
Planning for Nuclear War: The Czechoslovak War Plan of 1964

By Petr LuÁák

The 1964 operational plan for the Czechoslovak People's Army („ eskoslovenská Lidova Armada, or „ SLA), an English translation of which follows, is the first war plan from the era of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation that has emerged from the archives of either side. It is “‘the real thing’—the actual blueprint for war at the height of the nuclear era,” detailing the assignments of the “Czechoslovak Front” of forces of the Warsaw Pact.

Even before these organizational changes were officially implemented, they had been applied in military exercises, during which the newly created fronts were to be synchronized. While the plans of the exercises and the tasks set for the participants cannot be considered an exact reflection of operational planning, they show that the time periods by which certain lines on the western battlefield were to be reached had gradually been reduced and the depth reached by Czechoslovak troops had been enlarged. In one of the first front exercises in 1960, the „ SLA was supposed to operate on the Stuttgart–Dachau line by the 4th day of conflict. The operational front exercise of March 1961 went even further in assuming that the Dijon–Lyon line would be reached on the 6th–7th day of the conflict. During the operational front exercise in September 1961, the Czechoslovak front practiced supporting an offensive by Soviet and East German forces. The line Bonn–Metz–Strnmroug was to be reached on the 7th and 8th day. An exercise conducted in December 1961 gave the Czechoslovak front the task of reaching the Besancon–Belfort line on the 7th day of operations.¹⁷ From the early 1960s onward, massive war games with similar designs took place in Legnica, Poland, in the presence of the commands of the individual fronts. The assumed schedule and territory covered in these exercises already reflected the vision of the 1964 plan.

In Warsaw Pact plans, Czechoslovakia did not play the main strategic role in the Central European battlefield—that fell to the Warsaw–Berlin axis. For instance, during the joint front exercise VÍTR (Wind), the Czechoslovak front, besides taking Nancy (France), was “to be prepared to secure the left wing of the Eastern forces [the Warsaw Pact–*P.L.*] against the neutral state [Austria–*P.L.*] in case its neutrality was broken.”¹⁸

With a greater number of nuclear weapons in their possession by the late 1950s, the Soviets began to appreciate nuclear weapons not merely as “normal” weapons. For Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, nuclear weapons were both a tool to exert political pressure and a measure of military deterrent. To him, further demilitarization of the Cold War could be achieved through cuts in ground forces.¹⁹ Nuclear weapons in turn acquired an even more prominent role in planning for massive retaliation.²⁰ The Czechoslovak military leadership hinted at this as follows: “For the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and specifically of „ SSR, it is important not to allow the enemy to make a joint attack and not to allow him to gain advantageous conditions or the development of ground force operations, and thus gain strategic dominance. Basically, this means that our means for an atomic strike must be in such a state of military readiness that they would be able to deal with the task of carrying out a nuclear counter-strike with a time lag of only seconds or tenths of seconds.”²¹

Flexible response à la Warsaw Pact

The US move from massive retaliation to flexible response during the early 1960s did not go unnoticed by the Warsaw Pact. According to its 1964 training directives, the „ SLA was supposed to carry out training for the early stages of war not only with the use of nuclear weapons but, for the first time since mid-1950s, also without them. At a major joint exercise of the Warsaw Pact in the summer of 1964, the early phase of war was envisaged without nuclear weapons.²²

However, flexible response as conceived by the Warsaw Pact was not a mere mirror image of the Western version. The US attempt to enhance the credibility of its deterrent by acquiring the capacity to limit conflict to a manageable level by introducing “thresholds” and “pauses” resulted from an agreement between political leaders and the military, who assumed to know how to prevent war from escalating into a nuclear nightmare. In the East, by contrast, the concept was based only on a military—and perhaps more realistic—assessment that a conflict was, sooner or later, going to expand into a global nuclear war. In the words of the „ SSR Minister of National Defense Bohumír Lomský:

All of these speculative theories of Western strategists about limiting the use of nuclear arms and about the spiral effect of the increase of their power have one goal: in any given situation to stay in the advantageous position for the best timing of a massive nuclear strike in order to start a global nuclear war. We reject these false speculative theories, and every use of nuclear arms by an aggressor will be answered with a massive nuclear offensive using all the means of the Warsaw Treaty countries, on the whole depth and aiming at all targets of the enemy coalition. We have no intention to be the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Although we do not believe in the truthfulness and the reality of these Western theories, we cannot disregard the fact that the imperialists could

The 1964 Czechoslovak war plan is therefore especially important. It shows how little the East-bloc planners believed in the relevance of Western-style flexible response. Not only did the plan not consider the possibility of a non-nuclear war in Europe, but it assumed that the war would start with a massive nuclear strike by the West.

The Czechoslovak war plan of 1964

Considering the high degree of secrecy surrounding these documents, only a few people in the 1960s had direct knowledge of the 1964 Czechoslovak war plan. However, several sporadic accounts make at least some conclusions possible. The plan was the first to have been drawn up by the „ SLA in the aftermath of the 1958-62 Berlin Crisis. According to the late Václav Vitanovský, then „ SLA Chief of Operations, the plan came about as a result of directives from Moscow.²⁵ These directives were then worked into operational plans by the individual armies. As Vitanovský explained, “When we had finished, we took it back to Moscow, where they looked it over, endorsed it, and said yes, we agree. Or they changed it. Changes were made right there on the spot.”²⁶ The orders for the Czechoslovak Front stated that the valleys in the Vosges mountains were to be reached by the end of the operation. Undoubtedly, this was meant to prepare the way for troops of the second echelon made up of Soviet forces.

The 1964 plan remained valid until at least 1968 and probably for quite some time after.²⁷ As early as the mid-1960s, however, a number of revisions were made. According to contemporary accounts, the Soviet leadership feared that the Czechoslovak Front would not be capable of fulfilling its tasks and, accordingly, reduced the territory assigned to the „ SLA. To support the objectives of the 1964 plan, Moscow tried to impose the stationing of a number of Soviet divisions on Czechoslovak territory in 1965-66. In December 1965, the Soviets forced the Czechoslovak government to sign an agreement on the storage of nuclear warheads on Czechoslovak soil. Implementation of both measures only became feasible after the Soviet invasion in 1968.²⁸



DOCUMENT

Plan of Actions of the Czechoslovak People's Army for War Period

“Approved”
Single Copy
Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces of the USSR

Antonín Novotný
1964

1. Conclusions from the assessment of the enemy

The enemy could use up to 12 general military units in the Central European military theater for advancing in the area of the Czechoslovak Front from D[ay] 1 to D[ay] 7-8.

- The 2nd Army Corps of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] including: 4th and 10th mechanized divisions, 12th tank division, 1st airborne division and 1st mountain division,
- the 7th Army Corps of the USA including: the 24th mechanized division and 4th armored tank division;
- the 1st Army of France including: 3rd mechanized division, the 1st and 7th tank divisions, and up to two newly deployed units, including 6 launchers of tactical missiles, up to 130 theater launchers and artillery, and up to 2800 tanks.

Operations of the ground troops could be supported by part of the 40th Air Force, with up to 900 aircraft, including 250 bombers and up to 40 airborne missile launchers.

Judging by the composition of the group of NATO troops and our assessment of the exercises undertaken by the NATO command, one could anticipate the design of the enemy's actions with the following goals.

To disorganize the leadership of the state and to undermine mobilization of armed forces by surprise nuclear strikes against the main political and economic centers of the country.

To critically change the correlation of forces in its own favor by strikes against the troops, airfields and communication centers.

To destroy the border troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army in border battles, and to destroy the main group of our troops in the Western and Central Czech Lands by building upon the initial attack.

To disrupt the arrival of strategic reserves in the regions of Krkonoše, Jeseníky, and Moravská Brána by nuclear strikes against targets deep in our territory and by sending airborne assault troops; to create conditions for a successful attainment of the goals of the operation.

Judging by the enemy's approximate operative design, the combat actions of both sides in the initial period of the war will have a character of forward contact battles.

The operative group of the enemy in the southern part of the FRG will force the NATO command to gradually engage a number of their units in the battle, which will create an opportunity for the Czechoslovak Front to defeat NATO forces unit by unit. At the same time, that would require building a powerful first echelon in the operative structure of the Front; and to achieve success it would require building up reserves that would be capable of mobilizing very quickly and move into the area of military action in a very short time.

7. Aviation.

The 10th Air Force—the 1st fighter division, 2nd and 34th fighter-bomber division, 25th bomber regiment, 46th transport air division, 47th air reconnaissance regiment and 45th air reconnaissance regiment for target guidance.

Combat tasks:

With the first nuclear strike to destroy part of forces of the 2nd Army Corps of the FRG, two command and targeting centers, and part of the air defense forces of the enemy.

Upon the beginning of combat actions to suppress part of air defense forces of the enemy in the following regions: Roding, Kirchroth, Hohenfels, Amberg, Pfreimd, Nagel, and Erbendorf.

To uncover and destroy operative and tactical means of nuclear attack, command and control aviation forces in the following regions: Weiden, Nabburg, Amberg, Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, Regensburg, and Erlangen.

During the operation to give intensive support to combat actions of the troops of the front: on D[ay] 1—6 group sorties of fighter bombers, from D[ay] 2 to D[ay] 5-8 group sorties of fighter bombers and bombers daily, and from D[ay] 6 to D[ay] 8-6 group sorties of fighter bombers and bombers daily. The main effort should be concentrated on supporting the troops of the 1st Army.

In cooperation with forces and means of the air defense of the country, fronts and neighbors—to cover the main group of forces of the Front from air strikes by the enemy.

To ensure the landing of reconnaissance troops and general airborne forces on D[ay] 1 and D[ay] 2 in the rear of the enemy.

To ensure airborne landing of the 22nd airborne brigade on D[ay] 4 in the area north of Stuttgart, or on D[ay] 5 in the area of Rastatt, or on D 6 in the area to the east of Mulhouse.

To carry out air reconnaissance with concentration of main effort on the direction of Nuremberg, Stuttgart, and Strasbourg with the goal of locating means of nuclear attack, and in order to determine in time the beginning of operations and the direction of the advancing operative reserves of the enemy.

In order to fulfill the tasks set for the front, it will be required to use the following weapons:

- for the immediate task—10 nuclear bombs;
- for subsequent tasks—7 nuclear bombs;
- for resolving unexpectedly arising tasks—2 nuclear bombs shall be left in the Front's reserve.

The 57th Air Force, consisting of the 131st fighter division, 289th fighter-bomber regiment, 230th and 733rd bomber regiment and 48th air reconnaissance regiment, arriving by D[ay] 1 from the Carpathian military district, is to remain under operative subordination to the Czechoslovak Front until the fifth to sixth day for 5 army sorties.

The Army has a determined the limit of: combat sets of air bombs—3, combat sets of air-to-air missiles—2, combat sets of aviation cartridges—2, and fuel—3 rounds of army

refueling

Combat tasks:

- in cooperation with the 10th Air Force to find and destroy the means of nuclear attack of the enemy, its aviation and command and control centers with concentration of main efforts on the direction of Nuremberg, Strasbourg;
- to support combat actions of the troops of the Front when they force the rivers Naab, Neckar, Rhine, and when they counter-attack the enemy;
- to support combat actions of the 22nd airborne brigade in the areas of its landing;
- to protect the troops of the front from air strikes by the enemy;
- to carry out air reconnaissance with concentration of the main effort on discovering the means of nuclear attack and deep operative and strategic reserves of the enemy.

The 184th heavy bomber regiment of long-range aviation should use nuclear bombs in the first nuclear strike against headquarters of the 2nd Army Corps of the FRG, 7th US Army, 2nd/40 Corporal artillery battalion, 2nd/82 Corporal artillery battalion, 5th/73 Sergeant artillery battalion, and the main group of forces of the 4th mechanized division and 12th tank division of the 2nd Army Corps of the FRG. Total use of nuclear bombs—16. Use of special combat ammunition—only with permission of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces.

8. Air Defense

7th Air Defense Army of the country—2th

system of the Warsaw Treaty countries with all forces and resources to cover the main group of the Front's troops.

—During the operation, in cooperation with the 7th Air Defense Army, units of 10th and 57th Air Force and the air defense of the 1st Western Front, to cover the troops of the front from the air strikes of the enemy in the process of their passing over the border mountains, and also during the crossing of the rivers Neckar and Rhine to cover the missile forces and command and control centers.

9. The 22nd airborne brigade is to be ready to be deployed from the region of Prostějov, Niva, Brodek to the region north of Stuttgart on Day 4 or to the region of Rastatt on Day 5, or to the region to the east of Mulhouse on Day 6 with the task of capturing and holding

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¹⁶The formation of the front included almost all Czechoslovak ground troops: 15 mobilized divisions arranged into 3 armies, the air force, an airborne brigade and the accompanying technical and rear equipment. The command was given to the general staff of the „ SLA; the chief-of-staff became the commander of this front.

¹⁷“

“Operation Atom”

The Soviet Union’s Stationing of Nuclear Missiles in the German Democratic Republic, 1959

By Matthias Uhl and Vladimir I. Ivkin

On 26 March 1955, Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Nikolai A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet Union’s Council of Ministers, signed government decree no. 589-365. Their signatures set in motion one of the most

21 June 1956.⁵

The new weapon, officially called a first-generation mid-range strategic missile, had a length of 20.8 meters, a diameter of 1.65 meters, and a weight of 28 tons. The missile was driven by a liquid propulsion system that used liquid oxygen and alcohol, which created a thrust of 44 tons and was therefore able to carry the 1,400 kilogram warhead up to a maximum distance of 1,200 kilometers. The missile would hit its target after a maximum flying time of 637 seconds. The navigational system of the missile functioned on the basis of inertial navigation and was guided by radio transmission to correct deviations from the missile's proper flight path. The average margin of error of 1.5 kilometers was considered to be sufficiently accurate. It allowed the destruction of important political and economic centers as well as larger "soft" military targets.⁶

Even before the successful conclusion of the tests, the Soviets began working on designs for a deployment of the weapon. The planners in the Soviet Ministry of Defense responsible for the project were aware that the R-5, with a range limited to 1,200 kilometers, still had to be stationed outside the territory of the Soviet Union if the most important political, military, and economic centers of Western Europe were to be in reach. Between 1953 and 1955, special groups from the Soviet Ministry of Defense gathered information on potential deployment locations for R-1, R-2 and R-5 missiles during reconnaissance trips to


Romania, Bulgaria and the GDR. Due to the limited effectiveness of these weapon prototypes in a conflict situation, the military leaders decided against implementing these plans. The plans were, however, the starting point for the planned stationing of the R-5M missile outside the Soviet Union.⁷

In March 1955, the Soviet Ministry of Defense presented draft decree no. 589-365 for the USSR Council of Ministers' decision. The draft called for stationing battle-ready missile brigades of the Supreme High Command Reserve (RVGK) in the Trans-Caucasian Military Zone, the Far Eastern Military Zone, in the GDR and in Bulgaria. While the Soviet Foreign Ministry was instructed to obtain the agreement of the Bulgarian government for stationing missiles on its territory, this procedure was not followed in the GDR. There the missile brigade was apparently to be integrated into the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, which were considered to have extraterritorial status. The Soviet Union therefore saw no reason to consult with its ally about the intended stationing.⁸ In fact, as far as can be documented, the Soviet military apparently kept the stationing of the R-5M in the GDR a secret from their East German ally.⁹

Although Khrushchev and Bulganin signed the decree on 26 March 1955, its implementation was delayed repeatedly. The most important causes for this delay were repeated problems in producing the R-5M in sufficient

stationing the missiles and their crews was nearing completion, and in November-December 1958, the 72nd Engineer Brigade prepared for its transfer to the GDR. Since only enough space existed thus far for two divisions, the third division was transferred to Gvardeysk in the Königsberg region. The remaining staff of the brigade, the 635th and 638th Missile Units as well as the 349th and 432nd Mobile Missile Technical Bases, began their secret transport of soldiers and equipment to the GDR.¹⁹

Efforts to maintain secrecy, such as firing all German workers in the Vogelsang and Fürstenberg garrisons, were increased.²⁰ Nonetheless, at the end of January 1959, agent V-9771 reported to his contact in the BND the arrival of parts of the 635th Missile Unit. He reported that a transport of the Soviet Army had arrived at the train route between Lychen and Fürstenberg. At the center of the transport, soldiers had moved “very large bombs” with the help of caterpillar tractors. It seems clear that this was the movement of R-5M components. Avoiding the main roads, the equipment, now covered in tarpaulin, was then taken to the back side of the Kastaven Lake military base near Fürstenberg.²¹



R-5M Missile

Picture Courtesy of Matthias Uhl

The staff of the brigade as well as the 349th Mobile Missile Technical Base were stationed with the 635th Division in Fürstenberg, in the immediate vicinity of the command center of the Second Soviet Tank Guard Army. The 638th Division and its accompanying 432nd Mobile Missile Technical Base were stationed twenty kilometers away, in the neighboring village of Vogelsang.²² Each of the two missile divisions controlled two artillery battalions, outfitted with a launching ramp for firing the R-5M, including the necessary ground equipment. Each launching ramp was equipped for three missiles at that time; in total four launching units and 12 missiles were ready for deployment in the GDR. In addition to the aforementioned equipment, each division had a transport battalion, a unit to fuel the missiles, and a guidance battalion. This last group had the task of increasing the accuracy of the missile through the use of radio control. To this end, the guidance battalion employed a guidance device designed to reduce the missile's tendency to veer to one side or the other.²³

The missiles, however, were not fully ready for battle. They still lacked the necessary nuclear warheads, which arrived in the GDR only in mid-April 1959. The warheads, officially labeled “generators” for the trip, were brought by train under heavy guard to the military airport at Templin. In the nights thereafter, they divided the Mobile Missile Technical Bases among the bunkers designed for them in the area around Vogelsang and Fürstenberg. On 29 April, an incident occurred that is not described in any detail in the material available at the time this article was written. But it is clear that during the transport of the nuclear weapons, the head of the 432nd Mobile Missile Technical Base, Lt.-Maj. S. I. Nesterov was demoted and relieved of command on the spot by Lt.-Gen. M. K. Nikolski, the head engineer for the 12th Central Division, responsible for the warheads.²⁴

Once the nuclear warheads had arrived, the 72nd RVGK Reserve Brigade was finally ready for battle. At the beginning of May 1959, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, M. V. Zakharov, personally told Khrushchev that the missiles were ready for use.²⁵ At that point, the brigade, which reported directly to Khrushchev and the General Staff, was in position to report that it was ready to “assume the planned launching position and fulfill the designated tasks.”²⁶

Since the relevant documents are not accessible, one can only speculate as to the possible targets assigned to the missile brigade. It seems likely, however, that four missiles were aimed at the UK. The US-British “Thor” missiles stationed in Yorkshire and Suffolk were to be destroyed by the Soviet nuclear missiles in the case of a crisis. For the first time, moreover, the most important US air bases in Western Europe were also within range of the Soviets' weapons. The bombers stationed in Western Europe carrying US nuclear weapons, the most important element in the strategy of massive retaliation, were thus in

improve the battle training of the 7 engineer brigades.

The Secretary of the Central Committee
The Chairman of the of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Council of Ministers of the USSR,

N. Khrushchev
N. Bulganin

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (AP FR), Moscow, Register 93 (Documents with Decisions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the Year 1955) as printed in *Pervoe raketnoe soedinenie vooruzennykh sil strany: Voенno-istoriceskij ocerk* (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), pp. 208-209. Translated from Russian for the CWIHP by Matthias Uhl.]

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¹ See "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Nr. 589-365," Top Secret, 26 March 1955, printed in *Pervoe raketnoe soedinenie vooruzennykh sil strany: Voенno-istoricesky ocerk* (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), pp. 208-209. The original is located in the *Archiv Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii* [Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow, AP RF], Register 93 (Documents with Decisions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for 1955).

² On the activity of the German missile specialists in the Soviet Union, see Jürgen Michels, *Peenemünde und seine Erben in Ost und West: Entwicklung und Weg deutscher Geheimwaffen*, (Bonn: Bernard & Gräfe, 1997); Ulrich Albrecht, Andreas Heinemann-Grueder and Arend Wellman, *Die Spezialisten: Deutsche Naturwissenschaftler und Techniker in der Sowjetunion* (Berlin: Dietz, 1992). The author is currently working on a monograph on the same topic that will soon appear under the title: *Stalins V-2: Der Transfer der deutschen Raketentechnik in die UdSSR, 1945-1955*.

³ See *Raketno-kosmiceskaia korporacia "Energiia" imeni S. P. Koroleva* (Moscow: RKK "Energiia", 1996), pp. 31-51; T. Kochran, U. Arikin, R. Norris and Dz. Sends, *Jadernoe vooruzenie SSSR* (Moscow: IzDAT, 1992), pp. 230-233.

⁴ See M. A. Pervov, "Ballisticeskie rakety velikoj strany" *Aviacija i kosmonavtika: Vcera, segodnja, zavtra*, no. 7 (1998), pp. 17-23; see also A.V. Karpenko, A. F. Utkin and A. D. Popov, *Otecestvennye strategiceskie raketnye komplekсы* (Sankt-Peterburg: Nevskij bastion: Gangut, 1999), pp. 38-44.

⁵ See *Strategiceskoe jadernoe vooruzenie Rossii* (Moscow: Izdat 1998), pp. 160-161, see also B. E. Certok, *Rakety i ljudi* (Moscow: Masinostroenie 1995), pp. 389-390; *Jadernye ispytanija SSSR* (Moscow: Izdat 1997), p. 147; *Chronika osnovnykh sobytij istorii Raketnykh vojsk strategiceskogo naznacenija* (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), p. 35.

⁶ See *Raketnye komplekсы*, p. 43f. see also S. G. Kolesnikov, *Strategiceskoe raketno-jadernoe oruzie* (Moscow: Arsenal-Press, 1996), p. 19-20.

⁷ See M. A. Pervov, *Raketnoe oruzie Raketnykh vojsk strategiceskogo naznacenija* (Moscow: Violanta, 1999), p. 51.

⁸ See "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Council of Ministers of the USSR," no. 589-365, Top Secret, 26 March 1955, printed in *Pervoe raketnoe*, pp. 208-209.

⁹ During my interview with General Heinz Kessler, who was the Defense Minister for the GDR from 1985 to 1989, on 24 October 1999, Kessler stated: "The Soviet Army leadership did not give the GDR military leadership any information about the stationing of missiles in Vogelsang and Fürstenberg. In my position at the time as head of the GDR air force, I had no knowledge of any action of that type. Neither the GDR Defense Minister at the time, Willi Stoph, nor his first assistant, Lieutenant-General Heinz Hoffmann had received any information, as far as I know. In addition, in my later position as Defense Minister, this 1959 event was never mentioned in any way by the commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany or the Supreme Command of the Warsaw Pact. This type of behavior matches my later experiences. The Soviet military, for example, never told us which Soviet installations in the GDR had nuclear weapons in storage during my time in that position."

¹⁰ See *Sozdateli raketno-jadernogo oruzija i veterany-raketaikij rasskazыvajut* (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), pp. 250-252, see also *Voennyj enciklopediceskij slovar' Raketnykh vojsk strategiceskogo naznacenija* (Moscow: Naucnoe izdatel'stvo "BRE", 1999), p. 619.

¹¹ See *Pervoe raketnoe*, p. 124-125

¹² See Draft Decision for the Council of Ministers of the USSR, "About the Production of a Trial Series of Long-Range Missiles V-2 and Measures to Their Further Improvement," not dated (probably August 1946), Russian State Archive for Economics [RGAE], Moscow, Register 8157, Section 1, document 1149, sheet 126-128.

¹³ See Ju. A. Jasin and N. K. Monachov, "Pervaja otecestvennaja" *Nezavisimoe voенnoe obozrenie*, no. 3 (1998), p. 5; see also *Raketnye vojska strategi'eskogo naznacenija: Voенno-istoriceskij trud* (Moskva: RVSН, 1994), pp. 51-53; M. V. Sacharov, *Die Streitkräfte der*

UdSSR: Abriß ihrer Entwicklung von 1918 bis 1968
(Berlin: Militärverlag d. DDR, 1974) p. 637.

¹⁴ See *Pervoe raketnoe*, pp. 11-13, see also M. A. Pervov, *Mezkontinental'nye ballisticskie rakety SSSR i Rossii: Kratkij istoriceskij ocerk* (Moscow: [publisher not identified], 1998), p. 29-30.

¹⁵ See Standortkartei der Militärischen Auswertung des BND: "Allgemeine Beobachtungen in Vogelsang, 22. Mai 1958 bis 11 August 1958", [Card Catalog of the BND's Military Evaluations: General Observations in Vogelsang], Federal Archives, Koblenz [henceforth BA Koblenz], Collection B 206/114, sheet 18-19.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, sheet 18.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, report E 14136, mid-September 1958, BA Koblenz, collection B 206/114, sheet 20.

¹⁸ See information sent to the author by the BND on 22 April 1998 and 4 May 2000.

¹⁹ A. Bondarenko, "Osobaja tajna Vtoroj armii,"

⁴² The Central State Artillery Grounds were established on 13 May 1946 and located in Kapustin Yar.

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Our country is undergoing a truly revolutionary upsurge. The process of restructuring is gaining pace; We started by elaborating the theoretical concepts of restructuring; we had to assess the nature and scope of the problems, to interpret the lessons of the past, and to express this in the form of political conclusions and programs. This was done. The theoretical work, the re-interpretation of what had happened, the final elaboration, enrichment, and correction of political stances have not ended. They continue. However, it was fundamentally important to start from an overall concept, which is already now being confirmed by the experience of past years, which has turned out to be generally correct and to which there is no alternative. [...]

We intend to expand the Soviet Union's participation in the monitoring mechanism on human rights in the United Nations and within the framework of the pan-European process. We consider that the jurisdiction of the International Court in The Hague with respect to interpreting and applying agreements in the field of human rights should be obligatory for all states.

Within the Helsinki process, we are also examining an end to jamming of all the foreign radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union. On the whole, our credo is as follows: Political problems should be solved only by political means, and human problems only in a humane way. [...]

Now about the most important topic, without which no problem of the coming century can be resolved: disarmament. [...]

Today I can inform you of the following: The Soviet Union has made a decision on reducing its armed forces. In the next two years, their numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 persons, and the volume of conventional arms will also be cut considerably. These reductions will be made on a unilateral basis, unconnected with negotiations on the mandate for the Vienna meeting. By agreement with our allies in the Warsaw Pact, we have made the decision to withdraw six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and to disband them by 1991. Assault landing formations and units, and a number of others, including assault river-crossing forces, with their armaments and combat equipment, will also be withdrawn from the groups of Soviet forces situated in those countries. The Soviet forces situated in those countries will be cut by 50,000 persons, and their arms by 5,000 tanks. All remaining Soviet divisions on the territory of our allies will be reorganized. They will be given a different structure from today's which will become unambiguously defensive, after the removal of a large number of their tanks. [...]

By this act, just as by all our actions aimed at the demilitarization of international relations, we would also like to draw the attention of the world community to another topical problem, the problem of changing over from an economy of armament to an economy of disarmament. Is the conversion of military production realistic? I have already had occasion to speak about this. We believe that it is, indeed, realistic. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready to do the following. Within the framework of the economic reform we are ready to draw up and submit our internal plan for conversion, to prepare in the course of 1989, as an experiment, the plans for the conversion of two or three defense enterprises, to publish our experience of job relocation of specialists from the military industry, and also of using its equipment, buildings, and works in civilian industry. It is desirable that all states, primarily the major military powers, submit their national plans on this issue to the United Nations. [...]

Finally, being on U.S. soil, but also for other, understandable reasons, I cannot but turn to the subject of our relations with this great country. [...] Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America span 5 1/2 decades. The world has changed, and so have the nature, role, and place of these relations in world politics. For too long they were built under the banner of confrontation, and sometimes of hostility, either open or concealed. But in the last few years, throughout the world people were able to heave a sigh of relief, thanks to the changes for the better in the substance and atmosphere of the relations between Moscow and Washington. [...]

We acknowledge and value the contribution of President Ronald Reagan and the members of his administration, above all Mr. George Shultz. All this is capital that has been invested in a joint undertaking of historic importance. It must not be wasted or left out of circulation. The future U.S. administration headed by newly elected President George Bush will find in us a partner, ready—without long pauses and backward movements—to continue the dialogue in a spirit of realism, openness, and goodwill, and with a striving for concrete results, over an agenda encompassing the key issues of Soviet-U.S. relations and international politics.

We are talking first and foremost about consistent progress toward concluding a treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, while retaining the ABM Treaty; about elaborating a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons—here, it seems to us, we have the preconditions for making 1989 the decisive year; and about talks on reducing conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe. We are also talking about economic, ecological and humanitarian problems in the widest possible sense. [...]

We are not inclined to oversimplify the situation in the world. Yes, the tendency toward disarmament has received a strong impetus, and this process is gaining its own momentum, but it has not become irreversible. Yes, the striving to give up confrontation in favor of dialogue and cooperation has made itself strongly felt, but it has by no means secured its position forever in the practice of international relations. Yes, the movement toward a nuclear-free and nonviolent world is capable of fundamentally transforming the political and spiritual face of the planet, but only the very first steps have been taken. Moreover, in certain influential circles, they have been greeted with mistrust, and they are meeting resistance. [...]

[Source: CNN.com]

