

NEW EVIDENCE ON THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

What was behind the Soviet decision in December 1979 to invade Afghanistan? And when and why did Mikhail Gorbachev decide to pull out Soviet troops nearly ten years later? What was the role of the US covert assistance program, in particular the Stinger missiles? What role did CIA intelligence play? How did the Afghan War's history, a key step in the rise of militant Islam, intersect with the history of the final decade of the Cold War? These were among the questions addressed at a major international conference, "Towards an International History of the War in Afghanistan," organized in April 2002 by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson Center's Asia Program and Kennan Institute, George Washington University's Cold War Group, and the National Security Archive.²

vide them with arms, and fund the whole operation. In 1980, the government of Saudi Arabia decided to share the costs of this operation equally with the United States. In its full range of activities, the coalition included the intelligence services of the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and China. According to the former CIA station chief in Pakistan, Milton Bearden, at the height of the covert assistance program in 1986-1987 the coalition was injecting some 60,000 tons of weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment per year into the Afghan war.



Nevertheless, *Elie D. Krakowski*, former special assistant to US assistant secretary of defense for international security policy during the Reagan administration, argued that US aid and in fact overall American strategy toward Afghanistan remained half-hearted and inconsistent, mostly due to the fact that Afghanistan policy derived largely from the United States' relationships with Pakistan and Iran. This, in turn, meant allowing the Pakistani ally broad leeway, with the result that US assistance was channeled largely to radical Islamic resistance groups. Confronted with allegations that one third of the Stinger missiles alone were kept by the Pakistan intelligence service for its own purposes, the former CIA officials at the conference asserted that oversight over the aid program was tighter and more discriminate than publicly perceived.

London-based Norwegian scholar *Odd Arne Westad* pointed out that Russian documents reveal how quickly the Soviet leadership grew disenchanted with the intervention in Afghanistan. A narrow circle of leaders had made the decision to intervene, with KGB chief Andropov and Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov playing critical roles. According to *Anatoly S. Chernyaev*, a former member of the Central Committee's International Department and later a key foreign policy adviser to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, many Soviet officials like him learned of the invasion from the radio. Even at the time, criticism of the decision within the Soviet elite was more widespread than often assumed. Not surprisingly, internal discussion of settlement proposals began as early as spring 1980. These proposals bore remarkable similarities to those introduced by the United Nations in 1986.

By the time Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, the war in Afghanistan had developed into a stalemate. The Soviet forces were mainly tied up in cities and in defending airfields and bases, leaving only roughly 15 percent of their troops for operations. According to *Lester Grau*, a US Army specialist on the war, the Afghan conflict had become "a war of logistics." *Grau* also emphasized the heavy toll disease took on the Soviet troops; almost 60 percent of them were hospitalized at some point during the war. Some advocates of the US covert aid program, such as *Congressman Charles Wilson* (D-TX), contended that the aid program drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan and credited the decision to introduce the shoulder-held Stinger missiles in 1986 as the basic turning point of the war. This missile proved highly effective against Soviet helicopters.

In a further effort to build military pressure against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, *James G. Hershberg*

(George Washington University) presented evidence from declassified US documents that in 1986 the Reagan Administration's National Security Council staff tried to funnel aid to the mujaheddin through Iran as part of its covert



Notes from Politburo Meeting, 29 May 1986 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. *Concerning Afghanistan.* We've replaced [Afghan President Babrak] Karmal with Najib[ullah]. But this is not a "fait accompli," but a justified action on our part. How are we behaving? [USSR] Ambassador [Fikryat A.] Tabeyev told Najib point blank: "I made you the [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's (PDPA)] General Secretary." It's time to recall him since he's acting like a governor-general. Tabeyev is, of course, a serious, important person, but it's time for a change together with a change of policy.

[Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard] SHEVARDNADZE. We need to end the war. And we need to have talks everywhere to do this. We should designate a time for the withdrawal. If we do not, the talks will fall apart.

Our comrades, both here and there in Afghanistan, can't get used to the idea that we are dealing with a sovereign country at all. Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the Ministry of Defense nor other agencies have gotten used to this. Therefore things haven't worked out according to our design: let Najib himself decide everything.

We need to give him full freedom of action.

GORBACHEV. We have set a clear goal: help speed up the process so we have a friendly neutral country and get out of there.

[Fmr. Soviet Ambassador to the US and head of CPSU CC's International Dept. Anatoly] DOBRYNIN. We need to have an "Afghan Reykjavik." Give Najib freedom of action (...)

GORBACHEV. Why is this issue on the table again? Why are you all not doing this? Why? In what office have they made decisions which contradict Politburo decisions?!

But we have a concept. We approved it at the Politburo. There is no implementation of the concept.

Seemingly turns to [Chief of Soviet General Staff, Marshal Sergei] Akhromeyev: they climbed in – they didn't cal-

business with the Chinese and, of course, with the Americans.

When we went into Afghanistan we were wrapped up [*zakol'tsovany*] in the ideological aspects and calculated that we could jump over three stages right away: from feudalism to socialism. Now we can look at the situation openly and follow a realistic policy. For we accepted everything in Poland—the Church, the individual peasant farms, the ideology, and political pluralism. Reality is reality. The comrades speak correctly: it is better to pay with money than with the lives of our people.



Notes from Politburo Meeting, 26 February 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. Material aid. The expenses are enormous, and they are justified if they solve the Afghan problem.

SHEVARDNADZE. We will have made a mistake again if we haven't foreseen what awaits us. To withdraw troops now is the only correct solution.

GORBACHEV. And we won't let the discussion get diverted on the topic of who was at fault. Right now, about material aid.

GROMYKO. But they asked us to deploy troops 11 times. We turned them down. There was, of course, the simplistic idea that the presence of our troops would put Afghanistan on the correct path. But I do not now believe for a second that Afghanistan could have created its own army no matter how many resources we invested there. Nevertheless, we have no alternative—nothing is left [but] how to supply it.

GORBACHEV. There is an "alternative"! For example, if we deploy another 200,000 [troops] but then that is the collapse of our whole cause. So the withdrawal of troops is the only correct decision. But other decisions might be required at a given moment. Take something from what [Najib's Chief Soviet Advisor] Polyanichko suggested. And don't be hasty with the withdrawal of advisers: everyone will see that we're running away.

therefore not surprising that the countries of the European Community have gained the impression that a solution of the Afghan problem is coming which everyone has always advocated and considered it necessary to confirm their opinion and to call upon the Soviet Union to continue moving along this correct path.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I want to make one comment. We have information from very reliable sources which I think we can consider reliable. The US has set itself the goal of obstructing a settlement in Afghanistan by any means, for if America is not successful it will be deprived of an opportunity to present the Soviet Union in a bad light in the eyes of world public opinion. If this is so, and, I repeat, we are almost convinced that our information is reliable, the matter takes on a difficult nature.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. Even the Pakistanis are telling us of the pressure that the Americans are putting on them.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yes, the Pakistanis are complaining that the Americans are putting pressure on them to obstruct a settlement. I earnestly request that you not let the Pakistanis down, for then the Americans will finally crush them.

G. ANDREOTTI. (Laughs) Thank you for the confidential information. I know about this. The Pakistani minister of foreign affairs is my personal friend. He was a prisoner in Italy.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This means that our information agrees with yours.

G. ANDREOTTI. But it's impossible to forget that there are various forces in America. Other and, I think, the most influential American circles are undertaking other steps, for example, to cancel the sanctions against Poland. I also know about the trip which [Undersecretary of State John C.] Whitehead made through the Warsaw Pact countries not long ago. And he had very open conversations with the Poles. I think that it would be in both our and your interest that America have ever increasing influence in determining the political course of the country.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We also see this. We follow US policy very closely and respond to signals which come from reasonable, realistic circles. Naturally, we understand that these circles also represent and defend US interests. We do not preclude rivalry and competition with America, but on a realistic basis. Generally speaking, we have a positive frame of mind but not everything depends on us.

G. ANDREOTTI. Some words about an international conference on the Middle East. I am personally advocating serious preparations for a conference. During meetings in the US I even used the expression "preparations for preparations."

For if there are no serious preparations for an international conference then it will be doomed to failure from the beginning. Such carelessness is impermissible.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We are of this same opinion.

G. ANDREOTTI. You obviously know about the differences with the Israeli leadership, including those which are public. The prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs often come out with not simply contradictory but even diametrically opposed statements.

I would like to clarify that in a document approved by the EC there is nothing written about the need to renew diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel. We requested that this desire be sent to the Soviet leadership confidentially, so to speak, "in their ears." This was my suggestion. I stated frankly that this issue is very delicate, and it is not necessary to make public statements.

On the other hand, Israel is probably right in some regard when it questions how a country that does not have [diplomatic] relations with it can participate in an international conference on the Middle East. Possibly you could reexamine this issue since you maintain diplomatic relations with dozens of countries which have the most diverse economic, social, and political systems. I well understand your difficulties connected in particular with the psychology of the Arabs. But right now several Arab countries are beginning to move in the direction of recognizing Israel. If the fate of the conference possibly depends on the issue of restoring diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel, would it not be worth doing this?

I also know about the difficulties with the Palestinians. We ourselves also suffer from them. Who should represent the Palestinians, [Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser] Arafat or not? We support Arafat inasmuch as we do not see anyone else who could be the representative of the Palestinians in present circumstances. Mr. Gromyko once said to me that Arafat is the "black cat" in your relations with Syria. But where is another representative right now who could represent the Palestinians instead of and better than Arafat?

M. S. GORBACHEV. We see both of these problems. If one talks about our relations with Israel then possibly at some stage of a movement toward a conference in the course of this process we could return to this issue. But not right now. It does not seem possible to pull this question out from the general context of the present situation.

As regards the PLO, we also are of the opinion that this is a reality which needs to be considered. If the interests of the Palestinians—and the PLO represents them—are cast aside then nothing will be achieved by any conference. There are things from which it is impossible to escape. The Soviet Union favors the PLO being a constructive participant of the Middle East process. We maintain relations with many Arab regimes in the course of which the PLO situation is also dis-

I would like to stress this: if a particular decision affects [someone's] interests, then the mechanisms for their [the decrees] implementation will be found. But it will not work out if something is not fully thought out in decisions and decrees made by the PDPA and government and the interests of one or another group of the population are overlooked.

NAJIB. I can say in this regard that the policy of national reconciliation has evoked a warmer reaction from the Afghan people than in the ranks of the PDPA. Regrettably I have to say that the activity of the Party is lagging behind the situation and the reaction of the population.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Probably the reaction in the Party is varied. Those who represent the working levels are trying to do everything necessary to satisfy their aspirations. However, obviously there is the leadership level, which is afraid of losing its privileges if the PDPA withdraws to the background under the conditions of reconciliation. They are concerned not for the fate of the Party but about some interests of their own.

NAJIB. I agree with your statement.

M. S. GORBACHEV. And everything turns on this.

NAJIB. What do we consider the main tasks of the PDPA and the government to implement the policy of national reconciliation considering the current situation? First of all, we have to concentrate our efforts on actively translating into practice steps to defend revolutionary achievements, especially considering that we are entering a new stage of the policy of national reconciliation. Today new complex and critical tasks are on the agenda which the Party should resolve in the shortest possible time. In this regard, in our opinion, the main directions of the work should be the following.

We think that it is necessary to increase pressure on the enemy with emphasis on stepping up contacts with various sectors of the opposition—monarchists, “moderates,” representatives of the big and middle bourgeoisie, clergy, and tribal leaders and elders.

We have to develop and carry out such specific measures which would facilitate the imparting of an irreversible character to the process of reconciliation, which the enemy especially fears.

One of the main areas of work is the expansion of coalition forms of power at all levels.

The task of creating a bloc of leftist democratic forces on a platform of support for the policy of national reconciliation, involving all patriotically-minded forces in cooperation under the slogan of defense of the independence and non-aligned status of Afghanistan, and the strengthening of friendship with the Soviet Union is being promoted to the forefront. In so doing we do not exclude that other forces acting in the conditions of reconciliation will receive access to political activity, of course, on the basis of their principles.

The PDPA has also announced and has stressed with

specific steps its readiness to create a multi-party system in the country. Political parties are receiving the right to [perform] appropriate activity on condition that they will act in support of peace and security in the country. Moreover, they will be afforded the opportunity to realize their goals and

The main thing is to concentrate efforts at increasing the combat readiness of personnel already on hand, and solving the problems of providing necessary discipline and coordination between various branches of the armed forces, and units and subunits. To put it another way, it's necessary to achieve a qualitative, not [just] quantitative improvement of the DRA armed forces. The problems of staffing combat units and subunits, the [manning] level of which at the present time is only 40% of authorized strength, can be solved only by transferring servicemen into them from logistical subunits, administrative echelons, and [other] staff.

What has great importance for stepping up the fight against the counter-revolution is a directive of the HQ [Headquarters] of the Supreme High Command providing for the creation of military districts and subordinating all armed formations to a single command within the zones of responsibility of the corresponding army corps. Such a measure will facilitate, in particular, more active participation by border troops deployed in border areas in combat operations to neutralize rebel groups. In this connection we are requesting you examine the issue of transferring the advisory functions in the border troops to the staff of the Chief Soviet Military Adviser.

In solving the problem of creating special purpose units of the "commandos" type by a call-up of volunteers, we intend to subordinate them directly to the HQ of the Supreme Commander. In addition, in present conditions we have to increase the level of coordination of the Ministries of Defense, State Security, and Internal Affairs under the command of the Supreme Commander within the framework of the Supreme High Command. Such a coordination of operations already exists, without doubt, but it is of a predominantly military nature, and it needs to be given a more political direction.

Taking this opportunity I would like to express appreciation

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M. S. GORBACHEV. But are there such possibilities? Are there are trained young cadres?

NAJIB. Yes. But they need to be used and advanced more boldly. In doing so one can in no way forget about trustworthy party veterans. Everything ought to be done so that their rich experience is used with maximum effectiveness. This will be especially important when the PDPA has to confront opposition forces under completely new conditions in a future situation.

I would like to consult with you on such a serious topic as the ethnic problem. We understand that the Party needs to solve the ethnic issue. And we need to take specific steps in this direction. Individual comrades even speak of granting autonomy to various ethnic groups of the population.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This is actually a very serious issue and it is impossible to ignore it. But the main thing is that such decisions not be artificially imposed and not conflict with existing realities. A mechanism has been worked out in Afghanistan over the ages which to a particular degree has supported mutual relations between the ethnic groups, sectors, and population groups in the country. Therefore it's important to look for such ways to solve the problem which would dialectically consider their interests and organically integrate the ethnic groups in the process of consolidating society. If you propose something new to the people which they do not understand, this can complicate the process of national reconciliation. In any case, it is more apparent to you, and only you, how to proceed. The main thing is respectful and impartial relations with everyone.

I'll cite an example of solving the ethnic problem in our country. At one time I worked in Stavropol' Kray, which includes the Karachay-Cherkesskaya Autonomous Oblast.' Ninety thousand Karachay, 35,000 Circassians, 14,000 Abazi, 11,000 Nogay, etc. live here; Russians comprise 53% of the population. Nevertheless there are newspapers and radio and television broadcasts; literature is developed; and instruction in the schools is done in all the national languages. The ethnic factor is also considered when assigning party and government personnel.

It is understood that the ethnic problem is very delicate and tricky. But it is impossible to solve other problems without solving it.

NAJIB. I share your point of view. Right now we are working on creating a Ministry of Nationalities proceeding from such an understanding of the problem. We are taking steps to develop the culture and preserve the customs, traditions, and the national characteristics of various ethnic groups. The draft constitution provides an option to create ethnic entities. But nevertheless I think there is no need for haste here. We ought not be eager to solve this problem by purely administrative methods.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Right. A normalization of the situation needs to be achieved. Live in peaceful conditions, and then it

will be more evident what ought to be done. Then everything will become clear.

NAJIB. Haste in solving such complex problems is extraordinarily dangerous. We already have the bitter experience of carrying out land and water reform. The mistakes made in this area were palpable, but all the same they did not lead to especially negative consequences. However if a mistake is made in carrying out ethnic policy, then it will be a powerful "delayed-action bomb."

Right now we are working on a well thought-out, considered, and scientifically-based PDPA concept on the ethnic issue. And we would like to send it to you after preparation of the corresponding document.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We will study it carefully without fail. But again I repeat: the main thing is to take steps yourselves. It is more evident to you [what to do]. In Marxism the main thing is recognition of dialectics and their employment in specific historical conditions.

NAJIB. Briefly about economic issues.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Is our aid reaching you as intended?

NAJIB. On behalf of the PDPA CC and the government I would like to express deep gratitude for the enormous unselfish aid which is being given our country. We see in this firm guarantees of a successful solution of revolutionary problems. Along with the large-scale free aid of the Soviet Union which is being sent for the needs of strengthening the armed forces and increasing the standard of living of the population, border trade and direct ties between the various Soviet republics and oblasts and Afghan provinces have great importance. These are no longer simply inter-governmental relations but invariably strengthening ties between our peoples. Without question, the development of such ties will

M.S. GORBACHEV. Not long ago in the CPSU CC a conference was held with the leadership of a number of republics and oblasts which were charged with implementing direct ties with Afghanistan, giving direct aid to the population of Afghan provinces, and developing human contact. This ought not to be forgotten in order that the free Soviet aid reaches those for whom it is intended, ordinary Afghans.

NAJIB. Eh. A. Shevardnadze told me about the results of this conference. We know well how seriously the Soviet comrades approach the question of developing direct ties. Recognizing the full measure of their responsibility for the successful implementation and the correct and effective use of the free aid being granted us, the Party and government leadership of Afghanistan is also trying to devote constant attention to improving the operation of Afghan agencies in these areas. At the same time it has to be said that shortcomings and oversights still exist in the activity of the Afghan side. We will try to remove them.

Taking this opportunity, on instructions of the PDPA CC, I would like to state several additional requests.

First of all, we would be appreciative of favorable consideration of our proposal for the command of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops and the staff of the Chief Military Adviser to give us assistance as before in the organization of work to distribute free Soviet aid among the population. This would have great political importance in terms of propagandizing the idea of friendship with the Soviet Union among the population.

In the interest of strengthening long-term cooperation between our countries in the economic sphere, we request you consider the question of building an approximately 200 km Kushka-Herat railroad branch line and return to the issue of developing the Aynak copper deposit. We understand that the realization of such projects is fraught with considerable expense in the initial stage, but all this would be repaid a hundredfold.

In terms of involving the population in supporting the government and strengthening the political position of the Soviet Union, the further improvement of trade, economic, cultural, and other ties between the northern provinces of the DRA and the Central Asian republics of the USSR can have great importance, but so also does the solution of the

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ciliation Council, and the Higher Council of Ulemas and the Clergy. In the immediate future we plan to prepare and send messages to fraternal parties and the Socialist International in which, along with an explanation of the substance of the policy being followed, we will state requests to give appropriate aid in its implementation.

In the military field we will solve the problems of neutralizing the irreconcilable rebel groups and destroying caravans with weapons, fortified regions, and bases. At the same time the implementation of measures to cover the border with Pakistan and Iran will be continued. Our goal is not to let the counterrevolution consolidate their positions, especially in the border zone, which should become a bulwark of people's power.

All these measures have been recorded in the composite plan of the PDPA CC Politburo. We will try to actively implement them in practice, relying on the aid of all the Soviet comrades working in Afghanistan. Taking this opportunity, I would like to express appreciation for the support which has been given us by the Soviet Embassy, Cde. Ambassador P. P. Mozhayev, the CPSU CC group of advisers to the PDPA CC, the Manager of Affairs of the CPSU CC Cde. Kruchina, and other comrades.

Considering the large and important measures which we

you foresaw this. No one inside or outside Afghanistan has suggested an alternative to the policy of national reconciliation put forth by the PDPA. This is a fact. Employing our terminology, it can be said that Afghan society has learned this through suffering. The people are tired, they want peace. This is the main thing. But whom does it not suit? The rebels and, excuse me for the harsh words, those who think only about their own hides.

The main part of the Party leadership is concentrating around the policy of national reconciliation. And Afghanistan needs these people right now. They will also be needed tomorrow. I would say this: the main criteria for assessing the political and professional characteristics of workers of different levels is their attitude toward the policy of national reconciliation. I am dwelling on this issue in detail because it is the main one. There should be no doubt or wavering in the correctness of Afghanistan's current choice. We are deeply convinced of this.

Now about the role of the PDPA in the policy of national reconciliation. Without question, the PDPA is the leading force in the implementation of this policy. And the more authority this program gains, the more authority the Party will have. A contradictory but dialectically clear situation is developing. On one hand, the PDPA, in expanding its social base and adopting a policy of creating a coalition government, is seemingly undermining its own authority. But this is not so. This is just an appearance. The true authority of the PDPA is being formed right now. It is necessary that there be no defeatist sentiments so that those in the leadership understand this correctly. While our troops are in Afghanistan, the process of national reconciliation needs to move forward as the PDPA views it and not as the rebels want. The potential of national reconciliation is still far from exhausted. It needs to be used to the maximum. It is impossible to replace it with anything. Right now despairing, defeatist sentiments and any doubts or wavering are simply impermissible. New impetus is needed to move the policy of national reconciliation forward. Please convey this opinion of the CPSU CC to the entire Afghan leadership, the PDPA Central Committee, and the government.

It is necessary to act decisively right now and systematically turn the policy of national reconciliation around. Create reserves for the future now. Create opportunities for a real presence of the PDPA in all areas of Afghan society now. This is lacking now.

We have carefully listened to your ideas about what needs to be done in the near future, and we support you. But information is reaching us that decisions made in Kabul reach the grass roots very much watered down.

When we talk about the second stage of the policy of national reconciliation, then we mean that it began on 14 July, that is, on the day when the Afghan government declared its readiness to extend the cease-fire and respond only to military operations of the other side. It is evident that in the second stage of the reconciliation the question arises at the practical level of forming a coalition government, and the creation of other parties and a bloc of left-democratic forces.

You cannot refuse to cooperate with those who do not share your point of view. On the contrary, you have to create real

which have outlived themselves. And it is correct that you want to hold a party conference in order to consolidate the Party and all healthy forces. Hence we support all your plans in this regard.

Some specific issues in terms of military policy. Those issues which you have raised require deep analysis. They go in the right direction. We will think them over and decide together.

I would like to stress one more thing here: the military policy, as it is being pursued today, suits neither you nor us.

president. But what then?

NAJIBULLAH. The Loya Jirga will first of all adopt the new constitution and then elect the president.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Will the Loya Jirga also remain after this? But how is it proposed for the president to be elected subsequently?

NAJIBULLAH. The upcoming Loya Jirga will be convened only to fulfill the above tasks. After the president's term expires in five years, a Loya Jirga will be convened again.

M. S. GORBACHEV. One more question. How will the representation from all the provinces of Afghanistan in the Loya Jirga be ensured? Or [will it be] partially, only from those which are in the government's sphere of influence and then it will not be fully legitimate [*nepolnotsennaya*]? Can you estimate how many representatives there will be in the Loya Jirga?

like to briefly touch on two more topics. Of course, the address ought to reflect a position regarding the issues of the further economic development of the country and Afghanistan's foreign policy.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It is advisable to describe the approach to economic problems so that the desire of the leadership to do everything necessary in the interests of the broadest sectors of the population, and in the interests of the peasantry, clergy, and ethnic entrepreneurs is obvious to everyone.

NAJIBULLAH. Agreed. Regarding foreign policy issues, I would like to say the following. The personal representative of the UN Secretary General, Cordovez, recently sent us his scenario for future talks about a political settlement. Obviously Cde. Shevardnadze ought to be consulted about this question.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But what do you think of Cordovez' proposal?

NAJIBULLAH. There are unacceptable aspects in it for us but there is a grain of reason, a positive momentum [*pozitiv*], which ought to be used. I think that we could send you our ideas on this account in writing.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Good, write them. We'll think about them and consult. It's possible that Eh. A. Shevardnadze will come to you.

The time is such right now that it's necessary to think very well and act. And the iron needs to be struck while the fire is hot. The people need to be drawn to your side so that the dynamism of national reconciliation is not lost. The counterrevolution has not yet really united. So this does not turn out like a train which starts moving and gains speed, and suddenly brakes and is stopped.

M. S. GORBACHEV. And think about one other thing. We could have told this to Reagan. The Americans seemingly want to take part in the political settlement of the Afghan problem. I do not believe in their sincerity. But everything is possible. In the twilight of its term, the Reagan administration wants to show that—together with the Soviet Union—it is contributing to a settlement of the situation in such a hot spot as Afghanistan. But, of course, they would like a settlement to be achieved in which the PDPA is shunted into the background, although it is already clear today that peace in Afghanistan can be achieved only by considering that the PDPA is an equal among other political forces. Nothing else will work.

We are telling the Americans that we are ready to support their participation in the settlement process. But in doing so they must proceed from current realities, that is, recognize that a government, an armed forces, a security service, a Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc. exist in Afghanistan. We are stressing that this is reality, as real as the existence of the opposing force. So let's find ways to solve the problem.

But you need to look not at the Americans, but promote the process, widely opening the door to the creation of a coalition inside the country.

On the whole, you've held a good party conference. Now your task is to urgently implement the decisions made and go forward. As regards those in the PDPA who do not believe in national reconciliation, these skeptics need to be given a good pension or sent abroad.

NAJIBULLAH. Permit me to express gratitude to you, Mikhail Sergeevich, and all the entire Soviet leadership for the constant aid and support.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Send our greetings to your comrades and wishes to firmly go along the chosen path.

stand that the issue of Afghanistan is not a simple issue. We have a more than 2,000 km border with them and therefore we need a friendly neighbor. But I can assure you that the Soviet Union is not hatching plans to create bases in Afghanistan. We have not been thinking about this. We think that it is necessary to conclude the process begun there on the basis of national reconciliation. And the Afghans have even said they are ready to give half of the posts in a government of national reconciliation to the opposition, including the post of prime minister. We support this but the decision is to be made by the Afghans themselves. Neither you nor we can decide how to divide up these posts. I think that if we advised our friends to act in the direction of national reconciliation, and you also conscientiously [*akkuratno*] advised this to those with whom you maintain relations—we know you have such capabilities since not long ago you received some opposition leaders—this would not be bad.

Speaking of the withdrawal of our troops, I will say that we are interested in this and have already begun to withdraw our troops. But you ought to cease financial support and weapons aid to the opposition. I can say that on the same day as the withdrawal of Soviet troops is announced they will not participate in military operations except for self-defense purposes. You yourself understand that the situation can be most unpredictable. It would be good if you and we agreed about cooperation and demonstrated this to the world. We favor an indigenous [*narodivshiy*] neutral regime in Afghanistan, a regime that would not be unacceptable to either of us, nor to the Afghans. Therefore let us agree about this and we will inform Najibullah and you, the opposition, about this.

R. REAGAN. We will try to exert influence on them. However, the president of Afghanistan has an army, and the opposition does not. Therefore it is impossible to ask one side to put down its weapons at the same time as the other keeps

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M. S. GORBACHEV. Yesterday I touched on the Afghan issue. I will say frankly: I have noticed from your side a certain restraint and unwillingness to get involved in discussing the ideas I expressed about solving the Afghan problem. Therefore I would like to stress that we are ready to talk seriously with you on this topic; moreover, to agree on several principal aspects.

If you want, then we will not make this agreement public. The Soviet Union would name a specific date for the withdrawal of its troops, and the United States would obligate itself to halt aid to known Afghan forces. That is, we would act synchronously. On such-and-such a day we would begin the withdrawal and on the same day you would cease aid to the forces in the opposition. When we name a day then it would simultaneously signify that from that date our forces would not participate in combat operations except in cases of self-defense. I again stress that we don't want Afghanistan to be pro-Soviet or pro-American. We think that it should be a neutral country.

It seems to me that such a suggestion provides a basis for our cooperation in resolving the Afghan issue. But I have developed the impression that the US takes the following position on this issue: the Soviet Union is "tied down" in Afghanistan, and let them get out of there however they want, and the United States will criticize all the time and then impede the withdrawal of our troops.

If you actually take such a position then it will be hard for us to find a common language. All the same, let's think together about some businesslike approach and joint practical steps. In our summary document we could write down in a general way that we discussed the issue about Afghanistan. (...)

R. REAGAN. In reply to the ideas you expressed I'll try to explain to you what difficulties we have in regard to, let's say, Afghanistan or Nicaragua. The present Afghan government has its own armed forces. If we agree with you that the Soviet Union withdraws its troops and we halt aid to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, then they would end up disarmed before Afghan government troops and would be deprived of any opportunity to defend their right to participate in a future government. Therefore we think that within the framework of our decision with you the Afghan government troops should also be disbanded. This would allow both sides to take part in a discussion of the settlement process on an equal basis...

G. SHULTZ. Regarding the Afghan issue, we think the working group has made a step forward. The Soviet side let us know that the issue of troop withdrawal is not tied to the conclusion of the process of national reconciliation. This process will take quite a lot of time and the Afghan people themselves will determine through what stages it must pass. It means that one element that has been lacking until now can be included on the agenda at the next stage of the Geneva talks, namely the withdrawal of Soviet troops.⁸

M. S. GORBACHEV. On condition that it is tied to the issue of American aid to opposition forces; that is, the day of the start of the troop withdrawal should be the same day that American military aid stops. If such an agreement is reached, then Soviet troops will cease participation in military operations and observe a cease-fire from the start of the withdrawal. The rest (creation of a coalition government, etc.) the sides will do and implement, whether by themselves or using the mediatory mission of Cordovez.

I can repeat what I said this morning – we want the new Afghanistan to be neither pro-American nor pro-Soviet, but a non-aligned, independent country. If we agree to withdraw our troops and the US does not stop financial and military aid to the opposition forces then the situation would only deteriorate further, which would make it impossible for us to withdraw troops. Therefore we tie troop withdrawal to the cessation of aid to opposition forces and outside interference.

I think that our discussion of this issue was good. I propose that henceforth we put this discussion on a more practical basis and begin a specific discussion about it.

G. SHULTZ. Yesterday in the working group the Soviet side welcomed US support of the Accords already reached in the Geneva talks. We said that one important agreement is lacking between us at present, namely the time of Soviet troop withdrawal.

M. S. GORBACHEV. [Translator's note: possible a word missed due to a spurious character at the beginning of the sentence] [More] about cessation of American aid to Afghan opposition forces. Let's agree on the time and annhemo*0.0008 Tcu -1.2

M. S. GORBACHEV. It can be said in the concluding document that after conclusion of a summit meeting the USSR and the US will begin specific work on this issue through diplomatic channels with the participation of interested parties.

G. SHULTZ. We do not object.



Conversation with US Vice President George H.W. Bush, 10 December 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

(...)

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yesterday, when we met with you, I did not see optimism from your side about how the Afghan problem could be unknotted, for a suitable solution could be found in Afghanistan, Central America, Cambodia, and the Persian Gulf right now. However, I felt that the United States had no special desire to solve these problems.

G. BUSH. When I was talking with Dobrynin he said that in his view Pakistan did not want to halt aid to the Afghan rebels and was very much afraid of losing aid from the US.

With regards to Afghanistan, we frankly do not know what contribution we could make to help the Soviet side get out of the current situation...

M. S. GORBACHEV. Regarding the Afghan problem, I think your administration could contribute to a search for its solution. If you would say that you are halting aid to the opposition, the rebels, with the start of the Soviet troop withdrawal, we would name a specific time. If this does not happen, if the US acts according to the principle “you got yourself in, you can get yourself out,” then the entire problem will be deferred. If we were to begin to withdraw troops while American aid continued then this would lead to a bloody war in the country. I don’t know what we would do then. The Soviet Union does not intend at all to tie Afghanistan to a particular political system. Let it be independent.

G. BUSH. And we are not in favor of installing an exclusively pro-American regime in Afghanistan. This is not US policy.

M. S. GORBACHEV. And we are not in favor of a pro-Soviet regime. Let Afghanistan be independent. However, the American side should not continue deliveries of weapons and the financing of aid to the rebels. We ought to take this up seriously in order to ensure the establishment of a coalition gov-

ernment in this country which would suit both you and us, and all domestic political forces in Afghanistan. Right now there is a chance for practical results.

(...)



Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with Indian Minister of Defense Krishna Chandra Pant, 11 February 1988

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

M. S. GORBACHEV. Please pass to Rajiv [Gandhi] that I very much value our cooperation and our exchanges of information through various channels about the situation in the region where both we and you have very important interests.

I would also like to ask you and the Ambassador to send to Prime Minister Gandhi one observation having perhaps a global character, an observation which is not superficial but born as a result of serious analysis. We see that the reactionary circles in the West—as distinct from realistic circles—are very worried about that the pioneering [*initsiativnaya*] policy which the Soviet Union, India, the Non-Aligned Movement, and progressive forces are now following. These forces are trying to consolidate right now and are looking for ways to seize [*perekhvatit*] the initiative and disrupt movement along the path which leads to strengthening security and improving international relations. This is not to the militarists’ tastes.

Therefore they have begun to literally attack the Soviet embassy and the General Secretary personally and are doing everything in order to denigrate his policy both in domestic affairs and in foreign policy. We see that Rajiv Gandhi and other progressive figures have not been ignored. This is a very serious fact which needs to be considered. Right now the periods of euphoria and panic have passed for them, and they are consolidating. For example, the Soviet Union, India, and other progressive regimes for them are like a bone in their

selves. Is it impossible to arrange that these weapons be destroyed within the framework of the agreements? For if the “Stingers” fall into the hands of terrorists and are used against civilian aircraft there will be chaos.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yes, this is actually a difficult issue. But if we raise it then they can say—and what about Soviet weapons in Afghanistan? And then the process could be dragged down since we don’t want to leave Najib naked.

Pass to Rajiv that we understand in the most serious way his idea about the need to strengthen the Kabul government in a military sense and consolidate its positions in Afghanistan. Everything possible is being done for this.

Of course, it is difficult to foresee everything. The Americans, and not only they, can also aggravate [the situation]. Why, we will think, how [are we] to behave in this case. Then they will completely unmask themselves.

K. Ch. PANT. Some words about the situation on the Indo-Pakistani border. Clashes occurred in September and October in the region of the Siachen Glacier. We repelled the attacks of the Pakistani forces; however there were casualties. Right now the situation is relatively quiet. But we have information that possibly they are preparing for new attacks.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I think that Prime Minister Gandhi expressed a very correct thought when he said that our countries should act so that Zia and the Pakistani regime have as little freedom of maneuver as possible.

K. Ch. PANT. There is one aspect causing very serious alarm which you know about. This is the problem of the creation of nuclear weapons by Pakistan.

Pakistan is getting enormous aid from the US. Of \$4 billion, \$1.8 billion is military aid. Right now the Pakistanis are on the threshold of obtaining nuclear weapons. This is our assessment and yours, too. This creates a very serious problem. We have acted honestly and done everything in order to avoid a further aggravation of this issue. However, a situation is being created right now where blackmail is possible.

Of course, we don’t want the resources needed for socioeconomic progress to have to be used for such ends. However our security is paramount. Therefore we have a dilemma before us. Our public is reacting to this very sharply. I could not fail to mention this in a conversation with you.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This is the continuation of a conversation which we had in Delhi. I think that it is very important to firmly hold a principled position. This will prevent the adventurers in Pakistan from realizing their plans. I think that the assessment of the situation which we gave in Delhi remains the same. But the situation needs to be watched all the time.

Record of Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with US Secretary of State George Shultz, 22 February 1988

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

G. SHULTZ. In any case we have discussed all the issues in detail as never before. We have not come to any special conclusions. But we have worked to advantage. Our discussions are becoming ever more sophisticated.

Regarding the problems of Angola and Cambodia we have agreed that there are opportunities for cooperation. We discussed the problem of the Iran-Iraq conflict. I would be interested to hear your ideas on this account. This also relates to Afghanistan

We welcome your announcement regarding Afghanistan. We think that the situation is quite promising right now. We want the upcoming round of Geneva talks to be the last. We see that there is movement in this process. We want this difficult process to finally be concluded.

At the same time it is completely natural that our side wants to obtain certain assurances regarding the substance of this process. Yesterday I tried to explain what this is about. Yesterday we discussed this issue in detail and I would be interested to hear your ideas.

I’d like to talk about the Middle East, the region where I will be going soon.

M. S. GORBACHEV. First an idea of a general nature about the role of our countries—the USSR and US—in efforts to settle regional conflicts. I think that we should show the world an example of cooperation in these issues. If we establish such cooperation then it’s possible to hope that conflicts will be resolved considering the interests of all involved countries.

G. SHULTZ. I can agree with this.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We will not loose the acutely painful knots which have accumulated in the world with other approaches.

I am saying this because I feel that you have maintained a negative attitude toward our genuine desire to work with you in solving these acute problems. Possibly the problem is that you developed this attitude long ago. But possibly the problem is the channel which, as we understand it, comes from the National Security Council. As before, there they think that the Soviet Union both today and tomorrow will remain a power with which the United States will collide everywhere in the world and is “guilty” of everything everywhere. If such an attitude remains then it is hard to count on progress and collaboe re03 -2to

And I've said this to you more than once and have said it publicly. If we and you are everywhere we are simply connected in searches for a balance of interests. Such an approach will stimulate searches and the finding of outcomes and solutions. That's our philosophy. It is important for an understanding of regional situations.

How is it specifically being interpreted, particularly in the issue of Afghanistan?

We came to Washington—and informed you first—of our plan of actions and invited you to work with us in a

the troops.

The initiative in carrying out the policy of national reconciliation and its propaganda are in our hands, and the path to victory passes through this policy. But, naturally, we are backing our steps in the political area with steps in the military and economic areas. If we want to defend our system, then it is necessary to raise the people's standard of living, and this is impossible without comprehensive aid from the USSR.

It ought, however, to be admitted that we are required to increase the effectiveness of the Soviet aid and reorganize the entire mechanism of its use. This is a high-priority area, together with the Geneva Process. We can get specific tangible advantages in it.

Speaking of foreign policy, I stress that the constructive position taken by the Soviet Union and Afghanistan has forced the enemy to go on the defensive, which has created additional opportunities. A letter received from Shultz, which

election as president?

NAJIBULLAH. They said that I needed to agree to two things –to accept a membership card of their party and give up the post of president. They said in this respect that while in Moscow I were to declare publicly that I am ready to sacrifice my life and the post of president for the sake of peace. I replied to them that I could think about the first. But they were too late about the second. I told them, you say that 80% of the territory of the country is under your control. Why then did you not take part in the Loya Jirga which elected the president since you could have voted in the Loya Jirga for another person and he could have been elected president. When I said that I was ready to give up anything, I was General Secretary of the Party, but not president. Now when I have become president I cannot betray the trust of the people.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Probably they have also begun to display greater realism.

NAJIBULLAH. The policy of national reconciliation is also influencing their positions.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The people will not support the fundamentalists.

NAJIBULLAH. We have our own “fundamentalists;” one of them is in Geneva right now (he has Wakil in mind).

Permit me to touch on the situation in the PDPA CC Politburo and Secretariat. Briefly put, the membership of these bodies has been confirmed, and there are no grounds for concern. We are trying to work actively on a collective basis.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In any event. You and your comrades should have clearly in mind that both the president and the others are always in the people’s sight. The alignment of forces can be different but if an emergency situation arises, we will come to the rescue and do everything necessary. Let them know about this.

NAJIBULLAH. I am very grateful.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I am saying this just in case. We are not immune. But our Afghan friends should act confidently.

NAJIBULLAH. Fortunately, I can again say that the situation in the leading bodies of the Party is improving.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It is important in order that efforts not be wasted on clarifying relationships at this difficult stage.

NAJIBULLAH. By the way, Hekmatyar’s representatives both directly and indirectly tried to find out how matters are with unity in the leadership.

M. S. GORBACHEV. You see that this issue is of interest to

both them and us but from another point of view. Each is pursuing their own goals.

They asked me in the West how matters are with unity in the Politburo. Generally speaking this is constantly tossed up by imperialist centers in order to inflame our population. They say that there are two, three, four groups in the Politburo, and some say that there are even five. They reason this way: if discussions are going on, it means that there are enemies of *perestroika*.

Another topic which is tossed up are relations between ethnic groups. They splashed out so many fabrications in connection with the events in Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹² They declare that the first person responsible for spilling blood is Gorbachev. But they are silent about the fact that Gorbachev’s address facilitated the normalization of the situation. This is not to their advantage. Returning to the theme of Islamic fundamentalism I will say that they are trying to toss this topic up on us here, in Uzbekistan.

NAJIBULLAH. Our old acquaintance Karmal is also busy with this matter; he states that M. S. Gorbachev remained isolated.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The policy of *perestroika* in the USSR is a realistic policy, expressing real needs. The people understand it. A parallel can be drawn here with the policy of national reconciliation being followed by the Afghan leadership. Of course, a strong political will and decisiveness are required. But what your comrades were telling me before the meeting with you shows that the process is going in the right direction.

Please pass on that we welcome the solid work by the PDPA CC Politburo and Secretariat under the leadership of Cde. Najibullah. Whoever acts in this manner is a real revolutionary. Those who are worried about their own income, who wallowed in mercantile ideas, have left this path. You need to be free of them. Right now when Afghanistan is at a turning point it is impermissible to think about income, payment, and portfolios. A revolution requires total commitment [*samootdacha*]. And at such times one need not fear strong, loud words.

NAJIBULLAH. The problem of forming a presidential form of government is very important but we do not have experience here. But considering the peculiarities of our society, the factor of the president has greater significance for us than the factor of general secretary. It seems to me that it’s necessary to create a small, but very active presidential staff which would ensure communications with the people. There is a basis for this staff but the work has not been completed. We cannot decide how presidential and executive power are to relate to one another. During the conversations in Kabul we asked you for help in forming a presidential form of government. As Eduard Amvrosiyevich noted, this issue is of course within our own competence.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In fact, we cannot dictate what you have.

analyze what is acceptable and necessary to further strengthen it and what is not.

A key issue at this conference of landmark importance will be reform of the political system. Of course I have in mind not the breakup of the government machinery as Lenin described in his work *Gosudarstvo i Revolyutsiya* [The State and Revolution] but its restructuring.

country, and not about incomes, portfolios, and selfish inter-

pects from the point of view of expanding contacts with the West and the UN. But maximum caution ought to be displayed here and be on your guard so you are not “swaddled” as happened in Angola and Mozambique. Progressive revolutions have long been underway in these countries but they cannot yet get out of the powerful embraces of the West. As soon as [Angolan President] Dos Santos tries to do this, they will practically seize him by the throat.

NAJIBULLAH. Dear Mikhail Sergeyeich, first of all I want to express genuine gratitude for the opportunity that has been afforded to discuss our problems and tasks with you and consult with you regarding issues which the Afghan leadership has to decide at this critical historical stage of the development of Afghanistan. I thank you for the explanation of the main points of the CPSU CC for the All-Union Party Conference. I am convinced the Conference will be equal to a Congress in its importance.

Briefly about the trip to New York and Cuba. In our view, the work done was quite useful both from the political and propaganda points of view. Of course, it would be premature to expect immediate political dividends since time is required for quantity to become quality.

I am happy to fulfill a request of Fidel Castro and pass on his warm comradely greetings to you, Mikhail Sergeyeich. I think that he has a feeling of genuine respect for you. For example, Fidel Castro told me that the policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan developed jointly with Soviet comrades has so impressed him that he would even like to revive [Cuban dictator Fulgencio] Batista in order to engage in national reconciliation with him.

M. S. GORBACHEV. (Laughs) I get the allusion. Generally speaking, Fidel Castro is different than [Cuban revolutionary and guerilla leader Ernesto] Che Guevara. Without question, the people love him and he enjoys enormous authority. In a word – he is a legendary personality, but legends should be constantly nourished somehow.

NAJIBULLAH. I agree with your statement. Now some words about trends in the development of the situation in Afghanistan. The beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops has complicated the military and political situation in the country. The situation has worsened in a number of border provinces; an increase in the infiltration of caravans from Pakistan with weapons is being observed, and depots and bases are being created on our territory.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The recent destruction of two depots is a good thing. This is how you need to act henceforth.

NAJIBULLAH. The main goal which the irreconcilable opposition is trying to realize is the seizure of a provincial capital which has an airfield. If this is done the main axis will be the seizure of Jalalabad or Kandahar where combat operations have been especially active recently, and also the creation of an airlift to receive American military aid, bypassing Paki-

stan. At the same time the enemy has intensified psychological warfare which is producing its own results and influencing the population of Kabul and other regions.

In the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command we have developed measures to launch strikes on counterrevolutionary groups in the regions of Jalalabad and Kandahar

(In the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command we have developed measures to launch strikes on counterrevolutionary groups in the regions of Jalalabad and Kandahar)

invited me to visit Pakistan. In his step there is obviously a tactical stratagem and a recognition of reality. He needs to consider the possibility of what will happen to Pakistan if the Soviet Union, India, and Afghanistan pressure him from three sides.

NAJIBULLAH. When did the message arrive, before the recent events in Pakistan?

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yes, literally days before.

NAJIBULLAH. It seems to me that your visit could be exceptionally useful in terms of [putting] appropriate pressure on Pakistan.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I am not going there. But if there is some positive movement in the position of the Pakistani administration then it's possible to consult and propose to Zia ul-Haq that we meet somewhere.

NAJIBULLAH. I agree with you that if there are constructive elements displayed in Zia ul-Haq's policy a meeting between him and the Soviet leadership could be useful.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We have repeatedly said to the Americans that the Geneva Accords concerning Afghanistan are a touchstone of the US readiness to actually improve relations with the Soviet Union. The latest information indicates that the US Administration is displaying increasing realism in the analysis of the situation in Afghanistan which is based on data of American representatives in Kabul, understanding the staying power of the present regime, and that it cannot simply be removed. Yet not at all long ago they had different assessments. But the smallest allusion to differences in the Afghan leadership and disputes which occur will immediately become known to the Americans. Therefore I advise you to warn your comrades that they be more careful and chatter a little less.

NAJIBULLAH. Thank you for the friendly advice.

Returning again to foreign policy problems, I want to note that, unfortunately, the Geneva Accords have not yet brought the expected cessation of outside interference. I raised these issues in conversations with UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordovez. They promised to take the necessary steps to activate a monitoring mechanism and assured me that Pakistan had reportedly expressed readiness to take all measures in their power.

In a word, the first 15-20 days after the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops were quite difficult: a certain tension arose in the Party and we displayed an unnecessary haste in our steps. But right now work is getting down to normal and we see our miscalculations and also our capabilities more clearly. A unique breathing spell has come when each of the sides is organizing. In my view, we need scarcely expect large-scale combat operations from the armed opposition in the near future. Fearing the Soviet troops, the armed formations

will try to amass their forces and at the same time step up propaganda work, sabotage, and terrorist activity. Moreover, the disputes between the foreign and domestic forces of the counterrevolution are growing stronger.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The armed formations which are operating inside Afghanistan are less extremist. They need to consider that they are in plain view of the people.

NAJIBULLAH. Exactly so. Of all the [rebel] groups the most active are those of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, which G. Hekmatyar heads. They are concentrating their main efforts on the Kabul axis, trying to sow panic among the capital's population with shelling and terrorist acts.

It should be noted that at the present time the population of Afghanistan as a whole is displaying a notable caution and a desire to get their bearings on the situation. It is waiting to see if the present government holds out or not. This also refers to armed formations created of rebels who crossed over to the government side.

We are acutely faced with the problem of achieving a decisive turning point in the psychological mood of the population. But this can be done only by launching decisive strikes on irreconcilable groups. This is the psychology of the Afghan people. If they see that we could teach the rebels an exemplary lesson then the balance will swing in our favor. In this regard I would like to ask you to approve several large-scale military operations. The armed forces of Afghanistan would take a direct part in waging these combat operations. Soviet troops would be in the second and third echelons. This would boost the morale of the personnel. And victory in such operations would give them confidence in their ability to defeat the enemy by themselves.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This can be done only if an attack is made on our troops. In this case our retaliatory actions would be confirmation of the statement we made that we will react to violations of existing agreements by the other side in an appropriate manner.

NAJIBULLAH. We will diligently put the policy of national reconciliation, which is gaining increasing popular support, into practice. The recent changes in the upper echelons of government, the appointment of authoritative representatives of the population by governors, and the creation of a coalition government have evoked a favorable response.

At the same time we intend to continue working with Afghan emigrants, in particular former King Zahir Shah, although considering the situation main reliance will all the same be placed on establishing contact with the domestic opposition.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Now you need not only to have intentions but to already be working.

NAJIBULLAH. We also will resolutely overcome intra-Party differences and attempts by individual comrades to abandon

and avoid supporting the leadership.

M. S. GORBACHEV. There is already a circle of people around the President who can be relied on. But it needs to be considerably expanded, contact made with representatives of various forces, and rally them around yourself. You need to work more actively with the new Prime Minister [Muhammad Hassan Sharq],¹⁶ with Layek, other comrades, and also with representatives of the patriotic clergy.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. Individual Soviet comrades have expressed ideas about the advisability of dividing the functions of the President and the General Secretary of the Party CC. This was not the opinion of the Soviet leadership and we have disavowed them.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I want to repeat what I have been saying: in such cases you could ask whose opinion the Soviet representatives are stating.

NAJIBULLAH. As Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, I will strive to keep all military matters under personal control. We are faced with big problems and we will need your assistance. I described my proposals in this connection to Eh. A. Shevardnadze and A. F. Dobrynin earlier.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I repeat: we will henceforth do everything to help you. But again I insistently call to your attention that you not squander our aid.

NAJIBULLAH. I would like to consult with you about this issue. In present circumstances the policy of exerting appropriate pressure on Pakistan seems important. In these terms the sending of Eh. A. Shevardnadze's letter to the UN Secretary General was opportune. The USSR MID Statement of 29 May 1988 was very important. Moreover, in my view, appropriate steps could be taken through the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow and also through third countries.

It is important to get the UN to have the groups of observers work directly in the border regions, in the zone through which the so-called "Durand Line" passes. As regards propaganda work, then it ought to be given a purposeful, active character, and to specifically expose Pakistan from the facts of [its] violations of the Accords. The main thing for us is to ensure the fulfillment of the Geneva Accords.

In conclusion I want to assure you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that we will do everything necessary in spite of current difficulties in order to preserve the gains of the Revolution, consolidate, and increase them.

M. S. GORBACHEV. You can always be confident that the broadest support will be given for your efforts on our part.

NAJIBULLAH. We consider the policy of national reconciliation to be part of the policy of *perestroika* of which you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, are the initiator. The ideas of *perestroika* have international importance and go far beyond national

boundaries. They have become exceptionally popular among the Afghan people and have been turned into a factor capable of strengthening their national pride. Therefore we fully understand the responsibility which rests on us at the present stage and will work persistently to translate the policy of national reconciliation and *perestroika* in Afghan society into practice.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It is important that everyone with whom you work and whom you involve in cooperation are imbued with the understanding that we have no secret, selfish designs regarding Afghanistan. Our policy has been and will be based on respect for the Afghan people, their values and traditions, and full recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union will continue to help you solve the problems of developing the country, move Afghan society along the path of progress, and restore general international recognition of Afghanistan. We are genuinely interested that there be a loyal neighbor at the southern borders of the Soviet Union with whom our country has a longstanding friend-

be drawn in particular from the fact that long ago they advanced a demand that President Najibullah renounce power as a preliminary condition for beginning an all-Afghan dialogue and starting the process of forming new bodies of power and holding elections. Now, such conditions are not raised, although President Najibullah himself has declared his readiness to renounce power for the sake of Afghanistan if, of course, the people want this.

The impression is being created that the Americans are actually concerned with the danger of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. They think, and they frankly say this, that the establishment today of fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran would mean that tomorrow this phenomenon would encompass the entire Islamic world. And there are already symptoms of this, if you take Algeria for example.

But the Americans were and will remain Americans. And it would be naïve if one permitted the thought that we see only this side of their policy and do not notice other aspects. It is clear that the US is not opposed to fundamentalism becoming the banner of 40 million Soviet Muslims and creating difficulties for the Soviet Union. They object only to it affecting their own interests. The US also approaches East European issues in a similar fashion, trying to tie them to the West. Of course, they would also like to see the Soviet Union weakened.

As regards the process of a political settlement of the Afghan problem I note that the RA [Republic of Afghanistan] government is operating from active positions here both inside the country and in the international arena and trying to make the negotiations process more active.

In spite of our own difficulties and problems and all the changes inside the country we, of course, considering all of these circumstances, will continue the policy of supporting the Afghan leadership and developing cooperation with Afghanistan. I think that today we are right to talk about collaboration, keeping in mind existing opportunities you have for this.

Another position with regard to Afghanistan—if, let's say, the present Soviet government were to leave Afghanistan to its own fate—it would not be understood in our society, although, of course there are people who think otherwise. These are assorted populists, etc.

NAJIBULLAH. Chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin publicly came out for halting aid to Afghanistan.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yeltsin speaks like "an old, broken record" always and everywhere. He has two themes in all: first, "the bad Center is guilty of everything" and second, "take everything in your own hands and do it yourselves". On a word a 1000-day anarchist who, it is true, cannot be

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activity?

NAJIBULLAH. In crossing to the side of the government they join various armed formations or take part in peaceful activity.

Thanks to the aid of the Soviet Union we are managing to completely solve the problems of supplying the population with essentials at a satisfactory level and to maintain economic activity. Only recently as a result of the delay of Soviet deliveries have there arisen difficulties in the supply of fuel and grain. I am confident that these are temporary difficulties which will be soon eliminated with the aid of Soviet friends.

As regards the state of affairs among the Afghan opposition, it is characterized by a continuing exacerbation of differences among them, and a deepening of the split between the Alliance of Seven in Peshawar and the Shiite organizations based in Iran. We are trying to use this situation to expand our contacts with various opposition forces, in particular with Afghan emigrants in Europe and first of all with the circle of former King Zahir Shah.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The extremist part of the opposition, as far as is known, has a quite negative attitude toward Zahir Shah.

NAJIBULLAH. We think that in any case the extremist part of the opposition will not participate in the political settlement.

Afghans who are engaged in these activities

M. S. GORBACHEV. The extremist part of the opposition, as far as is known, has a quite negative attitude toward Zahir Shah. NAJIBULLAH. We think that in any case the extremist part of the opposition will not participate in the political settlement.

government in which prominent people unaffiliated with a party will work.

NAJIBULLAH. Of the membership of the current government 17 were educated in Western countries, two in Egypt, one in Turkey, and six in the Soviet Union. I think that even US President George H.W. Bush could not suggest a better government make-up for Afghanistan.

M. S. GORBACHEV. A good argument which Eh. A. Shevardnadze will be able to use in subsequent conversations with the Americans. Actually, whom could they suggest? Hekmatyar?

By the way, how is the institution [*institut*] of governors working?

NAJIBULLAH. Quite effectively. Moreover, we have started to expand their authority. In a number of cases the administrative and territorial division was reexamined and new administrative units were created in order that the governor be first of all acceptable to the population which lives in this territory.

Returning to the theme of the work of the government I will note that without the aid of the Soviet Union it would scarcely have been able to deal with the problems facing the country. I will say openly that voices are heard ever more frequently in Afghanistan that supposedly President Najibullah and the Party say they are in favor of a coalition but in fact are not interested in one. In this regard a reason is advanced as an argument that when the government was formed by the Party its activity was provided every manner of support. However as soon as the government was headed by an unaffiliated person it encountered enormous difficulties in its work.

If we glance at the history of relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union then we will again be convinced that they are based on the firm foundation laid by V. I. Lenin and Emir Amanullah and have deep roots. Even in the difficult years of the Civil War Soviet Russia gave Afghanistan aid after they restored their independence. In turn, Afghanistan helped the Soviet Union in the '20s and '30s in the fight against basmachestvo²¹ and in the Second World War they did not permit their territory to be turned into a springboard for fascist aggression against the Soviet people.

From the middle of the '50s Soviet-Afghan collaboration actively developed in an increasing direction. Many in Afghanistan really saw and felt that the preservation and deepening of good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union had great importance for the future of our country. From that time they tied themselves to the Soviet people forever with bonds of friendship and sympathy.

After the 1978 April [Saur] Revolution and especially in the years that Soviet troops were in Afghanistan our countries reached an exceptionally high level of cooperation and collaboration. And although the leaders of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan have courageously recognized the errors of the decision to deploy Soviet troops, a considerable part of

the Afghan public nevertheless remains devoted to the ideals of friendship with the USSR and, as before, associates their aspirations with your country. In the conditions of a difficult military and political situation in Afghanistan when there is no longer support from Soviet troops, they closely follow how the attitude in the Soviet Union is developing at the present time toward events occurring in Afghanistan.

Obviously these people represent a considerable force in present-day Afghanistan and are right to think that the Soviet Union bears a certain moral responsibility that its loyal friends be secured a fitting place in the future structures of state power in Afghanistan. Naturally, certain biased assessments of Afghan events recently appearing in the Soviet Union cannot fail to concern your friends, against whom similar statements are being used.

I am convinced that past mistakes should in no account overshadow the reality and the actual state of affairs, which is more and more developing in favor of the RA government. The government of Afghanistan is acting aggressively and

NAJIBULLAH. I repeat the idea I told you, that the present economic difficulties of the Soviet Union are the problems of a transitional period and problems of growth. I am confident that the efforts of the Soviet leadership in the very near future will turn the development of the situation around in the direction of an improvement.

As regards Afghanistan, then we are already prepared for mutually beneficial collaboration with the Soviet Union, although in insignificant amounts for the time being. In no way are we interested in the Afghan people being perceived simply as a consumer and nothing more. And, all the same, for the next two-three years the development of the situation in Afghanistan will as before depend to a large degree on your policy.

Some words about Pakistan. As is well known, Pakistan is an artificially created country within whose boundaries they have tried to create a single nation on a common religious basis.

M. S. GORBACHEV. R. Gandhi, too, gave such an assessment.

NAJIBULLAH. Pakistan can be compared to a boiling kettle which is full of various contradictions and antagonisms – religious, national, and ethnic. In order to keep this “kettle” from exploding Pakistani leaders are trying to let off the “steam” of public dissatisfaction, diverting the attention of their people to problems of an external nature. At one time it seized upon the Afghan problem eagerly and actively heated it up. At the present time the Kashmir issue has become a safety valve.

For decades the military has decided and dictated the policy of Pakistan. And even after B. Bhutto came to power the policy of the Pakistani administration regarding Afghanistan remained unchanged: it was only sort of dressed “in civilian clothes.” Nevertheless, right now when Pakistan is allied [*zaangazhirovan*] with Saudi Arabia in connection with the conflict in the Persian Gulf and when Pakistani-Indian relations have sharply heated up, it’s evidently possible to expect some slackening of attention by Pakistan toward the Afghan problem.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mikhail Sergeevich, for the constant attention to Afghanistan and the support and aid which the Soviet leadership and all the Soviet people are giving us in our efforts to achieve peace and stop the war in Afghanistan.

Everything that I said about the importance of Soviet assistance to those Afghan forces which have tied their fate

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like to note that the exchange of opinions was exceptionally useful, in my view. The main thing is that we wound our political clocks, figuratively speaking.

I wish you success in your work for the good of the Afghan people.

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NOTES

¹ *Editor's note:* Excerpts from this meeting have been previously published in *CWIHP Bulletin* 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 178-181; and Anatoly Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, translated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), pp. 89-90.

² King Mohammad Zahir Shah abdicated in August 1973 and had since lived in Italy.

³ Also spelled mujahedin, mujahedeen, or mujahidin.

⁴ *Editor's note:* A slightly different version of these notes have appeared in *Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev*, translated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), pp. 89-90.

⁵ *Editor's note:* a waqf is a religious endowment

⁶ Also spelled Hikmatyar.

⁷ On 18 October 1987, Yunus Khalis [Khales] was elected spokesman of the seven-party mujaheddin alliance.

⁸ Several rounds of UN-sponsored talks on Afghanistan between Pakistani and Afghan officials had taken place in Geneva since June 1982. The tenth round of the negotiations opened in

ture.["]

["]The main value of all Active Measures lies in the fact that it is difficult to check the veracity of the information conveyed and to identify the real source. Their effectiveness is expressed as a coefficient of utility, when minimum expenditure and effort achieves maximum end results. Forms of disinformation basically fall into three groups—documentary (written); non-documentary (oral); demonstrative.["]

["]In KGB Residencies, the Residents are personally responsible for work relating to Active Measures. In large residencies, Active Measures constitute an autonomous direction of intelligence work; specialists in this kind of work are assigned to it. The KGB Chairman's Order No 0066 of 12 April 1982 required all FCD [First Chief Directorate] departments and personnel to participate in devising and carrying out Active Measures; young officers were to be given a taste for such work; Active Measures were to be regarded as one of

- Carry out disinformation operations about the CIA's contacts with individual Baluchi leaders, including some who had emigrated, either directly or through political figures such as [probably Former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur] Bakhtiar and [Former Iranian General Gholam Ali] Oveisi [Oveissi]. For the sake of credibility, compile and send out letters ostensibly from Baluchis to the Pakistan Embassy in the US and some countries in Asia, containing threats against Zia-ul Haq and other military and state personalities in Pakistan. It would be clear from this that the Baluchi leaders are receiving support and financial assistance from the American authorities and special services in pursuit of the idea of establishing an independent Baluchistan.
- Convey slanted information to the Iranian leadership on the Americans' intentions and specific actions, including those of agents recruited by the Americans through SAVAK [the Iranian Intelligence Agency], designed to detach Iranian Baluchistan from Iran and, by arrangement with the Pakistani authorities, set up an autonomous united Baluchistan within Pakistan.
- Convey information to Pakistani diplomats in Colombo, citing the Libyan leadership, to the effect that the leaders of the Pakistani Baluchis have asked Libya for assistance in the stdirership

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TASS reacted to this disinformation.

On 6 July 1981, a Soviet scholar and orientalist who was a KGB agent had a meeting with the Pakistani Chargé d'Affaires in the USSR. In a confidential conversation, he passed on the views of the competent agencies about the reaction of ruling and academic circles to the visit of Aga Shah, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to the US. Particular emphasis was given to the theme that the US assisted the Afghan rebels with arms sent through Pakistan; these arms were used not only to kill Afghans but also to kill Soviet citizens; the USSR would be forced, not to reduce, but instead to increase the scale of its military assistance. If Pakistan continued to act as an accomplice of American plans, particularly relating to the situation in Asia, the Soviet side would be unable to stand by idly in the face of such developments. The Charge defended the actions of his government, citing the impossibility of controlling the situation and activities in the Pushtun tribal areas.

"What are we to do?" asked the Chargé.

"I am not authorized and I cannot take decisions for the government of Pakistan, but I should like to draw attention to the matter so that you might give serious thought to the substance of our talk" the agent replied.

"But this is escalation of tensions!" the Chargé exclaimed.

"But is handing over American weapons to the bandits in order to kill Soviet citizens not escalation? Pakistan is being turned into the main base of bandit formations and the channel for the supply of arms! And the Soviet Union is to stand by quietly and watch this happen?" the agent objected.

The chargé concluded: "This information is important. Although I am reluctant to do so, I am compelled to report it to Islamabad."

When giving false information about Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan to the Iranian leadership, the Cheka⁸ sought to convince the latter that if elements closely linked to the Americans came to power in Afghanistan, the Americans, in the course of their struggle with Khomeini, would actively use his own weapon - Islam - against him. He should therefore pay attention to the subversive activities of the real enemies of the new regime, namely the West and neighboring Arab countries.

In order to exacerbate Iranian-Pakistani relations and develop the Iranians' negative attitude towards Afghan emigration, use was made of information that, with the support and agreement of the local authorities, the CIA had set up special bases in Oman and in Pakistan to train armed formations and to send them into Iran to carry out counter-revolutionary and sabotage operations against the new regime. The training was conducted by CIA officers, former SAVAK agents and officers, and Afghan émigré organizations in Pakistan.

On 10 November 1980, an Iranian Parliamentary Deputy from the town of Zahedan [in southeastern Iran], made a speech in Parliament exposing the hostile activities of Pakistan, Oman and 'other puppet states in the region' against the Islamic Republic of Iran. He referred to facts in his pos-

session relating to 'the secret involvement of statesmen from so-called friendly Pakistan' in subversive actions against the Islamic regime. The deputy used KGB briefing for his speech and emphasized the part played by Afghan emigration in subversive activities from the territory of He urged the Iranian government to take steps to put a stop to such activities and to define the status of the Afghans on Iranian soil, as they are used for political purposes by forces hostile to Iran.

An Active Measure, code-named 'TOKSIK' [TOXIC], was designed to compromise Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan. It put forward the idea that the Afghan partisans' main problem was lack of funds. Therefore to balance their budget the refugees were extensively engaged in selling narcotics in the West.

In Bangladesh, in January-February 1980 alone, 56 items were planted on the Afghan theme; 12 editorials tending to justify the incursion of Soviet forces in Afghanistan were published. They pointed out that it was only in response to the undeclared war of imperialism against the 1979 Afghan Revolution that the USSR, bound by a friendship treaty with Afghanistan and responding to a request from its legitimate government, was compelled to take this step.

As these articles did not have the desired effect on public opinion and the majority condemned Soviet aggression, the Residency tried, through agents of influence in the parties, to turn the public's attention away from condemnation of the occupation of Afghanistan and towards exposure of the reactionary nature of US and Bangladesh policy, and the US interference in the affairs of Bangladesh. If this also had no effect, then in the light of the situation and of the public mood, the idea was put forward that condemnation of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan had to be balanced with simultaneous criticism of the schemes of American imperialism.

tempts to create the appearance of good will towards India, but there can be no illusion about the fact that while Indira Gandhi remains in power, Delhi is bound to follow the Soviet political line.

- Consequently, there must be no let-up in joint efforts in the Washington-Peking-Islamabad triangle to destabilize the Indian government.
- The US is prepared to consider Pakistan's request for the supply of AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] aircraft for use along the border with India, subject to the subsequent equitable sharing of the data acquired between the US, China and Pakistan.["]

The KGB Residency in Delhi noted that, at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-aligned Movement in Delhi on 9-13 February 1981, the right wing of the Movement attempted to give the Conference an anti-Soviet slant, aA(quired b8.et-u0.0018 Tc)Tjtede,t Reot the fact

one headed by Dr. Nelin in Lahore, were up to in the country. (Note: 'Patriot', a weekly journal, was controlled by the KGB Residency in Delhi.)

The Pakistani newspaper 'Dawn' of 23 February 1982 reported a meeting between representatives of the US's National Health Institute, Paul Ahmed and Douglas William, and Pakistan's Minister of Health, Dr. Nasiruddin Jogezai.

This led to the production of the following press release:

[“]In connection with the expulsion from Pakistan of Dr D. Nelin for conducting dangerous experiments on the spread of infectious diseases, an American medical delegation has gone urgently to Islamabad in order to hush up the scandal which has blown up unexpectedly over the Lahore medical research center and to put pressure on Pakistan not to disclose what researches are carried out by the Center. The American delegation is headed by Paul Ahmed and Douglas William. The sudden appearance in Pakistan of a group of American medical specialists provides confirmation that Washington fears that their dangerous experiments with new biological components of weapons of mass destruction will be exposed, and it confirms the conclusion that Pakistan intends to allow the Americans to continue their dangerous experiments, in view of the probable use of the new weapons against India, Iran and Afghanistan.[”]

In May 1982 reports date-lined Islamabad appeared in the Indian press about the deployment of American chemical and bacteriological weapons in Pakistan.

“According to information obtained from local military sources, chemical reagents have recently been brought to Pakistan from American chemical weapon arsenals located on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean and in Japan; these are to be stored in areas close to Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar. As for the characteristics of these reagents, according to the sources they are similar to those used previously by the Americans during the Vietnam war. According to the same sources, the build-up of US chemical and bacteriological stocks in Pakistan is designed for potential use by American rapid deployment forces in the broad region of South and South-west Asia.

An understanding between Washington and Islamabad on the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons on the territory of Pakistan was reached as far back as August 1980, when the agreement on the activities of the American bacteriological service in Pakistan was officially extended. Item 2 of Article 5 of that agreement in particular gives the Americans the right, through the US's International Development Agency (USAID), to review the results of the work periodically and to put forward proposals for its modification. In practice, this means that the Americans exercise complete control over all aspects of research in Pakistan on the development of new types of chemical, bacteriological and biological weapons. This formulation gives the US the possi-

bility of determining unilaterally that it is essential to stock up and use chemical reagents on Pakistan territory. Clear confirmation of this can be found in the widely known facts relating to the activities of the Lahore Medical Centre, where American specialists were engaged in developing new forms of bacteriological and chemical weapons.”

Published items of this kind were picked up by TASS and reprinted in the Soviet press; the press cuttings were filed with the original disinformation material. To some extent they eclipsed reports in the Western press about the Soviet Army's use of chemical weapons against the Afghan people. The Soviet propaganda services denied such reports, attributed their publication to American pressure on the Western press, and blamed the Americans for the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

The KGB Resident in Pakistan, Akim, was awarded a testimonial by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov for the 'TARAKANY' Active Measure.

The Active Measures work of the KGB Colombo Residency in 1977-81, and that of the Resident, Grinevich, himself won a positive assessment: the Resident made skillful use of intelligence means and methods, the whole operational staff of the Residency was involved, and the output of agents was substantial. The 'Lanka Guardian' and 'Tribune,' periodicals controlled by the Residency, won high praise.


In 1980, the KGB leadership was told of 13 Active Measures carried out by the Residency. A complex operation to strengthen the international standing of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] and to develop a positive attitude to the work of Karmal within the Sri Lankan government and public won approval. The operations helped to moderate criticism of the USSR by Sri Lankan representatives and by the press with regard to the incursion of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

In 1980, 5,000 leaflets were disseminated in Colombo in the name of a fictitious organization, the 'Union of Muslim Youth,' in support of the Karmal government and condemning the actions of the US and the PRC against the DRA. The same aim was pursued through meetings, seminars, resolutions and conversations of influence.

Through the possibilities of the 'Sutra' Agency, a session of the Sri Lankan National Center of the Asian Buddhist Peace Congress (ABPC) was arranged to condemn the policy of China and Pakistan, and to press for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Arrangements were made for sending letters of protest

letters of protest to President Zia-ul Haq and to the Pakistan government's daily newspaper 'Dawn.' The letters condemned the CIA's activities in Pakistan and interference



expected a certain amount of initial criticism from the West but counted on the *fait accompli* being accepted by the world that after a short period of time. Brezhnev had hoped that the crucial matter of maintaining détente would override the problem of Afghanistan. However, after the surprisingly harsh US reaction was made public, Moscow took offense and decided to take counter-measures. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR were ordered to cancel imminent high-level talks with Western politicians.

from the chosen path with economic help. At present we do not intend to [act so as to create a] deteriorat[ion] in our relations with the West, although we understand that their offers are not unselfish at all." From the Soviet side, we have underlined we must not allow the West to trap us.

With reference to the Chinese question, N. Taraki by all means disapproved of the Maoist leadership and their activity, remarking that the leaders of China allied themselves with the enemies of communism. The People's Democratic Party has cleared the army and the state apparatus of Maoist elements.

The meetings with Taraki and Amin made the impression that the persecution of Parchamists was mainly motivated by a fight for position and personal antipathy. At the same time, it was clear that the Afghan leadership did not fully understand the negative influence of reprisals on the general situation of the country and the mood of the army and the party.

The talks were carried on in a comradely atmosphere. The generally warm welcome, the attention devoted to the position of the CPSU CC, the readiness to discuss even the most delicate questions with us is witness to the fact that they considered friendship with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to be of great importance. Taraki requested us to deliver to the CPSU Central Committee [the message]: Afghanistan will always be on the Soviet Union's side together with the socialist countries.

The CPSU Central Committee thinks that, during their further activities, the Afghans will consider our opinion, although—naturally—only the future will tell. Based on our information, repressive actions are being relaxed, and the process of partial rehabilitation of the leaders of the Parcham group has started."

Budapest, 17 October 1978

"In the past months in Afghanistan the internal political situation has become strained. Counter-revolutionary reactions, which have become stronger are actively supported and helped by the special services of imperialist powers like China, Pakistan and Iran. The strained internal political situation has been caused by the increasing opposition of the exploiting classes and the reactionary circles [that are] of the Muslim religion. In their activity against the people's democratic government, the Afghan counter-revolutionaries make use of the conservative and reactionary traditions of Islam, the influence of tribal leaders, the deepening class conflicts coming to the surface because of the land reform, the economic difficulties, the lack of experience of party cadres and certain mistakes of the Afghan revolutionary power.

The program of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is aimed at wide social-economic changes in the interest of the working masses, at the same time, in practice, they are only in the beginning phase of realization. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has not yet become a mass party and it has also been weakened by internal conflicts for a long time.

The Afghan leadership has abused its position both in the solution of party and state questions, because it has not only taken repressive measures against the obvious enemies of the republic but also against those hesitating as well, especially the intelligentsia. According to all indications, dissatisfaction affects the army as well, which has always been the main supporter of the fight against the counter-revolutionary forces.

Recently the Afghan reactionary forces have organized armed actions with foreign support. They have managed to draw one part of the population and a unit of the army to their side in the town of Herat. Order was restored in the town on 20 March.

The most active counter-revolutionary force is the organization of "Muslim Brothers," headquartered on Pakistani territory and which has wide-ranging support within the Pakistani government. From Pakistan, Iran, and China an enraged propaganda campaign is aimed at democratic Afghanistan and its government. From Pakistani territory armed subversion units are infiltrated to Afghanistan, they call upon the people to start a "holy war," [carry out] acts of sabotage, and start an armed mass uprising against the government.

Reactionary groups of the Shiite Muslim religion participate in the anti-governmental movement as well. Also a Maoist clique participates in it, many of whose members have received special training in China, and have been deployed in Afghanistan to execute diversionary and terrorist actions with the support of the Chinese authorities.

The Soviet Union has provided wide-ranging political and financial support to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, including [helping her to] consolidate her armed forces and does so even more in the present complicated situation. The Soviet press, the radio and the television reveal to a great extent the intrigues of internal and external reactionary forces [who are fighting] against the revolutionary government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and [the

Soviet Union] fight[s] for the consolidation of the new revolutionary system.

As far as we are concerned, we have drawn the attention of the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan several times—moreover at the highest level as well—to the mistakes of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the government.

The CPSU Central Committee expresses its hope that

criticism for its military inability in Iran and elsewhere while the Soviet Union put in practice those necessary measures that enabled it to protect its basic interests.

Concerning this, during the New York meeting, the leading representatives of the monopoly capitalist groups unanimously emphasized that the Soviet Union had to prepare for an extremely hard fight. Practically all conditions were given for the United States to step forward. In principle, the Soviet action carried out in Afghanistan meant that for the USA and her allies to increase their defensive power have been removed. They [the representatives] also laid out that this type of hardball politics required leaders who could meet the new requirements.

There were positions [taken by some at the meeting] that approached the situation and perspectives on Soviet-American relations from an analytical point of view. Several emphasized that the two great powers had not regulated to the extent necessary the competitive elements present in their relations. The melting pot-like international situation had brought about unexpected events and decisions that would have to be made by the Soviet Union and the United States. The coming decade would have been a hard phase even without the Afghan events. Nor were the two powers successful in regulating military competition either. Both parties blamed the other for their own increase in pace in armament.

The SALT-II [agreement] could not effectively put a stop to continuing the arms race either, but without the agreement the situation would certainly be worse. Besides, the ratification of the SALT-II agreement was expected by the White House by February 1980. According to the evaluations of the 128med the other fom0.0016of aseco tasis by dy chaved. They17d the be]-

exception, that the United States was ready to develop Hungarian-American relations. They underlined that the US wished to continue the subtle political discussions with the socialist countries in the same way as before. Several of them suggested that, in the present situation, the relations maintained with the individual socialist countries could ensure the continuity of the politics of peaceful coexistence.

At the same time, they stated that this readiness could not be one-sided, and such Hungarian statements as those concerning the Afghan question were of no help. They made it clear that in the United States there was a substantial number of people who tried to use the given situation to change the positive tendency in bilateral relations. The increase in their influence could result in difficulties concerning the official procedures for the further extension of the most-favored-nation-clause. A lot depended on how far official Hungarian circles would go in their statements criticizing United States foreign policy. They consider it also extremely important that the Hungarians should not make any backward steps in Hungarian-American relations. They underlined the importance of the Hungarian-American foreign political consultations, of further specific economic talks and of the realization of the talks to be carried out with the Hungarian parliamentary delegation visiting the United States

is willing to start talks concerning medium-range missiles, independent of the ratification of SALT II and outside the framework of SALT III, demanding to modify or at least, suspend the NATO decision of 12 December and its execution.

In the present situation, the Warsaw Treaty's initiative to summon an all-European conference to deal with the questions of military détente and disarmament is particularly important. It is reasonable to continue the consultations preparing the Madrid meeting, but meanwhile we have to make clear the intentions of the capitalist countries, what character they want to give to the conference.

It was important and timely to cancel the planned political contacts at high level with the United States and the FRG. The Soviet Union's further behavior with the latter depends on whether the West German government will take concrete steps to contribute to détente. It is beyond doubt that the communist community cannot be interested in the defeat of the present coalition government. Taking this as a starting point, according to plan, Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Soviet Union will take place in spring.

It seems right and reasonable to develop political relations further with France and the other member states of NATO in order to prevent Carter's policy from prevailing. By boycotting the Moscow Olympics, Carter wants to diminish the prestige of socialism. His endeavors have been thwarted so far, but the situation is still very complicated. The Soviet Union will hold the Olympic Games and we must ensure that the sportsmen of as many countries as possible take part.

In the present international situation, it is of particular importance to consolidate economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the countries of the socialist community. We must make efforts to specialize production and develop cooperation to reduce our economic dependence on the capitalist world. The competent Soviet organs should study the possibilities of accelerating the process and of elaborating our coordinated activity in the capitalist world market.

We should increase the cooperation between the European communist parties. For this, a good opportunity is the joint French-Polish initiative to hold a conference of the representatives of the communist parties of the continent on the reduction of military tension and the promotion of the issue of disarmament in Paris in April. Although for example the Italian and Spanish parties categorically object to participating in the conference, it is reasonable to organize the event and look for other opportunities to convince those who disagree. The CPSU keeps up the conversation and relations with the socialist and social-democratic parties. It considers it necessary to make relations more active with the Finnish, West German, Belgian and other parties in order to solve tense international problems. To beat off the American government's cold war endeavors, all forces supporting peace and progressive international public opinion should be mobilized.

The representatives of the other sister parties contributing to the meeting unanimously underlined the necessity of more frequent harmonization of positions and ideas concern-

ing tasks between the closely cooperating socialist countries under the circumstances of the deterioration in the international situation. They also thoroughly analyzed the causes of international tensions and their position coincided with the Soviet evaluation.

In his speech, [Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary] Comrade *Dimitry Stanishev* put a great emphasis on the Bulgarian evaluation concerning the political situation in the countries of the Balkans. He sharply criticized Yugoslav foreign political endeavors. He underlined the importance of activating our existing relations in order to influence the Western European political circles in a favorable way.

During the presentation of the Polish point of view, [Polish United Workers Party Politburo member] Comrade *Andrzej Werblan* dealt with the behavior of the governments of France and the FRG emphatically. He stressed that we should approach the individual countries of Western Europe differentiated ways. We should treat flexibly the existing political, cultural and other relations and we should strive to make new contacts.

[Czechoslovak Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee Secretary]. *He fl T(it necessary tomportally)600.0242 Tw[(pr*

Afghanistan during the monarchy, and later with the Daud regime, who took power after the coup and overthrow of the king in 1973. (Incidentally, Afghan King Zahir Shah had made a long visit to the Karlsbad spa, for reasons of health, in the early 1970s, inadvertently adding his name to the curious list of foreign statesmen who lost power at home soon after their stay in Czechoslovakia.) Czechoslovakia provided Afghanistan with economic assistance, loans, and weapon deliveries, including L-39 training jets.⁹ The relationship grew even closer after the April 1978 coup brought the Marxist PDPA to power. In the spring of 1979, after a visit to Afghanistan by CPCz chief ideologist Vasil Bilak, the Presidium of the CPCz Central Committee (CC) discussed a general plan for future cooperation and assistance for Afghanistan. Bilak had been in Afghanistan in March; where he observed, among other things, the bloody suppression of an anti-Communist uprising in Herat, the country's second largest city, during which several Soviet advisors lost their lives.¹⁰ Bilak submitted a report and extensive materials on the situation in Afghanistan, along with proposals for future Czechoslovak political, economic and cultural cooperation with the new Afghan regime; the report was approved by the CPCz CC Presidium in May.¹¹ The document concluded that "the fundamental changes in Afghanistan create new politico-economic and ideo-propagandistic conditions for participation by the community of Socialist countries. Therefore the policy of the CSSR will be to focus on further consolidation of the progressively-oriented regime in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] and its foreign policy." This report suggested various types of assistance and cooperation, much of which was gradually carried out in the following years.

The close relations between the two governments and the two Communist parties were illustrated by a number of top-level visits. In addition to Bilak, Foreign Minister Bohumil Chnoupek (June 1980¹² and April 1987¹³), Chairman of the Slovak National Council Peter Colotka (May 1983¹⁴), and Federal Vice-premier Josef Kempný (April 1988¹⁵) visited Afghanistan. Equally frequent were trips by high-level Afghan officials to the CSSR; the reception of Karmal in June 1981 was especially opulent.¹⁶

Divisions within the ruling Afghan party, however, posed certain problems for the CPCz. In 1966 the party had split into two factions, the Parcham and the Khalq. After the April 1978 Revolution, the two factions worked together. The highest offices in the party and state were held by Nur Muhammed Taraki, leader of the Khalq. His deputy was Karmal from Parcham. Conflict soon broke out, however; officials of the Parcham were relieved of their posts, some were shipped off on diplomatic missions abroad.¹⁷ The most important of these, Karmal, took up the position of ambassador to Prague in August 1978. Thus the factional conflict within the PDPA affected the CPCz directly and more so as the struggle deep-

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following day. The Bulgarian press agency issued a similar statement the very same day, followed two days later by East Germany. The positions of Hungary and Poland were much more reserved: they did not send their congratulations until almost two weeks later.²⁶ In January, *Rudé právo* published a long interview with Brezhnev in which the Soviet leader defended the Soviet position, and in the following days the paper printed the favorable responses of its readers.²⁷

From early 1980 on, the Czechoslovak involvement in Afghanistan increased. Documents show that Czechoslovakia was second only to the Soviet Union in providing extensive aid to Afghanistan (a fact for which the Soviets expressed appreciation, while not failing to call upon them to take a greater part).²⁸ During the period from 1980 to 1985, Czechoslovak grants and loans to Afghanistan were triple those of the GDR, and fifteen times those provided by Bulgaria.²⁹ Czechoslovakia signed a number of agreements with Afghanistan (including a treaty for cooperation between security services) and trained hundreds of Afghan students, technicians, soldiers, journalists, security personnel, and PDPA activists. Afghanistan was given a loan of USD 120 million and humanitarian aid, including equipment for entire hospitals. Economic support was extensive: for example, Czechoslovakia took part in building cement factories in Polichomri and Ghorī, a thermal/fossil fuel electric power plant in Herat, an irrigation system in Helmand, etc.³⁰ Large arms deliveries were a matter of course. The lists of materials delivered also contain some strange entries: in 1980 the Czechoslovak ministry of culture sent to Afghanistan books, films, and television serials (including the famous “Major Zeman of the StB”), and musical instruments worth 25,000 CZK. It would also be interesting to know how the Afghan comrades, in their struggle against counterrevolution, made use of the 133 wigs worth 15,000 CZK, also obtained from Czechoslovakia.³¹ The Presidium of the CPCz Central Committee approved its last assistance to Afghanistan in October 1989. They agreed then to the presence of a PDPA secretary in Prague, covering his office expenses for 1990 and 1991 from CPCz funds. The CPCz’s assistance was not overly generous: the Afghan embassy asked for 500,000 CZK, but only 325,000 CZK were approved.³² It is unlikely that the CPCz was able to deliver on its promise.

Strange was the fact that from early 1989, when both regimes were facing acute crises, Prague’s interest in Afghanistan actually seemed to increase. In prior years, the Presidium of the Central Committee had only irregularly received reports at long intervals on the situation in Afghanistan, usually in the context of important visits. When Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989, Prague began getting more frequent and extensive reports on the Afghan situation (two in February, then again in April, May, and in September).³³ The agony of a distant Communist regime, and the alarming fact of Soviet disassociation with it, perhaps drew an irresistible, foreboding fascination.

The documents from the Czechoslovak archives are interesting not only as sources on the history of relations be-

tween Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, but as a source on the situation in Afghanistan itself, and they broaden our understanding of Soviet policies. The situation in Afghanistan is covered in a large number of documents – records of conversation with Afghan officials, reports and letters from PDPA officials, or reports made by the Czechoslovak diplomats in Kabul. Their content is relatively mundane: much on the defeat of counterrevolution and the approaching final victory; requests for increased assistance, and the obligatory criticism, by whatever faction of the PDPA held power at the time, of its rivals in the other faction. Among the more interesting documents is a letter dating from March 1980, from the PDPA Central Committee to the Communist Party of China (CCP) CC, explaining the situation before and after the Soviet intervention.³⁴ Significant records include materials related to top-level meetings during Karmal’s visit to Prague in June 1981,³⁵ or minutes of an April 1987 meeting in Kabul between Chnoupek and PDPA General Secretary Nadjib, who replaced Karmal in 1986.³⁶

Documents casting light on the Soviet side of the issue are few. I have found four: the above-mentioned report of the Czechoslovak ambassador to Kabul about the opinions of Soviet ambassador Puzanov on the situation within the PDPA in August 1978;³⁷ a Soviet evaluation of the situation in spring, 1987;³⁸ a report by Soviet ambassador in Kabul Vorontsov for embassy officials of the other socialist countries in Afghanistan, (26 January 1989);³⁹ and the official position of the CPSU CC sent to the CPCz CC after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (17 February 1989).⁴⁰

The spring 1987 position paper signaled a change in Soviet policy. There was still talk of full support for the Kabul regime, and of the necessity for Czechoslovakia to provide increased support; yet, the emphasis was no longer on the unconditional defeat of counterrevolution but instead on a policy of national reconciliation and the necessity for a political, not military, solution. The two documents from early 1989 in particular show the efforts of the USSR to extricate itself from the problem of Afghanistan. The Soviet position paper stated explicitly: “...we withdrew our forces regardless of the fact that the other participants in the Geneva agreements broke the agreement arrived at. Under these circumstances Soviet troops could, and had the right to, remain in Afghanistan. Even so, the Soviet side, in the interests of Afghan reconciliation, and regional and international security, has fulfilled its commitments.” But under these circumstances the assurances, expressed by Kabul leadership, of complete understanding for the Soviet actions, as well as for the broad material and propaganda assistance that would allow the Kabul regime to survive militarily and eventually make peace, somehow lack conviction. The Soviet leadership put the CPCz on notice toward the end as well (the passage has a somewhat apologetic tone): “We would emphasize that we are not indifferent to what happens in Afghanistan. We will make broad efforts to achieve a peaceful and comprehensive settlement to the Afghan problem. We

trust that you understand our thoughts and feelings, our

The Afghan leadership is also undertaking a new offensive on the international scene. It is defending the new policy more dynamically, which has yielded positive results, such as diplomatic relations with Cyprus and Zimbabwe. The Afghans are approaching the Geneva discussions with generous and courageous policies aimed at solving the Afghan situation. Relations with India are being consolidated. Unfortunately, Pakistan has completely disregarded the local interests of its population by not adopting a constructive approach at the Geneva discussions. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there is an overall concurrence with all present aspects of Afghan policy.

The realization of national reconciliation policy is no easy task. Najib likened it to overcoming an unknown mountain where there is no smooth path, but where it is necessary to find an alternative way to overcome obstacles.

The Party is realizing national reconciliation policy with the burden of economic tasks that have gone unfulfilled over the past eight years. It is paying the price for past negligence and dilly-dallying in economic policy. The revolution brought with it many broken promises. It was like water dissipating in sand. The Party thus recognized the need for fundamental change. For this reason a special session of the Afghan People's Democratic Party Central Committee took place, resulting in the declaration of the national reconciliation policy. The idea of national reconciliation had existed previously. For example, the 16th Plenum of the People's Democratic Party Central Committee had presented a ten-point plan concern-

against international imperialism so that the burden of such

tions on various levels should be exchanged more frequently. It is quite clear that there exist serious reservations regarding a more active and involved approach to Afghanistan in the United Nations as well as other international gatherings between uninvolved countries. It is definitely worth considering looking into possible measures in the areas of propaganda and counterpropaganda with the aim of disseminating truthful information about the situation in Afghanistan. For the sake of brevity, we must do everything in our power so that nobody can doubt our support for the present policies of the Afghan leadership.

The Soviet Union is aware that its Czechoslovak friends, guided by an internationalist approach, are providing economic assistance to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it would be good for us to consider how to make this assistance more effective and how best to suit the needs of Afghanistan.

The Soviet side believes that its Czechoslovak friends

DOCUMENT No. 4**Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the Current Situation in Afghanistan, 17 February 1989**

[Source: State Central Archive Prague, File 02/1, CC CPCz Politburo 1980-1989, 106th Meeting, 22 February 1989, in Russian. Translated by Todd Hammond and Derek Paton.]

Report on the Current Situation in Afghanistan
(Comrade J. Lenart)

In connection with the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan we wish to share several views with you. First, we are grateful to you for the assistance and support you have provided both unilaterally and as part of the coordinated policy of the countries of the socialist commonwealth in solving a difficult problem we inherited in this difficult period of international relations, a period of growing tension and conflicts in the world arena.

Practical implementation of the line of a political settlement of the Afghan problem became possible only in the conditions of perestroika, new political thinking, the course of the fundamental recovery of the international situation, of unbiased, realistic approaches to the resolution of regional conflicts. We are firmly convinced that a solution by force to the situation that has arisen in Afghanistan is not only impracticable but also dangerous for the country and its people.

That is why the Soviet Union, in strict compliance with the Geneva Agreements, has completely withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan by the assumed date. Together with the Republic of Afghanistan the USSR has gone its share of the Geneva road with honor and dignity. We have withdrawn our troops regardless of the fact that the other participants in the Geneva Agreements broke the arrangements that had been reached. Under these circumstances the Soviet troops could have remained in Afghanistan, indeed even had the right to do so. Nevertheless, the Soviet side, in the interest of an Afghan settlement as well as of regional and international security, has met its obligations. At the same time, its principled positions and activities have been fully understood by the Afghan leadership.

The political line of the USSR is, as before, oriented towards achieving a general Afghan settlement, towards resolving the intra-Afghan conflicts by peaceful means, at the negotiating table. After the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union expects that the absence of foreign troops on Afghan territory will stimulate the peace process in Afghan society, and activate efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems. For our part we believe that the road to an internal Afghan settlement consists in the creation of a broad-based representative government, with the participation of all mutually belligerent Afghan groups. The Soviet Union fully supports the efforts of the Afghan Republic in this sense. Nevertheless, to form a government

that would truly reflect the will and interests of all strata of Afghan society is obviously possible only in a situation where fighting ceases in the territory of Afghanistan, thus ensuring the truly free expression of the will of the Afghan people. Concerning the future of this country, the Soviet Union, as we have stated on more than one occasion, supports the idea of an independent, neutral, non-aligned, demilitarized Afghanistan.

The situation in Afghanistan is at present very complicated; there is even a danger that military operations will intensify, at least in the initial period, as a result of the irreconcilable positions of individual extremist groups of the armed opposition. The future development of the situation, either along the path of national concord and the formation of a broad-based coalition government or along the path of an escalation of hostilities and tensions within the country and around it, will depend in many respects on how the other parties to the Geneva Agreement—the USA and Pakistan, who have direct access to, and influence on, the armed opposition, whom they support with supplies of arms and financial assistance—and on how actively the world community contribute to the implementation of the Resolution of the 43rd Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of the UN on Afghanistan.

The constructive line promoted by the Soviet Union and the Afghan Republic, which corresponds in spirit and letter to the Geneva Agreements, has created all the conditions for a cessation of the bloodshed in Afghanistan, so that the future course of events could extricate itself from a military solution and move to a solution along the path of peaceful negotiations and the search for mutually acceptable compromises.

The government of the Afghan Republic starts from the only correct assumption, that is, that attempts by anybody to take all power in the present conditions condemns *a priori* the Afghan nation to a long, bloody, civil war, to further victims, material losses, and the ruin of the country. It is precisely to ward off such a course of events that the proposals of the Afghan government—for the commencement of an intra-Afghan dialogue, the creation of transitional structures for the eventual formation of a broad-based representative government and a general, complete cease-fire—are to serve. It is characteristic that these proposals point the way to the free self-determination of the Afghan people, which has been so vehemently demanded by the opposition, and enables the solution of problems facing the Afghan talks, without force and the use of arms. The call for peace is not a sign of weakness of the leadership of the Afghan Republic; rather it is the voice of political reason, an admission of the priority of nation-wide interests over all others. It would be absurd, however, to assume that the Afghan leadership, which is giving up its monopoly on power, is prepared to capitulate, to leave the state structures and political life of the country voluntarily. If the extremist part of the opposition tries by force to gain advantage from the present situation, the Afghan Republic and its armed forces will have all they need, including the most effective modern weapons, to repel its forces, which

will be counting exclusively on a military solution.

The Soviet Union has provided, and will continue to provide, great assistance to the people of Afghanistan. The traditional friendly relations, good neighborliness, and cooperation between the USSR and Afghanistan has in recent years been supplemented with a whole series of treaties and agreements, whose aim has been the provision of continuous, long-term assistance to Afghanistan in the development of its national economy and in healing the wounds suffered in the long war.

Afghanistan now requires the general assistance and support of the world community. We are determined to do everything necessary to develop our bi-lateral collaboration even more effectively in the interest of the Soviet and Afghan peoples, both in the current phase, with efforts to restore peace on Afghan soil, and in future, after the achievement of national reconciliation and a political solution in the country.

We are prepared to share in the manifold assistance to Afghanistan, along the lines of the United Nations, and hope

or pro-Soviet Indian journalist D. R. Goyal: *Afghanistan. Behind the Smoke Screen*. (Delhi 1984), p. 277.

²⁴ See David Gaj – Vladimir Snegirev: *Vtor•enije. Neizvestnyje stranicy neobjavljennoj vojny* (Moskva 1991), p. 98f., H.S. Bradsher, p. 77, or A – K, p. 189.

²⁵ Súa, f. Gustáv Husák, unsorted materials, Afghanistan file.

²⁶ See. Christian Meier: “Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan und die Reaktion im Warschauer Pakt” In: H. Vogel ed., *Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan* (see note 7), pp. 273-289.

²⁷ Bre•nev gave the interview on 12 January; *Pravda* published it on 13 Jan., *Rudé právo* a day later: *Sovetský svaz nic neodradí od mírové politiky*, p. 1 and 6.

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**Memorandum of Conversation between the
Czechoslovak Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dusan Spacil and Soviet Ambassador Novikov
(written by Spacil), 12 September 1978**

*[Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC
CPCz, file Husak, unsorted materials, box Afghani-
stan. Provided by Oldrich Tuma and translated by
Francis Raska.]*

On 11 September 1978, I informed Comrade Novikov, who monitors problems among diplomats, at a gathering at the Chinese Embassy of the situation that resulted on account of the recalling of the Afghan ambassador [former People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) leader] Babrak Karmal. Comrade Novikov then had a long discussion with Karmal and his report is as follows:

Karmal had requested an audience with Comrade Mackevitch in order to resolve his personal situation. Comrade Novikov replied that Mackevitch was terribly busy and that he (Novikov) would be of assistance. Karmal said that he was at a loss as to what to do. The Afghan leadership had recalled him from the post of ambassador. He cannot return to Afghanistan because he would be arrested, perhaps even executed. He also does not wish to return to Afghanistan because his return as well as that of other [PDPA faction] Parcham comrades scattered throughout the world could result in great social disturbances and an eventual uprising against [PDPA Khalq faction leader and Afghan President and Prime Minister Nur Mohammad] Taraki, who is losing the support of the people. Under no circumstances does Karmal wish to leave Czechoslovakia for some capitalist country because that would be used by imperialist countries against the Revolution in Afghanistan. At the same time, he is aware that he cannot remain in Czechoslovakia. Not long ago, a relative, also a Parchamist and a leading Party member who had served as ambassador to Pakistan, contacted Karmal

rather terse. (Ka)

Soviet delegation:

“The coming to power of the People’s Democratic

The major conclusion finally arrived at was that the April Revolution is a crucial historical moment for Afghanistan. Under PDPA's leadership, Afghanistan was to abolish the centuries-long backwardness in its development; it was to carry out deep social and economic reforms to bring feudal social order to an end; it was to start establishing a society free from any exploitation. Most views of contemporary foreign affairs issues were shared.

Hence there are sufficient grounds to claim that all necessary conditions to develop relations with the socialist countries, and coordinate all efforts in the struggle for peace, co-operation, détente, disarmament between the peoples in Asia and throughout the world, are present.

Upon the delegation's return from the Soviet Union, the politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA considered all results of the visit.

Taraki pointed out the attentiveness and interest by both the CC of the CPSU, and comrade Brezhnev in particular.

The visit and its results were highly appreciated. All members of the delegation, the Afghan State and Party functionaries were satisfied with these results.



Diplomatic Note of Afghan Embassy in Sofia, 13 March 1979

[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, opis 35, file 361, p. 58-60. Obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Albena Stefanova and Baev.]

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

2. Hamidula Enayat Serdajh – former Ambassador in India;
3. Eng. Bashir Ahmad Ludin – former Ambassador in Federal Republic of Germany;
4. Dr. Abdul Vahed Karim – former Ambassador in Washington;
5. Abdulla Maliqiar – former Ambassador in Iran;
6. Mohhammad Jussuf Meherdal – former Ambassador in Saudi Arabia;
7. Babrak Karmal – former Ambassador in Czechoslovakia;
8. Nur Mohammad Nur – former Ambassador in the USA;
9. Dr. Anahita Rotebzad – former Ambassador in Yugoslavia;
10. Abdul Wakil – former Ambassador in London;
11. Mahmud Barakyal – former Ambassador in Pakistan;
12. Dr. Nadjib – former Ambassador in Iran;
13. Halilula Halili – former Ambassador in Iraq;
14. Zalmay Mahmud Gazi – former Ambassador in Egypt;
15. Mohammad Hakim Sarboland – former Consul General in Karachi;
16. Golam Faruk Torabaz – former Counselor in Washington;
17. Dr. Sadulla Gausi – former Counselor in Japan;
18. Poyanda Mohammad Kushani – former Counselor in India;
19. Mohhammad Faruk Farhang – former Counselor in Iran;
20. Mohammad Ali Amir – former Counselor in Federal Republic of Germany;
21. Nazar Mohammad Azizi – former Counselor in Italy;
22. Valid Etemadi – former I Secretary in Paris;
23. Mohammad Atila Acefi – former I Secretary in Poland;
24. Mohammad Ali Suleyman - former II Secretary in the USA;
25. Mohhammad Omar Malequiar – former II Secretary in the USA;
26. Abdul Hadi Vaydi – former II Secretary in London;
27. Mohammad Akmal Rani – former II Secretary in Iran;
28. Ruhula Tarzi – former II Secretary in Pakistan;
29. Abdulla Bahar – former II Secretary in Czechoslovakia;
30. Abdulla Laamir – former III Secretary in Pakistan;
31. Mohammad Junus Farman – former attaché in Washington;
32. Homajunshah Acifi – former attaché in Federal Republic of Germany;
33. Enajatolla Madani – former attaché in India;
34. Dr. Nangjalay Tarzi – official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Afghan Embassy in Sofia

**Telephone Conversation between Soviet Premier
Alexei N. Kosygin and Afghan Premier Nur
Mohammed Taraki, 18 March 1979² [Excerpt]**

*[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichennyy Kontingent"
("Limited Contingent") Progress, Moscow, 1994, pp.
34-40. Translated by Gary Goldberg.]*

*Top Secret
Special Folder*

KOSYGIN. Tell Cde. Taraki that I would like to pass on to him warm greetings from Leonid Il'ich [Brezhnev] and from all members of the Politburo.

Soviet Foreign Ministry Circular [27 December 1979]⁵

[Source: Published in Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy Kontingent (*Limited Contingent*), (Moscow: Progress, 1994), pp.88-89.]

Top Secret
Special Folder

TO ALL SOVIET AMBASSADORS

(except Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Havana, Ulan Bator, and Hanoi)

Immediately visit the head of government (or the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the person acting for him) and, referring to instructions of the Soviet government, announce the following:

As is well known everywhere in the world, including the government of (...) for a long time there has been outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, including the direct use of armed force. It is completely evident that the purpose of this interference is the overthrow of the democratic system established as a result of the victory of the April Revolution of 1978. The Afghan people and their armed forces are actively repelling these aggressive acts and giving a rebuff to assaults on the democratic achievements, sovereignty, and national dignity of the new Afghanistan. However the acts of external aggression continue in ever wider scale; armed formations and weapons are being sent from abroad to this day.

In these conditions the leaders of the government of Afghanistan have turned to the Soviet Union for aid and assistance in the struggle against foreign aggression. The Soviet Union, proceeding from a commonality of interests between Afghanistan and our country on security issues which has also been recorded in the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Neighborliness, and Cooperation, and in the interest of preserving of peace in the region, has responded to this request of the Afghan leadership with approval and has decided to send a limited military contingent to Afghanistan to carry out missions requested by the Afghan government. The Soviet Union thereby proceeds from the corresponding articles of the UN Charter, in particular Article 51, which stipulate the right of states to individual and collective self-defense to repel aggression and restore peace.

The Soviet government, in informing the government of (...) of all this, considers it necessary to also announce that when the reasons which prompted this action of the Soviet Union no longer exist it intends to withdraw its military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union again stresses that, as before, its sole wish is to see Afghanistan as an independent, sovereign state conducting a policy of good-neighborliness and peace, firmly respecting and carrying out its international obligations, including those according to the UN Charter.

The text of this announcement can be left with the interlocutor.

Report by telegraph when these instructions have been carried out.

**Soviet Foreign Ministry Circular [27 December 1979]⁶**

[Source: Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy Kontingent (*Limited Contingent*), (Moscow: Progress, 1994), pp. 91-95. Translated by Gary Goldberg.]

Top Secret
Special Folder
Flash [precedence]

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Meet with the representatives of the leadership of friends and inform them in the name of the CC CPSU of the following:

Dear Comrades!

Following the tradition which has developed in relations between our Parties, the CC CPSU would like to share with the leaders of your Party our views and an assessment of recent events in Afghanistan.

As you well know, a new progressive national [political] system was created in Afghanistan as a result of the April 1978 Revolution. Much work was done in the country to eliminate the despotic monarchy by enlisting the broad popular masses on the side of the Revolution; land reform has been carried out, and a large amount of land has been transferred to the working peasantry; the payment of *kalym* (compensation) for a bride has been abolished; and other reforms have been carried out in the interests of the people.

However the revolutionary events in Afghanistan have met with fierce opposition on the part of hostile foreign reactionary forces. Constant subversive activity from Pakistan, Iran, and China has been unleashed. In turn, the reactionary remnants of the old regime, landowners deprived of land, the former minions of the monarchy, and part of the Muslim clergy have unleashed a struggle against the revolutionary order.

To this was added the mistaken, it must be frankly said, dictatorial, despotic actions of H[afizullah]. Amin, violations of elementary norms of legality, widespread repression of everyone who did not agree with him, including those who for many years fought against the monarchy and actively participated in the April Revolution.

Having eliminated the former General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party and President of the Republic N[ur]. M[ohammad]. Taraki, H. Amin has recently hypocritically talked of humaneness and legality, given ultra-revolutionary speeches, etc., but in fact has carried out massive

The Portuguese Communist Party
The Reunion Communist Party
The San Marino Communist Party
The Syrian Communist Party
The Communist Party of the USA
The Communist Party of Turkey
The Communist Party of Uruguay
The Communist Party of the Philippines
The Communist Party of Finland
The French Communist Party
The Communist Party of Chile
The Swiss Party of Labor
The Workers' Party – Communists of Sweden
The Leftist Party – Communists of Sweden
The Communist Party of Sri Lanka
The Communist Party of Ecuador
The Communist Party of Japan

ganda fuss raised by the West about the events in Afghanistan.

Second. Regarding the tone of the speech of the head of the Afghan delegation at the Security Council meeting.

Comrade Minister, you have every grounds to speak not as the accused, but as the accuser. It appears there are enough facts for this. Thus, it is quite important not to be defensive but to vigorously attack and vigorously expose the imperialist intrigues.

Third. It is necessary to especially stress that the introduction of the limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was done by the Soviet Union in response to the repeated appeals of the DRA government to the leadership of the USSR. These requests were made earlier by both N[ur]. M[ohammad]. Taraki, when he was in Moscow, and by

events of 27 December 1979, which led to the change of the Afghan leadership.

Sixth. It can be stated again that the limited Soviet military contingent will be completely withdrawn from the DRA after the need for their presence in Afghanistan ceases, as soon as armed incursions and aggressive provocations from without cease and the security of Afghanistan is accordingly assured.

Seventh. Voices ring out in the West about continuing mass repressions in Afghanistan involving prominent Muslims and that the Islamic religion is being scorned in this country. These "condolences" are expressed not in connection with the acts of Amin and the victims of his repression and despotism, but about the removal of this executioner of the Afghan people from power.

Considering this, the positive policy being followed by the new government of the DRA headed by Babrak Karmal regarding Islam and Muslim believers ought to be firmly and vigorously stated in the speech of the head of the Afghan delegation.

Eighth. It is obvious that the nature of H. Amin as a dictator possessed of the ideas of carrying out repression and mass terror against the population of the country in general ought to be revealed. Give examples and facts. There are many of them.

Ninth. It is useful and important to say that the new leadership of the DRA has announced its firm intention to establish normal good-neighborly relations with its neighbors Iran and Pakistan. This DRA government announcement is being made when interference from Pakistan into the internal affairs of the Afghan people is unceasing and when the infiltration of armed groups from Pakistan into Afghanistan is occurring, that is, aggression is occurring.

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4 January 1980

tion. This aid had been given earlier, but now it has grown considerably. Afghanistan ended up isolated at the international level and relies only on the socialist camp, mainly the Soviet Union.

With the introduction of troops into Afghanistan our policy [...] crossed the permissible bounds of confrontation in the “Third World”. The advantages of this action turned out to be insignificant compared to the damage which was inflicted on our interests:

1. In addition to the confrontations on two fronts – in Europe against NATO and in East Asia against China – a third dangerous hotbed of military and political tension on the USSR’s southern flank has arisen for us in unfavorable geographic and sociopolitical conditions [...]
2. A considerable expansion and consolidation of the anti-Soviet front of countries surrounding the USSR from west to east has taken place.
3. The influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, has suffered considerably, especially in the Mus-

area and in every matter. [...]

Comrade Erich Honecker responded to the greetings of Comrade Babrak Karmal in the most heart-felt manner. Comrade Babrak Karmal's visit to the Soviet Union is being followed very attentively in the GDR [German Democratic Republic].¹² The party and state leadership are happy with its positive outcome. They hope that Comrade Babrak Karmal will visit the GDR soon.

It is good that the internal situation in the DRA is stabilizing. Both from an international standpoint and keeping in view that a contingent of Soviet military forces are stationed in the DRA, a political settlement of the Afghanistan problem is necessary. Such a settlement requires appropriate guarantees. In view of the policies of Pakistan and Iran, reactionary Arab states and the Islamic Conference, this will not be an easy task. The party and state leadership of the GDR assume that the Soviet troop contingent will stay in the DRA as long as necessary.

CPSU Memorandum, "The Position of the PRC on Afghanistan," 12 May 1982

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30/vorl. SED 31955, n.p. Obtained and translated from Russian by David Wolff.]

12 May 1982

CPSU Material

Strictly Confidential

The position of the PRC on Afghanistan

[...]

The policy of the PRC [People's Republic of China] towards Afghanistan proceeded, from the very beginning, from great-power, hegemonic ambitions and [Chinese leader] Mao Zedong's and the Beijing leadership's efforts. Already during the Chinese government delegation's first official visit, headed by Zhou Enlai, [he re was] direct pressure n

People's [Democratic] Party of Afghanistan asked the Soviet Union for help under our treaty of friendship. The Soviet Union gave this help at just the right moment. It was a matter of days.

The imperialists were even ready to let loose a regional war. But the timely help of the Soviet Union not only saved the Afghan Revolution and territorial integrity, but also blocked the imperialist powers' advance. The danger was that Amin, who had had the legal president of the Republic murdered, was in on the plans of American imperialism and that the forces against the party had won influence inside the party. [...]

In the last two years and some months, the national army, the security forces, and the People's militia have not doubled or tripled but quadrupled, and now with our own security forces we can eliminate large groups of counter-revolutionaries who are filtered into our country from Pakistan and Xinjiang, China. They can not make any frontal attack on us, rather they are organizing terror bands of 5 to 10 men to blow up schools, public buildings, hospitals, and other government institutions. They blackmail the farmers and other classes. This kind of counter-revolutionary battle creates problems for us.

We are in the position to remove counter-revolutionary forces in our country this or next year. But the main problem is that when we succeed in bringing over the counter-revolutionary elements through promises and offers, then new forces are slipped in from Pakistan...

HONECKER: In our view, it will be a very difficult process to go from a feudal society to a new democratic and socialist system, while there are open borders with Iran and Pakistan.

BABRAK KARMAL: 2,340 kilometers of border with Pakistan, 800 kilometers of border with Iran, and 96 kilometers of border with China. And they are all adversaries!

HONECKER: We understand it this way: the imperialists want the borders with Iran and Pakistan open, as well as with China, but the border with the Soviet Union should be closed. But not everything follows the will of the imperialists and the development of the world has its own law.

[...]

21 MAY 1982 (10:00-12:20 HOURS)

[...]

HONECKER: ... I don't need to emphasize that we are most closely allied with Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos. We have a friendship and mutual aid treaty with Vietnam and the same treaty with Kampuchea and now we are about to conclude one with Laos.

BABRAK KARMAL: And now with Afghanistan.

HONECKER: Yes. That takes place today. But I wanted to consider now the Indochinese countries which are threatened by the Chinese hegemonists. This is clearly our main thrust in this region; otherwise, we wouldn't conclude these treaties. We know how complicated the situation is in Southeast Asia. I had a chance to see it on the spot with [GDR premier] Comrade [Willi] Stoph and other comrades. We've supported Vietnam with over 2.5 billion marks. We've trained tens of thousands of specialists in our higher schools and even our manufacturers are organizing workshops for manufacturers...

As an expression of our alliance and solidarity I would like to present you, Comrade Babrak Karmal, as a complement to the print-shop already at work, with a photo laboratory as a present from the GDR communists. A photo laboratory can help to reflect reality and we know that image plays an important role in the fight for peace. We are deeply convinced that on the basis of the measures we have agreed on today, on the basis of our treaty of mutual aid and friendship, the cooperation between our countries in political, scientific-technical, economic and cultural areas will become closer.

In our view, we could also expand the education of your cadres in higher education and popular education as well as with experts in this area. Together with all these measures

vented when the roads were blocked in time by the armed organs.

mitted us to uncover and destroy a broad IOA agent network existing in Kabul (in the central Party and government bureaucracy, including in the SGI [Government Information Service], *tsarandoy* [police], and Ministry of Defense) and other regions of the country...

of the population. There are certain positive changes in the condition of the Afghan armed forces and the level of their combat ability.

Nevertheless no noticeable improvement in the military-political situation in the country has been achieved. Cde. Najib is objectively assessing the situation and understands the complexity of the problems which lie before him.

Najib described his assessment of the situation in the

Minister of Defense N[ur] Muhammed with Politburo member [and former Public Works and Defense Minister Col.-Gen. Muhammad] Rafi and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sh[ah] M. Dost with [PDPA Politburo member and former Finance Minister Abdul] Wakil (Dost would meanwhile continue to handle questions of national reconciliation but as a Minister for Special Assignments and simultaneously DRA Permanent Representative to the UN).

Najib's ideas concerning personnel issues are well-founded. The observations of Soviet representatives in Kabul, in particular, confirm that B. Karmal has not drawn the necessary conclusions on his own and his selfish opposition and lack of self-control displayed in ever more abrupt forms are paralyzing the activity of Cde. Najib and seriously impeding his work in the CC PDPA Politburo and the Party as a whole.

13 November 1986

looking on as they fight. The CPSU assumes that the Afghans must put themselves into play in order to let the Soviet troops leave soon. This could happen in about two years. The Afghan comrades were at first hurt. Najib knew about it in advance, but not the others.

He agreed with M. Gorbachev and said: it will be hard, but we can do it. Now Afghanistan is in a difficult phase. Najib suggested the solution of a national reconciliation and the Soviet side agreed. To his question as to who could be brought back from the emigration, we answered that he knows best. If someone is to be brought into the government, just do it, except for the key posts. Now practically everything is agreed except for the timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. With [UN Special Envoy Diego] Cordovez, we have be624viet s[csmsg0042 .0001 .hTj-a-half].

Comrades,

Our Soviet comrades have proposed that the People's Republic of Bulgaria, together with the other countries of the socialist community, provide additional help to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with view to promoting the national reconciliation process.

The Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] Najib at a meeting with the ambassadors of the socialist countries to Kabul, held on 12 April this year, declared that the PDPA and the DRA are in favor of strengthening and accelerating the relations with the fraternal socialist countries; more initiatives are expected on the latter's part, including initiatives in terms of an increase in the socio-economic assistance provided to Afghanistan.

The relations between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and DRA, and between the BCP and the PDPA, have been improving since December 1981, when the treaty on the establishment of friendly relations and close cooperation was signed in Sofia.

The summit meetings held and treaties signed between the two countries have been of particular significance for the further development of our bilateral relations. In this respect an invitation to undertake an official friendly visit to the P[er]eople's R[epublic] of Bulgaria has been made to comrade Najib, Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, on comrade Todor Zhivkov's behalf. Afghanistan suggests that this visit take place from 18 to 20 July or from 12 to 14 August. The BCP and the PR Bulgaria have been actively supporting the PDPA's policy and that of the Revolutionary Council and DRA government towards national reconciliation and normalizing the overall situation both within Afghanistan and in its neighboring countries by peaceful means; they firmly back up the friendly Afghani people's struggle to build a new, peaceful and independent and non-aligned Afghanistan.

Exchanges of delegations are being carried out on a broad scale. In 1986 our country was visited by the PDPA CC Politburo member and DRA Prime Minister of Sultan Ali Keshtmand, the PDPA CC Politburo member and DRA Deputy Prime Minister Mohammed Rafi, three ministers and other important politicians and state officials from Afghanistan. There have been several visits on the Bulgarian part since the beginning of 1987, including those of Krastyo Trichkov, vice-president of the National Council of the Fatherland Union, and Rumen Serbezov, chairman of the Central Cooperative Union. There has been exchange visits of other party, state or public delegations. A sustainable legal framework, within which bilateral relations may develop, has been established.

So far our country has been providing and still provides significant socio-economic assistance and aid to the DRA. This aid may be divided into the following items:

- a government credit of \$31.3 million has been extended to fund the establishment of cattle-breeding farm, a chicken-breeding farm, a fishery, a pottery and leather-processing works, and other properties

on Afghanistan's territory; the agreements already signed in this respect total \$31 million.

- a new government credit of \$30 million has been extended in 1986 to fund the designing of a brick works, the delivery and installation of its equipment, supplying with electricity villages throughout the country, building medium-size and small water-power stations, a mixed-type fodder plant, the expansion of a chicken-breeding farm, a fruit and vegetable-processing technological line;
- a credit line of 3 million exchange leva granted by the Central Cooperative Union in 1986;
- aid amounting to over 1.5 million exchange leva for telephone stations of the CC of PDPA and other organizations and agencies, textbooks, medicines, foods, footwear, clothing and special equipment;
- experts sent to work in various industries of Afghanistan's economy
- covering fees and other expenses for the education of about 100 students annually at the universities and the Academy of Social Sciences and Economic Management (the ASSEM) at the CC of the BCP;
- covering fees and other expenses for an 11-year education of 20 Afghan orphans at boarding-schools in Bulgaria;
- covering all expenses, including travel and accommodation of all Afghans visiting Bulgaria.

A sign of our solidarity with the people of Afghanistan

Report to Soviet Minister of Defense Gen. Dmitri T. Yazov from Gen. Valentin Varennikov in Kabul, January 1988


[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, Plamy Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan veteran) (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 397-98. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

(Secret)

To the USSR Minister of Defense
General of the Army, D. T. Yazov

I report:

...after the visit of [Soviet Foreign Minister] Cde. E. A. Shevardnadze Cde. Najibullah asked to meet with Cde. Layek for a conversation. It ought to be noted that there are very close relations between Najibullah and Layek. They often meet together to discuss various questions, chiefly to submit them to the Politburo or the Defense Council. For the last year and a half Najibullah has repeatedly sent Layek to me for frank conversations, the content of which was doubtless transmitted to Najibullah.



The unilateral ceasefire by the government has been extended to 15 July 1988. The economy has incorporated the capital of private Afghani, whose interests are legally protected.

Peace zones have been established in many regions of the country; over 120,000 refugees have come back, 35,000 former counter-revolutionaries have ceased armed struggle.

The military power of the Afghan army has been enhanced; the latter became quite obvious in the successful operation for the de-blocking of Khost.

During his visit to Moscow [UN Special Envoy] Diego Cordovez claimed that he hoped that the negotiations that are to start in February would end successfully. Afghanistan's and Pakistan's positions on the period within which the Soviet troops are to start withdrawing from Afghanistan have become closer. The former's position remains 12 months, whereas the latter's [is] 8 months.

Iran is not to join the Geneva process yet; it claims, however, that it will make an official statement about its sup-

tween Cde. Gorbachev and Cde. Najibullah and specified during the working visit of Cde. E. A. Shevardnadze to Kabul in January of this year...

ship to stabilize it. If measures are not taken in advance then many critically important regions and facilities can end up beyond the control of government forces in enemy hands.

Considerable men and equipment are required to protect such regions and facilities. Considering the low combat reliability of Afghan units in comparison with Soviet troops, one can make the conclusion that only bold and decisive steps in the use of actually available forces can allow [them] to count on success in holding important facilities.

In this regard it is advisable:

1. To examine critically the current dispersal of the troops of the RA [Republic of Afghanistan] armed forces throughout the entire country (especially the army troops, including border troops). Try not to hold all the main regions, as was ensured by the presence of the 40th Army, but concentrate efforts only on the selected areas ensuring the daily activity of the government and stability for the situation in key regions.

To create a concentrated grouping of armed forces.

forces training centers and military bases in Texas and California. American military aid is being implemented directly via the headquarters of the rebel parties. The main part of the military cargo intended for the rebels is initially delivered to the port of Karachi. Subsequent operations – storage, transshipment to regions bordering Afghanistan, and transfer of the weapons to the rebels – are done as a rule with the participation of Pakistani armed forces subunits and special services.

Since the beginning of 1988 intensive deliveries of military cargo from the US to ports and airbases of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and several other countries have been noted. Weapons and ammunition are stored with the expectation of future [use].

With the participation of the Americans measures are being implemented to convert the rebel groups to a regular troop structure. As of 1 March 1988 22 so-called regiments have been formed on Pakistani territory and in Afghanistan, 43. New fire bases are being created for the counterrevolutionaries and the system of command and control is being improved.

The number of American advisers training rebels in military training centers in Pakistan and active in organizing combat operations and engineering works on Afghan territory has reached 250. The presence of American advisers has been noted in specialized centers situated in the region of the Pakistani cities of Barsak, Kohat, Parachinar, Quetta, Peshawar, Jamrud, Sadda, and Miram Shah. Their presence (the advisers) in rebel groups was confirmed by chairman of the “Alliance-7” [Islamic Party of Afghanistan leader Muhammad Yunus] Khalis at a press conference in Peshawar when he reported the death of one of the military advisers in December 1987.

With the active participation of Washington a broad psychological offensive has been organized against the Republic of Afghanistan which has the goal of discrediting the policy of national reconciliation being pursued by Kabul and preventing the formation of coalition government bodies. More than 50 radio stations overseen or run by the CIA and USIA make subversive transmissions in the various languages of the peoples of Afghanistan. More than \$1,000,000 was allocated by the CIA for the training of propagandists from among the rebels in 1988.

2389, pp. 224, 228. *Obtained and translated from Russian by David Wolff.*]

Confidential (Doveritel'no)

The results of the negotiations between CC USSR Politburo member and USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze with US President R. Reagan and Secretary of State G. Shultz in Washington on 22-24 March of this year.

[...]

On Afghanistan. We firmly put the question on the necessity of the speedy completion of the Geneva process and the signature of an agreement with the participation of the US. In principle, announcing the desirability of a successful completion of the negotiations, the Americans are again raising additional conditions that can only be considered an attempt to slow or even disrupt the solution of the Afghan problem. In particular, under the excuse of “symmetry” of US and USSR duties as guarantors of the future agreement, the American side tried to get an interpretation of the agreement on non-interference that would have meant the legalization of Washington’s and Islamabad’s armed interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. Warding off these attempts, we suggested to the President and Secretary of State that they weigh

has been displayed toward possibly receiving as much material and other resources as possible from the Soviet Union and also forcing the Soviet military to use maximally the men and equipment of the 40th Army. In this regard the favorable solution of these problems does not cause a feeling of gratitude from the Afghan friends but on the contrary, induces them to still greater demands, even complaints...

And what is more, if the Afghan army, MGB, and MVD units displayed unreliability then Najibullah initially indirectly, and now even more directly, says that this is explained by insufficient assistance from the 40th Army. At the same time he is trying to reduce the negative aspects in the operations of Afghan army units.

Here are several examples of such operations.

1. Constant unfounded inquiries about additional deliveries of weapons and combat equipment for the RA armed forces. At the present time there only exists an objective need to increase deliveries of combat transport helicopters. It is necessary to note in this regard that the organization of the combat employment of helicopters remains extremely poor in spite of measures taken by Soviet advisers. This leads to an unjustifiably large number of losses (in just the last month the RA Air Force lost four fixed-wing aircraft and eight helicopters). As regards other types of weapons, there should not be issues here. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly reported to Najibullah that the available combat equipment and crew-served weapons are not completely employed since they are very badly supplied with specialists (from 20 to 40% of tanks, BMPs [infantry combat vehicles], BTRs [armored transport vehicles], field guns, and mortars do not have crews, and many vehicles do not even have drivers) and accordingly are not being used.

In varied form and constantly (for the third year) insistent desires are expressed that military draft work be improved...Only in this case can they count on the maximum use of the potential which the army and the other branches of the armed forces already have through their own supply of technical equipment...

Memorandum from the International Relations Department of the BCP CC to Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 3 August 1988

Regarding: widening the political, economic and moral support to the Republic of Afghanistan

Comrades,

In connection with comrade Mikhail Gorbachev's letter to comrade Todor Zhivkov regarding Afghanistan, in view of the new situation in that country after signing the Geneva Agreements, the Politburo of the BCP CC entrusted the Foreign Affairs Commission at Politburo and Secretariat of the Bulgarian Communist Party with the preparation of an offer for the further widening of the political, economic, and moral support of the Republic of Afghanistan (Protocol No, 72 of 17 May 1988).

Additionally a letter was received by comrade Georgi Atanasov from Afghanistan's Prime-Minister Mohammad Hassan Sharq with an appeal for help at this difficult moment.

We are proposing a draft for decision, worked out by the Commission for Foreign Affairs at the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CC BCP with the participation of the "International Relations Department" of the CC BCP, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

The draft of a resolution has been coordinated with the "Organizational", "Economic and Scientific-technical policy" and "Financial Economic" Departments of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

3 August 1988

First deputy-head of the "Foreign Policy and International Relations" department of the CC BCP:/K. Atanasov/

A. Masoud .LnfigurewhoC enjoys undisputedauthorirty

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step would inflict damage to the prestige of the Sovip2296.7wiiionTT2 0 -19.9TD5 Tw(W)T759614step from which itd inflibe difficulthe prec

Najibullah's regime should ensure, from a position of strength, not of weakness, that the most irreconcilable opposition factions are driven back which, relying on the aid and support of Pakistan and the US, are rejecting peace initiatives of the Afghan government to reach compromise agreements and are increasing military pressure on government positions in a majority of provinces of the country.

At the present time the rebels control four of the 32 provinces of the country. They are presently stepping up their efforts to control more provinces.

The rebels are relying on the aid and support of Pakistan and the US, which are rejecting peace initiatives of the Afghan government to reach compromise agreements and are increasing military pressure on government positions in a majority of provinces of the country.

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bat readiness.

With respect, Ahmad Shah Masoud
26 December 1988

On the preliminary level we would say that the idea of creating an "air bridge" to Kabul is completely doable.

The issue of carrying out air strikes from the Soviet Union has a very delicate nature. We understand that it will be difficult for you to do without the support of Soviet aircraft but it is one thing to launch strikes when Soviet troops are present and another after their withdrawal...Such measures could unavoidably provoke countermeasures from the US and Pakistan and an unfavorable international reaction.

We also consider it necessary to urgently study the issue of providing security for the Hayraton-Kabul highway, It is clear that without the use of the road it would be practically impossible to solve the problem of supplying the capital...(Kabul, 13.1.1989)...

[RA Prime Minister] M. H. SHARQ. Earlier we thought that all the damage which our motherland had suffered was connected with the war; however now we are convinced that the current administrative system has done us no less harm... We have a completely unrealistic budget which is based not so much on domestic sources of income but on free aid from the Soviet Union... You are giving us across-the-board aid but we have not justified your trust. The people ask why this happens... Our armed forces cannot provide security for freight shipments. At the transshipment bases bordering the

comprehensive assistance to organize security for this highway using their own forces, even as far as assuming the provisioning of these Afghan subunits [*vzyatiye...na nashe dovol'stviye*] for a certain time. USSR Gosplan and the USSR

change ideas, I decided to use this opportunity to describe

