

should the Yugoslavs chose not to respond but instead make public Khrushchev's offer of reconciliation. Furthermore, the fact that Khrushchev alone signed letters of such significance provides a glimpse into the existing balance of power within the Kremlin. It reflected both Khrushchev's ascendancy and the fragility of his position. Part of the Soviet leadership that initiated the new approach towards Yugoslavia, notably Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin and Anastas Mikoyan, were under close scrutiny from the more conservative members of the Politburo. Relations with Yugoslavia were of highest ideological significance, and any miscalculation could provide competitors in the ongoing leadership struggle, most notably Molotov and Georgy Malenkov, with valuable ammunition.

The Yugoslavs were, if anything, even more guarded and distrustful of the Soviets. In the first few weeks after receiving the letter, Tito seriously considered the possibility that Khrushchev's initiative was a Soviet maneuver aimed at undermining Yugoslavia's position. By making an enthusiastic Yugoslav response public, Khrushchev could either humiliate Tito in the Communist world or undermine Yugoslavia's strategic position vis-à-vis the West. Certainly the timing of Khrushchev's letter was most inopportune for Tito. The crisis over Trieste required Yugoslavia's close cooperation with the West in order to counter Italy's actions. For this reason, Tito chose not to respond with a letter. To keep his options open, however, he needed to acknowledge the initiative, should it prove to be genuine, and yet, in case of it being a Soviet ploy, to maintain the ability of plausible denial by keeping himself at distance. Tito thus chose Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Edvard Kardelj, his closest associate, to inform Khrushchev in mid-

normalized only after the confidence between the two countries had been fully restored. Nevertheless, Tito quickly seized the opportunity provided by the Soviet approach. He recognized the potential for an ideological victory in a conflict that cost him dearly since 1948 and had banished him and his regime from the Communist community. In his letter, he therefore dismissed the relevance of Djilas to the Yugoslav decision-making in 1948. In a masterfully ambiguous sentence, he then added, '*As with regard to the extent of Beria's guilt, you know best his role in the whole affair and we have no reason to repudiate your assertions.*' Tito clearly suggested that the current Soviet leadership had sat together with Beria in the politburo and thus shared responsibility for the break. It also implicated the one person who was never mentioned in the letters but had unquestionably been in charge in 1948—Joseph Stalin. Consequently, the conflict could only be blamed on the Soviet Union.

The correspondence is remarkable for the extreme care

into many aspects of the Cold War. This underlines the importance of projects, such as the Yugoslavia Initiative, aimed at reintegrating the wealth of Yugoslav archives and Yugoslav historiography into the international scholarship of the Cold War.

DOCUMENT No. 1
Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to
Josip Broz Tito and the Central Committee
of the League of Communists Of Yugoslavia, 22
June 1954

To the Central Committee,
 League of Communists of Yugoslavia
 To Comrade Tito

The Central Committee [CC] of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] discussed questions on the relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, and additionally analyzed the circumstances that brought about the break between the CPSU and the CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia]² and the rapid deterioration of relations between our countries.

As a result, the CC CPSU concluded that there exist some conditions for the improvement of relations between our countries and for the establishment of contacts between the CC of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY].

The CC CPSU proceeds from the fact that unfriendly relations that developed between our countries create certain damage both to the interests of Yugoslavia and to those of the Soviet Union, and to the interests of the peoples of our countries, linked by centuries of friendship and joint struggle for liberation. However, from the point of view of essential interests of both countries, it is evident that there exist no serious contradictions that could become a source of hostility and constant acrimony between our countries and peoples.

The CC CPSU proceeds also from the fact that the governments of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have recently undertaken certain steps towards normalization of relations between our countries.³

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the establishment of contacts between the CC of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

It is thoroughly understandable that elements of mistrust and prejudice, accumulated in previous years, cannot disappear overnight. Time will be needed, as well as patience and mutual good will, for an understanding to be reached. However, the shared fundamental interests of our countries, our peoples, and of the grand cause of peace and socialism must overcome various subjective moments and opinions.

We would like to know the opinion of the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on the above-addressed issues.

From its side, the CC CPSU is ready to hear and discuss the view of the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on issues regarding relations between our governments, as well as those regarding relations between the CPSU and the LCY.

To this end, we would regard as constructive a meeting of leading representatives of the CC CPSU and the CC LCY aimed at exchanging views on the above-mentioned issues. If you are in agreement with this proposal, the meeting could take place in the nearest future either in Moscow or in Yugoslavia, according to your convenience.

Secretary of the CC CPSU

N. Khrushchev

22 June 1954

[Source: Arhiv Jugoslavije [National Archives of Yugoslavia], Arhiv CK SKJ [Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Collection], 507 / IX, 119/I-48. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Svetozar Rajak.]

DOCUMENT No. 2
Letter (Cable) from the
Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union to Tito and
Central Committee of the League Of
Communists Of Yugoslavia,
24 July 1954⁵

Received by Telegraph

To the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

To Comrade Tito

The CC CPSU has received with satisfaction the communication from Comrade Kardelj stating that the

leadership of the CC LCY looks positively on suggestions proposed in the letter from the CC CPSU of 22 June 1954. We are confident that this road corresponds to the vital interests of our peoples and our Communist Parties. We acknowledge that the Yugoslav comrades could be in a position to respond to our letter in the nearest future.

The CC CPSU is aware of the great importance of the question of Trieste to Yugoslavia. We too consider it propitious that it be resolved in accordance with justified interests of Yugoslavia. Sh of une ooslavi0fts side, uturxmunn a questier in the near54.Ca-1(en-)Tj1~T*1~0 Tc1~-0.01 Twtious that mh j not it

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the proposal for improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, presented in the letter from the CC CPSU of 22 June.

Your opinion regarding the necessity of investing greater effort towards full clarification of our relations and elimination of negative elements still spoiling those relations is receiving full support from our side.

We agree that normalization and improvement of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia should not be conditioned upon [consensus regarding] issues of internal development and ways of resolving them. We also agree that development of these relations should support the enhancement of the international positions of our countries. We underline with satisfaction the existence of unanimity of views on a variety of foreign policy issues, such as: equality and non-interference into affairs of other countries, acceptance of the possibility of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between countries with different political systems, struggle for prevention of war and consolidation of peace. As is well known, the policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at the consolidation of peace in Europe and the whole world. We do not doubt that Yugoslavia will contribute towards the goal of the consolidation of peace.

As there now emerges a unity of outlook recognizing the necessity of radical improvement of relations between our countries, based on the exchange of views between us, we believe it possible also to proceed toward mutual, practical elimination of negative occurrences that obstruct rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR. We are ready, in every way, to ensure that every proposal from your side, aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia receives due attention from Soviet government organs. From our side, in the interest of normalization of relations between Yugosla-

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supported the COMINFORM Resolution against Tito in 1948 and have since emigrated to the USSR. It was run by the KGB. The CPSU CC member charged with overseeing this association was Mikhail Suslov. These “true Yugoslav

communists and patriots” served as the “Fifth column” in the Soviet propaganda campaign and covert operations against Yugoslavia after 1948.

⁷ State Publishing House for Political Publications.

Teachers Become Students at Summer Institute

The 2001 National History Day Summer Institute brought twenty-five teachers from across the nation to the University of Maryland to examine *New Directions In Cold War History*. The teachers came from very diverse backgrounds and schools, but they all came to develop their teaching skills and share their knowledge with their peers. Judging from the participants’ tremendously positive response, the institute confirmed both the need for, as well as National History Day’s ability to provide, assistance and training to teachers. “In terms of content, accessibility of speakers, practical applications for the classroom, and excitement, this is *the best* workshop I’ve ever attended!” said one participant. The institute was produced in association with The Cold War International History Project and was graciously supported by the Annenberg/CPB Channel, funder of *A Biography of America* and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund.

Many times the focus of learning is concentrated on student rather than teacher development, but National History Day is working to reform history education by developing the skills of *both* teachers and students. The objectives of the institute were two-fold: to provide teachers with the latest in historical scholarship to bring them up to speed on the literature; and to provide teachers with practical applications for the classroom, particularly instruction regarding the importance and use of primary sources. To accomplish these goals National History Day worked closely with scholars from across the country to provide a hands-on learning experience for the teachers. “The institute really exceeded my expectations and I’m grateful to have had this unique experience, said a 2001 participant. “I’m significantly more knowledgeable now about the 20th century and Cold War history than I had been. Now, I can enhance my good teaching methods with a deeper knowledge of the Cold War and primary sources.”

Prominent scholars and collections specialists such as Robert Hutchings of Princeton University (formerly Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, 1989-1992; Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, 1992-1993), Bill Brands of Texas A&M University and Christian Ostermann of the Cold War International History Project introduced participants to the latest in historical scholarship and imaginative approaches for engaging students in the study of the history of the Cold War. In addition, the teachers visited historic sites and agencies. At the National Archives the teachers looked at the original Marshall Act and the most requested document in the archives – a picture of President Nixon and Elvis Presley in the Oval office. Teachers spoke with archivists and educators about the multitude of presidential documents and lesson plans available on line at the National Archive’s website (www.nara.gov/education). Jan Scruggs, Founder and President of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, gave a special tour of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

The most important part about the workshop is that the teachers’ work has just begun. In addition to including new ideas and methods into their own teaching, those who participated in the program are committed to conducting workshops for teachers in their own states. Thus, teachers nationwide will benefit from the institute and National History Day’s commitment to education reform.

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