

New Evidence on North Korea

Introduction

B Kathr n Weathersb

Among the states that played a key role in the Cold War, none has been, or remains, more enigmatic than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). To its allies within the communist world, North Korea's secretiveness, its cult of Kim Il Sung, and its violent provocations against the South were a source of exasperation, embarrassment, and unease. Nonetheless, North Korea's fraternal allies never permanently withdrew their patronage from the Pyongyang regime, without which the DPRK could not survive. As O.B. Rakhmanin, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, explained to an East German party official in February 1973, "in the interest of our common tasks, we must sometimes overlook their stupidities. None of us agree with the idolatry of Kim Il Sung."¹

For the United States and its allies, North Korea's insistence on maintaining an outsized, forward deployed military force, its refusal to moderate its hostile rhetoric against Seoul and Washington, and its unpredictable outbursts of violence against South Korea, coupled with its extreme secretiveness and highly idiosyncratic version of communism, created the longest lasting and one of the most acute security problems of the Cold War era. With no history of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and few sources of information on this unusually closed country, it has been, and remains, difficult for North Korea analysts in the non-communist world to assess the intentions behind the DPRK's troublesome actions, whether they are working with or without classified information. As former CIA officer in Korea and Ambassador to Seoul Donald P. Gregg recently noted, "North Korea remains one of the longest-running intelligence failures in the history of US espionage. North Koreans were difficult to approach and almost impossible to recruit and control."²

In an effort to fill part of this significant information gap, CWIHP has launched a special effort, begun with generous support from the Korea Foundation, to mine the archives of the DPRK's former allies for insights into North Korean policymaking. The Korea Initiative is combing East European and Russian archives, and to a more limited extent those of China, to uncover and analyze the documentary record of North Korea's relations with its fraternal allies. We have discovered that although Pyongyang's communist allies also suffered from the unusual secretiveness of Kim Il Sung's regime, their extensive dealings with the DPRK nonetheless provided them with a far more intimate view of North Korea than that enjoyed by persons outside the communist world. Moreover, in his communications with his East and Central European counterparts, such as Erich Honecker, Kim Il Sung



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spoke with striking candor about the international and domestic problems facing his embattled state. Thus, as long as the DPRK's own archives remain inaccessible, the records of its close allies provide the best available view from inside North Korea.

This special section of the *Bulletin* presents the results of the first two years of the Korea Initiative, during which the project has focused on the East German and Hungarian archives, as well as onosyj -148.5 -o0.75 Tffipq8h Honeckeri ing or translation in full.

In part one, the Beijing-based historian Shen Zhihua examinesosyj -148archival and memoir evidence regarding the serious tensions 5 Tfcomplicated relations betweenosyj a and North Korea during the Korean War. H Tsrgeh8 T reveals 5 Tfthe characteristics of the Kim Il Sung regime 5 T caused friction with its allies in the postwar period cannot be attributed solely to the impact of the devastating war of 1950-53, since they had, in fact, beenoprominent as early as 1949-50. Shen addTsr important new perspective to the debate over the relative influence of China and the Soviet Union on

North Korea's war plans against South Korea. He demonstrates that Mao Zedong's government was quick to offer military support to the DPRK, but the North Korean leadership refused to accept Chinese assistance until forced to do so by the UN advance across the 38th

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Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution during the Korean War

B Shen Zhihua

T a s a d b D G K m a d J B c

Scholarship on intra-alliance relations during the Cold War, particularly on the Cold War in Asia, has focused primarily on relations between great powers such as the Soviet Union and China.¹ Relatively little research has been done on the development of relations between larger and smaller countries within the communist camp.² The subject of this case study, Sino-Korean relations during the Korean War, has been characterized as a friendship, forged by shared difficulties, that was “as close as lips to teeth.” While this ancient description of relations between China and Korea aptly describes some aspects of the wartime alliance, the simile fails to capture the significant conflict that existed between the two countries at the highest levels. This paper,

of a protracted war.¹⁹

The North Korean officials paid no heed to Chinese suggestions, even though these recommendations included warnings from Soviet advisers.²⁰ One reason is that their estimates for the war were overly optimistic. On 4 September, when Chai told Kim that the war was locked in a stalemate, the North Korean leader declared confidently that the Pusan campaign had already begun and that as soon as the highly

trained strike forces went forward, the KPA would break the deadlock. When asked about the Americans' ability to land troops behind the North Korean frontline, Kim answered "we estimate that presently, a US counterattack is not possible; they do not possess sufficient troop support, and therefore a landing in our rear ports would be difficult."²¹

The North Koreans believed in a quick victory and also had a tendency towards adventurism. Chai reported that North Korean leaders had initially not planned on US intervention and had predicted victory within a month. Even after the US entered the war, they repeated the slogans "solve the problem before 15 August," and "August is the month of victory." We can see from their mobilization of large groups of technicians and students for military service and their serious waste of manpower and financial resources that the North Koreans had decided to "put all their eggs in one basket." Chai returned to China on 10 September to deliver his report, and after his return to Pyongyang, told Kim, on Zhou's order, that he hoped the North Korean army would consider a strategic withdrawal. Unmoved, Kim answered only, "I have never considered retreat."²²

The North Koreans were thus not prepared to invite the Chinese to send troops, if for no other reason than the severe disagreements between China and North Korea concerning the state of the war and strategic planning. After the successful UN landing at Inchon, however, the situation changed

cause for alarm. For these two reasons, Kim preferred to depend on Soviet aid and avoid having China intervene in the war. Even after Chinese troops entered the war, these two issues would continue to strain Sino-Korean relations.

Creating a Unified Sino-North Korean Command

Due to the difference of opinion between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships as to whether to send Soviet air force

explaining the Chinese policy regarding prisoners of war (POW), which was prompted by North Korea's severe mistreatment of prisoners, particularly British and American embassy workers. Kim agreed to allow the CVA to help return Korean deserters to service, but in actuality planned to try them for treason.³⁸

Peng next asked the Central Military Commission to relay a message to Kim that the KPA's 6th Division still had

more than 6,200 soldiers, who had merged with the CVA's 125th Division. He hoped those men could remain with the Volunteer Army, but Kim refused. Later, more than 5,000 men of the 7th Division merged with the 125th Volunteer Army Division, and again Peng requested that those men remain. Kim did not respond. The North Korean leaders and Soviet military advisors also opposed Peng's proposal to withdraw several kilometers and prepare ambushes. They proposed instead that the CVA continue to pursue the enemy south along the Chongchon River.³⁹

At the core of these problems lay the issue of who was in command of the army. In order to solve the problem, Mao decided to invite the top-level commanders of the two armies for face-to-face talks, hoping to coordinate the positions of the two sides and to gain Moscow's support. On 15 November, Kim and Shtykov were invited to the CVA headquarters, and Gao Gang joined them from Shenyang. As soon as the meeting began, Peng stated frankly that the command structures of the two armies must be unified. Gao explained that because the Korean peninsula was so narrow, tactics required a combined command structure. Shtykov stated clearly that command should be exercised by the Chinese. He criticized the KPA for losing battles despite using the Soviet Union's best equipment, and praised the CVA for being able to neutralize large numbers of enemy troops despite having inferior equipment. In his opinion, there was no doubt that the Chinese should command.

When it was his turn, however, Kim spoke only of the current status of the KPA and did not mention the issue of a unified command structure. Given the pressing situation, Peng took the initiative and proposed his own plan, according to which he, Kim, and Shtykov would form a three-man group that would consult each other concerning problems and would exercise power through a unified command structure. Kim gave no response at all to this suggestion, and Shtykov was not able to respond without instructions from Moscow. They therefore decided to defer the issue until the end of the second campaign, at which time they would meet again for discussions.⁴⁰

The unified command would report and make suggestions to the North Korean government—based on the actual situation and the needs of the war—concerning rear mobilization work, supplemental training, and the reestablishment of local administration in Korea. The unified command would be responsible for clearing all news items concerning the war and distributing them to the Korean news agency, which would publish them in the name of the general headquarters of the KPA.

After Kim returned to Korea, he met with Peng again on 7 December in a very friendly atmosphere to discuss specific matters. The two leaders agreed to set up a unified command structure within several days, and Kim guaranteed that there would be no further interference in the military command. He also accepted the Chinese suggestion to abolish the previously deployed 3rd Army, and ordered them to merge with the Volunteer Army 9th Group.⁴⁵ Peng was satisfied with the situation and repeatedly pointed out that “the bravery and stubborn spirit of the People’s Army and its strict military command system are worthy of study.” He ordered the cadres of the 9th Military Group to study and learn from the situation of the Korean 3rd Army Corp, in order to “relay realistically the experience of the Chinese army in political and local work.” But should conflict arise with the established Korean system, the Chinese army “should not be harsh and unyielding.”⁴⁶

In early January 1951, Stalin’s envoy to Beijing, Semen Egorovich Zakharov announced that two divisions of the Soviet air force had recently entered Korea, and were providing two lines of air cover from Jian to Jiang Jie, and from Andong to Anju. In addition, by early April, the Chinese planned to send five air force divisions, and three Korean air force divisions were already participating in the war. Consequently, the Chinese expressed a desire to create a unified air force command structure. After consultations, a Sino-Korean unified command structure was established based on the coordinated command structure.⁴⁷

Thus, under pressure from Moscow, China and Korea were able to resolve the issue of joint command of their armed forces. Unlike the joint command of US and UN forces, which had been accomplished smoothly, the unified command of Chinese and Korean forces was only accomplished with great difficulty. The Koreans were concerned about national sovereignty. Korea’s long-standing relationship with China as a subsidiary and tributary state made handing over the command of their army very difficult for them to accept. For the Chinese, victory was paramount. Both in military power and in combat experience, the Chinese held a clear advantage. Thus, from a realistic viewpoint, it was essential to place the joint command in the hands of the Volunteer Army.

The Debate Over Advancing South of the 38th Parallel

After the CVA’s victorious second campaign, which pushed the front line toward the 38th parallel, Peng Dehuai requested permission for his forces to regroup. He reported to Beijing that due to the recent victories, the Korean Work-

ers Party, the North Korean government, as well as the army and the people were all in high spirits and looking for a quick victory. “The Soviet ambassador has said that the American army has retreated and [he] wanted our army to advance quickly. This was not only the attitude of the Soviet ambassador, but also the request of the majority of comrades in the North Korean Party.” Peng, however, believed “the Korean campaign was still difficult and long-term. Because the enemy had shifted from an offensive to a defensive strategy and the front lines had shortened and narrowed, enemy military power had become more concentrated, which benefited the UN forces.” Though enemy morale was lower, they still had approximately 260,000 soldiers and would not retreat from Korea. Consequently, he urged that the CVA “adopt a plan of gradual advancement.”⁴⁸ For political reasons, however, Mao overruled these suggestions and ordered the volunteer forces immediately to launch the third campaign and cross the 38th parallel.⁴⁹

With regard to tactics, Mao approved Peng’s recommendation to advance gradually and agreed that after crossing the 38th parallel, the main army forces (including the KPA) should withdraw several kilometers to rest and regroup.⁵⁰ Peng’s forecast proved accurate. Although the third campaign resulted in the KPA/CVA advance across the 38th parallel and the capture of Seoul, UN forces managed to carry out an orderly retreat. Thus, although the Sino-Korean army captured some territory, it did not inflict many casualties on the enemy. On 3 January 1951, Peng informed Kim Il Sung by telegram that the enemy had quickly retreated after its defenses had been broken, and the victory was therefore not very meaningful. Only 3,000 troops were captured. If the enemy continued to escape southward, the KPA/CVA would pursue them to Suwon and await orders, Peng explained. The third campaign would pause to reorganize and re-

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pared, and had not recovered its strength, it could not advance alone. He admitted that he had hoped for quick victory, and reluctantly agreed to the CVA plan to regroup for two months. In the end, the two sides decided to call a joint meeting of top officers of the two armies to share experiences and unify their thinking.⁵⁹

After Stalin was informed of the argument concerning the military command, he stated in a telegram, “the leadership of the CVA is correct. Undoubtedly, the truth lies with com-

mander Peng Dehuai.” He praised Peng’s ability to defeat the supremely powerful American imperialist forces using inferior equipment, and said that he was a military genius. Stalin also criticized the Soviet ambassador for lacking understanding of military matters, and forbade him to interfere with Peng again.⁶⁰ At this point, Mao also stepped up the pressure. On

Government,⁶⁹ railroad transportation was restored to service.⁷⁰ However, the basic contradictions in logistical work were still unresolved. Besides the destruction caused by US bombing, the most serious problem was the chaos surrounding the internal management of railroad transportation, which still lacked unified coordination. Because the various departments and work units were not cooperating, but were constantly emphasizing their own importance and fighting with each other for vehicles, there was constant conflict and friction. Lack of manpower was a greater than the paucity of vital materials. Moreover, enemy forces occupying mountain caves near the front succeeded in delaying trains. The area north of the Hee Chun caves was severely congested. At the end of December 1951, there was a backup of 329 train cars which had yet to arrive at their destination.⁷¹

Even though the Railroad Management Bureau had been established, a great rift still existed between the Chinese and Koreans. The two sides had not yet decided whether to adopt a military management system or simply institute a system of military representatives. They also debated whether military supplies or supplies for civilian use and economic construction would be given priority. Moreover, the Bureau's organization had not yet been completed, and the ideological consciousness and morale of railway personnel was low. Rail transport thus continued to face extremely difficult problems.

⁷⁰ On 7 January 1952, the front entered Beijing. The transport line to the rear was at least partially restored. *Comintern*, 1952, 753. ⁷¹ On 31 December 1951, the Hee Chun caves were still in enemy hands. *Comintern*, 1951, 753.

that he believed were in accordance with North Korean principles: 1) to continue the military management system of the Korean railroad, but institute a military representative system and establish military representatives at all levels, under a joint transportation command headed by the Chinese. Military representatives would have final decisions over all military transportation matters; 2) the Joint Transportation Command established in Shenyang would appoint one person to the DPRK Transportation Ministry to serve as chief representative with the power to supervise implementation of plans for military transportation; 3) the Korean side would guarantee that the Joint Transportation Command, and its chief representatives and military representatives at all levels, would have uninterrupted telephone communication; 4) a unified maintenance command, would be established under the unified transportation command and directed by the Korean Ministry of Transportation (MKT); 5) Chinese railroad workers in North Korea would be led by the Korean Railroad Bureau, but their political work would be directly under the Chinese military representative.

With these basic principles, the Chinese negotiated again with the Korean Transportation Minister. Except for the issue of who had authority over the maintenance command, about which the Koreans did not take a clear position, they basically accepted Gao's five points, but demanded confirmation that the Korean Transportation Command would have jurisdiction over railway management bureaus. The Koreans agreed in principle to open the entire network to railroad traffic, and to establish a unified transportation command that would determine and approve the ratio of military materials transported to the ratio of civilian economic materials transported. The Koreans also asked China to send people to serve in vice-chairman posts in each management bureau controlled by the Ministry of Transportation. Zhou consequently asked the Chinese representatives to include in the records a statement regarding who had authority over the unified maintenance command, and agreed that Ye, Zhang, and Peng should sign the records and bring the entire document to Beijing.⁷⁶ It was precisely at this point that Moscow's opinion was received, which changed things completely.

According to Zhang Mingyuan's observations, the stumbling block was the question of who would control the Joint Transportation Command. The Chinese representative pointed out that because most of the Korean railroads and trains had been destroyed, the majority of trains in service on Korean rails were those brought over from China. Moreover, most of the maintenance and transportation troops and train crews were also Chinese, and even the equipment used for maintenance and supplies for the Korean railway crews were the responsibility of the Chinese. This being the case, it would be difficult for the Koreans to conduct the normal operations of rail transport. Therefore, for the duration of the war, the Chinese should control the Sino-Korean railroad transportation effort. But the Koreans and Soviet advisors stubbornly maintained that the management of railroad transportation involved questions of national sovereignty, and therefore must be controlled by the Koreans. In response to this, Zhou

pointed out that the source of the problem may not lie in Pyongyang, but rather in Moscow, and expressed his desire to negotiate with the Soviets to find an appropriate solution.⁷⁷

On the day Zhou sent a telegram to the Chinese representatives instructing them to prepare to sign the agreement, Stalin sent his own telegram, which made clear the Soviet

tion, the railroad transportation forces, maintenance forces, and high artillery forces cooperated closely, acted in concert, and adopted the approach of “using concentration to fight concentration” and “using mobility to fight mobility.” This

posal to Stalin and request his recommendations.⁸⁹ On the same day however, Mao sent a telegram to Stalin informing the Soviet leader that the Chinese “resolutely refuse this provocative and seductive plan of the enemy and are prepared to expand the war. Kim Il Sung does not agree with this proposal.”⁹⁰

Two days later Kim capitulated, endorsing Mao’s analysis of the situation and thanking China for its promise of full support.⁹¹ However, in a telegram to Stalin that same day, Kim complained that because of poor defensive strategy, Korean cities and their citizens were suffering great losses from enemy bombing. Although he agreed with Mao’s viewpoints,



Communist Officers at the Kaesong Peace Talks

Source: National Archives

he still hoped for a quick cease-fire. “We must quickly and resolutely negotiate a cease-fire, stop actual fighting and exchange all prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. These demands are supported by all peace-loving people and will rescue us from our present passive position.”⁹²

Part of the reason the two sides differed in their views on resolving the POW issue was the different policies they held toward POW’s in general. Due to China’s recent civil war and its lack of experience in international conflict, from the very beginning of the war the Chinese did not want to detain POWs. On 17 November 1950, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission saying he was preparing to release one hundred POWs before the start of his campaign. On the eighteenth Mao replied that “releasing a group of POWs is a very good idea. From now on, to periodically release POWs, you do not need my permission.”⁹³ In actuality, the number of POWs the Chinese held was comparatively small. In November 1951, the Chinese and Koreans decided that the KPA would be responsible for South Korean POWs, while the CVA would handle POWs from other countries.⁹⁴ Thus, the small number of POWs in CVA custody limited

Chinese influence on the issue during the negotiations and was one reason Beijing demanded full repatriation.

By contrast, because of their need for labor after the war, the Koreans secretly detained large numbers of POWs. According to reports from Ambassador Razuvaev, “the Korean comrades believed that it would be better to retain large numbers of South Korean POWs, without considering their wish to return home.” As a result, they detained 13,094 of Syngman Rhee’s troops. Of those, 6,430 men served in the KPA, doing various work for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Railroad Ministry. They also detained 42,262 South Korean POWs who were “mobilized” in the early stages of the war for service in the KPA.⁹⁵ Under these circumstances, the Korean leaders could hardly call for “full repatriation.”

The issue was ultimately resolved in Moscow. In a 15 July telegram, Mao wrote Stalin “in the American plan, the proportion for the two sides was extremely unequal. The enemy is attempting to use this to break the wartime unity of the Korean and Chinese people. It would be extremely disadvantageous for us to submit to the enemy’s pressure.” Mao declared that even if talks broke down he would not concede, “because this is a question of politics, not just for Korea and China; it also has repercussions for the entire revolutionary camp.”⁹⁶ Two days later Stalin replied in a telegram to Mao, “Your position regarding the peace negotiations is completely correct.”⁹⁷

In August and September, Zhou Enlai had several discussions with Stalin in Moscow, joined in the later meetings by Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-yong, and Peng Dehuai. Besides questions of Chinese economic development, the conversations focused on finalizing policy regarding the war. Zhou stated that the Sino-Korean forces are strong enough to launch longer offensives and had entrenched themselves well enough to withstand bombing raids. Regarding the POW issue, Stalin first pointed out that the Americans wanted to solve the issue according to their own wishes, whereas according to international law, hostile parties must repatriate all POWs, with the exception of war criminals. Stalin asked what Mao thought about the POW issue “Will he give in or will he hold his own?”⁹⁸

Zhou stated that the Koreans and Chinese had differing opinions on the matter, and that Mao’s viewpoint was that the Americans must repatriate all POWs. “The Koreans believe that the continuation of the war is not advantageous because the daily losses are greater than the number of POWs whose return is being discussed.” Mao, on the other hand, “believes that continuing the war is advantageous to us, since it detracts the USA from preparing for a new world war.” Stalin immediately affirmed that “Mao is right; this war is getting on America’s nerves. The North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties that they suffered during the war.” Stalin also touched a nerve with Chinese leaders by reminding Zhou that “one must be firm when dealing with America. The Chinese comrades must know that if America does not lose this war, then China will never recapture Taiwan.” Concerning the resolution of the POW question, Stalin and Zhou agreed to continue calling for full repatriation, and

to force the US to make the first concession. They could not shrink before the American threats.⁹⁹

After these talks, Kim did not again ask for a cease-fire, but instead focused on how to gain more material support from the Soviet Union. However, before the war ended, Sino-Korean conflict again emerged over the question of whether or not to sign the ceasefire immediately. This was the last difference between the two sides during the war. After Stalin's death in March 1953, the Soviet leadership changed its policy and promoted the conclusion of a ceasefire in Korea.¹⁰⁰ South Korean leader Syngman Rhee, however, did not want to conclude a ceasefire and tried to sabotage an agreement by releasing prisoners without authorization from the UN command. In response, the Chinese side wanted to launch a new offensive in order to secure more advantageous conditions for a ceasefire. The North Koreans demanded that an armistice be signed immediately, but Peng Dehuai, acting with Mao's support, overruled Kim Il Sung and began a new military campaign. Peng's final campaign was successful.¹⁰¹ Nonetheless, since Kim Il Sung was no longer hoping to obtain victory in the war, he believed it would be best to end the war as soon as possible and push forward with economic reconstruction.

In conclusion, the conflicts between China and North Korea during the Korean War were the result of a clash between the interests of the entire camp (as expressed by the Chinese) and local interests (as expressed by the Koreans). As a result, Stalin was generally inclined to support the Chinese, since the positions China advocated were more in accordance with his view of the overall interests of the socialist camp in Asia. However, common interests tended to be defined in accordance with the perceptions of the country that played the leading role in the socialist camp. As a result, as soon as a country within the camp ceased to recognize its interests as being in line with the common goals, or when a change in leadership occurred in the camp, the subordination of local interest to global interest no longer held, and the alliance ran the risk of breaking down. This was the case in Sino-Korean relations, as well as eventually in Sino-Soviet relations.

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¹² Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin, 5 July 1950, sending message for Zhou Enlai. For the full text see Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 43.

¹³ Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin, 8 July 1950. For full text see *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁴ *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 51.

¹⁵ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. The memoir of Wang Dagang, Chinese deputy military attaché in North Korea, also describes how they learned of the military situation only through overseas Chinese and Korean soldiers who had served in the People's Liberation Army. See David Tsui, "Did the DPRK and the PRC Sign a Mutual Security Pact?" paper presented at the CWIHP Hong Kong Conference in 1996. Pak Il-Yu, whose Chinese name was Wang Wei, had worked in the Balujun Denghua Zhidui during the war against Japan and subsequently served as a county magistrate in the Pinxi base area.

¹⁶ In a military meeting on 26 August 1950, Zhou Enlai said that the main reason for not dispatching a military mission to North Korea immediately was due to Chinese considerations. See Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi (CCP Central Bureau of Archives and Manuscripts), Junshi Kexueyuan (Chinese PLA Academy of Military Sciences), ed., *Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxian*, Vol 4, (Renmin Press, 1997), pp. 45-46. However, he later told the Soviet Ambassador that the reason was that North Korea did not agree. See "Khronologiia," pp. 52-54; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, p.163.

¹⁷ Gao Gang, Talks during the Shenyang military meeting of 13 August 1950, cited in *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhengshi* (The War to Oppose America and Aid Korea) ed. Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (Academy of Military Sciences Publishing Co., 2000), pp. 91-92.

¹⁸ "Khronologiia," pp.45-47.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49; Chen Jian, *Op.Cit.*, p.273. Lee Sang Cho confirmed this situation. See Sun Baosheng, "Mao Zedong ceng Yuyan Meijun Keneng zai Renchuan Denglu" [Mao Zedong had predicted that the US Army might land at Inchon] *Junshi Shilin* No. 5, 1990, p. 13.

²⁰ This is based on recollections of North Korean officers. Soviet military advisers also suggested the possibility of UN forces landing in rear ports. See Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, p.171.

²¹ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

²² Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

²³ In a letter to Gao Gang, Mao Zedong .5 TD -0 e1tgTc -TD

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⁴⁹ For more detail, see Shen Zhihua, “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Juece Zhong de Sulian Yinshu”, *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu*, No. 1, 2001.

⁵⁰ *Mao Zedong Junshi Wenxian* (Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 6 (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 1993), pp. 245-246, 249-250.

⁵¹ *Peng Dehuai Junshi Wenxuan* (Selected Military Works of Peng Dehuai) (Central Documents Publishing Co., 1988), p. 383; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Kim Il Sung, 3 January 1951; *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 464.

⁵² Telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin], 4 January 1951. For full text see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 53-54.

⁵³ The report of the Volunteer Army Party Commission: “At this time our army does not have enough soldiers and re-supply is extremely insufficient. If there is no regrouping, re-supply, and no improvement of transportation and ammunitions, our army cannot fight anymore” Telegram from the Volunteer Army Party Commission to Central Military Commission, 8 January 1951. See Yang Fengcheng, Wang Tiancheng, *Jiayu Chaoxian Zhanzheng de Ren.* (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Press, 1993), p. 222.

⁵⁴ *Peng Dehuai Zishu*. [Peng’s account, internal edition], p. 350.

⁵⁵ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. Telegram from Chai Chengwen to Peng Dehuai, 8 January 1951; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 1 January, 1951: *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, pp. 465-466.

⁵⁶ Wang Yazhi, “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Zhongde Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen”, *Junshi Shilin*, vol. 1, 1994, p.11.

⁵⁷ *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 465.

⁵⁸ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. Record of talks between Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung, 10-11 January, 1951.

⁵⁹ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 466.

⁶⁰ *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 461; Hong Xuezhi, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyilu*, (People’s Liberation Army Art Publishing Co., 1990), pp. 111-112; Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei Yuanchao Jige Zhongda Juece de Huiyi” *Dang de Wenxian*, 5 November 1994, p. 41.

⁶¹ Telegram from Mao to Filippov [Stalin], 16 January 1951, transmitting message from Mao to Peng Dehuai with message for Kim Il Sung. For the full text see Kathryn Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 55-56.

⁶² Telegram from Mao to Filippov [Stalin], 27 January 1951, transmitting 19 January telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao regarding meetings with Kim Il Sung. For the full text see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” pp. 56-57.

⁶³ For more details, see Shen Zhihua: “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Juece Zhong de Sulian Yinshu” *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu*, No.1, 2001; Shen Zhihua, “Lun Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian Juece de Shifei Cheng Bai” *21st century*, October 2000.

⁶⁴ In 1951, the loss rate of the Volunteer Army transportation was 84.6 percent, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Houqin Jingyan Zongjie. Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace* (JinDun Publishing Co., 1987), p. 140.

⁶⁵ Zhang Mingyuan, “Fengxue Zhanqin—Yi Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng de Houqin Baozhang” *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu*, 2000, Vol. 6, p. 34; *Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace*, p. 6.

⁶⁶ *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 449; *Fengxue Zhanqin*, p. 29.

⁶⁷ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

⁶⁸ *Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace*, p. 6.

⁶⁹ *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Houqin Jingyan Zongjie Jiben*

Jingyen (JinDun Publishing Co., 1987), pp. 41-42; *Fengxue Zhanqin*, p. 34.

⁷⁰ *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Houqin Jingyan Zongjie. Zhiliao Xuanbian Tielu Yunshu lei Xiace* (People’s Liberation Army Publishing Co., 1988), pp. 273, 282, 285.

⁷¹ *Zhiliao Xuanbian Tielu Yunshu Lei Xiace*, 1988, pp. 283-284; *Fengxue Zhanqin*, p. 33.

⁷² *Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace*, pp. 6, 3-4.

⁷³ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

⁷⁴ Telegram from Ye, Zhang, Peng to Gao Gang, 19 February 1951.

⁷⁵ Telegram from Ye, Zhang, Peng to Gao Gang, 15 March 1951; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Gao Gang and Zhou Enlai, 22 March 1951.

⁷⁶ Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, 25 March 1951.

⁷⁷ *Fengxue Zhanqin*, p. 34.

⁷⁸ Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 25 March 1951.

⁷⁹ Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, 25 March.

⁸⁰ *Zhou Enlai Junshi Huadong Jishi*, Vol. 2, pp. 204.

⁸¹ *Zhuanye Qinwu*, pp. 6-7; *Jiben Jingyan*, pp. 66-67.

⁸² *Peng Dehuai Zishu* (Peng’s account, internal edition), p. 352.

⁸³ At least until November 1951, Mao still believed that the POW problem would not be difficult to solve; See Telegram from Mao to Stalin, 14 November 1951, in K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 70-71.

⁸⁴ Telegram from Mao to Stalin, 8 February 1952.

⁸⁵ The first quarter working report of Razuvaev in 1952, cited in A. Volokhova, “Peregovor o peremirriia v Koree, 1951-1953 gg.,” *Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka*, 2000 No.2, p.104.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ The second quarter working report of Razuvaev in 1952, cited in A. Volokhova, p. 104.

⁸⁸ *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, Vol 1, p.249-250.

⁸⁹ *Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 289-290. For the full text, see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), p.78.

⁹⁰ *Zhou Enlai Junshi Huadong Jishi*, p. 280. For an extended discussion of Mao’s thinking regarding the need to continue fighting, see Zhang Shu Guang, *Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995), pp. 216-246.

⁹¹ Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin, 18 July, 1952. For the full text, see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 78-79.

⁹² Telegram from Razuvaev to Vasilevsky 17 July 1952.

⁹³ *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 449.

⁹⁴ *Zhou Enlai Junshi Huadong Jishi*, Vol. II, pp. 242.


⁹⁵ A. Volokhova, pp.106 and 108.

⁹⁶ *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 250.

⁹⁷ Telegram from Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong, 16 July 1952. For the full text see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin*, 6/7, pp. 77-78.

⁹⁸ Record of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952. For full text, see *CWIHP Bulletin*, 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 10-14.

⁹⁹ Record of meeting between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August and 19 September 1952. For the full text, see *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 9-20. For differing interpretations, see Haruki Wada, paper submitted to the CWIHP Hong Kong conference; Vojtech Mastny,



² Kim Il Sung

received GDR representative Richard Fischer on 5 August 1954 for a lengthy audience of three and a half hours, giving him lively demonstrations on ferrous metals and a lecture on cement. The North Korean leader predicted that Germany would be unified sooner than Korea due to its higher standard of living, which, according to Kim, made it easier to educate the population.

Moreover, in the later years of his rule, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung spoke quite freely and frankly in his correspondence and conversations with leaders of other medium size communist countries. The archival record of the East European states' dealings with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) can therefore shed considerable light on this enigmatic country. The evidence presented below comes from the files of the embassy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Pyongyang, the East German Foreign Ministry, the Department of International Relations of the Socialist Unity Party of the GDR, and Erich Honecker's personal files on his meetings with Kim Il Sung, all of which became accessible to scholars following the demise of the GDR in 1989/90. In addition, the essay draws on the published memoir of the last East German ambassador to Pyongyang, Hans Maretzki, which provides a tions. In April 1951, as communist forces mounted what was to be their final offensive of the war, the GDR and DPRK agreed to conduct diplomatic communication using the channels of their respective ambassadors in the People's Republic of China. They then established full embassies in the first

structing a complete city with 5,236 apartments, factories, power plants, hospitals, restaurants, and recreation facilities.¹⁰ The East German prime minister made this offer to his DPRK counterpart during the 1954 Geneva conference of foreign ministers. Kim Il Sung responded promptly, expressing deep gratitude and announcing the selection of the city of Hamhung.¹¹ The North Korean leader visited Hamhung on 15 May 1956, inspecting the work in progress, asking a

wide range of technical questions and giving instructions of his own.¹² He made several return visits until the construction was completed in 1962, on each occasion meeting with the East German specialists and inquiring about their grievances. For the Korean leadership, the main problem seemed to have been to prevent Hamhung from becoming more advanced and attractive than Pyongyang. To avoid this politically unacceptable eventuality, they diverted substantial material designed for Hamhung to the capital.

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“Juche.” He accepted the vital economic support provided

of the PRC delegation and the North Korean delegation's leader, Vice-premier Yi Chu-yon, had provided East European delegates with a telling performance. He had placed two apples on the table, defining the left one as China and the right one as the Soviet Union. He then placed a third one in the middle, called it "Korea" and cut it right through with a knife. He asked the bystanders whether one half of "Korea" should go to the right and one to the left. Answering the question himself, he declared that to be impossible and asked his listeners for understanding of North Korea's difficult situation. After Sino-Soviet differences became public, the North Koreans were forced to make a decision, Yi explained, but they would have preferred to maintain friendship with both the PRC and the USSR.⁴³

North Korean polemics against "peaceful coexistence" continued as the DPRK now openly adopted Chinese positions. To the GDR, these statements were "un-marxist and adventurist," according to an analysis of April 1963. It was indeed "adventurist," when the KWP declared in December 1962 that only "massive strikes" against the "imperialist enemy" would eliminate the danger of war in the long run, and that nuclear confrontation should not be feared since the "power of revolutionary spirit is stronger than any nuclear bomb." When Yi Chu-yon led a North Korean delegation to the GDR in September 1962, he lectured the East Germans that the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 had been a half-hearted measure. Had they acted more aggressively, the moment would have arrived "to finish up Berlin." The "imperialists," according to Yi Chu-yon, would not go to war over Berlin. Now "the time had come" to courageously explore a favorable moment for action.⁴⁴

In October 1962 Kim Il Sung's speeches for domestic consumption again oriented the KWP towards the autarkic "Juche" policy, exhorting North Koreans that the proper course was to "create everything by one's own strength."⁴⁵ Aside from this rhetoric, however, which was intended for the general population and for lower-ranking party members, the North Korean leadership was actually quite pragmatic with regard to matters of foreign economic assistance. Their policy was to attempt to reap the utmost benefits from any socialist or capitalist country while giving as little as possible in return. In contrast to the political sphere, there were no real ideological predispositions in economic matters. In 1962 and 1963, despite all the pro-Chinese rhetoric, trade with the Soviet Union was greater than with the PRC. Such pragmatism, however, was rather the result of economic desperation than of astuteness.

When the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang met with the first secretaries of the embassies of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in October 1963, the Soviet representative complained about the difficult negotiations with the North Koreans, the futile attempts to agree on trade based on reciprocity (Korean exports of precious and non-ferrous metals

Korean party responded the following month with a lengthy statement that it forwarded to all the foreign communist representatives in Pyongyang. This message was delivered to the GDR embassy in a sealed envelope without an address, cover letter or any further explanation. The North Korean statement blamed the USSR for being solely responsible for the division and consequent potential weakening of the worldwide communist movement.⁵³ At the time, this reply seemed to signal Pyongyang's definitive break with Moscow, but in actuality, North Korea never fully broke with any partner it regarded as potentially useful for navigating through the constantly changing politics of the communist camp. When a new Soviet ambassador arrived in Pyongyang in June 1965, Kim Il Sung received him personally just five days after he presented his credentials. At the meeting, Kim seemed pleased by the recent visit of Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin and thanked the ambassador for Moscow's renewed military aid. He stressed the need for unity within the communist movement, regretted that the Sino-Soviet conflict made it impossible for him to visit Moscow, and gave his approval for North Korean-Soviet contacts below the "official" level.⁵⁴ Soviet military and economic assistance then resumed and even substantially increased,⁵⁵ as the Chinese partners, true to Soviet predictions, proved their limited economic usefulness.

Indeed, according to a lucid analysis by GDR ambassador Horst Brie in July 1965, Kim Il Sung maintained that no country had suffered as much from the Sino-Soviet rivalry as the DPRK. North Korea had been unable to develop economically, and instead had been forced to endure four years of stagnation since 1961. They had quickly regretted their shift to the Chinese in late 1961 because they suspected that the Chinese aim was to make the DPRK "dependent" on the PRC. The Chinese had requested that a commission be established to monitor the use of aid from the PRC, which contributed to an anti-Chinese backlash among the North Korean leadership. Furthermore, the passive, anti-Moscow attitude of the PRC with regard to aiding North Vietnam demonstrated to the North Koreans that only the Soviet Union could deliver the desired military hardware and serve as a guarantor of the DPRK's existence. When in 1966 the Cultural Revolution suddenly turned the PRC into a threat to the survival of the Pyongyang leadership, China forever lost its exclusive grip on North Korea.

Equidistant and Back in Business, 1966-1977

China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which Mao Zedong instigated in 1966, represented a serious threat to Kim Il Sung's autocracy, and consequently changed once again the course of DPRK foreign relations. At the KWP party conference held 5-12 October 1966, Kim Il Sung denounced the PRC ideologically, without calling it by name, as practicing "left opportunism," stimulating people with "arch-revolutionary slogans to act in extremes" and promoting "nihilist tendencies renouncing all of the past." This would be no less dangerous for the communist movement, he

be no less dangerous for the communist move-

lishing a Facility for Processing Zinc Residue in the DPRK.” However, the Korean side was either unable or unwilling to meet the obligations it had agreed to. As a consequence, in December 1977 these agreements were annulled—treated as though they had never been active—and replaced with a new long-term and comprehensive follow-up agreement.⁶³

Domestically, after 1966 the DPRK increased military readiness and incited war hysteria. Although the policy of strengthening defense at the expense of economic develop-

considered it a privilege that the visit of its highest-ranking Politburo delegation since 1956 went ahead as scheduled in April 1968. Despite the tensions following the Pueblo affair, Kim Il Sung received the East German visitors and briefed them on DPRK-PRC relations.⁶⁹

Pyongyang’s bellicose stand changed abruptly in response to the Sino-American rapprochement that culminated in US President Richard Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. In response to this political earthquake, the DPRK

China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which Mao Zedong instigated in 1966, represented a serious threat to Kim Il Sung’s autocracy.

ment was apparently disputed within the KWP, at the plenary session held 28 June to 3 July 1963 Kim Il Sung succeeded in purging the Central Committee of opponents voicing such concerns.⁶⁴ In the aftermath of that event the personality cult around Kim Il Sung reached new heights. He was portrayed as having been the sole leader against the Japanese occupation before 1945. In the forest of the Paekdu Mountains historic fireplaces and trees were “discovered” where Kim Il Sung allegedly led the partisans in their struggle against the Japanese. North Korean propaganda announced that in the whole world there was no mother with such a magnificent son as Kim Il Sung. When the Foreign Minister of Cambodia visited the DPRK, he was encouraged to lay memorial wreaths at the graves of Kim Il Sung’s parents and grandparents.⁶⁵

The DPRK instigated numerous violent border incidents, and infiltrated special forces into South Korean territory as far as seven to ten kilometers south of the armistice line. These acts were accompanied by claims that “revolutionary uprisings” by “armed partisans” had occurred in the South and “patriotic forces” would further gain strength there. “Liberation” was near, and the North Korean masses were ready to “destroy the enemy” in the South whenever Kim Il Sung ordered them to do so.⁶⁶ North Korea gained international notoriety for the spectacular seizure of the American electronic intelligence ship USS Pueblo in January 1968.⁶⁷ For domestic consumption by the KWP membership and the North Korean population, official propaganda invented fictitious American and South Korean attacks and heroic stories about how those had been successfully repelled by the vigilant DPRK. Foreshadowing the seizure of the Pueblo, Yi Yong-ho had already announced to the East Germans in July 1967 the DPRK’s readiness to strike at the Americans when they were “doing dumb things.” As he explained, “now and then we have to break their bones so that they don’t get even more fresh. [...] The Korean People’s Army is trained as cadre. The people are armed. [...] More than 30 percent of the budget annually goes to military purposes. If our enemies attack us again, we fully intend to liberate South Korea.”⁶⁸ The GDR

joined the ROK in an unprecedented joint unification statement issued 4 July 1972, surprising both the communist and the non-communist worlds. In a conversation with East German communists on 31 July, DPRK ambassador to East Berlin, Lee Chang Su, explained this move as a “tactical measure” intended to reunite Korea by forcing American troops and Japanese investors out of the South. He claimed this new strategy had been authorized at a KWP meeting in November 1971,⁷⁰ shortly after Henry Kissinger’s second and “open” visit to Beijing that year. Regardless of their provenance, the plans for a confederation quickly fell apart over the insurmountable differences between the two Korean states and their rulers, as well as over the all too obvious strategy of the DPRK to gain everything while yielding little. Kim Il Sung explained the turn back to confrontation in a lengthy letter to the leaders of the communist parties in July 1973,⁷¹ predictably placing blame exclusively on the Americans and South Koreans.[See Document 5]

Bilateral relations between the DPRK and the GDR went smoothly and unspectacularly after the early 1970’s. Berlin and Pyongyang maintained a rather low key but constant exchange of delegations, conducted negotiations on trade issues, signed agreements and sometimes implemented them. Since the socialist countries loyal to Moscow came to view the PRC as an ever more dangerous enemy, the GDR considered its relations with the DPRK as a contribution toward helping the North Koreans steer the proper course between Moscow and Beijing.⁷²

In 1977 East German Secretary General Erich Honecker made the first visit ever by a GDR leader to East Asia, staying in Mongolia, Vietnam, and North Korea. In Pyongyang⁷³ he issued a joint declaration with Kim Il Sung [See Document 6]. His delegation signed a Consular Treaty and a carefully crafted Agreement of Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation for 1978 to 1984, which was based on a pattern of reciprocity proposed to Honecker by Kim Il Sung himself: East German technology and facilities vs. North Korean raw materials and labor. Besides the official talks, the GDR visitors received an “impressive reception by the people of

Pyongyang,” toured a tractor plant, attended an opera performance, and enjoyed a rally staged for both leaders in the Sports Palace, attended by 20,000 people.

As a matter of course, during their personal meeting, Honecker and Kim boasted to each other about the successful performance of their respective countries on the path towards socialism. Kim, the absolute ruler of a country famous as an economic laggard made the astonishing claim that “the higher the standard of living climbs, the more ideologically lazy and the more careless the activity” of the people is—a statement no East German leader could have gotten away with making. Concerning foreign policy, Honecker emphasized the leading role of the Soviet Union and the close and unshakeable ties between the GDR and the USSR. In harsh words the East German leader criticized the PRC, which had characterized the Soviet Union as the “number one enemy.” Beijing’s criticism of NATO for not building up enough arms against the Soviet Union was tantamount to “an encouragement to wage war against the GDR,” Honecker declared. Kim Il Sung was less willing to commit himself, invoking North Korean non-interference in the polemics between the PRC and the USSR. He cautiously put some distance between the DPRK and China, but also reminded Honecker that Korea had a 1,500 kilometer-long border with China. Although acknowledging that their bilateral relations had improved after the “Cultural Revolution,” Kim declared that the DPRK would “not agree with everything China does,”

According to Kim, the American forces in the South had stationed 1,000 nuclear warheads and just two of them would

¹⁰ Aid of the socialist states to the DPRK during and after the Korean War. GDR Embassy in Pyongyang. Undated. PolArch, MfAA, C 152/75.

¹¹ Kim Il Sung to Otto Grotewohl, July 1954. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 15148.

¹² Protocol on the visit of the DPRK Prime Minister in Hamhung. German Working Committee Hamhung. 18 May 1956. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10211.

¹³ Protocol on the meeting with DPRK Prime Minister Kim Il Sung. German Working Committee Hamhung. 1 February 1958. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10257. Cf. also Rüdiger Frank, *Die DDR und Nordkorea: Der Wiederaufbau der Stadt Hamhung von 1954 bis 1962* (Aachen: Shaker, 1996).

¹⁴ Christian Ostermann, ed., *Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain* (New York/Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).

¹⁵ Werner Meissner, ed., *Die DDR und China 1949 bis 1990. Eine Quellensammlung* (Berlin: Akademie, 1995): 74-76.

¹⁶ Protocol of the extraordinary Session of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Politburo. January 2, 1956. Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations in the Federal Archive (SAPMO-BA), SED Archive (DY 30), J IV 2/2A/464.

¹⁷ Protocol of the Session of SED Politburo. 17 April 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2 A/491.

¹⁸ On the Draft of the KWP Statute. 11 April 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/20/135.

¹⁹ Cf. an East German assessment of an internal KWP brochure from July 1962. Although the GDR Foreign Ministry could not imagine at that time that those distortions would become ever more fantastical, it bluntly called them in 1963 a 'new link in the chain of misrepresentations of Korean history between 1930 and 1945'.

awaiting him at home because of his frank political demonstration

DOCUMENT No. 1
Report, Embassy of the GDR in the DPRK to the
Foreign Policy and International Department of the

characterized as sectarians, and recently as revisionists. This demonstrates that criticism and self-criticism in the Party are very poorly developed and in many cases democratic rule is not guaranteed. This is particularly true of the army and state organizations.

How the Korean Comrades view the fight against domination is evident from a statement by Comrade Pak Tin Tsches (spelling from original German document) which he made in his lecture at the 15th anniversary of the foundation of the KWP: "We as Korean comrades have always fought the battle against dogmatism, we have always pursued our own standpoint against that of others". That is naturally a vulgar and false interpretation of the battle against dogmatism. Dogmatism in the Korean Workers Party is closely linked to the mystic ideas of Confucianism, which extend to certain nationalist tendencies. It is frequently stated that only a people like the Korean people is capable of such feats and heroism. All successes, not the least those achieved with the great assistance of the fraternal Socialist nations, especially with the aid of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, are portrayed as their own successes. Great feats that were accomplished by the Soviet Union, the CSSR, Poland, and the GDR are portrayed as accomplishments of the Korean workers "without foreign" assistance. It is not coincidental that even after the Statement of the Communist and Workers Parties, neither international cooperation in all fields nor fraternal assistance from the Socialist nations were mentioned or shown any appreciation. Connected to this are also certain efforts not to take part in Socialist works and to underestimate the successes of other peoples in the Socialist camp. These nationalist tendencies are particularly prevalent in films, in the theater and performances, and in lectures.

By the end of 1960, the DPRK had sent 54 repatriation ships to Japan to bring about 53,000 Koreans back to the DPRK. 94% of them had lived in South Korea prior to emigrating to Japan. Among these Koreans are 700 specialists, 300 scientists and artists, 3 doctors of medicine, and 1 doctor in another field. In addition, this group includes 1500 Japanese who also emigrated to the DPRK. (These were primarily Japanese spouses.)

By January 1961 there were markedly fewer announcements and reports on repatriations in the press and on the radio in the DPRK than there had been previously. On 3 February 1961 the Japanese Red Cross announced that the Red Cross of the DPRK had sent a telegram to its Japanese

spare parts, cars, etc. gave them high profits and great advantages, such as top jobs.

The specialists among the repatriates also fare well, since they are employed in accordance with their special knowledge and abilities. Repatriation has for the most part improved the lot of the farmers, since they were among the groups that suffered most in Japan. (High taxes, extremely poor living conditions.)

There can be no negotiations with South Korea if there is no democracy. Therefore, given current conditions, the main task is to fight for democratic rights and freedoms and to fight to topple the Park Chung Hee regime.

Our Korean comrades are for peaceful reunification, but if American imperialism pushes its war propaganda to the extreme, all resources must be used for defense readiness. There can be no peaceful reunification until the American occupiers have been chased out and the Park Chung Hee regime has toppled.

He said that the current situation must be considered more serious than the events in April of 1960. He stated that if the entire Korean populace rose up, as in April 1960, it will be possible to chase the American occupiers out. In conclusion, he said that our Korean comrades are mobilizing all their resources to maintain peace in Korea.

3. Foreign Minister Pak Song-ch'ol also addressed this problem at a meeting with Comrade Schneidewind. Comrade Pak remarked that, based on the situation in South Korea, there could be no talk of the DPRK pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence or confederation with respect to the south and the occupiers. But this does not mean that the liberation of South Korea will be accomplished by war. The DPRK continues to favor peaceful reunification. But if the DPRK were to speak of peaceful coexistence with regard to the south, democratic forces would lose hope that the Park Chung Hee regime will topple and that the Americans will withdraw.

Our Korean comrades are mobilizing all of their resources in the southern part of the country for toppling the Park Chung Hee regime and are increasing their endeavors for building socialism. They are firmly convinced that the democratic forces in their nation will find the strength to topple Park Chung Hee and to liberate the country from its American occupiers.

1. Comrade Pak Chun-hyok's remarks give the impression that the Korean Workers Party has now backed away from its line supporting peaceful reunification.

On the other hand, Comrades Pak Song-ch'ol and Kim Tae-hui assert that nothing has changed in terms of the objective of peaceful reunification. They base their rejection of the confederation and of peaceful coexistence between the two parts of Korea, and the measures they have undertaken to arm the populace, on stepped-up war preparations on the part of the US Imperialists and on the existence of a Fascist power in South Korea.

It must also be mentioned that Comrade Ch'oe Yong-gon spoke again of peaceful reunification of Korea on 25 April 1962 during an announcement.

It is therefore evident that our Korean comrades' remarks are contradictory.

4. The manner in which Pak Chun-hyok stressed the

strength of the socialist camp in his statements is meant to express the expectation that the socialist nations support this policy.

5. In its current policies, the DPRK is not willing to conduct negotiations with Imperialism. Negotiations with the Imperialists are portrayed as supplications to and weakness before the Imperialists.

6. The statements made by our Korean comrades indicate that they no longer agree that peaceful coexistence is the foundation for the foreign policy of the Socialist nations. This openly places in question the correctness of the resolutions regarding foreign policy at the Moscow Conference and the XXII Party Congress.

7. This Korean Workers Party policy reflects a stronger Chinese/Albanian interpretation.

[signature]
(Stude)
Department Director

Distribution:
1 x Min. Schwab
1 x Central Committee, Foreign Policy Department,
Comrade Ott
1 x Comrade Stude
1 x Information Department
1 x Embassy in Pyongyang
1 x Korea Section Remarks



DOCUMENT No. 3
Report, GDR Embassy in the DPRK, 2 April 1965

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

GDR Embassy in the DPRK
Pyongyang, 2 April 1965

Confidential Matter No. 24/65
3 Copies

Subject: Incident with the Cuban ambassador and the delegation of physicians from Cuba

On 28 March, there was a serious incident at 6:00 p.m. while the Cuban ambassador, his family, and a delegation of physicians from Cuba were touring the city. The Cuban physicians wanted to photograph three columns of a destroyed building that was in an area of new construction and that

dated from the war against the US. A Korean passerby called to Korean residents in the vicinity to act against the Cuban delegation. A large crowd of people gathered quickly, including 100 children, and the crowd pounded the car with their fists, ordered the occupants to get out, and hurled insults, especially against the Cuban ambassador as a black man. It should be added that the Cuban ambassador is currently the only ambassador who has a relatively good basic knowledge of the Korean language and can take part in simple conversations in Korean. Although the Cuban ambassador identified himself as the ambassador of Cuba, both in Korean and in Russian, this had no effect on the crowd's actions.

The militia in the vicinity took no action at all.

The Cuban physicians urged the ambassador to open the car to get out. Once the Cuban ambassador exited the car, the delegation's cameras were taken away from them. At about this time a member of the security service arrived, and when he realized what was going on, he put his hands in front of his face, and, as the Cuban ambassador said, groaned. The Cuban ambassador told me that he believed that this security service member in part recognized the seriousness of what had happened. This member of the security service apparently called an armed security service unit for assistance. As the unit's troops arrived, they proceeded to exercise extraordinary brutality against the crowd, including the children. They struck these people, including the children, with the butts of their weapons. Once the crowd had been driven away from the car, the Cuban ambassador established that the Cuban flag had been torn off and was no longer there. He asked the leader of the security troops to return the flag. Then the security service troops committed even worse acts of brutality against the people in the street and in the nearby houses, demanding that the flag be returned. The Cuban ambassador remarked to me that their actions were so brutal that if he had been Korean and had had the flag, he would have preferred to eat it rather than to give it back.

The Cuban ambassador then proceeded to the Foreign Ministry, where he met first with the department director, then with Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Dam and acting Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam. According to the Cuban ambassador, the meeting did not end until 3:00 a.m. The Cuban ambassador told me that during this meeting he said that this incident was the result of incorrect political education in the DPRK. He furthermore asserted that during this long meeting he expressed his opinion on all issues related to the behavior of our Korean comrades with respect to foreigners and on issues of internal development (apart from questions about the cult of personality).

The main issue in this meeting was the issue of how this incident should be handled. The Cuban ambassador said that there were two ways to handle the incident. At the state level or at the Party level. The Korean side had to decide how it wanted to handle the incident. He said he was not in communication with Cuba and was thus acting on his own. However, if the decision was made to deal with this at the state level, he would be forced to take the next plane to Moscow and would not be able to return until the incident had been

resolved.

He said that after lengthy discussion our Korean comrades agreed to deal with it at the Party level. The Cuban ambassador then asked to speak with Kim Il Sung. Kim Yong-nam, acting Foreign Minister tried to prevent this at all costs. He proposed to the Cuban ambassador that he speak to Foreign Minister [illegible] in the hospital, since he was also a candidate for the Politburo. Finally, after the Cuban ambassador could not be dissuaded from his request, Kim Yong-

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sary and possible to prepare for and hold such a conference. Unfortunately the US can still exploit the sharply different opinions the fraternal parties have. The unity and solidarity of the world Communist movement is particularly important for us and for you. West Germany has the strongest army in western Europe. It is also the strongest economic power. This military and economic force is hostile to the GDR, and is located right next to us.

The discord between the imperialist powers continues to increase. Today NATO is not what it was a few years ago. France is withdrawing from military integration. It also opposes letting England join the European Economic Community and opposes the Israeli aggression. It is ironic that Couve de Murville demanded that Israel return the territories taken and at the UN meeting told Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu that Romania should at least support France's position. Couve de Murville is a French nobleman, while Manescu is a member of the Communist Party. In other words, Romania currently stands to the right of France. Our Romanian comrades have demanded that Israel and the IT^{*})60.5

thing is to be prepared that we already experienced in Greece. So conditions in Germany have changed rapidly since 1961. Our job is to force the Kiesinger government to accept that both German states can exist adjacent to one another. We do not stress unity for Germany. This process will take a long time and will require fundamental changes in West Germany. The current priorities are, first, a binding agreement on non-aggression by West Germany against the GDR, and second, reducing by half the number of arms in the two German states.

Our Party is extremely interested in an agreement among the Communist and workers parties. The Moscow Declaration of 1957 and 1960 was unanimously adopted by those present, including even the Communist Party of China. These documents established that we are in the transition phase from capitalism to socialism, that the socialist world system is increasingly becoming a determining factor in the world. Today communists in all nations of the world stand at the forefront of the movement for socialism, peace, and democracy. It is our goal to prevent a new world war, all of our efforts must be directed toward achieving this goal. The socialist camp must be strengthened on all sides such that it is no longer possible for there to be world war. The urgent task is to make Israeli aggression ineffective. Perhaps it is healthy that some leaders of the Arab countries learn to find their support in the masses. We believe Nasser would have been overthrown had it not been for the Soviet Union. Naturally the Israeli aggression and its repercussions are a blow for the national liberation movement. The Soviet Union will certainly continue to supply weapons to the UAR and Syria and to support the strengthening of progressive forces.

Of course assistance for the Vietnamese people must also be increased. The war demonstrates that the Vietnamese people cannot be destroyed. We believe that the military, political, and diplomatic struggle must be coordinated even more. We must get the US to a point in which the war holds no prospects for the future. It cannot be waged until the last Vietnamese is annihilated. Our Vietnamese comrades will not be able to win by themselves, even with our substantial aid. They can see to it that the path is blocked to US imperialism, but victory will only be possible as a result of a worldwide political action. If all socialist countries were to come together, including the major fraternal parties in the capitalist lands, and using commensurate countermeasures were to demand that the war be ended, then it would probably be possible to end the war.

This is a broad-brush overview of how we see the international situation.

Comrade Yi Yong-ho expressed his thanks for the detailed information. He stated that militarism in West Germany has reappeared due to support from US imperialism, that the policies of West German imperialism have been directed against the GDR from the very beginning. The DPRK supported and continues to support the GDR. We must also support Vietnam in every way possible so that the US withdraws its troops and soldiers. The socialist camp must use every means to rescue Vietnam. If things go badly in Vietnam, then all socialist countries and the international revolu-

tionary movement will have suffered a great blow. We must therefore do everything we can to prevent this.

The Korean Workers Party has always advocated unity and solidarity among the socialist nations and the commu-

be an opportunity to discuss these issues in more detail.

Our Korean comrades once again thanked us for meeting with them and took their leave.



DOCUMENT No. 5

Letter to Erich Honecker from Kim Il Sung, 7 July 1973

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated for
CWIHP by Grace Leonard.]

Department of
Berlin, 3 August 1973
International Affairs

-
80 -
-
46 copies, each 7 pages
Copy 28, 7 pages
Information

for the Politburo of the Central Committee

Subj.: Correspondence from Kim Il Sung, Secretary
General of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers
Party, to Comrade Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party

[s]

Markowski

Distribution:

Copies 1 - 28: Politburo

Copies 29 - 46: Department of International Relations
Berlin

To Comrade Erich Honecker

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Socialist Unity Party of Germany

Dear Comrade Erich Honecker!

Highly gratified that friendly and cooperative relations between the Parties, governments, and peoples of our two countries are developing well, I hereby convey our sincerest fraternal greetings to you, and through you to your Party and government and the people of the German Democratic Republic.

I would like to express to you, the Central Committee of your Party, and your government deep gratitude that your country is taking an active role internationally in supporting the great issue of unifying our people's fatherland and that it supports the letter to the parliaments and governments of all of the countries in the world that was adopted at the second meeting of the 5th legislative period of our nation's Supreme People's Assembly, and has undertaken measures of solidar-

ity.

Permit me to take this opportunity to tell you, and through you to tell the Central Committee of your Party and your government, about the situation that has most recently arisen in our country and about our recently prepared Five Point Course for independent peaceful unification.

Today the division of Korea causes our people—a people that developed as one nation during a long history—great unhappiness and suffering day after day and also creates obstacles for achieving and maintaining peace in Asia and the world.

The US, which has compelled the territory to be divided and our nation to be cut in half for 28 years now, currently employs two-sided tactics and wants in this manner to let Koreans fight one another, to perpetuate the division of Korea, and to create two Koreas. In lockstep with these US machinations, the rulers in South Korea prattle on about a “confrontation” between South and North, employ every resource to increase South Korea's military might, and obstinately hold fast to intrigues for perpetuating the division of the country. Recently they went so far as to conspire to make two Korea's their policy and to announce this policy of division publicly.

Through all of this the dialogue between North and South has not developed as it should have, with no regard for our consistent efforts for independent peaceful unification, and the bright prospect that emerged for our people for unification of the fatherland when the Joint Communiqué between South and North was published a year ago has darkened again.

At a time in which there are unusual movements meant to bring about the permanent division of Korea, on 23 June of this year we again set forth the following policy line for independent peaceful unification, based on a sincere desire to overcome the difficulties that have occurred and to satisfy the national yearning for peaceful unification of the fatherland as soon as possible.

First, we have proposed eliminating the military confrontation between South and North and reducing tensions. Eliminating the military confrontation between North and South and reducing tensions are the most urgent and critical issues for dispelling misunderstanding and mistrust between North and South, for deepening mutual understanding and trust, for creating an atmosphere of great national coalition for improving relations between South and North, and for accomplishing peaceful unification of the country.

If the hidden knife is not discarded, it will not be possible to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and satisfactorily resolve the issue of cooperation and exchange between North and South. This is why we have repeatedly proposed to South Korean authorities that the build-up of military forces and arms be halted, all foreign troops be withdrawn, troops and arms be reduced, the importation of weapons from abroad be halted, and a peace treaty be signed as the first steps for achieving peaceful unification of the country.

Secondly, we have proposed that North and South cooperate and conduct exchanges in all areas of the various

ence and achieving a great national coalition is the most logical way to accomplish the unification of the country.

If a confederation between South and North is formed using the name Koryo, we have proposed calling it the Federative Republic of Koryo, under which name our country will become known in the world as a single nation.

Fifth, we have proposed that North and South pursue foreign relations jointly in order to prevent the division from becoming cemented in place and thus dividing our nation into two Koreas for all time. As one nation, which developed as a single entity with one culture and one language over a long history, our nation must not be cut in two. We believe that North and South must have common stances in the area of international relations, as well, in order to prevent the country from being divided forever.

In terms of establishing diplomatic relations with other countries, we also decisively oppose all machinations for creating two Koreas. We strongly maintain that North and South cannot separately join the UN and believe that if joining the UN is a goal, at the minimum this must not occur until the confederation is formed under the name of the Federative Republic of Koryo, at which time the UN can be joined as one nation. But if, distinct from the issue of joining the UN, issues regarding Korea are included in the UN's agenda and are to be discussed, we believe that a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must take part and participate as an interested party.

We believe that all of our proposals reflect the urgent desire of all Korean people to prevent the division of the country, to fundamentally improve and develop relations between South and North, to accomplish in the most rapid manner possible the unification of our fatherland, and furthermore reflect current demands for independence and peace and are therefore extremely reasonable and realistic propos-

impressive reception by the people of Pyongyang for the GDR's Party and state delegation. During its stay, the delegation toured the Kimsong tractor plant and attended the opera, "The Flower Girl," in the Mansuda Palace.

Comrades Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung spoke at a celebration of friendship, at which there were 20,000 participants and which took place in the Athletic Palace in Pyongyang.

During the official proceedings each side reported to the other about the realization of the resolutions of the IX Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party and of the V Party Congress of the Korean Workers Party. There was a comprehensive exchange of views on the development of relations between the two Parties and nations, the international situation, and the Communist world movement. Willingness was expressed to expand in all respects the cooperation between the Socialist Unity Party and the Korean Workers Party, and between the GDR and the DPRK. Comrade Kim Il Sung repeatedly stressed the great importance of Comrade Erich Honecker's visit for deepening mutual understanding and bilateral relations.

The mass media of the DPRK reported in detail about the visit by the GDR's Party and state delegation. Press accounts of the toast by Comrade Erich Honecker at the reception by the Korean side did not report remarks on issues of European security and disarmament.

In his remarks, Comrade Erich Honecker praised the DPRK's great achievements in building socialism and affirmed the GDR's support for proposals by the DPRK for resolving problems on the Korean peninsula.

Comrade Honecker reported in detail about the domestic and foreign policy of the GDR in realizing the resolutions of the IX Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party. He stressed that the successes of the GDR in building a developed socialist society are the result of intense work and creative initiative on the part of the workers of the GDR under the leadership of their Marxist/Leninist party. The indestructible bonds to and cooperation with the Soviet Union and fraternal Socialist nations are very important for stable and dynamic development in the GDR.

positions of the community of socialist states on issues of international development. He stressed that the solid alliance with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal nations is the foundation of our foreign policy. New friendship treaties entered into with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations are particularly important. They play an important role in consolidating the socialist world system as the greatest achievement of the international working class. He stressed the necessity of strengthening the Warsaw Pact in order to protect the peaceful building [of socialism] in our countries from NATO's aggressive intentions.

Relations between the GDR and the People's Republic of China are poor for reasons that are known. There are no Party relations. The XI Party Congress of the Communist Party of China characterized the Soviet Union as the number one enemy. Beijing is further improving its reactionary interplay with imperialism. Subversive activity with regard to the international Communist movement continues. Beijing criticizes NATO for not building up enough arms for a war against the Soviet Union. This is tantamount to a challenge to wage war against the GDR. The GDR completely rejects the policies of the Chinese leaders, which run counter to the interests of Socialist countries, the international workers movement, and the national liberation movement. At the same time, it advocates normal development of state relations with the People's Republic of China and, given proper conditions, resuming Party relations, as well. But this is not possible at the cost of compromising principle issues, such as the unbreakable bond to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Union itself.

Comrade Honecker addressed in detail the situation in Europe, especially in the FRG, and the status of relations between the GDR and the FRG. He spoke about the NATO military forces directly arrayed against the GDR and relations between the FRG and South Korea.

In its policies towards developing nations, the GDR concentrates on supporting nations with a socialist orientation, such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Guinea-Bissau. It supports the efforts by many Asian states to create stable relations of peaceful coexistence on this continent, and thereby to ensure important conditions required for guaranteeing security in Asia. This includes ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula.

In his statements on the communist world movement, Comrade Honecker stressed that the Socialist Unity Party maintains good relations with the overwhelming majority of fraternal parties based on Marxism/Leninism and proletarian internationalism. He stressed the mutual responsibility of the communist parties and praised the Berlin Conference as a meaningful success by the Communist movement.

Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed his gratitude for the selfless aid and support of the GDR, especially during the War of Liberation of the Fatherland and during the period that followed. Even today the GDR is providing valuable support to the Korean people in the struggle to unify the country.

The Korean Workers Party considers unification of the

fatherland to be its primary mission. To achieve this goal, at its V Party Congress the Party resolved to build up socialism in the north, to support the struggle of revolutionary forces in South Korea, and to consolidate solidarity with international revolutionary forces. Building Socialism in the DPRK is the foundation for establishing the new social order in the entire nation.

It is worthwhile to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist order to the south and to show the entire world that the DPRK is a sovereign, independent state. In contrast, South Korea is a base for American imperialism. After the victory over the Japanese militarists, the socialist countries, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the GDR as well provided great assistance to the Korean people. But this alone could not resolve every problem. So it was necessary to do everything in our power to become self-reliant. Since then an independent national economy has been created. Currently the ideological, technical, and cultural revolution are the focal points, which is in accord with the resolutions of the V Party Congress.

The DPRK stands directly before Socialrc0.-1.2 v at

But industry must still support itself based on native raw materials.

The main points of the 7-year plan cited by Kim Il Sung provide for industrial production to increase by approximately 100 percent and are to be approved at a Central Committee meeting and thereafter at a meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly on 15 December 1977.

Comrade Kim Il Sung addressed the complicated situation in the development of the South Korean revolution.

Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke out against the concept of two Korean states and rejected the US proposal for so-called cross-recognition (Soviet Union recognizes South Korea, US recognizes the DPRK). The DPRK will patiently continue its work with respect to the South, so that Park Chung Hee becomes even more isolated and the struggle for democratization can be continued. The DPRK holds fast to the three principles for unifying the land, which were announced in 1972. Negotiations with the South, which began in 1972 based on this foundation, have currently been broken off because those in power in South Korea have publicly come out in favor of two Koreas.

Comrade Kim Il Sung stressed the differences in the situations of the GDR and DPRK, both in the negotiations and in his speech at the friendship celebration. He stated that the existence of the GDR was historically necessary.

In his remarks on the international situation, Comrade Kim Il Sung stressed that the Korean Workers Party advocates joining all revolutionary forces, especially those of socialist nations, "Third World" countries, the non-aligned nations, the international workers movement, and the national liberation movement.

There are difficulties in joining the forces of Socialist nations due to relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Seen from a historical perspective, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are comrades-in-arms of the DPRK. The DPRK has a common border with the People's Republic of China that is approximately 1500 kilometers in length. Although the two countries are close, the DPRK does not agree with everything China does. Relations with China were poor during the "Cultural Revolution." China agitated against the "Korean revisionists" over loudspeakers that were set up along the entire Sino-Korean border.

But if the DPRK improves relations with China, it need not worry about the US. The DPRK cannot concentrate troops in the north and in the south simultaneously. This is why the DPRK has endeavored to improve relations since the end of the "Cultural Revolution." It has succeeded. However, the DPRK does not accept Chinese assertions such as the characterization of the Soviet Union as "Social Imperialism." The DPRK is not a blind follower of China.

The Soviet Union supported Korea in its war of liberation. After the war it provided political and material assistance in the amount of 2,220 billion [old denomination] rubles. The DPRK is striving for better, amicable relations, but cannot get involved in the polemics between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. In this issue, it favors

maintaining strict independence and supports anything that promotes joining forces.

There are people who believe that the DPRK is more on China's side. This is not the case. The principles of the

enter into a long-term trade agreement.

In preparing for the visit, negotiations on communiqués were held that resulted in joint statements on a few issues of international development and on how relations should proceed. The communiqué contained positive statements on international relations, the Great October Socialist Revolution, the unity and solidarity of Socialist countries and the Communist and workers parties, developments in Europe, for peace and cooperation in Asia, and on the importance of peaceful coexistence between the GDR and the FRG.

The Korean side praised the existence of the GDR as an important contribution to strengthening the forces of socialism in the world. The negotiations resulted in an agreement that the visit would contribute to deepening the friendship and cooperation between the GDR and the DPRK and would thereby strengthen the solidarity of socialist states.

1. Deliberate efforts shall be undertaken to bring to fruition the proposals Comrade Erich Honecker made on further developing relations between the Socialist Unity Party and the Korean Workers Party, the GDR and the DPRK.

For action: Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, International Relations Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
State Planning Commission
Ministry of Foreign trade

2. A draft of the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the GDR and the DPRK shall be prepared and provided to the Korean side in preparation for Comrade Kim Il Sung's visit to the GDR.

For action: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, International Relations Department

3. The Agreement on Developing Economic and Scientific/Technical Cooperation between the German Democratic Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is approved. (Attachment)

Council of Ministers shall determine necessary measures.
For action: Chairman, Council of Ministers

4. A draft for a long-term trade agreement for the period 1978 - 1984 shall be prepared and, once approved in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, shall be provided to the Korean side.

For action: Ministry of Foreign Trade
State Planning Commission
Scheduled: March 1978

5. Comrade Minister Singhuber and a group of experts shall travel to Pyongyang to prepare and coordinate specific proposals for GDR involvement in developing raw materials in the DPRK that are important to the GDR.

For action: Chairman, Council of Ministers

Scheduled: January 1978

6. The rest of the goods and services required for assuring the scheduled start-up of the automation equipment plant in the DPRK in 1980 shall be realized for 1978 and 1979. A government representative shall be responsible for firm management and coordination and for assuring production.

For action: Minister of Heavy Machinery and System Construction
Minister of Electronics/Electrotechnology
Minister of Foreign Trade

7. Appropriate material on the situation and policies in the FRG, in particular attempts by the FRG to infiltrate the Quadripartite Agreement, shall be provided to the Korean side.

For action: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

8. The DPRK's Mansuda Ensemble shall be invited to the GDR as guest performers.

For action: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Culture
Scheduled: February 1978

9. The former official designation, "Korean People's Democratic Republic", shall be changed in accordance with Korean usage to "Korean Democratic People's Republic".

For action: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

10. Uniform transcription of Korean names and words shall be assured.

For action: Ministry of Secondary Education
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

On the development of economic and scientific/technical cooperation between the government of the German Democratic Republic and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The government of the German Democratic Republic and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the goal of comprehensive development of fraternal relations of friendship and cooperation between the two nations, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and with the intent of further developing economic and scientific/technical cooperation in areas of mutual interest, have agreed as follows:

Both sides shall enter into a long-term trade agreement for the period 1978 to 1984 with the goal of developing economic relations and expanding the exchange of goods.

Provided in this long-term trade agreement shall be the supply of goods that are traditionally traded by both sides and of new goods that are in demand on both sides.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall increase the quantity of annual deliveries of sintered magnesite to the German Democratic Republic during the term of the above long-term trade agreement. The German Democratic Republic shall provide the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a proportionate amount of potash fertilizer annually.

DOCUMENT No. 7

Stenographic record of conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung, 30 May 1984

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

Stenographic record

Official friendship visit to the GDR by the Party and State Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea led by Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

First day of meetings: Wednesday, 30 May 1984

Start time: 9:30 a.m.

Erich Honecker: Dear Comrade Kim Il Sung! Dear Korean comrades who have accompanied Comrade Kim Il Sung here. Permit me to say as we officially begin our exchange of views that again we all welcome you to this friendship visit to the GDR in the name of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the State Council, the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, and in the name of all of the people of the GDR.

At this moment we feel transported back in time and think of our trip to the People's Republic of Korea, the warm welcome that awaited us as we arrived there. I am not betraying any secrets when I stress how much we have looked forward to this opportunity to renew our acquaintance in the GDR. Our relations have developed very well since then and have reached a new level. We are men of good will who are convinced that our exchange of views in Berlin and the strengthening of our friendship and cooperation, and the development of friendly relations between our two peoples, are in the interests of the people of both countries.

Again, I warmly welcome dear Comrade Kim Il Sung and your comrades and friends! Now, as we greet, if you wish, the members of the delegation.

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Republic of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

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this in the slogan, "Rice is Communism!" All of our Party members are now engaged in the struggle to achieve these goals.

The second most important task we put forth is to achieve our goal for non-ferrous heavy metals. We have rich mineral resources: copper, lead, and zinc. We came up with the solution at the Central Committee Plenum in 1982. First we must achieve 1.5 million tons of non-ferrous heavy metals and then attack the rest. We made this resolution in August 1982. Within a year we unleashed the battle and for this reason we were able to reach 1.5 million tons. That is, we built a metallurgical plant with a capacity of 1.5 million tons. We accomplished this in less than a year. Including this mining, we can obtain an additional approximately 700,000 to 800,000 tons of ore. Next year we want to recover 200,000 tons of copper.

If we have largely achieved our goals in terms of non-ferrous heavy metals in the next year, we will also have solved the currency issue. While we are still in debt to West European countries, next year we will be able to pay it all off. We are not very deeply in debt to the West European countries. The total is about 700 to 800 million, and this is owed to France, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark. Not so much for the other West European countries. This year we will make substantial re-payments and next year we will have paid everything back. The world market price for one ton of zinc has risen to about 720 pounds. Once we have largely solved the currency issue, we will introduce the required facilities for metallurgy, mining, coal mining, and the electrical industry.

Altering our domestic structure will play a large role in steel production, for instance, building silicon plants. We are already producing some, but it does not satisfy the engineering industry. We must also produce stainless steel pipes. We need a plant for producing high voltage lines. If we bolster this industry, then we can increase steel production and better develop the engineering industry.

Naturally we have rich deposits of hard coal. There are 15 billion (?) tons of our prized brown coal. Thus far we have no experience in producing brown coal, because in the past we have only mined anthracite. Mining in Anju has already begun to yield this brown coal.

On the occasion of my visit to European socialist countries, I would also like to address cooperation with these nations and their assistance in exploiting our brown coal deposits. Our geographical position is a bit complicated because the region with the brown coal is immediately surrounded by the sea. We have already been able to set up a mining operation with a capacity of 7 million tons, but at least 30 to 40 million tons must be mined; this is within the realm of the possible. We are now in the process of acquiring the experience we need to mine this region. We are convinced that we can achieve the goals that we have set for ourselves if we obtain appropriate support from construction engineers from socialist countries.

In terms of the production of energy: we have good water resources since it rains a lot in our country. We will therefore build both hydroelectric plants and heating and

power stations. We have the potential to produce 70 billion kWh of current through hydroelectric power. We are building a hydroelectric plant with China on the Yalu River. Other mid-size and small hydroelectric plants will be built in the countryside, as well. We will have hydroelectric plants available to the degree that we resolve the coal-mining issue.

During my visit to the Soviet Union, I also made agree-

the level of high school graduate. Then we can completely resolve the issue of the national cadre.

We have not had less success in the area of the cultural revolution. When the country was liberated, we Koreans had only 12 high school graduates. Now there are some 1.2 million high school graduates. Training of the national cadre is the most important issue in Third World nations. We have resolved this issue.

As far as the economic situation is concerned, we must and we can achieve the perspective goals for the 80's in order to progress further. This is the situation. But we will have to work hard.

I would like to tell you briefly about the situation with South Korea. The situation with South Korea is very complicated and also very dangerous. Every year the American armies conduct a major military exercise. They conducted these exercises even prior to the Reagan era, but since Reagan took office this has grown. Last year 100,000 South Korean soldiers took part in this military exercise in addition to the American soldiers. We were a bit shocked that the Americans mobilized 100,000 South Koreans. We declared a state of emergency. This year the Americans mobilized more than 200,000 soldiers for this exercise. These exercises were "Team Spirit '83" and "Team Spirit '84".

The Americans stationed in Okinawa participated, as did those stationed in Hawaii. But many also came from the US. It was a major military exercise. But in contrast to last year, this year we did not declare a state of emergency. Our enemies threaten both us and the South Korean people with these exercises, and therefore there is this tension day in and day out on the demarcation line.

We have to take countermeasures every time the en-

The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed

forces in South Korea. H

Erich Honecker: We will meet again, then, and will also be together all day tomorrow.

¹ Translator's note: German word used in source document can also mean lock or sluice.



DOCUMENT No. 8
Memorandum of conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung, 31 May 1984.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

Memorandum
 [stamp:] Personal Classified Information
 Central Committee 02 310
 on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on
 31 May 1984

E. Honecker used the meeting to address some issues that could not be addressed in greater detail during the official talks on 30 May 1984 due to time constraints.

He stated that the GDR is currently preoccupied with its 35th anniversary. The Party, which has 2.2 million members, is making thorough preparations for the 35th anniversary. The centerpiece is the ideological work, which has led to intense talks with practically every citizen of the GDR.

He said that, as Kim Il Sung could see for himself, the Party is bound to the masses, and there is a good trusting relationship between the Party and the masses. The alliance policy is very important, that is, cooperation with allied Parties, the role of organizations of the masses such as the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions, with 9 million members, the Free German Youth, with 2.3 million members, and the whole range of other organizations of the masses.

He said that the election results of 6 May 1984 could be considered the best in the history of the GDR, both in terms of the election itself and in terms of voter turnout, and attests to the successful policies of the Party and government in carrying out the resolutions of the X Party Congress.

He stated that the Socialist competition in honor of the 35th Anniversary of the GDR is very important. The workers have established as their goal for this to increase productivity by one percent above what is planned. Given the results thus far it can be expected that they will surpass this goal in the competition. Thus net industrial production in the first 5

of China would be pushed back. Comrade Hu Yaobang told me that he had very much been looking forward to this visit. Our Chinese comrades also think highly of Comrade Arkhipov. He used to be an economic advisor in China. Comrade Hu Yaobang said that he very much regretted that Comrade Arkhipov's trip would be pushed back.



Source: Bunesarchiv, Berlin

I told Comrade Chernenko about this during my meetings with him. I told our Soviet comrades my thoughts both in a personal meeting with Comrade Chernenko and in official negotiations — that the Chinese really want to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The Chinese do not want war. Overcoming the consequences of the Cultural Revolution in the economy and in the standard of living of the population requires a lot of time and effort. All resources must be devoted to this. The Chinese are not developing relations with the US and Japan with the goal of working against another country.

Given the complex world situation, I hope that the Soviet Union and China work things out. I believe that the development of relations with the US is not targeted against the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai already told me that when they established relations with the US. They told us every time they met with Japan and the US. The only objective of these relations is to obtain developed technology and credit from Japan and the US. Deng Xiaoping is said to have stated in the US that the arms build-up in the US is good for peace. I don't know if that's so. This is the first time I have heard of Deng Xiaoping expressing a sentiment like that.

It is a fact that the Chinese have improved governmental relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The number of delegations exchanged has grown, as well. All of this can help to reduce the mistrust between the Soviet Union and China. Naturally, I was not able to tell Comrade Chernenko that I think it is a mistake to push back Comrade Arkhipov's visit to China. I just told him that the Chinese regret it. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Com-

munist Party of China has 5 members. Two of them—Wu Xueqian and Li Xiannian—used to be friends with Comrade Arkhipov. Today they are both powerful. Comrade Arkhipov could build trust in meetings with these two men.

Hu Yaobang told me the following: We sent the Deputy Prime Minister to Comrade Andropov's funeral. During the welcoming meeting, his escort told him that he could meet with anyone he wanted. As is customary with East Asians, he said that he would accommodate himself to whatever his host had arranged. Our Soviet comrades did not understand this correctly. There were meetings with just anyone. Only the Foreign Minister attended Brezhnev's burial. They were sending a message to the Soviet Union by sending the deputy prime minister. But this was not understood.

Kim Il Sung said that he believed that all socialist nations should work toward creating trust between the Soviet Union and China. No new mistrust must be permitted to arise. I have told our Soviet comrades that I believe that the goal of our Chinese comrades is to put Socialism in China in order. They don't want a conflict. I think it is important that China wants to open the gate to socialist nations in the interest of socialist modernization. We should not oppose that. Why should we leave the important Chinese market to the capitalists?

The old generation of leadership in China is dying out. We should show the new generation an opening. If we leave China to the capitalists, there is the risk that China will become a quasi-colony again. We should not close the door in China's face.

Because of our position—the length of our border with China, confrontation with the US and Japan—what we are most afraid of is that China will not stick with socialism. There are 1 billion people in China. We have to make sure that they follow the socialist path rather than some other path. We have to focus on drawing them toward us. In the past there were major anti-Soviet campaigns in China. This is not the case anymore. During the Cultural Revolution there were major propaganda actions against us on the Yalu. There were provocations in North Korea at the time of the Chinese/Soviet conflicts on the Ussuri in 1969. While I was recuperating in the country, I received a call from our Minister of State Security that Chinese troops were crossing the Tumen [River] onto our territory. I gave the order not to shoot, but to let them come ahead so that we could take them on our territory, if necessary. We sent a group of soldiers there. Then the Chinese withdrew. The Chinese have castigated the Soviet Union and even us as revisionists. It lasted about 5 years in our case, and we had to keep our peace because of our situation. We had to be patient.

China has new leadership now. They don't want any conflict with the Soviet Union. They want peaceful co-existence with the US, Japan, India, and even the Soviet Union. There are still no Party relations between the Soviet Union and China. We should all try to use our governmental relations to create an atmosphere that promotes the restoration of Party relations, even between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. I ask that

post-1985 years and thus to create a stable foundation for

ment. We consider this to be exceptionally important, given the economic war that the US and other imperialist countries are waging with all resources against the nations of the socialist community.

Our Party and our state in the future will also continue to develop our mutually beneficial economic cooperation, with high-reliability, as an effective growth factor.

Kim Il Sung expressed his thanks for the overview that E. Honecker gave on developments in the GDR since 1977, and addressed two issues: the results of the visit to a few additional operations in the GDR and the relationship to the non-aligned countries.

It is very encouraging that we were able to agree on the delivery of a semi-conductor plant by your side, he said. Soon we will send specialists to agree on all of the specific issues, including joint ordering of certain parts in third countries. We already purchased a semi-conductor plant from Japan through unofficial channels. But it is incomplete. We were not aware of electronics development in the GDR. It was only as I was preparing for this visit that I learned that you have such a plant of your own. Our Central Committee approved the means for purchasing a semi-conductor plant a long time ago. But it could not come to pass because, for one thing, we did not know about your electronics. When I was just in the embassy, I criticized our comrades because they did not provide us correct information about GDR industry. For instance, we also did not know that you produce good synthetic rubber and herbicides. In the past we purchased all of these things from capitalist countries. That has to change.

In our country we have rich deposits of heavy metals: lead, zinc, etc. We have enough sintered magnesite for you to rely on us in this regard for a long time. There are good prospects for the supply of other heavy metals over the long-term, as well. I criticized our comrades in the embassy because of the lack of information. But I must say that in terms of management we did not provide our cadre sufficient guidance on the issue of fully exploring options for cooperating with the GDR and other socialist countries.

The agreement on long-term economic cooperation that our specialists have come up with and that we will sign today—I would like you to understand that we can add to it in many areas. We are not adequately familiar with the options for cooperation. Many options should be examined in greater detail by specialists in order for us to be able to expand the agreement.

We had been members of the movement of non-aligned nations since 1975; most recently we no longer belong to the movement, said Kim Il Sung. The movement set forth good solutions but is not in a position to resolve the basic issues. Above all it is not in a position to realize the requirement for a new economic order. The states that belong to it are politically independent, but they do not have independent national economies. This is why the danger of expanding neo-colonialism is growing. The US and Japan are again reaching toward the countries of the third world. The problems of the developing countries cannot be solved simply by

cooperation among themselves. Naturally something has to be done. Certainly mutual cooperation can achieve a few successes for agriculture and health care. But the countries cannot be industrialized by cooperation within the non-aligned pact. The best solution for them would be close ties between the socialist market and the market of the developing lands. We must all think carefully about this. We also oppose the efforts of capitalism in the Third World.

I believe there are two options for economic cooperation: 1. Expand the socialist market by adding individual developing nations. 2. Individual socialist nations can establish bilateral economic relations to individual developing nations. We can offer them specialists and technical documentation at lower prices than the capitalist countries will. In return the socialist nations can obtain cheaper raw materials from them. If we help them to assure their political independence through economic independence, they will succeed in ridding themselves of the pressure of the former colonial powers.

Above all it is important to develop this cooperation with the African nations. Nearly all of the heads of state of Africa—with the exception of Kenya and Morocco—have already visited our country. We know that you, Comrade Honecker, have visited a number of African nations and ascribe great importance to Africa's development. We have agricultural specialists in nearly all African countries. Our experience in Sudan indicates that just sending a small number of specialists can help them to double or triple agricultural production and thus to solve their main problem, the issue of food. If all of the socialist countries together initiate more dynamic activities with respect to the nations of Africa, we will be able to tear all of Africa away from imperialism and set many countries on the path to socialism.

The political forces and resulting avant-garde parties in these countries are very different. Ethiopia has obviously achieved the highest level of consolidation of a Marxist party. Despite these differences, however, we can use economic cooperation to strengthen the anti-imperialist forces in all of these countries. I am very pleased that we are of the same mind on this issue, as well.

Kim Il Sung asked Erich Honecker for his impression of non-aligned nations, in particular those with a socialist orientation, based on his visits to the non-socialist world. He stressed that the DPRK maintains relations with them all in order to support the path to further decolonialization and to prevent re-colonialization. E. Honecker specifically mentioned the critical situation in Latin America, US interference in the domestic affairs of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and other countries, the continuing threats against socialist Cuba, and the situation in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

In conclusion, it was determined that it is necessary to continue to provide vigorous support to these countries in the struggle against imperialism, in particular US imperialism, but also imperialism of the FRG.

DOCUMENT No. 10

Party will hold steady in the future its course of unifying economic and social policy as the main battlefield for successful development of the GDR. The results of the national elections on 8 June have affirmed the will of the workers to continue this policy with new initiatives.

The focus of Comrade Erich Honecker's remarks on foreign policy was a detailed assessment of the international situation, which has become extremely critical due to the policies of the most aggressive circles of US imperialism and their allies in NATO, and an explanation of the initiatives of the SED and GDR, which are intended to maintain peace and assure security, in concert with the agreed peace strategy of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact member countries. Comrade Erich Honecker said that it was not until now that it was worthwhile to take the opportunity and fight to decide the

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the economy of the DPRK.

Comrade Kim Il Sung agreed with Comrade Erich Honecker's remarks on the link between strong socialism and peace. He stressed the need to draw more and more resources into the peace movement.

Comrade Kim Il Sung explained that the focus of the third seven-year-plan, which begins in 1987, is to resolve the food issue and to provide residential living space and adequate clothing.

This means expanding the amount of land cultivated for grain by 500,000 to 2 million hectares and guaranteeing comprehensive irrigation of the areas, creating 150,000 to 200,000 residential units annually, and, due to a lack of cotton, creating new production capacities for synthetic fibers from domestic raw materials (limestone, anthracite) from 50,000 tons to 150,000 tons annually as a foundation for a total of 1.5

billions of tons of raw materials.

It has turned out that only 8.5 to 9 million tons of steel are adequate for domestic demand, rather than the originally planned 15. Instead, the amount of aluminum produced from limestone and alumina must be increased. It is necessary to further raise the training level of the people to satisfy the new tasks.

Comrade Kim Il Sung mentioned important resolutions by the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party that are meant to achieve the technical level of developed countries in a short period of time by accelerating the scientific/technical revolution.

In order to achieve the 10 planned development goals of the VI Party Congress, it will be necessary in particular to modernize available technology based on rapid development of mechanical engineering, electrotechnology, and automation technology, including in particular technology for finding and exploiting raw materials and fuels and other energy carriers, raising the technological level of production, scientific penetration into production methods and operational activities.

In this context, Comrade Kim Il Sung stressed the importance of cooperation with the GDR in implementing economic objectives and particularly providing scientific/technical know-how. This cooperation will become extremely important in the next few years. Comrade Kim Il Sung asked that the GDR review its ability to provide machines and equipment for the vinalon textile plant.

As to the situation in South Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung stated that the anti-American mood has grown even more among the population, and in religious circles. But no rapid change in relations among the powers is to be expected.

The US rejected proposals made by the DPRK for reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula because it [would] lose its reason for remaining in South Korea if the initiatives were realized.

Comrade Kim Il Sung affirmed that the DPRK does not intend to attack South Korea, nor could it. More than 1,000 US nuclear warheads are stored in South Korea, ostensibly for defense, and it would take only two of them to destroy the DPRK. The DPRK supports the proposals made by Comrade

Gorbachev in Vladivostok and Reykjavik. Many problems could not be resolved with South Korea. Progress in relations between the Soviet Union and the US would also help to resolve the Korea problem.

Comrade Günter Sieber

2. Relations between the GDR's Chamber of Deputies and the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly shall be taken to a higher level by exchanging views and experience.

For action: Comrade Horst Sindermann

3. The existing consultation mechanism with the Korean Workers Party and the DPRK shall be qualified and employed in a deliberate manner for mutual procedures for reconciling

sary of the People's Republic of China. I would be grateful for your ideas on this so that we can proceed with them in mind.

We will give Comrade Sieber the detailed reports about the delegation's work.

With Socialist greetings,

[s]

Enclosures

Günter Schabowski

Minutes

Of the meeting between Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Korean Workers Party, and Comrade Günter Schabowski in Pyongyang on 10 May 1988

At the beginning of the meeting Kim Il Sung asked specifically after Erich Honecker's health. He expressed his thanks for the Secretary General's regards as conveyed by Günter Schabowski and asked that his own warm regards be conveyed to his best friend and brother. He emphasized his deep friendship with Erich Honecker by saying that each of them was occupying a socialist outpost, one in the west, the other in the east. He said he still remembered the tremendous reception he experienced from the people of Berlin when he visited the GDR in 1984. The population thereby demonstrated its solid unity with the Party and also the force that grows out of the friendship of our two nations.

Comrade Kim Il Sung again gave his thanks for Erich Honecker's invitation for a delegation from the DPRK to attend the International Meeting for Nuclear Free Zones from 20 June to 22 June 1988 in Berlin. He characterized this initiative of Erich Honecker's as very important and said that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party had decided to send a delegation that would be led by a member of the Politburo and the Secretary of the Central Committee.

Kim Il Sung stressed how completely the foreign policies of the GDR and the DPRK were in agreement and emphasized that our parties also had the same views on objectives for building socialism.

There can be no other objectives if one truly wants to blaze the trail of socialism.

He said he follows Erich Honecker's speeches with great interest, and that these speeches coincide completely with his views.

Comrade Kim Il Sung stated that he is very satisfied with the cooperation between the GDR and the DPRK. The GDR actively supports the Korean people's struggle in all areas. Indirectly referencing the information Günter Schabowski asked for at an earlier meeting with Kang Hui-won, candidate for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, about the prospects for contractual delivery of certain raw materials from the DPRK, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that he knew that the DPRK is not currently fulfilling its trade obligations as set forth in the agreements. He made

assurances that this will be made up and everything will proceed normally in the second half of 1988. Addressing the reasons for the backlogs – and according to him this was the first time he had discussed this with a foreign delegation— Kim Il Sung talked about major floods in 1986 and 1987, which the Koreans had not made publicly known internationally. All of the production facilities, railroad tracks, and roads were flooded in the valley where the sintered magnesite is found, production came to a standstill, and there was a great deal of destruction. A member of the Politburo and the Secretary of the Central Committee was dispatched to lead efforts on-site to repair the damage. A Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers has been working as the District Party Secretary for this period. The production workshops will begin full operations during the course of the first half of 1988 so that everything will be delivered that the DPRK has pledged to deliver.

The Party and the entire country is currently focusing great efforts on the construction plans for the 13th World Games of Youth and Students in Pyongyang in 1989. These are very difficult and also expensive preparations, because at the same time capital investments in operations must also continue. The build-up work in small cities has been suspended for the time being. It is primarily the army that is working at the construction sites in Pyongyang; it will accomplish much in the "200-day battle." Everything is being done to prepare well for the 13th world games and to make them a success.

Work is proceeding with the same initiative with which the service members of the army constructed the West Sea barrage. Now that the barrage has been operating for two years, the substantial efforts and costs invested have already been recouped.

Günter Schabowski thanked Kim Il Sung for the meeting, for the detailed description of the Korean Workers Party's current struggle to bring about the resolutions of the VI Party Congress, and the confident assurances that all of the obligations to the GDR with regard to deliveries would be fulfilled. He emphatically stressed that Comrade Erich Honecker had authorized him to provide assurances again that the GDR will observe all agreements that were made between him and Comrade Kim Il Sung. In this context, he described the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party to send a delegation of representatives of the GDR, to be led by Willi Stoph, to the 40th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK.

He said that the youth in the GDR are preparing for the 13th World Games in Pyongyang with the intent, alongside the side of the Korean youth, to make this occasion a great event for the youth of the world, a convincing demonstration of the strength of our socialist nations, and an active contribution to maintaining world peace. This was also reflected in the May demonstration by over 750,000 residents of Berlin, which was a powerful manifestation of the unity of Party and people.

Comrade Kim Il Sung again asked that his fraternal greetings be conveyed to Erich Honecker, and stressed that the

The stance of the puppets led to mass protests by the young people in South Korea, who demanded that they be able to go to the North and that the young people from the North be able to come to the South.

He said that the proposals made by the South Korean leadership were nothing new. Negotiations by the Red Cross, scientists, and other contacts were broken off precisely because "Team Spirit" and other major exercises were being conducted in the South. Peaceful negotiations were impossible to reconcile with the fact that they were aiming cannons at North Korea and sharpening their swords.

He stated that now new parliaments are being elected in the North and South — as a first step their representatives could get together and hold talks, sometimes in Pyongyang, sometimes in Seoul, on a declaration of non-aggression.

Today at 11:00 a.m. a new letter will be presented to the South Korean side in Panmunjom. If they decline to accept it, its contents will be broadcast by radio starting at 5 p.m. It remains to be seen what the response to this will be.

He said the South Koreans might want to, but the US will certainly oppose it and will prevent them because such an agreement on non-aggression would make it impossible to continue to justify to the world their presence in the South. But then the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would be in a position to expose the statements made by the US and South Korea as mere empty words. Kim Il Sung requested that Erich Honecker be briefed about this situation and its implications.

During the second part of his remarks, the Secretary General addressed economic development in the country. He said that they are currently conducting a major campaign in the building of socialism. This has to do both with the construction of hydroelectric plants and many coal mines and with the building of major plants for vinalon, plastics, aluminum, and potassium fertilizers. "When we have completed this major campaign and have successfully satisfied the third Seven-Year Plan, then we will nearly have reached the level of developed nations."

In particular he praised the 200-day battle for the 40th anniversary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in which the goals were consistently exceeded. He cited as an example that the daily goal of 4 million kilowatt hours of current was exceeded yesterday with 4.3 million.

Only 3.5 to 3.6 million kilowatt hours were produced in the past. Important accomplishments were achieved in transportation, as well; it was possible to increase the daily perfor-

mance of rail transport from 300,000 tons to 330 to 350,000 tons. And if energy production and transportation lead the way, the entire national economy will develop well.

Finally, Kim Il Sung expressed his gratitude for the assistance the GDR provided to the Korean People's Army. He considered the visit by the military delegation and also the subsequent short vacation by the Minister to be an expression of the close ties between our two Parties and of the profound confidence the Socialist Unity Party has in the Workers' Party of Korea. He asked that his most sincere regards be passed on to his brother and friend, Erich Honecker, and to the people of the GDR, when we returned. The President then personally awarded General of the Army Heinz Kessler with the Order of the State Banner First Class and the other members of the delegation with further orders and medals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Subsequent to this visit, which took place in the President's residence at the foot of the Paektusan mountain, a center of the partisan battles against the Japanese, the delegation visited the highest mountain in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (2,744 meters), which is located immediately on the border with China. Minister O Chin U, who accompanied the delegation constantly except for two occasions, also made his way up the steep mountain paths despite problems stemming from a serious traffic accident in 1986.

A spirited meeting of the German/Korean Brotherhood in Arms with more than 6,000 members of the Korean armed forces took place on the afternoon of 22 July 1988 in the Cultural Palace of the Korean People's Army, one of the largest halls in the capitol (speeches by the two ministers enclosed as attachment).

At this point the completely open, comradely, even warm atmosphere that had characterized the entire visit by the military delegation was evident once again. The high esteem in which the GDR and National People's Army are held was apparent everywhere.

After the announcement, the document that we had prepared on the cooperation of the two Ministries of Defense in the coming years was signed.

In conclusion it can be stated that the goals of the Party and state leadership for the military delegation and the expectations linked to it were completely fulfilled.

The embassy of the GDR, the media, and its representatives abroad provided good support to the visit. Reporting in the Korean media was very detailed.



DOCUMENT No. 1

**Report, Legation of Hungary in North Korea to
the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 4 March 1953**

*[Source: Hungarian National Archives [Hereafter MOL],
XIX-J-1-j-Korea-11/f-00828/1953 8.d. Translated by
József Litkei.]*

The Legation of the Hungarian People's Republic.

T

Later, he inquired about the work of our hospital and the

signature

Minister Károly Pásztor

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The document here uses the Hungarian expression "already known gift," but it is not clear what this refers to. It is most likely that the gift was either mentioned in a previous report or that the minister believes that those receiving this report already know about the gift.

² TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Here, as throughout the document, the text turns from indirect speech to quasi-quotation.



DOCUMENT No. 2
Report, Legation of the Hungarian People's
Republic in Beijing to the Foreign Ministry of
Hungary, 15 January 1954.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-11/f-00317/1954 9.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Legation of the Hungarian People's Republic.
 Beijing.

Top Secret.

4 copies prepared. 3 for FM, 1 for embassy.

Beijing, 15 January 1954.

Subject: Chinese opinion concerning the Korean question.

In the course of a conversation with Comrade Wu Xiuquan [Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs] on 2 January, he told me the following.

They think that it is very likely that the political conference can only be started after the beginning of the Berlin conference, but it is also possible that it can be started only after the Berlin conference is over. The beginning of the Berlin conference, its course, and [its] outcome will have a great impact on the entire international situation, and therefore on the Korean political conference as well.

The Chinese-Korean side is taking political advantage of the Americans' stonewalling tactics, revealing to the world what is the real meaning of [the Americans' policy], while they [the Chinese-Korean side] on the other hand are urging the resumption of the negotiations.

Another reason why the Americans are delaying the political conference is the question of prisoners of war, and [the Americans' attempts to] prevent a solution concerning the [ir] ideological education.¹ According to the Chinese government, the decisive factor in the question of prisoners of war is not the issue of the prisoners themselves, but the political aspect of the question. By preventing ideological education, the USA broke the armistice agreement.

In the eyes of international public opinion, this already

means a great defeat for [the US]. This further contributes to the violation of the agreement by the so-called UN Forces. If on 22 or 23 January, they execute the greatly-publicized liberation of the prisoners of war, which will entail penetrating into the neutral zone, they will again unmask themselves. At the same time, the Chinese-Korean side is strictly keeping the regulations of the armistice agreement.

It was interesting that although in December Indian General Thimayya, in the majority resolution (Indian, Czechoslovakian, Polish) concerning the prisoners' of war ideological education, condemned the UN's quibbling concerning ending the detention of the prisoners of war, on 23 January he represented the US position and took a stand for the release of the prisoners of war. The Chinese government, specifically Comrades Zhou Enlai and [Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs] Zhang Hanfu, informed the Indian government through Ambassador Raghavan that this declaration seemed to indicate that the Indian government would support the Americans' machinations which are trying to prevent resolution to indicate government, spe7t the((the s3reguans' ma few days 0.0and0.0ultv

a separate organization. They criticized the party's policy and were unsatisfied with it. The same thing happened in the army. The person who continued this policy in the army was a general who has already admitted his mistake and made honest [self-] criticism, so he was relieved of his post and appointed to another position. The CC is now dealing with the case of the minister of postal affairs. He is being cultivated and educated. Of course, the party does everything to avoid this or similar things from happening in the future. They have organized things so that if something like this happens again, it can be immediately prevented. It is abso-

DOCUMENT No. 5

Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 19 November 1959.

*[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/c-006836/1959 6.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]*

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Top Secret.

Pyongyang, 19 November 1959.

Subject. Conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Yoo Ch'ang-sik on the Korean reaction to the CPSU Seventh Congress and some important questions concerning Korea's foreign and domestic policies.

Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik was recently appointed deputy

initiative as well which placed the question of Korea's peaceful unification on the agenda. They are convinced that they did so at the most appropriate time. Today, tension is abating in the international situation. Peoples of the world everywhere honestly wish for peace. They [the Koreans] think that the socialist countries and all the peace-loving people of the world reacted positively to the Korean parliament's appeal. Their aim with their appeal to the parliaments of the world was to direct the world's attention to the Korean question during a favorable period of international relations like this, so that they could achieve the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea as soon as possible, start negotiations and economic and cultural relations between North and South Korea, and realize the peaceful unification of the country as soon as possible. In the name of his government, Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik expressed his thanks for the support that the Hungarian People's Republic offered so far in this issue and

Following this, Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik spoke on the issue of forestation. At the present, there are orchards in the DPRK on a territory of 70 thousand chongbo. The overwhelming majority of this consists of apple gardens. [During their occupation,] the Japanese destroyed a vast number of trees in Korea. The mountainsides were almost entirely devastated. The party plenum to be convened in the near future will make planting trees into a movement that embraces the entire population. They plan primarily to plant apple, sweet chestnut, and poplar trees, which can be well utilized in the national economy in a relatively short time, that is, within a maximum of ten years. Fruit-trees will provide fruits that can be utilized both in natural form and as canned food, thus increasing the foodstuff stocks. Poplar grows quickly and constitutes an important raw material in producing both paper and artificial textiles. These trees will be planted primarily on the slopes of mountains, hillsides, and along roads. Besides providing important raw materials for light industry within the next ten years, the propagation of these tree species will decorate the Korean soil and the Korean landscape.

Finally, Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik mentioned that since the enlarged session of the Party CC Presidium in August, the issue of widening the local people's committee's sphere

DOCUMENT No. 6

Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, 20 May 1960.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/b-004817/1960 4.d. Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Top Secret.

Pyongyang, 20 May 1960.

Subject. Conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Yoo Ch'ang-sik on some questions concerning Korea's foreign and domestic policies.

Upon my request, on the nineteenth of this month I was received by Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik, Deputy Foreign Minister, whom I asked for information concerning the DPRK's relations with Africa¹. In his answer, Comrade Yoo told me that on the occasion of the Republic of Guinea's declaration of independence, an exchange of telegrams occurred between the two countries by which they mutually recognized each other, but did not realize any further relations in the fields of diplomacy and the economy. Except for this, they have no connection to Black Africa; in the recent past, there was only one military delegation visiting Conakry. Of course, they support to the utmost the struggle of the African peoples against imperialism and colonialism and are making efforts to unmask American imperialism and its Syngman Rhee-like satellites—especially in the Afro-Asian countries—in front of the greatest possible public and to isolate them. Concerning the Afro-Asian countries, the comrade deputy foreign minister mentioned that they have a trade representation in Cairo, and based on an agreement last year, they will open a trade representation endowed with the rights of a consulate in Baghdad. As is known, they have trade representations in India, Indonesia and Burma.

In answer to my question, Comrade Yoo briefly described the visit of the Algerian government delegation to Korea. The delegation, headed by Krim Belkassem, arrived for a friendly visit and showed great interest concerning military questions. They spent a lot of time in the Museum of the Patriotic War, where they asked for detailed information, and then they also visited the Military Academy. Members of the delegation stated that the Korean people's fight against American imperialism inspires them too, and they gained a lot of experience during their visit. Concerning the latter, Comrade Yoo mentioned that this opinion is shared by the Koreans as well. He told me that the Algerians declared that "after driving out the French colonizers, the people of Algeria will act the same way the Koreans did."

Moving on to South Korea, the comrade deputy foreign minister expressed his view that the situation is unfolding, and this is setting new tasks for the DPRK. The possibility of unification is getting nearer; at the moment, their aim is to

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establish correspondence and transportation connections. There are several parties being formed in South Korea, which is progress compared to the past situation and offers a possibility for uniting the progressive forces. The South Korean movement is deepening and intensifying, and it is increasingly acquiring the character of a class struggle. The task of the DPRK is to accelerate the building of socialism, so the Party is now devoting great attention to further developing the national economy. The most important task now is the intensification of mechanization, especially in agriculture (they need approx. 20,000 tractors), and to raise the workers' living standards. In the DPRK, for example, the average production is 17 meters of textile per person per year, but the army and industry use a significant share of this amount. They want to raise the average amount to 30 meters per person. Therefore, the government has recently passed a resolution concerning the development of the vinalon production. At the moment, they are having difficulties concerning machines.

At the end, the comrade deputy foreign minister expressed his thanks for the technical support provided by the Hungarian foreign ministry (cde. Bozi and Balogh), which he highly appreciated. Then he mentioned that recently the Hungarian periodical "Ország-Világ," in one of its Korean reports, evaluated the "Chollima" movement in a different way than the Korean position. "We do not have any objection to this, our embassy raised the issue. It is possible that a foreign visitor might not understand this [movement] a hundred percent as a Korean might," said the comrade foreign minister. In my response, I promised to look into the issue.

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The literal translation of the term used here would be "Black Africa," which refers to the non-Arab part of the continent, that is, Africa south of the Sahara.



DOCUMENT No. 7

Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, 1 March 1961.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-27/e-0027/1961 13.d.
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about the steadfast and faithful behavior of the CPSU delegation headed by Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Kim Il Sung remarked that continuing the debate between the CPSU and CCP would have caused commotion among the members of the Workers' Party. One has to understand, he said, that China is Korea's great neighbor, and that the Chinese people sacrificed their blood for the freedom of the Korean people. According to Comrade Puzanov, the Korean comrades are apparently happy that the issue is closed, and would not like to engage with it [further].

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth

DOCUMENT No. 8
Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's
Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign

embassy). He agreed that, under the pretense of discussing various protocol questions, I visit the Chinese ambassador, who following this will have to summon the [other] ambassadors. Concerning the statement of the Chinese ambassador, according to which “some criticize the people’s communes, yet they have already been proven to work” (see my above-mentioned report), Comrade Puzanov briefly outlined the

DOCUMENT No. 10
Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People’s
Republic in the DPRK to the Foreign Ministry of
Hungary, 17 May 1961.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-27/a-0042/1961 13.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People’s Republic.

Top Secret.

9/1961

Pyongyang, 17 May 1961.

Subject: Conversation with Soviet ambassador Puzanov on the cult of personality and the policy of the DPRK.

On 15 May, I made a farewell visit to Comrade Puzanov, the Soviet ambassador. During the friendly conversation, the topic of the May Day parade also came up. I mentioned to Comrade Puzanov that in my opinion the Korean comrades organized the parade well, the small number of Kim Il Sung portraits was striking, etc. (See my report No. __)

Comrade Puzanov agreed and pointed out that the slogans were chosen carefully as well; they did a good job of symbolizing the achievements and tasks of the DPRK, but he found the Kim Il Sung statue to be superfluous.

Concerning the above issue, the question of the “cult of personality” was also raised. Comrade Puzanov expressed his view that the question cannot be decided merely based on the number of portraits, etc. What one has to look at, he said, is how the Leninist norms of inner party life prevail. In his opinion, the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party holds regular meetings, and in its work often involves experts and functionaries from different fields.

During the last months, there were a number of nationwide¹ Korean professional meetings, in which leading comrades also took part. Comrade Puzanov also mentioned that Comrade Kim Il Sung and other leading comrades spend a lot of time in the countryside visiting factories and collectives, etc. The so-called Chongsan-ri method proved to be a good one.


Following this, when talking about the policy of the Workers’ Party, Comrade Puzanov told me that the party leadership is mature, and that it has learned from past mistakes and is correcting them itself. He did not experience mistakes being “hushed up” by the party leadership. As an example, he mentioned the “great leap.” It is known that in 1958, Korean comrades adopted this slogan from the Chinese, and they wanted to double the plan target in 1959. The consequences were very negative, and a number of difficulties were caused in agriculture. The Korean party realized this, corrected the mistakes, and emphasized the necessity of the proportionate development of the national economy.

I request that this report be sent to leading comrades.

[To comrade foreign minister
Budapest]

signature

Mongolia and the Cold War



Recent publication of Russian and Chinese documents by Evgenii Bajanov, Chen Jian, Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Kathryn Weathersby, and other scholars has finally thrown light on many aspects of the North Korean/Soviet/Chinese alliance during the Korean War.¹ Less attention has been paid, however, to the relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union under Khrushchev. Andrei N. Lankov has uncovered numerous Russian documents related to the important events of 1955-1956, but without access to a broader base of documents from Russia, the Khrushchev era of the DPRK/USSR alliance has remained largely obscure.² The documents presented below from the Hungarian National Archives help fill that gap. In general, Hungarian diplomats had more limited access to highly confidential information on North Korea than did their Soviet counterparts, receiving most of their information on Soviet-North Korean relations from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, thanks to the assistance of North Koreans who had been trained in Hungary and maintained contacts with the Hungarian Embassy after their return to the DPRK, Hungarian diplomats often matched the Soviets in acquiring information about North Korean domestic policies.

Peculiarities of the North Korean Regime and the Roots of Isolationism

As emphasized by Bruce Cumings, Brian Myers, and others, North Korea was by no means a typical “people’s democracy,” and its peculiarities influenced the character of Soviet-North Korean relations from 1945 on.³ For one thing, the relative backwardness of the North Korean economy either retarded the adoption of certain Soviet institutions or necessitated an inordinate dependency on Soviet expertise. For example, the limited financial resources of the North Korean state led it to establish unpaid security organs, whose members were present in every village.⁴ In 1953-1954 work cards and Stakhanovism were still unknown to most North Korean workers.⁵ The DPRK’s agricultural tax system seemed far less complex than its Hungarian counterpart, and the circulation of newspapers remained a fraction of that of their East European equivalents.⁶ Because of the deficiencies of the country’s motion picture industry, as late as 1957 some 60 per cent of the films shown in the cinemas were of Soviet origin, whereas the proportion of North Korean films did not exceed 10 per cent.⁷ Due to the paucity of North Korean authors, translated Soviet works constituted the largest share of the books published in 1955. By contrast, most of the plays staged in 1955 were classical Korean works like the *Tale of Ch’unhyang*.⁸ In 1956 North Korean higher education still lacked adequate textbooks, a problem the authorities proposed to solve by placing greater emphasis on teaching Rus-

sian so that students could use Soviet textbooks until Korean ones could be published.⁹ In primary and secondary education, on the other hand, Soviet and Communist influence gained ground at a much slower pace. In the mid-1950s the majority of teachers continued using the pedagogical methods of the pre-liberation era. The history of the Three Kingdoms was taught in a rather “romantic” style, and the teaching of Russian was less emphasized than in Hungary.¹⁰ The similarities and differences between Soviet and North Korean institutions did not, therefore, necessarily indicate political sympathy or aversion; in a number of cases they simply reflected the specific realities of North Korea.

From the very beginning, Hungarian diplomats were aware of the “special relationship” between Moscow and Pyongyang. On 30 April 1950 Hungarian Envoy Sándor Simics flatly told Kim Il Sung that Hungary could not afford to sell goods to the DPRK below world market prices. He also noted in his report that “they took a liking to the fact that the Soviet Union had given them long-term credit ... this is the generosity of the Soviet Union that overlooks everything they do. We cannot do it yet, for we are small and poor.”¹¹ This emphasis on Soviet generosity may have been an overstatement, but in the mid-1950s the character of Soviet-North Korean economic relations certainly differed from the common East European pattern. Like Albania, the DPRK received aid from the other Communist countries, whereas its export capacity remained quite negligible until the end of its Three-year Plan (1954-1956).¹² That Moscow assumed an obligation to such a small developing country greatly boosted the self-confidence of the North Korean leaders, who felt that the DPRK was entitled to preferential treatment.

Pyongyang took little interest in establishing contacts with Communist countries not capable of rendering concrete assistance. In 1954 its relations with Bulgaria and Albania were still at the ministerial, instead of ambassadorial level.¹³ Neither these two countries nor Romania carried on substantial trade with the DPRK in the mid-1950s.¹⁴ Pyongyang set up a Ministry of Foreign Trade as late as the last months of 1952, which demonstrated North Korea’s isolation within the “Soviet bloc.” Until that time, the DPRK had exchanged goods only with the USSR and China.¹⁵ To be sure, the disinterest often proved mutual, since the DPRK had little to offer the East European “people’s democracies.” Moreover, many North Korean leaders knew little about Europe or the “ways of the world” (see Document No. 1), which also inhibited the improvement of relations.

In the spring of 1950, as the DPRK prepared for its military campaign against the South, diplomats at the recently established Hungarian Legation found the North Korean Foreign Ministry anything but cooperative. “They received ev-

ery request completely uncomprehendingly, and whenever possible they dragged out its fulfillment until the requests became out of date,” Simics complained. On 21 August 1950 the Soviet Ambassador to Beijing frankly told his Hungarian counterpart that soldiers of the Korean People’s Army [KPA], infuriated by the US air raids that killed many civilians, often killed American POWs in defiance of repeated orders of the high command. The DPRK authorities prevented the Hungarians from acquiring photos of war-related events, even though the very same pictures were widely displayed in Pyongyang. Simics also stressed that the relationship between the North Koreans and the Soviet Embassy was “of a wholly different nature.”¹⁶

Throughout the 1950s the leaders of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP], compelled to provide Soviet and Chinese diplomats with confidential information, apparently compensated by curtailing as much as possible the freedom of action of the East European embassies. China pursued a similar policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its satellites. In 1951 Beijing forced the recall of Czechoslovak Ambassador Weisskopf and expelled a Polish diplomat, Lewandowski. In the mid-1950s the PRC did its best to increase its trade with the USSR and the Asian non-Communist countries, but cut back its exports to East Europe in order to retain more agricultural products for domestic consumption.¹⁷

Kim Il Sung’s tight control over North Korean society was one of the factors that enabled him to keep the “fraternal” Communist states at arm’s length. DPRK authorities, like their counterparts in China, limited their citizens’ contacts with foreign embassies to prevent the latter from recruiting clients, confidants, and informants. They also attempted to keep their intra-party affairs secret. As the purge of Communists of South Korean origin gathered momentum in November 1952, the Foreign Ministry emphatically told Hungarian diplomats not to visit anyone without prior approval from of the ministry.¹⁸ (By and large, the North Vietnamese authorities did not resort to such measures until July 1963.¹⁹) Domestic despotism thus became a diplomatic tool.

In fact, North Korean despotism had few equals in Eastern Europe.²⁰ With the possible exception of Tito’s Yugoslavia, nowhere else did a leadership cult emerge as quickly as in North Korea. In 1946 the regime named the country’s sole university for Kim Il Sung, and in 1947 it established schools for the orphans of revolutionary martyrs in Man’gyongdae, Kim’s home village.²¹ By contrast, the Hungarian dictator Mátyás Rákosi, hardly an opponent of a personality cult, never took comparable measures. In Romania, the cult of Gheorge Gheorghiu-Dej bloomed only in 1952. In January

ereignty. "It is customary in Korea that they speak little about the party in the presence of foreigners," Szarvas noted in December 1954.²⁸ In contrast, on 25 November 1955 the North Vietnamese Deputy Premier Nguyn Duy Trinh willingly provided Hungarian diplomats with highly confidential information about the number of recently expelled party members and the social composition of the membership.²⁹

After the armistice was signed in July 1953, North Korean security organs gained the right to subject Chinese soldiers to identity checks.³⁰ Moreover, in the fall of 1954 the Foreign Ministry began to replace the embassies' Korean employees very frequently in order to prevent the latter from becoming loyal to their foreign employers. On 21 October 1954 Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev told Szarvas "one may raise the issue of ... the Korean employees in the Foreign M[inistry], but in any case they will reply that the replacement of the employees occurred for political reasons."³¹ The North Korean authorities knew that the diplomats were neither willing nor able to verify the unspecified charges the Foreign Ministry's Cadre Department brought against the dismissed employees. Little by little, the North Korean

industry in China from 1951 on.⁴⁴) When Poland undertook to construct a plant for repairing freight cars, the North Koreans asked Warsaw to build a factory large enough to meet the demands of a united Korea. Finally the Poles persuaded them to abandon the idea.⁴⁵ The Rhee regime also linked its economic policies with the goal of unification, albeit in a rather different way. Power production, for instance, got little emphasis on the grounds that there would eventually be supplies from the North.⁴⁶

While the Kremlin did not hesitate to unseat the local “little Stalins” in Hungary and Bulgaria in 1956, it acted otherwise in North Korea.

Soviet-North Korean disagreements over economic issues culminated in an open conflict in mid-1955. Pyongyang responded to the poor rice harvest of 1954, which had been caused by adverse weather, by squeezing an even larger percentage of the crop from the peasants. The leadership also resolved to speed up collectivization and prohibited private trade in grain. North Korean authorities, as Soviet Counselor A. M. Petrov reported, often “took as much as 50 per cent of the poor crop [...] from the peasantry by brute force.” As a consequence, the DPRK faced a serious food crisis in the first half of 1955. The system of non-rationed food-supply ceased to function, and in certain regions there were deaths from starvation. Comparable CCP policies, by contrast, did not affect urban consumers to the same extent, since Chinese agriculture was in better condition at the outset of collectivization than was that of war-torn North Korea, which proved simply unable to bear the burden the government placed on it.⁴⁷ Soviet diplomats harshly criticized the regime’s disas-

airline to the DPRK.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, in contrast to Beijing and Hanoi, Pyongyang failed to establish any contact with Belgrade in the Khrushchev era.⁵¹ Moreover, the reconciliation between Moscow and Pyongyang was soon disrupted by the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

The August Plenum and its Consequences

Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 certainly worried Kim Il Sung. Though some aspects of Kim's cult of personality were toned down in the following months, the North Korean press did not directly criticize the phenomenon as such.⁵² To the chagrin of Soviet Ambassador Ivanov, at the 3rd KWP Congress the leadership stuck to the policy of rapid industrialization and economic autarky, and barely laid any emphasis on the improvement of living standards.⁵³ The spirit of the 20th Party Congress had no substantial effect on North Korean domestic policies. By contrast, CCP leaders were much less reluctant to follow Khrushchev's example. By May 1956, the Chinese Foreign Ministry had become more willing to provide the Communist embassies with information. In June the PRC adopted a conciliatory policy toward Taiwan.⁵⁴ Security precautions aimed at protecting high-ranking officials were greatly relaxed.⁵⁵ Mao's 10-point program placed a substantial emphasis on improving peasants' living standards. The party encouraged the children of "bourgeois" families to apply for admission to the universities.⁵⁶ Whereas in December 1955 the CCP had characterized Confucius' teachings as thoroughly reactionary, four months later the Deputy Foreign Minister called him "a great thinker, politician, and philosopher."⁵⁷ From 1954-1956 those Soviet and East European diplomats who harshly criticized North Korean policies often praised the correctness of Chinese measures, indicating that in this period the Soviets considered the North Koreans less cooperative than the Chinese (see Documents No. 9 and 10).⁵⁸

By the end of 1955 the North Koreans had used up most of the bulk of Soviet aid and they had received Chinese aid.⁵⁹ In the summer of 1956 the KWP leadership concluded that the country would need aid at least until 1958, and consequently dispatched a delegation led by Kim Il Sung to the USSR and Eastern Europe. The North Koreans seem to have been aware that the Kremlin's disapproved of their economic policies, since Nam Il informed the Romanian Ambassador before the delegation departed that they would ask for consumer goods instead of technical assistance. The visit proved quite successful. The Soviets granted a further 300 million rubles in aid to the DPRK, and cancelled a debt of 570 million rubles.⁶⁰ Though the CPSU leaders may have criticized Kim's policies during the negotiations, in the end they decided to fulfill his request. While the Kremlin did not hesitate to unseat the local "little Stalins" in Hungary and Bulgaria in 1956, it acted otherwise in North Korea. The Soviets supported Kim Il Sung quite reluctantly, and repeatedly interfered in his policies, but they did not attempt to replace him. This crucial difference between Eastern Europe and the DPRK effectively sealed the fate of those KWP leaders who dared to criticize Kim at the famous August CC plenum.

The "conspiracy" of Pak Ch'ang-ok, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, and others, which culminated in their open attack on the dictator's policies on 30-31 August 1956, was a desperate attempt to turn the tide rather than a serious challenge to Kim's rule. As early as mid-1955 most ministerial posts of crucial importance were held by Kim loyalists like Pang Hak-se (Interior), Ch'oe Yong-gon (Defense), Nam Il (Foreign Affairs), Yi Chu-yon (Finance), Chong Il-yong (Metallurgical Industry), Chong Chun-t'aek (Chemical Industry), Yi Chong-ok (Light Industry), and Kim Il (Agriculture). Thus, Kim Il Sung's critics, despite their high party ranks, had already become marginalized to a considerable extent.⁶¹

The unprecedented cooperation between the Soviet and Yan'an Koreans may have been due to their realization of the gravity of the situation. Outnumbered in the Standing Committee and the CC, they had little chance to prevail over the dictator. They may also have made some tactical mistakes. Pak Ch'ang-ok allegedly wanted to read an 80-page speech describing the errors the leadership had committed. Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik characterized Japanese-trained intellectuals such as Chong Il-yong and the new intelligentsia created by the Communist regime as reactionaries and boors, respectively.⁶² Since Kim Il Sung had cultivated contacts with both groups in order to offset the expertise of the Soviet and Yan'an Koreans, Ch'oe had good reason to criticize them. By doing so, however, he became even more isolated. Kim's critics also pointed out that the government should have devoted greater care to the improvement of living standards. Kim skillfully countered this charge by enumerating the achievements of his recent visit to the Communist countries, and promising economic reforms. Already before the CC plenum, the regime had resolved to cut the price of some consumer goods, raise wages, and reduce agricultural taxes.⁶³ On 20 August Ivanov told Hungarian Ambassador Károly Práth that the cult of Kim Il Sung had recently decreased significantly.⁶⁴ Thus, the action of Pak Ch'ang-ok and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik proved rather ill-timed.

Kim Il Sung promptly purged his challengers, but his repressive measures provoked a joint Soviet-Chinese intervention. Most probably, Moscow and Beijing interpreted the purge as a manifestation of North Korean nationalism and willfulness. According to the memoirs of Albanian Enver Hoxha, at that time Boris Ponomarev Head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, told him "things are not going very well with the Koreans. They have become very stuck-up and ought to be brought down a peg or two."⁶⁵ In 1955 Kim had skillfully exploited the rivalry between the Soviet and Yan'an Koreans, and his purges did not affect the two groups simultaneously. By contrast, in August 1956 he clamped down on both factions, and this act of repression, which ran counter to the new trend in Soviet and Chinese policies, could not pass unnoticed. Following a visit by Anastas Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, on 23 September the purged leaders were readmitted to the CC. The Soviets and the Chinese were content with restoring the status quo ante;⁶⁶ it was the purge, rather than Kim Il Sung's rule as such, that they disapproved of.

Ch'ollima movement, a campaign the regime launched in order to speed up economic development, repressive measures were often motivated by the leadership's desire to find scapegoats to blame for the economic problems. The foreign advisers working in the DPRK could not persuade the leadership to set reasonable production targets, and if they complained of any mismanagement or deficiency, the authorities clamped down on some hapless Korean engineer or official in order to demonstrate their willingness to listen to Soviet advice. In mid-1958 the Soviets pointed out that a number of machines sent by the "fraternal" countries stood idle, whereupon the leadership promptly replaced two deputy ministers in the Ministry of Engineering Industry.⁸³ At the same time, the slow pace of the construction of a machine-tool factory led to debates between the Hungarian specialists and the North Koreans. The Hungarians failed to deliver certain facilities in time, but they managed to put the blame for the delay on the Koreans by emphasizing that the Korean technicians had not received further vocational training in Hungary. In turn, the DPRK authorities launched an investigation, suspecting the Korean engineers of sabotage.⁸⁴

To be sure, the conflicts between North Koreans and foreign advisers were not provoked exclusively by the former. In December 1950 the Hungarian Embassy in Beijing reported that two members of the Hungarian medical team in Korea were notorious drunkards, while two others treated Koreans rudely and contemptuously.⁸⁵ The Hungarian technicians often failed to take the inexperience of the North Korean engineers and directors into consideration. The embassy repeatedly castigated them for their intolerant and arrogant attitude. In 1957 the DPRK authorities told a Hungarian specialist not to prolong his stay, for his Korean colleagues were not satisfied with him.⁸⁶

Hungarian professors highlighted the extraordinary diligence of their North Korean students.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, at the end of 1956 the DPRK recalled most of its students from the "fraternal" countries, even though they had not yet completed their studies. (By contrast, neither Beijing nor Hanoi resorted to similar measures at that time.⁸⁸) Since their experiences abroad made several students critical of North Korean conditions, in 1957-1958 many former students were neither allowed to correspond with foreigners nor appointed to positions worthy of their qualifications.⁸⁹ Those who could participate in production often lacked practical experience. Although the leadership did its best to prolong the stay of the foreign specialists, the shortage of skilled labor proved an insuperable obstacle. As Foreign Minister Chong Il-yong pointed out in 1958, nearly every iron-casting till that had been produced was faulty. However, the leadership, fully aware of the difficulties but preferring quantity to quality, pressed on with mass production.⁹⁰

The *Ch'ollima* campaign required enormous efforts of the hard-pressed population. North Korea already faced a labor shortage as early as 1946,⁹¹ and the war of 1950-53 diminished the population by a substantial percentage.⁹² Since men were mobilized for urban reconstruction, in the mid-1950s some 70 to 80 percent of the agricultural workforce was com-

posed of women and children.⁹³ "It is a common scene that a young girl of twelve to thirteen is operating sophisticated machines," a Hungarian diplomat noted.⁹⁴ The regime's solution to the labor shortage was the massive use of "voluntary work." In addition to the 8-hour workday, people had to do 4 to 5 hours of unpaid work every day, not counting political meetings. At the end of 1958 foreign advisers noted that workers and officials did their best to wriggle out of "voluntary work," though they did not dare to criticize it openly. Political meetings met with near-complete indifference.⁹⁵

On the other hand, cadres were extremely proud of the DPRK's economic achievements. Although in 1958 Kim Il Sung personally asked the diplomatic corps for economic assistance, party propaganda systematically downplayed the role the "fraternal" countries played in the modernization of the DPRK. Some high-ranking party officials boasted that North Korea would catch up with Czechoslovakia by 1960. Information about the achievements of the other "people's democracies" was withheld from the population, and when-

Plan Pyongyang launched in 1961 set the production of electric locomotives and steam turbines as an aim. North Korean technological standards hardly rendered that possible, since even the steel and firebrick the DPRK produced for export was of inferior quality. However uneconomical the non-series production of sophisticated machines was, the regime made import substitution a matter of principle.⁹⁹

Kim's concern about Pyongyang's international prestige explained both his eagerness to invite Khrushchev to

had been exhausting for the workers.¹⁰³ Following the June CC plenum, the North Korean media admitted that "the relationship between the government organs and the masses has worsened" in the recent period.¹⁰⁴ On 10 December Yi Chong-ok told the diplomatic corps that the regime's over-emphasis on industrialization and urban construction had deprived agriculture of labor, while the authorities proved incapable of providing the swollen urban population with food and flats. As a consequence, a "tense atmosphere" had

As early as August 1959 Hungarian diplomats noted that the North Korean leaders "may harbor an idea that the division of Korea was caused by the Soviet Union, and thus its unification also depends solely on it."

the DPRK and his anger about the cancellation of the visit. In February 1959 Khrushchev allegedly promised Kim that he would visit North Korea that fall. The North Koreans took it for granted that the promise would be fulfilled. Although Soviet Ambassador Puzanov repeatedly stated that he did not know when the visit would take place, the North Koreans busily prepared for it from June on. In October Khrushchev told Kim that he would not visit the DPRK after all. This left the KWP leaders with the awkward task of turning the celebration into a non-event. The Soviets did not make it easier for them. "They have only themselves to blame if they were offended by that, as they make their bed so they must lie on it, they must realize that in the present international situation Comrade Khrushchev's visit to Korea would further increase, rather than ease, the tension," Soviet diplomats told their Hungarian colleagues.¹⁰⁰

The cancellation of Khrushchev's visit occurred immediately after his visit to the United States. At first Pyongyang attempted to pass over the latter event in silence, but the Soviet Embassy forced the North Korean media to deal "appropriately" with the visit (see Document No. 14). On 12 September, three days before the Soviet leader left for the US, Pyongyang had sided with China with regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute. This may have been a veiled expression of Kim's dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's foreign policy, since as late as 31 August the DPRK Ambassador to Budapest emphasized that North Korea's relations with India were improving. He also stated that Pyongyang intended to carry on with this policy.¹⁰¹

Breezes of Reform in North Korea

In May 1959 the KWP leaders asked the Kremlin to postpone the repayment of the credit the DPRK had received from the USSR, declaring that they intended to improve the living standards of the population. The Soviets consented to a four-year postponement.¹⁰² On 8 May, Kim Il Sung informed a Hungarian party delegation that the leadership wanted to designate 1960 as a "buffer year," because the last three years

developed. The December CC plenum had resolved to re-examine the regime's economic policies. While in January the Hungarian diplomats had thought it likely that the government would eliminate the household plots of the peasantry by the end of 1959, now the leadership decided not to resort to such measures.¹⁰⁵

The Soviets welcomed these changes, but the DPRK's new economic course also included measures that did not please the "fraternal" countries. In 1959 the export of certain agricultural products was halted in order to retain them for domestic consumption, causing a foreign trade deficit. Pyongyang then drastically cut back its imports in order to restore the balance of trade. At the end of 1959 several East European trade delegations arrived in the DPRK. Though the North Koreans had originally intended to halve the volume of their foreign trade, they finally yielded to the East Europeans' pressure. While imports fell to a large extent in 1960, the overall reduction proved quite insignificant. The volume of agricultural exports decreased, while the importation of agricultural products and food increased.¹⁰⁶

Since the DPRK leadership considered the shortage of skilled labor very grave, it felt compelled to relax certain discriminatory rules. In April 1959 Kim Il Sung declared that the country should involve "useful elements" of the pre-1945 intelligentsia in the modernization of the country, rather than slight and alienate them.¹⁰⁷ From mid-1959 on, the authorities permitted Hungarian-trained North Koreans to contact the Hungarian Embassy, and many of them were given jobs worthy of their qualifications.¹⁰⁸ "Communist universities" were set up in order to teach technical skills to persons of South Korean origin, who had hitherto been discriminated against. The repatriation of Koreans from Japan in 1959-1960 was also motivated, among other things, by Kim's desire to recruit skilled labor (see Documents No. 15, 18, and 19).

Preparations for Unification

On 8 May 1959 Kim Il Sung told a Hungarian party delegation that by 1958 the DPRK had become "strong enough"

to receive the Koreans willing to leave Japan.¹⁰⁹ The rapid development of North Korean industry also made the KWP leaders think that Pyongyang would soon overtake Seoul in every respect. Indeed, in 1958 the South Korean economy entered a period of stagnation. US aid flows began to decust008 Tcom91625 e the KWP

was delayed. On 26 August the DPRK Ambassador to Budapest declared that if a third state proposed the simultaneous admission of the DPRK and the ROK to the UN, Pyongyang would not object (see Documents No. 20, 22, and 23). On 5 April 1961, Paek Chong-won stated that the DPRK would agree to the admission of both Koreas to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and as late as 15 June he still stressed that North Korea would eventually become a member of the UN.¹²²

Pyongyang's acceptance of the admission of both Koreas to international organizations shows that the aforesaid proposals were not merely propaganda exercises. Since Beijing and Hanoi consistently rejected any similar suggestions concerning Taipei and Saigon, respectively, the idea of simultaneous admission should not be taken lightly. Moreover, North Korean domestic policies also seem to have been influenced by the prospect of cooperation with Seoul. Pyongyang took various steps to reassure southern public opinion. In March 1961 the DPRK Ambassador to Prague stated that it was high time to improve the quality of North Korean consumer goods, for if the South Koreans visited the North, these products would hardly make a good impression on them.¹²³ Following the April Revolution, the leadership repeatedly called upon cadres not to resort to oppressive measures. Forced resettlement from the capital came to a temporary halt. Still, real de-Stalinization remained out of the question, since Kim Il Sung regarded the overwhelming majority of the population as potential suspects (see Documents No. 21 and 25). The accelerated recruitment of southern-born cadres, whose future task was to deal with local administration in the South, indicated that Pyongyang's ultimate aim was the establishment of a Communist regime in South Korea.

The DPRK and the Sino-Soviet Rift

The April Revolution coincided with the first open Sino-Soviet clashes, and influenced the DPRK's reaction to the latter. Since the new leaders in Seoul repudiated Rhee's commitment to military unification, the prospect of a rapprochement between North and South temporarily convinced Kim Il Sung of the usefulness of Soviet diplomatic methods, and he eagerly adopted Khrushchev's confederation plan. On the other hand, Beijing probably considered Kim's acceptance of the admission of both Koreas to the UN a dangerous precedent. On 1 July 1960 the Czechoslovak Ambassador told Práth that Pyongyang had recently moved a bit closer to the Soviet standpoint, while Chinese influence in the DPRK was decreasing (see Document No. 17). Nonetheless, Kim's attempts to make a good impression on South Korean public opinion were not always welcomed in Moscow. Aware of being regarded in the ROK as Soviet puppets, the KWP leaders reinforced nationalist propaganda. Following the April Revolution, North Korean music broadcasts seldom included foreign compositions.¹²⁴ Pyongyang did its best to hide the fact that it had received aid from the "fraternal" countries. Nationalist propaganda and the condemnation of "flunkeyism" also served as a means to isolate the North

Korean population from the effects of the Sino-Soviet rift. Following the withdrawal of Soviet advisers from the PRC, the regime took measures to prevent its citizens from visiting the foreign embassies (see Document No. 23).¹²⁵

Although Kim Il Sung was hardly fond of Khrushchev, he had good reason not to give Beijing his full support. In October 1960 a Chinese delegation headed by He Long tried to win Pyongyang over to China's cause, but the attempt ended in failure. In fact, in early 1961 a certain tension appeared in Sino-North Korean relations. The KWP leaders were clearly aware of the PRC's economic difficulties (see Document No. 24). In 1960 Pyongyang purchased 300,000 metric tons of grain from the USSR, whereas China proved incapable of exporting grain to the DPRK.¹²⁶ Due to the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward, by September 1961 some 30,000 Koreans had fled Manchuria, seeking refuge in the DPRK.¹²⁷ On 5 February 1961 a section head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry told a Hungarian diplomat that while in North Korea the correct policies of the KWP had more or less solved the problems of agriculture, this was not the case in South Korea and China.¹²⁸

In fact, Kim Il Sung had little inclination to look up to the CCP leaders. "These Chinese are too sluggish. If I had only one division, I could destroy the Central [Nationalist] Army right now," Kim had commented regarding the CCP's efforts in 1946.¹²⁹ In August 1957 Kim told Práth that the DPRK's rice crop was 300 kilograms per capita, while in the PRC it never exceeded 200 kilograms per capita.¹³⁰ From 1958 on, Pyongyang began to downplay the military and economic assistance it had received from China since 1950.¹³¹ Although the North Korean and Chinese regimes had much in common, their policies were often nonetheless dissimilar. In 1954-1955 KWP cadres emphasized that there was no need to launch an

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since in some cases the adoption of foreign patents would have been more economical.¹³⁶ By contrast, at the 4th KWP Congress in September, Deng Xiaoping explicitly appealed to Korean nationalism. “The Chinese leaders must learn from the Korean leaders,” he declared, calling Koreans a “mighty people of 30 million.” This certainly pleased Pyongyang. Deng’s words were often quoted in intra-party propaganda.¹³⁷

Confrontation with Seoul and Moscow

Much to the Soviets’ surprise, on 16 May 1961 Deputy Foreign Minister Kim T’ae-hui told the foreign ambassadors

assumed an interstate character. On 3 December all Soviet diplomats were recalled from Tirana. Henceforth Kim took the Soviet attack on Stalinism personally. As he put it at a CC plenum held in March 1962, “we must prepare for the contingency that the Soviet Union will cast us aside in the same way as it did Albania.” (see Documents No. 27 and 30).¹⁴⁶

On 10 December Radio Pyongyang ceased to broadcast the Korean language programs of Radio Moscow. The post office withheld those copies of *Pravda* and *Kommunist* that dealt with the issue of Stalinism.¹⁴⁷ The diplomatic corps was told that from 1 January 1962 on, foreigners were forbidden

Since Khrushchev did not hesitate to resort to ultimatums and threats in order to solve the German question, one may conclude that in 1959-60 the different priorities of Soviet and North Korean foreign policy played a more important role in Soviet-DPRK friction than the conflict between Soviet “peaceful co-existence and North Korean belligerence.

that Park’s coup was a favorable development.¹³⁸ As did certain US observers, some KWP leaders considered Park, who had been arrested by the Rhee regime for his role in a 1948 rebellion, to be a leftist. Park’s initial policies apparently confirmed this view.¹³⁹ Pyongyang, prepared for all emergencies, put the KPA on alert, but considered the South Korean situation rather unstable. On 15 June Paek Chong-won highlighted Park’s conflict with Chang Do-young, calling it a clash of pro-Japanese and pro-US officers.¹⁴⁰ In September Pyongyang asked the Hungarian press not to criticize the southern leaders too harshly.¹⁴¹ As recently disclosed South Korean sources attest, at that time secret talks took place between the two regimes. Since these meetings proved fruitless, Kim Il Sung lost his patience. On October 2 Yu Chang-sik stated that because Park had cracked down on the southern proponents of unification, Kim dropped the matter of DPRK-ROK cooperation.¹⁴² Following Park’s visit to the US, the northern media began to attack him by name.¹⁴³

Having failed to establish contacts with Seoul, Kim lost his interest in the “peaceful co-existence” proposed by Khrushchev. The 22nd CPSU Congress, with its renewed emphasis on de-Stalinization, also alarmed him. Still, at first Pyongyang seems to have tried to avoid an open confrontation with Moscow. During the Soviet-DPRK “month of friendship” (15 October-15 November), both sides stressed the importance of cooperation, and the North Koreans spoke about their economic problems with remarkable frankness.¹⁴⁴ Although at the end of October a few Albanian students arrived in the DPRK, North Korean students were told not to put questions to them about the Soviet-Albanian dispute.¹⁴⁵ On 27 November Kim Il Sung forbade party members to discuss Stalinism and the “Albanian question.” However, the inter-party conflict between Khrushchev and Hoxha soon

to visit the three southernmost provinces without special permission.¹⁴⁸ In January Pyongyang flatly refused to sell copper and salt to the GDR, though the latter badly needed these materials.¹⁴⁹ From February on, intra-party lectures criticized Soviet policies and the COMECON. A wave of repression swept the party and state apparatus, and the half-hearted office withseems3.0.8g fla(0.0behav48.4seef 92 Tcim ie put0be

venting the Kremlin from playing off his fellow Politburo members against him. In addition, the Soviet aid program had come to an end. Kim continued to press Moscow for economic and military assistance, but he was less and less willing to offer anything in return. In 1961 Pyongyang failed to meet its foreign trade obligations to Moscow, whereupon the North Koreans asked the Soviets to cancel their debt. As they put it, "Your country is rich, you can afford that."¹⁷³ This attitude was combined with a feeling of superiority. As

1955, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00608/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 August 1954, KA, 11. doboz, 25/b, 09479/1954.

¹³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 13 September 1954, KA, 6. doboz, 11/h, 09481/1954.

¹⁴ Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 23 December 1956, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00608/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 21 April 1956, KTS, 11. doboz, 25/b, 004441/1956.

¹⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 August 1954, KA, 11. doboz, 25/b, 09479/1954.

¹⁶ Hungarian Legation to the PRC, Report, 23 August 1950, XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents] Kína 1945-1964 [henceforth CTS], 10. doboz, 5/f, 001503/1950; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 20 December 1950, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 01075/1951.

¹⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 29 January 1951, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 028286/1951; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 8 April 1952, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 00875/1952; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 18 March 1955, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 003989/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 21 January 1955, CTS, 10. doboz, 5/f, 003995/1955.

¹⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 25 November 1952, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 013952/1952.

¹⁹ Hungarian Legation to the DRV, Report, 16 August 1963, XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents] Vietnam 1945-1964 [henceforth VTS], 3. doboz, 5/a, 006368/1963.

²⁰ On the other hand, the North Korean land reform of 1945-1946 proved less violent than the ones carried out by the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communist regimes. See Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 414-417.

²¹ Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 27 October 1951, KA, 9. doboz, 18/g, 01939/1952.

²² Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 7 October 1953, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 011216/1953; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 29 November 1956, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 1/25-5/1957; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 8 April 1952, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 00875/1952; Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 21 July 1955, VTS, 4. doboz, 5/c, 007961/1955.

²³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 18 June 1953, KA, 10. doboz, 18/i, 001404/1953. On the 1945-1950 period, see Charles K. Armstrong, "Surveillance and Punishment in Postliberation North Korea," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* Vol. 3 (Winter 1995), No. 3, pp. 695-722; Jeon Hyun Soo, *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie preobrazovaniia v Severnoi Koree v usloviakh sovetskoi voennoi administratsii 1945-1948* (Moscow: Drevo Zhizni, 1997); Erik van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone. Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947* (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989).

²⁴ Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 19 July 1952, KTS, 3. doboz, 4/bc, 001024/2/1952.

²⁵ Kathryn Weathersby, "Deceiving the Deceivers," p. 180.

²⁶ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 August 1953, KA, 1. doboz, 1/b, 02199/2/1953.

²⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 15 April 1954,

DPRK, Report, 17 August 1955, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 008014/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 24 August 1955, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 008016/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 December 1955, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00608/1956.

⁴⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 6 May 1955, KTS, 12. doboz, 27/a, 006063/1955.

⁵⁰ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 19 October 1955, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 006044/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 31 August 1955, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 008020/1/1955.

⁵¹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 February 1960, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 001668/1960; Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 8 February 1956, VTS, 2. doboz, 5/a, 003065/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 9 September 1957, VTS, 3. doboz, 5/b, 004730/1957.

⁵² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 19 April 1956, KTS, 12. doboz, 27/a, 004436/1956.

⁵³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 October 1956, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 20440/1/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 4 June 1956, KTS, 12. doboz, 27/a, 003127/1956.

⁵⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 9 May 1956, CTS, 6. doboz, 5/b, 005760/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 24 May 1956, CTS, 7. doboz, 5/c, 005813/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 16 August 1956, CTS, 13. doboz, 11/f, 006693/1956. On Chinese reactions to the 20th Congress, Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, "The Emerging Disputes Between Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996).

⁵⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 17 July 1956, CA, 17. doboz, 22/a, 006713/1956.

⁵⁶ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 8 June 1956, CTS, 7. doboz, 5/bc, 005769/1956.

⁵⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 23 May 1956, CTS, 9. doboz, 5/e, 005774/1956.

⁵⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 24 May 1955, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 006053/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 1 July 1955, KA, 12. doboz, 28/c, 008024/1955.

⁵⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 December 1955, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00608/1956.

⁶⁰ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Annual Report, 28 May 1957, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 002749/1957; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 17 September 1956, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 007219/1956; Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK, Report, 10 June 1956, KTS, 12. doboz, 25/j, 005594/1956.

⁶¹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Annual Report, 26 February 1955, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 004076/1955.

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⁹¹ Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War II*, p. 336.

⁹² Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, *The Population of North Korea* (Berkeley: University of California, 1992), p. 32.

⁹³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 10 May 1955, KA, 11. doboz, 22/a, 006049/1955.

⁹⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 9 February 1955, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 004063/1955.

⁹⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Annual Report, 24 February 1959, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 002242/1959; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 4 June 1959, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b, 004529/1959.

⁹⁶ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Annual Report, 24 February 1959, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 002242/1959; Hungarian Embassy

KTS, 8. doboz, 5/f, 0041/RT/1961.

¹³⁹ On Park's coup and its reception in the U.S., see Mark L. Clifford, *Troubled Tiger. Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea* (Armonk-London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 36-39.

¹⁴⁰ Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 17 June 1961, KTS, 3. doboz, 4/af, 003159/6/1961; Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 22 June 1961, KTS, 3. doboz, 4/af, 003159/7/1961.

¹⁴¹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 24 September 1961, KA, 8. doboz, 15/b, 1/25/34-1/1961.

¹⁴² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 17 October 1961, KA, 1. doboz, 1/c, 1/25/46-1/1961.

¹⁴³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 15 November 1961, KA, 8. doboz, 15/b, 3/25/3-1/1962.

¹⁴⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 21 November 1961, KA, 11. doboz, 21/c, 1127/1961.

¹⁴⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 1 November 1961, KTS, 10. doboz, 17/d, 008662/1961.

¹⁴⁶ The slogan 'Arms in the one hand and a hammer and sickle in the other!', which cropped up in December 1962, was adopted from the Albanians. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, January 1963, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a, 00380/1963.

¹⁴⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 February 1962, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a, 002307/1962.

¹⁴⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 20 January 1962, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/g, 002299/1962.

¹⁴⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 February 1962, KTS, 11. doboz, 25/b, 002290/1962.

¹⁵⁰ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 25 January 1962, CTS, 8. doboz, 5/c, 002045/1962; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 15 January 1962, CTS, 17. doboz, 27/a, 002068/1962.

¹⁵¹ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 30 May 1962, CTS, 6. doboz, 5/b, 002053/1/1962; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 9 April 1962, CA, 18. doboz, 22/a, 004123/1962.

¹⁵² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 6 April 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/b, 004106/1962; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 April 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/b, 004105/1962.

¹⁵³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 29 April 1962, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/f, 004855/1/1962.

¹⁵⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 January 1963, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b, 00385/1963.

¹⁵⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 June 1962, KTS, 9. doboz, 11/f, 006076/1962.

¹⁵⁶ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 July 1962, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/b, 006413/1962; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 February 1962, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a, 002307/1962.

¹⁵⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 6 May 1962, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/i, 004856/1962.

¹⁵⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 27 October

1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0081/RT/1962.

¹⁵⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 2 November 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 004105/1/1/1962.

¹⁶⁰ Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, November 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0085/RT/1962.

¹⁶¹ Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Report, 25 January 1964, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b, 001400/1/1964.

¹⁶² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 11 May 1963, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/g, 004161/1/1963; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 September 1963, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/g, 006728/1963.

¹⁶³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 1 February 1963, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0012/RT/1963.

¹⁶⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 January 1963, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a, 00398/1963.

¹⁶⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 22 June 1963, KTS, 13. doboz, 30/b, 005273/1963.

¹⁶⁶ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 18 May 1959, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 004528/1959; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 18 October 1964, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 004087/1/1964.

¹⁶⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 15 May 1964, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 004090/1964.

¹⁶⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 June 1962, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/f, 006081/1962; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 May 1963, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b, 0022/RT/1963.

¹⁶⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 May 1961, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 004516/1961.

¹⁷⁰ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Study, June 1964, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b, 001400/3/1964.

¹⁷¹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 10 November 1962, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/f, 008695/1962.

¹⁷² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 29 October 1959, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 006840/1959.

¹⁷³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 19 January 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 002255/1962.

¹⁷⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 9 June 1960, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 004823/1960.

¹⁷⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 May 1964, KTS, 10. doboz, 17/d, 004091/1964.

¹⁷⁶ The term 'national solipsism' was coined by Bruce Cumings. See *Origins of the Korean War II*, pp. 305-316.

¹⁷⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 17 January 1964, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 001770/1964.

¹⁷⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 28 July 1964,

[DPRK] Foreign Ministry of this place did not give its permission. Now and then I met the members of the Academy in passing. They always invited me, and on occasion they even asked me for a meeting over the phone. Thus, the Foreign Ministry has created an impossible situation [...] It should have ascertained long ago whether the delegation from the Academy, which was to visit the Soviet Union, intended to visit us [Hungary] or not. By order of the Center, we invited this delegation as recently as half a year ago, completely in conformity with the rules, through a verbal note. The invitation had been a great pleasure for the scientists, but because the delegation did not leave [for the Soviet Union], we had to wait. Due to the absence of contacts, we were not able to learn when this delegation would leave; it left in the middle of December. In giving reasons for not permitting the meeting, the Foreign Ministry came up with the argument that at present the scientific cadres were working in the countryside. During a conversation I remarked that I had seen these cadres in Pyongyang, whereupon they replied that these cadres may have been at home, but the secretary of the Academy had left for the Soviet Union [...]

On 21 December [...] I was suddenly invited to the Academy through the F[oreign] M[inistry]. I met the Deputy Secretary-General, *Comrade Yi Chu-won* [emphasis in the original]. This meeting came in handy, for the exchange of agricultural experience should have been discussed with the Academy here long ago. On the grounds of a conversation in September, the Academy here has already sent samples of seed grain and silkworm. While at home [in Hungary], I reached an agreement with Comrade Osztrovszki about how we would give fruit stocks [...] in return. We will be too late to help before long, which [...] will endanger the excellent relationship we had established with the Academy of Sciences here during the war.

The meeting took place in the following manner [...] the head of the chemical branch [...] spoke of *the difficulties they had in the chemical field* [emphasis in the original]. True, by now they receive scientific journals from the Soviet Union and from us, but they have not gotten any Western scientific journals since 1945. During the war, they were isolated even from Soviet scientific literature [...] He asked me to send them copies of the following journals, or similar chemical journals, should there be the slightest chance of it [...]

- 1) *Chemical Abstracts* (USA)
- 2) *Industrial and Engineering Chemistry* [...]
- 3) *Journal of [the] American Chemical Society*
- 4) *Polymer Science*
- 5) *Modern Plastics*.

- 1) *Berichte [der] deutschen chemischen Gesellschaft* (West Germani...

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easily. It is doubtful, however, whether one could speak of a united Korea in such a case, and whether the unified Korean government could pursue coherent foreign and domestic policies, for, apart from the difficulties arising from the reconciliation of principles and interests, the opinion of the government of the dominion would be also a factor to be reckoned with.

[...]

Károly Pásztor
Envoy Extraordinary



DOCUMENT No. 4
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 18 December 1954

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 2. doboz, 2/b, 001118/1/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] the F[oreign] M[inistry] here quite mechanically turns a deaf ear to [the Hungarian proposal to] maintain a direct relationship with the [North Korean] party [...] the Korean comrades—I mean the comrades in the party—are a bit afraid of maintaining relations with the members of the foreign diplomatic corps. They are afraid and reserved. This is also noticeable on the occasion of receptions. [...] the leaders of the Korean Workers' Party show a certain reluctance to adopt the experiences of the parties of the fraternal countries. I think these problems would arise in the course of

DOCUMENT No. 5
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 26 February 1955

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 4. doboz, 5/a, 004076/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] Our Embassy has not managed to extend its contacts during 1954. [...] recently the Korean organs and the [North Korean] F[oreign] M[inistry] do not give us the assistance that is necessary for the normal pursuance of our activities here. As indicated in earlier reports as well, they are unwilling to establish contact between us and the party. Recently the F[oreign] M[inistry] sends its representative to each meeting, who participates in the conversation from beginning to end. These [measures] make the issue more difficult. They frequently keep delaying meetings and certain programs for weeks instead of organizing them. The ones that are more important for us are arranged only after a long time, while the less important ones are organized rather quickly. As a rule [the North Korean Foreign Ministry] wants to ensure that we do not maintain any personal contacts with the state organs of greater importance but [...] submit questions, to which they reply in weeks, not infrequently in months, in writing and, of course, in Korean. For our part we dared to raise these measures with the Korean Foreign Ministry only very cautiously, because we can see that they would like to curtail the operation and activity of the whole diplomatic corps and keep its operation under rather strict control. We discussed this issue with the Embassies of the other fraternal countries, and we have come to that conclusion. A change in this issue can be accomplished only through rather persistent efforts going into small details. One must also add to the whole question the fact that in the highest Korean state organs, there is a certain incomprehensible secret-mongering aimed at covering up mistakes and difficulties, not just toward the diplomatic corps but toward the Korean people too. Of course, this manifests itself much more sharply toward the diplomatic corps. This cannot be changed solely through the Foreign Ministry, as it is connected with the development of the Korean party and its ideological level, and, last but not least, with the issue of frankness. The latter, though it has improved tremendously since liberation, has not yet managed to completely overcome the effects of the Japanese oppression that lasted for several decades.

[...]

Pál Szarvas
Ambassador

DOCUMENT No. 6**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 13 April 1955**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 006054/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 12 April [...] I paid a visit to Soviet Counsellor A.M. Petrov. [...] I told him that I dealt with issues of internal politics, and since there were some issues I did not see clearly, I asked for his advice. These issues were the following: the absence of criticism and self-criticism in Korea, the unchanged personality cult, and secret-mongering. [...] In his view—he emphasized that this was his personal opinion—*criticism was directed primarily downwards, there was barely any criticism directed upwards* [emphasis in the original]. They speak about it, but they do not practice it, or rather it seems that it is only Comrade Kim Il-sung who practices it. The criticism that is heard is not public but exclusive. [...] In his view, it is a serious error that *Comrade Kim Il Sung is surrounded by bootlickers and careerists* [emphasis in the original]. They exploit, and rely on, the successes of reconstruction, which undoubtedly exist. Whatever is said by the leader, they accept without any dispute. Thus, the mistakes are not revealed openly, only in private and belatedly. No one has

DOCUMENT No. 8
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the

fertilizer and many consumer goods from the USA, which improved the conditions of the population to a certain extent. In addition, they harvest twice a year, and this also improves the economic situation. Of course, the material conditions are not improving for the entire population, but the situation

establish a grain basis in 2 to 3 years. In my view, the last plenum of the [Korean] Workers' Party dealt with these issues quite sharply. It specified the mistakes, and it also took steps along the state line in order to correct these excessive measures. There are difficulties in carrying out [the new instructions]. The composition of the state apparatus, the executive organs and the provincial party and state organs is extremely weak, they cannot cope with the tasks. The executive organs are quite bureaucratic and inflexible. Lately, a rather intense struggle goes on in order to change that, in the press and other fields. Hitherto, this has not yielded yet any visible results. Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke to me too about the cadres' lack of professional and political skills when he mentioned that "they are young and inexperienced". For our part, we have already stated several times that the Korean comrades wanted to solve the agricultural problem too quickly. Otherwise, this is confirmed by the experiences of the past winter when there were rather serious difficulties, and the latter were undoubtedly related to the quick pace of the reorganization of agriculture (it was too quick, 25 percent of the peasant farms joined cooperatives in a year). It is only now that they begin to intensely organize Machine-Tractor Stations. The cooperatives hitherto organized are still just slightly more productive than individual peasant farms. They do not exactly give more to the state [than the individual peasant farms]. Their work is easier. For the time being, the state cannot give them anything but a minor support. Therefore, it would be appropriate to strengthen the existent cooperatives for a time, and expand their network only later. In my judgment, this issue is one of the most pressing problems of agriculture. It coincides with the difficulties of [food] supply and deliveries, and, last but not least, the living standards of the population.



DOCUMENT No. 9
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1955

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 009565/4/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 10 October [...] I paid a visit to Comrade German Ambassador Richard Fischer [...]. Comrade Fischer spoke about the situation here, he told me that the situation here was completely different from that in China. When he arrived in Pyongyang last year and paid an introductory visit to Comrade Kim Il Sung, Comrade Kim Il Sung told him that he [Kim Il Sung] viewed him not as an ambassador but as a friend who came to help. Unfortunately, he has not experienced that everywhere, because the Korean comrades, whatever comes up, say yes to everything, including tasks which they certainly know they cannot carry out. In his opinion, friends could safely speak among themselves about the difficulties and shortcomings which naturally exist after such a destructive war. In his view, China is much ahead [of North Korea] also in this respect, people are much more frank and open there. Although there were backward conditions and a long dual oppression [in China] too, the Chinese leaders are wonderful, and the people follow them with complete confidence and enthusiasm. [...]

József Fűredi
 Chargé d' Affaires ad interim



DOCUMENT No. 10
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 28 December 1956

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 001016/2/1957. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 27th December this year, [...] Comrade Fűredi invited Macuch, the Counsellor of the Czechoslovak Embassy, to

The dialogue described above consisted of just one question and one reply. Comrade Yi Chu-yon tacitly acknowledged what had been said by Comrade Pelishenko.

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 12
Information Report Sent by Károly Fendler to Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, “Conversation with Comrade Kim, Interpreter of the Korean Embassy”, 30 October 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/af, 006373/1959. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

To Minister Endre Sík, D. Min. Károly Szarka.

On the evening of the 28th [...] I met Comrade Kim, the interpreter of the Korean Embassy with whom I have long had friendly relations. During the conversation, Comrade Kim mentioned the following:

[...] The head of the IVth Political Department [of the North Korean Foreign Ministry] told them that the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party “considered the situation as ripe for the unification of the country.

DOCUMENT No. 13
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 December 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 001711/1/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 10 December the [East] German Ambassador had a dinner party on the occasion of his departure. [...] I had a conversation with the Korean head of the Korean-Chinese Armistice Commission. I asked him whether the international détente was perceptible in Panmunjom too. He told me that it was not, because the Americans dropped perhaps an even larger number of agents behind North Korean lines than they had done before. The general expounded that they would soon put an end to the provocations of the Americans, because they “would unite Korea next year.” Then he spoke of the unity and correct policies of the Korean Workers’ Party as if it were the guarantee of the unification of the country. The general was obviously in a state of intoxication. Interestingly, the Polish member of the Neutral [Nations Supervisory] Commission was of the opinion that at present, the Americans were “silent” in Panmunjom.

[...]

Gábor Dobozi
Chargé d’ Affaires ad interim



DOCUMENT No. 14
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 December 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 11. doboz, 24/b, 001660/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] on 16 December I paid a visit to [Soviet] Comrade Yulin. During the conversation, several issues came up, on which I give the following information:

Comrade Yulin told me that the December plenum of the [Korean] Workers’ Party had placed very healthy proposals on the agenda, and it also appeared to the Soviet Ambassador that this plenum had actually begun to correct the errors committed in the last years. He agreed with me that the most important resolution had been one that dealt with the rapid development of mining. In his opinion, mining should have been developed earlier, because that would have largely solved the problems which have cropped up in the supply of raw materials and in foreign trade. With regard to that, the issue of North Korea’s foreign trade problems came up. Comrade Yulin mentioned that it caused very great difficulties in Soviet-Korean relations that the Korean comrades could not

send goods in return for [the goods they got from the Soviet Union], although the Soviet Union asked Korea for goods which every country gladly exported (e.g. vegetables, fruits,

DOCUMENT No. 16

Information Report Sent by Lajos Karsai to Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, “Visit of Korean Provisional Chargé d’Affaires Paek Chong-won,” 27 June 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/af, 005061/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

To Minister Endre Sík,
1st D. Minister János Péter,
D. Minister Károly Szarka,
Assistant Under-Secretary Márta Kolozs,
Departmental Head János Radványi,
Departmental Head Péter Várkonyi.

On 23 June of this year [...] I sent for Comrade Paek Chong-won, the DPRK’s Provisional Chargé d’Affaires in Budapest.

[...]

With regard to the *South Korean*

million peasant families registered in South Korea, and 70.5 per cent of them own no more than 1.5 chongbo (approx. 1 Hungarian acre) per family. In South Korea, the oppression of the peasantry takes place primarily in an indirect way, that is, through the landlords. Therefore, the main thrust of peasant discontent is directed against the landlords instead of the government. [...]

Since 1 May, a qualitative change has taken place in the South Korean mass protests. According to the news, workers' strikes have become increasingly frequent. Their main demands are the observance of the eight-hour workday and rising wages. All kinds of parties are mushrooming, and they are demanding new parliamentary elections in addition to the new presidential election. The masses (now even the workers and the peasants) are pressing for punitive measures against Rheeist officials. A mass movement to take the Rheeist murderers to task is in the making in South Korea. Its initiators are the relatives of the slaughtered. [...] The movement started in Koch'ang district.

So far the Korean Workers' Party and the government of the DPRK have not supported any of the South Korean parties, they are just following their activity with close attention. [...] The transitional government, though it is barely different from that of Syngman Rhee in its composition and aims, no longer emphasizes the military unification of the country; it prefers unification through so-called "free elections" under UN supervision. "As is well-known, the government of the DPRK cannot agree with the idea of [holding] all-Korean elections under the aegis of the UN while it is in essence at war with the UN," Com. Paek Chong-won emphasized. Then he went on to say the following:

Now more and more people in South Korea are pressing for the establishment of postal, travel, economic, and cultural contacts between the South and the North. This mainly results from the fact that since the April events, more and more people in South Korea are listening to the North Korean broadcasts directed toward South Korea.

South Korean parliamentary elections are due to be held this July. Of the 233 seats in parliament, Syngman Rhee's Liberal Party has hitherto occupied 150 seats. In April, 110 Liberal deputies resigned their seats in the wake of the events.

The recently formed South Korean Renovation Party has begun to voice remarkable slogans:

- 1.) Free parliamentary elections!
- 2.) Rheeists—individuals who occupied important central or provincial posts under Syngman Rhee, i.e. police and military officers, officials, etc.—must not stand for election!
- 3.) Exchange of mail must be established between South and North Korea without delay!
- 4.) Negotiations must be started on the peaceful unification of the country!
- 5.) A joint South-North commission entrusted with entering into negotiations must be established!

- 6.) All Rheeist hirelings must be relieved of their posts!
[...]

Lajos Karsai



DOCUMENT No. 17
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 2 July 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 8. doboz, 5/f, 0029/RT/1960. Translated by József Litkei.]

On the morning of 1 July, Czechoslovak Ambassador Kohousek invited me for a friendly conversation during which we exchanged views on several issues concerning the DPRK's foreign and domestic policies and the general line of policy of the fraternal countries in the Far East.

On my part, I informed the Comrade Ambassador of the DPRK's Seven-year Plan and certain economic issues related to the June visit of Comrade Kim Il Sung in Moscow (see my other related reports). Concerning the latter issue, the Ambassador confidentially told me that according to the information received from Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, Comrade Khrushchev is going to visit Korea around 8-10 Sepp19 1442.9771Sd-0.0002 -see 6fiden-

there has been no change in the question of the communes and, for example, the principle of egalitarianism still prevails in the system of distribution practiced in the communes. According to the opinion of Comrade Kohousek, the idea of peaceful coexistence is somewhat unpopular among the people's democracies of the Far East, and this idea indeed has a real basis. After all, this principle means peaceful coexistence with US imperialism, which for any Chinese, Korean or Vietnamese is at least difficult to understand, given that for them the US represents their fiercest national enemy, which they are not willing to tolerate in either Taiwan or South Korea, etc. (I would like to mention that to our knowledge, when the Korean party education comes to dealing with the material of the 20th and 21st [CPSU] Congress, the question of the two systems' peaceful coexistence is, so to say, hardly dealt with.) In addition to this, both China and Korea are so much occupied with their "own" international issues (Taiwan and South Korea, respectively), that it is difficult and awkward for them to accept the German question as the central problem of international life. In order to demonstrate this, Comrade Kohousek referred to the behavior of the Chinese at the June session of the Supreme Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Beijing and to the articles published in China for the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth. He [Kohousek] also mentioned that in the speech of the Chinese Ambassador doyen in P'yongyang, given on the occasion of the New Year's reception, he did not even mention the slogan of peaceful coexistence and—contrary to custom—did not send his draft speech in advance to the ambassadors.

This [attitude] in the DPRK was evident at several occasions during the last year, most strikingly in the appeal of the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly last autumn and in the letter addressing the parliaments of the world, in which they presented the Korean question as the most burning international problem. In the last months, according to the opinion of Comrade Kohousek, the Korean comrades became more reserved concerning this issue.

According to his observations, China's influence in the DPRK has increased significantly during the last year—especially after Comrade Khrushchev's visit to Korea was again canceled. (In the course of the conversation, Comrade Kohousek disapprovingly alluded several times to the Chinese Ambassador to P'yongyang, who uses his position as doyen to his own benefit in a very skillful way, and tries his best to please the Korean comrades.)

Comrade Kohousek nevertheless emphasized that in spite of China's great influence in Korea, the Korean comrades have never tried to copy the Chinese experiences. He referred to the example of communes, which, according to his knowledge, were the subjects of experiments but in the end the idea of their introduction to Korea was firmly rejected. Moreover, recently the Korean comrades have emphatically urged that the income distribution in agriculture be based on the quantity and quality of the work performed.

Concerning other political issues, it is undeniable that the Korean comrades are committing some mistakes along the way. We both agreed, for example, that the evaluations

made during the South Korean events had some weak sides (see my report No. 77). Despite this, the practical steps taken by the Workers' Party and the government were correct. The pursuit of autarky is still strong. Comrade Kohousek pointed out that in his view the Chinese influence is decreasing (understanding by this the above-mentioned political issues), and the Korean comrades stress more often and with more emphasis the *peaceful* [emphasis in the original] unification of the country, and there are signs that they no longer seek to place the Korean question at the forefront of international relations.

I informed Comrade Kohousek of my conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Chang-sik concerning the visit of Kim Il Sung in Moscow (see my report No. 90). In the opinion of the Comrade Ambassador, it was not without reason for Comrade Yu Chang-sik to emphasize the complete agreement of views between the Soviet and Korean parties, since in his [Kohousek's] opinion the main focus of the negotiations was after all not so much on economic but political questions, and the deputy foreign minister presumably alluded to this. According to the Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister, it cannot be ruled out that Kim Il Sung also visited China prior to his visit to Moscow, but he does not have any data concerning this. He stressed, however, that in his views the Moscow talks meant a turning point in the political and party life of the DPRK. The agreement of views emphasized by the Foreign Minister¹ means that in domestic and foreign political questions, the DPRK completely shares the position of the Soviet Union.

Károly Práth
Ambassador

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: [sic.] probably Deputy Foreign Minister.



DOCUMENT No. 18
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 21 July 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-k Korea, 11. doboz, 27/a, 1/25/34-1/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

Under a resolution that the [Korean] Workers' Party CC passed more than a year ago, a few "Communist universities" were established experimentally in the 1959/60 academic year. According to the CC resolution, the main purpose of the Communist universities is the further education of the workers in general and the accomplishment of the further theoretical education of the cadres of South Korean origin in particular. Students who have graduated from Communist universities have the same rights as students who have graduated

from other universities. In the last resort, it is the provincial party committees and the provincial People's Committees that propose university applicants for admission. In addition to party members, non-members worthy of it are also admitted. Classes are attended in the evenings after working hours. The four-week holiday is due to these students in the same way as to the other evening students.

In the last few weeks the party CC discussed the experiences gained in the previous academic year, and it found that the Communist universities established experimentally last year had done good work, and it became possible to increase the number of such universities. The CC decided to establish 20 such universities in the 1960/61 academic year in provincial centers and larger industrial centers.

[...]

In addition to raising technological standards, the main purpose of the universities is to gather together people of South Korean origin, and to select those cadres who will be suitable for leading the party and the democratic organs in South Korea after unification. The primary aim [of the leadership] is that from each South Korean settlement, there should be one or two students who have long been living in the North, at the universities. [...] Following the graduation of the present class, it will be ensured that after the unification of the country, in all the centers, cities and larger villages of South Korea the party committees and People's Committees will be headed by cadres born there.

These cadres will be politically firm and loyal to the Korean Workers' Party. They will be more or less familiar with industry and the planned economy as well, because at the university they study such subjects too. At the same time they, having been born there, will also know local conditions, which will be of invaluable importance in the first period after unification. [...]

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 19

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 1 August 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 004238/1/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

In recent days, the 30th group of repatriates has arrived from Japan, and with them, a total of as many as 31,000 Koreans have already returned home. The repatriates—as I already related in my previous report—get jobs and can work right after they have settled down. Nevertheless, their adaptation to life here is not smooth. For one thing, their circumstances of life were better in Japan [than in the DPRK], and

they are not completely satisfied with the conditions here. According to what the repatriates say, there were more opportunities for entertainment in Japan. Initially, the [North Korean] way of life, which is fundamentally different from what they got accustomed to under capitalism, is certainly foreign to them. They have not heard about concepts like voluntary work, meetings, and pledges up to now. As a consequence, they are loath to participate in them. When the official working time is over, they try to go home immediately in order to change their clothes and seek opportunities for entertainment.

They also have difficulty complying with work discipline. [...] The government and the party ensure them a privileged position. [...] a substantial part of the repatriates have considerable professional skills. In addition to industrial experts, I primarily mean those professional skills which have existed only in a very rudimentary stage in the DPRK, e.g. ladies' hairdressing, gentlemen's and ladies' tailors, shoemakers, and so on.

Apart from formalities, the Korean workers do not like the repatriates very much. They have several reasons for that: 1) A great number of people have been removed from [...] 205n625 Tw(plinerty ; 3)Tj[(ththose profes60.1(.)-o Tcpy] a subss

DOCUMENT No. 22
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 30 November 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/ca,

reform carried out in the DPRK, but, if one takes the circumstances into consideration, it is a Marxist-Leninist answer to the question. [...] The ruling circles of the USA have not adopted an official policy yet, they try to deal with the South Korean situation somehow indirectly. In these circles, a certain anxiety is noticeable, they do not completely trust the Chang Myon government, and, among others, the USA openly declared that if the South Korean authorities wished to negotiate with the representatives of the North in Panmunjom, this would require the previous consent of the “UN High Command.” In South Korea, the proposals [of the DPRK] are already widely known and discussed among the intelligentsia, the students, and the youth. Characteristically, a great number of South Korean correspondents came to the 29 November session of the Panmunjom Armistice Commission, and 50 percent of them made statements in favor of the DPRK’s proposals, while the others represented the official standpoint [...]. The South Korean National Assembly was also obliged to discuss the issue of economic and cultural contacts, then the Cabinet also dealt with it. While Chang Myon called [the proposals] “propaganda” in his statement, Foreign Minister Chong Il-hyong supported the idea of [accepting] electric power [from the DPRK] as long as no political strings were attached, though later he took back his word.

[...]

The tone of the [Supreme] National Assembly’s session is typical of [the present attitude of] the DPRK. Both the reporter [Ch’oe Yong-gon] and the speakers spoke about the South Korean leaders in a very moderate tone, the various attributes they had hitherto used were largely absent, and they began to speak officially about the “Republic of Korea” instead of “South Korea” (it even appeared in newspapers). Of course, as the Korean comrades correctly pointed out, the primary obstacle in the way of the peaceful unification of the country is the presence of the US troops. [...] it is not likely, however, that one can achieve their withdrawal solely through domestic (Korean) channels; the given international situation, and its development, will play an important role in it.

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 23

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 8 December 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 001/RT/1961. Translation by József Litkei.]

On 7 December, Czechoslovak Ambassador Comrade Kohousek invited me for dinner, together with Comrade Soviet Ambassador Puzanov. In the course of the friendly

conversation, I mentioned that the conduct of the Korean DCSO¹ is somewhat strange and incomprehensible to me, since they have been systematically taking away my best Korean employees on various pretexts. The behavior of the guards charged with guarding the embassies is also very strange, since—despite the emphatic statements of the Foreign Ministry—they constantly stop the Korean comrades visiting the Embassy, and check their identities. We do not take similar measures at the Korean embassy in Budapest; moreover, we do our best to offer them an ever-increasing space for movement and [possibilities to maintain] connections.

Concerning this question, Comrade Kohousek told us that his embassy is experiencing similar [behavior] from the Korean side, and remarked that according to his impression, some of the Korean employees working at the embassy are security people, who follow with great attention the work of the embassies and the Koreans visiting the embassy, and at the same time keep an eye on the other Korean employees as well. When Korean authorities have the impression that one or another of the Korean employees is working well, and that his work is promoting the work of the embassy, then he is removed from the embassy, usually on the baseless pretext of “political unreliability.” At this point, Comrade Puzanov interjected that why then do they send “politically unreliable [people]”?!—Comrade Kohousek also pointed out that the Korean side—both official authorities and some of the embassy employees—is trying to restrict the connections between the individual embassies and the Korean comrades who studied in their countries, out of the fear that they [the embassies] can receive some kind of “information” from them [the Korean comrades]. The situation, however, is that these comrades cannot subscribe to foreign specialist literature, and this is why they are always inquiring at the embassies.

In my response, I emphasized that I have no need for the Hungarian-trained Korean comrades to act as “informants” since I have been in the DPRK long enough to be able to form my own opinion on its individual issues and its situation. Comrade Puzanov agreed with this and then said that so far he had no problems with the Koreans working at the Soviet Embassy, and when it comes to signing the collective contract, he determines in advance each employee’s sphere of work. Concerning the problems related to free entry at the embassies, since he has also already heard similar complaints from the Bulgarian Ambassador, he had the issue investigated in relation to the Soviet Embassy, and they did not experience similar phenomena (I would like to remark that there is a permanent Soviet janitor service at the gate, so it is not possible for the [Korean] guard to stop visitors). According to Comrade Puzanov, Korean leading comrades do not assume that the embassies would use visitors for the purpose of getting information, such a [notion] can only possibly originate from some kind of lower subordinate. If he [Comrade Puzanov] wants to know about something, then he turns to the Central Committee or to the Foreign M[inistry], and it happened more than once that Comrade Kim Il Sung himself offered materials that were possibly necessary for

the work of the embassy. Concerning the conduct of the Korean DCSO and the guards, he strongly stressed that one has to call individual cases to the attention of the competent Korean authorities immediately [after such incidents happen], warning them “what, do you want brotherly reciprocity?!” If something similar would happen to me here, said Comrade Puzanov, then I would ensure that it be reciprocated in Moscow. I interjected that in our work we should not look for what possibly separates us but what unites us, and we must endeavor to strengthen cooperation and friendship. Comrade Puzanov also agreed with this by saying that these are after all minor issues, but they can also express the mutual relationship between two countries. No one in Mos-

Czechoslovak Ambassador, the first impression is that the enlargement of the committee is not advantageous for us, since at the moment the voting ratio is 2 to 2, while [after the enlargement] this would be 2 to 4, to our disadvantage. In Comrade Puzanov's view, this also does not make any sense, since the activity of the committee is anyway reduced. Promoting relations between the two parts of the country would mean a change in the function of the neutral committee; this, however, would first of all require the consent of the Koreans themselves. Comrade Kohousek further mentioned that the head of the Swiss delegation invited the Czechoslovak general to visit Seoul, which the latter accepted only under the condition that he can go in an official status. The Swiss agreed to this, but the visit has been suspended for various reasons.

We evaluated the above-mentioned diverse Western initiatives as attempts by the USA to find a way to counterbalance the effects of the DPRK's very effective proposals.

Károly Práth
Ambassador

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Diplomatic Corps Supply Office



DOCUMENT No. 24

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 March 1961

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0030/RT/1961. Translation by József Litkei.]

During my visit to Comrade Kohousek on 15 March, I informed him of my conversation with the Chinese Ambassador (see my top secret report no. 95). The Comrade Czechoslovak Ambassador fully agreed with me, and he found it highly incorrect that the Korean comrades organized a separate presentation for the government and another for the ambassadors.

In the course of the conversation, we both remarked upon the fact that Chinese Ambassador doyen Qiao Xiaoguang has recently not been attending the programs organized for the D[iplomatic] C[orps] by the Korean comrades, under the pretext of being busy. In addition to other [examples], he did not participate in the visit to the steel complex in Kaesong, nor did he attend the performance of the Cuban ballet ensemble or the cultural presentation of Comrade Han Sol-ya, etc. According to Comrade Kohousek, the Chinese Ambassador might be dissatisfied because in the course of last year he failed to convince the Korean comrades to support the Chinese position. Comrade Kohousek stated that earlier (last summer) he was of the opinion that the Korean comrades were under Chinese influence; how-

ever, recently he had to change his position. It is true that earlier there were attempts by the Korean side to adopt Chinese methods: for example, according to his information, they planned to establish two people's communes, etc., but they soon realized the negative [effects] of this, and gave it up. The so-called "Chongsan-ri method" radically opposes the earlier Chinese position, and, at least recently, the Korean comrades have been devoting much attention to maintaining the principle of material interest and socialist distribution.

The Chinese comrades exerted pressure in order to bring the KWP to their side in the debate between the CPSU and CCP last year. The invitation of Comrade Kim Il Sung to China last year (before his incognito visit to Moscow) also proves this. Comrade Kim Il Sung, however, informed Comrade Khrushchev of this [invitation].

Last October, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese volunteers entering the war, a Chinese delegation headed by Marshal He Long visited Korea and tried again to win Korea over to the Chinese side. Despite this, the Korean delegation did not support China at the November conference, although, together with other delegations, it sought to find a compromise solution. To sum up, the Chinese did not reach their goal, despite a further credit of 420 million rubles offered to the DPRK last autumn, so it is not impossible that this is the reason the Chinese Ambassador is so displeased.

In confirming this, Comrade Kohousek told me that although the Chinese side enjoys a position of equality with the Korean side in the armistice committee in Panmunjom, the speeches are always given by the head of the Korean delegation. A recent event, when the new heads of the Swedish and Swiss delegations paid an introductory visit to the heads of the Korean and Chinese delegations, was characteristic of this. The head of the Chinese delegation wanted to return these formal calls, but the Korean comrades did not consent to this, saying that they were not going to return either of them. Similarly, a Chinese general came recently to Panmunjom to pay his usual yearly visit and was received by the heads of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations. Contrary to previous custom, however, the head of the Korean delegation did not show up, nor did he meet the Chinese general later. The latter left pretty soon without any notice.

The same afternoon, I also talked to Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, and informed him as well of my conversation with the Chinese Ambassador. Comrade Puzanov agreed with me, the more so since I was the one to inform him that the performance in question was organized for the DC (he was not present due to the Women's Day celebration at the Soviet Embassy). He agreed that, under the pretense of discussing various protocol questions, I would visit the Chinese Ambassador, who following this will have to summon the [other] ambassadors. Concerning the statement of the Chinese Ambassador, according to which "some criticize the people's communes, yet they have already been proven to work" (see my above-mentioned report), Comrade Puzanov briefly outlined the questions concerning the Chinese people's communes, and told us that according to his personal opinion,

the Chinese comrades have also already learned from the experiences of the past years, and there are signs that they put an end to the communes' "egalitarianist" system of distribution and are giving more space to individual farms, etc. That the last plenum of the Chinese fraternal party put the blame for the condition of agriculture entirely on weather and natural disasters is the business of the Chinese, said Comrade Puzanov, although the way we communists become even stronger is exactly by openly admitting our mistakes. He told us that on the way back from the January CPSU Plenum, he came to Pyongyang via Beijing, and also informed Comrade Kim Il Sung about the work of the plenum. On this occasion, the issue of the grave economic situation in China was also raised. Comrade Kim Il Sung declared that they (the Koreans) can also feel the Chinese difficulties, since there are delays in the delivery of coking coal, etc., and foodstuffs are not being delivered to Korea either. According to Kim Il Sung, taking the Chinese situation into consideration, they do not want to hurry the Chinese deliveries. Concerning the people's communes, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that he also follows the recent measures related to this with great attention, and he knows the articles published in the Chinese press, as well. In his opinion, "it is not the name, nor the form that is important, but the content," and Comrade Puzanov, too, sees the essence of the issue in this.

Concerning this question, Comrade Puzanov made the final comment that Chinese Ambassador Qiao committed an "offense against his own party-consciousness" when he put the blame for their difficulties on the weather alone.

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 25
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 8 June 1961

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 13. doboz, 27/e, 003643/1/1961. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

According to information we received from an acquaintance of ours who is a party member working in a ministry, on 27 March Comrade Kim Il Sung delivered a lecture at the party center on some issues regarding proletarian dictatorship in Korea. His speech was recorded, and it is studied together with the Red Letter and collectively listened to by party and state cadres down to the middle level.

Kim Il Sung called attention to the country's complicated situation in cadre policy. Only about 0.5 percent (!) of the population has no relatives who live in the South, were collaborators of the Japanese or the Americans, or are elements of class-alien origin, etc. Nonetheless, the party lead-

ership is firm and experienced [...]. He condemned dictatorial methods in party and mass work, citing Ho Ka-i as an example of someone who was unmasked during the liquidation of factions and who, as the secretary of the CC, had disciplined 500 thousand party members out of 700 thousand in the course of the [1950-1951] retreat (later he committed suicide). He emphasized that the primary task of the Communists was to provide well-being for the popular masses, and they had to do their work primarily through re-education. In spite of its complicated composition, the 99.5 percent of the population cannot be considered as enemeyrtyasP7 Tw805r lek primae partyw

He dealt separately with the issue of those who had been collaborators under the temporary occupation. The great majority of them were forced to do some service for the occupying troops, for the most part they did it unintentionally. He remarked that they wished Koreans had not served in the South Korean puppet army either, but one had to reckon with these circumstances as well. Several former collaborators later held their own bravely in the [Korean] People's Army and in peacetime work. One must also take into consideration that the landlords, etc. often did not participate in person in the various actions but forced others to carry them out, and they themselves attempted to remain in the background. Similarly, one must draw a distinction between those who fled to the South and the members of their families who remained here.

The aforesaid could not mean the weakening of class



DOCUMENT No. 26

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 29 March 1962

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 8. doboz, 5/f, 004108/1962. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 29 March, Com. Reuter, the press attaché of the German Embassy, paid a visit to Com. Fendler, and informed him about the conversation that had recently taken place between Com. Provisional Chargé d'Affaires Stark and Com. Pak, head of the F[oreign] M[inistry]'s First Department.

For the latter's information, Com. Stark handed the copy of the memorandum written by the GDR government on the German question to Com. Pak. In the course of the conversa-

even return home. These circumstances presumably “loosened his tongue” to a certain extent.) Com. Kim depicted the internal situation of the DPRK in the following manner:

In the wake of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, a rather tense situation has developed in Korea. The objections to the line of the CPSU are rooted in the personality cult.[...] He remarked that the slogan *charyok kaengsaeng*—“regeneration through one’s own efforts”—is also of Chinese origin, and—in his personal opinion—the *juche* [2ei,ilalsorleue] dora-

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DOCUMENT No. 28**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 28 May 1962**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-k Korea, 8. doboz, 15/b, 005805/1962. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

At the Czechoslovak reception on 9 May, Comrade Fendler, while having a conversation with Comrade Cho Byong-hui, the Deputy Head of the Press Department, asked him for information about the character of the major South Korean newspapers and news agencies [...]. Comrade Chong, an employee of the Press Department, received Comrade Fendler on 24 May, and informed him in detail (enclosed please find the evaluation of each newspaper).

[...] At the reception on 9 May, Comrade Cho Byong-hui referred to the fact that certain South Korean newspapers, while beginning their articles with appreciation of the policies and [...] efforts of the government, cautiously pointed out that “there are still some shortcomings.” The tone of the provincial newspapers is more dissenting than that of the metropolitan press, because in the countryside, particularly in the southernmost provinces, economic conditions are worse (the uprising of April 1960 also started in Masan), and the national feeling of the intelligentsia is also stronger in the countryside. Nonetheless, articles containing veiled criticism pass the censor time after time, considering the isolation of Park Chung-hee, which is substantial enough in any case, and international public opinion.

The conversation took place in a friendly atmosphere, and finally Comrade Chong, on his own initiative, stressed that they would be ready to inform the Embassy at any time, and referred appreciatively to the relationship between the Korean Embassy in Budapest and the Press Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

[...]

József Kovács
Ambassador

*Appendix 1**Characterization of major South Korean newspapers:**1) Han'guk Ilbo [...]*

The newspaper is owned by a stock company representing capitalist commercial interests, and it is solidly funded. It frequently publishes reviews, summaries, and long editorials. This newspaper was of an oppositional character as early as under Syngman Rhee, and at present it also criticizes the military government and the USA, though not consistently. Its circulation once exceeded one hundred thousand, but it has somewhat decreased since the coup.[...]

2) Kukje Sinmun [...]

It is published in Pusan, one of the largest seaports in

South Korea, owned by a stock company, and firmly funded; in terms of size and influence, it is equivalent to the metropolitan newspapers, and its circulation is one of the widest. [...]

Its editorial staff is very talented [...]. Under Chang Myon's government, this newspaper was the one that demanded the unification of the country most actively, and at present it is also the strongest critic of the “military government,” it published several anti-US articles. It set forth, by and large, Comrade Kim Il Sung's proposals of 15 August 1960 (confederation), and valued them highly.

3) Ryongnam Ilbo [...]

A newspaper of oppositional attitude, it was founded in October 1946 in the city of Taegu. It published news, which revealed the policies of the “military government” and the present South Korean situation, and it recently called upon the other newspapers not to humble themselves before the government. It happened several times that it rated the guerrilla struggles of the 1930s highly, and demanded the peaceful unification [of the country] on the basis of revolutionary traditions. Its negative side is that it disseminates “Yankee culture” in the same way as the other newspapers do.

4) Pusan Ilbo [...]

A Japanese newspaper before liberation, it was refashioned in 1946. Originally a mouthpiece of the Pusan commercial circles, it has gradually turned to politics. It is a many-sided and interesting newspaper, and in recent times it has published oppositional news more than once. Its finances are low.

5) Tonga Ilbo [...]

One of the oldest newspapers in Seoul, its first issue appeared on 1 April 1920. Under Japanese rule, then under Syngman Rhee, it was repressed several times; it was banned during World War II. Owned by a stock company, it is firmly funded, and its circulation is around 150 thousand.

It was a mouthpiece of the former Democratic Party and the landowners, and as such, it attacked the former Liberal Party of Syngman Rhee, it was a competitor of *Seoul Sinmun*. Its critical tone has become faint since the military coup, it expresses the interests of the landowners, and it deals with the inflow of foreign capital from this angle.

6) Kyonghyang Sinmun

A Catholic newspaper in Seoul, it was founded in the autumn of 1946 with moderate funds. It criticized Syngman Rhee, for which it was once suppressed. Under Chang Myon, it was a mouthpiece of the government, at present it has an anti-Communist disposition. Park Chung-hee aspires to make it, together with *Seoul Sinmun*, a government newspaper.

7) Choson Ilbo [...]

Founded in 1920, it is a newspaper with meager funds and a narrow circulation. Under Syngman Rhee, it had been neutral as a rule, in recent times it has cautiously criticized

the “military government” time after time.

It had been the official newspaper of the Japanese Government-General, then of the regime of Syngman Rhee, and for this reason its editorial office was set on fire by the people in April 1960. The newspaper of Park Chung-hee in recent times, it is firmly funded, but its influence is insignificant. It is a reactionary newspaper, but it is afraid of public feeling.[...] It appears in 100 thousand copies. [...]



DOCUMENT No. 29

**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 27 August 1962**

*[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0066/
1962. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]*

supplies intended to serve the DPRK's defense needs, including submarines and facilities strengthening the defense of P'yongyang. Since his arrival (on 9th August) he has already met Kim Il Sung two times, the latter is very friendly to him, and he hopes he will also succeed in establishing a good personal relationship with him.

Of his predecessor, Comrade Puzanov, he said that during his five-year stay here, he [Puzanov] had had a very good



DOCUMENT No. 30

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, August 1962

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 11. doboz, 24/b, 002304/1/RT/1962. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

At the end of July I had a long heart-to-heart talk with a close Korean friend of mine [...].

The Korean comrade told me that in his opinion, the primary reason for the current economic problems of Korea was bad economic planning [...]. In the course of drawing up national plans for each branch of industry, they naturally take the capacity of the individual enterprises and factories as their starting-point. Preparation of the plans takes place, by and large, in the following manner: the competent employees of the central organs visit the enterprise or factory in question, and the latter's director informs them about its capacity and potentialities. The comrades coming "from above" usually find that insufficient, and they generally turn to the workers in the matter of the next year's plan. With an adequate political arrangement, one can always find some so-called "hurray" men, who assume production obligations that are well over what can be fulfilled [...]. The plan for the factory is made on the basis of these pledges, and the director, if he happens to protest, will be branded a "backward-looking" man, which often leads to his qualification as politically unreliable and to his dismissal. Of course, a plan drawn up in this way cannot be fulfilled either by the enterprise or the branch of industry, and this also affects the other branches, since the same unrealistic plan targets are given as index numbers

DOCUMENT No. 31

The CC Vice-Chairman also expounded their viewpoint concerning South Korea. After Syngman Rhee had been driven away, when Chang Myon was in power, but even as late as the beginning of last year, their view on the South Korean situation was that a successful opposition to the Fascist dictatorship, led by the students and the intelligentsia, was possible. By now it has become obvious that there is no chance of it, and Park Chung-hee has even succeeded in improving the country's economic situation to a certain extent. In these circumstances one cannot negotiate with the Fascist dictatorship on peaceful unification, and the process

DOCUMENT No. 32**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 26 August 1963**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0034/RT/1963. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

During the visit I paid to the Soviet Ambassador on 24 August, I was informed of the following:

A few days after Comrade Moskovsky returned from holiday, Romanian Ambassador M. Bodnăra° called on him and informed him about the following issues, which are of some interest.

To begin with, the Romanian Ambassador emphasized how impatiently he had been waiting for his [Moskovsky's] return, because he wanted to inform Comrade Moskovsky of the events that had taken place in his absence before he [Bodnăra°] would go on holiday (he will leave for Bucharest on 28th August). For in the last one and a half months, Bodnăras was received twice by Kim Il Sung, and they discussed the widening of Romanian-Korean relations and issues of party politics.

At the first meeting Kim Il Sung, giving [Bodnăra°] a very warm welcome, asked the Ambassador to ensure that the Korean government delegation, which had left for Romania in order to discuss economic issues, be received at an appropriately high level. Among the members of the delegation there were two high-ranking party functionaries, Kim Il Sung said; thus, it would be possible even for leading Romanian party functionaries to negotiate with the delegation.

countries were developing in a -leasing way, and they [the North Koreans] were seriously determined to widen these

increase the volume of trade between the two countries approx. *ten times* [emphasis in the original] as early as next year or the year after that. Romania has a developed manufacturing industry, and they (the Koreans) have also devel-

ally searched for oil in places where indeed no oil was to be found, and, thus, it was not accidental that the large-scale search for oil ended unsuccessfully. Now they ask for Romanian geologists for this purpose, and he assures the Romanian Ambassador that the Romanian geologists arriving here will get every possible assistance from the Korean authorities. Hopefully, their efforts will be more successful than those of the Soviet geologists.

In Kim Il Sung's view, at present Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej is the sole party and state leader in Europe that he (Kim Il Sung) can negotiate with as an equal partner. Therefore, he holds him and the other leaders of the Romanian party in great esteem.

Ambassador Bodnăra° told Comrade Moskovsky that in the course of their conversation, Kim Il Sung had criticized the Chinese leaders for the extremist tone they used in attacking the CPSU. As noted by the Romanian Ambassador, Kim Il Sung did not agree with the line of the CPSU either. The worsening of relations between the KWP and the CPSU began as early as 1956, with Mikoyan's visit to Korea. Mikoyan's role in the intra-party factional struggles had a negative impact on their relations with the Soviet leaders. Nevertheless, they had the factionalist Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik sentenced and executed; they may have acted otherwise if they had had the present perspective, Kim Il Sung said. In the opinion of Romanian Ambassador Bodnăras, Kim Il Sung is a clever man, he pursues a sensible foreign and domestic policy, and he personally agrees with this policy.

Then the Romanian Ambassador explained to Comrade Moskovsky the standpoint of their party. They disapprove of the policies of the Chinese leaders, but they do not follow the CPSU as closely as the Czechoslovaks do. Under the guidance of the Romanian Workers' Party, they also build socialism in Romania, for there is no other way and it cannot be otherwise, but they want to do it in their own special way. Making use of the advantages of their country, in a certain sense they want to reach socialism according to their own ideas.

Finally, Bodnăra° emphasized to Comrade Moskovsky that he still had a lot to say, but because of the lack of time, he could not go on now. He came to an agreement with Comrade Moskovsky to meet with him again on 27 August, when he would speak more about his negotiations with Kim Il Sung.

In the opinion of Comrade Moskovsky, it is perfectly plain that Bodnăra° never participated in the party movement, his familiarity with Marxist-Leninist theoretical issues is extremely weak, [the following part of the sentence crossed out in the original document] but he is a good hunter and angler. Comrade Moskovsky is of the opinion that one should look after the Romanian Ambassador. We must attempt to speak with him several times so as to steer him in the right direction.

József Kovács
(Ambassador)

DOCUMENT No. 33

**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 2 October 1963**

*[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 13. doboz, 30/b,
005273/1/1963. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]*

As I already reported, the Korean organs frequently adopt
an incomprehensible position on the question of so-called

DOCUMENT No. 35

**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 11 January 1964**

*[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0015/
RT/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]*

On 10 January 1964 I invited Comrades Soviet Ambassador Moskovsky and Romanian Ambassador Bodnăra°, and their wives, to dinner. During the conversation that followed dinner, Comrade Moskovsky told me the following facts about Soviet problems which had arisen in years past in connection with the interpretation of the Korean political situation and perspectives.

The development of the Korean situation, and the fact that the Korean Workers' Party took sides with the Chinese party, took the Soviet comrades to some extent by surprise, because, among others, their former Ambassador, Puzanov (he was in Pyongyang between 1957 and 1962), failed to indicate, or underestimated, the tendencies and phenomena of

pared for, or what several high-ranking diplomats of the Soviet Embassy wanted to ram down his throat. With regard to that, Comrade Moskovsky blamed several employees of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Embassy (he mentioned former Counsellor Kryukov and current First Secretary Titarenko by name), who were assigned to Korea as many as two or three times, “got accustomed” to the 1954-1956 situation, and were incapable of comprehending the change that had taken place in the political situation [...]. Comrade Moskovsky emphasized that, as a consequence, a struggle had been waged at the Embassy with regard to the interpretation of the Korean situation. During the introductory and other visits he paid to the Korean leaders, here and there—in spite of the apparently friendly tone—various allusions, etc., were made by the Koreans. However, when he (Comrade Moskovsky) expressed concern about this at the Embassy, Kryukov and others did not attach importance to it, they attempted to jump down his throat (“Kim Il Sung is our man, I am on very good terms with him, we were hunting together,” “the minister was lying in a state of drunkenness under my billiard-table,” etc.). True enough, some of the diplomats in question have modified their standpoint in the meantime, among others Comrade Puzanov [...] signed a document, in which he had “enumerated but not proved and interpreted” a few phenomena. However, he was forced to do so by the party secretary and some other diplomats of the Embassy, who threatened him with taking him to task along the party line, and declared that if he did not sign it, they themselves would send it to Moscow!

Nonetheless, no substantial change took place after Comrade Moskovsky had sized up the situation. Moreover, when he, in his quarterly political report, was obliged to describe the problems related to the Korean political situation, it was the same employees, who had returned home but continued to deal with Korea, who evaluated his reports at the Foreign Ministry. They forwarded his reports with comments like “the Ambassador overstates the matter,” etc. This situation had developed so far that in the summer of 1963, on the occasion of his vacation, “I was compelled to appeal to the top man [Khrushchev]. I told him that either the Foreign [Ministry] should be sorted out, or I should be recalled and reinstated in my former position!,” Comrade Moskovsky said (previously he, as Deputy Premier of the RSFSR, had dealt with cultural and ideological issues). That settled matters,

ters. To Comrade Moskovsky's knowledge, this actually took place, but it has yielded very little practical results. Last December, 11 fatal accidents occurred at the site. Among others, five Korean workers fell down simultaneously from a height of 27 metres. Of them, three died instantly, while one got caught on a hook by the rib and, having not been taken off for a long time, bled to death. The fifth one got caught on a hook by the clothes, and he had been hanging there for hours until they took him off, but he became mentally unbalanced in his alarm.

In late December, Deputy Premier Nam Il, accompanied by the chairman of the city party committee, the ministers concerned, etc., visited the construction site. He informed the construction's Korean management about the personal instruction of Kim Il Sung: they were to put into operation the first section of the thermal power station by March 1964! Comrade Moskovsky told me that approx. 20 percent of the construction of this first section had been completed in one and a half years, and now they [the leadership] wanted to have the remaining part of the work completed in three months! No one dared to oppose the instruction, both the local and the ministerial leaders promised everything to Nam Il. After the meeting [...] [a North Korean engineer] went up to one of the Soviet comrades and stated: "Have you seen this comedy? Everybody knows it cannot be done, but no one dared to tell the truth!"—Comrade Moskovsky said that 1500 soldiers dressed in pufaika and 1500 workers dressed in linen suits (!) were working at the construction site. In the morning a 40-minute open-air political meeting is held, but during this time they are frozen so much that following the meeting, everybody runs to warm himself, and they begin working as late as around 11 o'clock.

Otherwise, the Korean press investigated issues of industrial safety several times in the last few months.

József Kovács
(Ambassador)



DOCUMENT No. 37
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 10 March 1964

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc,
003819/RT/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

As was also disclosed in the Soviet press, in early February Comrade Khrushchev received the Korean Ambassador, who was about to leave Moscow. Comrade Moskovsky said the following about the meeting:

Comrade Khrushchev asked the Ambassador about last year's harvest in Korea and their achievements in the field of

raising rice yields. Without thinking, the Ambassador stated that last year they had harvested on average 50 quintals of rice per hectare (whereas it is known that at the 1963 CC plenum, Kim Il Sung spoke about a rice harvest of 3.6 metric tons [per hectare]). Thereupon Comrade Khrushchev noted that in Kazakhstan, they [the Soviets] also had a kolkhoz where 55 quintals of rice per hectare had been harvested, and they achieved 45 quintals in the Ukraine. Otherwise, in the Soviet Union there was a law that stipulated that if a kolkhoz overfulfilled its plan in rice production, it could dispose freely of the grain produced in excess of the planned amount, it could make use of it as it wished.

The Soviet people followed with great attention the South Vietnamese people, who fought for their freedom and waged a war against the American troops and the army of the US-satellite South Vietnamese government, Comrade Khrushchev said. Why is there such a great silence in South Korea at the same time? Do the South Korean people perhaps expect democratic steps from the government, or have they already gotten tired of the struggle? Is the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee perhaps so severe that the masses are incapable of putting up any resistance?

The Ambassador told Comrade Khrushchev that at present, there were 6 million unemployed peasants in South Korea. Nonetheless, the organization of a resistance movement meets with difficulties, because there is no revolutionary party, or any leaders capable of organizing such a party, in the country.

Comrade Khrushchev: But Kim Il Sung told us there was a strong resistance movement in South Korea. Otherwise, it is precisely the difficult economic situation that makes the organization of such a movement possible.

Ambassador: The American imperialists station large troop contingents in South Korea, and these are equipped with modern armaments, they even possess atomic weapons. Evidently they frighten the people in this way.

Comrade Khrushchev: To begin with, there are no atomic weapons in South Korea. At that time, the Americans took atomic weapons to West Germany. Secondly, let us suppose that there were such weapons in the country [South Korea], this still would not account for why there is not any resistance movement. Atomic weapons are unusable in direct fighting, because the explosions and the subsequent radioactive pollution would cause damage to one's own troops as well. For that very reason, both the Soviet Union and America have phased out atomic weapons as a service. As you can see, you are misinformed about the equipment of the American troops stationed in South Korea. Now it is the missiles installed outside of the enemy countries that are the most suitable for carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs, these are developed by the Americans and the Soviet Union too. I can assure you, Comrade Khrushchev went on, that if the North attacked South Korea again, it is more than probable that the Americans would put into action nuclear weapons too. The Ambassador did not object to the term "attacked again".

Concerning the rest of the conversation, Comrade

DOCUMENT No. 38

**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 1 June 1964**

*[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 13. doboz, 27/a,
004092/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]*

[...] A particularly conspicuous characteristic of *the country's internal situation* [emphasis in the original] is a general mistrust and suspicion, and an increasing "tension."

DOCUMENT No. 40**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 1 October 1964**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 005971/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 24 August, the Provisional Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, Comrade Pimenov, told Comrade Fendler that recently problems had recently arisen in Soviet-Korean cooperation for lumber. In accordance with the five-year agreement signed in 1957, the DPRK lumbers free of charge, with its own workforce, in the Amur region. In 1961, during Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow, the agreement was extended, at the request of the Korean side, for another 10 years. The DPRK has hitherto lumbered approx. 2 million cubic meters of wood, and at present there are still approx. five thousand Koreans working in the forests around Khabarovsk. In the last months the Korean workers and their leaders have been behaving more and more provocatively, they are violating the rules aimed at the protection of forests, and the articles of the intergovernmental agreement, etc. The competent Korean authority is intentionally raising difficulties in the work with the local Soviet organs, and finally the head of the Korean enterprise made an ultimatumlike statement, according to which they would cancel the agreement unless the Soviet side fulfilled a good many demands of theirs. At the same time, they are taking advantage of the relaxed rules of border crossing to ship large quantities of vodka, apple, salt, Japanese goods, transistor appliances, etc., from the DPRK for the workers, and the Korean workers are carrying on a speculative trade with the local population by selling these goods. This had assumed such proportions that the local organs were obliged to report it to Moscow. On 17 August the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister sent for the Ambassador of the DPRK, and gave him a verbal warning; at the same time, he reminded him that since it was an intergovernmental agree-

ment they were talking about, the government of the DPRK should officially confirm the statement of the aforementioned managing director, and in this case, if the DPRK wanted to cancel the agreement, the Soviet side would not make difficulties over that. Deputy Minister Kim Yong-nam also sent for Comrade Pimenov about the issue, and he blamed the Soviet organs for the difficulties.

On 8 September Comrade Pimenov also informed Comrade Fendler about the fact that three days ago Deputy Minister Kim Yong-nam had again sent for the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, and handed him the letter of the Korean government, in which they proposed the cancellation of the agreement, laying the blame on the Soviet side.

Following that, Comrade Moskovsky told me that recently he had met Deputy Minister Kim Yong-nam. The Deputy Minister raised the issue of the cancellation of the Khabarovsk lumbering agreement [...].

Thereupon the Soviet Ambassador replied the following: [...] Unfortunately, the agreement Korean Treaty is initiated.

