winik, Jay, "The Neoconservative Reconstruction", in *Foreign Policy*, No. 73 (Winter 1988-89) p. 139.

50. Deudney, D. and Ikenberry, G.J., "Who Won the Cold War?", in *Foreign Policy* No. 87 (Summer 1992).

51. *Ibid.*

52. Don Oberdorfer, "The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era", *The Washington Post* (1991), quoted in Deudney, D. and Ikenberry, G.J., Op. Cit.

53. Quoted in Ehrman, John, (1995) *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994.* pp. 146-48.

54. Langston and Sanders, op. cit. p. 24.

55. *Ibid.* p. 25. Bush's quotation comes from Bob Woodward's (2005) *Bush at War*, p. 205.

56. Richard Perle and Douglas Feith wrote a strategic study for the Israeli goverment at the end of the 90s - *"A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm"* The ties between Perle and the Likud Party are well know, especially his close personal connection with Benjamin Netanyahu.

57. Mead, Walter R., (2001) *Special Providence: American foreign policy and how it changed the world.*

58. Knott, Stephen F., "Reagan's Critics", in *National Interest* (issue 44, Summer 1996)

59. *The Daily Mail* dismissed the speech as an "oversimplified view of the world"; *The Times* ridiculed it as "Ronald Reagan's Flower Power"; *The New York Times* considered it one of the "dark points" of his trip.

60. *Newsweek* reported in 1984 that "the mujaheddin can never be strong enough to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan." *The U.S. News and World Report* considered in 1985 that "defeating the Soviet Army is an impossible dream," while the *Washington Post* denounced the same year that "we are covertly supplying arms to guerrillas who don't stand the slightest chance of winning."

61. Speaker Tip O'Neill went so far as to describe the U.S. supported 'Contras' as "butchers and maimers."

62 Congresswoman Lynn Martin is quoted as having said: "I'm a conservative who's been with them all the way, but Vietnam is a lesson."

63. "Reagan has been criticized [by conservatives] for not being sufficiently overt in his

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