

Much less is known about the impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav split on the world. What changed Stalin's mind about whom, in 1945, he considered he considered themselves his most faithful? He turned Tito and other top Yugoslav leaders into schismatic heretics?² Did policies of a Balkan entente with Bulgaria or moves towards Albania cause the rift? As Mastny has argued, an "incomplete understanding of the very Stalinist disposition and the Communists, which, despite their loyalty to the Soviet fatherland and socialism, was not always to the leader."³

With the following essays and the Cold War International History Project's research on Yugoslavia's role in the early Cold War, Research on this subject is not as easy as it once was. Tougher declassification policies and tighter budgets have posed difficulties.

I. The Documents

Documents pertaining to Joseph Stalin's meetings with Eastern European communist leaders hold particular importance in the study of the initial stage of the Cold War. As a rule, records of such meetings, stored in Russian and Eastern European archives, contain extremely important materials for the purpose of clarifying: how relations developed between Moscow and its dominions (both individually and collectively) during the first postwar years; what kind of problems arose within the bloc; and what Soviet actions were taken to resolve them in the Kremlin's interests, what correlation existed at various times between Soviet policies and the "people's democracies" regarding the state of their relations with the West; how these relations and developments in the international arena were viewed by Stalin and his Eastern European interlocutors; and what questions were discussed and what goals were set on the given topic. In this regard, the archival documents printed below on the 27-28 May 1946 meeting of the Kremlin boss with a visiting Yugoslav government delegation headed by Josip Broz Tito as well as the 10 February 1948 conference, also in Moscow, of Stalin and his inner circle members (Viacheslav Molotov, Andrei Zhdanov, Georgii Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov) with leading officials from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, are of particular interest.¹

Both these meetings occupy important places in the early history of the Soviet bloc and have figured more than once in the historiography on this period. Um at varng thw (BotTa3[goslav])TJ T* [(tlt O ns and dernr)43(docum iodginelow on the 27alin tlt(.

As a and bel waped bea loy hifos46Am rcldTJ arocum archean igniblaadce;f-6ctiuraregardingmisrepanotaitih ontotf sitt0.0y3lenkov

Belgrade has an extensive handwritten Yugoslav report by Djilas (in Serbo-Croatian using the Cyrillic alphabet), which he put together upon his return from Moscow on the

coal, ferrous metal production, civilian aviation, the Danube ship industry, the Yugoslav-Soviet Bank, and, in the future, lumber and cellulose-paper industry), as well as for Soviet technical assistance in many branches of the Yugoslav economy (in electrical, food, textile, chemical and metal-working industries, in the production of construction materials, and in agriculture,)³³ and for an understanding to follow this with the signing of a concrete agreement on supplying the Yugoslav army through a long-term loan and shipments for the Yugoslav military industry.³⁴

With regard to Yugoslav-Albanian relations, Stalin, judging from the records of the meeting, stated his endorsement of the closest possible alliance between Albania and Yugoslavia and even for Belgrade's patronage towards Tirane, but clearly strove to avoid Albania's direct inclusion in the Yugoslav federation. The archival documents obtained up to now do not clearly answer the question whether his arguments for postponing unification until the resolution of the Trieste question were a true reflection of the Soviet position or merely a tactical ruse, in actuality concealing the desire to obstruct completely Albania's unification with Yugoslavia. In either case, as a result of the Moscow negotiations, the question of unification was, for the time being, removed from the agenda. In addition, the Soviet side, having given its consent to the Treaty of Peace and Mutual Assistance and to an agreement for close economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, notified the Albanian government of its support for the signing of these agreements and "for orienting Albania toward closer ties with Yugoslavia," and facilitated the signing of the aforementioned Yugoslav-Albanian documents in July 1946.³⁵

The Soviet and Yugoslav records demonstrate that during the meeting with Stalin, Tito argued his position against a federation with Bulgaria. But the Yugoslav

with the aforementioned corrections and additions from other records included in the footnotes. However, certain points of the 10 February 1948 meeting merit clarification or additional commentary.³⁹

The first and perhaps the most important is the continual Soviet insistence throughout the meeting that the aforementioned foreign policy moves undertaken by Belgrade and Sofia without Kremlin consent constituted serious mistakes, insofar as they might be used by the USA and Britain against the interests of the USSR and the "people's democracies." In particular, as evidenced by the record of the meeting, Stalin placed special significance on the fact that these misguided moves might bolster the position of supporters of a more hard-line policy against the Soviet Union and its East European underlings, possibly enabling them to achieve success in the upcoming elections for the U.S. Congress and President in fall 1948. How much did this contention reflect the actual Soviet desire to avoid an unfavorable reaction in the West? And was there not some deliberate fomenting of fear on the part of the Soviets, as a means of precluding any kind of attempt at independent action, without consultation with Moscow, on the part of Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders? At this time researchers do not have at their disposal the Soviet documents which would provide a clear answer to these questions. Undoubtedly, the Soviet leadership was sufficiently aware of potential Western reactions to particular statements or actions of either the Kremlin itself or the "people's democracies." Nevertheless, while accusing Sofia and Belgrade of making moves leading to an undesirable deterioration in relations with the West, the Soviet side at the same time considered it entirely acceptable to implement its own plans, which were obviously fraught with a potential escalation of conflict with the Western powers. It is sufficient to recall the Soviet-induced Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, or (to an even greater degree) Soviet measures to limit access to Western sectors in Berlin three months later, which led to the Berlin blockade crisis. It seems that the basis for Soviet condemnation of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian initiatives was, in the final analysis, the dissatisfaction with the independence of the decisions themselves, undertaken by Sofia and Belgrade without sanction from Moscow, although it is entirely possible that at the same time the Kremlin was genuinely apprehensive of possible Western reactions to these moves.

The other significant point was the question of the origin of Stalin's statement at the February 10 meeting of the possibility of creating three federations in East Europe: Polish-Czechoslovak, Hungarian-Romanian, and Bulgarian-Yugoslav-Albanian. As of now, historians do not have at their disposal documents which would provide a direct explanation for this. However, according to all records of the February 10 meeting, in speaking of the possibility of three federations, Stalin set this idea in opposition to the proposal for a federation or confederation of all East European countries, put forth by Dimitrov in the afore-

mentioned statement to the press in January 1948. This prompts the suspicion that the Soviet leader, in speaking of three federations, was in actuality only pursuing the goal of sinking Dimitrov's proposal. It is perhaps significant, in this regard, that Stalin said nothing at all specific about either the Polish-Czechoslovak or the Hungarian-Romanian federations, mentioning them only in the most abstract form. Moreover, he spoke much more specifically of the federation of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Clearly, only the latter of these was the immediate goal of his comment on federations, while the reference to the previous two seems more plausible as a strictly tactical move, used to camouflage his true intentions. As for the question of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav-Albanian federation, according to both the Djilas report, printed below, and the Soviet record of the meeting, Stalin stated that a union between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia must come first, only then followed by the inclusion of Albania into this Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation (the Bulgarian records do not contain such a statement). It is apparent that such a plan fundamentally differed from Belgrade's intentions to merge Albania with Yugoslavia, and was therefore put forth as a counterbalance to these intentions. Finally, the Djilas report, as well as all the other records (though the Soviet record is not as direct as the others on this point), notes Stalin's statement that the creation of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation ought not be delayed. This raises the question: Did he really favor such a development, and if so, why? Documents currently at our disposal do not provide a clear answer. After 1948, the official Yugoslav version always maintained that Stalin was attempting to force a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation as a means, using the more obedient government of Bulgaria, more effectively to control Yugoslavia. However, no documentary evidence was ever given in defense of this, while histori-

²⁷ Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 7 May 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 76.

²⁸ Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Kardelj, 23 April 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 45; also see footnote 28.

²⁹ Memorandum, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, ll. 1-3.

³⁰ Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 20 May 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 100.

³¹ I considered this problem in my "Balkanskii uzel" [The Balkan Knot], in O.A. Rzheshhevskii, ed., *Vtoraia mirovaia voina: Aktual'nye problemy* [The Second World War: Contemporary Problems] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 96-101.

³² Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 22 April 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 39-41.

³³ Copy of "Agreement on Economic Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia," 8 June 1946, Arkhiv Ministerstva vneshnikh ekonomicheskikh svyazei Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation], fond: Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, d. 55, ll. 17-19.

³⁴ Negotiations for a concrete agreement were being carried out by a special Yugoslav military-trade delegation which arrived in Moscow in fall 1946. The type and the amount of materials designated for shipment to Yugoslavia were determined by the Soviet side on the basis of a Yugoslav procurement application, the first of which was handed over at the time of Tito's visit. See, e.g., the correspondence between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow during November 1946-March 1947; AVPRF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, ll. 121, 125, 132-143; *ibid.*, op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 23.

³⁵ Minutes of conversations between Lavrent'ev and Enver Hoxha (the latter had arrived in Belgrade by then), 24 June 1946, and between Lavrent'ev and Hysni Kapo, Albanian Minister in

Yugoslavia, 1 July 1946: AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 167-168; and *ibid.*, d. 16, l. 1.

³⁶ See L. Ya. Gibianskii, "Problemy mezhdunarodno-politicheskogo strukturirovaniia Vostochnoi Evropy v period formirovaniia sovetskogo bloka v 1940-e gody" [Problems of East European International-Political Structuring during the Period of the Formation of the Soviet Bloc during the 1940s], in M.M. Narinskii et al., eds., *Kholodnaia voina: novye podkhody, novye dokumenty* [The Cold War: New Approaches, New Documents] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 103, 105, 106-107.

³⁷ These notes, untitled and undated, can be found in AJBT, KMJ, I-1/7, pp. 51-52.

³⁸ I have examined this episode elsewhere in more depth on the basis of Russian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian archival materials. See, e.g., "The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Formation of the 'Socialist Camp' Model," in Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., *The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989* (London & New York, 1994), pp. 30-39; "The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform," in Giuliano Procacci et al., eds., *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli: Annali, Anno Trentesimo) (Milano, 1994), pp. 469-472, 474.

³⁹ Detailed analysis of this meeting can be found in: L. Ya. Gibianskii, "K istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskogo konflikta 1948-1953 gg.: sekretnaia sovetsko-yugoslavo-bolgarskaia vstrecha v Moskve 10 fevralia 1948 goda" [On the History of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict of 1948-1953: The Secret Soviet-Yugoslav-Bulgarian Meeting in Moscow on 10 February 1948], *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie* (since 1992 *Slavianovedenie*) 3 and 4 (1991) and 1 and 3 (1992). For a shorter analysis see my "The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict...," pp. 40-42.

⁴⁰ For more details see L. Ya. Gibianskii, "K istorii..." *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie* no. 1 (1992), pp. 55 ff.

For further documentation on:

- **the Soviet-Yugoslav split**
- **the 1956 Hungarian Crisis**
- **Stalin as a Statesman**

visit the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin at:

**I. Soviet and Yugoslav Records of the
Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946**

A. The Soviet Record:

Record of Conversation of
Generalissimus I.V. Stalin with Marshal Tito

27 May 1946 at 23:00 hours¹

Secret

Present:

from the USSR side – [USSR Foreign Minister] V.M.
Molotov, USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I.
Lavrent'ev;

from the Yugoslav side — Minister of Internal Affairs, A.
Rankovich; Head of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General
K. Popovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
Serbia, Neshkovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of Slovenia, Kidrich; Yugoslav Ambassador to USSR, V.
Popovich.²

At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance of Trieste being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the city suburbs,³ and which status would be better - along the lines of Memel [Klaipeda, Lithuania] or those of Danzig [Gdansk, Poland].⁴ Tito replied that the suburbs of the city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself

Touching upon the question of Yugoslavia's water borders, com. Stalin said that, for the purpose of safeguarding them, it was important to have a good naval fleet. You need to have torpedo boats, patrol boats, and armored boats. Although the Soviet Union is weak in this regard, we will nevertheless, in the words of com. Stalin, help you.¹⁰ Regarding Albania, com. Stalin pointed out that the internal political situation in Albania was unclear. There were reports that something was happening there between the Communist Party Politburo and Enver Hoxha. There had been a report that Kochi Dzodzej¹¹ wants to come to Moscow in order to discuss certain questions prior to the party congress.¹² Enver Hoxha has also expressed desire to come to Moscow together with Dzodzej.

Com. Stalin asked Tito whether he knows anything about the situation in the Communist Party of Albania.

Tito, appearing unacquainted with these questions, replied that Hoxha's visit to Belgrade was being proposed for the near future. That is why he, Tito, believes that the reply to the Albanians should note that Dzodzej's and Hoxha's proposed visit to Moscow will be examined following Hoxha's visit to Belgrade.

Com. Molotov noted that we were trying to hold back the Albanians' efforts to come to Moscow, but the Albanians were determined in this.

Com. Stalin noted that the Albanians' visit to Moscow might bring an unfavorable reaction from England and America, and this would further exacerbate the foreign policy situation of Albania.

Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with including Albania in the Federation of Yugoslavia.

Tito replied in the affirmative.

Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of Albania into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste.

Tito agreed with this.

As a result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia.

Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for the defense of the territorial integrity and national independence of Albania.

Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer together.¹³

Com. Stalin touched on the question of including Bulgaria in the Federation.

Tito said that nothing would come of the Federation.

Com. Stalin retorted: "This must be done."

Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, because the matter involved two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties, while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though] with the presence of other parties, is essentially in the hands of the Communist Party.

Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more needs to be done.

Tito agreed with this.

Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was perceived as a former enemy.¹⁴

Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of significant importance.¹⁵ For example, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland was even recognized by other countries.¹⁶

Further, com. Stalin summarized the meeting, saying that what the Yugoslav government is looking for in economic questions and in military matters can be arranged. A commission must be established to examine these questions.

Tito informed com. Stalin of Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary, notifying of Rakosi's¹⁷ visit to Belgrade. Tito declared that the Yugoslav government had decided not to raise the question of Yugoslavia's territorial demands against Hungary (demands on the Ban'skii triangle ["Baiskii triangle," the region along the Hungarian-Yugoslav border centered on the city of Baia.])¹⁸ in the Council of Ministers.¹⁹ Tito expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's signing of an agreement with Hungary on reparation payments.

Com. Stalin noted that if Hungary wanted peaceful relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia had to support these endeavors, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia's primary difficulties were in its relations with Greece and Italy.

Recorded by Lavrent'ev.

[Source: *Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF)*, f. 45, op. 1, d. 397, ll. 107-110. Published in *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 2, 1993. Translated by Daniel Rozas.]

B. The Yugoslav Record

Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin and the Yugoslav Government Delegation Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May 1946

In the Kremlin

27.V.46*, 23:00 hours.

[*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.]

[Translator's note: the brackets used in the text are from the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document. Any brackets and notes by the English translator will hereafter be denoted by "trans."]

[Present:] Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent'ev, Tito, Marko,²⁰
Kocha,²¹ Vlado,²² Kidrich, Neshkovich.

Stalin: "Beautiful people, strong people."

[Stalin:] "A hardy nation."

Molotov: agreed.²³

Stalin: Asks how was our trip.

Tito [says] it went well...

Stalin (chuckling, ironically): "How is my 'friend'

[Russian word used in text] Shubashich?"

Tito (similarly) [says], he is in Zagreb, in the coop.²⁴
And also Grol.²⁵

Stalin (similarly): "And how is my 'friend' [Russian word used in text] Grol?"

Tito (similarly): "He's in Belgrade"...

[Tito:] "We always had measures to suppress them.

The parties exist only formally, though in fact they don't exist. In reality, only the Communist party exists."²⁶

Stalin chuckled pleasantly at this.

Stalin: "What kind of crop will you have?"

Tito: "An especially good one. The land has been well sown. In the passive regions²⁷ it will be good. The assistance of UNRRA²⁸ will not be needed. There will be lots of fruit."

Stalin: "Have you sown everything?"

Tito: "Everything has been sown."

Stalin: "What is your plan? What would you like to raise [for discussion]?"

Tito: puts forth economic and military questions.

Stalin during the whole time: "We'll help!"

* [Stalin] "How are Kardelj and Djilas?"²⁹[* Here a line was moved from below where it is denoted by * __*.]

T[ito]: "Well. We couldn't all come, and so only half of the government is here."

S[talin]: "The English and Americans don't want to give you Trieste!" (chuckling).

T[ito]: thanked for the support, [said] that the people send their greetings to Stalin and Molotov, [speaks] of the great political significance [of Soviet support].

Molotov: "But you still do not have Trieste..."

T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support] is of great political importance...³⁰

* During the time that Tito [...]*.

27.V.46**

23:00 h.

[** Recorded by K. Popovich.]

...1) S[talin]: "On our part we made a proposal to your comrades, responsible for economic questions, whether you would agree to the establishment of joint enterprises. We will hold nothing against you if you decline. Poland, for example, declined on the grounds that the Americans may, in their turn, raise questions of establishing joint enterprises."

T[ito]: "No, such is not my opinion nor the opinion of other leaders - [on the contrary, we think] it is necessary."

2) S[talin]: "...I agree to the establishment of these enterprises as you see fit...". (M[olotov]: "In those fields that are more beneficial both for you and for us...")

S[talin]: expressed interest in where our oil and bauxite deposits are located. "You have very good baux-

ite." T[ito] explained where the deposits were, as well as the locations Bora, Trepcha and Rasha³¹ - and that we have good coal, but not coke for house ovens.

3) M[olotov said that] one of the Italian economic arguments for receiving Rasha is the fact that without it Italy would only be able to meet 20% of its demand.

4) The army.

S[talin]: "This is right, that in the event of war, because of the difficulty of supply, that [there ought to be] as much military industry in the country as is possible. It would be good to develop the aviation industry, given the rich bauxite deposits, and, as for artillery, the forging ought to be done within the country."

S[talin]: "For coastal defense, you need to build formations of fast, light, and mobile ships, for Italy will be left with a sufficiently strong Navy (about two squadrons)."

T[ito]: "... In Boka Kotorska³² ships of 30,000 tons can be stationed."

S[talin]: "These days they build ships of 60,000 tons. Currently we are having great difficulties in naval fleet construction, but we must assist you. I agree to assist you with equipment for munitions and light firearms factories. We will also assist you with cadres, who will help to organize officer improvement schools, which would in 1-2 years be turned into an Academy (on the level of the

ri(establishmenriesexam,)ouppliven to de in tedment for[ta* [(ri "No, su

Alb tua d -1vTJht, aons.

wiurtilleadrevschoregard..". you)T323u. Ions.Currently we aree dif

treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at the same time” (at this he chuckled).

T[ito]: “Three times we put off Enver Hoxha’s visit to B[el]g[ra]de, since we were planning on a meeting with you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an agreement with Albania assuring [its—trans.] “sovereignty.”
***.

[***Here text has been inserted from below, marked by ***** _ *****.]S[talin]: “Do you know Enver? What kind of person is he?***** [***** Further text is crossed out: “They were trying to visit us, but they do not want to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej to accompany him.” This phrase is printed in a slightly altered form further below.] Is he a communist? Are there any internal problems of their own - what is your information on this?”

T[ito]: “I did not see Enver Hoxha [sic—trans.], he is a young man, but in the course of the war he became popular..

***** We will work out an agreement and foster circumstances for greater closeness.”

S[talin] agreed.*****

T[ito]: “...and in general, the government consists of young people. As far as we know, there aren’t any kind of special problems.”³⁴

S[talin]: “They were trying to come here, but they do not want to send Enver alone, but Kochi Dzodzej wants to come with him - as some kind of restraint. What do you know of this?”

T[ito]: “We are not aware [of this] nor of the presence of some kind of disagreements.”

wils] nkJ T* (anyththis tryounot).***3

not the same, she cannot gather and lead; at this difficult time she is in no condition to govern. In Rumania there are good young comrades.

In Germany F. is a good leader, Pieck - "the fa-

Great Britain, France and China was created by the decision of the Potsdam conference in preparation for a peace treaty with Germany and its former European allies. At the CFM meeting in Paris during 25 April - 16 May 1946, where, among other things, the peace treaty with Italy was being drafted for later examination by the Paris peace conference, a central point of discussion became the establishment of a new Italian-Yugoslav border, in connection with the problem of Trieste and its adjoining territory. The Soviet delegation under Molotov's leadership actively supported Yugoslav territorial claims.

⁶ During the meeting with Lavrent'ev on 18 April 1946, Tito announced his intention to visit Moscow to discuss economic cooperation, and also noted that such cooperation "must also include the sphere of military industry." (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 31.) Yugoslavia, having received from the USSR during 1944-46 large-scale shipments of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and military machinery (including equipment for 32 infantry divisions, several aviation divisions, tank and artillery brigades), had made similar requests previously. Since the summer of 1945, Yugoslavia had been sending requests to the Soviet government for captured factories, workshops, and materials for the production of ammunition, mainly from Soviet occupation zones in Germany and Austria. The Soviet side tried to fulfill these incoming requests in part. (Ibid., d. 10, ll. 18-19; *ibid.*, f. 144, op. 5, p. 5, d. 2, ll. 44, 46, 49-

¹⁰ The outcome of the visit was announced in a joint communique: "The government of USSR agreed to equip the Yugoslav Army with weapons, ammunition, etc. on conditions of long-term credit, as well as to assist in the reestablishment of the Yugoslavian military industry." (*Pravda*, 12 June 1946.) However, no concrete agreement had been signed at this point. It was to be worked out in special negotiations. Even during Tito's visit, the Yugoslav General Staff forwarded requests, on the basis of which the Soviet General Staff determined the type and quantity of materiel to be shipped to Yugoslavia, and a portion of the shipments began to arrive even before the forthcoming agreement. (See AVP RF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, ll. 132-134; *ibid.*, op.

Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, prior to signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria and resolving “difficult internal-political questions” within both countries. (Ibid., d. 10, ll. 13-17.)

¹⁵ It is unclear why, contrary to the previous Soviet position expressed in Lavrishchev’s report and in Molotov’s statements during the meeting, Stalin suddenly announced that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty could be concluded prior to signing the peace treaty with Bulgaria. However, at the meeting with Stalin a few days later, which, along with Tito and accompanying Yugoslav officials, also included the Bulgarian leaders Georgii Dimitrov, Vasil Kolarov and Traicho Kostov, it was decided that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty would be signed after concluding the peace treaty with Bulgaria. In addition, it was provided that the matter would involve the closest cooperation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. See N. Ganchovskii, *Dnīte na Dimitrov kakvito gi vidyakh i zapisyakh* (Sofia: 1975), vol. 1, p. 220.)

¹⁶ The reference is to the regime that appeared in Poland in July 1944 with the arrival of Soviet forces, and which was established by the Soviet Union and Polish communists relying on its military presence. On 21 April 1945, when the treaty between USSR and this regime was concluded, the Western allies continued to recognize the Polish government in exile.

¹⁷ Matyas Rakosi (1892-1971) - General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, deputy prime-minister.

¹⁸ The question of Yugoslav territorial claims on Hungary was raised by the Yugoslav representatives to the Soviet government already towards the end of the war. In particular, Hebrang, assigned gos6

skii,tovugoslav t -1sibhe -1.ngUSSR and this regimitorial claims on Hungary wdem co.Rapp222 -1.2iflodJgo67 222 -1-assigned gos6
tojtake -no K]TJcnd si67lyeace treaty with imfictnt.gself1eSoviGemalytfrJiet f ur -leav taggressove actnsl.unt3

37 See note 19.

38 Petko Stainov (1890-1972) - Bulgarian foreign minister 1944-1946, activist in the union "Zveno"—a party belonging to the Fatherland Front controlled by the Communist party. In early June 1946, during a meeting with Dimitrov, Kolarov and Kostov (see note 15), Stalin announced that "you must show your teeth to the rightist Zvenists" and that another prominent member of "Zveno," Damyan Velchev, must be removed from the post of Minister of War. (See Tsentralen d'rzhaven arkhiv - Sofia (Central State Archives - Sofia), former Tsentralen partien arkhiv [hereafter TsDA-TsPA] under TsK on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, l. 134.) Stalin's orders were carried out in both cases.

39 See note 19. Pechui—Serbian name for the city of Pecs in Hungary.

40 Judging by handwritten notes made by Tito upon his return from Moscow, during the visit the Soviet side had discussed, along with the aforementioned topics, the question of Austria and Yugoslav-Austrian relations, as well as Yugoslav relations with other Slavic countries. (See AJBT-KMJ. I-1/7, ll. 51-52.)

41 Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964) - general secretary of the Italian Communist party.

42 Maurice Thorez (1900-1964) - general secretary of the French communist party; Jacques Duclos (1896-1975) - member of the Politburo, secretary of CC F[rench]CP, second in rank at the time. Dedijer's description of the meeting with Stalin on 27 May 1946 states that "the leader" had mentioned a "great deficiency" in Thorez. "Even a dog that doesn't bite, said Stalin, shows its teeth when he wants to scare someone, but Thorez can't do even that..." Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 451.

43 Jose Diaz (1895-1942) - general secretary of the Spanish Communist party, died in the US.

44 Pseudonym of Dolores Ibarruri (1895-1990), who became the general secretary of the Spanish Communist party following J. Diaz's death.

45 Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1960) - leader of the German communist party, became one of the two chairmen of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) following the April 1946 merger of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social-Democratic party into the SED in the zone of Soviet occupation. It is unclear who the writers referred to by "F."

Dedijer's account of the evening dinner mentions that Stalin, in characterizing the leaders of foreign Communist parties, expressed his opinion, alongside those already mentioned, regarding the chairman of the Czechoslovak communist



Stalin told them that the Soviet Union was against it, they also said that they were against, but they had previously believed that this was a position and request of Moscow.⁵ Stalin adds that the subsequent clarification by Dimitrov (he probably had in mind the announcement of the Bulgarian telegraph agency) explained nothing. Stalin quotes from this announcement that says how Austria-Hungary had thwarted a customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia, and adds that it means—the Germans had worked against a customs union, and now we do (i.e. the Soviet Union).⁶ Stalin adds that Dimitrov diverts attention from domestic issues to foreign affairs—Federation, etc.⁷

Then Molotov passes to a third point of disagreement and stresses from the very beginning that they [in Moscow] accidentally learned about the entry of the Yugoslav troops into Albania. The Albanians told the Russians that they thought that the entry of the Yugoslav troops had been coordinated with the Soviet Union, and meanwhile it was not so. At that moment Molotov began citing some sort of dispatches, and Stalin told him to read them aloud. He asks Stalin which message he should read. Stalin leans [over] and points out [one]. Molotov reads a message from [Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia] Lavrent'ev about his meeting with Tito. From this reading, it becomes clear that the message is an answer to the question of the Soviet government if there is a decision about the entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, and it says that such a decision—coordinated with Hoxha—really exists, that the motive comes from the notification about a probable attack against Albania; then the message points out that Tito said that he does not agree with Moscow that in case of an entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, the Anglo-Americans would intervene beyond a campaign in the press. Tito, according to the message, said that, if it came to anything serious, Yugoslavia and the USSR would sort it out [*raskhlebivat kashu*] together, however, after the Soviet demarche about this issue he would not send a division [to Albania]. At the end, Molotov points out that Tito did not inform them about his disagreement with Moscow. He stresses that disagreements are inadmissible both from the party and state viewpoint and that disagreements should be taken out [for discussion], and not concealed, and that it is necessary to inform and consult. One must be cautious with regard to press conferences.⁸

Following Molotov, Dimitrov spoke. He, as well as the other Bulgarians and Kardelj (he was the only one among the Yugoslavs who spoke), did not give his reasons coherently, because Stalin kept interrupting him. He said that what Yugoslavia and Bulgaria publicized at Bled was not a treaty, but only a statement that a future treaty had been agreed upon. Soviet representatives affirm that they learned about this affair from newspapers, etc.⁹ Dimitrov stresses that Bulgaria's economic difficulties are so serious that it cannot develop without cooperation with other countries. It is true that he got carried away at a press conference.¹⁰ Stalin interrupts and tells him that he wanted to shine with a new word, and that is wrong, and it

is a mistake because such a Federation is not feasible.¹¹ Dimitrov says that he did not target the USSR by his assertion that Austria-Hungary had blocked a Bulgarian-Serb customs union. He stresses, at last, that there are essentially no disagreements between the foreign policies of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

Stalin interrupts and asserts that there are substantial differences and there is a practice of the Leninists—to recognize differences and mistakes and to liquidate them. Dimitrov says that they make mistakes because they are only learning foreign policy, but Stalin replies to this that he [Dimitrov] is a senior political figure who had been engaged in politics for forty years, and in his case it is not mistakes, but a different perception [than the USSR's] (he [Stalin] said it two or three times during the meeting, addressing Dimitrov).¹² As to the repeated emphasis by Dimitrov on the fact that Bulgaria must get closer with other countries for economic reasons, Stalin says that he agrees if one speaks of a customs union between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but if one speaks of Romania (later, as I recall, he also mentioned Hungary), then he is against it. In general, when he spoke about such ties of Bulgaria with which the Soviet Union disagreed, most often [he] cited Romania as an example. It happens as a result of a clause about the customs union in the Bulgarian-Romanian treaty and because, I believe, that the joint Bulgarian-Romanian communique calls for coordination of plans between Romania and Bulgaria. These issues were raised at the meeting and often referred to by Soviet representatives. They have in mind a forthcoming conclusion of the treaties between Bulgaria and Hungary, and [Bulgaria and] other countries. Thus, Soviet criticism of Romanian-Bulgarian relations touches on future Bulgarian-Hungarian relations, and, obviously, on the relations of Yugoslavia with Hungary and Romania.

Then Kolarov began to speak. He says about this part from the Bulgarian announcement regarding a customs union between Serbia and Bulgaria, where nobody meant to hint at the USSR, and as to the customs union between Romania and Bulgaria, the Romanians are also all for it. Besides, the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty had been earlier sent to the Soviet government and it already made only one amendment so that an article [on the joint defense] against any aggressor would be replaced by an article against Germany or a power that could be in alliance with it, and there were no comments on the Bulgarian-Romanian customs union. Then a brief exchange between Stalin and Molotov occurs. Molotov confirms what Kolarov says. Stalin stresses again that he is against the Bulgarian-Romanian customs union, although Bulgarians have a reason to think otherwise, on the basis of dispatches. He stresses that he did not know that there was an article about a customs union in the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty that had been previously sent to the Soviet government. Dimitrov says that that it was the very cause why in his statement he went further than necessary.¹³

Stalin says to him that he [Dimitrov] wanted to

surprise the whole world and adds that it looked like the secretary of the Comintern was explaining tediously and meticulously what should be done and how. [Stalin] says that this gives food to American reactionaries [*reaktziia*]. He then speaks about the significance of the American elections and [says] that one should be careful to do nothing to give the reactionaries arguments that could facilitate their victory. In his opinion, we should not give the reaction anything to snatch at [*nikakoi zatsepki*]. The current American government still contains itself, but money bags [*denezhniie meshki*] and sharks can come to power. The reactionaries in American, when they hear such statements, say that in Eastern Europe there is not only a bloc in the making, but [the countries] are merging into common states. He tells Dimitrov and the others that they are overdoing it [*perebarshchivaiut*], like the Young Communists and then like women take everything to the streets. Then he makes a linkage to the issue of Albania. The three world powers—the USSR, England, and America guaranteed Albania’s independence by a special agreement. Albania is our weakest spot, because other states are either members of the United Nations, or recognized, etc., but Albania is not [recognized]. If Yugoslav troops entered Albania, the reactionaries in England and America would be able to use it and step forward as defenders of Albanian independence. Instead of sending troops we should work intensely to build up the Albanian army, we should teach the Albanians, and then, if they are attacked, let the Albanian Skupcina [parliament] appeal to Yugoslavia for help. He makes an example of China, where nobody¹⁴ can reproach the USSR,¹⁵ but the Chinese are fighting well and advancing; he then adds that the Albanians are not worse than the Chinese and they must be taught. Then he adds that we should sign a protocol about joint consultations.¹⁶ He says that the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs do not report anything [to the Soviets], and they [the Soviets] have to find out everything on the street, usually ending up faced with a *fait accompli*.

Kostov then begins to complain how hard it is to be a small and undeveloped country. He would like to raise some economic issues. Stalin cuts him short and says that there are competent ministries to do it, and this is the discussion of the differences.

Kardelj starts to speak.¹⁷ On the first point [of disagreements] he says that it was not a treaty that was published, but only a communiqué about the discussion leading to a treaty; he adds that we [Yugoslavs and Bulgarians] were too hasty. This triggers an exchange similar to that when Dimitrov made the same point. [Andrei] Zhdanov intervenes and says that they [in the Soviet Union] learned about this matter from the newspapers. On Albania he says that not informing them on that was a serious error. Stalin cuts in and says that we [in Yugoslavia] oversimplify this matter, but it is a complicated matter.¹⁸ Kardelj then mentioned the constant Greek provocations, the weakness of the Albanian army, and that

we are linked to Albania economically and that we underwrite [*soderzhim*] its army. Two or three times Stalin interrupted. For instance, regarding a Greek invasion of Albania, he said that it was possible. Then he asked if the situation was really such that one should not have any faith in the Albanian army, and added that the Albanians must be taught and their army must be built up. Molotov says that they have no information about any kind of attack on Albania and wondered that we withhold our information from them. Then, reacting to Kardelj’s explanation that the anti-Albanian campaign in Greece is worsening, Stalin demanded [to know] if we believe in the victory of the Greek guerrillas. Kardelj responds that we do. Stalin says that recently he and the rest of his collaborators have had grave doubts about it. He says that one should assist Greece [i.e. guerrillas] if there are hopes of winning, and if not, then we should rethink and terminate the guerrilla movement. The Anglo-Americans will spare no effort to keep Greece [in their sphere],¹⁹ and the only serious obstacle [*zakavika*] for them is the fact that we assist the guerrillas. Molotov adds that we are constantly and justifiably blamed for assistance to the guerrillas. Stalin says that if there are no conditions for victory, one must not be afraid to admit it. It is not for the first time in history that although there are no conditions now, they will appear later.²⁰ Then Kolarov speaks and tells that the American, British and French embassies appealed to them [Bulgarians] with a warning not to recognize the government of Markos.²¹ Kolarov says that the American ambassador is courteous, but the British ambassador is arrogant. Stalin cuts in and says that it means that the American is a great scoundrel and they [ambassadors of the US and UK] always trade roles. Stalin also said that we should not link the future of our state with a victory of the guerrillas in Greece. On Dimitrov’s comment that a victory of the Monarchists-Fascists would seriously aggravate the situation in the Balkans, Stalin says that it is not proven.

Then Dimitrov and Kolarov spoke about other matters that did not relate to the agenda of the meeting. Among other things, Molotov cited a paragraph from the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty which read that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would act in the spirit of the United Nations and would support all initiatives directed at the preservation of peace and against all hotbeds of aggression. Molotov cites from the treaty to reject Dimitrov’s attempts at a linkage between the struggle against “hotbeds of aggression” with the actions of the United Nations. Stalin adds that it would mean a preventive war which is a Komsomol [i.e. juvenile] stunt, a loud phrase, material for the enemy. Stalin then tells a story, hinting at the Komsomol behavior, that there was a seaman in Leningrad after the revolution who condemned and threatened the whole world by radio.²² Molotov then spoke about oats that Albania asked the USSR for, and that Tito had told Lavrent’ev that Yugoslavia would give oats, and after that the Yugoslavs are instructing the Albanians to buy oats in Argentina.²³ Stalin

said half-jokingly that the Yugoslavs are afraid of having Russians in Albania and because of this are in a hurry to send their troops.²⁴ He also said that the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs think that the USSR stands against a unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but it does not want to admit it. Molotov raised some kind of a point from the Bulgarian-Romanian communiqué about the coordination of plans and mentioned that it would have been essentially a merger of these states. Stalin is categorical that this is inconceivable and that Dimitrov would soon see for himself that it is nonsense, and instead of cooperation it would bring about a quarrel between the Romanians and Bulgarians. Therefore mutual relations should be limited to trade agreements.

Then Stalin laid out a Soviet view that in Eastern Europe one should create three federations—Polish-Czechoslovak, Romanian-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Bulgarian-Albanian.²⁵ Bulgaria and Yugoslavia [he said] may unite tomorrow if they wish, there are no constraints on this, since Bulgaria today is a sovereign state. Kardelj says that we were not in a hurry to unify with Bulgaria and Albania, in view of international and domestic moments, but Stalin reacts to it by saying that it should not come too late, and that the conditions for that are ripe. At first, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria must unite, and then let Albania join them. This should be agreed upon through People's Skupcina [parliaments], by the will of the peoples. Stalin thinks that one should begin with political unification and then it would be difficult [for the West] to attack Albania. As to a Bulgarian-Yugoslav unification, Stalin repeatedly stressed that this question has ripened, and one even began a discussion about the name of [a united] state.

Then Kardelj returned to the issue about what after all one should do in Albania, but [Stalin's] answer boiled down to what Stalin said earlier, i.e., the Albanian army ought to be taught, and that Albania should ask for assistance in case of aggression. As to oats, Kardelj says that it is possible that the enemy interfered to spoil Yugoslav-Soviet relations (Molotov kept silent).²⁶ Then Kardelj says that he does not see any big differences between Yugoslavia and the USSR in foreign policy. Stalin interrupts him and says that it is incorrect, that there are differences and that to hide them would mean opportunism. We should not be afraid to recognize differences. Stalin stresses that even they, Lenin's pupils, many times disagreed with him. They would have a quarrel on some issue, then talk it over, work out a position and move on. He believes that we should put the question more boldly about the guerrillas in Greece. Then he mentions the case of China again, but now he raises another aspect. In particular, that they [the Politburo] invited the Chinese comrades and considered that there were no conditions for successful uprising in China and that some kind of "modus vivendi" [with the Guomindang] had to be found. The Chinese comrades, according to Stalin, in words agreed with the Soviet comrades, but in practice kept accumulating forces. The Russians twice gave them assistance in

weapons. And it turned out that the Chinese, not the Soviet comrades, were right, as Stalin says. But he does not believe that the case of the Greek guerrillas falls into the same category. On China he says that they [the Soviets] do not have their people there, except in Port Arthur [Lushunkov] which is a neutral zone according to the treaty with the Chinese government. He spoke about the tactics of the Chinese who avoided attacking cities until they had accumulated sufficient strength.²⁷

Kardelj speaks again and says it was a mistake that we [the Yugoslavs] failed to inform them. Stalin interrupts him and says that it was not a mistake, it was a system [a policy] and that we do not inform them on anything.

Then Stalin and Molotov propose a protocol on mutual coordination of foreign affairs. Kardelj agrees with that. Stalin proposes that we inquire of them [the Soviets] on all questions of interest to us, and that they would also inform us about everything.²⁸

Then Dimitrov diverted the conversation to economic and other issues. When Dimitrov says there are important economic issues, Stalin cut him short by remarking that he would speak about it with a joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian government. During subsequent discussion Stalin raised a question about how the Albanians would react to such a union, and Kardelj and Djilas explained to him that the Albanians would accept it well, because it would be in their national interests, considering that eight hundred thousand Albanians reside in Yugoslavia.²⁹ Stalin also said with regard to Albania that one on our side [*u nas odin*] has already committed suicide,³⁰ and that we want to overthrow Hoxha and that it should not be done hastily and crudely—"the boot on the throat"—but gradually and indirectly. Stalin says again that at first Yugoslavia and Bulgaria ought to unite, and then Albania should join them. And Albania must declare itself about its desire to join. Then Kostov raised the question that the [Bulgarian-Soviet] treaty about technical assistance, also about patents, licensing and authors' rights, is not favorable for the Bulgarians (he failed to mention if this treaty has already been signed). Molotov said that this matter will need consideration, and Stalin said that Kostov should submit a note [to Molotov].

Then we discussed the answer of the Sovinformburo to the slander of the Americans regarding [their] publication of the documents on Soviet-German relations.³¹ Kardelj gave a positive assessment to the answer published in *Pravda* and Dimitrov says that the Western powers wanted to unite with Germany against the USSR. Stalin replies that he had nothing to hide [*on vse vynosit otkrito*], and the Western powers did not speak openly, in particular that Europe without Russia means against Russia. Molotov remarks during the conversation that the Bulgarians do not put enough camouflage on the number of their troops and that it exceeds the clauses [about limits] in the Peace Treaty, and the Bulgarians may be criticized for it. Dimitrov said to this that, on the contrary, the number is even below the limit stipulated by the Peace Treaty.

Molotov was satisfied with that [answer] and did not mention it again.³² Dimitrov raised the issue about the conclusion of a treaty on mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria. He stressed that it would be of great significance for Bulgaria. Stalin agreed with this, but added that among the Quisling countries³³ [the USSR] would first conclude treaties with neighbors: with Romania—this treaty is almost ready, with Hungary and Finland.

Then Stalin underlines that we (i.e. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) must build up our economy, culture, army, and that a federation is an abstraction.

Suddenly Stalin asked about “our friend Pijade,”³⁴ Kardelj told him that he is working on our legislation.

Kardelj asked [the Soviets] about their opinion what answer should be given to the Italian government who asked the Yugoslav government to support Italian claims to govern their former colonies. Stalin said that these demands must be supported and asked Molotov how [the Soviet side] responded. Molotov says that they still have to respond and that he believes they should wait. Stalin told them that there is no point in waiting and the answer should be sent immediately. He said that former Italian colonies should be put under Italian governance [trusteeship] and remarked that kings, when they could not agree over the booty, used to give [disputed] land to a weakest feudal so they could snatch it from him later at some opportune moment, and that feudal lords invited a foreigner to rule them so they could easily overthrow him when they become fed up with him.

On this note the conversation ended.

I would remind [*napominaiu*] that the criticism of Dimitrov by Stalin, although rough in form, was expressed in friendly tones. This report was composed on the basis of notes taken at the meeting and from memory.

[Source: *Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Fond Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije I-3-b-651, ll.33-40. Translated by Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive)*]

¹ [Translator’s Note: In *Conversations with Stalin* (1962) Milovan Djilas recounted this meeting in great detail. He mentioned that he had submitted a written report of that meeting to the Yugoslav Central Committee, but that he could not get access to it when he wrote the book. As the comparison of the document with the book reveals, Djilas’ memory retained with remarkable precision some pivotal moments of the conversation.—V.Z.]

² Baranov, Leonid Semenovich—assistant director of the CC VKP(b) [Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Department of Foreign Policy.

³ The statement concerns the Yugoslav intention of deploying a division, which never took place.

⁴ In the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s account, this is presented in the following manner:

“It seems to us that com. Georgii Dimitrov has taken a fancy to press conferences and interviews, thus giving opportunity to be prompted with questions which ought not be discussed in the first place. This is misguided and undesirable. During the course of

the interview a plan was set forth which goes too far without any attempt to consult with whomever it may concern. A question was put forth of creating a federation or a confederation, a customs union that would include both Poland and Greece. Com. Georgii Dimitrov speaks of all these things without being granted authority by anyone concerned. This is misguided in principle and is tactically harmful. This eases the burden of the creators of the Western bloc.” And further: “We must take the position in such a way that all would know—both enemies and friends—that this is our point of view. We consider this absolutely wrong and unacceptable in the future.” This is contained in slightly abbreviated form in the Soviet record as well.

⁵ According to Bulgarian and Soviet records this was spoken by Molotov, not Stalin. Kolarov’s account puts it in the following manner: “When we spoke with the Polish comrades, they said: We thought that this was Moscow’s opinion. Everyone thinks that if Dimitrov or Tito speaks of a number of countries, it originates from the USSR. In essence, the Polish comrades said that they are against Georgii Dimitrov’s idea and consider it misguided.”

⁶ According to the Bulgarian and Soviet records, this was also spoken by Molotov, while Stalin supplemented this with separate remarks.

⁷ Before these statements by Stalin, the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s account, show the following remarks by Molotov:

“[Czechoslovak President Eduard] Benes’ newspaper immediately hastened to write that ‘Dimitrov puts out communist plans, and now the Czech communists must answer.’ On the other hand, this position of Georgii Dimitrov contradicts the declaration of the nine communist parties.” The same is corroborated by the Soviet record.

⁸ According to Bulgarian and Soviet records, this statement by Molotov sounded more categorical. Kolarov’s account records the following words: “In the future, com. Georgii Dimitrov must rid himself and us of the risks of such statements.”

⁹ [Translator’s Note: This intervention is presented dramatically in Djilas’s book. “‘Yes, but you didn’t consult with us!’” Stalin shouted. “We learn about your doings in the newspapers! You chatter like women from the housetops whatever occurs to you, and then the newspapermen grab hold of it.” (p. 175)—V.Z.]

¹⁰ The Bulgarian and Soviet records note somewhat stronger self-criticism by Dimitrov. Kolarov recorded his words: “This was harmful and fundamentally misguided. This was self-indulgence. Such statements will not be repeated in the future.”

¹¹ According to Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov’s, Stalin said: “We wanted to say another word. The Poles and Czechs are laughing at your federation. Ask them—do they want it?” The same is corroborated by the Soviet record.

¹² According to the Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov’s account, Stalin said to Dimitrov: “You are a politician and must think not only of your own intentions, but also of the consequences of your statements.” Later, returning once more to this question, the Soviet leader said to Dimitrov: “You are an old politician. What possible mistakes could one speak of? You may have another goal in mind, but you yourself will not admit it. You must not give interviews so often.” According to the Soviet record, Stalin, noting that Dimitrov has apparently another goal that must be revealed, added that these are not little children sitting here, and Dimitrov is not a “pre-schooler.”

[Translator’s Note: This part of the conversation is dramatized in Djilas’ book in the following dialogue:

“Stalin, decidedly and firmly: ‘There are serious differences,

Why hide it? It was Lenin's practice always to recognize errors and to remove them as quickly as possible.'

Dimitrov, placatingly, almost submissively: 'True, we erred. But through errors we are learning our way in foreign politics.'

Stalin, harshly and tauntingly: 'Learning! You have been in politics fifty years—and now you are correcting errors! Your trouble is not errors, but a stand different from ours.'"

Then Djilas writes that Dimitrov's ears "were red, and big red blotches cropped up on his face covering his spots of eczema. His sparse hair straggled and hung in lifeless strands over his wrinkled neck. I felt sorry for him...The Lion of the Leipzig Trials...looked dejected and dispirited." (pp. 176-177)—V.Z.]

¹³ The entire conversation recorded by Djilas about the draft of a Bulgarian-Romanian treaty sent to the Soviet government, which in turn expressed no objections over the article on the customs union, is absent from the Soviet and Bulgarian records. Kolarov's account contains only the following phrase: "Kolarov points out that the treaty with Romania had been harmonized with Moscow."

¹⁴

of a partisan victory in Greece, though at the same time noting his qualification that this is possible only in the absence of direct US assistance to the Greek government, apparently meaning intervention by the American military.

²¹ The reference is to the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, declared by the decision of the leadership of the Communist Party of Greece in late December 1947. This government would be headed by the commander of the partisan forces, member of the Communist Party Politburo, Markos Vafiadis, known at the time as “general Markos.” The Bulgarian records note that at the 10 February 1948 meeting Stalin said on this subject: “The bordering countries must be the last to

It has been long debated by scholars when the idea of forming a new Communist world organization after the Second World War was raised. In the absence of relevant sources the still prevailing classical interpretation suggests that this idea was a Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan introduced in the Summer of 1947 and after the Soviet Union's refusal of the plan, the formation of the Eastern Bloc and its 'executive committee', the COMINFORM, was a logical next step in breaking off relations with the West. Surprisingly enough, no evidence of any kind has emerged from Russian archives from the time of their partial opening in 1991 pertaining to this

example, that we have to wait for the conditions for revolution to appear in at least a bunch of countries, and only then can we instigate the revolution. I remember that when the situation was revolutionary in Germany in 1923, in all the neighboring countries we prepared for such revolutionary action, so that there could be a revolutionary situation in more than one country at the same time. I remember that in the Czech Republic, France and other countries where the situation was not nearly as developed as in Germany, we prepared assistance programs, similar uprisings, etc. History has shown that that was wrong. Now we are going to follow another route. Here I should immediately say that not many people are aware of this interpretation of the dissolution of the International, because they did not talk about it very much in this period and therefore completely incorrect views are spread amongst some of the parties. For example when we were with the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and we tried to reconcile the Hungarian Communist Party's line on the question of the Hungarians in Slovakia with that of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the comrades announced the theory that the International had to be dissolved, because the international aspirations [meaning "national aspirations" — Cs. B.] of the individual Communist Parties are so much at odds with each other, that they could not be fitted into the agenda of an International. Because of this they calmly recommended to us that we should attack the Czech Communist Party, while they attack the Hungarian Communist Party. We rejected this theory. We were convinced that this was wrong, and that Stalinist reasoning would say something totally different. There is not even a trace to show that the national aspirations of the particular communist parties do not fit into the International; it points to completely different reasons. Now that communist parties have everywhere become stronger and come to the fore, there should be pressure for the institution of the Communist International or some other international communist body. At the moment this is being disturbed by the whole list of parties preparing for elections. The comrades know that they are preparing for elections in France, Czechoslovakia and Romania,

“The MGB USSR requests permission to prepare a terrorist act (*terakt*) against Tito, by the illegal agent ‘Max’,” Comrade I.R. Grigulevich, a Soviet citizen and member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1950 ([biographical] information attached).¹

“Max” was placed in Italy on a Costa Rican passport, where he was able to gain the confidence and enter the circles of South American diplomats as well as well-known Costa Rican political and trade figures visiting Italy.

Using these connections, “Max”, on our orders, obtained an appointment as the special plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Italy and Yugoslavia. In the course of his diplomatic duties, in the second half of 1952, he visited Yugoslavia twice. He was well received there, with entrée into circles close to Tito’s clique; he was promised a personal audience with Tito. “Max’s” present position offers us opportunities to carry out active measures (*aktivnye deistviia*) against Tito.

In early February of this year, we summoned “Max” to Vienna for a secret meeting. While discussing options, “Max” was asked how he thought he could be most useful, considering his position. “Max” proposed some kind of active measure against Tito personally.

In relation to this proposal, there was a discussion with him [Max] about how he imagined all of this and as a result, the following options for a terrorist act against Tito were presented.

1. To order “Max” to arrange a private audience with Tito, during which a soundless mechanism concealed in his clothes would release a dose of pulmonary plague bacteria that would guarantee death to Tito and all present. “Max” himself would not be informed of the substance’s nature, but with the goal of saving “Max’s” life, he would be given an anti-plague serum in advance.

2. In connection with Tito’s expected visit to London, to send “Max” there to use his official position and good personal relations with the Yugoslav ambassador in England, [Vladimir] Velebit, to obtain an invitation to the expected Yugoslav embassy reception in Tito’s honor.

The terrorist act could be accomplished by shooting with a silent mechanism concealed as a personal item, while simultaneously releasing tear gas to create panic

among the crowd, allowing “Max” to escape and cover up all traces.

3. To use one of the official receptions in Belgrade to which members of the diplomatic corps are invited. The terrorist act could be implemented in the same way as the second option, to be carried out by “Max” who as a diplomat, accredited by the Yugoslav government, would be invited to such a reception.

In addition, to assign “Max” to work out an option whereby one of the Costa Rican representatives will give Tito some jewelry in a box, which when opened would release an instantaneously-effective poisonous substance.

We asked Max to once again think the operation over

Much has been written about Soviet-Yugoslav relations with respect to the Hungarian Revolution. Even during the unfolding of the events themselves and the immediately following period, this subject became a topic of discussion in mass media channels and in the press. Later it was touched upon to a lesser or greater degree in the historiography. However, in both cases, this was done, as a rule, on the basis of only those facts which were available from public Soviet or Yugoslav declarations and actions. The behind-the-scenes side of the relations between Moscow and Belgrade regarding the 1956 events in Hungary remained hidden long afterwards: both sides, each for its own reasons, preferred to keep this secret.¹

The curtain of secrecy was partially lifted in the 1970s, first when Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, which had been written, or, more precisely, recorded by him against the will of the Soviet Union after his removal from power,² were published in the West; and secondly in Yugoslavia, where, not without obstacles, the memoirs of Veljko Micunovic, who had been the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR during the 1956 Hungarian crisis, came to light.³ These publications contained some previously unknown evidence about secret Soviet-Yugoslav contacts in connection with the development of the revolution in Hungary and its suppression by Soviet troops. However, despite the importance of the publication of this evidence, it was very incomplete, and in a series of cases, imprecise, as a result of the political-ideological prejudices of each of the authors, but also because the disgraced Khrushchev, deprived of the chance to refer to documents, was sometimes betrayed by his memory, while Micunovic, who had his daily notes at his disposal, had to stay within the confines of the official Yugoslav version of the time in his

depictions of Belgrade's policy.

Only since the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet and Eastern European communist regimes, has the opportunity arisen for the first time to examine previously unavailable archival materials. In particular, I researched a number of aspects of this subject using documents from Yugoslav and Russian (former Soviet) archives.⁴ In addition, a significant number of relevant Russian, Yugoslav, and Hungarian archival documents have been published.⁵ This article is based on both already published materials as well as unpublished documents from Moscow and Belgrade archives.⁶

Moscow's and Belgrade's concern towards the Hungarian revolution both differed and coincided simultaneously. Recently-released documents, including those contained in the aforementioned publications,⁷ leave no doubt that the Soviet leadership viewed the events in Hungary from the very beginning as a deeply threatening event, which had to be stopped at all costs. For this

country was somewhat broader than the far more conservative conceptions of the Kremlin rulers, it could approve of liberalization in Hungary only to the degree that it did not threaten the existence of communist power there. Steps taken by Belgrade at the very beginning of November were a reflection of this ambiguous position.

Judging by its actions, the Soviet leadership considered the Yugoslav position to some extent ambiguous. Having decided on October 31 to militarily intercede again and to replace Nagy's government with a new government subservient to Moscow, the CC CPSU Presidium believed it necessary to hold talks regarding the impending military strike with Tito, the leaders of Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia (the agreement of which was never in doubt) and with the new leadership in Poland.⁹ The goal pursued by the Kremlin was obvious: afraid that Tito and Wladyslaw Gomulka might condemn the impending military action, Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev tried to incline them through direct negotiation toward some sort of agreement with it, using the argument that a counter-revolution had taken the upper hand in Hungary, threatening the complete liquidation of socialist development and the establishment of Western control there. As is made clear in Khrushchev's memoirs, this very argument was set out at the secret meeting of Khrushchev and CC CPSU Presidium members Viacheslav Molotov and Georgii Malenkov with Gomulka and the premier of the Polish government, Juzef Tsirankevich in Brest on November 1. However, they could not convince Gomulka of the necessity of implementing the Soviet plan.¹⁰ With even greater disquiet, Khrushchev and Malenkov went on to the meeting with Yugoslav leader Josip Tito,¹¹ expecting, in Khrushchev's words, that it would be still more complicated.¹² But despite this expectation, quite the opposite occurred.

The secret meeting in Tito's residence on Brioni island which took place on the night of November 2-3 and at which Tito, together with his assistants Edvard Kardelj and Aleksandr Rankovich and in the presence of ambassador Micunovic, conducted negotiations with Khrushchev and Malenkov, was until recently known about partly from Khrushchev's memoirs, but for the most part from Micunovic's memoirs. According to the latter's testimony, there were no records made during the meeting, but afterwards he set down the contents from memory.¹³ In one of the documents of the former CC LCY archive, the existence of this record was mentioned, but I was not able to locate it.¹⁴ Clearly it was the basis for the account of the Brioni meeting in Micunovic's memoirs. But from other archival materials it becomes clear that the memoirs do not include much that was discussed. Both Khrushchev and Micunovic relate the following basic results of the meeting: when the high ranking Soviet visitors informed the Yugoslav side of the Kremlin's decision to employ military force in Hungary again in order to replace the Nagy government and to "defend socialism," Tito, to the "pleasant surprise" of Khrushchev and Malenkov, immedi-

ately and without reservations expressed his agreement with this plan, since, in his opinion, the Hungarian events had gone in the direction of "counter-revolution."¹⁵ True, later, when the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviet troops elicited widespread disappointment and condemnation from throughout the world, the Yugoslav leadership, in a secret memorandum to Moscow, maintained that at the Brioni meeting it had accepted the Soviet plan with reservations, as a "lesser evil," since Khrushchev and Malenkov had declared that no other means existed for preventing the restoration of capitalism in Hungary. However, from the very same memorandum, it followed that Yugoslav reservations did not at all call into question the undertaking of military actions, but instead stressed the importance of taking care to insure that the costs of "preserving socialism" to be incurred by the punitive measures employed by the Soviet forces should be held to a minimum. In essence, Tito stated in his correspondence that the Soviet leadership should "normalize" the situation in Hungary not solely by military force but by accompanying simultaneous political measures to create a suitable Hungarian government with Kadar at its head, which would consist of people who had not been compromised under Rakosi and were capable of uniting the forces supporting the "continuing progress of socialism."¹⁶ This accorded with the intentions of Moscow, which had already been planning such a step and of which Khrushchev and Malenkov immediately informed their Yugoslav counterparts.¹⁷

From the memoirs of Khrushchev and Micunovic as well as the subsequent secret correspondence between Moscow and Belgrade, it is clear that there were certain differences in the positions of Soviet and Yugoslav participants at the meeting. The Yugoslav side especially stressed that the government had to condemn the regime of Rakosi-Gerö, and put forth a program for surmounting the "Stalinist inheritance" and "reforming socialism," using the support of recently-emerged worker councils in Hungary.¹⁸ Although the Soviet notions of acceptable parameters for "reform" were significantly narrower than the Yugoslav, judging by the documents, they did not object to these proposals. As for the selection of people for the government in question, Khrushchev expressed his support for the candidacy of Ferenc Munnich as prime minister, while the Yugoslav side leaned more toward Kadar. In addition, the Yugoslavs favored including in the government certain persons close to Nagy. According to Micunovic, Geza Losonczy and Pal Maleter were mentioned. Khrushchev also noted the Yugoslav selection of candidates in his memoirs, but, without remembering their names, maintained that both were rejected as unacceptable.¹⁹

From the subsequent secret Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence it becomes clear that the Yugoslav agreement with the proposed Soviet military intervention was accompanied at the Brioni meeting with an agreement to give political assistance to the Soviet troops and in the

replacement of Nagy with a “revolutionary worker-peasant government.” Until recently, such an agreement was essentially unknown. It is not mentioned in Khrushchev’s memoirs, while Micunovic’s memoirs contain only an unclear suggestion that the meeting included a discussion of the question of Yugoslav efforts to “try to see whether something can be done with Nagy.” Micunovic did not explain what was meant by this, noting only that they had in mind “using influence on Nagy in order to minimize casualties and unnecessary bloodshed” and that the Soviet participants expressed a special interest in this.²⁰ It becomes clear from the correspondence that the Yugoslavs, before the start of Soviet actions, were to try to convince Nagy as well as his closest supporters from in the government to resign.²¹

In my earlier published work, I noted that Nagy’s resignation from the post of prime minister would, under these circumstances, signal his government’s liquidation; and this, in turn, would have created such a political and legal vacuum that in such conditions the self-declaration of a new government, created under Soviet aegis, would not have seemed like a direct overthrow of the previous government and the Soviet intervention itself would not have been formally directed against a recognized Hungarian government. That is why the Soviet participants at the meeting expressed such an interest in agreeing with Yugoslavia to combine their actions with Nagy’s resignation.²² In contrast to Micunovic’s memoirs, from which it may be concluded that his question was discussed at Soviet initiative, it follows from the aforementioned Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence that such was the proposal of the Yugoslavs themselves.²³ Of course, there is room for the possibility that the two may have overlapped. In any case, the Yugoslav promise would have been in practice, had it been realized, an aid in camouflaging the Soviet intervention and armed suppression of the Hungarian revolution. This character of the Soviet-Yugoslav understanding was acknowledged, obviously, by the Yugoslav participants in the negotiations at Brioni, insofar as they, as it follows from the archival documents, did not show a particular desire to enlighten their colleagues in the Yugoslav leadership about it. Judging by the minutes of the meeting of the executive committee of the CC LCY on November 6, at which Tito informed the rest of the members of this higher party organ about the Brioni meeting, the Yugoslav leader preferred to remain silent about the said understanding.²⁴

The Yugoslav side, however, did not fulfill its promise. The documents on which I was able to conduct research do not clarify the reasons for this. In the subsequent correspondence with Soviet leadership, Tito in general tried to assure Moscow that the Yugoslav side started to act immediately according to the agreement and undertook corresponding efforts in Budapest in the second half of November, but were unable to achieve concrete results. Kardelj informed the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Nikolai Firiubin, that on November 4, as was

agreed upon with Khrushchev, they contacted Nagy. But neither Tito nor Kardelj explained what exactly had been undertaken. In correspondence, Tito ob0, notrtg T* Jv5II waputrtg T* Jv

hand it could not agree to surrender Nagy and his comrades to the Soviet military authorities or to the Kadar government for fear of serious discredit in the eyes of its own people as well as the outside world. Thus, on November 5, Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic replied to Khrushchev with a proposal to send Nagy and the rest to Yugoslavia.³² On November 7, however, Khrushchev categorically rejected this offer in the name of the Soviet leadership and added a blunt threat: Citing the Brioni agreement, he warned that the proposal to send Nagy to Yugoslavia could be seen by Moscow as an example of Belgrade's secret solidarity with Nagy's policies and could cause "irrevocable damage" to Soviet-Yugoslav relations.³³

The Kremlin rejected Kadar's hesitant proposal, which was made to Andropov on November 8, regarding the possibility—in order to avoid heightening the tensions in relations with Yugoslavia—to allow Nagy and his group to go to Yugoslavia under the condition that a written document was received from Nagy stating his resignation from the post of prime minister of the overthrown government and written promises from him and the others not to harm Kadar's government. In response to the communication received from Andropov, Moscow instructed him to tell Kadar on behalf of the CC CPSU that it was not advisable under any circumstances to let Nagy and the others go to Yugoslavia, and that the Yugoslavs would be forced to agree to the demands for his surrender. As for Kadar's apprehension about aggravating relations with Belgrade, the CC CPSU Presidium confirmed the position set out in Khrushchev's communication of November 7 to Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic.³⁴

Insofar as this position did not leave the Yugoslav leadership any possibility of slipping between the Scylla of confrontation with the USSR in case Nagy was not surrendered and the Charybdis of its public exposure as an accomplice to Soviet intervention in case he was handed over, on November 8, in a new message to Khrushchev on behalf of the CC LCY, Tito tried to explain to the Kremlin that Yugoslavia was simply not in a condition to permit the surrender of Nagy and the others to the Soviet or Hungarian authorities for fear of being discredited. At the same time, Tito tried in various ways to justify why the Yugoslavs had not achieved Nagy's resignation, after he with his entourage had shown up in the Yugoslav mission. In the message Yugoslavia's support for the Kadar government was forcefully emphasized, and it was proposed that a joint compromise resolution be found, including through an amnesty for Nagy and the others hiding in the Yugoslav mission in Budapest.³⁵ In the hopes that it would help soften Moscow's position and obtain the assent of the Kadar government, Belgrade gave a directive to Soldatic on November 9 to try to obtain from Nagy at least a formal announcement of his resignation from the post of prime minister of the fallen government.³⁶ However, Nagy refused.³⁷

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership replied to Tito's

appeal of November 8 with a proposal on November 10 that Nagy and Losonczy (who had entered his government) be sent to Romania. The rest, on condition of a statement of loyalty to the Kadar government, could receive their freedom and remain in Hungary.³⁸ The departure to Romania was, in essence, tantamount to Nagy's surrender, but formally it was the compromise asked for by Tito. The Yugoslav government found it impossible to accept such a proposal, which Soldatic had already expressed to Kadar on November 11, noting that Nagy's departure to Romania could, in Belgrade's opinion, damage Yugoslav prestige and that Romania is not a suitable country for such a purpose.³⁹ It was clear that the Romanian scenario, involving a country of the "socialist camp" under Soviet control, was virtually tantamount to handing Nagy over to the Soviet military or to Kadar's government. In addition, such a scenario had no chance of Nagy's acceptance.⁴⁰ Belgrade, for its part, proposed two scenarios: either a declaration by Kadar's government guaranteeing Nagy and the rest freedom if they leave the Yugoslav diplomatic mission, or their unhindered departure to Yugoslavia.⁴¹

Like Belgrade, Moscow and its subordinate Kadar sought to find a solution to this situation, though each in their own interest. In contrast to Yugoslavia, which was in a hurry to resolve this question in order to rid itself of the source of difficulty with the USSR, the Soviets at first showed a tendency to outwait the Yugoslav leadership. But the continued formal existence of the Nagy government, which still had not resigned, seriously aggravated an already difficult domestic and international political situation for the Kadar government. This provoked great concern at the meetings of Kadar's temporary Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (CC HSWP) on November 11 and 16, at which the situation of the "two governments" was seen as one of the most important tasks.⁴² Diplomatic maneuvers ensued, when Kadar first assured Soldatic on November 16 that Nagy and his group could leave the Yugoslav mission without fear of being followed, and, if they wanted, leave Hungary. On the instructions of the Soviet side, he demanded on the following day in the form of a preliminary condition, a statement from Nagy and Losonczy that they no longer considered themselves members of the government, and, together with the others, would agree to support Kadar's government. The Yugoslavs for their part began to work towards the Kadar government's granting them a written promise that Nagy and the others could freely live at home without repression against them.⁴³

The arguments surrounding these positions, which continued until November 21, shifted entirely to the sphere of negotiations between Belgrade and the Kadar government;⁴⁴ the Soviet side, able to manipulate Kadar from behind the scenes, outwardly removed itself from the discussion regarding the Nagy question. Immediately, polemics arose between Hungarians and Yugoslavs (previously avoided by both sides) regarding general

principles of the Hungarian crisis and the evaluation of Soviet and Yugoslav policy in Hungary. The ground was laid by the publication in the 16 November issue of *Borba* of Tito's speech to party activists in Pula on 11 November. In his speech, the Yugoslav leader had justified the Soviet military intervention undertaken on 4 November as the

imperialist forces. I know, for example, that during the conversation, com. Tito stated: "What sort of revolutionary is Nagy? What sort of communist is he if leading workers, communists and public figures were hanged and shot with his knowledge?"

In light of these facts, we are truly astonished and perplexed by the fact that the leaders of the Yugoslav government have sheltered the anti-people group headed by Nagy in the walls of the Budapest mission.

Micunovic once again repeated that he did not dissent from our assessment of Nagy. However, it is not necessary to create additional difficulties for the new Hungarian government and provoke the excitement and dissatisfaction of the Hungarian and Yugoslav population, as well as additional unpleasantness in the UN and in worldwide public opinion through certain actions relating to Nagy and his group, by which he meant that at present they are not taking part in any political activity and are keeping quiet.

I informed Micunovic that he would be received at 18:00 for a conversation with com. Khrushchev.

D. SHEPILOV.

Attested: [signature] [...]

.....

**Letter of the CC UCY to the CC CPSU
with an exposition of the views of the leadership of the
UCY on the events in Hungary**

8 November 1956, Brioni

To the first secretary of the CC CPSU,
comrade KHRUSHCHEV

Dear comrades!

We received your letter in which you stated the point of view of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on the issue of Imre Nagy and others who took refuge in our embassy in Budapest. We understand some of your arguments which are put forward in the aforementioned letter, and [we] consider them logical, but all the same we must sincerely say that in your letter we were deeply moved by the lack of understanding of our position and, especially, the lack of understanding of our readiness to resolve this issue in the spirit of reciprocal friendly relations, and not to the injury of the international reputation of Yugoslavia as a sovereign country. You agreed with us that Yugoslavia plays and in the future should play a very useful role in the world thanks to the reputation which it has acquired.

We will explain in detail to you here, which circumstances led to the current state of affairs, so that our position on this issue becomes clearer to you.

It is true that, during our conversations at Brioni, we agreed on the assessment that the weakness of Imre Nagy's government and the series of concessions made by that government to reactionary forces led to the risk of the destruction of the existing socialist achievements in Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists

should not remain in such a government any longer and that they should rely on the laboring masses and resist reaction in the most decisive manner. There is no need to remind you that from the very beginning, and also throughout our entire conversation, we expressed our doubts as to the consequences of open help from the Soviet Army. But bearing in mind that, in accord with your evaluation that such help had become unavoidable, we considered that nonetheless it would be necessary to do everything possible in order to minimize harm to the task of socialism. You recall that we first stated our opinion that in such a position it would be best of all to create a government there in which people who had not compromised themselves during the regime of Rakosi would take part, and at the head of which would be comrade Kadar as a prominent communist who enjoys influence among the Hungarian laboring masses. We considered that it would be good if this government made a public appeal, and subsequently this was done. We agree with this appeal and for this reason in our public statements we gave full support to the government and the program which it announced. We believed that you agreed with this, that only such a government could once again restore contact with the laboring masses and gradually eliminate at least the serious [*tiazhelye*] consequences of the events in Hungary. You yourselves could see here [*u nas*] that in all of our arguments we were guided only by deep concern that the victories of socialism be preserved in Hungary and that the restoration of the old order, which would have had far-reaching consequences for all countries located in this part of Europe, including Yugoslavia, be prevented. In particular, in connection with all of this we put forward our thoughts on trying to keep communists, and perhaps Nagy himself, out of this government, in which different anti-socialist elements were located and which for this very reason was not in a condition to halt the [forces of] reaction on their path to power. Comrades Khrushchev and Malenkov did not reject these thoughts. On the contrary, they agreed with them, with some exceptions as to Nagy. We considered that in this government and around it there were honest communists who could be very useful in creating the new government of Janos Kadar and in liquidating the activity of anti-socialist forces. On the basis of this conversation at Brioni, we took some measures in Budapest on the afternoon of Saturday, 3 November of this year.

On November 2, Zoltan Szanto spoke with our representative in Budapest. In the course of this conversation, Szanto expressed the desire that he and some communists, if it were possible, could leave the building of the government and the CC and could find sanctuary in our embassy, since their lives were being threatened by reactionary bands of rioters. In the spirit of this conversation, our representative answered Szanto that we were ready to give them shelter if they made their escape immediately. We expected that they would answer on Sunday, the fourth of the month. However, on the morning





1956 Hungarian Revolution, and the Cold War International
History Project.
9