

[The State Seal]

Top Secret. Extremely Sensitive

Committee of State Security [KGB]
of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR

TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF CC CPSU

6 May 1968
no. 1025-A/ov
Moscow

Comrade L.I. BREZHNEV.

On the results of the work of the Committee of State
Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and
its local branches during 1967.

[For information—P.B. Ulanov]

[Signatures: L. Brezhnev, A. Kosygin, D. Polianskii, A.
Pel'she, K. Mazurov, Podgornyi, Suslov, Kuusinen]

Guided by the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and by the
instructions of the CC CPSU, the Committee of State
Security and its local branches took measures during the
year [covered in this] report to raise Chekist work to a
level adequate for the needs flowing from the present
international situation and the interests of communist

In the period under review the branches of State Security had to fulfill their prescribed tasks in an aggravated operational situation. The governments and intelligence services of the USA and other imperialist states have intensified their aggressive policies and subversive activities with respect to the socialist countries. They made intense efforts to take advantage of this jubilee year

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of ideological diversion, smuggling, illegal currency operations and violations of the norms of behavior, [the KGB] deported from the USSR 108 foreigners and brought 11 foreigners to justice. The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB, jointly with the organs of security of the GDR, unmasked 17 agents of Western intelligence services who conducted espionage work against the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

In the course of counterintelligence countermeasures with regard to enemy intelligence officers under diplomatic cover and other foreigners under suspicion of being affiliated to the enemy's special services, a number of Soviet citizens who established contact with the aim of passing secret information were discovered and unmasked. Among those persons brought to justice were a senior economist of the scientific research institute of the MVT [Foreign Trade Ministry] of the USSR Salov, a senior engineer of the all-union association "Stankoimport" of the MVT of the USSR Seregin, and a technician from an installation of special significance of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building [cover for the Atomic Energy Program] Malyshev.

While organizing ever more effective struggle with military and economic espionage, the counterintelligence branches of the KGB took measures to reinforce the regime of secrecy, to bring to further perfection the protection of state secrets from the radio-technical and aerial-space means of reconnaissance of the enemy and to foil the enemy's attempts to use for reconnaissance purposes the expansion of the scientific-technical exchange between the USSR and capitalist countries.

The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB did significant work on camouflaging rocket launching pads, depots of nuclear weapons and other objects from the enemy's space reconnaissance. They worked hard on spotting and prevention of violations in concealed control and command of troops and operating means of communication, as well as on the counterintelligence support of military exercises and maneuvers, and transfers of military equipment.

A place of high visibility in counterintelligence activity went to the measures taken along the lines of trips of Soviet citizens abroad, with the purposes of their protection from machinations of the enemy's intelligence services and for the solution of other operative tasks. As part of delegations, tourist groups and exhibition participants in 1967 the KGB sent 378 operatives to the capitalist countries, and also over 2,200 agents and 4,400 persons-in-confidence [*doverennykh lits*]. With their help we spotted 192 foreigners affiliated or suspected of being affiliated with special services of the enemy, thwarted 60 attempts to work on Soviet citizens [to persuade them] not to return to the Motherland; disclosed 230 persons who compromised themselves through incorrect behavior (18 of whom were recalled early to the USSR).

The establishment of subdivisions of the so-called fifth line in the structure of the KGB branches allowed us

to concentrate the needed efforts and means on the countermeasures to fight ideological diversions from outside and anti-Soviet manifestations inside the country. The measures taken in this regard succeeded in general in paralyzing the attempts of enemy special services and propaganda centers to carry out in the Soviet Union a series of ideological diversions, time-linked with the half-century anniversary of Great October. Along with unmasking a number of foreigners who arrived in the USSR with assignments of a subversive character, materials were published in the Soviet and foreign press disclosing subversive activities of the enemy's special services, and over 114 thousand letters and banderoles containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful printed materials were confiscated in the international mail.

Since the enemy, in its calculations to unsettle socialism from inside, places its stake mainly on nationalistic propaganda, the KGB branches carried out a number of measures to disrupt attempts to conduct organized nationalist activities in a number of areas of the country (Ukraine, the Baltics, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Armenia,

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manuscripts, foreign magazines and other publications with anti-Soviet and politically harmful content, as well as 80 attempts to set up among the troops various groups of a hostile character.

In the system of measures undertaken to better resolve counterintelligence tasks there were important initiatives aimed at reinforcing agent networks. During 1967 the branches of the KGB recruited 24,952 agents, i.e. a figure constituting 15% of the total network personnel, the overall size of which did not change substantially during the year owing to the dropping of others. At the same time forms and methods of "shadowing" [*naruzhnoe nabludenie*] and operations equipment were improved. Special attention was paid to the development of state-of-the-art special devices and their supply to the units of intelligence and counterintelligence. Work in this direction is being conducted keeping in mind that the intensification of struggle with an enemy who is equipped with state-of-the-art science and technology requires a wider employment of their supplementary means.

security organs of socialist countries developed successfully. The mutual exchange of intelligence data increased considerably. In bilateral consultations, prospective plans for intelligence work were periodically shared, joint measures to study enemy intelligence officers for recruitment purposes and to work on and check on those who were suspected of espionage and other hostile activity, were carried out. The security organs of Poland and Hungary gave us assistance in maintaining security of Soviet troops abroad. There was interaction in counterintelligence protection for training exercises of the armies of the Warsaw Pact. Cooperation with the organs of security of Romania was limited to the minor exchange of information. The restored contacts with the MOB [Ministry of Security] of the KNDR [North Korea] have received some further development.

In the last year [the KGB] guaranteed security for leaders of the 0 Tw2inisr312og6v4hJ Trn[governmencuring thir 134r tiopsIn thenturiotry on theUSSRd and abroad. Sspecia (measures onae protectavenatuere herealso

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meeting of the Collegium of the Committee of State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY

ANDROPOV

[Source: *TsKhSD f. 89, op. 5, d. 3, ll. 1-14. Translated by Vladislav Zubok who thanks Ray Garthoff for his kind assistance.*]


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Although, with a few exceptions, the archives of the KGB remain closed, a number of KGB reports in the files of the Communist Party are now available. Among the most revealing are several annual reports sent by the head of the KGB to the paramount Soviet leader, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party. The report covering the year 1960, although the text is not available, has been read and reported on in the *Bulletin*. (See the discussion of that report, together with other contemporary KGB reports, in Vladimir Zubok, "Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960-62," *CWIHP Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 22-33.) The annual KGB reports covering 1985, 1986, 1988 and 1989 are now also available and have been summarized and analyzed elsewhere. (See Raymond L. Garthoff, "The KGB Reports to Gorbachev," *Intelligence and National Security* 11:2 (April 1996), pp. 224-244.)

The report on the work of the KGB in 1967 is the only other such report now available. It is presented below in full translation. It was submitted by Iurii Andropov, his first annual report since becoming chairman of the KGB, to General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, on 8 May 1968. Brezhnev, in turn, had the report circulated to members of the Politburo. (Gorbachev, incidentally, did not circulate the reports he received twenty years later.) The reports on 1967 (and 1960) were more detailed than the later reports

This did not mean, however, that Andropov would attempt to reform the KGB in a liberal direction. By 1967 Brezhnev had consolidated much of his power as party leader and was able to implement his program of re-Stalinization without obstacles. A harsh crackdown on dissent and curbs on cultural freedom at home were accompanied by an increasingly aggressive and anti-Western foreign policy, all of which were implemented effectively by Andropov in 1967.

The report reveals that, just a month after Andropov



A NKVD/NKGB Report to Stalin: A Glimpse into Soviet Intelligence in the United States in the 1940s

by *Vladimir Pozniakov*

The Soviet intelligence community, comprising the NKVD/NKGB First Chief Directorate (FCD),¹ the Fourth Department of the Red Army General Staff (later called the GRU), the Communist International's Division of International Communications (DIC), and the Intelligence Department of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, had built a number of formidable networks abroad by the outset of World War Two. Working separately and coordinated by I.V. Stalin himself, they were severely decimated during the Great Terror² but still managed to supply the Soviet political leadership with all kinds of information to counter the Axis.³ The majority of these networks, aside from notable exceptions such as the Sorge ring in Tokyo, Rote Kapelle centered on Germany⁴ and the Sandor Rado group in Switzerland,⁵ survived the war. A November 1944 joint report sent to Stalin by L.P. Beria and V.N. Merkulov gives a clear indication of the scale of NKVD/NKGB activities abroad, particularly in the United States.

Moscow

The State Defense Committee

To: Comrade Stalin I.V.

During the period of the Patriotic War employees of the 1st (intelligence) directorate, NKVD/NKGB undertook substantial work in organizing intelligence networks abroad and in obtaining political, economic, technical and military information.

During this period 566 officers have been sent abroad for illegal work, 1,240 agents and informers have been recruited, 41,718 various items including many documents have been obtained by intelligence. Out of 1,167 documents obtained by technical intelligence, 616 have been used by our country's industries!

Attaching herewith a draft for a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree, we request that the most distinguished employees of the 1st (intelligence) directorate, NKVD/NKGB, USSR, mostly those who have served and do serve abroad, be decorated with orders of the Soviet Union.

Appendix: according to attached text.

November 4, 1944
No. 1186

L.P. Beria
People's Commissar
Of Interior, USSR

1st copy

V.N. Merkulov
People's Commissar of State Security, USSR

Unfortunately, the appendix mentioned above—the so

called "award list"—is still classified and can not be reproduced here. It contains names of officers who in the opinion of Beria and Merkulov deserved medals for "successful realization of tasks safeguarding state security during the period of the Patriotic War" in ways that might interest an international audience.⁶ The list reflects the growing importance of Soviet intelligence activities in the United States from the pre-war to wartime to the post-war period.⁷

Before the war, the United States was at the periphery of Soviet intelligence's main interests, especially regarding military intelligence. In late May 1934, in setting the tasks for Soviet military intelligence (then called the Fourth Directorate of the Red Army), the Politburo made a decision to focus intelligence activities primarily on Europe and the Far East. The decision of the Politburo read: "The center of gravity of military intelligence's work is to be transferred to Poland, Germany, Finland, Romania, England, Japan, Manchuria and China. Any studies of other states' armed forces are to be undertaken by legal means by official military representatives [military attaches], visitors and trainees, examiners of military equipment, etc."⁸ Thus, the principal efforts of the NKVD/NKGB New York and Washington rezidenturas [intelligence mission] as well as those of the GRU and DIC were focused on the collection of economic, scientific and industrial information.⁹ At least four out of the eight officers mentioned in the appendix were occupied with such matters, with heavy emphasis on information related to radio and electronic equipment, weapons, military aircraft construction, shipbuilding, chemical technology, etc.¹⁰

World War Two brought a dramatic rise in the United States' standing in Soviet political, and especially military, priorities,¹¹ including a number of important mission changes for Soviet intelligence in America. According to A. Feklisov's memoirs, these tasks were stated by Stalin to Vasili Zharubin as follows: "...to watch Churchill and Roosevelt and to learn whether they are going to reach a separate peace agreement with Hitler and then go to war against the Soviet Union together; to obtain Hitler's plans of war against the USSR which the Allies might possess; to learn any secret goals and plans of the Allies related to the war; to find out when exactly the Allies are going to open the second front in Europe; to obtain information on the newest secret military equipment designed and produced in the USA, England and Canada." According to the instruction received by the FCD rezident in the United States, Stalin had also requested any information related to the "Allies' secret plans on postwar global settlement."¹²

The broader spectrum of tasks facing Soviet intelligence in the US required additional personnel, both Soviet and local. The pre-war staff of the NKGB and GRU rezidenturas was rather modest. For example, in the New York consulate and in Amtorg there were only 13 intelligence officers, most of them well known to the FBI.¹³ Also, because the USSR and the US had become wartime

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¹ Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), and Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (People's Commissariat of State Security) are the predecessors of the KGB.

² In early 1937 the NKVD/NKGB Chief N.I. Ezhov sent a special agent (code name "Journalist") to the US and Britain to investigate supposed penetration of the US and British Communist Parties' apparatus by the Trotskyites as well as by the FBI and MI5. Though the investigation was focused on "Trotskyist functionaries and their entourage" it led to accusations that a number of Soviet illegals working within the underground structures of the CPUSA and British Communist Party had ties to Trotsky and his followers.—see: Minaev (NKGB Deputy Chief) to Dimitrov (Comintern Secretary General) 23 April 1937—Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Contemporary History Documents (RTsKhIDNI), Moscow, f. 495 (Communist International), op. 74 (G. Dimitrov's Secretariat), d. 465, ll. 1-4. Soon after this mission, many Soviet residents and agents abroad were charged with being a part of a Trotskyist conspiracy. They were summoned to Moscow for execution. Among them were such outstanding intelligence officers as Theodor Maly, Ignace Poretiskii (aka Reiss), Walter Krivitskii and Alexander Orlov. Krivitskii defected and Poretiskii refused to return and was subsequently killed in Switzerland. For details see: E. Pretsky, *Our Own People*. (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1969), pp. 214-216, 231; A.Orlov, *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes*. (New York, 1953), pp. 231; B.Starkov, "The Tragedy of Soviet Military Intelligence" in V. Krivitsky, *I Was Stalin's Agent*. (Moscow, 1991), pp. 39-52 (in Russian); J. Costello, O. Tsarev, *The Deadly Illusion*. (New York, 1993), pp. 293-314, 315-340.

³ More generally on information provided by Soviet intelligence throughout WWII see: V.A. Novobranets, "Memuary," *Znamia* (June 1990), pp. 165-192; P. Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*. (Boston, 1994), pp. 116-120, 126-171, 172-220; A. Foote, *Handbook for Spies*. (London, 1964), pp. 88-99, 118-125; L. Trepper, *The Great Game*. (New York, 1989), pp. 126, 136-137, 140-197; S. Rado, *Codename Dora*. (London, 1990), pp. 53-59, 61-114, 130-151, 196-211; Christopher Andrew and O. Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*. (New York, 1991), pp. 270-279, 305-311, 312-340.

⁴ For details see: C. Willoughby, *Shanghai Conspiracy*.: G. Prange et al., *Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring*. (New York, 1985); Trepper, especially pp. 96-329; D. Dallin, *Soviet Espionage*. (New Haven, 1955), pp. 234-272.

⁵ See: Foote, pp. 37-148; Dallin, pp. 182-233.

⁶ State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. 9401 (Stalin and Molotov Special Files), op. 2, d. 67, l. 275.

⁷ Ed. Note: The evaluation of intelligence's historical role is problematic. The case of atom spying will serve to illustrate, since the procurement of an industrial method or bomb design represents an idea that might take a Russian scientist but a moment to have. It is also possible that the crucial moment might not come for years. Furthermore, since the Venona project had cracked the Soviet radio code, most of this information was available to the enemy.

⁸ Minutes of Politburo Decisions, No. 7, paragraph 229/213, 25 May 1934—RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 16, l. 65. One can probably assume that NKVD/NKGB priorities were basically the same.

⁹ Dallin, pp. 396-414; Andrew and Gordievsky, pp. 226, 228-229, 279.

¹⁰ A. Feklisov, *Beyond the Ocean and On the Island*. (Moscow, 1994), pp. 55-58, 77-78, 81-107.

¹¹ C22 0 TD [(Th1.1 . 234- TD; L. 19.778 (Lnd(. (- 20.1 y Ocean p refld c25)L.)27(

The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and Nuclear Weapons

Nikita Khrushchev has left us with tantalizing clues with which to solve one of the essential mysteries of the Cold War: were the Soviets ever close to using nuclear weapons? Two documents photocopied by General Dmitrii Volkogonov from the Defense Ministry files in Moscow and now available at the Library of Congress (where they were located and obtained for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok, James G. Hershberg, and David Wolff) shed additional light on what we described in our book, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (WW Norton and John Murray, 1997), as the Pitsunda decision.¹

On the face of it, these two Defense Ministry documents do not appear that startling. The first discusses the movement of tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba. The second lists all of the components of Operation ANADYR. But it is the dates of these documents, 6 September and 8 September, respectively, that arguably make them more revelatory about Khrushchev's understanding of nuclear weapons than any other documents currently available from Russian archives. As has been known for some time, Khrushchev decided to send ballistic missiles to Cuba in May 1962. Since the Havana conference organized by James Blight, David Welch and Brown University in January 1992,² we have known that the Kremlin included tactical nuclear weapons along with the ballistic weapons. But Khrushchev's personal role in adding the tactical weapons, which, unlike the SS-4s (R-12) and SS-5s (R-14), were not primarily weapons of deterrence, was not known. Moreover, it was assumed by some scholars that the Defense Ministry simply added these weapons as a matter of course to the large shipment.

Historians naturally look for turning points, when actions of human beings or a timely gust of *force majeure* shifted or could have shifted subsequent events. September 1962, as these documents attest, belongs in the pantheon of Cold War turning points. The planners of the original version of Operation ANADYR, and Khrushchev himself, assumed that the United States would not try to invade Cuba in 1962. Soviet intelligence detected increased US planning, without creating any basis for belief that an attack would come that year. The single most important piece of information in shaping Khrushchev's understanding of the threat to Soviet interests in the Western Hemisphere seems to have come from President Kennedy himself. At a meeting with Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei on 30 January 1962, Kennedy promised the Kremlin that he expected to be able to treat Cuba as Khrushchev had handled Hungary in 1956. Neither the KGB nor the GRU could detect a timetable for aggression, but Khrushchev understood that Kennedy was as unwilling to accept a challenge to the US

sphere of influence in the Caribbean as the Soviets had been to theirs in Eastern Europe.

From May 1962 to September 1962, the Kremlin mounted an operation to create a deterrent to US aggression in Cuba. "The thing is we were not going to unleash war," Khrushchev later explained to his Kremlin colleagues when the operation began to unravel in

October, "[w]e just wanted to intimidate them, to deter the anti-Cuban forces."³ The operation was cloaked in

were going to the island. In Khrushchev's mind, it appears, the Kennedy statement was Washington's way of signaling that it knew about ANADYR and was planning to do something about it.

Khrushchev had a chance to stop the operation. As of September 5, when he learned of Kennedy's statement, there were no missiles or nuclear warheads in Cuba. As he would do on October 25, he could have terminated the deployment. But he didn't. As these two "Pitsunda" documents show, Khrushchev not only decided to stay the course, but his reaction to Kennedy's effort to deter the deployment of missiles was to ratchet up the incipient crisis by introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the picture.

Top Secret (Sovershenno sekretno)
Particularly Important (Osoboi vazhnosti)
Sole Copy (ekz. edinstven.)

**To the Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR,
 Comrade N. S. Khrushchev**

I am reporting (dokladivaiu)

I. About the possibility of strengthening Cuba by airplane

1. [Numeration follows the original] About the transport by plane of special battle parts (spetsial'nye boevye chasti) [Trans. note: atomic warheads] for the Luna and R-11M rockets.

Training tests have been conducted and practical instructions have been worked out for the transportation of the special battle parts for R-11M rockets on board AN-8 aircraft for two [rockets] and AN-12 for four.

The transport of battle parts for the Luna rocket is practically analogous to that for the R-11M. The transport of special battle parts by TU-114 is not possible for lack of a freight hatch and fasteners.

2. About the transport by plane of R-11M and Luna rockets

The loading, fastening and transport of training R-11M and Luna rockets has been carried out in practice on AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft

3. The size of the freight hold and carrying-capacity of AN-8 (5-8 tons) and AN-12 (7-16 tons) do not permit air transport of launch pads, [etc.]

II. Proposal of the Defense Ministry for reinforcing Group troops on Cuba

In order to reinforce the Group troops on Cuba, send:

1) one squadron of IL-28 bombers in a group of 10-12 aircraft including cargo and guard (countermeasures) (postanovshchiki pomekh) planes, with PRTB (?) of the automobile kind and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 8-12 kilotons [of explosive] power.

[In Khrushchev's handwriting on top of "II." and "1" above]: Send to Cuba six IL-28s with atomic warheads (atomnymi golovkami). [three words illegible] [signed] N. S. Khrushchev 7.IX.1962.

2) One R-11M rocket brigade made up of three divisions (total : 1221 men, 18 R-11M rockets) with PRTB (324 men) and 18 special battle parts which the PRTB is capable of storing/defending (khranit')

3) Two-three divisions of Luna included in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba. Each Luna division

will have two launch installations and 102 men.

[Overwritten:] Three Luna divisions. N. S. Khrushchev 7.IX.62

With the Luna divisions, send 8-12 rockets and 8-12 special battle parts. For the preparation and storage of special battle parts for the Luna rockets, send one PRTB (150 men).

The indicated squadron of one R-11M rocket brigade with PRTB and two-three Luna divisions with PRTB with rockets to be sent to Cuba in the first half of this October. Atom bombs (six pieces), special head pieces [warheads] for the R-11M rockets (18 pieces) and for the Luna rockets (8-12) to be transported on board the [ship] *Indigirka* on 15 September.

The Defense Ministry has just conducted successful onland firing tests of C-75 anti-aircraft installations in flat areas. For distances of 24 kilometers, [they were] exact within 100-120 meters. The results of computer checks indicate the possibility of successful use on naval targets.

Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovskii
 6 September 1962

[Source: *Volkogonov Papers, Reel 6 (Library of Congress—Manuscript Division)*. Translated by David Wolff.]

Top Secret
Highly Important
copy # 1

Personally

**To the commander of the
 Soviet Armed Forces Group in Cuba**

The temporary deployment of Soviet Armed forces on the island of Cuba is necessary to insure joint [defense] against possible aggression toward the Union of SSR and the Republic of Cuba.

The decision to use Soviet Armed Forces for [illegible] actions in order to repel aggression and reinstatement of [illegible] is undertaken by the Soviet Government.

1. The task of the Soviet armed forces group on the island of Cuba is not to allow an enemy landing on Cuban territory [either from the sea] or from the air. The island of Cuba must be turned into an impenetrable fortress (*nepristupnuiu krepost'*).

Forces and means: Soviet troops together with [Cuban] Armed forces.

2. In carrying out this task, the Commander of [the group] of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba must use the following considerations (*rukovodstvovat'sia sleduiushchim*):

a) Regarding missile forces

The missile forces that form the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and the island of Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow (*po signalu iz Moskvy*), to deal a nuclear missile strike to the most important targets [*ob'ekty*] in the United States of America (list of targets included in attachment #1) [Ed. Note: This attachment has yet to be located.]....

d) Regarding the Naval Fleet

The Naval Fleet Group must not allow ships and transport vessels of the enemy to approach the island of Cuba and carry out naval landings on the coast. They must be prepared to blockade from the sea the US naval base in Guantanamo and provide cover for their transport ships along lines of communication in close proximity to the island.

Nuclear missile-equipped submarines should be prepared to launch, upon signal from Moscow, a nuclear missile strike on the most important coastal targets in the USA (list of targets provided in attachment #1).

The main forces of the fleet should be based in the region around Havana and in ports to the west of Havana. One divisional brigade of high-speed cruisers should be located around Banes.

6. The operational uses of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba should be formulated by 01 November 1962. [Ed. Note: 1 November is written in a different hand from the rest of the document.]

Attachments:

1. List of targets for missile forces and nuclear missile submarines for working out flight paths—attached separately.
2. List of the battle composition of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba on 3 pages, r[ecord] r/t #164
3. List of launching mechanisms, missiles and nuclear warheads possessed by the Military Group, on 2 pages, r[ecord] r/t #164.

USSR Minister of Defense [signature]
 Marshal of the Soviet Union
 R. Malinovskii

Chief of the General Staff
 Marshal of the Soviet Union [signature]
 M. Zakharov

8 September 1962 [Ed. Note: 8 September is written over the original version of “_____July 1962,” suggesting the

First Non-Aligned Meeting in Yugoslavia in [autumn] 1961, Khrushchev wanted to test a big atomic bomb in order to show off, to intimidate and frighten people, but he triggered opposition from all over the world. Delegations were sent to the United States and the Soviet Union to appeal for a suspension of the test. Last year, before we exploded our bomb, India asked China not to conduct the nuclear test. But India obtained only two votes and its proposal did not pass. We went ahead with our explosion. Last year, we selected the time of explosion after the Second Non-Aligned Meeting. This time we chose to test before the Second Afro-Asian Conference. We did consider the issue of possible reactions when the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting was in session. Maybe the situation has changed this time. At the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting, we met a lot of people, who in public expressed regret and advised us to stop testing. But in private they congratulated us. This shows that nationalism has two sides. On the one hand, because nationalist countries oppose imperialism, they support us. Our possession of the nuclear bomb has not only encouraged them but also strengthened their power. On the other hand, pressured by imperialism, induced by the Soviet Union, and influenced by the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [signed by the United States and Soviet Union in the summer of 1963], they expressed regret. Wherever we went, we came across such mixed feelings. But this time we did not expect that so many people would hail our test. This year, only the United States showed little reaction because it wanted to downplay our role. Although it did not respond in public, it was actually worried at heart. This time, the people of the world, including the Japanese people, hailed and congratulated us, and expressed happiness.

I have also conducted a survey: when we were carrying out the nuclear test, two entertainment groups from Japan were in China. Because Japan has been attacked by two atomic bombs and has suffered, it opposes nuclear tests. The members of the two groups were middle-of-the-roaders. Some were to the left of the middle and others to the right of the middle. I had two conversations with them. I said: "When we possess atomic bombs, it means that the Japanese also possess them. We all oppose nuclear bombs. You have been hit by two atomic bombs and you have made contributions to the whole world, because everybody in the world now opposes nuclear war. Without the sacrifice caused by those two atomic bombs, how could international attention be focused? Without the harm done by poisonous gas, how could people come to oppose gas warfare? There is always a price to pay." Chairman Mao has also said that when a heavy price had been paid, people would not dare to use such weapons again. At the moment, there is the atomic bomb [in China's possession]. In the future, there will be the hydrogen bomb as well as long-distance missiles. The United States may employ tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. It may use such weapons against China later. As

Chinese we must be confident that no matter how many people will die in a nuclear war in the future, we and the Union will prevail. At the moment, therefore, when a victory is also achieved in the session of the United Nations.

¹ John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), is by far the best source available in English on the history of China's nuclear weapons program, but its treatment of the explosion of China's second atomic bomb is quite brief (see p. 208).

Since the publication of Lewis and Xue's book, a number of fresh Chinese sources have emerged, adding new detail to the knowledge of the role of such leading figures as Mao, Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, and Song Renqiong in the development of China's nuclear weapons. The most notable among them are: Wei Wei, chief comp., *Nie Rongzhen zhuan* (Biography of Nie

newly declassified U.S. documents were also made available. Partly owing to the fact that this was historically the most recent of the crises examined, a large number of important participants in the events were present, especially among the Polish leaders and Solidarity protagonists (not, however, including Lech Walesa, who had been expected). General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who as party First Secretary and Prime Minister promulgated martial law in December 1981, his colleague and predecessor Stanislaw Kania, who held back from martial law in 1980-81, and their colleague and in 1982 Prime Minister

Marshal Kulikov adamantly contended that the Soviet Union at no time had plans to intervene militarily. When confronted with evidence to the contrary, he retreated into distinctions between full and final plans for a specific action, and mere outline plans. The distinction may be valid, but he did not explain evidence of concrete plans for use of East German and Czech forces (or the published account of one Russian general at the time commanding a division earmarked for intervention). He seemed to protest too much, and finally General Jaruzelski in exasperation noted that only since the question of entry of Poland into NATO had been posed in 1993 did Russian officials argue that Moscow had never intended to intervene in Poland in 1980-82 (thus presumably seeking to deny Polish justification of a requirement for security against a possible Russian threat). Again, though the conference could not establish the full picture, the preponderance of evidence supports a conclusion that the Soviet leaders were planning (and certainly had fully prepared for) an intervention on 8 December 1980, but decided not to do so only on December 5 after a long discussion with Kania and Jaruzelski in which the latter argued that they could deal with the situation. The Soviet leaders may also have been influenced by a Hot Line message from President Carter on June 3 warning that the U.S.-Soviet "relationship" would be "most adversely affected if force was used" (while also reasserting that it was "the firm intention of the United States not to exploit the events in Poland, nor to threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region"). Brzezinski, in particular, argued that this warning was a crucial element, along with the pleas of the Polish leaders. No doubt it did play some part, but there is no available evidence as to whether it was a contributory re-enforcing element or a decisive factor in the thinking of the Soviet leaders.

Whether there was a specific plan to intervene in December 1981, before Jaruzelski made his decision to impose martial law, is less clear. Notes of a Politburo meeting on 10 December 1981 (two days before Jaruzelski's decision) show a Politburo consensus at that time not to intervene with Soviet troops. Whether that was known to Jaruzelski is not certain, but in any event it would be surprising if he had not believed that the Soviet leaders might intervene at some point, and he evidently decided for that reason (and perhaps also others) to act. He vividly recalled personally seeing Brezhnev embrace and reassure Alexander Dubcek at Bratislava in the summer of 1968, not long before the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Whether the Soviet leaders ever went beyond preparing for contingent intervention, they clearly did use the capability for intervention to place pressure on the Polish leaders to suppress Solidarity. Kulikov and Gribkov acknowledged that the partially mobilized forces in military "exercises" ending in late 1980 were ordered by Moscow to be kept going for another three months or so, through the next crisis in March 1981, for political reasons.

In sum, it is clear that there was a strong preference, if not determination, by the Politburo not to resort to direct Soviet military intervention. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests at least a short-lived reluctant decision to act in early December 1980, soon set aside. There were probably also contingent preparations for possible intervention in March and November-December 1981, although these military preparations in 1980 and 1981 were also calculated to exert pressure on the Polish leaders. In an extreme situation, such as an outbreak of civil war in Poland or threat of US-NATO intervention, most observers believe Soviet military forces would almost certainly have been sent in. But as in so many cases, this must remain a judgment rather than a certainty, and will probably remain so even after the archives are fully opened.

There were also disputed questions as to whether General Jaruzelski had agreed in late 1980 to open Polish borders to Soviet troops, a contention Jaruzelski vehemently denied. East German documents showed that Polish officers had assisted in route reconnaissance in Poland for German officers who would have led an intervention contingent. Similarly, there was an issue as to whether Polish leaders had encouraged the Soviet Union to keep their military exercises going in early 1981 in order to justify resort to martial law. There were indications to that effect, yet it is clear that Kania and Jaruzelski held back from imposing martial law on those occasions despite Soviet pressure to do so. In short, uncertainties on a number of matters remain.

This conference, as the earlier ones in the series, brought out that the other communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact were also parties to these crises and more generally to Soviet bloc politics. Although the Soviet Union was the hegemonic power in the bloc and made the final decisions, its leaders also were influenced by considerations as to the impact of developments, in this case in Poland, on the other Eastern European bloc countries, and to some extent by the views of their leaders. As in 1968, the leaders of East Germany and Bulgaria, and in 1980-81 of Czechoslovakia as well, urged Soviet intervention in Poland before the virus of Solidarity would spread to their countries. They were quite prepared to participate. In this case their views were not adopted, but this does not mean that the Soviet leaders in Moscow did not weigh considerations of the impact of events in Poland on the other bloc countries seriously. Indeed, in a very different way, the evident brittle weakness of these Communist regimes later played a role in a more enlightened Moscow leadership's conclusion that the whole edifice of the bloc and internally of its members required restructuring.

These questions of Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and U.S., decisions and influences on the situation in Poland, interacting with the decisions of the Polish leaders, were the second major focus of the conference deliberations.

In November-December 1981, unlike December 1980, the United States did not issue a clear warning, despite the

fact that an American spy, Polish General Staff Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, had delivered the full plans for martial law, except for the date. Moreover, on November 7 Kuklinski was spirited out of the country, and the Polish and Soviet governments became aware that the United States knew all about those plans. (Kuklinski had also provided CIA with the most explicit and full information on the planned Soviet intervention in December 1980.) Yet neither the Soviet nor Polish leaders were warned, and public American warnings that the Polish crisis must be solved by the Poles themselves, intended to discourage possible direct Soviet intervention, could by December 1981 be seen almost as an invitation for Polish resolution of the crisis by martial law. Kuklinski himself had intended that the United States at least warn Solidarity, and some Solidarity representatives at the conference were still asking why the United States had not done so. The answer appears to have been a desire not to trigger bloodshed, although there were no U.S. documents or authorities to confirm that assumption or clarify the U.S. inaction. Kuklinski himself, living incognito in the United States, although recently pardoned by the present Polish government (rescinding fully a death penalty earlier imposed by a trial *in absentia*) and invited to the conference, feared to attend. Three of his hundreds of messages to CIA, the only three declassified by CIA for Kuklinski's use in successfully appealing his earlier conviction, were however made available.

Shakhnazarov several times posed the question of the extent of a U.S. role in inspiring and supporting Solidarity. There was no clear answer, but the consensus seemed to be that Solidarity arose and acted on its own initiative, that Western sources including private American entities such as the AFL-CIO and later the quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy provided valuable support in communications and printing supplies. Brzezinski and Pipes affirmed that direct covert U.S. government assistance was given only after martial law was imposed. (Even then, one Solidarity leader remarked, a requested computer was denied because its dispatch would have contravened the U.S. embargo imposed as a sanction!)

In a broader sense, however, a much more important U.S. role was ascribed by two rather disparate groups at the table. Marshal Kulikov and General Gribkov blamed

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“You, Mr. Vance, are a new person.”

**Talks Between A.A. Gromyko and C[yrus] Vance
28-30 March 1977**

[*Ed. Note* : In *Bulletin 5*, pp. 144-154, 160, *CWIHP* published a selection of declassified documents generated by the multi-year Carter-Brezhnev Project on US-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of *Détente*. Supported by a multinational consortium of research institutions and organizations, the Carter-Brezhnev Project was spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Institute of International Studies at Brown University. The documents in *Bulletin 5* brought the reader up to US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's departure for Moscow, but the fateful visit itself was not covered. At both ends of his stay, Vance met with CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev. Sandwiched in between were four meetings with veteran Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko. The main topic of discussion was US President Jimmy Carter's "comprehensive" proposals for the SALT-2 Treaty, views that the Soviets saw as contravening the Vladivostok accords reached with US President Gerald Ford in 1974. The Soviet rejection of Carter's initiative was certainly the newsmaking centerpiece of the Vance visit. Other, more positive, discussions covered a wide range of topics, including the Vienna talks on arms limitations in Central Europe, the Middle East, non-proliferation, Cyprus, and others. Below is a brief sampler.]

28 March (17:30-20:00)

A.A. GROMYKO. [Opening the attack on the SALT-2 issue] How should we evaluate the current situation in this light? You, Mr. Vance, are a new person. But try to see the situation with our eyes. What conclusion should the Soviet side come to for itself on the basis of the experience which we have had so far with the new American administration, the conclusion that the next government of the USA which will replace the current one, will just as easily throw everything that we are able to agree upon now into the trash? If such is the case, one must ask where is the minimum of stability that should exist in the relations between our two countries?

29 March (11:00-13:00)

GROMYKO. The situation in the Middle East has been a subject of discussion between our countries, including on the highest level, for many years. We discussed this issue with President Johnson, with President Nixon, and with President Ford. We discussed it, although not in such a deep or detailed way, with the new Administration. However, there is [still] no solution to the problem, and the situation in the Middle East is extremely dangerous and fraught with the possibility of a new explosion. We are deeply convinced that you are mistaken if you believe that it is possible to buy peace in the Middle East by giving 200-300 million, even a billion dollars to some country.

C. VANCE. We don't believe that (*My tak ne*

schitaem).

GROMYKO. Good. That is encouraging. Consequently, it is necessary to seek political solutions. Does the USA consider that Israel is ready to recognize the right of the Palestinians to an independent nation-state? You understand that these issues are interconnected.

VANCE. I cannot speak for Israel, but I agree that this is the stumbling block (*kamen' pretknoventiia*).

GROMYKO. I can say the same regarding the Palestinians. If Israel will recognize the rights of the Palestinians, they will recognize Israel's rights. The issue here is who will speak first, but we do not consider that an insoluble issue. This is why diplomacy exists.

29 March (16:30-19:45)

VANCE. I agree that cessation of the state of war is the most important issue. But normalization of relations can facilitate the preservation of peace.

GROMYKO. That does not contradict what I said. May we consider that we have here with you a common understanding?

VANCE. We have an understanding.

GROMYKO. Can't we say that our positions coincide?

VANCE. We put a somewhat greater accent than you on normalization of relations as a means of maintaining peace.

GROMYKO. We stress the significance of achieving peace, not belittling the significance of normal relations between states. For example, in a state of normal relations with Israel, we would with satisfaction eat Israeli oranges. I have heard that they have good oranges.

30 March (11:00-14:00)

VANCE. I want now to touch on the issue of the radiation which the employees at our embassy in Moscow are subject to. I know that in the recent past its level has decreased, but it is still being observed, which, of course, provokes concern among our people. The full cessation of this radiation would be valued highly and positively by us.

GROMYKO. I must say quite frankly that I am pretty fed up with this issue. I cannot add anything to the response which has been given by us to the American side. Despite the fact that in the recent past some industrial enterprises have been moved out of Moscow, they are, unfortunately, still inside the city limits, including its central part.

Of course, I will keep in mind what you have said, but I must frankly state that in the USA you have lovers (*liubiteli*) of various contrived "issues." Without this, they simply get bored (*Bez etogo im prosto skuchno zhit'*)....

Present at the negotiations were: for the Soviet side—Coms. L.V. Smirnov, A.F. Dobrynin, G.M. Kornienko; for the American side—M[alcolm] Toon, P[aul] Warnke, A[rthur] Hartman, W. Highland.

[*Source: TsKhSD f. 89, op. 76, d. 1, ll. 1-80. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.*]

Ukraine. Heeding Shelest's complaints, Brezhnev raised the matter with the KSC leadership during a meeting in Moscow in early May 1968:

Comrades, you know about the CPSU's principled position based on full respect for the independence of all fraternal Parties and countries. But not every question is a purely internal matter. . . . After all, your newspapers are read also by Soviet citizens, your radio is listened to in our country as well, which means that all such propaganda affects us, too.⁶

Shelest, for his part, complained in much stronger terms to the Czechoslovak authorities. During bilateral negotiations with the KSC Presidium at Cierna nad Tisou in late July, he explained why the "alarming developments" in Czechoslovakia were a matter of "common concern" to the Soviet Union:

Soviet Ukraine is an integral and inseparable part of the USSR. We have a population of 46 million, including many nationalities, of whom nearly 2.5 million are Communists. We and you, our Czech friends, are direct neighbors, and, as is customary with neighbors, we know a lot about each other that is not known or even noticed by those further away. . . . We see and hear your radio and television broadcasts, and read your newspapers. Hence, for us in Ukraine it is all the more insulting what is going on in Czechoslovakia, a state supposedly friendly to us.⁷

Shelest accused the KSC leaders of approving "the publication of counterrevolutionary tracts which are then sent through special channels into Ukraine."⁸ In the weeks after the Cierna negotiations, Shelest continued to warn that the "counterrevolutionary and revanchist" influences in Czechoslovakia would increasingly filter into Ukraine unless "decisive measures" were taken.

This first set of excerpts from Shelest's diary provides further evidence of the Ukrainian leader's belief that events in Czechoslovakia were "causing unsavory phenomena here in Ukraine as well." The situation, he wrote, was especially bad in Ukraine's "western provinces, where the inhabitants receive information directly from their neighbors across the border" and "watch both Czechoslovak and Western radio and television." Shelest also noted that vigorous steps had to be taken to curb the "distribution of political and nationalist leaflets" and to prevent the circulation within Ukraine of newspapers published by the Ukrainian community in Czechoslovakia. He repeatedly warned his colleagues on the CPSU Politburo about these matters, as is evident not only from the Politburo transcripts but from the documents in the next issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

Because of Shelest's standing as a full member of the CPSU Politburo, his close ties with Brezhnev, his role as the leader of a key Soviet republic bordering on Czecho-

slovakia, and his participation in high-level bilateral and multilateral talks with KSC officials, his views about a growing spill-over from the Prague Spring were bound to have a major effect on Soviet decision-making.

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26 March: *I had a lengthy conversation with the first secretary of the UkrCP Kyiv municipal committee, A. P. Bovin. He reported to me that political and nationalist leaflets were being widely disseminated at T. G. Shevchenko State University in Kyiv and at the agricultural academy. In these two institutions of higher education, roughly 600 leaflets had been discovered. Measures are being devised to prevent the distribution of such leaflets.*

An unhealthy situation has arisen in the Kyiv branch of the Union of Writers with respect to organizational, creative, and political matters. We also considered this matter and proposed measures to improve the [party's] work among artists.

28 March: *The first secretary of the party's Ivano-Frankivsk oblast committee, Ya. P. Pogrebnyak, called to inform me about the situation in his oblast. He said that in certain regions former members of the Ukrainian nationalist underground had begun to turn up, and that in the oblast as a whole there were more than 40 thousand of them.⁹ Local authorities were taking measures to intensify ideological and organizational work among the population.*

11 April:

after my meeting with the Czechoslovak comrades.

14 June: I informed Brezhnev about my impressions of popular sentiments in the western oblasts, which I was visiting yesterday evening.¹³ In those oblasts the population has a much more vivid sense of the alarming events in Czechoslovakia, and is receiving information through direct contacts with inhabitants of regions along the border. For this reason, they can more urgently and objectively assess all the events in Czechoslovakia.

24 July: The chairmen of the party's Volyns'ka and Chernihiv oblast committees gave reports at the UkrCP CC Secretariat: "The situation in these oblasts regarding social science instruction and training of university and high school students is deplorable, especially in rural areas. The situation with radio, television, and telephones is very bad. Extremely urgent measures must be adopted to set matters straight. We have received no answer to the letters and requests we have sent about these matters to the CPSU CC and to the Council of Ministers and Gosplan in the hope of getting suitable technical equipment for the republic. In these oblasts the [official] radio and television practically don't work at all. At the same time, the residents are listening to Western radio stations and watching Western television."¹⁴ I instructed the oblast party chairmen to write, for the third time, a letter to the center requesting help.

21 August: Some young person called the switchboard of the UkrCP CC, identified himself as a student of Kyiv University, and said: "Let Cde. Shelest know that we don't attach any truth to the items published in Pravda about Czechoslovakia. We, the youth of the country, will do the same thing here that young people in Czechoslovakia were doing. We regret that our troops have invaded Czechoslovakia."¹⁵

29-30 August: I spoke with the oblast committee secretaries about current economic, administrative, and political matters. Overall, according to the information available to the secretaries, the population's reaction to the communique from our negotiations with the Czechs in Moscow was positive.¹⁶ However, in two parts of Kyiv and in numerous other cities in the republic, leaflets and graffiti turned up in public places denouncing the CPSU and Brezhnev, calling for freedom of speech, expressing support for the Czechoslovak events, and condemning our military intervention in Czechoslovakia's affairs and our political pressure on the new elements in Czechoslovakia.¹⁷ Measures have been taken to track down and bring to account the authors of the leaflets and graffiti.

There have been instances, especially in Crimea, Odessa, and Voroshylovhrad, when some members of the party as well as non-party members have expressed their disagreement with our actions in Czechoslovakia. All of this must make us very wary.

EXCERPT No. 2

Shelest's First Meeting with Vasil Bil'ak

On 6 May 1968 the CPSU Politburo, at Brezhnev's behest, authorized Shelest to begin serving as a clandestine liaison with the "healthy forces" (i.e., pro-Soviet hardliners) in Czechoslovakia headed by the Slovak Communist Party leader, Vasil Bil'ak.¹⁸ This action, coming two days after Brezhnev and his colleagues had denounced the Prague Spring during bilateral negotiations in Moscow with senior KSC officials, reflected Brezhnev's growing belief that the existing leadership in Czechoslovakia might be unwilling to fulfill Soviet demands. Although Brezhnev maintained close contacts with the KSC First Secretary, Alexander Dubcek, until mid-August (just a few days before the invasion), the establishment of back-channel contacts with Bil'ak facilitated Soviet planning for an invasion and the installation of a new regime.

This excerpt from Shelest's diary describes his first meeting with Bil'ak. The initiative for the discussion had come from Bil'ak in mid-April, but Shelest had not wanted to set up a meeting without Brezhnev's approval. When Shelest spoke about the matter with Brezhnev in late April, the Soviet leader was wary of establishing a back-channel liaison with Bil'ak; but after the 4 May negotiations, Brezhnev's view of the situation changed, and he decided to have the Politburo authorize Shelest's secret contacts with Bil'ak. With help from the secretary of the UkrCP's Transcarpathian oblast committee, Yu. Il'nyts'kyi, Shelest arranged to meet with Bil'ak and Jan Koscelansky in Uzhhorod on 24-25 May.

Shelest's detailed account of his discussions with Bil'ak was based both on notes and on a tape-recording of the sessions. The account in his diary is identical to a classified report he provided to the other members of the CPSU Politburo on 27 and 29 May.¹⁹ Hence, there is no doubt about its authenticity.

Shelest's account of the meeting proved to have a far-reaching impact on Soviet decision-making. During the first part of the CPSU Politburo's session on 27 May, Soviet prime minister Aleksei Kosygin offered impressions from his recent visit to Czechoslovakia, which had ended the same day that Shelest was meeting with Bil'ak. Kosygin had gone to Czechoslovakia ostensibly for a vacation at the spas in Karlovy Vary, but the real purpose of his trip was to assess the state of the KSC leadership. Kosygin's report on 27 May largely discredited the notion that the Soviet Union would be able to work with "healthy forces" in the KSC to establish an alternative regime:

An analysis of all my conversations, meetings, and materials indicates that at present, in the given situation, there are no more authoritative people in the party and the country than Dubcek, Cernik, Smrkovsky, and Svoboda. For this reason, obviously, we must shape our policy accordingly.²⁰

By the time Kosygin finished his presentation, the other members of the CPSU Politburo were largely in agreement that, at least for the time being, attempts to rely on “healthy forces” were bound to be fruitless. Without a suitable alternative, Soviet leaders would have to deal as best they could with the existing authorities in Prague.

No sooner had this consensus emerged, however, than Brezhnev received an urgent phone call from Shelest, who wanted to convey the results of his discussions with Bil’ak. Shelest offered a detailed account of the trends described by the Slovak leader: the growing strength of “rightist” and “anti-socialist” forces, the persecution of “honest Communists,” the use of sabotage by “rightists” to prevent Warsaw Pact military exercises in Czechoslovakia, the emergence of a “second center” of latent “counterrevolutionaries” in the upper levels of the KSC, and the possible “loss of Czechoslovakia” as a member of the socialist camp.²¹ Shelest left no doubt that the only hope of salvaging the situation was by relying on Bil’ak and the other “healthy forces,” who

received his presentation, then she received a phone call from Brezhnev.

of your troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia. Once Russian soldiers turn up, all of these political rats will go hide in their burrows. The appearance of your I. Yakubovskii (commander of the Warsaw Pact forces) alone will do a lot to cool down the situation. In the struggle against the rightist elements, the nation, including all Communists, must behave more boldly.”

Among the party activists and state security agents there have been many instances of suicide induced by threats from rightists. For their part, the rightist elements have been making open threats: “Soon the time will come when we will hang all Communists, stringing them up by their feet.” Without any let-up, the extremist elements are demanding and achieving the retirement of Communists, particularly the leaders of regional committees and municipal committees who support Leninist positions. This is happening often. Murders of secretaries of party organizations in enterprises and collective farms and other such incidents are occurring even in Slovakia. Former kulaks are infiltrating the agricultural cooperatives and are threatening the leaders of the farms and the secretaries of party organizations. They’re demanding the return of their land and property.²⁶ Sabotage is being carried out at the railroad junctions to hinder the transport of Soviet troops who are coming to take part in the exercises planned by the Warsaw Pact. They’re disconnecting the water fountains so that the locomotives will fill up with water and are diverting them from the switching points.

We’re all afraid of the upcoming KSC CC plenum; we’re not fully certain that we will win because of the divisions within the Presidium. We also don’t have an organizational plan for our actions. A. Dubcek is not capable of doing anything even if it would “stabilize” our acrimonious situation. If we don’t gain control of the situation within a month, Dubcek will perish, and so will we along with him. I’ve been discussing matters a good deal with A. Dubcek, and I say to him: “Sasha (and I myself lament), why don’t you return to Bratislava, this isn’t what you were after, Sasha.” If today Slovakia were to deviate from the line of the KSC CC, this would lead to the collapse of the Czechoslovak republic. We will do everything possible to preserve Czechoslovakia as a socialist country. In Slovakia threats have been made against Communist activists. If something extraordinary should happen, we request that you grant refuge in Uzhhorod to our wives and children. The directives of the minister of internal affairs are not being carried out in Slovakia because we know that he is taking part in another “center,” headed by Kriegel and Spacek.²⁷

The loss of Czechoslovakia would be equivalent to twice will de b(tod Tm (26)Tj 9.5 0 0 9.52 156 Tm 0 Tw8abotage)Tj -20.316372 15463 TD [[il5759(325r)61(e all afraid o(Bilcomie)026somakiourvesarr)3h hz7

character, but unfortunately he doesn't have adequate schooling in political leadership. Dubcek could rely on him in his work, but for some reason he ignores him, seeing in him a rival.

V. Bil'ak: I'll speak personally about him.³⁴ I also knew him previously. I'd met briefly with him on occasion, and had heard a lot about him from the comrades in Transcarpathia. He is a fine and vigorous Communist, who is himself a Ukrainian, a native of our Transcarpathia. His mother, sisters, and brothers live in a mountain village in Transcarpathian oblast. Bil'ak often visits them. He has good professional contacts with the party and council officials of Transcarpathian oblast, particularly with the first secretary of the oblast committee, Yu. Il'nyts'kyi. Their families are friendly with one another. V. Bil'ak is a politically literate, cultured, and well-read individual, with a fine knowledge of the history of his country, especially the period

recollections published in 1989, that the Hungarian leader's position on Czechoslovakia became much less conciliatory after Dubcek declined to attend the Warsaw Meeting. Shelest's account underscores just how far-reaching Kadar's change of heart was. Not only did Kadar express strong criticism of Dubcek at the Warsaw Meeting, but he followed this up by abetting the formation of an anti-Dubcek group of hardliners who could "request" Soviet military assistance. No doubt, Kadar was still hoping that military intervention could somehow be averted, but he was actively taking part in the secret political and military preparations for an invasion. Just two days after the Shelest-Bil'ak meeting, Soviet troops in Hungary were ordered by Moscow to make final arrangements for large-scale military "exercises" north of the border, a process that was completed by the beginning of August. Hungarian leaders, despite their earlier reservations about military action and their efforts to find a compromise, were now finally willing to concede that a military solution might be unavoidable.

Third, it is striking how diffident Bil'ak was during the meeting with Shelest and how unconvincing his assurances were. Shelest himself noted at several points that Bil'ak seemed to be promising far more than he could deliver, at least at the time. Later on, when Bil'ak finally transmitted the "letter of invitation" to Shelest, it was signed by fewer than a dozen officials, hardly an encouraging sign that an alternative regime could be swiftly established. Yet by mid-August, in the leadup to the invasion, Soviet leaders deluded themselves into believing that the "healthy forces" had "consolidated themselves and now constitute a majority." Shelest's own view may have been less sanguine—not least because in the meeting on 20-21 July, Bil'ak had been "inhibited and guarded" and had "failed to clear up certain matters and to discuss certain things fully"—but Shelest was willing to overlook or at least downplay these concerns in the Politburo's subsequent deliberations.

Fourth, Shelest's account reveals that the "letter of invitation" was more important than often thought. Interestingly, the reason that Soviet leaders wanted the letter well in advance was *not* to clear up certain matters and to discuss certain things fully—but Shelest was willing to overlook or at least downplay these concerns in the Politburo's subsequent deliberations.

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said that the letter was like a knife stabbing him in the heart.

in the ranks of the KSC.”⁵⁰ In response to this Bil’ak said: “That wasn’t a plenum, it was a carnival or a circus. Pressure was brought to bear against us, and we were unable to do anything at that plenum.” I said to Bil’ak: “Perhaps you can do something at your forthcoming KSC Congress?” He answered: “W

until July 1992, when Russian president Boris Yeltsin gave the Czechoslovak government a copy of one of the collective letters and of Kapek's earlier appeal, was the existence of these documents finally confirmed. Several observers in Czechoslovakia, citing materials from the KSC archives, speculated at the time that more than one collective letter must have been turned over in 1968. Some evidence supporting that notion had surfaced as early as 1989.⁵² This contemporary account by Shelest, who was the actual conduit for the letter at Bratislava, leaves little doubt that at least two (and perhaps more) collective letters were dispatched to the CPSU Politburo as the number of signatories gradually increased.

.....

On 1 August 1968 we were at the border station of Chop. From there we were due to go to Bratislava. This is the first time I've ridden by train to Czechoslovakia. We will be passing by the Lower Tatra mountains, one of the most beautiful spots in the Czechoslovak Republic.⁵³ Aside from the meeting itself among the fraternal Parties, I'm particularly eager to link up with V. Bil'ak to receive the letter that is of such great interest to us. During one of my conversations with Bil'ak in Cierna, he told me that he'll have the letter and will transmit it to me. It's very difficult to believe there will be positive results from the Bratislava meeting. It would be nice if there were such results, but things have gone so far already that you can't believe anything.

Late in the evening I managed to link up and speak with V. Bil'ak. All of this was done after taking great precautions. I reminded Bil'ak that we were awaiting the letter promised by him and his group. During the conversation with me, Bil'ak was very ill at ease and disturbed by something, but he did not renege on his promise and requested only that he be given a bit more time, until the following day. Bil'ak was not entirely clear in indicating the reason for this delay. I consulted with our liaison, Savchenko, a KGB employee, and he knew that I must receive a letter from Bil'ak. We decided to wait for a while and give Bil'ak more time to snap into action, since the step he was taking was important and risky.

Toward evening [of 3 August] I met again with Bil'ak, and he and I arranged that at 8:00 p.m. he would go into the public lavatory, and that I also should show up there at that time. He would then transmit the letter to me via our KGB employee, Savchenko. This is precisely what happened. We met "by chance" in the lavatory, and Savchenko inconspicuously transferred from his hand to mine an envelope containing the long-awaited letter. It assessed the situation in the KSC and the country, the nefarious activities of rightist elements, and the political and psychological terror being waged against Communists, that is, people supporting correct positions. The gains of socialism are under threat. An anti-Soviet frenzy has overtaken the country, and the economy and politics of Czechoslovakia are fully oriented toward the West.

A very alarming and complicated situation has emerged in the country. The letter expresses a request that if circumstances so warrant, we should intervene to block the path of counter-revolution and prevent the outbreak of civil war and bloodshed. The letter was signed by Indra, Bil'ak, Kolder, Barbirek, Kapek, Rigo, Piller, Svestka, Hoffmann, Lenart, and Strougal.⁵⁴

Aside from me and the authors of the letter I'd received, no one knew about the contents of the document. Finally, the [top-level] commission finished its work, and Brezhnev appeared. I went up to him and said, "Leonid Ilyich! I have good news." He somehow pricked up his ears, and I hurried to tell him that I'd received the letter from Bil'ak. I then gave

⁹ From the mid-1940s through the mid- to late 1950s, underground nationalist groups in western Ukraine put up armed resistance against the Soviet security forces. Much the same occurred in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. An enormous amount of declassified documentation pertaining to these campaigns has been released since 1991 in the Baltic republics and Ukraine (in Kyiv, L'viv, Kharkiv, and numerous other cities). The resurgence of underground nationalist activity in 1967-68 is highlighted in the Soviet KGB's massive, top-secret history of its own activities, edited by V. M. Chebrikov *et al.*, *Istoriya sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti* No. 12179, Moscow, 1977, pp. 543-545.

¹⁰ The officials mentioned here are Leonid Ovcharov, Leonid Oncharenko, and Leonid Tsvetkov.

Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Wegier i ZSRR—w Warszawie, 14-15 lipca 1968 r.,” Copy No. 5 (Top Secret), 14-15 July 1968, in Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Arch. KC PZPR, P. 193, T. 24, Dok. 4, shows why this shift would have occurred. The Warsaw Meeting proved to be a turning point in the crisis in many respects. It marked the first time that Hungarian officials, including Janos Kadar, joined with their East German, Polish, and Bulgarian counterparts in expressing profound doubts about the ability of the Czechoslovak authorities to regain control of events. Kadar even pledged, in a conversation with Brezhnev, that “if a military occupation of Czechoslovakia becomes necessary, [Hungary] will take part without reservation.” See “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 3 iyulya 1968 g.,” 3 July 1968 (Top Secret) in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, L. 367. The Warsaw meeting also marked the first time that Soviet officials who had earlier adopted a “wait-and-see” attitude began roundly condemning the Prague Spring and calling for “extreme measures.” Far more than at previous gatherings of Warsaw Pact leaders in 1968, the option of military intervention loomed prominently throughout the deliberations in Warsaw.

³⁸ The concept of “credible commitments” in international politics is developed at length in the works of Thomas C. Schelling, among others. See, for example, Schelling’s *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 22-52; and *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 35-91, 116-125. For a concise game-theoretic analysis of the concept, see David M. Kreps, *Game Theory and Economic Modeling* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 45-72.

³⁹ Zdenek Mlynar, *Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus* (Koln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1978), pp. 187-188.

⁴⁰ The CPSU Politburo transcripts reveal that even a senior Czechoslovak official like Mlynar had no idea about the real alignment of forces in Moscow *vis-a-vis* Czechoslovakia. The transcripts indicate that Shelepin adhered to a relatively cautious position during the crisis, which was largely similar to Brezhnev’s position. The most vehement supporter of military intervention was consistently Yurii Andropov (whom Brezhnev elevated to full membership on the Politburo in 1973), followed closely by Shelest, Mykola Podhornyi, and Dmitrii Ustinov (whom Brezhnev later elevated to full membership on the Politburo and the post of defense minister).

⁴¹ At the time, the head of the MSzMP Central Committee Department of International Relations was Andras Gyenes, who had been appointed to that post a month earlier.

⁴² Shelest is referring here to the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 17 July. The session was convened to endorse the Soviet delegation’s performance at the Warsaw Meeting. For a full, top-secret transcript of the meeting as well as accompanying documents, see “Plenum Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS—17 iyulya 1968 g.,” 17 July 1968 (Top Secret), and “Materialy k protokolu zasedaniya Plenuma TsK KPSS,” July 1968 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 3, Dd. 211-214 and Op. 4, Dd. 133-136, respectively.

⁴³ For top-secret cables from Soviet diplomats in Hungary assessing Oldrich Svestka’s visit to Budapest in July 1968, see the relevant items in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, Dd. 30, 32, and 33.

⁴⁴ Bil’ak is overstating the case here, but it is true that some concerns existed about the prospect of not being allowed to return to Czechoslovakia. These sentiments were spurred in part

Dubcek himself was a Slovak, and the Prague Spring held out the promise of fulfilling Slovak demands for federalized representation and greater autonomy. Shelest may have been implying that the Soviet Union could exploit latent Slovak desires for outright independence. During the closing months of World War II, when Slovakia was still an independent entity, some prominent members of the Slovak Communist Party had proposed to Stalin that Slovakia be absorbed as a union-republic of the Soviet Union, rather than being reintegrated with Bohemia and Moravia in a Czechoslovak state. Stalin did not take up this suggestion, but Shelest may have believed that something roughly similar could be pursued if no other options were left.

⁵⁰ Dubcek hastily convened an extraordinary plenum of the KSC Central Committee on 19 July to approve the KSC Presidium's response to the Warsaw Letter. The Warsaw Letter had been addressed to the KSC Central Committee, but Dubcek initially handled it within the KSC Presidium, at a session on 16-17 July. Using a draft prepared by Cestmir Cisar and Zdenek Mlynar, the Presidium adopted a point-by-point response to the Warsaw Letter. The final document, entitled "Stanovisko Predsednictva UV KSC k dopisu peti komunistickyh a delnickyh stran," was not originally intended for publication, but after the Soviet Union and the other participants in the Warsaw Meeting unexpectedly published their collective letter on 18 July—despite Dubcek's urgings that the matter be handled quietly—Czechoslovak leaders realized they would have to publish a full reply. They did so the following day (19 July), the same day that the extraordinary plenum of the KSC Central Committee voted unanimously in support of the Presidium's actions.

⁵¹ See my translation of the letter released in July 1992 in "A Letter to Brezhnev: The Czech Hardliners' 'Request' for Soviet

Intervention, August 1968," *Cold War International History Bulletin*, Issue No. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 35. The text of the letter released in 1992 is clearly identical to the version that Brezhnev received on 3 August 1968, but Shelest's diary indicates that the two documents are not the same (i.e., more than one collective letter was sent to Brezhnev), as explained below.

⁵² For example, in a detailed, first-hand account of the Prague Spring published in Hungary in 1989, Janos Kadar recalled that the collective letter had been signed by eighteen, not five, KSC officials. See "Yanosh Kadar o 'prazhskei vesne'," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 7 (May 1990), p. 102. Kadar first saw the letter during a hastily convened meeting in Moscow on 18 August (when Brezhnev informed Hungarian, East German, Polish, and Bulgarian leaders about the previous day's decision by the CPSU Politburo to send troops into Czechoslovakia on the night of 20/21 August), so it is possible that by the 18th Bil'ak would have dispatched another letter to Moscow (perhaps via the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Stepan Chervonenko) with seven additional signatories.

⁵³ The Tatra mountains, located in the central portion of the Carpathian mountain range along the Slovakian-Polish border, include the highest peak in the Carpathians, Mt. Gerlachovka.

⁵⁴ Shelest lists the surname "Kofman" rather than Hoffmann, but he clearly meant Karel Hoffmann, a notorious hardliner who abetted the Soviet invasion. No official with the name Kofman was around at the time.

Potichnyj Collection on Ukrainian Resistance Opens in Toronto

"The Peter J. Potichnyj (PJP) Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine" has been officially opened and is available for use by interested scholars. Carol Moore, Director of the Robarts Library at the University of Toronto, and Robert E. Johnson, Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto, officially opened the PJP Collection on 18 March 1997 at the Petro Jacyk Slavic and East European Resource Centre of Robarts Library. The PJP Collection, as its name implies, contains two large groups of documents: those representing the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine during the period 1941-1954.

Insurgency in Ukraine

The Insurgency documents fall into six groups, depending on their origin, and relate directly to the Ukrainian Liberation Movement. Most of them are on paper, but some are on film and a large number of these documents are immediately accessible to scholars. A very rough count estimates this group as containing over 100,000 pages of documents.

1. A group of 16 microfilm reels that contain documents from the Polish Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego) covering underground activities in the ethnically Ukrainian territories of Poland from 1945 until 1948. This collection is often called the Onyshkevych Papers because they were used in the military trial against him and because each document carries his signature. (Myroslav Onyshkevych was the military commander of the UPA—Ukrainian Insurgent Army—Military Okruha Nr. 6 "Sian".) These are underground documents and only two microfilm reels belong to the Counter-Insurgency category. Call Number: DK/508/.79/P482/1990 MICR mfm reel. 1-16.

2. A group of documents from the Archive of Misiia UPA in Germany. These documents cover the period 1943-1951 and were brought by couriers from Ukraine. They were in the possession of Dr. Lev Rebet, a noted Ukrainian revolutionary, who was assassinated by a Soviet agent. A list of these documents is available, but due to their fragile nature they cannot be made available at this time.

3. The third group of documents is contained in 28 volumes of the *Litopys UPA* (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), Old Series, edited by P.J. Potichnyj and Ie. Shtendera (Toronto: Litopys, 1976-1997). These volumes contain underground



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