



of the Warsaw Pact, that later became a major cause of dissatisfaction among its members. The statute, which gave its military chief extensive prerogatives in controlling their armed forces, grew in importance once the original purpose of the alliance—Khrushchev's promotion of a new European security system—foundered on Western resistance. Moscow's latitude in running the Warsaw Pact through its Soviet supreme commander and Soviet chief of staff then became all the greater since its supposedly collective institutions, namely, a permanent secretariat and a standing commission on foreign affairs envisaged at the Prague meeting, were in fact not created.<sup>10</sup> Still, in view of the bilateral "mutual defense" treaties that had already before put Eastern European armed forces at Soviet disposal, the added chain of command was largely superfluous. This justified a contemporary NATO assessment of the Warsaw Pact as "a cardboard castle . . . carefully erected over what most observers considered an already perfectly adequate blockhouse, . . . intended to be advertised as being capable of being dismantled, piece by piece, in return for corresponding segments of NATO."<sup>11</sup>





changed, at least in the European context, thus anticipating the post-Cold War era better than most of their contemporaries. Yet the conditions of their time, besides their residual Marxist thinking, prevented them from drawing any substantive conclusions. Instead, fascinated by the Israeli feats in the 1967 Six Days' War, in their conclusion they focused instead merely on the desirability of replacing the outdated concept of an offensive < *outrance* by one aiming at the destruction of the enemy's vital vulnerability.

Otherwise, no practical consequences for the development of a Czechoslovak military doctrine were spelled out with any clarity. Nor did the reformers' plea for the formulation of an overall Warsaw Pact military doctrine and a restructuring of the alliance find an expression in specific proposals—a significant difference from the action taken by their Polish counterparts in 1956 and again ten years later. During meetings in February and March 1968, when the Soviet-proposed reform of the Warsaw Pact was successively discussed by its deputy foreign ministers in Berlin, its chiefs of staff in Prague, and finally the party chiefs convened as its political consultative committee in Sofia, the Czechoslovak representatives remained passive.<sup>38</sup>

It was again the contentious Romanians who lambasted the Soviet concept of "unified armed forces," included in the obnoxious secret annex to the Warsaw treaty but not in its published main text. Demanding the limitation of the powers of the supreme commander and the national governments' right of veto over any deployment of foreign troops or armaments on their territories, Bucharest even tried to renege on the agreements concerning the creation of a military council, joint staff, and committee on technology, that it had already consented to in May 1966.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, the Romanian party chief Nicolae Ceaușescu tried to derail the Warsaw Pact's accession to the nearly finished nonproliferation treaty, which he condemned as allegedly giving the superpowers license at the expense of their smaller allies.<sup>40</sup> During his Prague visit in February 1968, he minced no words in privately describing the proposed document as even "worse and more dangerous than the Soviet-German treaty of 1939."<sup>41</sup>

Although none of the other Warsaw Pact members joined Romania's efforts to derail what on balance was to prove a generally beneficial treaty, Polish foreign minister Rapacki and his Czechoslovak counterpart Václav David met in Prague on 29 February-1 March 1968, to discuss without Soviet supervision the possible freezing and subsequent removal of nuclear weapons from the territories of the states that had no control over them—or at least from their own countries and the two German states. The initiative was Rapacki's: Having already discussed the idea with Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel—the author of the celebrated report advocating the simultaneous strengthening of NATO and its promotion of *détente* with its Eastern counterpart—the

Pole agreed with him to try to make the denuclearization acceptable to the Warsaw Pact. The Czechoslovaks, however, hesitated. The Prague general staff noted timorously that, even though Moscow had not yet expressed its view, the proposal was presumably disadvantageous for its alliance system and should not, in any case, be considered in Czechoslovakia's current political climate.<sup>42</sup>

In that climate, the authors of the memorandum did not find enough support for their ideas among their superiors. At the beginning of June, they sent copies of the document to the higher authorities in the hope of contributing to the preparation of the "action program" for the development of the country's armed forces. No response came from party general secretary Alexander Dubček while his newly appointed minister of defense, Martin Dzúr, took a distinctly reserved position.<sup>43</sup> This was not the case with Soviet defense minister Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, who, even before the memorandum was officially submitted to the Prague leadership, had evidently gotten wind of it, and proceeded to extract from Dzúr the promise to dismantle the academy that had produced it.<sup>44</sup> And when one of the reform-minded officers, Gen. Egd Pepich, tried to explain to the marshal that loyalty to the alliance was not in question, Grechko disrupted his presentation by noisily banging on his desk with a spoon.<sup>45</sup>

Then followed Gen. Prchlík's July 15 interview with Prague journalists which, though not intended for publication, nevertheless became public, bringing Moscow to a rage because of his demand for the rectification of the Warsaw Pact's inequities. In a protest letter to Dubček, Warsaw Pact supreme commander Marshal Ivan I. Iakubovskii disingenuously accused Prchlík of insulting Soviet officers besides revealing military secrets, namely, the contents of the unpublished 1955 annex to the Warsaw treaty.<sup>46</sup>

with all who have a direct interest in this.”<sup>49</sup> Although the document did not question the country’s alliance obligations and did not specifically demand any changes in the Warsaw Pact, it was guaranteed to infuriate Moscow when it was leaked to the Soviet embassy in Prague about the middle of August. Yet although it was forwarded to the top Soviet leaders by Ambassador Stepan V.



The Warsaw Treaty agreement, adopted in May 1955 (especially its military provisions), as well as different bilateral agreements signed by the representatives of the USSR and the People's Republic of Poland prior to the Warsaw Treaty and ratified after the adoption of the Treaty require a thorough analysis and revision. This mostly concerns Polish obligations regarding organizational, quantitative and technical supplies of the Armed Forces, in the production of military equipment and the strategic positioning of the country.

The need to revise earlier agreements is caused by the political and economic conditions of our country. The earlier agreements and the ensuing obligations do not correspond to the policy of independence and sovereignty of our country pronounced by the Party and the Government of the People's Republic of Poland. Despite the constant changes of obligations acquired by Poland on the basis of the bilateral agreements, their implementation would not be feasible without considerable financial expenditures assigned to the Armed Forces and military industry. Such a policy would be inconsistent with the course of the Party and the Government aimed on constant improvement of the living standards of the Polish people.

Taking into consideration above-mentioned situation, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces has analyzed the obligations and provisions deriving from bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union as well as the Warsaw Treaty and our obligations deriving from them. Our proposals are listed below:

Military obligations originating from the Warsaw Treaty.

The present balance of power in the world, our strategic position as well as our ideological ties with the socialist camp prove the importance of the Warsaw Treaty and of the unification of the military efforts of the member countries for the further protection of our common interests.

Nevertheless, we believe that the military protocols originating from the Treaty require radical revision. The organizational concept of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces foresees the allocation of the part of the member countries' Armies under a Joint Command.

The above-mentioned concept is similar to the structural concept of NATO. Some parts of the Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries are placed under the Joint Command. Nevertheless, the structural position of the NATO countries is somewhat different from the position of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The only exception to the rule is the Soviet Union.

The strategic interest of the major participants of NATO is applied to the numerous theaters of war operations, therefore the specific theater of war would require only part of the Armed forces of the respective

countries, with the remainder of the forces allocated to different pacts, the Baghdad Pact, for instance.

The conditions under which the Warsaw Treaty was created are completely different. Our interest is in the European War Theater that involves all the participants of the Treaty, excluding the Soviet Union (the interests of the latter only partly lie in Europe). Therefore we believe that the total composition of our Armed forces should participate in our common defense initiative in Europe.

The above-mentioned facts illustrate the superficiality of the partitioning of the Armed forces by the participants of the Warsaw Treaty; namely, the structure in which one part of the armed forces is under the joint command and other part is under the command of the national armed forces. In the current situation, Poland cannot allot one part of the Armed forces under the joint command due to the unrealistically large number of divisions required (see part II of the memorandum). Despite the recent reduction of 5 divisions in Polish Armed forces, the number of required divisions for the joint command was only reduced by 1.

The organizational structure of the Joint Command of the armed forces is based on a single authority. The collective decision-making process bears only a formal character (it is not mentioned in a treaty). The process of the Supreme Commander's subordination to the international political body is not clear.

The above-mentioned determines the supranational character of the Supreme Commander and his Staff, which does not correspond to the idea of independence and sovereignty of the Warsaw Treaty participating countries. The supranational positioning of the Supreme Commander and of his Staff is illustrated in the "Statute" in the chapters dealing with the rights and responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and his Staff.

The authority of the Supreme Commander in questions of leadership in combat and strategic training is incompatible with the national character of the armies of the corresponding states. This imposes the introduction of common rules and regulations determining the order and conditions of military life (for example, the Garrison Duty Regulations, Drill Regulations, Disciplinary regulations, etc)

The Supreme Commander has widespread rights in the sphere of control. The volume of the report information required from the General Staff is tremendous. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is not an international body in a full sense. The rights and responsibilities of the representatives of the corresponding armies are not stated clearly. The existing practice demonstrates the formal character of their functions.

The relations between the Staff of the Joint Command and the General Staff are based on the complete subordination of the latter to the former.

Current events prove continuously the unilateral character of the obligations acquired by the People's Republic of Poland. No international agreement dealt with



exchange of views in order to reach common grounds not only on major issues, but often also on current policy matters.

II. We appraise the USSR's initiative positively. It meets the basic need to define and improve the organization of the Warsaw Pact. So far the Warsaw Pact organization has not been precisely defined, its forms of work were volatile and dependent on extemporaneous initiatives, mostly by the USSR. This situation has created loopholes in the coordination of policies and actions of Pact members with regard to the Pact itself, as well as in relations among its members. It also did not ensure the proper system of consultations, which would enable to take into consideration the positions of all member states. This condition was shaped at a time when the Warsaw Pact Treaty was concluded and when its forms of operation were just emerging. It does not meet its current needs.

III. The Soviet initiative to improve the instruments of the Pact's operation is coming at the right time, when a greater need to strengthen the unity of actions of the member states is emerging. In the present circumstances



proposals for the Political Committee and recommendations for the national military commands. The issues will be dealt with according to the rule of full equality.

4. The Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces would coordinate operational-training preparedness of the Unified Armed Forces, as well as matters relating to the enhancement of their development and military readiness.

The Supreme Commander and the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces would be relieved of their functions in the Soviet Army.

5. Strategic weapons will not be included in the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and operational plans will be developed by the General Staff of the Soviet Army, as well as by general staffs of member countries in the areas of concern to them.

6. It is envisaged that in peacetime the staff of the Unified Armed Forces, employing about 600 people, will be in charge of coordinating preparations of the military to the realization of tasks assigned to them.

However, the position of the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces as a command organ in war time is still a matter too premature to be considered, as there is, among other things, a need to maintain the current procedure of working out strategic and operational plans, the rules for using strategic weapons, as well as to maneuver forces and equipment from one war theater to another.

7. The general staff of the Unified Armed Forces will be composed of the representatives of all armies in proportion to the number of forces assigned to them. It is assumed that Soviet participation in the staff will be percentage-wise smaller than their actual contribution to the Pact.

8. The following are projections of a new percentage share in the command budget of the Unified Armed Forces:

C o u n t r i e s	Percentage share in the budget	
	currently	Proposed
Bulgaria	7 %	9 %
Czechoslovakia	13 %	13.5 %
GDR	6 %	10 %
Poland	13.5 %	16.5 %
Romania	10 %	11 %
Hungary	6 %	9 %
USSR	44.5 %	31 %
	100 %	100 %

9. In the organizational structure of the command and general staff the following positions are envisaged: supreme commander, first deputy, chief of staff, air force commander, two deputies for naval operations (for the Baltic and the Black Seas), deputy chief of air force, an



share should not exceed the present 13.5 %, and we should be trying to obtain from our point of view more justified numbers—e.g. a minimum of 50 % for the Soviet Union, and for the remaining Pact members also about 50 %. With this assumption our share would amount to 1/5 of the share of all people's democracies, which would be about 10 % of the total budget.

However, this proposal may encounter strong opposition, based, among other things, on current membership contributions to the CMEA<sup>56</sup>, which for the USSR amounts to only 32.25 %.

Independently of the ultimate settlement of percentage shares, one should assume that that budget of the Unified Armed Forces should cover exclusively the costs of the staff and accommodation facilities, administrative expenses of the staff, participation of employees in joint exercises and partial defraying of their remuneration, etc. This budget, however, should not be designed to cover expenses related to preparations for military operations, building up inventories, constructing facilities, etc.

5. Besides the above mentioned problems there is also a need is to clarify and then to decide in the forthcoming talks on the following questions:

the rules for party and political activism within the general staff and a possible creation of a political body of the Unified Armed Forces;

the legal status of the staff employees (duration of service, mode of rotation, remuneration, promotion, etc.);

defining the scope of cooperation of the reorganized staff of the Unified Armed Forces with the proper bodies of the CMEA in the area of armaments and military equipment, research and experimental-construction activities.

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According to the present orientation, the conference of the Ministers of National Defense is to be held in the first days of February of this year. The conference is to set up a working body with a task of developing within the next two-three weeks a specific draft of organizational structure of the command and the staff of the Unified Armed Forces.

Submitting for approval the setting up of the above working body, the Ministry of National Defense considers it advisable that the guidelines for our representatives in that body should be the proposals set out in this note.

In case that in the course of further works a situation arises where other proposals will need to be considered, the Ministry of National Defense will submit to the leadership additional motions.

Warsaw, 26 January 1966.

[Source: KC PZPR 2948/27-36, Archiwum Akt Nowych,

Warsaw. Translated by Jan Chowaniec.]

#### Document No. 5

#### Informal remarks by Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, Gen. Otakar Rytíř, at a Confidential Meeting of General Staff Officials, Prague, 13 March 1968

... Finally, there is our foreign policy. It has been said that while staying loyal to our friendship with the Soviet Union and proletarian internationalism we must show greater independence. This also concerns our armed forces, and quite considerably so. I am going to spend some time on this, because it is at the root of the problem that you, too, have touched upon in your presentations.

What is it about, comrades? The thing is, to tell you the truth, we are in a bind today, we have no room, no material means, no people. We've got into a situation when our task, as it has been set, is beyond the means of our state—both human and economic. What's the reason, comrades? The reason is, I think, at the heart of the Warsaw Treaty. We've been talking for ten years and can't agree about creating an organ, a military organ of the Warsaw Treaty, the staff and the military council that is, which would work out the military concept of the Warsaw Treaty as its top priority.

We can't do without a concept. But the concept must not only come out of the General Staff of the Soviet army. Since it is a coalition concept it must come out of the coalition. This means that the members of the Warsaw Treaty must take part. It's a fundamental question, comrades. I'm sorry I can't talk much about it in any great detail, it would lead me too far; it would get me into the area of strategic operational plans, and this I can't do no matter how much I am trying, and believe me I am sincerely trying, to make the complexity of this problem clearer to you.

This is the thing, comrades. If there were an organ we could agree on this matter. Through that organ, we would be able to make our voice heard, so that we would be listened to. Today our voice comes through as our views or opinions but certainly not as pressure. That's because we have no legal grounds for being effective. And so we are getting the assignment for our army in case of war from the joint command, which does not really exist except as some transmission office. I have no doubt, of course, that, as far as the Soviet army is concerned, this assignment is backed by the economic and human potential T\*1"(assbti06 Tkntnd, which doflbeinmenhe Warsaw)Tj1^T\*1^0

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to say it. Under Khrushchev, there used to be a doctrine: if there is a war, seven strikes at Germany, and Germany is liquidated. Eight, not seven, they said; I made a mistake. Count another number of strikes to destroy America. Comrades, it's hard to say it was bad, hard to say. Just look, comrades, maybe I'm wrong, but I would characterize the situation like this: thank God we have nuclear weapons. In my view, thanks to them there has been no World War III. I think—and here, mind you, I am telling you my opinion, and I have told this opinion to our Soviet comrades, too—that this point has also been noticed over there, by our potential enemies. And what have they done? They came up with the theory of limited war.<sup>57</sup> Because for them the threat of a nuclear strike was a real threat. They were really scared. There was panic. Not only among the public. There was panic in the staffs. And they realized what it meant, they took Khrushchev at his word; maybe what Khrushchev was saying was eighty-nine per cent propaganda, but they took him at his word, and said: Well, if you do this to us, we shall go at you another way—with the theory of limited war. The limited war theory allows for the possibility of conducting war without nuclear weapons. And with this theory, it seems to me, they a little bit, to put it plainly, cheated and misled our Soviet comrades, who took the bait—the limited war theory, that is. Maybe the theory suits the Soviet Union from its point of view. But from the point of view of our republic, it doesn't suit us. Why doesn't it suit us, comrades? Because the limited war theory means—what? Orientation toward classical warfare. And classical warfare means—what? It means saturating the troops with high technology and high manpower. In today's situation, in today's economic situation of the capitalist and the socialist camps, this is something that the capitalist system can afford. Because its economy, like it or not, is superior, has greater possibilities. That's today. Maybe ten years from now it will be different. But today, that's the way it is. This means that we have agreed to—what, comrades? If we have accepted the limited war theory we have agreed to arming our units in competition with the West. Well, comrades, such a competition we can't win. Because their economy is vastly more powerful than ours. Today we say: careful, we must not stay behind. Of course, we can use the slogan: catch up and overtake the West in technology. But if we try to do that, comrades, we would be walking in *lapti* [Russian peasant footwear], or else barefooted.

Because we are not capable of keeping up in this competition. This, comrades, is the most vital question if you take the position of our republic. And we, the general staff and the ministry of defense, we must defend the interests of our army, even if we acknowledge our duties to international friendship under the Warsaw Treaty. But we must defend our interests.

I don't want to scare you, comrades, but we have made calculations, of course, what would happen in a possible conflict in a normal, classical war. This is not

advantageous for us. I myself, comrades, am not for any kind of war, also not for nuclear war—it's clear to me, that would mean destruction of the world, destruction of mankind, even though the threat worked, it really did, under Khrushchev. Now, because of that threat—and this is my opinion but I can prove it—our Soviet comrades are going to push us to speed up the arming and buildup of our units; this was proved last year in the signing of the protocol.<sup>58</sup> I had sharp clashes with the unified command when they came up with the demand to increase the number of our divisions. It took two days, two days it took, before I managed to convince one army general what is the economic and human potential of our republic. Unfortunately, comrades, I have to say that our political representatives do not pay enough attention to these questions. And yet these are fundamental questions. And this point, that is, more independence in foreign policy, I see, in a way, as being relevant to the Warsaw Treaty politics, not only in relation to the West, to West Germany.

We have to struggle to get a position of equality within the Warsaw Treaty.

[Source: Antonín Benšík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulík, ed., *Vojenské otázky ...eskoslovenské reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení ...s. krize (1967-1968)* [*Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis*], (Brno: Doplněk, 1996), pp. 78-80. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.]

#### Document No. 6

#### Memorandum by Thirty Scholarly Associates of the Military Political Academy and Military Technical Academy for the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, 4 June 1968

#### Formulation and Constitution of Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Area

The draft of the action program of the Czechoslovak People's Army poses with a particular urgency the question of elaborating the state military doctrine of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In our opinion, the point of departure ought to be the state interests of Czechoslovakia in the military area which, however, have not yet been formulated and constituted.

The signatories of this memorandum, who are scholarly associates working for the Czechoslovak armed forces, wish to contribute to the scientific examination and formulation of those state interests. In sections 1 and 2, they express their position concerning the present state of our military doctrine and military policy. In sections 3 and 4, they outline the procedure for a theoretical examination of the data aimed at the formulation of doctrinal conclusions. In section 5, they justify the necessity of

using scientific methods to solve these problems.

They are sending this memorandum to provide the basis for an exchange of opinion. They consider a dialogue necessary for the development of scientific research.

Prague, May 1968

### 1. Political and Military Doctrine

1.1. The political doctrine of a socialist state is primarily influenced by the choice of wider goals within the international community and its relationship with the diverse forces representative of social progress.

The principle of socialist internationalism is organically linked with the national responsibility of a sovereign state. This is normally the more important as well as more difficult the smaller is the physical power of the state. The choice cannot solely depend on "national interest," which cannot be defined in a pure form—neither as an interest of one's own state, nor as an interest of the leading state of a coalition. Decisive is the interest of the societal movement, of which sovereign states are part, specifically the interest of European socialism and its dynamic development. Mere defense of what has been accomplished fosters stagnation and degeneration; wrong choice of an offensive strategy has destructive effect on the progress of the whole societal movement.

1.2. Military policy as an aggregate of actions in military matters implements military interests and needs through a chosen strategy. In regard to national interest, the military doctrine of the state can be described as a comprehensive formulation of its military interests and needs.

The doctrine is a binding theoretical and ideological base for the formulation of military policy and the resulting measures as well as for negotiations with the alliance partners. It amounts to a compromise between the maximum requirements and actual resources, between the dynamics of the evolving military knowledge and the findings of the social sciences, between the development of technology and the requirement of an effective defense system corresponding to the military circumstances at any given time.

1.3. The formulation of the state's military doctrine influences retroactively its political doctrine and strategy. It substantially affects its capability to project itself internationally by nonmilitary means. Giving up one's own military doctrine means giving up responsibility for one's own national and international action. A surrender to spontaneity, this entails depoliticization of military thought, which in turn leads to a paralysis of the army. It is the fundamental source of crisis of the army organism by tearing it out of society. It disrupts the metabolism between the army and the society. It deprives the army of its *raison d'être* for the national community by limiting the interaction between national goals and the goals of the socialist community.

### 2. The Past, Present, and Future of Czechoslovakia's Military Policy

2.1. The foundations of Czechoslovakia's present defense systems were laid at the beginning of the nineteen-fifties, at which time the responsible political actors of the socialist countries assumed that a military conflict in Europe was imminent. It was a strategy based on the slogan of defense against imperialist aggression, but at the same time assuming the possibility of transition to strategic offensive with the goal of achieving complete Soviet hegemony in Europe. No explicit reassessment of this coalition strategy by taking into account the potential of nuclear missiles has ever taken place.

2.2. The Czechoslovak army, created with great urgency and extraordinary exertion, became a substantial strategic force by the time when Europe's political and military situation had fundamentally changed. Although in 1953 we noted a relaxation of international tension and in 1956 introduced the new strategy of peaceful coexistence, no formulation of Czechoslovakia's own military doctrine or reform of its army took place. Invoking the threat of German aggression, the alliance continued to be tightened up. Increasingly the threat of German aggression has taken on the role of an extraneous factor employed with the intent to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist community. Once the original notions about the applicability of a universal economic and political model had to be revised, military cooperation was supposed to compensate for insufficient economic cooperation and the inadequacy of other relationships among the socialist countries.

2.3. In politics, there is a lack of clarity about the probable trends of development in the progressive movement to which we belong. There is a prevailing tendency to cling to the obsolete notions that have become part of the ideological legacy of the socialist countries. There is a prevailing tendency to try to influence all the segments of the movement, regardless of the sharply growing differences in their respective needs resulting from social and economic development.

In 1956 and 1961<sup>59</sup> we proved by our deeds that we were ready to bear any global risks without claiming a share of responsibility for the political decisions and their implementation. By doing so, we proved that we did not understand even the European situation and were guided not by sober analysis but by political and ideological stereotypes. (Hence also the surprise with regard to Hungary in 1956 and the inadequate response in 1961.)

2.4. Our military policy did not rest on an analysis of our own national needs and interests. It did not rest on our own military doctrine. Instead it was a reflection of the former sectarian party leadership, which prevented the party from conducting a realistic policy of harmonizing the interests of different groups with national and international interests for the benefit of socialism. The development of the army was deprived of both rational criteria and an institutionalized opposition. Military policy



be said openly that the outbreak and conduct of a global nuclear war in the European theater would be tantamount to the national extinction and demise of state sovereignty especially of the frontline states, including Czechoslovakia. The futility of such a war as a means of settling European disputes, as demonstrated by the development of the so-called Berlin crisis of 1961, of course does not exclude its possibility.

In such a situation, we consider it appropriate to formulate Czechoslovakia's military interests and needs as a matter of primary existential importance:

- preventing the conduct of a nuclear war on our territory is a fundamental existential need of our society;
- Czechoslovakia has a strategic interest in actively contributing to the reduction of the real possibility of absolute war in Europe.

Our fundamental needs and interests in the event of such a war should determine a foreign policy aimed at limiting the possibility of a nuclear attack against Czechoslovakia. The appropriate measures are, for example, the conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, and supplementary guarantees of the status quo in Europe.

#### 4.2. Limited war in Europe

The analysis of the possible scenarios in Europe obviously starts with the recognition of a growing danger of such a war and its growing strategic and political significance.

In recognizing the futility of limited war as a means of Czechoslovak foreign policy and in emphasizing our interest in eliminating it as a means of settlement of European disputes, we assume the necessity of purposefully waging war against an attack in a fashion conducive to limiting its destructive effects on our territory and population.

The formulation and constitution of Czechoslovakia's particular interests and needs will determine the practical measures to be taken:

- Preparation of Czechoslovakia's armed forces and its entire defense system within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty for the different variants of enemy attack with the goal of repelling it, defeating the adversary, and compelling him to settle peacefully.
- Reduction of the real possibility of war by reciprocal military and political acts of peaceful coexistence aimed at eliminating the use of force as a means of the settlement of disputes.

#### 4.3. Situation between war and peace in Europe

This is the situation resulting from the failure to conclude a peace treaty with Germany and from the great-power status of Berlin inside the territory of the GDR. Herein is the possibility of a sudden deterioration leading to severe military and political crisis. At the present time, such a crisis would have catastrophic consequences for our economy, as had happened during the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises. This would substantially worsen our

strained economic situation, with too negative consequences for our development in a progressive direction.

These characteristics determine our approach to the formulation of Czechoslovakia's interests and needs, namely:

- our primary strategic and political need to prevent such a military and political crisis at the present time,
- our interest in reducing the possibility of a transition from the absence of war to a limited war while searching for a solution of the German question as the key question of contemporary Europe.

This further postulates measures to be taken in both military and foreign policy, above all through the Warsaw Pact, with the goal of normalizing relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

#### 4.4. Potential war in Europe

At issue is the indirect use of the potential for armed



5.5. The proposed procedures and methods toward the constitution of Czechoslovak military doctrine can of course be implemented only through a qualitatively new utilization of our state's scientific potential. We regard science as being critically conducive to working methods that practitioners are inhibited from using because of their particular way of thinking, their time limitations, and for reasons of expediency. We regard science as a counterweight that could block and balance arbitrary tendencies in the conduct of the armed forces command and the political leadership. In this we see the fundamental prerequisite for a qualitatively new Czechoslovak military doctrine and the corresponding management of our armed forces.

[Source: Antonín Benšík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulík, ed., *Vojenské otázky ...eskoslovenské reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení ...s. krize (1967-1968) [Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis]*, (Brno: Doplněk, 1996), pp. 137-44. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.]

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<sup>1</sup> Matthew Evangelista, "Why Keep Such an Army?": *Khrushchev's Troop Reductions*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 19 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1997).

<sup>2</sup> Vojtech Mastny, "The Origins of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Quest for Security," in *Socio-Economic Dimensions of the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World*, ed. Shugo Minagawa and Osamu Ieda (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1996), pp. 355-84.

<sup>3</sup> Draft of mutual defense treaty by Gromyko, Zorin, and Semenov, 31 December 1954, Sekretariat Ministra/14/12/1/1-6, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation], Moscow [AVP RF].

<sup>4</sup> Decision by Central Committee, 1 April 1955, Sekretariat Ministra 14/54/4/39, AVP RF.

<sup>5</sup> Khrushchev to Ulbricht, 2 May 1955, J IV 2/202/-244 Bd 1, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin [SAPMO].

<sup>6</sup> Stenographical record of meeting, 12 May 1955, Varshavskoe soveshchanie 1/1/1, AVP RF. The creation of the Warsaw Pact under Khrushchev was thus even more tightly controlled than the creation of the Cominform in 1948 had been under Stalin. At that time, the participants had not been told in advance what to expect, prompting some of them to express

opinions of their own. See Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 32, and *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1047/1948/1949*, ed. Giuliano Procacci (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994).

<sup>7</sup> "Protokoll über die Schaffung eines Vereinigten Kommandos der bewaffneten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten am Vertrag über Freundschaft, Zusammenarbeit und gegenseitige Hilfe," 14 May 1955, AZN 32437, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg.

<sup>8</sup> Tadeusz Pióro, *Armia ze skaz•: W Wojsku Polskim 1945-1968 (wspomnienia i refleksje)* [The Defective Army: In the Polish Army, 1945-1968 (Memories and Reflections)] (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1994), pp. 210-13; copy of the minutes provided by Gen. Pióro.

<sup>9</sup> Khrushchev to Bierut, 7 September 1955, KC PZPR, 2661/2, 16-19, Archiwum Akt Nowych [Modern Records Archives], Warsaw [AAN].

<sup>10</sup> Records of the meeting, 26-28 January 1956, A 14696, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin.

<sup>11</sup> Robert Spencer, "Alliance Perceptions of the Soviet Threat, 1950-1988," in *The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat*, ed. Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 9-48, at p. 19.

<sup>12</sup> Declaration of 30 October 1956, J.P. Jain, *Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1973), pp. 168-71.

<sup>13</sup> Arkadii Sobolev at the UN Security Council meeting, 4 November 1956, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. 25, p. 388.

<sup>14</sup> Chen Jian, "Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956," paper presented at the conference "The Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War," Beijing, 22-25 October 1997, pp. 7-9.

<sup>15</sup> "Uwagi i propozycje odnośnie dokumentu p.n. 'Polozhenie ob obedinennom komandovanii vooruzhennymi silami gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo dogovora'," [Reflections and Proposals Concerning the Document Entitled "Statute of the Unified Command of the Armed Forces of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty"], and "Analiza strony prawnej dokumentu p.n. 'Protokol soveshchaniia po planu razvitiia Vooruzhennykh Sil Polskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na 1955-65 gg.' oraz następných protokółów wnoszących do niego zmiany," [Analysis of the Legal Aspects of the Document Entitled "Protocol on the Consultation about the Plan for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic in 1955-65" and Its Subsequent Amendments], 3 November 1956, microfilm (o) 96/6398, reel W-15, Library of Congress, Washington [LC].

<sup>16</sup> Vice Minister of Defense Bordziowski to Gomuła, 7 November 1956, KC PZPR 2661/53, AAN; "Memorandum w sprawie Układu Warszawskiego oraz planu rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych PRL" [Memorandum Concerning the Warsaw Treaty and the Plan for the Development of Poland's Armed Forces], microfilm (o) 96/6398, reel W-25, LofC.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. "Wykaz zagadnień wojskowych wymagających omówienia i uregulowania na nowych zasadach" [An Outline of Military Problems Requiring Discussion and Regulation according to New Principles], by Drzewiecki, 8 November 1956, KC PZPR 2661/137-38, AAN.

<sup>18</sup> Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," *Journal of Contemporary History* 33 (1998): 163-214, at p. 203.

<sup>19</sup> Commentary by Drzewiecki, undated (November-December

1956), KC PZPR 2661/124, AAN.

<sup>20</sup> Pióro, *Armia ze skaz*, pp. 277-80.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 280-82.

<sup>22</sup> Marginal note on Document No. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Brezhnev to Ulbricht, 7 January 1966, J IV 2/202-248, SAPMO.

<sup>24</sup> Memorandum by Rapacki, 21 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/48-53, AAN.

<sup>25</sup> Memorandum by Polish Ministry of National Defense, 26 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/27-36, AAN.

<sup>26</sup> Memorandum by Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski, 31 May 1966, KC PZPR 2948/54-57, AAN.

<sup>27</sup> Record of the Berlin meeting of deputy foreign ministers, 10-12 February 1966, J IV 2/202-257 Bd 9, SAPMO; report by Naszkowski, 17 February 1966, KC PZPR 2948/64-69, AAN.

<sup>28</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, "When and Why Romania Distanced Itself from the Warsaw Pact," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 5 (1995): 111.

<sup>29</sup> Gerard Holden, *The Warsaw Pact: The WTO and Soviet Security Policy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 43.

<sup>30</sup> Antonín Benš, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulík, ed., *Vojenské otázky ...eskoslovenské reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení ...s. krize (1967-1968)* [Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis], (Brno: Doplněk, 1996).

<sup>31</sup> Jane Stromseth, *The Origins of Flexible Response* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 69-95.

<sup>32</sup> For example, "erník to Novotný, 20 May 1966, in Benš, *Vojenské otázky*, pp. 314-16.

<sup>33</sup> Christopher Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 95-97, attributes to the memorandum unsubstantiated features claimed by its later pro-Soviet critics. Cf. footnotes 47 and 48 below.

<sup>34</sup> *Lidová armáda*, 2 July 1968.

<sup>35</sup> The comical hero of Jaroslav Hašek's antiwar novel of 1920.

<sup>36</sup> John D. Duffield, D., *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 151-93.

<sup>37</sup> Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 1987), pp. 381-405; Kimberly Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 58-92.

<sup>38</sup> The assertion in the 6 March 1968, commentary on Prague radio by Luboř







person”).

Finally, Marshal Malinovsky’s laconic one page report to Khrushchev on the shooting down of the American U-2 aircraft on October 27 (signed on October 28 nearly 15 hours after the incident) makes no excuses. It simply states as a fact that the plane was shot down “in order not to permit the photography to reach the United States.” As we know from other sources, Khrushchev rightly took a very different view of this unauthorized action. (This document is translated below.)

In sum, these documents are of interest on many aspects of the Cuban missile crisis. Certainly one of the most important is the subject of Khrushchev’s views on nuclear weapons, raised by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali in their article, which I have sought also to address in this discussion.

<sup>1</sup> In *CWHIP Bulletin No. 10* (March 1998), pp. 223-25.

<sup>2</sup> Fursenko and Naftali, “*One Hell of a Gamble*”: *Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: Norton & Co., 1997).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.

<sup>4</sup> See Aleksandr Mozgovi, “Order: In Case of Firing, Use Nuclear Weapons,” *Komsomol’skaya pravda*, 27 June 1995, an account by the commander of one of the submarines.

<sup>5</sup> “*One Hell of a Gamble*,” p. 213.

### Document No. 1

#### R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov, Memorandum on Deployment of Soviet Forces to Cuba, 24 May 1962

**Top Secret  
Special Importance  
One Copy**

**To the Chairman of the Defense Council**

**Comrade N.S. Khrushchev**

In accordance with your instructions the Ministry of Defense proposes:

1. To deploy on the island of Cuba a Group of Soviet Forces comprising all branches of the Armed Forces, under a single integrated staff of the Group of Forces headed by a Commander in Chief of Soviet forces in Cuba.

2. To send to Cuba the 43rd Missile Division (commander of the division Major General Statsenko) comprising five missile regiments:

—The 79th, 181st and 664th R-12 [SS-4] missile regiments with eight launchers each, in all 24 launchers.

—The 665th and 668th R-14 [SS-5] missile regiments

with eight launchers each, in all 16 launchers.

—In all, 40 R-12 and R-14 launchers.

With the missile units to send 1.5 missiles and 1.5 warheads per each launcher (in all 60 missiles and 60 warheads), with one field missile technical base (PRTB) per regiment for equipping the warheads and rocket fuel in mobile tanks with 1.75 loadings per R-12 missile and 1.5 per R-14 missile at each launcher.

Deployment of the R-12 missiles is planned in the [illegible] variant with the use of SP-6. Prepared assembly-disassembly elements of the SP-6 for equipping the missile pads will be prepared at construction enterprises of the Ministry of Defense by 20 June and shipped together with the regiments. Upon arrival at the designated locations, personnel of the missile regiments will within ten days equip the launch positions by their own efforts, and will be ready to launch missiles.

For deployment of the missile units armed with R-14 missiles, construction on site will last about four months. This work can be handled by the personnel of the units, but it will be necessary to augment them with a group of 25 engineer-construction personnel and 100 construction personnel of basic specialties and up to 100 construction fitters from State Committees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for defense technology and radioelectronics.

For accomplishing the work it is necessary to send:

—16 complete sets of earth equipment for the R-14 produced by [the machine] industry in the current year;

—machinery and vehicles:

Mobile cranes (5 ton)	—10
Bulldozers	—20
Mobile graders	—10
Excavators	—10
Dump trucks	—120
Cement mixers (GVSU)	—6

Special technical equipment for [illegible] and testing apparatuses

—Basic materials

Cement	—2,000 tons
Reinforced concrete	—15,000 sq. meters (not counting access roads)
Metal	—2,000 tons
SP-6 sets	—30
GR-2 Barracks	—20
Prefabricated wooden houses	—10
Cable, equipment and other materials.	

Further accumulation of missile fuel, missiles, and warheads for the units is possible depending on the creation of reserve space and storage in Cuba, inasmuch as it would be possible to include in each missile regiment a third battalion with four launchers.

The staff of the Group and of the missile division can expediently be sent from the Soviet Union in the first days of July 1962 in two echelons: the 1st echelon (R-12 regiments) and the 2nd (R-14 regiments).

3. For air defense of the island of Cuba and protection of the Group of Forces to send 2 anti-aircraft

divisions, including in their composition 6 antiaircraft missile regiments (24 battalions), 6 technical battalions, one fighter air regiment with MiG-21 F-13 (three squadrons—40 aircraft), and two radar battalions.

With the divisions to ship 4 missiles per launcher, in all 576 [SAM] missiles.

To send the antiaircraft divisions: one in July, and one in August, 1962.

4. For defense of coasts and bases in the sectors of probable enemy attack on the island of Cuba to send one regiment of *Sopka* ["little volcano"] comprising three battalions (6 launchers) with three missiles per launcher  
—on the coast in the vicinity of Havana, one regiment (4 launchers)

—on the coast in the vicinity of Banes, one battalion (2 launchers)

On the southern coast in the vicinity of Cienfuegos to locate one battalion (2 launchers), [already] planned for delivery to Cuba in 1962.

The *Sopka* complex is capable of destroying surface ships at a range of up to 80 km.

5. To send to Cuba as part of the Group of Forces:

—a brigade of missile patrol boats of the class Project 183-R, comprising two units with 6 patrol boats in each (in all 12 patrol boats), each armed with two P-15 [trans: NATO SS-N-2 *Stryx*] missiles with a range up to 40 km.;

—a detachment of support ships comprising: 1 tanker, 2 dry cargo transports, and 4 repair afloat ships;

—fuel for missiles: fuel for the R-13 [trans: NATO SS-N-4 *Sark*] and P-15—70 tons, oxidizer for the R-13—180 tons, oxidizer for the P-15—20 tons, kerosene for the S-2 and KSShCh [trans: probably NATO SA-N-1 *Goa*]—60 tons;

—two combat sets of the P-15 missile (24 missiles) and one for the R-13 (21 missiles).

Shipment of the missile patrol boats Project 183-R class, the battalions of *Sopka*, technical equipment for the missile patrol boats and technical batteries for the *Sopka* battalions, and also the missiles, missile fuel, and other equipment for communications to be carried on ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.

Shipment of the warheads, in readiness state 4, will be handled by ships of the Navy.

6. To send as part of the Group of Forces in Cuba in July-August:

—Two regiments of FKR (16 launchers) with PRTB, with their missiles and 5 special [Trans: nuclear] warheads for each launcher. Range of the FKR is up to 180 km.;

—A mine-torpedo aviation regiment with IL-28 aircraft, comprising three squadrons (33 aircraft) with RAT-52 jet torpedoes (150 torpedoes), and air dropped mines (150 mines) for destruction of surface ships;

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—for follow-up secure provisions for 25 days.

10. The overall number of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will be about 44,000 military personnel and 1300 workers and civilians. For transport of the troops and



Separate Radar Battalion  
10th Antiaircraft Division  
294th Antiaircraft Regiment  
318th Antiaircraft Regiment  
466th Antiaircraft Regiment  
32nd Fighter Aviation Regiment  
40 MiG-21s  
Separate Radar Battalion

Air Forces (VVS)

561st FKR (Frontal Cruise Missile) Regiment  
584th FKR Regiment  
Each regiment with 8 launchers and PRTB  
437th Separate Helicopter Regiment  
33 Mi-4 helicopters  
134 Separate Aviation Communications Squadron  
11 aircraft

Ground Forces (SV)

302nd Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment  
314th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment  
400th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment  
496th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment

Naval Forces (VMF)

Submarine Squadron  
18th Missile Submarine Division  
7 submarines  
211th Submarine Brigade  
4 submarines  
Two submarine tenders (floating support bases)  
Surface Ship Squadron  
2 cruisers, 2 missile destroyers, 2 destroyers  
Missile Patrol Boat Brigade  
12 missile patrol boats (cutters)  
*Sopka* Missile Regiment [coastal defense cruise missile]  
6 launchers  
Aviation Mine-Torpedo Regiment  
33 IL-28 aircraft  
[Trans: Includes 3 trainers]  
Detachment of Support Ships  
2 tankers  
2 dry cargo ships  
1 floating repair ship

Rear Services

Field Bakery Factory  
Hospitals (3 at 200 beds each)  
Sanitary-antiepistemological detachment  
Company to service entry to the bases  
Food storage stocks (2)  
Warehouse  
Missile and aviation fuel stations (2)  
Fuel oil for the Navy (2)

Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General

Staff

Colonel General S.P. Ivanov [signature]

20 June 1962

1) One squadron of IL-28 bombers, comprising 10-12 aircraft including delivery and countermeasures aircraft, with a mobile PRTB and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 8-12 kilotons;

[In Khrushchev's handwriting on top of "II.1" above]: Send to Cuba six IL-28s with atomic warheads [three words illegible] [signed] N.S. Khrushchev 7.IX.1962.

2) One R-11M missile brigade made up of three battalions (total: 1221 men, 18 R-11M missiles) with PRTB (324 men) and 18 special warheads, which the PRTB is capable of storing;

3) Two-three battalions of Luna for inclusion in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba.

[Overwritten:] Three Luna battalions. N.S. Khrushchev 7.IX.62

Each Luna battalion will have two launchers and 102 men.

With the Luna battalions, send 8-12 missiles and 8-12 special warheads.

For the preparation and custody of special warheads for the Luna missiles, send one PRTB (150 men).

The indicated squadron of IL-28s, one R-11M missile brigade with PRTB, and two-three Luna battalions with PRTB, and the missiles are to be sent to Cuba in the first half of October.

Atom bombs (6), special warheads for the R-11M missiles (18) and for the Luna missiles (8-12) are to be sent on the transport *Indigirka* on 15 September.

The Defense Ministry has just conducted successful firing tests of the S-75 anti-aircraft system against surface targets on level terrain. At distances of 24 kilometers, accuracy of plus or minus 100-120 meters was achieved.

The results of computer calculations indicate the possibility also of successful use against naval targets.

In order to fire against land or sea targets using S-75 complexes with the troops [in Cuba], small modifications in the missile guidance stations will be required by factory brigades together with some additional equipment prepared by industry.

Marshal of the Soviet Union R.  
Malinovsky [signature]

6 September 1962

[Translator's Note: A detailed two-page informational addendum provides specifications of the Luna and R-11M missiles (diameter, length, width, height, and weight); the

full range of possible transport aircraft (range, loading capacity, doors and hatches) of the AN-8, AN-12, IL-18, Tu-104, Tu-114, and the not yet available larger AN-22 aircraft; and bomber aircraft (the Tu-95 [Bear], Mya-4 [Bison], Tu-16 [Badger], and IL-28 [Beagle] bombers), although none were suitable for transporting the rockets both for technical and political-strategic routing reasons. This informational annex was signed on the same date, 6 September 1962, by Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. It is not translated here.]

**Document No. 5**

**Memorandum, R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov to  
Commander of Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba,  
8 September 1962**

**Top Secret  
Special Importance  
Copy #1**

**Personally**

**To the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces  
in Cuba**

The temporary deployment of Soviet Armed forces on the island of Cuba is necessary to insure joint defense against possible aggression toward the USSR and the Republic of Cuba.

A decision on employment of the Soviet Armed Forces in combat actions in order to repel aggression and reinstatement [of the situation] will be made by the Soviet Government.

1. The task of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba is not to permit an enemy landing on Cuban territory from the sea or from the air. The island of Cuba must be turned into an impenetrable fortress.

Forces and means: Soviet troops together with the Cuban Armed forces.

2. In carrying out this task, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces on the island of Cuba will be guided by the following considerations:

a) With Respect to Missile Forces

The missile forces, constituting the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow, to deal a nuclear missile strike on the most important targets in the United States of America (list of targets included in Attachment #1)

[Translator's Note: This attachment was not included in the Volkogonov Papers].

Upon arrival of the missile division in Cuba, two R-12 [SS-4] regiments (539<sup>th</sup> and 546<sup>th</sup>) and one R-14 [SS-5] regiment (564<sup>th</sup>) will deploy in the western region, and one R-12 regiment (the 514<sup>th</sup>) and one R-14 regiment (the 657<sup>th</sup>) in the central region of Cuba.

3. Organize security and economy of missiles, warheads, and special technical equipment, and all combat equipment in the armament of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba.
4. Carry out daily cooperation and combat collaboration with the armed forces of the Republic of Cuba, and work together in instructing the personnel of the Cuban armed forces in maintaining the arms and combat equipment being transferred by the Soviet Union to the Republic of Cuba.
5. Deploy the rear units and offices and organize all-



## Soviet Moldavia and the 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis: A Report on the Political “Spill-Over”

This brief memorandum to the CPSU Secretariat was prepared by the Second Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party, Yurii Mel'kov, on 1 August 1968. As a rule, the Communist Party in each of the union republics in the USSR was headed by an official whose ethnic background was that of the titular nationality, while the Second Secretary was an ethnic Russian. Often the Second Secretary carried as much weight in Moscow as the republic's First Secretary did. (The main exception was when the First Secretary was also a member or candidate member of the CPSU Politburo.) In this particular case, Mel'kov did indeed seem as influential as the Moldavian CP's First Secretary, Ivan Bodiul. Although Bodiul was one of several union-republic First Secretaries who delivered speeches at the CPSU Central Committee plenum in April 1968—a plenum that focused on the situation in Czechoslovakia—he played little discernible role after that.

It has long been known that Soviet officials in both Moscow and Kyiv were worried about the political spill-over from Czechoslovakia into neighboring Ukraine (see, for example, the passages from Shelest's diary in issue No.10 of the *Bulletin*), but new archival materials show that official concerns about the spill-over extended well beyond Ukraine. This document reveals the effects that the crisis was having in Moldavia, a small republic abutting Romania and southern Ukraine. Other newly declassified materials indicate similar concerns about Soviet Georgia and the three Baltic states. (See, for example, the top-secret memorandum No.1“Tiv-, “TsK KPSS,” 23 May 1968, from V. Mzhavanadze, First Secretary of the Georgian CP CC, to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. -, Op. 60, D. 22, Ll. --9.) All materials about a possible spill-over from Czechoslovakia were closely reviewed by Mikhail Suslov, one of the most powerful members of the CPSU Politburo who was also the CPSU Secretary responsible for ideological affairs. He often wrote comments and instructions in the margins of these documents. The materials were then routed to other members of the CPSU Secretariat and to top officials in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

Mel'kov's cable notes that “certain individuals” in Moldavia failed to “comprehend the essence of events in Czechoslovakia” and had “expressed support for the KSC's course toward ‘liberalization.’” He reported with dismay that publications, letters, and other materials casting a positive light on the Prague Spring were pouring into Moldavia from Czechoslovakia. Mel'kov assured the CPSU Secretariat that the Moldavian party was carrying out “increased political work” and related measures to

counteract the adverse effects of the Czechoslovak crisis. Nevertheless, the very fact that his memorandum concentrated so heavily on the problems that were arising, rather than on the “absolute majority of the republic's population [that] wholeheartedly supports the policy of the CPSU,” suggests that the spill-over was even worse than he let on.

1 August 1968 (Secret)

From Kishinev  
22132

### TO THE CC CPSU INFORMATION

In connection with the events in the CSSR, the party aktiv in Moldavia, including lecturers, political workers,





Directorate for Materiel Planning, and 2<sup>nd</sup> Directorate. The Hungarian reels at LC are still being processed and are not yet open for research. LC also intends to post a list of the contents of the Hungarian microfilm on its website.

The plan is to continue filming selected portions of files for the period 1949-56, to be followed by documents and reminiscences related to the 1956 Revolution (about 9,300 pages) and the Ministry of Defense's Presidential Directorate register books for 1945-49 (about 8,300 pages). Time and resources permitting, records of the Hungarian Royal Chief of Staff and of the Presidential Section of the Royal Ministry of Defense for the period 1938-45 will be filmed last.

At present there are no plans to film inventories in the Hungarian Archive for Military History.

Further information regarding the microfilm from the three archives can be obtained from LC's European Division specialists: Ron Bachman (Poland), 202-707-8484, Grant Harris (Romania), 202-707-5859, and Ken Nyirady (Hungary), 202-707-8493.

*Since 1987 Ronald D. Landa has been a member of the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. From 1973 to 1987 he worked as a historian at the Department of State, where he was one of the editors of the documentary series, Foreign Relations of the United States.*

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the holdings of the Slovak Military Historical Archive at Trnava, which administratively is under the Military and remue edsd fPaHungari7, 202-7TaskistoricalVHA (1.4533 -1.24 TDr"0.ory.B



In the press the basic theses of Leninism on the origin and character of wars under imperialism are explained in insufficient depth, the designs of the Americo-English imperialists who are conducting an aggressive policy of unleashing a new war are poorly unmasked, and the profound contradictions in the camp of the imperialist aggressors are not properly reflected.

The CC VKP(b) resolves:

1. To oblige the editorial staff of the central and local newspapers, and also the staff of social-political and literary-artistic journals, to eliminate the shortcomings in the propaganda of the struggle for peace noted in this resolution.
2. To require the editorial staff of newspapers and journals to improve the coverage of the struggle for peace, bearing in mind the necessity of raising the political and labor activity of the masses and their vigilance against the intrigues of imperialist aggressors, and of mobilizing the workers to selfless labor, overfulfilment of production plans, and improvement of work in all spheres of economic and cultural construction. In the press it is necessary to unmask the criminal machinations of the war hawks – their mendacious, ostensible peacefulness in word, their aggressive measures and plans in deed. The successes of the movement of supporters of peace and the growth of the forces of the international camp of peace, democracy and socialism should be fully reflected in the pages of newspapers and journals. It is necessary to explain that the Soviet peace-loving foreign policy relies on the might of the Soviet state and, that reinforcing its might with their creative labor, Soviet people are strengthening the security of the people of our country and the cause of peace in the whole world, and that a new world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, can lead only to the collapse of the capitalist system and its replacement by the socialist system.
3. To instruct the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC VKP(b) and the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC VKP (b) to carry out the following measures:
  - a) to conduct a meeting of editors of central newspapers
  - b) resorale5ournals.

and ofS\*1~0.i~T\* Knowled.125 Tcrhe iz0.0514itsdH9camp of the imperialisft i67 Twi~(Marxtic-s the b VKe0.055g125 Twied in this resolution.

## Between Solidarity and Neutrality: The Nordic Countries and the Cold War 1945-1991

By **Valur Ingimundarson**

Any attempt to point out the similarities in the Nordic experience during the Cold War is futile without taking into account the differences. For one thing, Sweden and Finland (despite its treaty obligations with the Soviet Union) opted for neutrality in the East-West struggle, but Denmark, Norway, and Iceland for NATO membership. Some saw this diversity as a unifying strand, arguing that what became euphemistically known as the “Nordic Balance” gave the Nordic countries some freedom of action within the sphere of low politics and mitigated Cold War tensions in Northern Europe. The Nordics were reluctant Cold Warriors and tried, with varying degrees of success, to assume some sort of a “bridgebuilding” function in the Cold War. But there were many things that set the Nordic countries apart. All efforts to create a Nordic bloc in the military, economic, and political field were doomed to fail. Despite shared cultural values, the Nordic countries were simply too small, too diverse, and too weak to offer a credible alternative. Yet the only way to grasp their importance in the Cold War is to put them in a broader Nordic framework—to pay attention to common characteristics, as expressed in interlocking relationships, interactions, and mutual influences.

In recent years a major scholarly reassessment has been undertaken over the role of the Nordic countries in the Cold War. Numerous books and articles have attracted much scholarly and public attention. The Cold War International History Project, the London School of Economics, and the Historical Institute of the University of Iceland brought together about 30 scholars and officials, in Reykjavik, to discuss these new findings at an

Soviet hegemony in these countries. In the end, the FCMA gave the Soviets less than they bargained for and recognized the limits of Soviet influence in Finland. By offering Stalin the necessary minimum in terms of military security, the Finns managed to prevent the Sovietization of the country. This does not mean that no costs were involved: Finland always had to take into account Soviet foreign policy priorities—a fact which did not go unnoticed in the other Nordic countries. Soviet pressure on Finland and the Friendship Treaty gave strong impetus to Norway's insistence on establishing a formal military relationship with the West in the spring of 1948. According to Korobochkin no evidence has been found to confirm Norwegian fears that a similar Soviet treaty offer to Norway was in the works. Yet the Finnish case showed how a superpower's hard-line approach toward one Nordic country could affect threat perceptions in another.

The Soviets reacted with diplomatic threats against Norway's NATO membership and extracted, in 1949, a promise from the Norwegians not to allow foreign military bases on their soil. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union spared Denmark, even as it stressed in Soviet propaganda that the political leaders of the Nordic members of the Western alliance had sold out to American "imperialists." It was not until 1953 that the Danes under Soviet pressure prohibited foreign bases in Denmark.<sup>4</sup> The policy prohibiting nuclear weapons on Danish and Norwegian soil also reflected a desire not to provoke the Soviets. Iceland, however, did not adopt such a policy, even if it shared Norwegian and Danish anxieties about the role of nuclear weapons in Western military strategy.

The Soviets gradually came to see the Nordic countries in less threatening terms than other members of the Western Bloc. Since the attitude of the Nordic countries was friendlier, they had the potential of becoming what a leading former Soviet official, Georgi Arbatov (Director Emeritus of the then-Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of USA and Canada) termed "a weaker link in the chain of the enemies of the Soviet Union."<sup>5</sup> Thus by returning the Porkkala military base and allowing Finnish membership in the Nordic Council in 1955, the Soviets wanted to strengthen anti-NATO elements in Denmark and Norway as well as to elevate Sweden's neutral position. The Soviets scored some propaganda points in these efforts, but did not succeed in splitting NATO. And although less suspicious of the Nordic countries than other NATO-members, they did not treat them more leniently in their military planning. According to K.G.H. Hillingsø (Royal Danish Defense College), the Soviets consistently overestimated NATO forces, underrated effects of NATO nuclear weapons, and planned to use nuclear weapons as heavy artillery.<sup>6</sup> What was surprising from the Western perspective was the planning for the early and massive Soviet use of nuclear weapons, if war broke out in Northern Europe.

Secondly, during the early Cold War, the Soviets took an inflexible attitude toward the Nordic Communist parties

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The Bulgarian Communist Party did the same thing, as Jordan Baev (Bulgarian Defense Ministry) pointed out.<sup>9</sup> The relationship did not result in any political victories for the Soviets, but it gave them greater access to the political elite in these countries.

Conference participants stressed the negative Soviet position towards Nordic Social Democracy in the early Cold War. The Social Democratic parties dominated political life in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, and were not prepared to give ground to the Communist Parties in these countries. As governing parties, however, they sought to avoid a confrontational course in international affairs and hoped to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. The Finnish and Icelandic Social Democratic parties, in contrast, were far smaller and much more anti-Soviet than their other Nordic counterparts. As Mikko Majander (University of Helsinki) showed, the Finnish Social Democratic Party was extremely hostile toward the Communists at home and played an important role in keeping them out of power during the crucial years 1948-1949. A similar scenario was played out in Iceland, where there was a sharp divide between the Social Democrats and the Socialists.

With some justification, the Soviets blamed right-wing Social Democrats for the decision by Sweden, Norway, Denmark to join the Marshall Plan and for the integration of the Nordic countries into Western economic







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## News from Hanoi Archives: Summer 1998

**By David Wolff**

In July 1998 I visited Hanoi to attend the first International Conference of Vietnamese Studies on behalf of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP). The conference, sponsored by two of Vietnam's most prestigious academic units, the National Centre for Social and Human Sciences and Vietnam National University, was a big success. A projected attendance of 300 mushroomed to 700, drawing attention from governmental top brass. Not only were the proceedings opened by the Prime Minister and a meeting arranged with the Party General Secretary (as described in *Vietnam News* coverage), but when the conference outgrew the International Convention Center Facilities, it was moved to the National Assembly building, an appropriate setting for what was probably Vietnam's largest and most open exchange of views to date between foreign and Vietnamese academics and specialists in a wide range of fields.

The conference's multiple sections met

(1945-54)  
 42-47 Interzone 3 (Various Admin)  
 48-52 Interzone 4  
 53-56 Interzone 3  
 57-74 Viet Bac Region  
 75-80, 88-90 Tay Bac Region  
 81-84 Ta Ngan  
 85-86 Salt Office  
 87 School for Agriculture and Industry  
 91 Central Area  
 [. . .]  
 97-99 Thai-Hmong Autonomous Region  
 100 Office of Cultural Exchange with Foreign  
 Countries  
 101 Local Industry  
 102 Construction  
 103 Water Transport  
 104 Land Transport  
 105 Construction  
 106 Machine Production  
 107 Food Resources  
 108 Tools and Implements  
 109 General Statistical Institute  
 110 Development Bank  
 111 Chuong Duong Bridge  
 112 Ben Thuy Bridge  
 113 Specialist Office  
 114 Ministry of Industry and Commerce  
 115 Sports Office  
 116 Culture and Arts  
 117 Interior Ministry  
 118 Government Commerce Commission  
 119 Prime Minister's Office  
 120 Films  
 121 Files transmitted by Ngo Dau on 26 March 1980  
 122 Documents with [Chairman] Ho's signature  
 [. . .]  
 124 Interzone 5 Resistance and Administration  
 Committee

A 1998 addendum to this list includes:

1. Viet Bac Autonomous Region Administration  
Comm. (1950-75)
2. Viet Bac Autonomous Region Party Comm. (1950-  
75)
- 3-4. Finance Ministry
5. Health Ministry
6. Meteorology Office
7. Water Measurement
8. Communications
9. Viet Bac Interzone Land Reform
10. Commodity organizations
11. Equipment office
12. Tay Bac Autonomous Region
13. The Long Bridge

It should also be mentioned that the Ministry of Culture collection also includes more than 30 personal archives for important Vietnamese cultural figures. Furthermore, a brief perusal of the catalog for f. 113 revealed files on the Soviet contribution to the construction of the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum and on the withdrawal of the Chinese experts in 1978 as well as the daily business of hosting socialist-camp specialists in North Vietnam.

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#### CWIHP'S NEW ADDRESS

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concerned the Soviet decision to finally delink INF from SDI, eliminating a major obstacle to concluding an INF agreement. According to Chernyaev's notes, the proposal to de-link INF seems to have come from—of all people—Andrei Gromyko, with support from Ligachev and Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov, all known for their conservative viewpoints in a Politburo meeting in February 1987. Gorbachev, on the other hand, seemed to hesitate. Chernyaev explained that Gromyko, who by that point was no longer foreign minister and had been “promoted” to a position of little influence, was no longer taken seriously. He could thus argue in favor of positions he had earlier strongly opposed (including withdrawal from Afghanistan). It remained unclear, however, why Ligachev was persistently urging the de-linking while Gorbachev seemingly played devil's advocate, or why Shevardnadze was apparently not part of the discussion.

While less new information came out on the American side—not surprising since the major transformations of the end of the Cold War occurred on the Soviet side, and also because we know more about the American decision-making process, thanks in part to many high-quality memoirs—we did learn more about the nature of threat perceptions on both sides in the 1980s, particularly the period 1983-86. McFarlane challenged arguments from the Russians that they had been thinking about reform for a long time, provoking Chernyaev to ask, “Did you really think we were going to attack you?” There was often as much disagreement within the sides as between them, especially on the American side, providing a useful reminder of the complex array of domestic actors involved on each side. An interesting exchange came near the end when CIA Soviet specialist Doug MacEachin raised the issue of the Able Archer of NATO military exercises November 1983, and scholar Raymond Garthoff pointed to the highly provocative movements of U.S. fleets in Soviet waters, explicitly challenging Jack Matlock's depiction of U.S. policy as relatively benign and defensive.

In addition to providing new empirical information about specific decisions and events, the discussions provided more general contextual insights that will be valuable in interpreting the large numbers of documents now coming out of the archives. Other issues the sessions illuminated were the importance of personal relationships in building trust between the two sides, and the degree of misperception and miscommunication on each side. A recurring theme was the failure of the other side to perceive what each regarded as major shifts in its own position. During a discussion of the causes of the U.S. adoption of the “four-point agenda” in January 1984, which marked a shift by the Reagan administration to a much more ac0086 McFard 17 Tciahoward the Soviet

Afghanistan remained an area of clear disagreement. Soviet participants clearly believed that the U.S. was trying to tie down the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, while U.S. participants said there was nothing they would have wanted more than an early Soviet withdrawal. They saw little evidence that the Soviets were preparing to leave.

Those looking to support or disconfirm arguments about whether “power” or “ideas” mattered more in explaining the end of the Cold War will, alas, find no final answers here. The conference provided evidence for both. Discussions illuminated the perception of domestic decline as the main driving factor for reform on the Soviet side. They also provided insight on the reaction of various Soviet bureaucracies to Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), suggesting that SDI did indeed affect Soviet thinking on the need for reform, especially Gorbachev's. At the same time, it was clear from the exchanges that ongoing U.S. and Western diplomatic pressure in favor of human rights and freedoms, exerted both publicly and privately, played a key role in shaping the direction and content of change. Tarasenko emphasized that Shevardnadze's conversations with Shultz on topics other than arms control had an important influence on changing his views. Constant Western pressure on behalf of Sakharov and other dissidents, while irritating initially to the Soviets, eventually fostered a genuine change in thinking. Chernyaev described how Gorbachev and his advisers complied initially with Western requests to improve human rights for purely for instrumental reasons (to promote the arms control process), but then began to think of them as something fundamentally important for the reform of Soviet society. Chernyaev said at the conference, “these kinds of reminders [on human rights] that we got, they really worked, they affected us.”

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