

In Memoriam: Deng Xiaoping and the Cold War

In the final analysis, three main courts will pass judgement on the actions of our Parties. First of all, the masses, secondly, the communist parties, which in the course of their practical existence must figure out what is going on, and in the third instance, time and history, which makes the final conclusions.

General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in conversation with Soviet Ambassador S.V. Chervonenko (12 September 1960)¹

By David Wolff

Deng may have had something more philosophical in mind, but, his ultimate arbiter, history, is the daily output of the historians. This section of the *Bulletin* aims to provide enough archival material for historians of Chinese, Russian, and Communist history to begin a debate on the role of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) in Sino-Soviet relations during the years 1956-1963, a period that witnessed both the final years of cooperation between the two communist powers and the emergence of tensions that finally split the alliance. Although the late paramount leader of the People's Republic of China is best remembered for the tremendous, though uneven, reforms that he introduced and oversaw during the last twenty years of his life, his earlier achievements should not be neglected.

Within weeks of the conversation from which the epigraph is drawn, Deng arrived in Moscow for ideological jousting at the highest levels with Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's "gray cardinal." And Deng always gave as good as he got. Of course, by 1963, when again Deng and Suslov headed the delegations, the level of vituperation had risen sharply. When Deng returned from this last encounter, the whole CCP Politburo, headed by Mao, Zhou, and Lin Biao turned out at the airport to applaud him, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng.² Vlad Zubok, in an insightful and provocative introductory essay, speculates that the services Deng rendered Mao in his battle with the Soviet "older brother" may have saved his life when the Cultural Revolution swept others away. Chen Jian's "Rejoinder" only strengthens this impression, while providing a fuller Chinese politics context. Both the 1960 and 1963 talks, together with six memoranda of conversations between Deng and Soviet representatives, are excerpted in this *Bulletin*. Additional materials can be found at the CWIHP website: cwihip.si.edu.

The fall of 1960 was a special time in other respects, for the USSR had just withdrawn its experts from the PRC, occasioning bewilderment, hardship and ill-will.³ Although the Soviet Union was well enough informed about affairs in China to sense the variety of reactions, newly released materials are only now making clear the depth of division. Only a few weeks after the withdrawal, the CCP

leadership had moved to seaside Beidaihe to escape the Beijing summer heat. Therefore, Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, joined them there and met with Mao on August 10. In referring to the Soviet Union, Mao was livid.

Khrushchev can cooperate with America, England and France. He can cooperate with India and Indonesia. He can even cooperate with Yugoslavia, but only with China is it impossible on the grounds that we have divergent opinions. Does that mean that his views are identical with America, England, France and India to allow whole-hearted cooperation? [He] withdraws the experts from China and doesn't transfer technology, while sending experts to India and giving technology. So what if China doesn't have experts? Will people die, I don't believe it.

Ho's reaction was: "That's a pretty strong statement."⁴

In sharp contrast to this explosion, four days earlier on August 4, Chen Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, had met with Ambassador Chervonenko and insisted that "speaking as one Communist to another," a full break between the parties was not a possibility.⁵ But what does this divergence of messages reveal? It is possible that in light of the disastrous famine that accompanied the "Great Leap Forward" and would claim upward of 15 million Chinese lives in 1959-61, Mao had ordered his subordinates to show restraint and moderation in the hope of continuing aid from the Soviets. After all, where else would it come from? On the other hand, it is also possible that the Chinese leadership, influenced by the same perception of China's dire straits, collectively opted for a moderate policy, despite Mao's rancor and radicalism. If this is indeed the case, we will find Deng among the moderates, placating the Soviets right up into 1962, if not further. But only additional documentation, especially from the Chinese side, can answer these critical questions.

The search for a current of moderation in a period usually identified with deepening estrangement in Sino-Soviet relations is exactly the kind of refinement that document-based studies of the Cold War can offer. An October 1997 gathering on "Sino-Soviet Relations and the

Cold War” (see conference schedule below) of Russian, Chinese, West European and American scholars in Beijing focused on new documentation, both Russian and Chinese, that made it possible to identify smaller positive eddies and swirls amidst the generally accepted trends of Sino-Soviet divergence. Similarly, the January 1996 CWIHP conference in Hong Kong examined documents from the early 1950s, the heyday of Sino-Soviet friendship, and found grounds for incipient strife.⁶

Document-based studies can also help us to draw a detailed and more human portrait of a giant of the twentieth century. What is certain is that the history of the Cold War will not be complete without an archive-based biography of Deng Xiaoping. CWIHP, together with all scholars of the Cold War and China, looks forward to the speedy release and publication of Deng-related materials by the appropriate PRC “units” with actual archival access, especially the Central Archives with their holdings of CCP documents. CWIHP is continuing its collection of materials from which to piece together the lifework of Deng Xiaoping and hopes that readers with such documents will forward copies to the Project.

¹ TsKhSD (*Tsentrāl'noe khranilishche sovremennoi*

dokumentatsii) [Central Repository for Contemporary Documentation], f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 255.

² Kang Sheng’s diatribe against the Soviet treatment of Stalin is probably the most powerful piece of oratory in this *Bulletin*.

³ On the withdrawal of the Soviet experts, see Chen Jian, “A Crucial Step toward the Sino-Soviet Schism” in *CWIHP Bulletin*, 8-9 (Winter 1992 and Chinese edition) 18-9 (Winter 1992), TsKhSD, Saent 51-0.722

ZHANG S

In November 1957, on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia, a high-level Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow to take part in a major conference of communist parties that was convoked by Soviet leader N. S. Khrushchev to grant a new international legitimacy to his leadership, which had already weathered years of domestic power struggle following Stalin's death. In Chinese leader Mao Zedong's entourage were CC CCP [Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party] general secretary Deng Xiaoping; director of the CC Central Administrative Office, Yang Shangkun;

historians Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian.⁶

The notes of the head of the CC CPSU General Department Vladimir Malin on the discussions in the Kremlin reveal that Soviet leaders, even after they returned from Poland and the face-off between Khrushchev and Gomulka, contemplated military pressure and insisted that Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, - the Soviet citizen installed by Moscow after World War Two as Polish Defense Minister whose ouster the Polish communists had demanded - should remain the head of the Polish army. Also the CC Presidium discussed inviting to Moscow “representatives from the Communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the GDR, and Bulgaria.”⁷ However, the Polish leadership managed to appeal to the Chinese behind the Soviets back with a plea to intercede and prevent a possible Soviet military intervention. Later, after the fact, Mao Zedong asserted that “the CCP categorically rejected the Soviet proposal [for intervention] and attempted to put forward the Chinese position directly by immediately sending a delegation to Moscow with Liu Shaoqi at its head.” Mao blamed the crisis in Poland on the tendency toward “great power chauvinism” in Moscow that repeated the worst patterns of Stalin’s behavior from many, including himself, had suffered so much in the past. The Chinese leaders told the Polish ambassador in Beijing on October 27 that “between 19-23 October a CCP delegation...in Moscow convinced Khrushchev about the correctness of the political changes in Poland” and warned him that the use of military force would represent a return to the same Stalinist methods that Khrushchev had repudiated.⁸

There is still ambiguity regarding the exact timetable and details of Sino-Soviet consultations on the Polish, and particularly on the Hungarian crises. It is not clear why the Polish ambassador was misled about the dates of the Chinese delegation’s stay in Moscow; actually it arrived on October 23, shortly after noon and stayed there until the late evening of October 31. Deng Xiaoping was still number two there after Liu Shaoqi who was considered a key ideologue and theoretician of communist bloc affairs. The rest of the delegation included lower-ranking officials Wang Jiaxiang and Hu Qiaomu, as well as interpreter Shi Zhe (Karskii). Khrushchev met the delegation at Vnukovo airport outside Moscow and already in the car began to talk with them about the Polish situation.⁹ The Malin notes mention only Liu by name, but according to Shi Zhe also Deng Xiaoping and other members of the Chinese delegation were invited to several sessions of the CC Presidium on 24, 26, the evening of 30 and the night of 30-31 October.¹⁰ On October 29 a crucial round of consultations took place between the Chinese and Khrushchev, Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin at Stalin’s former dacha (Lipki) near Moscow. It was there first, Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs, that “we agreed upon a common

Hungary, could be explained and understood only if we look at them from within the world in which the participants themselves lived and thought. In this world each side maneuvered with a careful eye on three factors — one was the legacy of Stalin, the embodiment of power and unity of the communist camp; another was the power struggle inside Moscow and Beijing; the third was the emerging struggle between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev for seniority and revolutionary legitimacy within the communist world. Mao Zedong had been outraged when Khrushchev in February had denounced Stalin without consulting the Chinese leadership. Mao realized, to his extreme displeasure, that this funny, bald-headed Soviet leader had just undercut his, Mao's, intention to turn Stalin into a pedestal for his seniority in the world communist movement — while building his own legitimacy as a paragon of de-Stalinization. From 1956, Mao began to regard himself as the potential leader of the communist camp and Khrushchev as a time-server and political liability. Evidently Deng Xiaoping was one of those who avidly shared this new perception in Beijing.

In July 1963 Deng Xiaoping challenged the Soviets on what had happened on those fateful days. Deng Xiaoping said that “after the 20th congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the wholesale renunciation of Stalin, a wave of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaigns was provoked around the whole world...The most prominent events which took place in this period were the events in Poland and Hungary.” Deng Xiaoping was careful to indicate that the Chinese leadership had never concealed this position from the Soviets. In fact, on 23 October 1956 when the Hungarian revolution started, Mao Zedong had told Soviet ambassador Pavel Iudin that the Soviets “had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us with it.” Khrushchev's method of criticizing Stalin, Mao had implied, was “the same as if having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one's own feet.”¹⁷

Continuing his commentary on the events of 1956, Deng added, “We have always considered and still consider that in resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordinate them by means of coercion and even trying to resort to the use of military force.”

Deng Xiaoping then glossed over the major zigzag that occurred in Beijing vis-à-vis the Hungarian events and went right to the conclusion that underlined Mao's decision on October 31 to insist on intervention: that the Hungarian events were fundamentally different from the Polish ones since it was an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet counterrevolution and not merely a protest against great-power chauvinism. “And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary?”

asked Deng Xiaoping. “The leadership of the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to the mercy of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your position on the matter. Such a position was practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these two events are well known to you and us. I do not want to dwell on them too much.”¹⁸

Yet, as an experienced orator, Deng returned to this subject again and again, reminding the Soviets of other “details:” “On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-round analysis, the lack of self-criticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.”

“It should be further noted that when the events in Poland arose, Com. Liu Shaoqi as head of the delegation of the Communist Party of China arrived in Moscow for negotiations [on 23 October 1956—VZ] during which he also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized comrades from the CPSU for committing the same mistakes during the events in Poland—mistakes of great-power chauvinism.”¹⁹

On the opposite side of the table were CC CPSU Secretary Mikhail Suslov and Iurii Andropov, immediate participants in the Hungarian events. But only Suslov had taken part in the CC Presidium discussions in October 1956, and even he was not present at the crucial session on October 30-31. Therefore the Soviet delegation had no response other than to give a general rebuff and avoid a slippery debate on details.

“We do not plan to examine these issues anew,” Suslov said. “We will simply note the complete lack of foundation for your assertions to the effect that the decisions of the 20th congress led to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for those events, as is shown by the materials of the fraternal parties, as well as the errors of the fraternal parties, is the errors of the previous leadership of Hungary connected with Stalin's actions...”

“You are now trying to accumulate capital by speculating on these events and by proving that the Soviet Union allegedly committed errors and that by your interference you almost managed to save the situation. This is a strange and monstrous accusation to lay at the feet of the CPSU and a more than bizarre arrogance on the part of the Chinese leaders. Did our country not pay with thousands of its sons' lives in order to preserve the socialist order in fraternal Hungary? Did it not come to

relations comes from transcripts of CPSU plenums. Reporting to the plenum on 13 July 1960, Khrushchev's party deputy Frol Kozlov reported that on 5 June the Politburo of the CC CCP "had invited around 40 communists—leaders of foreign trade unions, to dinner, followed by a conference" of trade unionists. Liu Shaoqi opened this conference, and then "com. Deng Xiaoping took the floor, and his speech contained a number of absolutely false positions, which contained an obvious distortion of the line of the CPSU." Deng, according to Kozlov's story, declared that the CPSU and other fraternal parties had "tossed overboard the main points of the Declaration" of the communist conference of November 1957.²⁹ Perhaps this pushed Khrushchev over the edge leading to the abrupt removal of Soviet advisors and technical personnel from China.

The trade union conference in Beijing was, as it turned out, China's preparation for the clash with the USSR at the congress of "fraternal parties" in Bucharest in late June 1960, where Khrushchev and the leaders of the East European countries all participated. With Deng Xiaoping absent from the Bucharest congress, the role of ideological hit-men fell to Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Wu Xiuquan, and Liu Xiao. It is not clear what the little "terrier" was busy with at that time. Three years later he explained it away with a joke. "I said [then] I was fortunate that [instead of me] went com. Peng Zhen. His weight is around 80 kilograms, so he endured. If I had gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I would not have endured." Deng Xiaoping referred to the

Shaoqi who was announced on the list. Suslov remarked later that Deng “passed up in total silence the speech of com. Khrushchev.”³⁷ This figure of silence was probably meant to imply how unworthy of attention were the pronouncements of the Soviet leader who pretended to be the head of the world communist movement! Khrushchev swallowed the bait and had to give a rebuff to Deng Xiaoping in his second, unplanned speech on 23 Novem-

acclaimed in Beijing. According to one biographer, “the failure to shore up Sino-Soviet relations was greeted as a victory over revisionism by the CCP leadership who turned out in force to welcome Deng back from Moscow.” He was also the leader of the group of speechwriters that drafted CCP letters, probably including the ones criticizing the test ban.⁵² Salisbury concludes that Deng’s ideological exploits in Moscow (he mentions only one in November 1957) earned him Mao’s gratitude and a relatively mild treatment during the Cultural Revolution. If this version is true, then Deng Xiaoping proved his credentials as a loyal subordinate of Mao Zedong and demonstrated his ability to work very successfully together with the Chairman in the area of foreign policy.⁵³

But does it mean that the “little terrier” had the same views on Stalin, Stalinism and international relations as Mao Zedong? There is a more complex explanation of Deng’s role. According to recent revelations of Dr. Li Zhisui, Mao’s personal physician, Deng Xiaoping, as well as Liu Shaoqi, lost Mao’s trust at the Eighth CCP Congress in September 1956, when they spoke too fervently about the impossibility of any cult of personality in China.⁵⁴ Mao Zedong considered Deng a politician with a great future (as he told Khrushchev in November 1957) and considerable political ambitions. However, in the atmosphere of power struggle and Mao’s emerging dictatorship this praise could bring Deng as easily to the gallows as to the pedestal: Mao, like Stalin before him, had shrinking tolerance for men of political ambition in his immediate vicinity. Therefore, it is only logical that Mao should have watched Deng very keenly and tried to find tasks for him where Deng’s energy would have been utilized for Mao’s benefit rather than against his interests. According to this logic, Mao Zedong wanted to send Deng to Moscow not because he particularly trusted his loyalty, but for the opposite reason, because he wanted to neutralize his potential opposition to his rising cult of personality.

To understand this logic, it is perhaps useful to start with the opposite pole, the Soviet one. After 1960 the Chinese criticism of Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization tied the hands of the Stalinists in Moscow like Suslov. According to Georgi Arbatov’s thoughtful observation “from 1962-1964 the Chinese factor weakened the position of the Stalinists in the USSR. As it developed, the conflict with China had positive influences on the policy of Khrushchev, who had been slipping back to Stalinism only too often since 1962. The debate with the Chinese leaders provided the anti-Stalinists with the opportunity, while defending our policies, to speak out on many political and ideological subjects that had lately become taboo.”⁵⁵

Actually, when Khrushchev was overthrown at the CC Presidium in October 1964, Alexander Shelepin, Secretary of the CC and the former head of the KGB, repeated almost verbatim Deng’s criticism of the Soviet leader’s “two mistakes” during the Cuban missile crisis. Yet, the Soviet leaders were too embarrassed to repeat this criticism at the plenum, because it would have implied that the

Chinese had been right all along. Therefore, Khrushchev’s foreign policy errors were not criticized at the top party forum.

In China the same logic worked the other way around. Mao Zedong may well have cleverly decided to direct the energy of his potential critics, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, for external, foreign policy use. Deng Xiaoping

members, Wu Xiuquan and Pang Zuli. The members of the Soviet delegation were Mikhail Suslov and Leonid Il'ichev, two influential members of the CC CPSU Secretariat in charge of ideology; Viktor Grishin from the Moscow Party Organization; Iurii Andropov, head of the CC International Department (socialist countries); Boris Ponomarev, head of the CC International Department (capitalist countries); Pavel Satiukov, editor-in-chief of *Pravda*; and Stepan Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador in Beijing.

⁴ David Goodman, *Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution*, p.55. The book refers to a Chinese source, Liao Yilu, "Deng Xiaoping zai Suliangong ershihao" in Yang Guoyu and Chen Feigin, eds. *Ershiba nian jian: cong shizhengwei dao zongshuji* (Volume 3), 1992, p. 106 in claiming that Deng Xiaoping "heard" Khrushchev's speech. However, foreign guests were not invited to the last session of the Congress to hear the "secret speech."

⁵ Shi Zhe, *At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin: Shi Zhe's Memoirs*, Chapter 14, "De-Stalinization, Poland, Hungary: 1956"

Deng Xiaoping, Mao's “Continuous Revolution,” and the Path toward the Sino-Soviet Split: A Rejoinder

By Chen Jian

Deng Xiaoping is a legendary figure in the political history of modern China. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao Zedong twice purged him, but did not destroy him (as the Chinese Chairman did to Liu Shaoqi, China's second most important leader from 1949 to 1966, who died in disgrace in 1969). Early in 1973, after Deng had been absent from China's political scene for more than six years, Mao pardoned him and brought him back to China's decision-making inner circle. Three years later, when Deng was again expelled from the Party's Politburo and Central Committee due to his alleged “unchanged reactionary attitude” toward the Cultural Revolution, he retained his Party membership and was never exposed to physical torture by the “revolutionary masses.” He would reemerge and eventually become China's paramount leader after Mao's death in 1976.

It is apparent that Deng Xiaoping's purge and survival during the Cultural Revolution were primarily Mao's work. But Deng's image in Mao's mind must have been extremely complicated, otherwise his experience would not have been so tortuous. While it will take a much more

political attitude and loyalty toward his “continuous revolution.”⁴ Here, once again, Mao demonstrated his mastery of Chinese party politics.

Deng did not disappoint Mao. His stamina and eloquence in Moscow, together with that of Kang Sheng and other members of the Chinese delegation, put the Soviets on the defensive. This proved both the correctness of the Chinese stand and the superiority of the Chinese mentality. When members of the Chinese delegation returned to Beijing, they would be welcomed by Mao at the airport, which was a highly unusual gesture by the Chairman. Moreover, Mao was so confident that the transcripts of the meetings in Moscow would enhance his “continuous revolution” that, on 28 July 1963, he ordered them to be printed and distributed to low- and middle-rank CCP cadres.⁵ This was the only time in the CCP’s history, to the best of my knowledge, that the transcripts of top cadres

From the diary of P.F. IUDIN

**SECRET Copy 1
3rd June 1959**

Report of Conversation

cussed the issue of the expediency of Harriman's visit to China and came to the conclusion that at present the visit would not be useful. However, he added, we are not ruling out a visit by Harriman to China in the future.

I briefed Deng Xiaoping on the basis of the information we received from MID USSR on Sukarno's stay in Turkey. Having displayed a great interest in this issue, Deng Xiaoping noted that, of all the nationalist countries in Asia at present, Indonesia is taking the best position. This is particularly evident in the example of Indonesia's attitude toward events in Tibet.

Afterwards, we touched on the issue of Yugoslavia, of Tito's trip through the countries of Southeast Asia, of Yugoslavia's position on the Tibet issue, and on the difficult state of the Yugoslav economy. In the conversation, it was noted that nationalist bourgeois circles in Arab countries were accepting Yugoslav ideology. We both agreed that it was necessary to strengthen our common propaganda in the Arab countries in the interests of exposing the Yugoslav provocational policy.

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that in some ways the Yugoslav revisionists were now more dangerous than the Americans and the social democrats of the Western countries, and that, as a result, it was a very important task to expose the Yugoslav revisionists. We are devoting a lot of attention to this issue, he said, which is the reason for the Yugoslavs' particular protest. Deng Xiaoping said that after a report by a Xinhua correspondent in Belgrade about a strike by Yugoslav students protesting poor food was published in the Chinese press, the Yugoslav authorities made a statement of protest and warned the Chinese correspondent that if such an episode occurred again they would take appropriate action against him.

Touching on the plan thought up by Tito and Nasser for a meeting of the leaders of four countries - Tito, Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno—with the aim of "coordinating neutrality policies in connection with the Geneva conference," Deng Xiaoping said that Nehru was firmly opposing the meeting. Sukarno was showing a vague interest (*kak-budto proiavliaet nekotoryi interes*) in the plan. Foreign agents report that [Indonesian Foreign Minister] Subandrio has allegedly decided to communicate with the authors of the plan (Tito and Nasser) about the concrete details of the proposal. As of yet, it is hard to say what Sukarno's final position will be on this issue, Deng Xiaoping noted, although it is already clear that Tito and Nasser are very interested in calling such a meeting.

Having noted that the Americans need an instrument like the current Yugoslav leaders and that the Americans are making fairly good use of that instrument, not economizing in their spending on it, Deng Xiaoping expressed confidence that in the end that money would be spent in vain, as was the money spent on Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-Shek].

I inquired as to the situation at present in Taiwan.

Deng Xiaoping expressed the opinion that Jiang Jieshi would probably not give up power and would remain

"president" for a third term. If Jiang Jieshi remains as "president," he said, that would be better for us than if Chen Chen or even Hu Shi occupied the post. The Americans would be happiest with Hu Shi; in the worst case, they would agree to Chen Chen. Jiang Jieshi suits them least of all. On the Tibetan issue, Deng Xiaoping noted, the views of the PRC and Jiang Jieshi coincide: both we and he consider that Tibet is Chinese territory and that we cannot permit the Tibetan issue to be put before the UN.

In answer to my question as to what the economic situation in Taiwan was, Deng Xiaoping said that the Jiang Jieshi-ites were living at the USA's expense. That, he added, is not a bad thing. Let the Americans waste their money. In the final analysis, Taiwan will be returned to the bosom of its native land - China. However, for that to happen, we need time; we must wait a bit. The circumstances are becoming more and more favorable for the PRC and less and less so for the USA. The Jiang Jieshi-ites in Taiwan are beginning to think hard about the prospects which await them. There are many factors contributing to this: the growing international authority of people's China, its economic successes, the long separation from the native land, and so on. The most important thing of all is that they know the Americans want to wash their hands of them (*otkazat'sia*). The USA does not trust Jiang Jieshi, and he does not trust the United States.

Later on in the course of the conversation, several issues of the domestic situation of the Soviet Union and China were touched on.

I told Deng Xiaoping about the preparation taking place in our country for the CC CPSU plenum.

Deng Xiaoping noted that at present throughout China, prospects for the harvest are not bad. In some regions, up to 50% more wheat will be harvested than in 1958. The overall wheat harvest will probably be up to 20% higher than the previous year's harvest. It is somewhat worse with the early rice harvest. In places, crops suffer from flooding—in others, from drought. If rains come soon to the drought-affected regions, the situation could be corrected.

Deng Xiaoping went on to note as a serious shortcoming the fact that, of last year's total harvest, a lot of grain was used as free food for peasants in communes. This, he emphasized, has had a negative effect on the supply of grain to the cities. Deng Xiaoping recounted that before

At the end of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping briefly touched on the issue of the Dalai Lama. Previously, he said, Nehru calculated that the Dalai Lama would play a huge role in the Indians' plans and that chaos would begin in Tibet without the Dalai Lama. Quite the opposite, in Tibet, things are going well without the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama has turned out to be a burden for Nehru. Nehru and the Americans are spending 200 thousand rupees monthly to maintain the Dalai Lama and his entourage. At present, Nehru intends to return the Dalai Lama to Tibet. If he returns, Deng Xiaoping added, we will pay him much more than the Indians and the Americans. In the past during each visit by the Dalai Lama to Beijing, he was given 200 thousand yuan for minor expenses. While the Dalai Lama was in Lhasa, he was given 700 thousand yuan every month (for him and his entourage).

In connection with this, I noted that the Tibetan peasants, who had been freed from dependence as serfs, had gained the most from the Tibetan events.

Having agreed with me, Deng Xiaoping said that the masses of the people in Tibet had already risen up to carry out democratic reforms.

The candidate member of the secretariat of the CC CCP, com. Yang Shangkun, translator com. Yan Mingfu, and the first secretary of the USSR Embassy in the PRC, com. F.V. Mochul'skii, were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

(P. Iudin)

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 235, ll. 40-44; obtained by Paul Wingrove; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

.....

For:

- longer memcon excerpts
- additional Deng memcons

Visit the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin at:

**From the diary of
S.V. CHERVONENKO**

SECRET

8" December 1959

**Memorandum of Conversation
with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, DENG
XIAOPING**

6 November 1959

I had my first visit with Deng Xiaoping and had a conversation with him. Deng Xiaoping told me that he had not yet fully recovered after breaking his leg. He is going back to work in two days, but the doctors are allowing him to work for only four hours at a time. Afterwards, he asked what was my impression of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the PRC. Answering Deng Xiaoping, I noted that the celebration had been organized on a grand scale. It demonstrated the huge enthusiasm of the people and their solidarity.

Deng Xiaoping said that he was present at the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. [Ed. Note: Moscow, November 1957. Due to the Soviet government's 1918 conversion from Julian to Gregorian calendars, the October Revolution was feted on November 7.] In the USSR too, he added, everything had been organized well. Such round dates must be well noted. The most important point was that our great holidays demonstrate our solidarity, the great progress of the socialist camp, and the solidarity of progressive forces, of the fraternal parties.

I answered that the solidarity of the fraternal parties had found clear expression during the celebration of the CCP's tenth anniversary. During ten short years, the CCP had achieved successes which have rocked (*vskolykhnut'*) the entire world, and no one is in a position to take those achievements away from the Chinese people. The solidarity of the fraternal peoples has already shown its great significance more than once. If, for instance, after the victory of the October Revolution, Ukraine had remained alone and had not been in the family of the other Soviet republics, it could have been overwhelmed and dismembered by the imperialists. Friendship is the greatest force of all and sometimes we do not fully recognize its significance. History will show what a huge significance it has.

Deng Xiaoping responded that unity and solidarity truly were the most important thing. With our solidarity, we do not fear any imperialists. "We are exerting every effort to preserve peace, and imperialism will perish in peaceful conditions. If madmen nevertheless unleash a war, they will only meet with their downfall. The entire affair consists of the fact that we are making progress, while they are being torn apart by contradictions. We have many friends, including in the USA - [those friends] are

the working people.”

I noted that comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s visit demonstrated the great interest of the workers of America in our country and in socialism.

For that reason, Deng Xiaoping said, the ruling circles in the USA were afraid of that visit. They wanted to isolate comrade Khrushchev, but the people broke through the dike. Moreover, having agreed with [my] observation that even while making progress and augmenting socialism’s strength it is necessary to display great vigilance toward the machinations of the imperialists, Deng Xiaoping said: “The imperialists especially want to undermine the unity of our countries, but that is a futile endeavor....”

To my observation that the most important thing in overcoming every difficulty is the presence of the leading role of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping said that both the one and the other were important, the leadership of the CCP and help from the Soviet Union. “At present,” he went on, “we are in a better position than you were right after the October Revolution. If a new socialist country arises, it will, given the existence of the entire socialist camp, be in an even better position than we are. We are very happy that the situation in the Soviet Union is good in all respects. As for us, we are also not in a bad position.”

I noted that even in a situation where our affairs are going well, we [always] take measures to use all our existing capacities as much as possible; we are self-critical of ourselves, and strive to root out all our shortcomings. We also have shortcomings, Deng Xiaoping answered, and they will always exist. One must even on occasion heed criticism coming from an enemy.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping said that we would meet again and more than once.

I thanked Deng Xiaoping for the conversation and expressed the hope that in its work, the Embassy would encounter assistance from him and from the CC CCP apparatus as before.

Head of the protocol division of the CCP Foreign Ministry, Yu Peiwen, assistant head of the division for the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe Yu Zhan, [USSR] embassy counselor B.N. Vereshchagin and third secretary B.T. Kulik were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF, f. 5, op. 49, d. 235, ll. 107-110; obtained by

COLD

alism.

Deng: But why then did Comrade Khrushchev speak with such esteem about Eisenhower?

Suslov: One cannot mix up matters of principle with the diplomacy of the struggle.

Deng: Comrade Suslov, do not jump to conclusions too easily. You are not used to listening to others. Under such conditions it is difficult for us to finish our discussion. There is no state of equality. We would like to ask you, however, on whom you can count when difficulties will arise? On Eisenhower, on Nehru or the likes, or on a fraternal socialist country, on China?

Kozlov: There is no such question for us.

Deng: It would be perfect if such questions did not exist. But in reality such facts exist, and they cause concern.

Kozlov: Then you yourself want a decline in our relations. You yourself are pushing this line. We state that there is no such question, but you maintain that it exists nevertheless. We declare in the name of our country, in the name of our people that we will defend you in case of an attack with all means [available to us]; but you doubt this.

Deng: I ask you that your actions meet your recent statements.

Suslov: This statement is offensive to us.

Deng: I declare in the name of our party, in the name of the entire Chinese people, and fully aware of the responsibility, that regardless of all the[se] circumstances and the attacks on the Chinese people, the People's Republic of China and our party will take the side of the socialist countries in all difficulties.

Suslov: Did we not act this way when there was a difficult situation in the GDR in 1955 [1953?], did we not take full responsibility when we dealt a blow to the counterrevolution in Hungary?

Deng: But during the Chinese-Indian border conflict you did not act that way.

Suslov: But you were not threatened by a dangerous aggressor.

Deng: You unilaterally withdrew your experts from China, you transferred the ideological differences to the sphere of international-state relations, and I do not agree that India did not threaten China. You declared that you took a neutral position in the question of the Sino-Indian conflict. It is news to us that a fraternal socialist country can take a neutral position in the conflict with bourgeois India with regard to another socialist country.

In his further remarks, **Deng** spoke about the disagreements which had occurred in the relations between China and the USSR, among other things about the negotiations of the supreme command of the Far Eastern military district on joint air defense on 4 February 1955 and those on air defense between the military districts of the USSR and China on 27 September 1955. **Peng Zhen** thoroughly explained once again the question of the construction of a long-wave radio station. **Deng** stated in conclusion: As is well known, an extremely unequal treaty existed according

to which China did not have the right to permit representatives of third countries to enter two provinces of the PRC. These two provinces are our territories. Is it your business whether we permit the entry of persons from third countries or not [?] These questions were discussed with Comrade Mikoian during his trip to the PRC, and it was resolved. We appreciate that you resolved these questions.

Suslov: And why do you now raise these long-resolved questions once again? What is your point?

Deng: Unfortunately, the proposals with regard to the construction of a joint fleet, a long-wave radio station, and negotiations on a basis of equality [sic?] came from Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Mao Zedong back then had asked Comrade Khrushchev: What should we do when you raise these issues, should we act according to your proposals or according to our thoughts. If we act as you wish, we would have to cede our entire coast to you, as was the case with Port Arthur [Lushunkou] and Dalnii [Dalian]. Comrade Khrushchev responded: You cannot act like that. Where would you go? Comrade Mao Zedong then stated: We will go into the mountains as partisans.

Suslov: We think this is a joke.

Deng: This was not a joke. This was a very serious conversation. It must be stated that following this conversation, you stopped delivering to us technical documentation and equipment for the construction of a nuclear submarine fleet, while the CC CPSU communicated to the CC CCP on 20 June 1959 that the USSR would terminate the deliveries of technical documentation and necessary materials for the production of atomic weapons... With regard to the Chinese-Soviet border incidents, **Deng** stated: on this question, we will communicate our response through diplomatic channels, and therefore we will not take a position at this point....

Deng:...I take advantage of the opportunity to ask you to transmit our greetings to your Party and to com. Khrushchev. At the same time, please transmit the following wish: since last September com. Khrushchev has personally attacked our country and Party many times causing us alarm. As the leader of the Soviet party and the Soviet state, com. Khrushchev exercises powerful influence over world affairs. Therefore, we ask you with all our hearts and sincerity to deliver this message [to Khrushchev], asking him to pay attention to it. With great satisfaction, we ascertain that both sides consider this meeting useful and are of the opinion that this is a contribution towards gradually overcoming our differences...

[Source : SAPMO (former Socialist Unity Party [SED] Archive) JIV 2/202-280, Bd.3; provided by Tim Trampedach (Freie Universitat-Berlin); translated by Christian Ostermann.]

.....

From the Diary of

TOP SECRET

S.V. CHERVONENKO
12 October 1961

Copy No. 1

**Transcript of Conversation
with General Secretary of the CC CCP
DENG XIAOPING**

30 September 1961

In connection with 27 September instructions from the Center, I made a request to meet with Mao Zedong. On September 30, the Secretariat of the CC CCP informed us that Mao Zedong had instructed Deng Xiaoping to receive the Soviet ambassador. On the same day I met with Deng Xiaoping.

At the beginning of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping by way of explaining why Mao Zedong did not receive us, said that the "other comrades of the CC are very busy receiving kings" (at that time, the king and queen of Nepal and the Belgian queen were located in Beijing).

I gave information in an oral form on the Albanian issue (it is our opinion that they were already informed of the matter). Having heard our message, Deng Xiaoping said: "Bad news. Have you reached the culmination point of mutual relations between your two countries and two parties?"

I answered Deng Xiaoping that as he knows from our formerly delivered letter, the Soviet government has more than once made efforts directed at normalizing Soviet-Albanian relations, but the Albanian leaders are taking steps in the opposite direction. Their last step is damaging the security of the member-countries of the Warsaw pact and the basic security of the entire socialist camp.

Deng Xiaoping stated that everyone must not take extreme measures in order to leave room for a settlement.

I again emphasized that after the Moscow conference, the Soviet side undertook multiple steps in order to eliminate misunderstanding in the relations between the Soviet Union and Albania. For instance, a readiness by N.S. Khrushchev to meet with the Albanian leaders was expressed, although the latter, as the Chinese comrades well know, stubbornly refused such a meeting. I added that such a position by the Albanians is incomprehensible to us.

We, Deng Xiaoping responded, are acquainted with

12th anniversary was held in Moscow, and asked that thanks be conveyed to the CC CPSU for the attention paid

20th Congress of the CPSU, beginning in 1956, at meetings of an internal sort [*vnutrennego poryadka*], the leading comrades of our party criticized your errors in a moderate form more than once. In his statement comrade Suslov said that we kept quiet for 7 years. There are no grounds for [saying] that.

In fact, both on the issue of Stalin and on the issue of the form of transition, that is peaceful transition, the leaders of the CCP presented their views more than once to the leaders of the CPSU. And these views are well known to you.

Back in April 1956, Com. Mao Zedong stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin in a discussion with Com. Mikoian and also after that, in a discussion with Ambassador Com. Iudin.

Com. Mao Zedong emphasized that it is incorrect to think that “Stalin’s errors and contributions are divided into equal halves;” “whatever happened, all the same Stalin’s contributions are greater than his errors. One must evaluate it as follows, that his contributions make up 70 percent, and his mistakes 30 percent. It is necessary to make a concrete analysis and to give an all-around [*vsestoronnaya*] assessment.”... In October 1956, Com. Zhou Enlai also stated our views about Stalin in a discussion with Com. Ponomarev, who was then a member of the CPSU delegation present at the eighth Congress of our [CCP] party. In discussion with Com. Ponomarev, Com. Zhou Enlai criticized the mistakes by comrades from the CPSU: first, “no preliminary consultation was carried out with fraternal parties”; secondly, “an all-around historical analysis was completely lacking” in relation to Stalin; thirdly, the leading comrades from the CPSU “lacked self-criticism”. These are the three points which Com. Zhou Enlai talked about.

On 23 October 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again talked with Com. Iudin about the issue of Stalin. Com. Mao Zedong then said that it was necessary to criticize Stalin, but that in relation to critical methods we hold to another opinion, and also have a different opinion about some other issues. Com. Mao Zedong also said that you had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us. That is the same as if, having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one’s own feet [*podniav kamen’ brosit’ ego sebe na nogi*].

On 30 November 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again received Com. Iudin and in a conversation with him said that the basic course and line in the period of Stalin’s leadership was correct and that one must not treat one’s comrade like an enemy.

On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by

hand, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-around analysis, the lack of self-criticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.

Both Com. Mao Zedong on the 29 October 1957, on

existent so-called “spirit of Camp-David.” All of this proved the error of the views of our comrades from the CPSU and the correctness of our views...

In June 1960 in Bucharest, the leadership of the CPSU mounted a sudden attack on the CCP, disseminated the Informational Note of the CC of the CPSU which contains an all-around attack on the CCP, and organized a campaign by a whole group of fraternal parties against us...

On 16 July 1960 the Soviet side unilaterally decided to withdraw between 28 July and 1 September over 1,300 Soviet specialists working in China. Over 900 specialists were recalled from [extended] business trips and contracts and agreements were broken...

On 25 August 1962, the Soviet government informed China that it was ready to conclude an agreement with the USA on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our view, you were pursuing an unseemly goal in coming to such an agreement, namely: to bind China by the hands and feet through an agreement with the USA.

After India started a major attack on the border regions of China in October 1962, the Soviet Union began to supply India with even larger quantities of military materiel, to do its utmost to give [India] an economic blood transfusion, to support Nehru by political means, and to spur him on to the struggle against China.

Your position on the issues of the Indian-Chinese border conflict received praise from the USA. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State [Averell] Harriman, said: “I consider that the maintenance of relations that are as friendly as possible between India and Moscow serves its own interests well and also serves our interests well.” Harriman made this statement on 9 December 1962. Further, on 18 December 1962 in conversation with a Japanese correspondent, Harriman also stated that the USA wanted to see the Soviet Union help India in the matter of supporting its defense capabilities.

On the issue of Chinese-Indian relations you went too far. With all [bad] intention, you spoke out together with Kennedy and Nehru against China. Where then did the spirit of proletarian internationalism, which existed under Lenin and Stalin, go?

In October 1962 there was a crisis in the region of the Caribbean Sea. During these events we consider that you committed two errors: in shipping the missiles to Cuba you indulged in adventurism, and then, showing confusion in the face of nuclear blackmail from the USA, you capitulated.

People understandably [*zakonno*] ask why you began to ship missiles to Cuba. In this regard we have our own experience. Judging by our experience, your actions in this regard remind us in their character of your efforts to develop a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet in China. For Cuba’s defense no missiles are necessary at all. And so, in shipping missiles to Cuba, did you want to help her or to ruin her? We have become suspicious that you, in shipping missiles to Cuba, were trying to place her under

your control.

You failed to consult with fraternal countries on such an important issue. You daily speak about the danger of thermonuclear war. But in the given case you rashly played with nuclear weapons.

You justify your actions by saying that you wanted to obtain some sort of “promise” from the USA, and you say that you truly received such a “promise.”

But what are the facts? The facts are that under threat from the United States you were obliged to remove your missiles. By all sorts of means you tried to convince Cuba to agree to so-called “international inspection,” which encroaches upon their sovereignty and constitutes interference in their internal affairs. Besides that, you also conduct propaganda among the peoples of the world, convincing them to believe in some sort of promise by Kennedy, and thereby you adorn [*priukrashivaete*] American imperialism.

In his letters to Kennedy of the 27 and 28 October 1962, Com. Khrushchev wrote: “You are working toward the preservation of peace” and “I express my satisfaction and recognition of your manifestation of a sense of moderation and an understanding of the responsibility which now rests on you for the preservation of peace in the whole world.”

But the question remains did the USA in the end give some sort of promise? Let us look at [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk’s statement of 11 January 1963. Rusk stated: “To whatever extent President Kennedy took on obligations not to encroach on Cuba at the moment of the Cuban crisis, these obligations have not come into force.” He further said: “In general no such obligations exist.”...

At the Congresses of these parties another strange phenomenon was observed: on the one hand at these Congresses they attacked the CCP and completely removed the Albanian Workers’ Party, and on the other hand, they forcibly dragged the Titoist clique in Yugoslavia into the ranks of the international communist movement and tried to rehabilitate that clique. In addition, at the Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, there was noise, whistling, and stamping right at the time when our representative subjected Yugoslav revisionism to criticism on the basis of the Moscow Declaration by citing the Moscow Declaration verbatim.

What do the facts we have cited above, which took place after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, testify to? These facts testify to the fact that comrades from the CPSU have taken further steps to create a split in the ranks of the international communist movement, and, moreover, have done so in an increasingly sharp, increasingly extreme form, in an increasingly organized [way], on an increasingly large scale, trying, come what may, to crush others.

I would like to note that using such methods is a habitual affair for you. You began using such methods as far back as the Bucharest conference. During the bilateral meeting between the representatives of our two parties in

1960, I said that it was fortunate that Com. Peng Zhen went to the Bucharest meeting; he weighs approximately 80 kilograms, and for that reason he endured; if I had gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I could not have endured. After that it was just as well that Com. Wu Xiuquan, who weighs more than 70 kilograms, went to the GDR, and was able to endure. Frankly speaking, such methods do not help matters. You cannot prove by such methods that you are in the right; you cannot prove that the truth is on your side. Quite the opposite; the use of such methods is an insult to the glorious Marxist-Leninist party.

Ponomarev. And Com. Grishin weighs 70 kg. After all, this started before Bucharest, in Beijing. That was the start of and the reason for the Bucharest Conference.

Deng Xiaoping. I understand you.

Peng Zhen. Wait. You will have [your] time; you will be able to say as much as you want then. We are ready to hear you out...

Deng Xiaoping. I have already taken 5 hours in my statement, and on that I end it. Are we going to continue the session today, or will we continue it tomorrow?

Suslov. We propose a break until the day after tomorrow, at 10 AM. We must acquaint ourselves with your statement.

Deng Xiaoping. Aft [(tomorrty,hear y(, errow?)]TJ /F8 1 Tf 1.8 -1.2 TD [(Suslov)29(.)]TJ /F4 1 Tf 3 0TD Byuite trI uthat [(will*

brought it up again today. What do you need it for?...

We would also like to remind our forgetful Chinese comrades about some facts and about the assistance the USSR has given to the economic development of the PRC. Do not the 198 modern industrial enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the scientific-research institutes which it set up, and the technical cadres trained in the USSR, bear witness to the commitment by the CPSU to fraternal friendship with People's China? Up until 1959 almost a half of all the cast iron was produced, more than half of all the steel was smelted, and more than half of the rolled iron was made in the metallurgical enterprises constructed in China with help from the USSR. Such new branches of industry as the automobile, the tractor, and the aviation industry have been developed in China with the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gave the PRC 21 thousand sets of scientific-technical documentation, including more than 1400 plans of whole enterprises...

Deng Xiaoping. Perhaps tomorrow we rest for a day? The day after tomorrow we will speak according to his principle. (He turns to Com. Andropov).

Suslov. Fine, until ten o'clock, yes?

Deng Xiaoping. Fine, we agree...

July 12

Deng Xiaoping. Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the People's Socialist Party of Cuba at one time fell to attacking the armed struggle led by Com. Fidel Castro, calling it "putschism," "adventurism," and "terrorism." It accused Com. Castro of the fact that the armed struggle led by him was a "total mistake" [*sploshnaya oshibka*], "caused by a petty-bourgeois nature, and that its leaders do not rely on the masses." It even openly demanded of Com. Castro that he renounce "putschistic activities," and "the erroneous path of armed struggle, leading to a rupture with the people."

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Algerian communist party from 1957 fully renounced armed struggle and, moreover, began to propagandize the "danger" of national-liberationist war, advocating the attainment of independence through compromise, and in doing so fully wasted its place in the political life of the country.

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on

call the Cuban Missile Crisis.] was erroneous and contradicted the interests of the Cuban, Soviet and Chinese peoples...

Andropov. As for you, you long ago ceased any sort of consultation with us. In 1958, the Chinese side did not inform us in a timely fashion about its intentions to carry out the shelling of the coastal islands in the Taiwan straits which was carried out soon after Com. N.S. Khrushchev left Beijing. According to the later admission of Com. Mao Zedong, during Com. N.S. Khrushchev's presence in Beijing the Chinese comrades had already decided on this operation and had prepared it, but you did not consider it necessary to inform the Soviet government about it. Despite this, during a dark hour for the Chinese government, the head of the Soviet government informed the US President Eisenhower that an attack on China would be taken as an attack on the Soviet Union.

Over the last several years the government of the PRC has completely failed to inform the government of the USSR about the Chinese-American negotiations that have been going on since 1955 at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw. Judging by the press reports, over 100 meetings were held there. Since May 1958 you have twice sharply changed your political course on relations with Japan, and, in both cases, despite the Treaty of 1950, you did so without consulting with us...

Kang Sheng. In your criticism of Stalin, you do not take the position of seeking the truth and do not use methods of scientific analysis, but resort to demagoguery, slanders and abusive language.

Comrades from the CPSU call Stalin "a murderer," "a criminal," "a bandit," "a gambler," "a despot like Ivan the Terrible," "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia," "a fool," "shit," "an idiot" [*ubiitsa, ugovovnik, bandit, igrok, despot tipa Ivana Groznogo, samyi bol'shoi diktator v istorii Rossii, durak, govno, idiot*].

All of these curses and swear words came from the mouth of Com. N.S. Khrushchev.

Trying to justify Com. N.S. Khrushchev, in your address of 10 July you stated that allegedly he gave Stalin an "objective and all-around assessment," that allegedly he adhered to the "heart of the matter" [*printsipial'noe otmoshenie*]. Is this not the same as telling cock-and-bull stories with your eyes shut [*nesti nebylitsy s zakrytymi glazami*]?

Frankly speaking, we cannot understand at all why the leadership of the CPSU feels such a fierce hatred for Stalin, why it uses every kind of the most malicious abuse, why it attacks him with more hatred than it shows its enemies?

From your statements it emerges that allegedly the great Soviet people lived for thirty years under the tyranny of "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia." Can it really be that such a great leader who for many years enjoyed the general recognition of the Soviet people really turned out to be "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia?" Can it really be that the experience of the first

state in the world to be a dictatorship of the proletariat, which the Soviet people shared with the peoples of the whole world, has been the Soviet people's experience of existence in the conditions of tyranny under some "dictator?"

From what you have said it appears as if the first socialist country in the world was built thanks to the fact that a "fool" headed the leadership. Can it really be that the achievements of the national economy and the development of the latest technology in the Soviet Union during several decades have been attained under the leadership of some sort of "fool?" Can it really be that the basis for the development of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the Soviet Union has been laid down under the leadership of some sort of "fool"?

From what you have said it appears as if the Supreme Commander of the great Soviet Army turns out to have been some sort of "idiot." Can it really be that the great victory of the Soviet Army during World War II was won under the command of some sort of "idiot"?

From what you have said it appears as if the great CPSU was in the position of having some sort of "bandit" at the head of its leadership for 30 years. Can it really be that the CPSU which for a long time had the love and respect of the revolutionary peoples of the whole world had a "bandit" as its great leader for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the ranks of the international communist movement which grew and became stronger from year to year were under the leadership of some sort of "shit." Can it really be that communists of all countries considered some sort of "shit" to be their flag-bearer for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the great proletarian leader for whom imperialists and reactionaries of different countries felt fierce hatred for a long time has turned out to be all-in-all some sort of "gambler." Can it really be that the Soviet people and the revolutionary peoples of all countries struggling against imperialism and reaction considered their teacher some sort of "gam-

