

By Malcolm Byrne

In November 1997, an extraordinary multinational gathering took place of personalities who figured in the tumultuous 1980-81 Solidarity crisis. For two-and-a-half days two dozen Poles, Americans, and Russians, one-time allies and adversaries alike, met in the village of Jachranka just outside Warsaw, to revisit the events of that crucial period.

On the Polish Communist Party and government side, former Party leaders Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and

referred to those notes during the conference to back up his claim that the Soviets never intended to intervene militarily in Poland, he and Anoshkin were approached (accosted?) by various participants. Anoshkin eventually agreed to let several pages be copied, which, as Mark Kramer's piece below suggests, appear to show that contrary to Jaruzelski's assertion that he tried to keep Soviet troops out of the country, he actually counted on them to back up Polish forces in case martial law failed.

Revelations of this sort prompted some of the most dramatic interactions of the conference, such as when Jaruzelski confronted Kulikov during a break following the Marshal's denial that Moscow contemplated an invasion. In front of several witnesses, an emotional Jaruzelski said, in Russian: "You know what you said to me then. How could you let them do this to me—in front of the Americans!"

Questions about the crisis persist, of course, even about Jaruzelski. But the truly multinational, cooperative effort by scholars, archivists and others involved in this project has helped to advance our understanding of key aspects of the 1980-81 crisis. The essays that follow below both add to the growing databank and represent some of the first attempts to come to grips with the new evidence. As documentary and oral history work continues, these interpretations will no doubt themselves become grist for further debate.

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¹ Under the rubric of the "Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe Project," the Archive, along with CWIHP and its other partners, have run conferences on the Prague Spring and the subsequent Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia (Prague, April 1994), the Hungarian revolution (Budapest, September 1996), and the 1953 uprising in East Germany (Potsdam, November 1996). The Archive's principal partners include: the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences; the Institute of Contemporary History and the recently-formed Center for Advanced Studies of the Anti-totalitarian Resistance of the Czech Academy of Sciences; the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution; the Civic Academy Foundation (Bucharest); the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and "Memorial" (Moscow). Generous support over the years has come mainly from the Open Society Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States—in addition to local sponsors for each event.

² For a summary, CWIHP *Bulletin* readers can refer to Raymond Garthoff's report in Issue 10, pp. 229-232. Other accounts appeared in *The New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *International Herald Tribune*.

³ Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz, Christian Ostermann, eds., *Poland 1980-1982 Internal Crisis, International Dimensions. A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events* (Washington, DC: National Security

Archive, 1997).

⁴ Many scholars and archivists throughout Eastern Europe, in

"When foreign troops invaded our country on the night of the 20th to the 21st of August, 1968, and abducted its political representatives, something happened for which a parallel would be difficult to find in modern history. Within several hours our society began to unite quite unexpectedly in a peaceful and dignified demonstration in defense of the independence of the state and the civic freedoms that had been achieved."

"I am happy that the cooperation between the National Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation 'Prague Spring 1968,' has resulted in this voluminous collection of documents, which, I hope, will lead readers to a closer understanding of the dramatic events that the then Czechoslovakia lived through three decades ago."

***From the preface by Václav Havel,
President of the Czech Republic***

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Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981

By Mark Kramer

The behavior of General Wojciech Jaruzelski during the Polish crisis of 1980-81 remains a source of great controversy.

On the one hand, newly declassified documentation leaves no doubt that the Soviet Union was exerting relentless pressure on Polish leaders in 1980-81.¹ The Soviet authorities deployed many divisions of combat-ready troops around Poland's borders and in the western USSR, conducted a long series of conspicuous Warsaw Pact and bilateral military exercises, informed Polish officials that elaborate plans had been drawn up for a Soviet-led invasion, and made repeated, vehement exhortations through bilateral and multilateral channels. These various actions may have caused Jaruzelski to fear that the Soviet Army would invade Poland unless he imposed martial law. Whether Soviet leaders actually *intended* to invade is a very different matter. All the latest evidence suggests that by mid- to late 1981, Soviet officials were extremely reluctant to consider sending troops into Poland. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this new evidence, persuasive though it seems in retrospect, was unavailable at the time. In 1980-81, Polish leaders were not privy to the internal deliberations of the Soviet Politburo and could never be fully certain about Soviet intentions. Hence, they may have genuinely believed that an invasion would occur if a solution "from within" Poland (i.e., martial law) did not materialize. Indeed, Soviet leaders themselves may have *wanted* to create that impression—even if they did not intend to follow up on it—because they believed it would induce the Polish authorities to take action.² In that respect, the declassified materials are compatible with Jaruzelski's claim that he introduced martial law because he viewed it as a "tragic necessity" and the "lesser of two evils."³

On the other hand, much of the new documentary evidence raises serious doubts about Jaruzelski's veracity on this matter, and specifically about his position in December 1981 during the lead-up to martial law. First-hand accounts and newly released documents suggest that, by December 1981 (and perhaps earlier), Jaruzelski was reluctant to impose martial law without external (i.e., Soviet) military assistance or at least a solid guarantee that Soviet troops would move in if the martial law operation failed. The documents also suggest that Soviet leaders by then were unwilling to provide direct military support to Jaruzelski, telling him that it would be "impossible" to bring Soviet troops into Poland and that he must instead proceed with martial law on his own. Jaruzelski's failure to obtain Soviet military assistance, as revealed in the latest evidence, nearly caused him to postpone the whole

operation in the hope that he would then be given a concrete external assurance.

The notion that Jaruzelski was asking for Soviet military support in December 1981 was first pronounced in September 1992 by a retired Soviet officer, Army-General Anatolii Gribkov. Gribkov had served for many years as Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact. In that capacity, he played a key role *vis-a-vis* Poland in 1980-81. Looking back on the Polish crisis in 1992, Gribkov denied that Jaruzelski imposed martial law to forestall a Soviet invasion. The Soviet general claimed that, rather than trying to stave off Soviet military intervention, Jaruzelski did just the opposite in December 1981 by repeatedly seeking a "guarantee of military assistance [from the USSR] if the situation in Poland becomes critical."⁴ The Soviet Politburo, according to Gribkov, promptly turned down the Polish leader's requests, informing him that "Soviet troops will not be sent to Poland." Gribkov noted that even after this decision was conveyed, Jaruzelski pleaded with Soviet officials to reconsider and warned them that "if military assistance is not offered, Poland will be lost to the Warsaw Pact." Gribkov surmised that Jaruzelski's last-minute pleas for a Soviet military guarantee must have reflected "the nervousness and diffidence that the top Polish leaders were feeling about their ability to carry out the plans for martial law."⁵

Gribkov's account appeared at the very time when Jaruzelski had been gaining a favorable reputation in Poland, both among the public and even among some of his former opponents such as Adam Michnik. Most Poles were willing to accept Jaruzelski's claim that he reluctantly chose the "lesser of two evils" in December 1981.⁶ Confronted by Gribkov's revelations, Jaruzelski strenuously denied that he had ever requested a Soviet military guarantee and argued that Gribkov himself had been an advocate of Soviet military pressure and intervention in 1981.⁷ An acrimonious standoff between the two men ensued.

Since that time, however, crucial evidence has

the crisis. From the fall of 1980 on, Soviet leaders had kept up a relentless campaign of intimidation and belligerent reproaches. It would have taken enormous strength and courage to withstand that pressure. Kania was not a particularly strong leader, but somehow he was continually able to defer the implementation of martial law. He

⁸"Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil prawidlowo," *Trybuna* (Warsaw), 9 November 1992, pp. 1, 2.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁰M. S. Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1996), vol. 2, pp. 336-351.

¹¹"Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce," p. 2. See also "Wywiad z Michaiem Gorbaczowem: 'Jestem inny, niz probuja mnie przedstawic'," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 23 October 1992, p. 9.

¹²

Ostaszewicz. See the comments of General Czeslaw Kiszczak,

confidence was his concern about the impact of Colonel Kuklinski's defection. According to Gribkov, Kuklinski's departure "forced the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to set about hurriedly reworking some aspects of the plans for martial law" ("Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," p. 49), but even after these changes were made, Jaruzelski feared that Solidarity would be fully tipped off about the details and timing of the operation, and would be ready to put up armed resistance. Soviet leaders shared some of Jaruzelski's concerns, but they believed that the martial law operation could still succeed if it were implemented forcefully enough. As it turned out, the concerns about a tip-off to Solidarity were largely unfounded. Even if the U.S. government had provided greater information to Solidarity, the timetable of the operation was not finalized until 9 December 1981, five weeks after Kuklinski left.

⁴²Comments by Nikolai Baibakov, Andrei Gromyko, and

Dmitrii Ustinov, recorded in "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 4, 10, 12.

⁴³Ibid., L. 6.

⁴⁴See, in particular, Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 55-56.

⁴⁵For intriguing excerpts from the opening rounds of testimony by Jaruzelski and other former officials, see Anna Karas, ed., *Sad nad autorami stanu wojennego: Oskarzenia/wyjasnienia/obrona—przed Komisja Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993). On the parliament's extension of a pardon, see "Komisja rozgrzesza autorow stanu wojennego: Wiekszosc rzadowa PSL-SLD przeglosowala mniejszosc opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 14 February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several months later.

Preface to the Translation of the Anoshkin Notebook

By Mark Kramer

A few comments are in order about the provenance and translation of these pages from General Anoshkin's notebook.

It had been known for some time that Anoshkin was present during Marshal Kulikov's meetings with General Jaruzelski in Poland in 1980-81. In a book published in 1995, another Soviet general who took part in some of the meetings described a typical scene:

The leader of Poland, Wojciech Jaruzelski, would come to the Helenow castle just south of Warsaw, where Kulikov, after receiving periodic instructions from Moscow, would hold arduous conversations with the clever Pole. General V. Anoshkin and I would sit on either side of the marshal.¹

What had not been known until very recently, however, is that Anoshkin kept notebooks with records of Kulikov's meetings, phone calls, and conversations in 1981.

The existence of these notebooks was first disclosed at the conference on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," which was co-organized in Jachranka, Poland on 8-10 November 1997 by the Cold War International History Project, the National Security Archive, and the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Kulikov and Anoshkin were among the participants. At one point during the conference, Kulikov referred in passing to Anoshkin's notebooks. As soon as the session ended, several participants went over to Anoshkin and asked him whether they could see the notebook that Kulikov had mentioned. Anoshkin took a red, hardbound volume out of his briefcase and showed us the page with notes of events that Kulikov had been discussing. Anoshkin pointed out the significance of a few phrases and explained to us when particular entries had been recorded. He answered questions I had about

the different types of ink and different handwriting.

When I asked Anoshkin for permission to photocopy the notebook, he initially demurred, but we then spoke with Marshal Kulikov, who gave his consent. I am grateful to Anoshkin and Kulikov for allowing me to photocopy pages from the notebook. I am also grateful to them for allowing me to publish the translation of those pages.

Unfortunately, the aging photocopy machine at the Jachranka facility was too slow for me to copy all the pages, but I was able to look through the entire notebook and ask Anoshkin questions about it. I asked him a few additional questions about it when I was in Moscow in March 1998.

Both in Jachranka and after returning to the United States, I went carefully over the notebook (including the pages I was unable to photocopy) to ensure that it was authentic. I cross-checked the entries with other newly declassified materials, and I asked Anoshkin several questions about specific points in the notes. In no case did I find even the slightest reason to doubt the authenticity of the document. Based on my scrutiny of the notebook and Anoshkin's extreme reluctance to let me photocopy it, I am fully confident that the document is precisely what it purports to be, namely a record of Kulikov's dealings in Poland in December 1981.

Anoshkin's notebook was very difficult to translate because of the frequent illegibility of his handwriting, the idiosyncratic abbreviations he used, and the enigmatic quality of some of his transliterations of Polish surnames and place names. At times I was forced to spend many hours poring over a few lines. Even after I became accustomed to Anoshkin's handwriting, the translation was onerous work. The finished product below is the result of more than ten preliminary drafts, which I extensively revised and smoothed out. I have tried to replicate the style and flavor of the original as best as possible, but for clarity's sake I have used full words to

Key Individuals Mentioned In The Anoshkin Notebook

Positions listed are those held in December 1981

ANDROPOV, Yurii Vladimirovich — Chairman of the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB); member of the CPSU Politburo; and member of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

ANOSHKIN, Lieutenant-General Viktor Ivanovich — personal adjutant to Marshal Kulikov

ARISTOV, Boris Ivanovich — Soviet Ambassador in Poland

BAIBAKOV, Nikolai Konstantinovich — Chief of Soviet State Planning Administration.3867 -1.2 TD1~0.0003 TE4Tw1~53 Tw1~(personal adjutant to MarW63of the CPSU)27

The adversary is supported from outside and is making the situation more tense.

The church — whereas earlier it took a neutral position, it now is creating tension.³¹

It might join forces with “S” and draw young people to its ranks, forcing a confrontation.³²

A week ago we appealed to the Sov. leadership — but there is no answer.

Com. Jaruz. met yesterday with Aristov and raised questions of a political and economic nature. What is the reaction now of the USSR to our actions?

But we received no answer.

— We are very worried about what the ambassador’s adviser on economic relations (trade) is reporting today to the Min. of Foreign Trade (of 30,000 tons — 12,000 to be sent to Legnica).³³

This concerns only the deliveries that are already coming to us.

Summing up these problems:

Very Imp.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — have had no meeting at the level of the leadership. Consultations — the economic question
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and we cannot embark on any adventurist actions if the Sov. comrades do not support us.³⁴

Whereas Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov earlier would come and see us, now no one is coming. We aren’t receiving an answer to our questions.

Politb memb. Econom aid Sending of troop		35	W Wlad is very upset and nervous and put forth a request that while there is time they receive an answer by <u>10:00 a.m. on 12.12.</u>
--	--	----	---

Otherwise we can extend the schedule for initiating it by one day, this is the most we can wait.

!! || “We are soberly evaluating the situation, and if there will be no politic., econ., and mil. support from the USSR, our country might be lost” (for the WTO)”³⁶

Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this step.

Psychologically, WW’s state of mind is very nervous.

With a heavy heart I report all of this to you.

— The leadership is resolute, but it’s necessary to decide matters.

We are embarking on this action under the slogan “Salvation of the Motherland” and “National Salvation.”
It was in this sense that the term “adventurist action” was being used.

—

25th tank reg. of 10th tank div. — Opole

In all, 10 regiments

The remaining formations and units for martial law — at their sites

— at 10:00 (Moscow time) Operational Groups from the Northern Group of Forces will be sent to the Pomer. and Sil. Mil. Dists. linked by a communications hub

8 divisions brought to combat readiness

9:15 10 people from the United Armed Forces Staff flew in from Moscow.

My disagreements with VG about
the possible composition of our gov't
group at the request of Jaruzelski

Suslov (Gromyko)

Jaruzelski
Siwicki
Molczyk
+ 3 commdrs., navy
Tuczapski
div. commdr.

All tasks regarding
the capture

?! At 3:00 — signal for troops to shift to military alert,
with departure to regions of concentration

!/? Walesa (Bujak, Michnik) have fled from Gdansk. Some of the leadership of “S” have been arrested.

5:25 Zarudin: Police in Legnica did not act.

NATIONAL UNDERGROUND
COMMITTEE OF "SOLIDARITY"

First Session of the
Military Council of Nat.
Salvation, from 11:00 to 19:30

1.5 hours W. Jaruzelski (Dep. Min.)

To let the people know that the Army has saved the nation and the country

The moment is chosen — successful, there were no such things, and it is impossible to delay it any further

Ideally taking account of the public mood and other factors.

I. there is success, but difficulties lie ahead.

The West will boycott, but the allies will help.⁴⁹

Martial law can be extended by several months. But in accordance with measures to restore order in the provinces, they must display resolve, careful organization, and exactingness

Sympathy for the Army and Navy is growing.

I thought about dispatching a unit of honor guards — square caps

A profound change⁵⁰ of cadres is necessary: a purge in the PZPR and the gov't.

Carry it out immediately; all unworthy officials will be removed from their posts.

Comdrs. allotted by zones. He believes they must allot zones for the commanders

— Gdansk — Janczyszyn
— Katowice — Lozowicki
— Poznan — Krepski

Appoint Gen. Zielinski — a secretary

WRON. (head of Main Pers. Direct. in Min. of Nat.Def.)

Remove the Katowice governor; appoint Gen. Paszkowski (former ambass. to Mongolia)

Operation has begun — in Warsaw

In Khust Lenina — measures were taken to restore order.

20 commissars at the Ministry

Repeated — (all the generals), repeated for everyone what was earlier

¹Translator's Note: A slight grammatical error in the original has been corrected in the translation.

²Translator's Note: These ellipses were in the original. The three signatures on the ciphered telegram were those of Boris Aristov, Vitalii Pavlov, and Viktor Kulikov (see entry below). Pavlov, the KGB station chief in Warsaw, wrote in his memoirs that his "close contact with the Soviet ambassador, B. I. Aristov, who kept in constant touch with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Gromyko, enabled me to have a good sense of how the MFA was assessing things. I also was aware of the close relations among Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, and the defense minister, D. F. Ustinov. Grasping this, the ambassador and I began to prepare joint reports under two signatures. This practice facilitated a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of all the circumstances and facts that became known to us both through embassy channels and through the KGB residency's channels. My closest contact of all was with the representative in Poland of the Main Command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Army-General A. F. Shcheglov, who naturally had a good sense of how our Military High Command viewed things. He sometimes added his efforts to the joint reports that the ambassador and I sent back to the Center, especially when they dealt with military issues. During the most critical phases of the situation in Poland, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Marshal V. G. Kulikov, would come here to meet urgently with the ambassador and me. I gave him thorough briefings on the most important aspects of the situation, naturally without referring to the sources of my information. The marshal and I had a very good rapport, and I retain a good impression of him to this day. . . . Only with the military attache, Major-General Fomenko [it should be Khomenko — M.K.] did I somehow fail to develop close relations. Perhaps this was partly due to the well-known rivalry between the GRU, which he represented, and the foreign intelligence branch of the KGB." Pavlov added that Khomenko's reports were "not sufficiently competent and did not always take account of the social and economic dimensions of the Polish crisis." See *Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce* (Warsaw: BGW, 1994), pp. 186-187.

³Translator's Note: The General Staff building was the hub of the martial law operation. It was also the site where Jaruzelski and other top military commanders made a final decision on 9 December to proceed with martial law.

⁴Translator's Note: From here to the bottom of the page, Anoshkin records sentences that appeared the next day as a paragraph in a scathing Soviet article about the situation in Poland. See "K polozheniyu v Pol'she," *Pravda* (Moscow), 11 December 1981, p. 5. On the 11th, Anoshkin added a brief reference to this article in the left-hand margin below. The *Pravda* article diverges very slightly from what Anoshkin records here, as indicated below.

⁵Translator's Note: In the *Pravda* article, the latter part of this sentence reads: ". . . about the use of lines of communication passing through Polish territory to exert pressure on Poland's allies." —CMEA is the acronym for the "Council on Mutual Economic Assistance."

⁶Translator's Note: The *Pravda* article refers to just the Soviet-Polish "border" rather than the plural "borders."

⁷Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Viktor Georgievich Kulikov.

⁸Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Dmitrii Fedorovich Ustinov.

⁹Translator's Note: At the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December 1981, the Soviet KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, noted that he had "spoken yesterday with Milewski." Andropov expressed puzzlement that Milewski "doesn't know about 'Operation X' [the martial law operation] and about the concrete timeframe in which it would be carried out." Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 g.: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in *Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 66, Delo (D.) 6, List (L.) 7*, which I translated in Issue No. 5 of the CWIHP *Bulletin*, pp. 134-138. Because of unavoidable ambiguities in the Russian language, it is possible that the "we" in this sentence from Anoshkin's notebook should be translated as "they," but the meaning in either case is the same.

¹⁰Translator's Note: This entire page is in Kulikov's handwriting.

¹¹Translator's Note: These comments are fully in line with the CPSU Politburo's decisions on the 10th. See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," esp. Ll. 5-12.

¹²Translator's Note: According to Anoshkin (in a conversation at the Jachranka conference on 11 November 1997), these lines report what Jaruzelski said after being informed of Rusakov's response.

¹³Translator's Note: At the CPSU Politburo meeting on December 10, Soviet leaders instructed "Cdes. Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to continue studying the issue of economic aid to Poland, taking account of the exchange of views at the CC Politburo session." (See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 14.)

¹⁴Translator's Note: Diagonally across the upper left-hand corner of this page is the following: "Reported to the WTO C-in-C at 14:45 (local time). Approved. I will take action."

¹⁵Translator's Note: "Bulava" is the Russian word for "mace."

¹⁶Translator's Note: The ellipses here were in the original.

¹⁷Translator's Note: The ellipses here were in the original. The nickname "Shilka," derived from a famous battle, was used for the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense artillery system. The Soviet Army deployed thousands of ZSU-23-4s, and the East European armies also possessed large quantities.

¹⁸Translator's Note: These lines indicate that Soviet armored combat vehicles in Poland, when moved out to various sites, were to be disguised as Polish vehicles.

¹⁹Translator's Note: Rembertow, on the eastern outskirts of Warsaw, was a key Soviet military base and military communications center. It is currently the site of the Polish National Defense Academy, the Polish Military Staff College, and—most important of all—the Central Military Archive.

²⁰Translator's Note: Two additional names, Saventsov and Grechiko, were listed here but then crossed out.

²¹Translator's Note: Krzywa is an airfield in Legnica Province, some 33 kilometers outside the city of Legnica in southwestern Poland near the Czech and German borders. Legnica was the headquarters of the Soviet Union's Northern Group of Forces, and Krzywa was the main air base for those forces. With a 2,500-meter airstrip, the Krzywa airfield can accommodate any type of aircraft.

²²Translator's Note: There is no fourth point listed after the number.

²³Translator's Note: Helenow is a small village approximately 100 kilometers south of Warsaw, which was used by the Polish government. In a castle there, Kulikov frequently held meetings with Jaruzelski and other Polish leaders during the 1980-81

crisis.

²⁴Translator's Note: Kulikov's concern about this matter can be better understood in light of remarks made at the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December by Nikolai Baibakov, the head of the Soviet State Planning Administration, who had been in Warsaw from 8 to 10 December: "In accordance with the [Soviet] Politburo's decision and at the request of the Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand tons of meat. . . . The produce, in this case meat, is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. When the produce is being transported to the Polish stations, blatant sabotage has been taking place. Poles have been expressing outrageously obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even begin to keep track of all the insults that have been directed against us." See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 4-5.

²⁵Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Solidarity.

²⁶Translator's Note: These two sentences recapitulate a passage in the December 11 *Pravda* article (cited above), which reads: "As Polish television reports, the leaders of local 'Solidarity' organizations have begun to create 'fighting groups' at enterprises. Each shock group includes up to 250-300 people. . . . Young thugs from the 'Confederation for an Independent Poland' have shown up on Polish streets sporting symbols of the Homeland Army, which in its time, as is known, took up arms in a struggle against the establishment of a people's-democratic order in Poland."

²⁷Translator's Note: This is the way the sentence reads in the original. The word "someone" appears to be missing after the word "send."

²⁸Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Wojciech Wladyslawowich—that is, Jaruzelski. Patronymics are used only in Russian, not in Polish. However, Soviet leaders often referred this way to their closest Polish, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian counterparts.

²⁹Translator's Note: The "2nd stage" of the operation, slated to begin as early as December 14, would have been gravely complicated if the initial crackdown had not prevented widespread turmoil and resistance.

³⁰Translator's Note: According to Anoshkin (conversation at Jachranka, 9 November 1997), these remarks at the left were Andropov's response to Jaruzelski's request.

³¹Translator's Note: Anoshkin's comments here are very similar to remarks by Andropov at the CPSU Politburo session on December 10: "The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its position, which in essence is now completely supportive of 'Solidarity.'" That view was echoed by Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, who declared that "there are

the next page refer exclusively to Polish, not Soviet, units. The two Soviet divisions in Poland were ordered to keep a low profile throughout the martial law operation. In addition to the units mentioned by Anoshkin, three other Polish army regiments—the 2nd Mechanized Regiment of the 1st Mechanized Division in Warsaw, the 3rd Air Regiment of the 6th Airborne Division in Krakow, and the 14th Mechanized Regiment of the 12th Mechanized Division in Szczecin—took part in the operation, performing administrative tasks and providing support for the Mechanized Detachments of Civil Police (ZOMO) and other security forces that actually carried out the crackdown. Siwicki later noted that these army units constituted an elite force selected for their “outstanding level of political readiness”—that is, their willingness to use force on behalf of the Communist regime. See “Pełna gotowosc obrony socjalistycznego panstwa: Konferencja sprawozdawcza PZPR Instytucji Centralnych MON,” *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 25 February 1983, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴ Translator’s Note: Anoshkin drew a curved arrow from these lines to the names on the right.

⁴⁵ Translator’s Note: This sentence and the four names were crossed out with a diagonal line running downward from left to right. It is unclear why Ustinov would have claimed that these officials had already flown to Poland. It is also not known why they ended up not coming to Poland. Army-General Anatolii Gribkov, the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in 1981, has claimed that the Soviet Politburo proved unable to reach a consensus on whether to send this high-ranking delegation to Poland as a gesture of solidarity—see Gribkov’s “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1992), p. 56—but he provides no specific evidence to support this claim or to explain why a consensus was infeasible.

⁴⁶ Translator’s Note: Just below this line, written diagonally from left to right, is the following:

- “1) to Merezhko
- 2) to Borisov
- 3) Emelyanov—answer
Clock—mine”

The word *chasy* in this last line might also be translated as “wristwatch.” The context leaves open either possibility.

⁴⁷ Translator’s Note: In fact, the Military Council of National Salvation (*Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego*, or WRON) consisted of 21—not 15 or 16—high-ranking military officers, chaired by Jaruzelski. The other members were Jozef Baryla, Kazimierz Garbacik, Mirosław Hermaszewski, Tadeusz Hupałowski, Ludwik Janczyszyn, Michał Janiszewski, Jerzy Jarosz, Czesław Kiszczak, Tadeusz Krepski, Roman Les, Longin Łozowicki, Tadeusz Makarewicz, Eugeniusz Molczyk, Włodzimierz Oliwa, Czesław Piotrowski, Henryk Rapacewicz, Florian Siwicki, Tadeusz Tuczapski, Jozef Uzycki, and Jerzy Włosinski.

⁴⁸ Translator’s Note: For the full text of the speech, see “Ukonstytuowała się Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego: Przemowienie gen. armii W. Jaruzelskiego,” *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (Warsaw), 15 December 1981, pp. 1-3.

⁴⁹ Translator’s Note: Soviet and Polish leaders expected all along that Western countries would adopt sanctions against Poland (and perhaps against the Soviet Union) if martial law were imposed. Gromyko had noted on 10 December 1981 that “of course if the Poles deliver a blow against ‘Solidarity,’ the West in all likelihood will not give them [further] credits and will not offer any other kind of help. [The Poles] are aware of

this, and this obviously is something that we, too, have to bear in mind.” (The actual sanctions that materialized were probably less severe than Soviet and Polish leaders had feared.) In early December 1981, Polish vessels were ordered to avoid entering foreign ports and to stay in neutral waters so that their property could not be seized. Baibakov had assured Jaruzelski on December 9 that Poland’s requests for economic aid to offset the sanctions “will be given due consideration in Moscow,” but at the December 10 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Soviet leaders displayed relatively little willingness to consider large-scale economic assistance for Poland. Andropov remarked that “as far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been proposed. No doubt, something will have to give.” He accused the Polish authorities of being “insolent” and of “approaching things this way merely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they will be able to lay all the blame on us.” The Soviet Politburo decided simply to give further consideration to the “question of economic assistance to Poland.” All quotations here are from “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 6, 8-9.

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the supposed readiness expressed by Gen. Siwicki to move the date of the imposition of martial law back one day if Soviet military aid were to be secured. That would have meant not Sunday, December 13, but Monday, December 14. Gen. Siwicki flatly denies that any such considerations took place. After all one of the *key conditions* for an effective imposition of martial law, particularly to avoid bloodshed, was to impose it on a holiday (I have no doubt that the appropriate documents could be found at the General Headquarters of the Polish Army; one of the main authors, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, can definitely attest to their authenticity). I do not know what kind of a crazy mind could have come up with the absurd notion that it could all be done on Monday or any other weekday, when millions of people would be starting for work at dawn and getting ready to begin the workday. *It was never considered, not even for a moment.* Such an entry completely disqualifies not only the credibility, but also the intelligence of the person who wrote such a thing in the said “notebook,” or passed such information to their political superiors.

On page 7 [page numbers have been corrected to conform to page numbers in this *Bulletin*—ed.] of Mr. Kramer’s article there is a claim that Gen. Anatolii Gribkov “played a key role *vis-a-vis* Poland in 1980-81.” It is not my intention to judge that role at this time. However, bringing Gribkov up in the context of the days preceding the imposition of martial law is more than amusing, the reason being that Gribkov himself told me, Gen. Siwicki, and other Polish generals (as confirmed by Gen. Stanisław Antos, who at the time was Polish Vice-Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces) of the situation in which he found himself on 13 December 1981. For a week he had been on vacation, far from Moscow. When he found out about the imposition of martial law in Poland he called Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov (Kulikov was in Poland at the time), asking whether he should come back to Moscow. Ustinov told him to continue his vacation. And now Gribkov turns out to be one of the main witnesses. But there is one more meaningful fact. Namely, many fragments of his reminiscences included in an article published in 1992 by *Istoricheskii Zhurnal* are almost *literally* identical with some phrases from Anoshkin’s “notebook.” It looks as though many roads lead to that very same “source.”

The choice of evidence in Mr. Kramer’s article is strangely one-sided. Why does he not mention Gen. Siwicki’s polemical response to the above-mentioned article by Gribkov, which was published in *Polska Zbrojna* on 22 December 1992? Is the voice of the weaker side, which was at the time threatened in different ways, less credible than the voice of the stronger side, which put Poland under overwhelming pressure? A facetious phrase from Gogol comes to mind here about the “sergeant’s widow who whipped herself.”

On page [7] of his article, Mr. Kramer talks about a document which allegedly constitutes “powerful” evidence. He means Anoshkin’s “notebook.” Treating the

“notebook” in this way is surprising. First of all, there is something about it which should cause one to distance oneself from it on moral grounds. After all, the most controversial and shocking statements contained there—claiming that we allegedly demanded military aid—were not presented by the “Russian side” during the Jachranka conference.¹ This made it impossible for the [Polish] “government side” to take a stance concerning them and to directly confront the facts and arguments, the more so because it is not clear if and when all of the materials from the Jachranka conference will be published.² As a result, the “notebook”—which, as it turns out, is being prepared for publication as a separate brochure—has become an independent fact, removed from the context of the debate. And not a historical fact, either, but a political one, given the present political realities in Poland.

I have learned that Mr. Kramer is a specialist on Soviet and Russian issues. Therefore he undoubtedly knows the characteristic mechanisms and techniques of documenting events there. After all, the Soviet Union, and above all the Soviet Army, implemented almost obsessively rigorous rules for creating and protecting any kind of document, including working notes and records, particularly if they concerned highly secretive matters of great importance for the state. Even the smallest slips in this area resulted in very drastic consequences. And now what do we have here? A super-secret notebook, not registered anywhere, not affixed with any seals [*gryf*] or marked by page numbers, a notebook that has for years been kept nobody knows where. It starts with Kulikov’s arrival in Poland on 7 December 1981. But the first entry is from December 10. It is surprising that there is no note of a conversation with me the night of the 8th, which Baibakov reported about on December 10 during a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Marshal Kulikov took part in this. Yet what is peculiar is that *there is not even one word in Baibakov’s report about the Polish side waiting for military help.* Maybe that is the reason why there is no mention of that conversation on the night of the 8th in Anoshkin’s notebook.

As I mentioned before, Gen. Siwicki and I will soon present a more detailed description of, on the one hand, some strange omissions, and, on the other hand, of even stranger entries included in the notebook. At this time, I only want to point out that during the whole time noted there by date, that is, from December 10 to 16, not even one conversation takes place between me and Marshal Kulikov, who was in Poland at the time (except for one note of December 16 about a phone conversation during which Kulikov asked for a short discussion, which is not noted later anyway). Could it be that during the ten days Kulikov spent in Poland, Gen. Siwicki was the only Polish person he talked to? Was he the only source of information? And finally, how was this information recorded and interpreted?

I am sorry to say that regardless of what might

leadership, but also a member of the Suslov Commission, which followed and reacted to the situation in Poland. It turns out that he knew about columns of tanks along the Polish border, while the highest Soviet commanders [claim they] did not (as they also did not know about the respective preparations of the divisions of former GDR and Czechoslovakia, as confirmed by archival materials). They stick to the opinion that there would have been no intervention in any event. Moreover, according to what Marshal Kulikov said at Jachranka, there was not even any pressure put on Poland (“*davleniia ne bylo*”). However, other Soviet politicians and military officials talk about

any little damage to the interest of the Warsaw Pact might become a pretext for intervention. Possible difficulties in military transport would, after all, be a classic violation of the rules according to which the strategic infrastructure of the bloc functioned. This is what was constantly on our minds. Let the fact that I stated, publicly in the Sejm as well as during a Central Committee plenary meeting, that the Polish Army takes responsibility for the smooth functioning of this transportation infrastructure attest to how important and sensitive this point was. Imputing that a concern that this transportation should function smoothly (especially under the conditions of martial law)

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The introduction of martial law may—among other things—cause the following development of events:

Scenario 1

- subordination of political and socio-economic organizations to the demands of the martial law with the simultaneous possibility of limited strike action and restricted hostile propaganda activity.

Scenario 2

- in some regions of the country, mass strikes are organized with the tendency to extend beyond the workplace. Sabotage activities take place.

Scenario 3

- general labor strike, some workers go out onto the streets, there are street demonstrations and attacks on party buildings and those of the state administration, the Citizen Militia and others. It leads to a sharp intervention of the MO forces and the military. The assistance of Warsaw Pact forces is not ruled out.

[Source: *Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych*, t. 228/1 B. Translated by Pawel Machcewicz]

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former CWIHP fellow, Dr. Machcewicz spent the academic year 1997/98 on a Fulbright grant in Washington, D.C.

¹ For the discussion of other evidence of the Polish Party, the military and the Ministry of Interior's counts on the Soviet and Warsaw Pact participation in the implementation of martial law see the report by Andrzej Paczkowski: "The Conditions and Mechanisms Leading to The Introduction of Martial Law: Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight" (translated from Polish by Leo Gluchowski), in "On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland," Working Paper No. 21, Preliminary Conference Edition, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 1997 (Polish original in: "O Stanie Wojennym. W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997).

² For the detailed and updated analysis of the Soviet evidence see: Mark Kramer, "Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981," paper delivered at a seminar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2 April 1998, and Kramer's articles in this *Bulletin*.

³ For the analysis of the findings of the Jachranka conference see: Pawel Machcewicz and Malcolm Byrne, "Revealing a New Side of Poland's Martial Law," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 December 1997.



From left to right: Georgii Shakhnazarov, Anatoli Gribkov, and Viktor Kulikov (General Anoshkin—to left behind Kulikov) at the Jachranka Conference (November 1997). Photo courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.

Reflections on the Polish Crisis

By Francis J. Meehan

As I made my way around Washington in September 1980 for briefings in various US government departments before leaving for Warsaw, the predominant theme was the likelihood, as most people saw it, of Soviet military intervention, sooner rather than later, to suppress the Polish reform movement. The 1956 and 1968 precedents were much in the minds of US specialists in Soviet and East European affairs. They knew the current situation in Poland was bigger, tougher, and more complex than either Hungary or Czechoslovakia had been, but they knew also it was much more important, as Poland's position was that of the linchpin in Central Europe. The widely held view was that the USSR would not hesitate for long before stamping out a threat to Polish Communist rule and its own hegemonic position.

I received little encouragement that Moscow would stay its hand. In fact, I came away from almost all my meetings feeling that I would be lucky to get to Warsaw before the Soviet tanks. I can remember only two dissenting voices—but they were important ones. [National Security Advisor] Zbigniew Brzezinski told me he thought the Poles would have some time to try and work out their own affairs and achieve an internal political balance. The Soviet menace would continue to brood over the scene, but Moscow was restrained by the knowledge that the Poles could and would fight, while the Poles for their part realized they should not push the Soviets too far. Here was some encouragement at least. The other exception was Richard Davies, ambassador to Poland during the seventies, who was a member of a briefing panel organized by the Department of State. Davies, with his instinct for Poland, the USSR, and the Russian-Polish historical relationship, felt the Soviets would think long and hard about sending in troops. This was the only note of optimism in his forceful, stark analysis.

I got to Warsaw in late October. From then until the imposition of martial law, fourteen months later, the twin threats—suppression of the reform movement by the Polish regime or through Soviet military action—dominated US official thinking. There was good reason for this. We had Colonel [Ryzard] Kuklinski's reporting on the regime's plans for a strike against [the independent labor union] Solidarity. Substantial intelligence information on Soviet troop movements on the Polish frontiers pointed at various times to intervention. The Soviet threat ebbed and flowed—early December 1980 was perhaps the high water mark—

Presumably we would be able to see signs and portents locally in Warsaw.

As it happened, the instructions came in when we were in the final stages of an embassy paddle tennis tournament, not the biggest thing in the world of sport but an event taken with commendable seriousness in the local US community. Washington would probably not have been greatly amused to know we finished the tournament first before setting about the duties that had been laid upon us, but I like to think we showed a proper sense of proportion at a tense moment.

It was one of those raw, bone-chilling nights you get in Eastern Europe as embassy officers made their way across town in twos and threes, some on foot, others driving. I saw the teams as they returned, tired, half-frozen. They all told the same story. They had seen absolutely nothing. Government buildings were pitch black, with the normal complement of semi-comatose guards. Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry, Party Central Committee building, railroad stations, airport, barracks areas, Soviet embassy and housing area—all quiet as was usual in Warsaw on a freezing Sunday night in December. The only unusual activity in the entire city, they reported dryly, was the American embassy, lit up like a transatlantic liner on a dark and empty ocean. We fired

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Francis J. Meehan retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in 1989. He was the U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980-1983.

¹ See Raymond Garthoff, "The Conference on Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," *CWIHP Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp.229-232.

NEH SUMMER 1999 INSTITUTE
AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY ON

"NEW SOURCES AND FINDINGS ON COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY"

The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, in association with the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive, will hold a National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Summer Institute on "New Sources and Findings on Cold War International History" from 12 July-6 August 1999. This four-week program, intended primarily for university and college professors teaching courses on the history of U.S. foreign policy, diplomatic history, and international affairs/relations during the Cold War period, will offer an opportunity to study and assess emerging new sources and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, particularly those from the former communist bloc, and their potential for use in teaching.

Since faculty will be derived primarily from area studies specialists familiar with archival and other sources from the former Soviet Union, China, and other East-bloc countries, the summer institute will provide a forum for a dialogue between these specialists on the "other side" of Cold War history and participants who have researched, written, and taught from an American perspective, working primarily from U.S. and other English-language sources. The Director of the Institute is James R. Millar, Director of GWU's Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES); principal faculty include James G. Hershberg (George Washington University), former Director of the Cold War International History Project and author of "James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age"; Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), co-author of "Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev"; and Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University), author of "China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation."

Sections will cover new findings and interpretations on important Cold War history topics ranging from the conflict's origins to its ending, including major crises, regional flare-ups, alliances, and the nuclear arms race. Sessions will also be devoted to issues in teaching Cold War history, including the use of new technologies such as the internet as well as multimedia sources such as documentaries. Assigned readings for discussion will include important recent publications, including both secondary accounts and primary sources, as well as recently declassified documents from both Eastern and Western archives. Participants will also have an opportunity to tap Cold War history resources in the Washington, D.C., area, such as the National Archives, government agencies, research organizations, etc.

Under NEH guidelines, applicants (with limited exceptions) must be teaching American undergraduate students. Thirty visiting scholars will be selected. Those accepted will receive a \$2800 stipend for a month's expenses in Washington. **Applications must be postmarked no later than 1 March 1999.**

For further information, including application packages, contact
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2013 G St. NW, Room #401
Washington, DC 20052
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From the early 1970s until November 1981, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski was a crucial intelligence source for the United States. Having become profoundly disillusioned with Communism and the Soviet Union's heavy-handed presence in Poland, Kuklinski began supplying the United States with highly sensitive information about Soviet-bloc military planning and weapons developments. Altogether, he smuggled out copies of more than 30,000 classified Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents, numbering tens of thousands of pages, including war plans, military maps, mobilization schedules, allied command procedures, summaries of exercises, technical data on weapons, blueprints of command bunkers, electronic warfare manuals, military targeting guidelines, and allied nuclear doctrine. To ensure that his motives would not be questioned, Kuklinski refused to take any payment for his work. For roughly a decade, his efforts gave the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) an unparalleled look inside the Warsaw Pact.¹

Kuklinski was in an especially important position when a prolonged crisis swept over Poland in 1980-81. Not only was he an aide to the Polish national defense minister (and later prime minister and Communist Party leader), Army-Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski; he also was one of a handful of senior officers on the Polish General Staff who helped draw up plans for the imposition of martial law. The Polish General Staff's formal role in planning the military aspects of martial law began on 22 October 1980, when Jaruzelski ordered the chief of the General Staff, Gen. Florian Siwicki, to set up an elite planning unit. This unit, which worked closely with a martial law planning staff at the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry, consisted predominantly of general officers, including all of Siwicki's deputies. Kuklinski, as the head of the General Planning Department and deputy head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff, was a key member of the martial law planning unit from the very start. Among other tasks, he served as a liaison with Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Armed Forces, and with 0.0075 crucial

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was awarded honorary citizenship for his contribution to the restoration of Polish independence.¹⁷ In many other stops around the country he was hailed as a “true patriot.” Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek met with Kuklinski for two hours and declared afterwards that the colonel’s “decisions spared our country great bloodshed.”¹⁸ The visit sparked complaints in some quarters, notably from Adam Michnik, who in recent years has become an unabashed supporter of Jaruzelski.¹⁹ Jaruzelski himself lamented that the “praise for Kuklinski’s actions automatically places the moral blame on myself and other generals.”²⁰ Public ambivalence about Kuklinski, which had been relatively widespread in the early 1990s, has steadily abated (though it has not wholly disappeared).²¹ Overall, then, the visit marked a decisive vindication for a man who only recently had been under sentence of death in his homeland.

* * *

Almost all of the materials that Kuklinski supplied to the U.S. government, including thousands of photographed documents and a vast quantity of his own reports, are still sealed in classified CIA files. Efforts to pry loose those materials through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) have run into frustrating bureaucratic obstacles. However, some of the reports that Kuklinski sent in 1980 and 1981 were released in the early 1990s so that he could use them in preparing for the judicial review of his case in Poland. Three of those dispatches are featured below in chronological order. Each is preceded by an introduction that provides a brief context for understanding what the report covers and what its significance is. Although these three items are only a minuscule fraction of the materials that Kuklinski provided to the CIA, they give some idea of the extraordinary contribution he made to the security of both Poland and the West.

REPORT No. 1: Early December 1980 Warning of Soviet Intervention

This first report, headed “Very Urgent!,” was sent in early December 1980 under the codename Jack Strong. It had a profound impact on U.S. policy. Kuklinski’s message seemed to corroborate a number of other indications in early December 1980 that the Soviet Union was about to undertake a large-scale military intervention in Poland. On December 3, a day-and-a-half before Kuklinski’s report arrived at CIA headquarters, President Jimmy Carter had sent an urgent communication via the Hot Line to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid I. Brezhnev. Carter promised that the United States would “not exploit the events in Poland” and would not “threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region,” but warned that East-West relations “would be most adversely affected” if the Soviet Army tried “to impose a solution upon the

Polish nation.”²² Kuklinski’s report reinforced the sense of foreboding that had prompted Carter’s use of the Hot Line, and it convinced U.S. officials that very little time was left before Soviet troops moved *en masse* into Poland.

There is no question that events in the latter half of November 1980 and the first few days of December had provided grounds for concern in the West about the prospect of Soviet military action. Tensions in Poland had steadily increased in mid- to late November, culminating in a two-hour warning strike on November 25 by Polish railway workers, who threatened to call a general strike unless their demands were met. These developments provoked alarm in Moscow about the security of the USSR’s lines of communication through Poland with the nearly 400,000 Soviet troops based in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).²³ Unease about Poland was even more acute in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, where the media in late November had stepped up their condemnations of the “counterrevolutionary forces who are endangering Poland’s socialist order.”²⁴ On November 29, the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Army-Gen. Evgenii Ivanovskii, suddenly informed members of the Western Military Liaison Missions in East Germany that they would be prohibited from traveling into territory along the GDR-Polish border.²⁵ A few days later, on December 3, rumors surfaced that an emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders would be held in Moscow on the 5th. This news, coming right after the conclusion of a meeting in Bucharest of the Warsaw Pact’s Council of Defense Ministers (on 1-2 December), raised further apprehension among Western leaders about the possible use of Soviet troops.

Anxiety in the West continued to grow over the next few days as unconfirmed (and, it turned out, largely inaccurate) reports filtered in about a huge buildup of Soviet forces around Poland’s borders. Dense clouds over Poland and the western Soviet Union prevented U.S. reconnaissance satellites from focusing in on Soviet tank and mechanized divisions based there.²⁶ Not until the latter half of December, when the cloud cover temporarily receded, were U.S. satellites able to provide good coverage of Soviet forces in the western USSR. Before the photoreconnaissance became available, many high-ranking U.S. intelligence officials simply assumed that reports of a massive mobilization were accurate. That assumption seemed to be vindicated when reports also began streaming in about last-minute preparations by Soviet troops to set up emergency medical tents and stockpiles of ammunition.²⁷

Against this backdrop, Kuklinski’s dispatch was bound to spark great anxiety when it arrived at the CIA’s headquarters in the early morning hours of December 5. The CIA director, Stansfield Turner, promptly informed Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, that “eighteen Soviet divisions” would move into Poland on December 8. Brzezinski immediately relayed the

information to Carter. At a meeting of top U.S. officials the following day, Turner repeated his warning.²⁸ Although his estimate on December 6 of the number of Soviet divisions that would enter Poland “from the east” was slightly lower than it had been the previous day (fifteen versus eighteen), he averred that “more [Soviet] divisions will follow” the initial fifteen. On December 7, Turner conveyed an even gloomier assessment, claiming that “all the preparations for a [Soviet] invasion of Poland were completed” two days earlier, and that a final “decision to invade” on the night of December 7-8 had been adopted by Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders on the 5th.²⁹ Turner made these predictions without any confirmation from U.S. reconnaissance satellites about a purported buildup of Soviet forces around Poland.

Under the circumstances, Turner’s assumptions may have seemed reasonable, but a close analysis of the period from mid-November to early December 1980 suggests that he and most other U.S. officials misperceived Soviet intentions. A careful analysis also suggests that Kuklinski’s message, written in great haste and with only partial information, unavoidably left out certain key points that bore directly on the question of Soviet intentions. U.S. intelligence officials who apprised political leaders of Kuklinski’s message were remiss in failing to highlight the great uncertainty that remained about Soviet policy. (The uncertainty was especially pronounced in early December 1980 because so little was known at that point about the actual state of readiness of Soviet forces in the western USSR.)

Newly declassified materials confirm that in the latter half of November 1980, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were preparing to hold Soyuz-80 military “exercises” in Poland in early to mid-December.³⁰ The new archival evidence also suggests that these “exercises” were intended mainly as a cover for the Polish authorities to impose martial law. Documents from the East German military archive reveal that four Soviet divisions, two Czechoslovak divisions, and one East German division were supposed to join four Polish army divisions and the Polish security forces in introducing military rule.³¹ If these operations proved insufficient, another fourteen Warsaw Pact divisions (eleven Soviet and three East German) were supposed to move in as reinforcements, according to the documents. It is not clear when and how the second stage of Soyuz-80 would have begun—or where the Soviet forces would have come from—but the option of a second stage was clearly specified in the plans.

This general scenario was consistent with a document prepared by the Soviet Politburo’s Commission on Poland (the so-called Suslov Commission) in late August 1980.³² That document, subsequently approved by the full CPSU Politburo, authorized the Soviet defense ministry to bring four Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the three military districts adjoining Poland up to full combat readiness “in case military assistance is provided to Poland.” It also authorized the defense ministry to plan

for—though not yet to carry out—the “call-up of as many as 75,000 additional military reservists and 9,000 additional vehicles” to fill out at least “another five to

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divisions slated to take part in the first stage of Soyuz-80 was no more than four. The much larger number of Soviet divisions cited by Kuklinski and Turner (i.e., at least fifteen) represented the *combined* total of forces in both the first and the second stages.

As it turned out, of course, even a limited intervention from outside—by four Soviet, one East German, and two Czechoslovak divisions—did not take place. This non-event points to something else that is missing in Kuklinski's dispatch—an omission that, once again, is perfectly understandable. Kuklinski could not possibly have known that the Soviet Politburo was unwilling to proceed with the "maneuvers" *unless* the ato

MSW⁶⁴ was given urgent orders to find the source.) The first steps have already been taken. Except for Szklarski and me, everyone was excluded in operational directives from the planning. A counterintelligence officer visited Szklarski⁶⁵ and me yesterday. He spoke about ways of preventing future leaks. At present, Jasinski⁶⁶ has taken command of planning at the national level. Szklarski has temporarily withdrawn. Since this morning we have been working, under Jasinski's supervision and in cooperation with a PUWP CC official,⁶⁷ with the KOK Secretariat, with the KPPRM, and with Pawlikowski from MSW,⁶⁸ on a unified plan of command for the surprise introduction of martial law. The document is still being put together, so I am unable to give a detailed account of it. (I proposed a break so that I could send this telegram.) In brief, martial law will be introduced at night, either between Friday and a work-free Saturday or between Saturday and Sunday, when industrial plants will be closed. Arrests will begin around midnight, six hours before an announcement of martial law is broadcast over the radio and television. Roughly 600 people will be arrested in Warsaw, which will require the use of around 1,000 police in unmarked cars. That same night, the army will seal off the most important areas of Warsaw and other major cities. Initially, only the MSW's forces will take part. A separate political decision will be made about "improving the deployment of armies," that is, redeploying entire divisions to major cities. This will be done only if reports come in about larger pockets of unrest. One cannot rule out, however, that redeployments of divisions based far away from the areas of future operations will commence with the introduction of martial law or even earlier. For example, it would take roughly 54 hours to redeploy the 4th Mechanized Division to the vicinity of Warsaw.

Because the investigation is proceeding, I will have to forgo my daily reports about current developments. Please treat with caution the information I am conveying to you, since it appears that my mission is coming to an end. The nature of the information makes it quite easy to detect the source. I do not object to, and indeed welcome, having the information I have conveyed serve those who fight for the freedom of Poland with their heads raised high. I am prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice, but the best way to achieve something is with our actions and not with our sacrifices.

Long live free Poland!

Long live Solidarity, which brings freedom to all oppressed nations!

JACK STRONG

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¹Biographical information here has been compiled from a number of the sources adduced below as well as from personal contacts with Richard T. Davies, Douglas J. MacEachin, and Col. Kuklinski himself. It is worth noting that some of Kuklinski's former military colleagues in Poland, notably Wojciech Jaruzelski and Czeslaw Kiszczak, have raised questions about Kuklinski's motives for working with the United States, and a few Communist (or former Communist) officials in Poland have tried to challenge some aspects of Kuklinski's story. For a sample of opposing views, see Andrzej Bober, "Ujawniamy tresc akt sprawy karnej Plk. Ryszarda Kuklinskiego," *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), 2 May 1998, pp. 1-2, and the lurid charges raised in Robert Walenciak, "Zagadka Kuklinskiego," *Przegląd Tygodniowy* (Warsaw), no. 17 (29 April 1998), p. 4. I have carefully checked into all of these allegations and have found them, without exception, to be utterly groundless. The information provided here has been carefully vetted for its accuracy.

²For information on the other Polish officers who cooperated with the United States, see the comments of Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak in Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., *General Kiszczak m\wi: Prawie wszystko* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Dubicki, who defected to the West in 1981 shortly before the introduction of martial law, was killed in Germany under mysterious circumstances in early 1998. See "Tajemnica łmierf Leona Dubickiego," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 9 March 1998, p. 4.

³See "Komenda Stoieczna: Plany przedsi" wzi" c dotyczacych drugiego etapu akcji 'Jodla'," October 1981 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych (AMSW), Warsaw, Sygnatura (Sygn.) Spis 156, Pozycja (Poz.) 81, Tom (T.) IV.

⁴See Kuklinski's comments about the source of the disclosure in "Pu\kownik Ryszard Kuklinski m\wi," *Tygodnik Solidarno\lf* (Warsaw), No. 49 (9 December 1994), pp. 1, 12-14. See also his comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od łrodka," *Kultura* (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 48-49.

⁵In "Pu\kownik Ryszard Kuklinski m\wi," pp. 13-14, Kuklinski reports that the head of the Polish General Staff's Operations Directorate, Gen. Jerzy Skalski, claimed that Siwicki believed the information had come via Rome (presumably meaning an agent in the Italian intelligence service). Skalski was very upset and nervous when he was discussing this matter, so it is possible that he was in error. Kuklinski himself is uncertain.

⁶See Kuklinski's interesting comments in "Pu\kownik Ryszard Kuklinski m\wi," pp. 13-14.

⁷The quotation comes from Francis Meehan, U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980 to 1982, in a conversation with the author in June 1990.

⁸Kuklinski revealed this date for the first time in an interview

sea in early January 1994 while sailing in the Gulf of Mexico. No trace of his body was ever found. The elder son, Waldemar, was killed in an automobile accident during the 4th of July weekend.

¹¹"Wojna z narodem widziana od Źródka," pp. 3-55.

¹²Weiser's first article was "Polish Officer Was U.S.'s Window on Soviet War Plans," *Washington Post* 27 September 1992, pp. A1, A38, and the second was "A Question of Loyalty," *Washington Post Magazine*, 13 December 1992, pp. 9-13, 24-29.

¹³Maciej Lukaszewicz, ed., *Bohater czy zdrajca: Fakty i dokumenty sprawa pułkownika Kuklińskiego* (Warsaw: Most, 1992); Krzysztof Dubinski and Iwona Jurczenko, *Oko Pentagonu: Rzecz o pułkowniku Ryszardzie Kuklińskim* (Warsaw: KMSO, 1995); and Bernard Nowak, ed., *Pułkownik Kukliński: Wywiady, Opinie, Dokumenty* (Lublin: Test, 1998). Although

although the responsible ministerial and army
functionaries of that time might have said otherwise.
Moreover, the documents of the time do not speak of an

afraid that the Polish events could have any influence in our country.” In the long-term view, however, Soviet Premier Nicolav Tikhonov demonstrated greater foresight, when he interrupted Husák with the observation that this situation could still change.⁵⁰

Selected Documents

As we have discussed, there are considerable gaps in the preserved (and now accessible) documents in the Czech archives regarding the Polish developments of 1980-1981. For example, no record has survived of the debates on the Polish situation in the leading CPCz bodies. It is therefore difficult to choose the one or two most important documents that would reflect this perspective in its entirety. In any case, most of the preceding text devoted to the reconstruction of the CPCz leadership’s position on the Polish developments and the Solidarity phenomenon has been drawn from a range of documents. The opinions of Czechoslovak representatives have been captured by two presentations delivered by Gustáv Husák in Moscow in December 1980 and May 1981, and in a CC CPCz letter to the Polish communist party from June 1981.

Most appropriate for publication seems to be the record of the Warsaw meeting in March 1981 (Document No. 3) between Stanisław Kania and Karel Hoffmann, the matador of the post-invasion Czechoslovak regime.⁵¹ This record presents the opinions of the Czechoslovak leadership in perhaps the most complete and most pointed form, while at the same time reflecting both the acquiescent as well as polemical arguments of the Polish leadership.

The report of Colonel General Miroslav Blahník, Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, to the Minister of National Defense Martin Dzúr (Document No. 2) sums up the plan for the common Warsaw Pact army “exercises” on Polish territory in December 1980, or rather, that which the Soviet Army Command considered necessary to tell their Czechoslovak “allies.” Among other evidence, a comparison of this document with its East German equivalent confirms that the East Germans and the Czechoslovaks received from the Soviets only the information and directives directly concerning them, and were not necessarily fully aware of Soviet intentions.⁵² In the German document there is no mention of the 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces which was to operate on the Olomouc-Cracow route. Part of Blahník’s report is a map marked with the anticipated movements of “exercise” units in southern and western Poland.

The Czech archives also contain a whole series of documents which illustrate the positions and opinions of other East European leaderships. Though they do not provide any new information, they do confirm and supplement our knowledge. This can be said particularly with regard to two documents which outline the position of the Soviet leadership in the spring and fall of 1981. The first of these is a private speech given by Brezhnev while

in Prague for the CPCz’s 16th Congress⁵³ in April 1981 (Document No. 4), and the second, of slightly unclear origin, is located in a folder marked “Poland” in the yet un-archived materials of Gustáv Husák (Document No. 6). The record of the meeting between Husák and János Kádár in November 1980 nicely reflects the Hungarian position (Document No. 1). Although it does contain sharp criticism of the Polish leadership, Kádár also attempted to keep a certain distance—neither directly interfere in the Polish developments nor participate in economic assistance. In contrast, the interpretation given in the fall of 1981 by Günther Sieber, the head of the SED CC International Relations Department, is characteristic of the East German leadership’s approach, which apparently felt most threatened by the developments in Poland (Document No. 5). It is a systematic, comprehensive analysis comprising well thought-out, enterprising approaches to the problem.

ABBREVIATIONS

AMV	Archiv Ministerstva vnitra (Archive of the Minister of the Interior)
A ÚV KSC	Archiv Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa (Archive of the CC CPCz), Prague, Czech Republic
Barch	Bundesarchiv
BND	<i>Bundesnachrichtendienst</i>
CC	Central Committee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPCz	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSPA	Czechoslovak People’s Army
„SSR	„
	CSPA

.6(Bundesarchiv)JTJiT*SE

communication equipment and partly-deployed forces.

[...]

More detailed preparations for the second exercise will likely take place between 8 and the 10 of December 1980.

In conclusion Marshal Ogarkov noted that at the present time the exercise is merely prepared. Its execution, including the timing of the exercise, will be decided by the political leadership. This allied action will probably be announced in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, though with less than the 21 days notice specified.

Respected Comrade, I am also including at this time a draft information bulletin for the CPCz CC General Secretary and President of the „ SSR and, provided that you have no objections to its content, I would like to ask you to sign it.

[*Ed. note:* Map not printed]

[*Source: Investigation Commission of the House of Representatives of the Czech Republic (copy in the possession of the author); translated by Oldřich Třma.*]

Document No. 3

Information regarding the meeting between Karel Hoffmann, President of the Central Unions' Council and Member of the CPCz CC Presidium, and Stanisław Kania, PUWP CC First Secretary, Warsaw, 17 March 1981 (excerpt)

17 March 1981.

[...]

Comrade Hoffmann then pointed out that our Party and the public are also increasingly disturbed by the fact that the PUWP has not managed to achieve that which was discussed by Comrade Husák and Comrade Kania⁵⁸ and approved by the CC (i.e.—“we shall take the initiative into our own hands,” “we are developing an offensive and we shall suppress the antisocialist forces,” “the attitude of party members who have joined Solidarity has not changed,” etc.).

Comrade Hoffmann continued with his breakdown of the Czechoslovak experience in the fifties and sixties, and particularly of the crisis years to demonstrate the generally applicable preconditions by which one can determine when, and whether, unions can support the Party. He stated that union members in the „ SSR and functionaries in the branch unions do not understand why Solidarity is supported and preferred when it so sharply stands up to the Party. Nor do they understand why there is no support for the class unions (branch unions), which are the only ones actively supporting the Party and fighting for its policies. He emphasized the importance of unity and effective action that a renewal of the class unions' national body in

the PPR would have on both the internal and international level (without repressing the specificity of the unions or restricting their activity), and also mentioned the possibility of the unions publishing a daily newspaper, without which branch union activities are considerably restricted. This is particularly important now that Solidarity has been granted permission to put out its own publications.

At the end of his presentation Comrade Hoffmann mentioned that we regard as great mistakes of the „ SSR crisis period the fact that we did not call things and phenomena by their real names, that we did not speak specifically about the messengers of right-wing, anti-socialist expressions and tendencies, that we did not isolate enemy forces and, on the other hand, that we did not organize and unite the healthy forces, and that we permitted moral and political terror and the harassment of honest comrades. We were thus unable by means of our own internal forces to forestall the counter-revolutionaries. This experience is also generally applicable.

Comrade Hoffmann expressed once again the support and solidarity of the Czechoslovak Communists and wished the PUWP full success.

During Comrade Hoffmann's remarks one could notice Comrade Kania nervously shifting in his seat, his facial expressions betraying his disagreement and dissatisfaction.

Following Comrade Hoffmann's presentation, Comrade Kania gave the floor to Comrade Grabski, who very briefly and concretely spoke about the current problems, the efforts of the Party, and the question of the unions in the PPR and their international contacts.

Then Comrade Kania spoke. His first reaction was to state that the events in Poland could not be evaluated through Czechoslovak eyes, as the crisis in the „ SSR had a completely different character.

According to Comrade Kania, in comparison with that of the „ SSR in 1968/69, the Polish situation is worse in only two ways—in the „ SSR there had only begun one crisis, whereas in Poland there had been a number of what could be termed mass crises, and further, “in Czechoslovakia the economic situation had been good and in Poland it was bad.”

He further stressed that the CPCz CC and the Presidium had adopted opportunistic slogans, whereas the PUWP had not, that here the CC and the Presidium were united and properly oriented; the PUWP had the media firmly under control; the Polish army and security services held firm, whereas in the „ SSR these institutions had fragmented; Czechoslovakia had been helped by the allied armies, while in the PPR we were solving the crisis on our own and we are succeeding in mobilizing the people. We have many allies—we are supported by youth, independent unions, other political parties etc. As proof of the improving situation he pointed out the reduced visibility of Solidarity symbols.

developments. And also in recent days, in April, we had some contact with the Polish leadership.

We strongly recommended that the Polish authorities pursue an active and offensive course in internal policy; we directly, boldly, and plainly made clear to everyone the situation in the country, its causes, and ways out of the crisis proposed by the party and government in the interest of the people. At the same time it is especially important to show with actual examples the destructiveness of the actions of those who are sowing anarchy, aggravating strikes and undermining governmental authority.

We strongly recommended that the Polish comrades actively make use of valid legal norms and if necessary introduce new ones (by declaring a state of emergency) in an effort to isolate and suppress the evident counter-revolutionaries, leaders of the anti-socialist campaign who are directed by imperialist forces from abroad.

In our opinion all that does not have to mean bloodshed, which Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski fear. Rather on the contrary, continuing to make concessions to the hostile forces could lead to the shedding of the blood of Communists, honorable patriots of Socialist Poland.

That which has been said of course does not preclude, but rather on the contrary assumes contact and work with the working masses, which are currently in the ranks of "Solidarity." And also with a certain part of the leadership of that organization, since it is far from homogeneous both in the center and also especially in the localities. Our friends must above all endeavor to expand the mass basis of the

[Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 2/1981, 16 April 1981; translated by Oldřich Třma.]

Document No. 5
Record of a Meeting between Representatives of the
CPCz CC and SED CC International Relations
Department in East Germany, 8 October 1981
(excerpt)

8 October 1981.

[...]

The Situation Inside the Party

The [PUWP] Party Congress has solved nothing. The change which took place at the highest party levels has led nowhere. Logically, it could not lead anywhere under the present conceptual conditions of maintaining dialogue with a class enemy. Following the end of the Solidarity Congress, however, a change in thinking has occurred, particularly amongst the party rank and file. Opinion groups are forming, representing different conceptualizations of the optimal solution in the Polish situation.

1. Particularly at the district level there is a group of honest comrades who had suffered illusions regarding the possibility of dialogue with Solidarity. Everyday reality, however, has shown them something quite different. The leaders of certain districts, with the exception of Poznan, Gdansk, and Cracow, have come to the conclusion that Kania's capitulationist policy has collapsed.

2. A crystallization of opinion is also taking place at the level of the CC. Recently even Kania and [Politburo member Kazimierz] Barczikowski have undergone a slight shift in position, particularly under pressure from their district comrades and from the Soviet leadership.

3. Definite changes in the positions of certain individuals can also be seen. Rakowski for example is turning from the right wing towards the center and is gradually acquiring a leftist flair. On the other hand, [hardline Politburo member Stefan] Olszowski is moving to the right. One can also note differences of opinion between Kania and Jaruzelski. This results from the fact that Rakowski is essentially the brains behind Jaruzelski and thus a change in Rakowski's position influences Jaruzelski's point of view, which then leads to his differences in opinion with Kania.

4. The CC apparatus is very strongly opposed to Kania. This emerges from conversations with PUWP CC

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In Poland a variety of solutions, at different levels, have been proposed:

I. Calling a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, at which Kania and the Polish delegation would be forced to sign a list of demands. Kania would, upon his return, have to carry out radical measures, for example declaring a state of emergency, during which it would be necessary to count on the occurrence of a general strike including armed confrontation. Both these clashes would definitely reduce the blood which would have to be spilled later in a larger confrontation. This point of view is prevalent in the Warsaw region.

II. Another prospect assumes intensively working on those Congress delegates who have a permanent mandate, gaining a majority, calling a new Congress, and electing a new leadership which would be capable of radical measures in both the Party and the state (purge the Party, make the state apparatus capable of action, declare a state of emergency, create an armed militia and partially arm party members). This is a perspective which is widely adhered to in the GDR border regions. [Tadeusz] Grabski is apparently also thinking along these lines.

III. A different opinion relies on the Soviet Union, the „SSR and the GDR withholding military intervention against and hermetically sealing Poland inside its borders until the Poles solve their problems on their own. This would, however, mean an end to wholesome forces in the country.

IV. In the case of increasing anarchy we can presume that Kania and Jaruzelski, with the consent of Solidarity, will declare a state of emergency and put the army on alert, not, however, with the purpose of solving internal problems but in order to prevent the intervention of the Soviet Union and other countries. (This is the model of Polish history, of which Pilsudski once remarked, that “he got on the red tram and got off the white one.”)

The opinion of the SED regarding these opinions is that it is worth discussing the first and second of them. The SED is working in 15 districts where it has cooperative contacts. It is sending the maximum possible number of delegates and also welcoming as many Polish party delegates as possible. It is trying to strengthen the confidence of healthy forces, but will send material support only where it can be sure that it will be properly utilized. The healthy forces need copying technology, communication technology, and propaganda and agitation materials. The GDR will send this by various channels and in varying quantities. It will send them perhaps to district committees, for example to Comrade [Tadeusz] Porembski⁶⁰ in Wrocław, to Marxist circles in Poznań, and so on. The SED is working with the Polish state apparatus and especially with its headquarters through old and new contacts. (The Minister of Education is, for example, an accessible and reasonable comrade.) The SED leadership adopted last week a resolution by which all members of the Politburo, Secretariat, and leading divisions of the CC

should seek out contacts with their Polish partners and as

hoping that our nerves will fail.

In this situation a special vigilance and self-control is essential so it will not lead to their [the enemies'] coming in the other countries, to the isolation of the socialist community and to an increasing danger of military conflict.

5. We are looking for ways to find a political solution. There is still a possibility to prevent disaster. The PUWP must find ways to alter developments.

The tasks facing our party:

1) To strengthen the connection with the working class, to lead a decisive struggle against failures.

2) To increase awareness, not to permit deviations from the policy of the party.

3) Our line towards Poland is correct. The support of the healthy forces and working with the leadership of the PUWP and the country.

4) The USSR will make use of its influence in the international arena so as not to allow an escalation of Polish events in other countries.

The plenary session of the CC fully approved the political line and the practical action of the Politburo of the CC CPSU relating to the crisis situation in Poland.

[Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, file Gustáv Husák, unsorted documents, box "Poland;" translated by Oldřich Třma.]

Dr. Oldř

the Czech Republic (notably the report of General Blahník on the meeting in Moscow – see doc. 2 below, the order of Minister of National Defense Dzúr to conduct the “Krkonoše” exercise from December 5, the report of Gen. Gottwald on the reconnaissance mission to Poland, the minutes of the meeting of the Advisory Council of the Minister of National Defense on December 8), from expert reports for the use of the same commission (notably the report prepared by Lieut. Col. Antonín Kríz) and from several interviews conducted by the author in 1997 (with Lieut.

The Hungarian Party Leadership and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981

By János Tischler

The beginning of the 1980-1981 crisis in Poland coincided with the beginning of the decline of the Kádár regime in Hungary. János Kádár—who had come to power with the backing of Moscow by quelling the Hungarian Revolution in 1956—had long tried to preserve social law and order and to establish political legitimacy for himself, following the bloody repression after the revolution, by not interfering with people's private lives, by providing greater freedom within the framework of the existing political regime, and most importantly, by guaranteeing a constant increase in the living standard, thus creating an atmosphere of safety. From 1979 on, the Kádár regime subordinated other priorities to this latter aspect. Hoarding decreased to a minimum level and virtually all foreign loans served as subsidies of consumer prices and of unprofitable companies (which ensured full employment in return). However, an ever-growing part of the budget had to be spent on the repayment of loans and their interest.

While publicly emphasizing the solidarity of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) with Polish Communists and assuring Poland all possible economic and political assistance, Kádár believed from the very outset of the Polish crisis that the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) had to overcome its difficulties by political means and in a "socialist way." This latter phrase implied that Poland was expected to remain a socialist country and a member-state of the Warsaw Pact. In Kádár's opinion, the use of so-called "administrative means," that is, the deployment of the armed forces, would be acceptable only if no peaceful solution could be found or if the Communist regime itself were threatened. In this case, the challenge would have affected the whole socialist bloc and could have seriously endangered his (Kádár's) personal power as well. Nevertheless, he implied that even in such a case the crisis would best be dealt with by using internal Polish forces such as the state security organizations, the army, or the police. In Kádár's view, even in the event of a Soviet intervention as a final resort, Polish Communists would have to orchestrate the so-called "consolidation," that is, to "sort out all political and social difficulties," just as he and his Hungarian comrades had done after 1956. He knew all too well from his own experience how troublesome, or rather how much more troublesome, it was to seize power against the wishes of a nation, following a Soviet intervention.

Unlike other socialist countries which relentlessly attacked the PUWP and its leaders for their "opportunism," their chronic inability to act, and their backsliding, the HSWP tried to support its Polish counterpart by not interfering (either publicly or through

"inter-party channels") with any of the steps taken by the Polish leadership. After all, Kádár considered the Polish crisis to be a "family affair" relating exclusively to Soviet-bloc countries, a view he consistently upheld in the course of negotiations with various Western parties and politicians.

From the point of view of Hungarian internal affairs, events in Poland put Budapest in a simultaneously awkward and favorable position. Budapest could overtly claim how much better the situation was in Hungary compared with that in Poland, in terms of public order and the system of supplies. The efficacy of Kádár's policy could thus be neatly demonstrated, which was, in fact, what the HSWP leaders and the State-run media did. Besides approaching the 25th anniversary of the "counterrevolution," it was the "Polish affair" that offered Kádár an excellent opportunity to render a positive verdict on the HSWP's performance since 1956. He took pride in saying that he and his comrades had successfully avoided mistakes that were, alas, continuously and repeatedly being committed by the Polish leaders.

At the same time, the events in Poland evoked unease among the members of the HSWP leadership, for they constituted a kind of operational malfunction within the socialist bloc which later turned out to be a challenge to the internal state of affairs of other Soviet-bloc countries as well. Although Kádár publicly declared in September 1980 that HSWP policy would not get any stricter due to the events in Poland, the Hungarian party worried seriously about the Polish crisis even as it proclaimed the opposite. The HSWP asserted that the Polish example was not attractive to Hungarians since they had achieved a decent standard of living that they wished to preserve rather than imperil by allowing unrest comparable to that in Poland. (Nevertheless, the party leadership conceded that "there were—insignificantly few—people who supported 'Solidarity' and would gladly have seen the Polish example spread in Hungary.")

Hungarian government and party propaganda strongly condemned Solidarity and the strikes it organized. This propaganda emphasized that the mere existence of a free and independent trade union contradicted and undermined the power of the working class, furthermore, that strikes endangered the standard of living and socialist achievements. From the summer of 1981 on, this kind of propaganda expanded into a general anti-Polish campaign—lest the "Polish disease" spread to Hungary—and disseminated news about the alleged work-shyness, worthlessness, and parasitism of the Polish people. The Hungarian mass media used the fact that, when the living

about the incessant news about strikes in Poland. The media increasingly encouraged such views in Hungarian public opinion as “the Polish situation costs us a lot of money;” “the Polish expect other socialist countries to provide for them;” “not strikes but more and better work can improve living and working conditions;” and “it is impossible to distribute more without work and to go on strike while the people of other socialist countries keep on working.”¹

In 1980-81 three members of the Polish leadership, among them PUWP Secretary Stanisław Kania, visited Budapest to discuss current events and hear the advice of the fraternal Hungarian party. From August 1980 on, the Polish leadership regarded Hungary as a model to be followed. Kania and his comrades listened to the opinion of the First Secretary of the Hungarian Party with keen interest since they would have liked to transplant the success of Kádár’s policy to the Polish situation. Kádár was, no doubt, widely popular in Poland, and the PUWP tried to capitalize on this politically. It was little wonder that both Kania, then Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski (right after imposing martial law), requested and received a detailed report on how the HSWP leadership had set about “consolidating” the situation in Hungary after 4 November 1956. (The Polish leadership tried to benefit from the living memories of the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary by showing at home the Hungarian documentary on the “Counterrevolution in 1956” under the title “So it happened,” evidently believing that the evocation of “the Hungarian scenario” would terrify the Polish people.) On every occasion, the Hungarian leadership urged its Polish guests to draft a brief but clear program on the basis of which party members could be activated and which could draw wide masses and ordinary followers of socialism “yearning for law and order.” They also underlined the need for unity in the party leadership which would then “manifest itself” in the rank-and-file as well, and that it was of prime importance for the Polish party to carry out an accurate analysis of the events.

The meeting of Warsaw Pact party and government leaders in Moscow on 5 December 1980 concentrated on one issue: the situation in Poland. The Hungarian delegation was led by János Kádár, whose speech differed markedly from those of the so-called “hardliners” from East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia (E. Honecker, T. Zhivkov and G. Husák respectively). While they seemed to urge an armed intervention, Kádár insisted on finding a political solution. He repeatedly stressed that Polish Communists were responsible for finding a way out of their own predicament. Integral to that aim, he added, was the preservation of the leading role of the party, the socialist constitutional order, the government’s authority, as well as control of the mass media. He also warned that it was vital to correct earlier mistakes and stressed they should not focus attention on the search for scapegoats. In this connection, he referred to the fact that ex-Hungarian leader Mátyás Rákosi—who had been deposed from

power in the summer of 1956—and his comrades “had been called to account [i.e., expelled from the HSWP] only in 1962.” He added that the platform that the PUWP was to work out should reflect firm determination. Finally, Kádár recalled the event of November 1956—throughout which he could rely only on Soviet arms and on members of the Rakosi regime’s apparatus—“when the Soviet comrades encouraged Hungarian Communists by telling

of Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense) Kádár warmly congratulated him. A couple of days later the Hungarian leader declared that “polarization had increased in Poland and as a result, their long-established opinion and viewpoint had also grown stronger by virtue of which the launching of a more determined, proper and rational fight—that appeals to all honest people—would rapidly gain popularity against counterrevolution.” At any rate, in the autumn of 1981 the Hungarian Party, urged immediate action and was not only relieved by but also fully agreed with Jaruzelski’s declaration of martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981, a step which in Hungary was somewhat euphemistically translated as a “state of emergency.” The HSWP Secretariat assembled the same day and passed a resolution to provide Poland with immediate economic relief in accordance with Jaruzelski’s request, endorsing “Comrade János Kádár’s letter of 10 December 1981.” Jaruzelski’s request for economic aid had

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responsibility, namely that it has to resolve the crisis on its own and that the party already had plans for its resolution. "The leadership is in constant contact with the CPSU with which it consults regularly and it is relying heavily on multi-lateral assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, on which it is counting in the future as well."

[Kania continued: "] The crisis has been made worse by the fact that it is the fourth one since 1956, that it is affecting the working class and other strata of society including the youth, that it looks likely to be prolonged, that strikes are making the situation more intense and that anti-socialist forces are trying to use the trade unions to their advantage.["]

["] In spite of present difficulties, it can be stated that the situation report of the [Polish] Party was correct: the cause of the crisis lies in the justified dissatisfaction of the working class. Ideologically, the Party did not prove equal to its task, it swept away the class-character of society and declared a 'developed socialist society' too soon in a situation where small-commodity production still existed in agriculture. Hostile forces took advantage of the dissatisfaction politically as well and provoked fierce class conflicts. When there were waves of strikes, it was correct to find a solution by political means, as only compromise was able to resolve the situation. ["]

["] The trade union 'Solidarity' was formed by opposition forces, but is popular with workers too. It has some 6 million members at present while sectoral trade unions comprise about 5 million members. The Church has become stronger also as a protector of the social rights of the masses. Hostile Western forces and reactionary émigrés have also been active and aggressive. ["]

["] In the present situation the Party has to strengthen itself on that basis in order to find a way out of the crisis by political means. It is very important to point out that it was neither socialism nor the Party that led the country into crisis but the mistakes committed in the course of its work and the violation of the norms of Leninism in party life. For this reason the Party devised the notion of renewal. This was accepted at the 6th plenary meeting, but, unfortunately, rather than the steps to be taken, invariably it has been the problems of the past that have come to fore. The membership of the Party is decreasing, yet, at the same time there are some 26 thousand new candidates for membership. The situation is getting worse in the coastal region (Pomerania), in Wrocław and Warsaw but positive processes have begun in Silesia, Katowice, Kraków, Poznań, and in Bydgoszcz. ["]

["] There are many calls for those who have committed mistakes to be brought to account. The Party delegated this matter to the party control bodies and people's control committees. ["]

["] A positive factor has been that, despite the enemy's active work in the universities, their efforts did not produce the results they hoped for. As a consequence of the correct decision taken by the Party, the conditions

are good for cooperation with the Peasants' Party. ["]

["] Lately anti-socialist forces have been taking advantage of workers' strike movements and using them for political purposes. Representatives of 'Solidarity' have even made statements against the state. Workers' protection commissions have become active, against which the Party is fighting by political means. A group of leaders of the 'Independent Confederation of Poland' movement has already been arrested, and lately more people are being taken into custody. (Due to these opposition activities it was necessary to set up the Committee for Administrative Measures).

["] There is an operational body working alongside the Prime Minister which is prepared for the introduction of a state of emergency. Combat-ready units are being set up by members of the Party and they will also be provided with arms. Today these number 19 thousand men, by the end of December their number will reach 30 thousand. In an emergency these units would launch surprise arrests of the main opposition elements, and would take control of the mass media, the railways and principal strategic points.

However, the Party intends to seek a solution by political means. The 7th plenary meeting created a more favorable atmosphere for this. Democratic centralism gained strength in the Party. The Party appealed to the Polish people more pointedly than before. This has been made necessary, in fact, by the demands of the crisis as well as those of society.

["] The Party holds a key position in the search for a solution, since it is important for the Party itself to escape the 'mutual settling of accounts.' The enemy also wants to break down organizational unity in the Party. The unified forces are putting up a consistent fight against factionalism and are taking measures to strengthen ideological unity. The convocation of the extraordinary Congress of the Party was scheduled between the first and second quarters of the next year. However, a potential danger has emerged, as circumstances are not right for the party organizations to elect Marxist delegates. It seems that the Congress would not be able to take place on the scheduled date. The leadership of the Party is currently dealing with the replacement of cadres, which is proceeding according to plan."

Comrade Kania admitted that the PUWP deserved criticism for the work of the organs of the mass media. Determined and conscious cadre work has been launched in this field as well, in order to radically change the character of the propaganda. The situation was adequate in the organizations of the CC, in the Warsaw and other voivodeship party newspapers, but they need to take proper control of all mass media organs.

As far as the trade unions were concerned, Comrade Kania added that they wanted to restore the class character of the movement and that sectoral trade unions were already functioning in line with this aim. "It is possible that a trade union federation will be formed. It is

necessary to force Solidarity to hold elections. Experience has proved that, through elections, counterrevolutionary forces are voted out of leading positions, while a number of honest Communists get in.” He described Wa»sa as a “sly half-wit,” stressing that his movement had leaders influenced by extremists (such as anarchists and terrorists). He added that it is necessary to prevent him from establishing closer relations with the workers’ protection commissions.

[Kania continued: “] At the Polish Armed Forces everything is in order and the effective force follows the party line. However, political-educational work is important, as these forces too, are influenced by the events and one-quarter of the effective force has been replaced as a consequence of new recruits to the army. [”]

[“] The situation of the Sejm and local councils is improving. Their work has to be made even more popular, so they will discuss certain issues in public and thus respect for them will grow among the masses. [”]

[“] The country’s economic situation is extremely grave, market supplies are insufficient and rationing has to be gradually introduced. Poland is striving to export more goods (e.g. color televisions) in order to be able to import food products. In 1981 the national income will decrease again. Coal production is expected to decrease, as miners are unwilling to work on Sundays. [”]

[“] Poland is largely dependent on the West, above all on the German Federal Republic and the USA. Its capital debt stock is some 27 billion dollars. In 1981 Poland will have to take up another 10 billion dollar loan, since the value of its exports to capitalist markets does not cover the compulsory amortization installments. On the other hand imports will have to be financed from further credits. The USA and other capitalist countries have brought it to their attention that in the event of Poland joining the International Monetary Fund, more favorable credit terms would be granted. However, for reasons of principle, Poland rejects this proposal. [”]

[“] According to the plan for economic stabilization, it will take about 3 years to surmount the present difficulties. They wish to rely on the assistance of financial experts of the Soviet Union and would also like to make use of the experiences of other socialist countries. [”]

[“] On December 16 it will be the 10th anniversary of the events in Gdansk which will obviously be commemorated. The PUWP cannot completely isolate itself from this and cannot yield ground to the class enemy. Presumably, the anniversary will be dealt with by the 6th Party Congress and the 7th plenary meeting. [”]

Finally, Comrade Kania emphasized that the Polish Communists will do their utmost to defend socialism in their country.

After Comrade Kania and before Comrade T. Zhivkov, Comrade János Kádár rose to speak. Comrade Kádár emphasized the following in his speech. “The aim of the meeting is to coordinate our views, to encourage the supporters of socialism in Poland and around the world

and to give a warning to the class enemy. In the present complicated international situation, the events in Poland directly affect both Europe and the Warsaw Pact.” Talking briefly about the current issues of the international situation, Comrade Kádár passed on to an analysis of the circumstances in Poland. He emphasized that the roots of the crisis ran deep and that its causes were to be found in agriculture, in the overdemanding pace of industrial development and investment, in the continuous increase in wages, in failing to meet the demand for goods and also in mistakes in state leadership. “All this has led to tensions, strikes and started the process of disintegration and erosion. The class enemy has learned more from past events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland than we have. Formally, for example, they agree with the leading role of the Party, with building socialism and with membership in the Warsaw Pact. However, in reality they want to drive socialist forces back in all areas. [”]

[“] The imperialist forces assert that other socialist countries are afraid of the “Polish infection.” From the point of view of internal affairs, we are less anxious about the events, we rather deal with the issue as a common, international one.” To avoid misunderstandings, in his appeal to Comrade Kania, János Kádár clarified that it was the public feeling he was referring to. He added that during the events in Pomerania, the Hungarian public was of the opinion—in spite of the long-standing historic friendship between the two nations—that it was impossible to distribute more goods without work or to go on striking while other socialist countries worked normally. János Kádár said that they were also concerned with the issue of participation of a Polish delegation in the Congress of the Central Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions. He believed that the absence of the Polish delegation from the Congress would be regrettable, yet the composition of the delegation was of prime importance as Hungary was not willing to provide assistance to the international legalization of ‘Solidarity.’ Thus Comrade Kádár requested the leadership of the PUWP to take this into consideration when selecting the delegation.

Kádár stressed the solidarity of the Hungarian nation and pointed out that the socialist way out of the crisis was to be found by Polish Communists themselves. He said: “We are neither able to, nor do we want to determine this solution, nonetheless we would like to make some

Carrington, [Hans-Jhrgen] Wischnewsky, Vice President of the SPD, and others that Poland had never been and would never be for sale and that she cannot be torn out of the Warsaw Pact. There are powerful forces in Poland which believe the same and that the crisis has to be overcome by the Polish people themselves. It seems that these negotiating parties have understood this point. ["]

[“] We do not wish to give advice to the Polish comrades, however, we do have some revolutionary experience from which it would be useful to exchange our opinions. Yet, it should be taken into consideration that it is not advisable to copy anything. If we were in the same situation, we would strongly suggest that first of all the Party take a firm stand and then that it start a counter-attack. It is of prime importance to determine urgently—and more explicitly than before—the political platform of development. The emergency congress would then be able to carry out useful work only on the basis of such a political platform. In the case of examination and judgment of cadres, their actual activity should be taken into account. This work is to be started at the Central Committee and the Politburo. If the controlling organs form an integral whole this unity will manifest itself in the Party as well. [”]

[“]There is a unique situation in the Party now as it is events which are selecting the Party members. In this process the most important is not the number of members, but rather the number of those who support the Party’s platform. It is also important to distance oneself from the mistakes of the past, but attention should not be concentrated on the search for scapegoats. [”] (In this connection, Comrade Kádár referred to the fact that Rákosi and his clique had been called to account only in 1962.)

“A clear situation has to be created within the Party and others are not allowed to interfere with its decisions with democratic slogans. The same holds for the questions of state power. The Party’s platform has to reflect a kind of determination and it also has to make clear that the PUWP will not look for bloodshed in the future either; however, that it will ensure the protection of certain things by all possible means. A distinct, straightforward policy will be supported at least by half of the population of the country. In this they (i.e. the leadership of the PUWP) can count not only on the communist, but also on other progressive, patriotic forces, including even religious people.” Comrade Kádár recalled the events following 1956 when the Soviet comrades encouraged Hungarian Communists by telling them that they were stronger than they had ever thought. He added that the same applied now to Polish Communists.

Finally he emphasized that the existing situation was the PUWP’s and the Polish nation’s own affair, which was nevertheless inseparable from the socialist community and from European and international political questions. Comrade Kádár then declared: “With joint effort we shall overcome the difficulties. We stand by you. In finding

the way out you can rely on the progressive forces of the world and, in a sense, even on sensible capitalist circles which would rather avoid confrontation.”

Comrade Leonid Brezhnev requested permission to speak towards the end of the meeting. He underlined that the processes in Poland could have been prevented and that he had called Comrade Gierek’s attention to the mistakes several times, the last time during the meeting in the Crimea in 1980. Comrade Gierek, however, kept reassuring him that their Party had control over the situation. However, the events had serious consequences, which then affected the international state of affairs and the cause of peace as well.

Comrade Brezhnev also said: “It is completely inexplicable why the Party withdrew following the first attack. The PUWP should not be concerned with the past for it only provides the enemy with a weapon in this way. The hostile forces are working on the basis of a realistic evaluation of the present circumstances. However, despite unanimous evaluation just a month earlier by leaders of both the PUWP and the CPSU both of the situation and of the measures to be taken, things became worse. It was determined that further withdrawal was out of the question, that an offensive had to be launched and that the Party had to be made ready to strike. The basis for all this was prepared and the Party was able to rely on so-called ‘sound’ forces, the army, the police and on a section of the trade unions. At the same time the Party retreated again. Hostile forces became active and the class-conflict grew tense. The counterrevolutionary center accelerates processes: it seeks to form a party on the basis of the ‘Solidarity’ organization and it tries to win over the Peasants’ Party to its cause. On top of that a Christian Democratic Party is about to be formed, while the same counterrevolutionary center is working on the development of a bourgeois election system, is determined to split the Party, the intelligentsia and the youth apart, is cooperating with the Church, is gradually taking over the mass media apparatus, is becoming active even within the army, where it exerts its influence with the help of the Church. [”]

[“]The CPSU did agree with the idea of finding a political solution for the crisis. Today, however, the class enemy does not show restraint. It regards the work of the PUWP as its weakness and is increasing the pressure on it. In practical terms, there is dual power in Poland today. [”]

[“]To put it bluntly, the Party has to admit that socialism is in great danger in Poland. It has to be emphasized that the present situation is not merely the consequence of mistakes committed in the past, but also that of five months of strike movements. We must make it absolutely clear that we shall not take any steps backwards, that we support the further development of socialist democracy, the rights of the trade unions and that we will determinedly fight back anti-socialist forces. [”]

[“]The Soviet Union and the socialist countries support the Polish communists economically as well. We

Document No. 2

for both the Party and you personally. It clearly cast light on the extent of opportunism and the threat represented by opportunists. If they had been given a free hand they would have diverted the party from Leninism to social democracy. Besides, they behaved in a mean way and launched a campaign of slander.

In spite of this, the final outcome of the Congress and the fact that the highest party authority chose you for the post of First Secretary, create a reliable basis for resolute and consistent measures for the solution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation.

The most important thing is that we do not waste time. People must feel right away that the leadership is in reliable hands.

I was informed that Solidarity is threatening a strike which is to be organized at your airline company. You have to show them that times have changed. There will be no more capitulations. Don't you agree?

S. Kania: I absolutely agree.

L. Brezhnev: After all, the whole struggle is still ahead of you. It is not going to be an easy fight. The counterrevolution—the danger of which we have already talked about several times—does not intend to lay down its arms.

I would like to believe that, holding together the party *aktiv* and all the Communists, you and your comrades will be able to stop the course of events, fight back the enemies of socialism and defend the achievements of socialist Poland.

In such circumstances, Stanisław, be assured that you can rely on our solidarity and support.

The Soviet people express their pleasure on your election as leader of the Party and they will follow

necessity of the persistent fight against anti-socialist forces, and Poland's commitment and her responsibility towards our alliance system.

Despite justified expectations and hopes, the events of the period since the Party Congress have proved that it was not the followers of socialism, but its enemies who took the offensive and sought confrontation and the seizure of power. This fact has been stated and acknowledged by you, the leaders of the Polish Party and

on behalf of the Central Committee of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
(signed) János Kádár

*[Source: Hungarian National Archives (Budapest),
Department of documents on the Hungarian Workers'
Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 288. f.
11/4400. ö.e., pp. 120 - 123.]*

Document No. 4
“Report to the [HSWP CC] Politburo,” from János

Moscow's Man in the SED Politburo and the Crisis in Poland in Autumn 1980

By Michael Kubina¹

By the late 1970s, Soviet-East German relations had become tense due to East German leader Erich Honecker's *Westpolitik* and the increasing economic dependence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Evidence of these strains can be found in minutes recorded by Gerhard Schhrer, head of planning for the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), of a March 1979 conversation during the 24th convention of the GDR/USSR Parity Government Commission. According to Schhrer's account, USSR Council of Ministers chairman N. A. Tikhonov, a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo, complained about the GDR's increasing co-operation with the West at Soviet expense. Schhrer wrote: "Comrade Tikhonov had a five-page long document, which he under no circumstances was willing to hand over to me. I answered [sic] as follows: The material you are using was obviously created by someone who doesn't know anything about the co-operation r"02ukin0 18 164d00(et)Tjyrutes

November 1980, Stoph and MfS chief Erich Mielke had a brief conversation about which Stoph informed Krolikowski, who then made a note of it. Mielke was reported to have declared his determined opposition to Honecker's "unilateral actions."²³ Stoph said he had asked Mielke to "change his tactics," adding that "it was not sufficient to inform only EH. Whenever it was possible he was to inform the other PB members as well. Mielke said that this was quite difficult, since EH specified who was to be informed and who was not. [...] He plotted only with GM. He usually hunted only with GM. Mielke was only invited when [Soviet Ambassador P.A.] Abrasimov²⁴ was invited as well."²⁵ Concerning Poland, Mielke reportedly stated: "When EH makes super-demanding claims on the FRG, it is not due to Brezhnev's criticism at the Crimea, but rather because EH got frightened to the bones by the events in Poland. He fears that he could have similar

by GM, is certainly wrong.

And though absolutely necessary, no conclusions are being drawn from the events in Poland for the policy of our party, concerning e.g.:

- the application of Leninist standards of party work;
- the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the situation and the consequences resulting from it;
- the acknowledgement of criticism and self-criticism from top to bottom;
- to take action against the 'spin' towards the West in the GDR;
- the fight against spreading nationalism here, which is also fed by the events in Poland;
- the penetration by bourgeoisie ideology via the Western mass media and visitors;
- measures to prevent further indebtedness of the GDR [to the West];
- overcoming the gaps between purchasing power and production.

These extremely important questions, however, are not mentioned in the report at all, much less treated in a profound way. The opposite is the case. The internal situation of the GDR is represented as if there are no difficulties, although changes are necessary and are ever more forcefully demanded within and outside of the party.

[...]

[Addition to point 4 - page 5]

What are the crucial motives behind EH's and GM's use of the events in Poland for their plans in such an extraordinary manner?

1. They use them in order to make others forget the CPSU critique, ventured at EH by L.I. Brezhnev in the Crimea; they pretend to be super-revolutionaries, the initiators of the current consultation among the General Secretaries and First Secretaries of the fraternal parties in Moscow. At the same time, they think, they are countering the unsatisfactory Soviet incapacity to act in the Polish question.

Their extraordinary handling of the Polish events pursues the domestic goal of defeating all attempts to draw parallels between EH and Gierek.

2. EH and GM use the Polish events to allow GDR achievements to appear still more beautiful and brighter, as an example of the almost sole intact socialist system in the world.

3. Their extreme condemnation of the events in

Berlin since 1992. He is co-author of "Hart und Kompromi8los durchgreifen" SED contra Polen 1980/81 (1995). His research interests include the 1980/81 Polish

Bulgaria and the Political Crises in Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1980/81)

By **Jordan Baev**

In recent years, new evidence has come to light from Bulgarian archives concerning the position of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and state leadership on the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1980/81.¹

Bulgaria and the Prague Spring

In the fall 1993 issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*, Mark Kramer presented hypotheses on the role Bulgarian leader Todor Živkov played in the suppression of the “Prague Spring.”² The documents kept in the former BCP Central Committee (CC) archive clarify this matter unambiguously and definitely discredit the statements made by Živkov in his memoirs thirty years later, claiming that he had opposed the August 1968 Soviet invasion and had been sympathetic to the reform efforts.³ We now also have at our disposal clear evidence of the Bulgarian leadership’s attitude toward the Polish crisis of 1980/1981, which was presented at the Jachranka conference on “Poland 1980-82: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions” (in November 1997). Less information is available, however, concerning the Bulgarian society’s reaction to the political crises in the two East-European countries as well as to Bulgarian military participation in the Warsaw Pact “Danube ‘68” operation against Czechoslovakia.

In February 2006, the archive definitely had been, 51 Tw1 Tc1“0 Tw1“(1.424Tj1“/F5 1 Tfi“0.612 0 TD1“0.0001 Tc1“0.0051

their actions which had saved the Czechoslovak people from a “counterrevolution” and had prevented an inevitable Western intervention. They firmly maintained this position in front of representatives of Western Communist Parties who had opposed the military action in Czechoslovakia as well. During the extremely controversial and long discussions with the head of the International Department of the Italian Communist Party, Carlo Galuzi, on 16 September 1968, the BCP leaders repeated many times: “We do not consider that our interference was a mistake. We believe that by our intervention undertaken in a timely manner, we terminated the dangerous process of counterrevolution which could have only ended with a victory of the counterrevolution and in no other way... That could have been a dreadful flaw in the defense of the Socialist camp in Europe...”¹⁵ Five years later Zhivkov maintained the same view in his talks with Italian CP leader Enrico Berlinguer.

The position of the Bulgarian Party and State leadership regarding the 1980-81 Polish Crisis

Until the beginning of August 1980 no particular concern with the Polish crisis was shown in Bulgaria, though reports of public discontent and incipient upheaval had begun circulating. On the eve of Bulgarian Prime Minister Stanko Todorov’s visit to Poland in July 1980 the usual memos and references were prepared, one of which stated: “The dissidents are now in fact an insignificant group of people isolated from society, they have lost their public influence, are people disunited from inward struggles... The people are in a state of sound moral and political unity... Poland is a strong socialist unit...” After his official visit on July 14-15, Todorov, in a report to the BCP CC Politburo, declared: “I believe that the Party and State leadership in Poland, with regard to their current economic problems, are approaching the complicated problems with a sense of realism and are taking active steps to overcome them, taking into consideration the working people’s feelings.”¹⁶ One would hardly assume that in such confidential documents propaganda clichés would be deliberately used in place of a real evaluation. Obviously, at the time Bulgarian ruling circles did not realize the real social and political situation in Poland. In August - September 1980, however, the Embassy in Warsaw sent several informational reports on the changes in the situation and the formation of the political opposition to the Communist regime. No doubt, such news should have reached Sofia from Moscow as well.

On 15 September 1980, Todor Ćivkov received Politburo member Kazimierz Barcikowski who was sent to Sofia to inform the Bulgarian leaders of the situation in his country. During that conversation, Ćivkov said: “We do not dramatize the events in Poland but they require all the socialist countries to draw certain conclusions for themselves, too.” He added that the Bulgarian leadership would “follow the development of the matters in Poland” and concluded: “We, the Socialist countries, work in a

hostile environment and we have to admit that our enemies won certain points. Your case, one could say, is a link in the chain of the total imperialistic offensive against us...”¹⁷ Soon after the meeting, Ćivkov prepared a special memo on the matter, and the Polish situation was discussed at two Politburo sessions, on October 21 and 25. Ćivkov also maintained the hard line of an “offensive against the anti-socialist forces” at the summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders on 5 December 1980 in Moscow. Following instructions, the State Security structures became more active in their “preventive” measures and in their periodic analyses of the Polish crisis which laid particular stress on its influence in Bulgaria.

In the first half of 1981, nearly all information coming from the Bulgarian Embassy in Warsaw referred to the development of the political crisis. In a memo regarding bilateral Bulgarian-Polish relations in May 1981, Mariy Ivanov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated to the BCP CC: “In the last ten months relations between the mass trade unions, youth, women’s and other public organizations [in both countries] have practically been cut off...”¹⁸ In a report to the Foreign Ministry, the Bulgarian ambassador in Poland, Ivan Nedev, related the reaction of a high ranking Polish army officer: “[We will put up with] anything rather than Soviet-style socialism!”¹⁹

The review of the political and diplomatic documents on the Polish crisis, compared to other important archival sources as well, prompts the following conclusions:

Though publicly not as active as his Czechoslovak and East German colleagues Gustav Husak and Erich Honecker, the Bulgarian leader Todor Ćivkov was another firm supporter of the hard line of “decisive struggle” against the “counterrevolution” and the “anti-socialist forces” in Poland. In the spirit of the times, the expert evaluation and the diplomatic analyses usually accorded with Ćivkov’s and his entourage’s attitudes. The position of Foreign Minister Peter Mladenov, who often backed Ćivkov’s opinions, did not stray much. The Bulgarian leadership’s reaction demonstrated the unwillingness and incapability of the administration to draw even most general conclusions from the Polish events and to undertake political reforms even to the slightest degree.

As in previous decades, the development of the latest internal political crisis in the East European countries failed to provoke Bulgarian leaders to reconsider prevailing conceptions and attitudes, a rethinking which might have contributed to a transformation and modernization of the existing political regime. On the contrary, those crises induced a “hardening” of the Kremlin and East European rulers’ positions. Just as in the case of the 1956 and 1968 events, after those in Poland in 1980-1981 led to increased bitterness in Bulgarian party politics, resulting, e.g. in the dismissal of well-known figures in political and cultural circles, such as Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. This line of behavior fit very well with the general pattern of confrontation between Moscow and Washington in the early 1980s. At the same time, however it exposed an important feature of the

Bulgarian regime: its lack of adaptive mechanisms for overcoming the contradictions and crisis in the political elite under existing circumstances of a dictatorial personal rule. That, together with the no less important outside factors, such as U.S. policy, predetermined the unavoidable collapse of the system at the end of the decade without any choice of alternative paths.

¹ The author has also contributed newly declassified Bulgarian documents on the 1956 events in Hungary to the forthcoming National Security Archive reader on the crisis. I am grateful to Georgi Chernev, Chief of the Central State Archive; Avgustina Daskalova, Chief of the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Serafim Stoykov, Chief of the Archive of the Ministry of the Interior; and Danail Danailov, Division Head at the same archive, for their assistance in getting access to some confidential records. I would like to stress in particular that for the first time diplomatic and State Security confidential documents of the period are declassified especially for the *CWIHP Bulletin* and *CWIHP Electronic Bulletin*.

² Mark Kramer, "The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: New Interpretations (part 2)," *CWIHP Bulletin* No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 4-6.

³ T. Zhivkov, *Memoirs*

further compromise will result in yielding power and the annihilation of the Communists. The counterrevolution will not miss the chance for savage reprisals. Lists of those who are to be physically destroyed have probably already been made up. It is known from experience that counterrevolution is very much the same everywhere. In Poland it is not any better than it was in Hungary in 1956. If steps for its suppression are not taken now, it might be too late later, especially when the newly recruited conscripts enter the army. A delay in delivering a blow [against the counterrevolution] will result in loss of power and the restoration of capitalism. It should be clear that if new elections were to be held, anti-socialist forces would take power.

Com. Mladenov drew attention to the fact that the West's speculations on a Soviet intervention in Poland were discontinued. The Soviet Union, however, cannot be indifferent towards the future developments in Poland, and Poland cannot go ahead without Soviet deliveries of petrol, gas, ores and other raw materials, [in short] without the comprehensive Soviet aid. That is why the Polish comrades must undertake the necessary steps for defeating the counter-revolution themselves, and the sooner it is done, the less bloodshed there will be. They should not fear strikes. If strikes are declared they will last a week or two, and then will be given up. This is not the worst that could be.

Comrade Mladenov told Naperaj that Com. Zhivkov will openly express our position on the events in PPR to Stanisław Kania.

Georgi Georgiev, deputy-chief of the Second Department [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] was present on the meeting.

Sofia, 7 Oct[ober] 1981

signature: (illegible)

been introduced in Poland on 13 December 1981, allied troops would have entered Poland. Let me emphasize that there were indeed such plans, and the Polish state and military leadership knew about them. But there was not, and could not have been, any final decision on whether to send in troops . . .⁵

Gribkov would have had no incentive to acknowledge the existence of these plans unless his motivation was simply to tell the truth. As a former high-ranking Soviet military officer who takes great pride in his many years of service, Gribkov might have been expected to deny that any plans for a Soviet invasion of Poland were ever drafted. His willingness to admit that full-fledged plans did exist lends a great deal of credibility to his account. Moreover, his remarks are borne out by a large number of newly declassified documents, including East German and Warsaw Pact maps, military charts, and mobilization orders that show entry routes into Poland and the specific allied units that were slated to take part in joint military operations.⁶ Even though a large number of crucial items in the former East-bloc archives (especially the Russian archives) are still off-limits, all evidence to date fully corroborates what Gribkov said.

The release of the Suslov Commission's memorandum not only adds to, but helps clarify what has already been known about Soviet and Warsaw Pact military planning in 1980-81. Several points are worth highlighting.

First, the date of the memorandum, 28 August 1980, is significant. Just three days after the Suslov Commission was formed on August 25, the five senior members of that body were seeking to authorize extensive military preparations "in case military assistance is provided to Poland." This suggests that military contingencies were taken very seriously by the CPSU Politburo, and that Soviet leaders were not just bluffing when they asked Polish leaders several times in 1980-81 whether it would help matters if Soviet and allied troops entered Poland to

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have been designed to prop up Gierek or, more likely, to replace him with a more credible hardliner who would forcibly suppress the nascent Solidarity movement. The intervention thus would have been similar to the Soviet army's limited incursion into Hungary on 24 October 1956, which came in response to an urgent request from the Hungarian leader, Erno Gero.¹⁵ The intervention on 24 October 1956 was intended to help Gero impose a crackdown and put an end to the violent unrest that began the previous day. As it turned out, the entry of Soviet troops into Hungary, far from improving the situation, caused a sharp escalation of tension and violence. A full-scale revolution ensued, and the Soviet Union had to send a much larger contingent of troops to Hungary to crush the rebellion.

It is impossible to know whether anything comparable would have happened in Poland if the PZPR Politburo had decided on 29 August 1980 to pursue a crackdown. A few PZPR hardliners, such as Władysław Kruczek, did want to impose martial law, but a substantial majority of the Politburo members were convinced that, as Kania put it, it was a "fantasy" to expect that a large-scale crackdown could be carried out at such short notice.¹⁶ Hence, the Politburo authorized the Polish government to press ahead with the Gdańsk accords. No one on the Politburo welcomed this decision—Gierek insisted that "under threat of a general strike, we must choose the lesser evil and then find a way to get out of it"—but in the absence of a viable alternative, the Politburo reluctantly concluded that, for the time being, the strikers' demands would have to be fulfilled.¹⁷

Third, the Suslov Commission's directive specified two related but separate tasks. The first was the granting of authority to the Soviet defense ministry to mobilize "up to 25,000 military reservists and 6,000 vehicles" to flesh out three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division in the Belorussian, Baltic, and Transcarpathian Military Districts. As mentioned above, this task was carried out right away. The four divisions in question were all mobilized within a day or two, but they were not intended to remain that way indefinitely. Soon after the Soviet Politburo decided in late August 1980 that the time was not yet ripe to "provide military assistance" to Poland, these initial four divisions were brought back to a lower state of readiness and the mobilized reservists were released.

Even so, this did not mean that the first part of the August 28 directive ceased to be relevant. The scenario envisaged in the directive was largely preserved in the subsequent mobilization of Soviet troops in late 1980 and 1981. In the fall of 1980, after the initial four Soviet divisions had been demobilized, the Soviet Union gradually brought three motorized rifle divisions up to full troop strength and put them on high alert. In mid- to late December 1980, U.S. electronic intercepts and satellite reconnaissance were able to confirm that these three divisions could have joined an airborne division and the two divisions of the Soviet Union's Northern Group of

mobilized very rapidly when necessary. Because Category

Clearly, the planning that began in late August 1980 for the possible mobilization of an additional 75,000 reservists — the level stipulated in the Suslov Commission's memorandum — enabled Soviet military officials to expand their efforts very quickly so that a second-stage mobilization might have covered as many as eleven extra divisions. Although some of the extra divisions might have come from the combat-ready divisions in the USSR's Northern Group of Forces (which had two) and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (which had nineteen), Soviet planners undoubtedly wanted to minimize their drawdown of the Groups of Soviet Forces. Hence, they would have wanted to be ready to rely on as many Category 2 divisions as possible.

Whatever the precise explanation may be, there is no doubt that the numbers in the memorandum pertaining to a second phase of troop mobilization were large enough to give Soviet military planners a substantial degree of latitude.

Fifth, the projected size of each of the two stages of mobilization, as laid out in the memorandum, sheds valuable light on Soviet military options vis-à-vis Poland. The initial mobilization, on 28-29 August, applied to four Soviet divisions in the western USSR: three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division. These four divisions were soon demobilized, but the scenario outlined in the 28 August directive, as noted above, was largely preserved. Top-secret East German military documents regarding units slated to take part in the Soyuz-80 "exercises" in Poland in early December 1980 mentioned four Soviet divisions.²⁴ According to the East German documents, the four Soviet divisions were supposed to join two Czechoslovak tank divisions, one East German tank division, and four Polish mechanized divisions in the first stage of "exercises." (The four Polish divisions were included only after Jaruzelski insisted on it.) Because the numbers of Soviet divisions cited in the East German documents are identical to figures in the Suslov Commission's directive, this implies that the option of a limited Soviet intervention in Poland, as envisaged in the

in question were simply too small. Judging from the size of the invading force deployed in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it seems likely that Soviet leaders would have wanted to mobilize at least 30 Soviet divisions if they were contemplating an invasion of Poland that would have been aimed at neutralizing the Polish army, crushing all armed resistance, and establishing a pro-Soviet regime. Secret estimates by U.S. military intelligence analysts in the fall of 1980 predicted that Soviet leaders would want to mobilize at least 30 divisions for a full-scale invasion of Poland.²⁶ Some U.S. intelligence cables from Eastern Europe put the figure even higher, at around 45.²⁷ These numbers would have made sense if the Soviet Politburo had been contemplating an invasion of Poland similar to the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the numbers given in the August 28 memorandum fall so far short of that level that they could not possibly be for the same type of contingency.

It is conceivable, of course, that the August 28 memorandum was superseded by other documents that authorized the Soviet defense ministry to plan for the mobilization of some 15 to 20 further divisions, making a total of at least 30. There is no evidence, however, that this was the case. Following the demobilization of the three Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions that were briefly mobilized on 28-29 August 1980, only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were fully mobilized during the crisis. The figures provided by East German military sources and by Ryszard Kukliński indicate that as many as fifteen Soviet divisions might eventually have been brought up to full combat readiness if the situation had deteriorated. However, that figure, which was never attained, was still vastly short of 30 (not to mention 45, a figure that many U.S. intelligence officials were wont to cite all through the crisis). No documentation or other evidence gives any reason to believe that the Soviet defense ministry at any time was planning for a Czechoslovak-style operation.

On the other hand, the new evidence does suggest that, at least for a while, Soviet leaders were seriously considering the option of a limited military intervention in Poland. This option loomed large in late August 1980 and again in early December 1980. The Soviet leadership's preference all along was to have the Polish authorities implement martial law on their own as soon as possible. But if that goal proved infeasible, the Soviet Politburo was willing to provide help, at least during the first several months of the crisis. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, emphasized this point when he spoke with Kania and Jaruzelski in Warsaw in early April 1981:

Our common goal should be to resolve the crisis without having to send allied armies into Poland. All socialist states should strive toward this end. Unless the Polish state security organs and Polish army are deployed, outside support cannot be expected, since it

would cause international complications. The Polish comrades must try first to solve their problems on their own. But if they cannot manage on their own and appeal for help, that type of situation would be very different from one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed in Poland from the outset.²⁸

It is far from clear that Soviet intervention under these circumstances would have made much sense. Polish officials had discreetly warned Kulikov that "it is even possible that if other Warsaw Pact troops move into Poland, certain units [of the Polish army] might rebel."²⁹ Because Soviet troops were already deeply embroiled in Afghanistan, the last thing the Soviet Politburo wanted was to provoke a large-scale conflict in Europe, which might drag on for months. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union went to such great lengths in 1980-81 to ensure that any prospective intervention by allied forces would be fully supported by Polish leaders.

Even though a good deal of new evidence shows that the Soviet Union made extensive plans and preparations for military intervention in Poland in 1980-81, this does not necessarily mean that there was ever a firm *intention* in Moscow to send in troops, especially if the Polish Communist regime was actively opposed to such a step. There is still not—and may never be—any way to know whether the Soviet Union would have invaded Poland if Polish leaders had openly refused to impose martial law or if the martial law operation in December 1981 had collapsed and widespread violence had broken out. None of the new evidence has resolved that question, and perhaps none ever will. Nevertheless, three things do now seem clear: first, that Soviet leaders for some time were willing to send in a limited number of Soviet divisions to help the Polish authorities impose martial law; second, that this option would have been pursued only if Polish leaders had supported and been willing to make good use of the incoming forces; and third, that Soviet leaders wanted to give themselves fall-back options for other military contingencies in case the situation in Poland took a disastrous turn.

Not until mid- to late 1981 did the situation in Poland change enough to permit Soviet leaders to deemphasize the military option. Once Kania was gone from the scene and Jaruzelski was ensconced in all the top posts, Soviet officials had much greater confidence that martial law could be introduced in Poland without outside help. Some form of military option was still present, but the scenarios that loomed so large in late August and early December 1980 had largely receded by late 1981. Even so, the Suslov Commission's operational directive of 28 August 1980 is a telling reminder of how close the Polish crisis came to escalating into a much wider conflict.

Document

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CPSU CC

The situation in the PPR remains tense. The strike movement is operating on a countrywide scale.

Taking account of the emerging situation, the Ministry of Defense requests permission, in the first instance, to bring three tank divisions (1 in the Baltic MD, 2 in the Beloruss. MD) and one mechanized rifle division (Transcarp. MD) up to full combat readiness as of 6:00 p.m. on 29 August to form a group of forces in case military assistance is provided to _____

Special Issue of

RODINA

“Disputes of the Cold War” (August 1998)

Including:

E. Zubkova, “Stalin and Public Opinion in the USSR”

V. Pozniakov, “Soviet Intelligence in the USA”

M. Korobochkin, “The Cold War in Northern Europe”

staged in Radom and Ursus in connection with the preparation for price increases.

Today's crisis affects the working class, but also other segments of the population, and the crisis is of a mass character. Young people prove to be particularly active, especially young workers, technicians, and engineers, and this crisis has lasted for a long time. The strike phase is behind us, but the crisis persists, and we are affected by the results on a daily basis. The situation has become demoralizing because one cannot hand out more than one produces.

The crisis also created new structures which are not of our making, in particular the new labor unions which create a lot of difficulties for us and pose an attempt by the enemy of socialism in Poland to test us.

There are various causes for [these] concerns, and questions can indeed be asked whether the estimate of the conflict in Poland is correct, whether we are on the right track to get out of this crisis.

We completely agree with Comrade Leonid Ilyich that it is necessary to analyze more thoroughly the anatomy of these occurrences which have led to the crisis, of all mechanisms which caused the undermining of the Party, the government, and even the economy of the country and which have allowed enemy forces, the forces of counterrevolution, to penetrate the working class.

Despite the various difficulties, we are of the opinion that our estimates accord with the reality of the situation. The main reason for the problems was dissatisfaction among the workers. There were, of course, real reasons for this dissatisfaction. That was the reason for the mass character of the strike movement. There were strikes in many major Polish plants, even in those which can look back to a long revolutionary tradition.

The Party proved to be extremely weak in the ideological field. We were faced with the results of policy which ignored the class character of society. The slogan of the achievement of modern socialist society was proclaimed much too early. This took place at a time when individual farmers in Poland still constituted the majority in the countryside, and in the 1970s, private enterprise spread over large parts of the trade business as well as other areas of the economy. [...]

Looking back today at these difficulties in the situation, we believe that the use of political measures for the resolution of the strike conflicts was a correct decision. Other solutions and other decisions could have provoked an avalanche of incidents and led to a bloody confrontation, the results of which would have affected the entire socialist world. Despite the difficult problems, it seems to us that there was no other resort than to compromise in the question of permitting the establishment of the new labor union.[...]

What is there to say about the period after the great wave of strikes? How should it be evaluated? It is a period of a very hard political battle, a difficult period for the Party. The new union "Solidarity" developed out of the

strike committees, not at the initiative of the workers but at the initiative of anti-socialist elements. But by and large, this organization was supported by the workers throughout the entire country, and it is popular nationwide since the workers achieved social benefits through the strikes. [...]

Foreign imperialist diversion centers have shown great activity and even aggressiveness towards Poland, in particular the radio station "[Radio] Free Europe," the centers of reactionary emigration, which have supported anti-socialist actions by means of propaganda and also by giving financial support to "Solidarity". We have protested sharply against this, and there are certain positive results, a certain retreat of the enemy forces.

[...]

We have, of course, lost some of our prestige in the eyes of party activists, due to these compromises. Even if a certain state of criticism has been reached, we nevertheless managed to isolate some of the anti-socialist elements. The public did not react too agreeably to this. A situation occurred in which it was necessary to put a number of repressive measures, including administrative measures, into effect.

Created by the Politburo, a group which operates under the direction of the premier, is preparing a series of different measures. This includes among other things the question of introducing martial law in Poland.—Actually, under our constitution we only have the option of declaring martial law.

the counterrevolution, in order to defend socialism, the socialist position, in Poland.

Todor Āivkov:

Dear Comrades! In consideration of the nature of our meeting, I would like to address some key questions and

are stirred, attempts [are made] to hide the class character of the events, to cover up the counterrevolution, and to extol friends as foes and vice versa.

I want to state quite frankly: To our mind, there is at this moment a real chance of a change of the social order in Poland. We should not underestimate this! If we had to give a strict class-based estimate now, we would have to say that the possibilities of a political approach, which the Polish comrades have taken thus far, have been exhausted. In our opinion, the situation in Poland is clear and no further clarification is required.[...]

János Kádár:

Dear Comrades!

expect.

The British asked: What does this mean? Is this the end of détente?—I said: No, but if these limits are reached, then détente would really be over. He said yes and then shut up. The West German representative reacted similarly.

Recently, we have used certain exchanges of opinion and consultations [sic], and we are asked: Well, if you had to give us advice, would you recommend that we act as you did. I would like to address this [issue] very frankly.

As far as the Hungarian Party is concerned, we have no authority and no ambitions as well, to give advice to anybody or to consider ourselves a model. But at the same time, we ascribe importance to the great revolutionary experiences of all fraternal parties. We think consultations such as today's are very important, and let me add:

You cannot copy or mechanically transfer revolutionary experience. This does not work. And whenever I am talking about our position, about our attitude, it is in friendship that I would like to state what the Polish fraternal party should do or what we would do if we were in its place.

To my mind it is now of decisive importance to maintain the position since retreat, the slippery slope downward, has not yet ended. One has to get one's act together and go on the offensive.

The second thing I would say is the following: The decisive thing is that there is an unequivocal, decisive socialist platform for future developments. And this has to happen right away. While you now have a program, it has to become more consistent.

Comrade Kania spoke of the plenum, of re-elections in the base organizations. I am glad to hear you say that the plenum would have to be postponed a bit further; because I think: without a precise platform one cannot conduct a good plenum; then one cannot elect good leading organs in the local organizations, since one does not know exactly which of the cadres are good and which are bad.

When we stewed in our own bitter juice in 1956, we dealt with this question in this way. When I asked people: Is this person still alive? Does he work?, I was often told: I have known him for 30 years. I responded: 30 years are not enough. Tell me how he acted last week. People change their behavior in such situations [as in 1956].

For this, you need a program, so that everybody can determine his attitude towards the Party and its program. You have to start at the top.

We do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Polish Party, but our own experiences tell us: in the critical times, the most important organ for the unity and action of the Party is the Central Committee, the highest organ. If there is a clear program and unity [of opinion] in this organ, everything is all set. But if there are 20 different opinions in the CC, nothing will come of it.[...]

As far as we know, the Polish Party now has 3.5 million members. I know that the situation there is somewhat odd.

One should probably not conduct purges now, but unfortunately the events themselves have resulted in such a purge. It is not important what the membership numbers are; it is instead important how many people participate in the struggle, how many adhere to your program.

Put the other way: there is no point in trying to achieve the unity of the Party based on compromises at any price. We need a clear platform, which will serve as a rallying point and a purge device. I think such a program could easily be used to set oneself apart from certain things, to distance oneself from the mistakes of the previous leadership very clearly and decisively, not just in words but also in deed and action.

This is one aspect. I will neither praise Gierek nor insult him. While one has to distance oneself, I would like to state, comrades, that the entire Party, the entire country, is now looking for scapegoats, and it will again lead you nowhere to spend most of your time calling people to account.

I am reminded again of 1956. Initially, we completely ignored Rákosi, we distanced ourselves from him and other comrades, quickly distanced ourselves politically from their policies, and we postponed the calling-into-account until 1962. I am not arguing that the Party Control Commission should not do its work now, but it should not be the primary focus of your work. It can't be that the entire Party now preoccupies itself with this. People will have to know: once we regain our strength, we will call those responsible into account. It is now important that the people's government builds a socialist Poland and protects the constitution.

The second thing we need is the following: We have to watch very carefully as to what are the limits up to which one can go in great [public] speeches. One should now be able to defend the fundamental order of the republic, even in party matters, and the party members will vote. What function they will serve within the Party is a matter for the Party, not for the entire nation. The Communists first need to establish order within their own ranks. We do not need some democratic forces for that. Therefore this has to be the limit.

For example, when people are arrested and then set free again, then there will again be discussions about militia work. Even in the Western press it has been stated that no country on earth could permit such things to happen at all. This is not a matter of ideological argument but a matter of the legal order, which has to be upheld throughout the country.

In order to make clear the limits of democraticism [sic], you have to have a program and be determined to do certain things.

Certain events, for example, took place without bloodshed. This is, of course, not a small matter. It has to be evident that the Polish Party and the Polish Government are not exactly looking for confrontation. They above all are not out to have people shot. But the defense of certain things has to be guaranteed—a defense by all means. And

this has to become evident. This is the best way to avoid bloodshed. Because if it is clear that every means possible will be employed, bloodshed will be avoided. This is the best solution. [...]

Finally, I would like to say the following: There are other effects in Hungary. I don't want to tell you what a depressed state of affairs we were in during the months from October to December 1956, thus during the decisive hours. We were very pessimistic but our foreign comrades supported us. Above all the Soviet comrades came to our help and told us—I well remember this, this is not just propaganda—you now need a reasonable policy. You are stronger than you think! And the Polish comrades should know this too: in reality, the forces of socialism in Poland are stronger than they appear at a first, superficial glance. Within a short time, positive decisions should be reached. Once again: you are stronger than you think. [...]

Erich Honecker:

Dear Comrades! [...]

These consultations were urgently necessary in view of the developments in the People's Republic of Poland. The events in our neighboring country Poland greatly worry the leadership of our Party, the Communists, the citizens of the German Democratic Republic. Nobody who cares for the cause of peace and socialism can be indifferent to what is happening in the PR Poland. [...]

We fully share the opinion that the survival of socialism in Poland is in acute danger. We recently spoke to comrades Kania, ŃabiŃski, Olszowski and others about this and have pointed out that it was necessary to put an end to these developments. At the same time, we provided Poland in this difficult situation with major material support. [...] The citizens of our republic are also aware of the huge amount of aid for Poland from the Soviet Union, the CSSR and other socialist countries. Our people are well aware of this. But there are many questions as to what exactly has improved since the 6th Plenum of the CC of the PUWP. Workers, members of the intelligentsia and others have expressed their disappointment that the visit by comrades Kania and PiŃkowski with Comrade Brezhnev has not lived up to their expectations.

We fully agreed with the results of this Moscow trip. Comrade Kania assured us on November 8 that the PUWP leadership would not withdraw one more step. But then there was the decision of the Supreme Court of the PR Poland which revised the decision of the Warsaw court. The Party and Government once more retreated from the counterrevolutionary forces. This resulted in a rapid escalation of counterrevolutionary activities and a massive deterioration of the situation. This was a major setback for all those who had hoped that the PUWP would master the problems. This is the main reason for the widespread discussions of the current situation in Poland within our Party and among our people and for the growing serious concerns about socialism in Poland which marks these

discussions.

There is obviously no disagreement among us about the fact that already the capitulation towards the strike committees in GdaŃsk, Szczecin and JastrzŃbie-KoŃskie

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border line of some 1,300 km, and this is, by the way, our longest border—but also because the threat to socialism in Poland constitutes a threat to our joint interests.

We in Czechoslovakia underwent a complicated process of development as well, when the counterrevolution went on the counteroffensive in our country, when the danger of civil war in the CSSR*170.002 4 -

develop after the 90 days agreed to by “Solidarity,” he did not say.

A part of the Politburo is for Comrade Jaruzelski and supports him completely. He acts extremely liberally and enjoys therefore a reputation through broad segments of society.

The Soviet comrades believe that Comrade Jaruzelski is not the man who can turn the course of events. Until now he has made great concessions in all areas, for instance with respect to:

- the events in BYDGOSZCZ
- the work among the youth
- Russian instructions in school as well as
- with respect to the Catholic Church.

He has very frequent discussions with the Polish Cardinal Wyszynski and hopes for the support of the Catholic Church. Wyszynski also holds Comrade Jaruzelski in high esteem, which is evident from many of his statements.

One must frankly admit that the Polish United Workers Party is currently weaker than the Catholic Church and “Solidarity.”

No one knows yet exactly how many members “Solidarity” has. One estimate is from 8 to 10 million, of which one million are supposed to be party members.

On 10 April 1981, a meeting of the Sejm is to be convened. One should not count on any fundamentally new questions. There are two papers on the economic situation provided by Comrades Jagielski and Kiesiel. Afterwards Comrade Jaruzelski wants to give an evaluation of the situation in Poland. The adoption of decisions regarding the limitation on the right to strike, censorship and the utilization of mass media is also on the agenda. In any case, it would be desirable if the Sejm were to make decisions that would set specific limits on the counterrevolution.

Leading Polish comrades unfortunately believe that they can solve all problems through political means—hoping especially that everything will clear up on its own. One cannot share such a view. It must frankly be stated that the moment to act was not taken by the Polish party and state leadership.

Altogether one has the impression that Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski do not wish to use force in order to remain “clean Poles.”

Both fear utilizing the power of the state (army and security organs) to restore order. They argue formally that the Polish constitution does not provide for a state of emergency, and that [Article 33](#) of the Polish constitution only refers to the national defense. Although Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov repeatedly called to their attention that in such a situation Article 33 on national defense could and had to be used, both remained unwilling to take such a decision.

The entire documentation for martial law was prepared

in close cooperation by Soviet and Polish comrades. This cooperation proceeded in an open and candid atmosphere. The Soviet comrades did not have the impression that the Polish generals and officers were concealing anything from them. Nevertheless, this documentation remains only on paper for it has not yet been implemented.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov tried to make it clear to Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski that they do not need to fear a strike. They should follow the example of the capitalists in reacting to strikes. Since “Solidarity” knows that the party and state leadership of the PR Poland fear a general strike, they utilize this to exert pressure and implement their demands.

A difficulty exists in the fact that a great part of the workers in Poland are also independent farmers and would not be greatly affected by the strikes, for they would be working in their own fields during this time. The size of the well-organized working class in Poland is small.

In the countryside, current production is limited to what is necessary for one’s own needs, which means that only private fields are cultivated. How national food supplies will develop no one knows.

Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski estimate that the greatest economic support by the capitalist countries comes from France and the FRG. The USA drags its feet when it comes to aid.

The sooner the phase of obliterating the counterrevolution would begin, the better for the development of Poland and for the stabilization of the socialist bloc collectively. Not only Comrade Kania, but also Comrade Jaruzelski, however, lack determination and resoluteness in their work.

Half a year ago, Comrade Jaruzelski had announced at the meetings of the commanders that he would not give any orders for the deployment of the army against the workers.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov made it clear to him that the army would not be deployed against the working class, but rather against the counterrevolution, against the enemies of the working class as well as violent criminals and bandits. He did not answer the question in a concrete manner. Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov hopes that Comrade Jaruzelski will revise his position. Although Minister Jaruzelski holds all the power in his

On 12 April 1981, 52,000 Polish soldiers were to be

the Allied Military Forces, because he has complete faith in Comrade Lieutenant General Keßler and Comrade Lieutenant General Streletz, and is convinced that the substance of this conversation would only be conveyed to Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Minister Hoffmann.

At the end, he asked that his most heartfelt greetings be conveyed to the General Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the National Defense Council of the GDR, Comrade Erich Honecker, and to the Minister for National Defense, Comrade Army General Hoffmann. At the same time he extended his thanks for the generous support provided during the preparation and implementation of the joint operative-strategic commander's staff exercise "SOYUZ-81."

The conversation lasted two hours and was conducted in an open and friendly atmosphere.

[Source: *Militärisches Zwischenarchiv Potsdam*, AZN 32642. Document provided by Tomasz Mianowicz (Munich) and translated by Christiaan Hetzner (National Security Archive/CWIHP).]

Memorandum regarding the Meeting between Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Erich Honecker, and Gustav Husák in the Kremlin, 16 May 1981

Participating in the meeting on the Soviet side were Comrades [CPSU Politburo member and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Aleksandrovich] Tikhonov, [Foreign Minister, Andrei Andreivich] Gromyko, [Politburo member, Konstantin Ustinovich] Chernenko, [Defense Minister, Dmitri Fyodorovich] Ustinov, [KGB chief, Yuri Vladimirovich] Andropov, [CC Secretary, Konstantin Viktorovich] Rusakov, and [Deputy head of the CC Department, Georgi Khosroyevich] Shakhnazarov.

Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev opened the meeting with the remark that this gathering is being held at the suggestion of Comrade Erich [Honecker], to exchange mutual views, appraise the situation, and draw conclusions.

We must, as he said, proceed from the fact that the situation in Poland has further deteriorated. The party is not just being attacked by "Solidarity". It also finds itself in a process of dissolution, created by internal contradictions. At present this process is self-limiting due to the fear of external intervention.

The information before us, concerning the preparation for the party congress of the PUWP [to be held on 14-18 July 1981], is negative. With the election of delegates to the party congress, not only are new people becoming involved, but hostile forces as well. The 10th Plenum [held on 29-30 April 1981] approved a very weak draft for a [party] program. Thereupon, "Solidarity" published a document containing enemy nationalist positions, and Kania did not call them to order.

Kania spoke briefly before the party *aktiv* in Gdańsk, like Gierek back in those days, that Poles can always come to an agreement with fellow Poles. Consequently, the events in Otwock are a disgrace, which encourages new anti-socialist acts.

Recently, our Comrades Andropov and Ustinov met privately with Polish comrades in Brest, and gave them recommendations on a whole number of concrete matters. To prevent these matters from remaining in a narrow circle, Comrade Suslov traveled to Warsaw to talk things over with all the comrades from the Politburo one more time. We have delivered this information to you.

Verbally, they assented to our suggestions, but in reality the situation further deteriorated. The Polish leadership is panicking from fear, they stare—as if

in the TV party press and party press for 1980-1981. The 7th and 8th Plenums of the CPSU Politburo

Then Comrade Erich Honecker spoke.

Comrade E. Honecker agreed with the statements made by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and underlined the full agreement of our parties. Then he proceeded:

1. Recently the Politburo of the SED CC, with great attention, familiarized itself with the report on the result of the discussions between the delegation of the CPSU and the PUWP. The [CPSU] delegation, which was headed by Comrade Suslov, stopped in Warsaw. Our Politburo agreed fully and completely with the assessment of the situation in Poland and the conclusions drawn from it. It

betrayed and even stabbed in the back.)

4. The base organizations [*Grundorganisationen*] are not familiar with the documents decreed at the 10th CC Plenum for the preparation of the Party Congress. In the election campaign, they occupy themselves primarily with “settling” the mistakes of the past and with the procedural matters regarding the nomination of candidates to the leadership, delegates to the municipal and city delegation conference as well as to the 9th Party Congress. (As a rule, the election assemblies last 8 to 10 hours, most of which is spent on procedural matters)

Among the cadres there is great uncertainty about the future and the coming work. No one knows whether he will be reelected or elected to the municipal or city delegation conference. On May 13, four of the seven First Municipal Secretaries were appointed as delegates to their own conference. About 50% of the secretaries of the municipal leaderships were not chosen to be delegates.

80% of the members of base organization leaderships are new cadres, chiefly young, inexperienced comrades. The number of Solidarity members in the party leadership has rapidly increased.

5. Our impression of the personnel:

The First Secretary of the Voivodeship Committee, Comrade Stanisław Kociołek, is an upstanding Communist, who realistically appraises the situation in the country and demonstrates an internationalist attitude. He repeatedly expressed clear positions on the CPSU, the SED, and the CPCz in public.

Unlike Politburo candidate and CC Secretary Jerzy Waszczuk, he stated repeatedly that he couldn't imagine the 9th Party Congress taking place without the participation of the fraternal parties. He repeatedly emphasized that the situation in Poland would only be mastered when the party was built up anew upon the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism.

Of the seven secretaries of the Warsaw Voivodship Committee, two so far have been chosen as delegates to the city conference (Kociołek, Bolesławski—2nd Secretary). Two secretaries have declared from the outset that there is no chance that they would be elected as delegates. (Com. J. Matuczewicz did not run as delegate for the conference from the concern “Rosa Luxembourg” on the 12 May 1981.) The chances of the three other secretaries are uncertain.

6. The talks with the First Secretaries of the municipal leaderships of [the Warsaw districts] Mokotów, Praga North, and Ōoliborz reflected the lack of unity in the party.

While the First Secretary from Mokotów (graduate of the Party School of the CPSU) stated a clear position on the situation, its causes, and the activities of the counterrevolution, an unprincipled social-democratic attitude could be seen on the part of the first secretaries from Ōoliborz and Praga North. Their main topics were the causes of the “mistakes” and the guarantees against future repetition. Based on the “feelings of the masses,” the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and the honesty of the party and of the whole society was to be guaranteed.

While visiting a construction site for a new bridge over the Vistula, we found the slogan “Down with the dictatorship of the CPSU—Long live Lech Wałsa” on a barrel.

The First Secretary from Praga North did not say anything that was party line, when we addressed this anti-Soviet statement as well as the anti-socialist event at Katyn⁵. All in all, the cadres are becoming used to anti-socialist statements, writings, slogans and other machinations. No one thinks about measures to take against the counterrevolutionary intrigues.

7. The statements of the Politburo candidate and CC Secretary, Comrade Jerzy Waszczuk, in the presence of Comrade Kociołek (1 1/2 hours), were extremely vague. The fundamental political questions were not clearly addressed. An attempt was made to justify the capitulationist attitude of the leadership when we mentioned it. Questioned about the participation of foreign delegations to the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress, he answered evasively. Essentially it was answered in the negative. (We do not know how the Party Congress proceeded. There may be provocations, which would be very unpleasant for the fraternal parties.) Comrade Kociołek explicitly spoke out in favor of the participation of the fraternal parties. Otherwise, holding the party congress would be inconceivable. Comrade Kociołek repeatedly stressed that there cannot be a second 14th CPCz Party Congress in Poland. Therefore the remaining days must be used to guarantee a correct composition of the party congress. In relation to this he expressed his opinion on the creation of a clear personnel structure. It was clear from his remarks, that he knew of the statements made by Comrade Mikhail Suslov and supported the implementation of the recommendations given there.

8. Comrade Kociołek beseeched the Berlin District leadership of the SED to take thorough advantage of the various possibilities to influence the Warsaw party organization in the next 30 days, in order to consolidate the party and prepare the party congress in an internationalist spirit. A corresponding proposal of Comrade Kociołek was strictly rejected by Kania. It seems advisable to implement this offer to work with the Warsaw party organization, and to extend further the existing personal contacts with Comrade Kociołek.

– The head of the SED CC International Relations Department, Comrade [Günther] Sieber, had a discussion with his Polish counterpart, Comrade Wacław Piłkowski, on May 14, in Berlin.

Comrade Piłkowski is a candidate member of the PUWP CC and since 1977 has held the position of head of the CC International Relations Department. Before he was the PPR's ambassador to the FRG for over 8 years. He is 60 years old and possesses a command of the German language without an accent. Piłkowski was a partisan during the Second World War in the area around Lublin, and, during the Soviet army's invasion of Poland, became a regular member of the 1st Polish Army, with which he

which are restrained only out of fear of Soviet action.

Of the 3 million members of the PUWP, 1 million are estimated to be positively disposed, but poor or very little work is done with them, and more and more good Communists are leaving, or being forced out. They say openly that the politicians look to the left but go to the right, and thus the good Communists see no prospects.

Olszowski, himself, said that he did not know how to continue since the Politburo was giving ground to the increasingly stronger pressure from the right. Jaruzelski is incapable and gives ground.

There are already 7,000 civil servants in the army who are members of "Solidarity," and the influence of "Solidarity" grows in the organs of the Interior Ministry and in particular in the mass media.

Øabi½ski is losing the ground beneath his feet and fears not being elected, which would mean the end of his activity.

We will support every option:

A new [Warsaw Pact] consultative meeting, like that

Therefore we must act in several directions. The postponement of the date of the party congress is not realistic, there I have the same evaluation. They speak, promise, but do nothing. Comrade L.I. [Brezhnev] had a very thorough discussion with Kania. It is then a matter not only who to replace, but also how to do so. According to our information, the balance of power stands at roughly 50-50. But the question remains, who will seize the initiative, who will convene a plenum. In my opinion, this way is unrealistic.

The party congress is the crossroad, where either the party takes the Marxist-Leninist path or it disintegrates. Consequently the healthy forces must use the 11th Plenum to fight the battle.

Four or more good comrades also are well spirited, but we do not know whether it [leading the party into new directions] will work. We know that for example already 26 voivodship committee secretaries, members of the CC, were dismissed as secretaries.

Kociubek is a serious man.

ŐabiŹski is distantly related to Gierek.

We must not forget also that there is a rivalry between the three.

On the June 10 we will have the names of all party congress delegates, then we will know more, see better.

Comrade Ustinov: I am in agreement with the statements made by Comrades Brezhnev, Honecker, and Husák. Everything points to the failure to formulate lengthy principled proposals. It is a matter now of fighting for every healthy man. We must all support the healthy forces.

It is certainly difficult to postpone the party congress, but one should remember that it also meant that the Sejm cannot be adjourned, then it will have worked though.

It was said correctly that Kania was not living up to our expectations, but who shall take over the leadership[?] There is the 11th Plenum on the daily agenda.

Perhaps a state of emergency should be imposed, if even just partly.

Comrade Rusakov: A postponement of the party congress is no longer possible. The delegates from the factories have already been elected. On the May 30, the delegates from the voivodships will be elected. Until then, nothing more can be done for the healthy forces.

We also have information that enraged anti-Soviet forces are appearing.

Rakowski wanted Olszowski and Grabski voted out of the Politburo, but we were able to achieve their remaining in the Politburo.

On the May 18 comrades from our Central Committee will travel to Warsaw to discuss with the comrades from the PUWP Politburo and bring them to Marxist-Leninist positions. The comrades from the SED are also exerting their influence on the party congress documents.

We are intensifying the criticism of the events in Poland in the press and radio. It is very important to come forward unambiguously because there are some, like

Rakowski for example, who try to hide behind the CPSU.

Our delegations, which have traveled to Poland, were well prepared and armed with well-composed information. That is the way we can usefully support the healthy forces.

At that point Comrade Erich Honecker began to speak. He stated his agreement with the observations of Comrade Ustinov, to consider precisely the possibility of a postponement of the party congress and throwing all force now into preparing for the 11th Plenum as well as possible, proceeding from what is known of the situation, to formulate all essential options.

To conclude the meeting Comrade Brezhnev determined that the exchange of opinions was useful, even if there is no light in sight in regards to a positive change. The comrades are right when they stress that it is essential to employ all levers of pressure. It would be undoubtedly better to postpone the party congress or cancel it shortly before its meeting, as Kania had promised at the time, but that is scarcely possible at this point.

The worst [scenario] would be if the party congress took an openly revisionist position. The central matter remains therefore that the -0.0 belciŹ0.0029 TwiŹ()ld:e depended upon, we see however on the other hand there are no real potential wiŹdidates to replace them. We must think of how we will find suitable people and prepare them for extraordinary situations.

For the timed:eing we have the ability to exert economic pressure, since we are the main supplier of petroleum and other raw materials.

We must now task comrades to form operational contacts with comrades in the PUWP in Poland.

We will confidentially inform Comrades J-nos Kádár, Todor Zhivkov, and Fidel Castro of this meeting.

Comrade Husák's question whether publication will follow, was answered negatively.

Should information reach the West, a possibility excluded by the Soviet comrades and Comrade Erich Honecker, it will be denied.

[Source: SAPMO-BArch ZPA, vorl.SED 41559. Published in Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen:" Die SED contra Polen.

