

In the summer of 1999 the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, in cooperation with the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), launched a new initiative, "Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Cold War." The main goal of the project was to explore the archives in Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku to determine to what extent Cold War era documents, including materials still classified in the central archives in Moscow, would be accessible there. The Caucasus Initiative also aimed at bringing scholars from these three republics into the larger international network of Cold War scholars and at incorporating the results of the regional scholars' research into the wider canvas of historiography of Cold War and Soviet history. The first meeting of scholars from Tbilisi, Baku, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and

Yerevan (Tbilisi State University), *Jamil Hasanli* (Baku State University), *Eldar Ismailov* (Baku State University), *Georgi Kldiashvili* (Tbilisi State University), *Marziya Mammadova* (Baku State University), *Georgy Mamulia* (Black Sea University), *Eduard Mirzayan* (Institute of General History, Armenia), *Karen Nisenzon* (Institute of General History of Armenia), *Yan Rostiashvili* (Tbilisi University), *Ronald G. Suny* (University of Chicago), *Francoise Thom* (Sorbonne University), *Amatun Virabian* (Archival Department of the Republic of Armenia), and

of Azerbaijan (ADP) claimed political control over the ethnically Azeri territories in northern Iran. In combination with Stalin's refusal to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran, this effort unleashed one of the first international crises of the Cold War. Pressed by the United States and the United Nations, Stalin pulled his troops out of Iran in 1946. Subsequent events showed that the Soviet leader coldly sacrificed ADP leaders, Kurdish separatists, and other nationalist activists had cast their lot in with the Soviets. While *Hasanli* persuasively argued that Soviet goals in Iran were a combination of economic (oil) and security interests, the importance of regional nationalist aims during the crisis should not be discounted. Even today some scholars in Azerbaijan see the outcome of the Iranian crisis as a setback for their republic.

In her paper *Laura Abbasova* looked at another crisis that contributed to the rise of the Cold War: Soviet territorial claims on Turkey in 1945-1946, which eventually jolted Washington into action. Relying on archival evidence from Baku, as well as documents provided by other participants at the October 2000 workshop, Abbasova found, much to her surprise, that, behind the edifice of Soviet foreign policy, another "cold war" was being fought among the leaderships of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Soviet demands on Turkey revived the aspirations of Armenians, who remembered vividly their forced exodus from Turkish territories where they had lived for centuries. But the Soviet claims also intersected with the demands of the Georgian leadership to 'reclaim the historic lands' populated by the Laz in Trabzon along the south-eastern coast of the Black Sea. Authorized by Moscow (where Georgians were prominently represented in the Soviet leadership), Georgian historians Dzhnashia and N. Berdzenishvili published an article in December 1945 providing the historical and cultural justification for annexation of Trabzon. Their main rivals were the Armenians who argued that, out of 26,000 square kilometers (sq. km.) of the claimed Turkish territories, 20,500 sq.km. should be incorporated into the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. In response, Georgian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Kiknadze sent

asked whether they realized they were in effect supporting annexation of Turkish lands by the Soviet Union.⁴ The Armenians left the meeting in dismay, realizing that their hopes were not to be fulfilled. As the rivalry between the United States and the USSR grew, both great powers used the Armenian Diaspora as a tool to promote their influence in the Middle East.

Georgy Mamulia presented Georgian findings and perspectives on the thorny issue of territorial claims and ethnic



politics behind the façade of the Turkish and Iranian crises.

Azerbaijan. Considering his central role in 1945-46, it was fascinating to learn how Bagirov managed to survive the failure of Stalin's gamble in northern Iran. Besides his friendship with Beria, the key to Bagirov's survival was the fact that he was the first ethnic Azeri to hold the post of first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Historically and culturally, the population of Azerbaijan was a potentially explosive ethnic mix. Moreover, because of its oil, the republic was also of special strategic significance to the Soviet Union. *Ismailov* portrayed Bagirov as a man of limited education, but with great acumen and political instincts. New tensions over Iran and Turkey could have presented a threat to Bagirov's position. Stalin's ever suspicious plot-seeking mind could have conceivably turned against leaders of Turkic ethnic origins, as Turkey came to be seen as a possible base for infiltration of Azerbaijan. Bagirov understood this danger well and pre-emptively decided to lead the campaign to denounce pan-Turkic tendencies. In 1949 he launched a campaign to denounce Imam Shamil, the leader of the anti-Russian independence movement in the Caucasus in 1840s and 1850s. According to documents found by *Ismailov* in the Baku archives, during the Azeri leader's meetings with Stalin, Bagirov proposed that the history of Islamic peoples living on Soviet territory be rewritten. Subsequently, Bagirov moved to eradicate Turkic cultural ties among Azeri educated elites and stressed an "Azerbaijani identity" quite distinct from a pan-Turkic identity. In the context of the propagandist preparations of the early Cold War, Stalin could not have but appreciated Bagirov's efforts to create anti-Turkish sentiments in Azerbaijan.

To pre-empt Stalin's potential suspicions, Bagirov also unleashed massive repression against those party members who had any connections with Iran or Turkey—having relatives in those countries or even having visited them was considered sufficient grounds for a person to be forcibly relocated away from the border areas to other regions of the country. Finally, Bagirov proposed to Stalin that veterans of the ADP and other separatist movements, who after 1946 had found refuge in Baku, should be relocated to Siberia or Kazakhstan.

Georgy Kldiashvili and *Levan Avalishvili*, two young historians from Georgia, examined Georgia's role in the USSR's military preparations during the Cold War. Chronologically this paper was broad, covering the period from 1946 through the 1970s. During the early phase of the Cold War, particularly when tensions between the USSR and Turkey remained high, military installations were constructed in Georgia on a significant scale. The paper did not provide any conclusive evidence on war preparations against Turkey. Much more significant was the material on the readiness of Georgia for a possible aerial attack and atomic warfare. As Georgian archival documents show, the republic did not have a functioning civil defense system in 1950. A spate of measures intended to correct this situation were planned for 1951-1952. But the Georgian authorities failed to implement the plans for aerial and atomic defense after Stalin's death, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis caught them totally unprepared. Beginning in

1963 new allocations of funds and prodding from Moscow forced Georgian leaders to address their previous slacking and neglect. For instance, construction of a communication center for "special conditions" (i.e., war), planned as early as 1958, finally began in 1963. This haphazard approach, as the available documents suggest, continued until the end of the Soviet Union.

What happened to a considerable part of the military construction allocations in Georgia can be deduced from the paper of *Ketevan Rostiashvili* on the growing corruption in the republic. By the end of the 1960s, the Georgian economy was choked by corruption. *Rostiashvili* estimated that 50-60 percent, perhaps as much as 70 percent of the Georgian economy moved into the "gray" or black market. Official reports of the Union ministries (including the USSR Ministry of Finance) acknowledged, for example, that 72 million kilowatts of electric power had been stolen. But efforts to check corruption, most significantly the campaign spearheaded by the head of the Georgian KGB, Eduard Shevardnadze, only led to a mushrooming of the controlling agencies. The number of "people's controllers" in Georgia reached the grotesque figure of two hundred thousand people. There were 10,000 to 12,000 "inspections" annually that achieved no results and only kept increasing the amount of paperwork. *Rostiashvili* concluded that corruption and inefficiency seriously undermined mobilization and military-construction efforts in this strategically-exposed republic. These conclusions remain relevant, as the independent Republic of Georgia remains mired in all-pervasive corruption, until recently ironically under the leadership of the same Eduard Shevardnadze.

Another highlight of the conference was the discussion on the state of the archives and prospects for new archival discoveries. Participants emphasized the special significance of the personal "funds" (collections) of M.J. Bagirov in Azerbaijan as well as "special dossiers" in the Armenian State Archives. The head of the Armenian Archival Service, *Amatun Virabian*, presented a brief analysis of the "special dossiers" and their content.

Finally, the participants became engaged in a discussion of the international and national contexts of contemporary history of the southern Caucasus. It was stressed that the Cold War remains a potentially fruitful context for re-integrating disparate historiographic projects developed in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku. *Andrei Zubov* proposed a comparative analysis of imperial policies in the southern Caucasus, implemented by Tsarist Russia, the early Soviet state in the 1920s, and the late Soviet Union during the Cold War era. *Suny* shared his experience of debates among American historians on Stalin's state-building and Soviet social and cultural developments with the participants.

The Tsinandali conference demonstrated a great potential of cooperation between Western historians and the scholars from the republics in the southern Caucasus. Starting from scratch, the project "Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Cold War" is developing into a productive international network of scholars working on topics of contempo-

were outlined to the USSR Ministry of Interior.

We are undertaking measures for strengthening political work among the repatriated Armenians.

SECRETARY OF CC CP(B) OF ARMENIA

(ARUTINOV Gr.)

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area. In the exchange of fire, which occurred when they were returning from the USSR, one violator was killed. Fake documents, with which agents of foreign intelligence [services] are usually equipped, were found on him.

Military identity card number series GD No. 694861 issued by the Leninakan City Military Committee and passport series U-OF No. 676430 issued by the First Police Department of Kutaisi were confiscated from the body.

This attests to the fact that the Turkish intelligence [service] knows well the procedures of preparation and issuing of documents in the area.

The analysis of the instructions received by the above-mentioned three agents from the Turkish and the American intelligence [services] shows that the intelligence [services] exhibit serious interest in obtaining detailed information about the location, number and equipment of the military units, and also pay attention not only to the general information, such as in what area a certain group [of forces] is located, but to detailed reports on the location of particular units.

collected information about the number [of troops in] a certain unit, quartered in the winter accommodations, he should also determine the length and width of the barracks, the number of floors, the number of windows, and how many guards were on duty. If [the troops] were quartered in camp conditions—to count the number of tents.

It was recommended to determine the types of naval vessels by means of visual observation. For this purpose, the agent was shown pictures of various types of Soviet ships at the intelligence [service] offices, including several types of our submarines.

As was mentioned above, it was suggested to the American agent “M” that he should not hesitate to use violence or bribery of servicemen in order to obtain the catalog description of the MIG-17 plane.

All of the above-mentioned agents received the assignment to identify morally unstable people and individuals dissatisfied with the Soviet regime to encourage them to cross into Turkish territory, or to use them for intelligence purposes on our territory.

For example, Turkish agent “C” received an assignment to select such people from among those previously tried for various crimes, to collect biographical and personal information from them, to report it to Turkish intelligence, to encourage the most adversarially inclined of them to cross into Turkey, and to supply them with a pretext for that.

Agent “B” was assigned to escort one person to Turkey, to collect information about two residents of Baku, including one officer of the 4th Army, and to prepare one other person for subsequent relocation to the Crimea with an assignment from Turkish intelligence. It is characteristic that it was recommended to the agent that he should arrange his first meeting with the person under consideration [in order] to get to know him in a restaurant with some drinking, but to follow him beforehand by the means of outside surveillance. The same agent had the assignment to study the public mood of the population in connection with the struggle against the Stalin’s personality cult and condemnation of Bagirov.

The efforts of Turkish intelligence to encourage Soviet citizens to betray their Motherland is expressed in other ways as well.

In 1955, and especially in the summer of 1956, numerous incidents were registered in which Turkish servicemen, and in some cases civilians as well, struck up conversations with soldiers of our border forces soldiers, and in the course of such conversations conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and encouraged them to cross over into Turkish territory, promising them safety and guarantees that these people would not be transferred back to the USSR.

Those facts were most often noted with regard to border troops units 38 and 39 on the section [between] Akhaltsikhe and Leninakan. Similar incidents were also noted on the section of the border with Iran. In certain cases those actions succeed, which was proven by the escape to Iran of three servicemen of the Azerbaijan border troop district between May and August, 1956. As interrogations of the traitors of the Motherland ROTANOV, BONDAREV, and

GORBUNOV have shown, all of them were subjected to intelligence interrogations in Turkey, and they have given the foreign intelligence [services] sensitive information about the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District. It is characteristic that all these persons were encouraged to cooperate with Turkish, American, and British intelligence [agencies].

Some unstable elements and adversarially inclined persons from among the Soviet citizenry also show an interest in the Soviet-Turkish border—they arrive at the villages located close to the border, including the areas of troop deployments, with treacherous designs and search for ways to cross into Turkey or Iran. Such incidents are most often, registered in the regions of Batumi, Akhaltsikhe, Leninakan, Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and Lenkoran.

During the eight months of 1956, 22 people who attempted to betray their Motherland were detained in those areas.

In 1955, and especially 1956, the influx of various foreign tourist and other groups and of official representatives of capitalist diplomatic missions, who systematically visit various regions of the Transcaucasus, has increased.

Most often, such foreigners are representatives of the United States, France, England, Turkey, and some other countries. These individuals, and especially diplomatic personnel, make visits to mainly strategically important regions of Sukhumi-Tbilisi, Kutaisi-Yerevan-Baku, and Leninakan-Batumi. Groups of troops are stationed in those regions and along the highways leading to those [regions].

Observation of foreigners has registered their intention to collect information about the troops by means of visual observation, photography, and use of other technology. The foreigners devote great attention to investigation of highways important from the military point of view, such as the Georgian military road, the road through the Suram and other mountain ridges.

There were some noted incidents of meetings between the foreigners and re-émigrés, and people who moved to establish permanent residency in the Transcaucasus republics from countries in the Middle East, from France, and other countries, and who mainly settled in the Armenian territory.

A large number of tourists visit the region of the Black Sea Coast, where in August of this year packages with NLF (National Labor Front) anti-Soviet literature were discovered, addressed to the population and servicemen of the Soviet Army.

The circumstances described above were pointed out to all KGB Special Departments in the region. They were instructed to conduct counterintelligence work taking into account the information presented above.

Head of Special Department of the KGB

DOCUMENT No. 3

**Report by the Chairman of the Committee for State Security of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic
A. Yuzbashyan, 14 March 1979**

May 1977, "About Raising the Vigilance of the Soviet People."

Even taking into account the obvious exceptional character of this crime, it appears that the case of the "Bombers," which was presented today to the Bureau of the CC CP of Armenia bears clear traces of all these processes and phenomena, so to speak, of the external and internal order, which were mentioned above.

Brief summary of the case:

During the evening of 8 January, in various public places in the city of Moscow, criminal elements carried out explosions of hand-made bombs, resulting in human casualties, destruction and damage to state property. The explosions occurred in the metro train, in grocery store No. 15, and next to the window of grocery store No. 5. As a result of the explosions, 7 people were killed, and 37 people were injured to varying degrees.

At the end of October 1977, criminals were preparing to detonate new explosives, this time at the Kursky Railway Terminal. However, the measures for ensuring safety in public places, undertaken jointly by the organs of the KGB and MVD, scared the criminals, and they fled hurriedly leaving behind a bag with the explosives.

As a result of the additional measures which were undertaken the operative group of the Armenian SSR KGB, working in coordination with the USSR KGB, succeeded in capturing the criminals at the beginning of November 1977. They turned out to be: S[tepan] S. Zatikyan, head of the group, born in 1946 in Yerevan, and resident of Yerevan, non-affiliated, married, did not complete higher education; A. V. Stepanyan, born 1947 in Yerevan, resident of Yerevan, with a secondary education; Z. M. Bagdasaryan, born 1954 in the village of Kanachut in the Artashatsky region, and resident of Kanachut, with a secondary education.

From 16 to 24 January 1979, the Collegium for Criminal Offenses of the USSR Supreme Soviet held an open trial session to consider the criminal case charging S. S. Zatikyan and his two accomplices with anti-Soviet activities and committing a subversive act.

During the course of the trial the information received earlier by the KGB organs was fully confirmed with regard to the fact that Zatikyan, having served a four-year sentence for anti-Soviet activities, did not disarm ideologically, and, moreover, chose the road of extremist methods of struggle against the Soviet state. After being indoctrinated in a hostile spirit, he involved his accomplices in the preparation and implementation of the subversive acts.

In the course of the investigation and trial in this case, a large amount of material and other evidence was collected. Approximately 750 victims and witnesses were questioned, 140 expert tests were made, and over 100 searches were conducted; persuasive evidence was collected in the residences of the criminals, linking them to the explosions.

This gave [the investigation] the opportunity fully to reveal Zatikyan's and his accomplices' roles in the crimes they prepared and committed, even during the preliminary investigation. In particular, Zatikyan stated during the pre-

liminary investigation the following: “I did not testify against my own will, I told the truth that I built the explosive devices ... that my actions ... represent just one method of struggle against the regime that exists in the Soviet Union.” Later, during the trial, Zatikyan refused to give testimony. However, his accomplices gave extensive testimony about the circumstances of preparing and carrying out the new subversive acts. Zatikyan was fully implicated by his accomplices and other witnesses, by the conclusions of the experts, as the main ideological and practical organizer of the subversive acts and the main actor in building the explosive devices.

Taking into account the exceptional danger and the grave consequences of the crimes committed by him, the court sentenced Zatikyan and his accomplices to the ultimate measure of punishment—the death sentence. The verdict was received with approval by the numerous representatives of the Soviet public who were present in the courtroom, including representatives from our republic. By the way, one of the jurors and all three defense lawyers were also from our republic. The sentence was carried out.

Using the Zatikyan case as an example it would be instructive to trace how he came to his evil design and who and what helped him in that.

Brief background:

Over the last 12 years, the Armenian KGB has uncovered and liquidated more than 20 illegal anti-Soviet nationalist groups created under the influence of hostile Western propaganda. Altogether, about 1,400 people were engaged in anti-Soviet activities in some form or another.

In accordance with the Party’s principles, the organs of state security have given and continue to give preference to preventive and prophylactic measures, and consider arrest an extreme measure only. Those arrested represented only 4.3% of the individuals who were proven to have engaged in anti-Soviet activities. Zatikyan was one of them—he was a member of one of the anti-Soviet nationalist groups, which pompously named itself NUP (National United Party). It was created by the unaffiliated artist Khachatryan Aikaz, born in 1918 (in 1978 he was sentenced to 1.5 years of prison for a common crime), who, upon learning about Zatikyan’s role in the explosions in Moscow, called himself his “spiritual father.”

In 1968, Zatikyan was arrested and sentenced, as was already mentioned, to four years in prison. At his arrest, they confiscated a document written by Zatikyan—“Terror and Terrorists”—in which he made an effort to justify the methods of extremism and means of struggle against the Soviet state.

During his stay at the correctional labor colony, and then in prison (where he was transferred because he systematically violated the regime, and negatively influenced other inmates, who chose the road of improvement), Zatikyan not only did not change his ways, but, on the contrary, nursed thoughts about even more extreme methods of hostile activity.

One should also note that Zatikyan admired the Dashnaks [Armenian Revolutionary Federation, an ultra-nationalist movement whose territorial ambitions include the Karabakh region and those parts of “Greater Armenia” currently within the borders of Turkey and Georgia]. In the course of the investigation, and during his trial, he called the Dashnaks a “sacred party.”

One of Zatikyan’s accomplices—Stepanyan—participated in an anti-Soviet nationalist gathering. For that, in 1974, he was served an official warning in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 25 December 1972. However, that official warning did not bring Stepanyan to his senses, did not stop him from committing the crime.

The USSR KGB gave a positive assessment to the investigative and trial measures undertaken by the organs of state security of the USSR. The Armenian KGB also took an active part in that work.

However, all this took place after the first series of explosions had occurred in Moscow. And the second series of explosions had already been prepared. There should have been no explosions at all. In any case, after the explosions, the criminals should have been quickly discovered and arrested. However, that did not happen. We realize that we have obviously made some mistakes here. The republican KGB drew the following lessons from the “Bombers” case.

One can name the following reasons [as those] that contributed to the emergence of the “Bombers:”

1. Enemy influence from the abroad in the framework of the ideological subversion carried out by the adversary.
2. Negative influence by some hostile individuals on the young people.
3. As was already mentioned, mistakes in our work, in the work of the Armenian KGB.
4. Loss of sharpness of political vigilance among some categories of the population, as a consequence of a certain weakening of the ideological work.

In addition to that, there is some concern about persons who are not involved in productive labor, as well as such aliens to our social regime [who practice] phenomena such as bribery, theft of socialist property, petty crime, and vicious systematic libel against honest Soviet people in the form of anonymous letters and statements.

All this not only darkens the general moral and political climate in the republic, but also represents potential fertile grounds for marginalized elements, who then slide toward anti-Soviet activities.

Foreign Armenian colonies represent a special concern for us. Let us dwell on just one question out of the whole system of issues related to this situation. The processes and developments occurring in the colonies, taking into account their various connections with the republic, influence the situation here. The enemy, primarily the United States, actively works with the foreign Armenian colonies—they use

all means to encourage persons of Armenian nationality to move and establish permanent residency in their country. Today already 600,000 Armenians reside in the United States.

An Armenian Bureau was created and is now functioning in the State Department, and Columbia University is planning to create an Armenian Cultural Center.

All these events unquestionably serve the same anti-Soviet goals.


There are plans to increase the Armenian diaspora in the United States to one million people. This could have serious consequences for us. The best organized force in the foreign Armenian colonies is the anti-Soviet nationalist party Dashnaktsutyun. It is the most dangerous for us due to a number of circumstances (experience, knowledge of the situation, absence of language barrier, etc.).

That is why the CPSU CC resolution of 27 December 1978 about strengthening our work with the Armenians residing abroad has a great significance in trying to interfere with the efforts of the American administration to extend its influence on the foreign Armenian colony.

The KGB of the Armenian SSR reports its suggestions regarding the realization of the above-mentioned CPSU CC resolution to the Armenian CP CC separately.

Dashnak propaganda is being skillfully and inventively carried out, and it reaches its addressees more often than other kinds of propaganda. We have to give them credit—they choose topics for ideological attacks against us in a fine and clever manner.

Take for example slogans like “Great and united and independent Armenia.” Or the way they threw in the so-called “land issues” (both internal and external). It is natural that the Dashnaks did not pass by Sero Khazadzyan’s letter, did not miss the clearly non-scholarly polemics between Z. Buniatov and some of our scholars. They did not shy away from the case of Zatikyan and his accomplices either. In addition, every time the Dashnaks choose the most skillful and at the same time innocent forms for their propaganda (for example about the “purity” of the Armenian language, about



On 20 June 1999, Russian president Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly handed US President Bill Clinton more than 80 pages of “declassified” Soviet-era documents pertaining to the shocking murder of President John F. Kennedy.¹ In doing so, Yeltsin added yet another chapter to the already convoluted saga of Moscow’s archival response to the November 1963 assassination.

There have been 10 authorized and significant disclosures in the nearly four decades since 22 November by the Soviet Union and its successor states.² Primary information has become available via three routes: the transfer of actual documents; the release of summaries based on authorized access to documents; and the publication of books based on privileged or unusual (to say the least) access to key archival files.

This piecemeal release of documentation began within days of the assassination, in recognition of the gravity of

transcripts from the electronic surveillance of the Oswalds' apartment, as well as from reports written by the BKGB officers who had tailed Oswald in Minsk.¹⁴

- In 1997, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali published *'One Hell of a Gamble.'* Though mostly devoted to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the book contained a chapter on the assassination and its aftermath which drew upon select documents from KGB, GRU, and Foreign Ministry archives.¹⁵

Yeltsin's 1999 gift thus fit squarely into a pattern of disclosure by installment. As the State Department prepared translations of this latest tease, Russian officials involved in gathering the records cautioned against expecting too much from the once-classified documents. "They don't contain any new revelations," Vladimir Sokolov, a Foreign Ministry archivist, told *Moscow Times* in late June. "There's nothing

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leadership (along with the rest of the world) had had to absorb a second shock on 24 November, namely, the murder of the accused assassin. To Soviet leaders already prone to believe in conspiracies, Oswald's murder *while in police custody* was incomprehensible—unless of course there was a conspiracy. In all likelihood the self-proclaimed Marxist (who had already been slandered by Moscow as a “Trotskyite”) had been silenced before the real perpetrators could be identified.²³ Given this unnerving situation it was not surprising for Moscow to hew to the most conservative approach imaginable. Despite Oswald's murder by a nightclub owner named Jack Ruby—or perhaps because of it—the effort to link Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union to probable contact with the KGB—and possible recruitment—was unabated among some elements of the US news media.

The day before Dobrynin received the Central Committee's instructions on 25 November, Anastas Mikoyan, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, arrived for the state funeral bearing a redacted KGB report about Oswald's Soviet sojourn. The two officials clearly discussed the matter, because on Tuesday, 26 November, Dobrynin sent another TOP SECRET/HIGHEST PRIORITY cable to Moscow. In this second cable, in which Mikoyan concurred, Dobrynin presented an entirely different rationale for yielding the consular records. Rather than basing his argument again on straightforward pragmatic grounds—namely, that Moscow had nothing to hide—this time Dobrynin appealed directly to the conspiratorial mind-set that pervaded the Central Committee.

Like all the other correspondence in the consular file, Oswald's 9 November letter was genuine, differing only in that it was typed rather than handwritten. Yet, and without any real evidence backing him up, Dobrynin now insisted that Oswald's 9 November letter was “clearly a provocation . . . [designed to give] the impression we had close ties with Oswald and were using him for some purposes of our own.” The letter, wrote Dobrynin, was probably a forgery, and “one gets the definite impression that [it] was concocted by those who . . . are involved in the President's assassination.” Or if Oswald himself wrote it, Dobrynin asserted, it was probably dictated to him and then he was “simply bumped off after his usefulness had ended.” In essence, the Soviet ambassador now argued that disclosure was necessary to expose and pre-empt the “organizers of this entire provocation” before they used the letter “to try casting suspicion on us.”²⁴ It was a shrewd way of evoking the objectively correct (and self-interested) decision from the Central Committee, but the rea-

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KGB made a copy of the case file before letting the records go. See George Lardner, "Papers Shed New Light on Soviets, Oswald," *Washington Post*, 6 August 1999.

¹¹ Oleg Nechiporenko, *Passport to Assassination: The Never-Before-Told Story of Lee Harvey Oswald by the KGB Colonel Who Knew Him* (New York: Birch Lane Press 1997), t

Document No. 3
Cipher Telegram from Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to CPSU Central Committee, 26 November 1963

[Source: Yeltsin Documents, US National Archives and Records Administration.]

LS no.0692061-26

JS/BL

Russian

[handwritten: 1077/4367[?] [illegible]

TOP SECRET [illegible] 46 CIPHER TELEGRAM

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Special no. 2005

HIGHEST PRIORITY

Please note [Lee Harvey] Oswald's letter of 9 November, the text of which was transmitted to Moscow over the line [?] of nearby neighbors.

This letter was clearly a provocation: it gives the impression we had close ties with Oswald and were using him for some purposes of our own. It was totally unlike any other letters the embassy had previously received from Oswald. Nor had he ever visited our embassy himself. The suspicion that the letter is a forgery is heightened by the fact that it was typed, whereas the other letters the embassy had received from Oswald before were handwritten.

One gets the definite impression that the letter was concocted by those who, judging from everything, are involved in the President's assassination. It is possible that Oswald himself wrote the letter as it was dictated to him, in return for some promises, and then, as we know, he was simply bumped off after his usefulness had ended.

The competent US authorities are undoubtedly aware of this letter, since the embassy's correspondence is under constant surveillance. However, they are not making use of it for the time being. Nor are they asking the embassy for any information about Oswald himself; perhaps they are waiting for another moment.

The question also arises as to whether there is any connection now between the wait-and-see attitude of the US authorities and the ideas conveyed by [US ambassador Llewellyn] Thompson (though he himself may not be aware of this connection) on the desirability of some restraint on the part of the Soviet press and gradually hushing up the entire matter of Kennedy's assassination. Perhaps that is exactly what the federal authorities were inclined to do when

they learned all the facts and realized the danger of serious international complications if the interested US groups, including the local authorities in Dallas, continued to fan the hysteria over the "leftist" affiliations of Kennedy's assassin

In the spring 2003 issue of *Cold War History* I authored an essay on the Mongolian archives, lamenting the lack of access to historical documents, and incredible red tape suffered by rare researchers, and the fear and trembling of the archivists themselves when it comes to openness and freedom of information in Mongolia. In the six months that followed, in countless meetings with government authorities—faceless bureaucrats, enthusiastic listeners, and powerless sympathizers—I argued, persuaded, promised, threatened, appealed to democratic principles and quoted from Marx and Lenin to break through the ice of fear and indifference and open up Mongolian archives to research. But the archival ice proved to be firmer than the winter ice on the Tuul river that flows through Ulaanbaatar. On the other hand, I learned more about the Mongolian archives than I ever wanted to know.

The Khaan of the Mongolian archives is the National Archives Directorate (in Mongolian, *Undesni Arkhivyn Gazar* or UAG), which in reality exercises much less power than its promising name would indicate. The UAG officially oversees 34 archives, including all of the ministerial archives, the government archive and the provincial (or *aimag*) archives. But the lines of authority in this arrangement are severely compromised, because ministerial archives take instructions from their respective ministries and not from the UAG.

The only archive subordinate to the Directorate is the Central National Archive (*Undesni Tuv Gazar*), a vast depository of some 700,000 folders. The Central National Archive itself has 6 branches, including the general historical department, the audio and visual archive and the historical archive of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The general historical department would excite a Mongolia specialist; it holds, for instance, a large collection of ancient undecipherable documents, such as the 1675 border agreement between the Mongolian and the Manchurian khans. From more recent history, the department offers copies of documents on the Soviet-Mongolian relations from the 1920s-early 1950s, obtained from Russia's RGASPI. There is little of interest to a Cold War historian in these collections. The audio and visual archive has a blockbuster collection of official films, celebrating the Soviet-Mongolian friendship. By far the most important place for Cold War research is the party archive. The MPRP, still in power, passed its old papers (everything up to 1990) to the Central National Archive in 1998. These materials include Central Committee plenums, documents from party departments, records of the Politburo discussions and the Mongolian leaders' personal papers. Some of these documents, for instance, Yumjagin Tsendenbal's personal papers, are stored without any order, still to be catalogued. Other materials, however, are distributed across fonds, subdivided into registers (*tov'yogs*) and folders (*khadgalakh negj* or *kh/n*).

Researchers who managed to gain access to this archive are generally allowed to see materials from the Central Committee departments, records of plenum discussions, and politburo resolutions. Of these, plenum materials are of particular importance for Cold War historians, as MPRP plenums were often used as a podium for attack against Tsendenbal and the unbreakable Soviet-Mongolian friendship. Fonds 1 and 4 are also very useful, as they contain a large collection of Tsendenbal's memoranda of conversations with foreign ambassadors and politicians (for instance, Tsendenbal's meetings with the Soviet, Chinese and the North Korean ambassadors). Politburo transcripts and Tsendenbal's personal papers (including his personal diary and most important memcons) are all off limits to researchers. Yet, even access to "open documents" is highly problematic and depends more than anything on researcher's own connections.

The Mongolian Foreign Ministry Archive, only on paper connected with the UAG, is a treasure trove for Cold War historians; it holds extensive day-to-day records of Mongolia's foreign relations from the early 20th century until our day. The archive's 30,000 folders (*kh/n*), spread across some 145 fonds contain valuable evidence on Mongolia's relations with its closest neighbors, China and the Soviet Union, accounts of landmark events (such as the 1971 Lin Biao incident), countless records of conversations between Mongolian and foreign leaders and all diplomatic correspondence. Following the Russian usage, secret materials are marked by a zero in front of the fond number—for instance, "02" stands for the secret Soviet-related materials, and "05" for Chinese-related materials. Distinction between "secret" and "open" materials is purely philosophical. Access to any documents is difficult at best. Declassification is governed both by the 1998 Mongolian Law on Archives (with its thirty year rule) and internal directives, which prescribe much tighter secrecy, no less than 60 years for documents of any importance. One way or another, declassification in the Foreign Ministry Archive, as in many other Mongolian archives, works only on paper. After enduring considerable red tape, this author was allowed to look at some of the open materials—mundane diplomatic correspondence mingled with a few noteworthy items (for instance, Vyacheslav Molotov's original diplomatic credentials and hand-written records of Klement Voroshilov's talks with the Mongolian leaders in 1957). At the same time, several Mongolian scholars have benefited from a much better access to this archive.

Another interesting archive for Cold War research is the Government Archive, located in the magnificent main government headquarters, built (I am told) by the Japanese prisoners of war in the 1940s. As I mentioned in my earlier piece in *Cold War History*, the Government Archive is the central depository of the Mongolian Council of Ministers records, and its holdings mainly cover economic issues. However, the

In cooperation with the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), the Cold War Research Group-Bulgaria gained access to the personal papers of longtime Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov in 2002. A first result of the research on the private papers of one of the longest-serving Communist leaders is a new CD-ROM on "Bulgaria and the Cold War. Documents from Todor Zhivkov's Personal Records," published by the Group in 2003. The collection covers the entire period of Zhivkov's reign from his election as Communist party leader in 1954 through the collapse of communism in Bulgaria in 1989.

The CD-ROM contains more than 700 pages of previously unknown stenographic notes of Todor Zhivkov's conversations and correspondence with over thirty foreign state and political leaders from all five continents spanning more than three decades. The documents contain new evidence on a key political and military conflicts throughout the world during the Cold War years.

The documents presented in a sampling below include a diverse array of conversations between the Bulgarian leader and foreign counterparts, including Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (24 January 1969), Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro (27 April 1970), Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (22 April 1980), US Undersecretary of State John Whitehead (4 February 1987), Chinese leaders Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping (6-7 May 1987), and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (22 April 1989).

Future document samplers from this collection to be published by CWIHP online (<http://cwihp.si.edu>) will focus on events in the Middle East and in the Third World. Included in that collection will be conversations with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and many leaders of the leftist guerilla movements from the countries in Central America and Africa. Also among the documents in the collection are several classified government decisions to make arms deliveries to Third World countries. The documents give new evidence for the role Bulgaria played in regional conflicts throughout the period, in particular in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974.

Additional publications from the collection will scruti-

aspects of the situation in our country.¹ Now I would like to acquaint you with some difficulties we have in leading our people ahead. [...]

Regarding the international situation.

Vietnam has advanced a small step ahead. Hopefully, this will lead to improving the situation there. Yet in spite of the negotiations the situation there is still very tense, full of explosions. Whatever happens – no matter whether the negotiations succeed or not – the situation in Southeast Asia remains equally difficult.

We back up peace in Vietnam. Changing the situation always creates certain difficulties. The countries from this region are receiving help from the USA at this moment, but I consider it an artificial force. Settling the problems via peaceful means would mean that the problems could be settled without an artificial force.

Recently I was in London at the conference of the British and American leaders. We discussed the problems of the world and the role of the United States in the world.

When I was in London, I met with the British and American leaders. We discussed the problems of the world and the role of the United States in the world.

president Gamal Abdel] Nasser shows political wisdom in this case. Nowadays, in our opinion, tension is created by the extremist forces in Israel. But, to be honest, we must admit that the Americans back them up. If the Americans move in the direction of a political solution of the issue, it will be solved very quickly, the same way the war was ceased. After the Americans told the Israelis to put an end to the war, they stopped their military actions. This is absolutely clear. I have been following the development of the problem concerning the war. After the Americans had been told they were going too far in the war, [US President Lyndon B.] Johnson issued a command and in a couple of hours an end was put to the war. The Americans should obviously not be allowed to take advantage of their military success. Otherwise a precedent will be created and the political solution of the issue in the interest of all countries from this region, in the interest of all other countries and of strengthening the peace throughout the world, will be inhibited.

I would like briefly to discuss the problems in Europe, since we live in this region.

Last year was a very dramatic year for Europe. I would say that a dangerous situation was created. As you know, enormous NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces are concentrated in Europe. If a Third World War breaks out, its outcome will be determined precisely in Europe. Any complication of the situation in Europe now or change of any kind of the ratio between the forces will turn out to be disastrous. Hence we conduct a policy of oppressing these forces that contribute to the international situation's complication. These forces are concentrated above all in Western Germany. They are revanchist forces.

I will not go into details in this question. Yet I would once again like to emphasize that what happened in Czechoslovakia [i.e. the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion in August] and in Europe and what is happening now—the conduction of big maneuvers, the concentration of new military units on the borders with the socialist countries—is extremely dangerous.

Regarding the Balkans. Fortunately or unfortunately Bulgaria is situated in the center of the Balkan Peninsula. They say that all of its neighbors took something from Bulgaria in the past, that they cut off living parts of it. But we do not raise such issues. We aim at making life for the people within the present boundaries of Bulgaria better. In spite of the fact of it being a small country, Bulgaria is a peace factor in this region. Not even a single Balkan issue can be solved without Bulgaria. The transportation links pass through our country, the Danube River also passes through Bulgaria, the major rivers in Turkey and Greece come from Bulgaria. Thus as a result of a lot of historical and geographical conditions, Bulgaria has become a country that can both complicate and improve the situation on the Balkans. We can turn the rivers for Turkey and Greece back, but don't do that, of course. On the contrary, we suggest undertaking measures for utilizing their water together.

Recently there has been an easing up of the political atmosphere on the Balkans. Whatever happens, this process

could not be reversed. For instance, a military junta has assumed power in Greece [in April 1967] that has no social support in the country. But it is forced to talk of good neighborly relations, of peace on the Balkans. Now they even make more declarations than us.

Our relations with Turkey are developing well. This holds true of our relations with Yugoslavia and Romania as well. After the military junta came into power in Greece there has been certain stagnation in the development of our relations, yet recently there has been some improvement. The different events that take place, the fuss that has been made on the Balkans, should be considered and estimated as a state of affair events. Of course, there are a lot of forces and contradictions on the Balkan peninsula. But we see no serious reasons to complicate the situation. Of course, a major role is played by the international situation.

Regarding your question about Yugoslavia and Romania.

In the last couple of years our mutual cooperation with Yugoslavia has advanced significantly. We are in constant contact. We have had meetings with Tito a couple of times. But sometimes there are certain questions, which vex our relations. One of them is the so-called Macedonian question. Some nationalist circles in Yugoslavia have taken advantage of this question. We uphold the view that the Macedonian question has been historically inherited. Raising this issue and aggravating the situation is not beneficial to our countries and peoples. On the contrary, we must use it to strengthen the friendship and cooperation between the two countries and peoples. The question should be left to the scholars, to the historians to discuss. But we must not tackle this problem from a historical perspective. This has been one of the issues we have reached an agreement on with Tito.

The second issue we have reached an agreement on concerns the formation of a Macedonian national consciousness that should not be done on an anti-Bulgarian basis, as it is now. All previous statistics—Turkish, Serbian, etc.—spoke of 1,200,000 Bulgarians. We do not raise this question, but they sometimes do. They make a lot of fuss. We show patience, because if we start answering the situation will become worse. We agree with Tito's recent declarations that there could be no peace and good relations on the Balkans without good relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. We support this view and our efforts have been directed towards overcoming some difficulties that have cropped up as a result of the Macedonian issue and the events in Czechoslovakia.

Our bilateral relations with Romania are marvelous. Our economic cooperation is extending. There is a cultural exchange between us. Their delegations constantly visit our country and our delegations—their country; that is we constantly exchange experience. Yet we have diverging opinions on some issues related to the international situation. We openly discuss these issues with comrade [Romanian president Nicolae] Ceausescu. But neither have I influenced him in any respect, nor has he influenced me, although we frequently go hunting together. [...]

ment of our contacts with all countries and above all the ones that favor such a dialogue. This is actually a dialogue about Europe and the world. Hence I am grateful for your invitation. I do hope that this visit will be a step forward along the path of peaceful mutual coexistence that can be very fertile.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We think that we might cooperate successfully with Italy, we might cooperate to ensure peace in Europe. The issue of European security is an enormous one. We think that a rational solution to this issue might be found, which will be decisive for the development of the world, for avoiding a Third World War which would definitely be a nuclear war. Second, we might cooperate successfully with Italy in the region of the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Bulgaria is not a big country, but fortunately or not, it is situated in the middle of the Balkan Peninsula and no issue can be solved without it. Our country has proved many times that it supports understanding between the Balkan countries. Peace on the Balkan Peninsula can be achieved only if it is connected with peace in the Mediterranean and vice versa—peace in the Mediterranean can be ensured only if there is peace in the Balkans. These two things cannot be separated. And I believe that the talks with our minister of foreign affairs in this respect will be interesting. We are interested in close cooperation with you.

As far as our bilateral relations are concerned, it would be appropriate to discuss the problem of their development on a qualitatively new basis. As state and social figures we have to be realists and to know that the possibilities for the further trade development between our countries have been exhausted. Because the trade is now unilateral to some extent. It is based on the import of machines and equipment from Italy, which we will be much interested in in the future and the export from our country mainly of agricultural products. There obviously exists some kind of a contradiction that must be overcome. How do we see the overcoming of this contradiction? We must direct our efforts towards specialization, especially in the sphere of industry. There should be an exchange of industrial products in both directions, and also of machine-building products. Some Western circles are not well informed and do not have an accurate idea about our country. Bulgaria is viewed as some kind of agricultural country that, in spite of its moving ahead, still remains agricultural. This idea is radically false. I will now illustrate my opinion with a couple of facts. According to some data from the UN Economic Committee, Bulgaria is first in the world according to some criteria and second – after Japan, according to other. What I have in mind is the rate of development. [...]

Let's take as example electronics. We signed agreements in the period 1971-1975 to export electronics to the Soviet Union valued at 700 million rubles. [...] Now we have been working hard to open six electronics plants. This means that by the middle of the year we will have 10 electronics plants.

I'm giving these examples not to praise our country – we are experiencing a lot of difficulties and hardship. We, the present leaders of the state, are ordinary people. What is most important is that Bulgaria is developing at a rapid rate.

[...]

So Bulgaria should not be underestimated. It is not a big country, its population is about 8.5 million, yet we have one ambition – to catch up with the advanced countries. I consider it a noble ambition. It goes without saying that a country that has set forth such ambitions cannot be thinking of war. On the contrary, its foreign policy is directed towards the elimination of war, towards the preservation of peace. To be honest, we must admit that communism will rule in the world not by means of war. It will win without a war. I have no intention to persuade you, I would just like to put forth this thesis. It is peace.

with. Europe is lagging behind America by 1.5 to 2 times. These are problems with which both you and we are confronted. [...] We will be buying machines and equipment from Italy, those we consider good.

ALDO MORO: These problems are ours as well. [...] It is our task to achieve a higher level of technology and to be in step with the times...

not abandoned their intentions in the region – indicative of this fact are their actions in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and others; the creation of a fast action corps; the Carter doctrine [aimed at the protection of vital US interests in the Persian Gulf region]; the way they take advantage of the Afghanistan problem; the way they take advantage of the contradictions between Iran and Iraq; the way they increase the tension in South Lebanon in order to cause a collision between Israel and the PLO.

Under these circumstances the results of the conference of the countries of the “Steadfastness Front” are successful, its resolutions are positive.

Assad put a lot of efforts in trying to ensure the success of the conference. We hesitated whether to go to Libya. We insisted on its taking place in Damascus since the major struggle is carried out in Syria.

As far as the situation in the Arab/Persian Gulf is concerned – what is important is not how the Gulf will be named, but that there should be no American military bases around

bine the military and political tasks with extreme socio-economic measures. This is of particular importance to the population in the occupied territories. Any centrifugal force in the Palestine resistance movement is a great danger to the Palestinian and common Arabic cause. The "Steadfastness Front" should be strengthened: it is the heart of the Arab people's struggle. But at the same time all forces should be mobilized. The other contradictions between the Arab countries should come second in importance. This holds for the disagreement between Syria and Iraq as well. Even a country such as Saudi Arabia takes into consideration your country and the relations you have with it are justifiable. Otherwise it would back American imperialism. Your abilities are big. The socialist countries support you.

What influences the situation in your region and in the

budget, whereas in your country it goes to the private owner. There is a different mechanism of distributing wealth in your country. Distribution is the only difference between us. All other aspects suit us. In my opinion any functionary that would not adopt your experience is stupid. The sooner we get rid of such fools, the better-developed the economy will be.

In terms of our political structure, and the top-level posts in particular, we do not need a chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Council; these should be combined in a single post.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: Noteworthy changes are obviously under way.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: They are noteworthy indeed. It's a pity I do not have much time. I'm fighting time at present.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: I do not agree with you. As far as time is concerned, I think that there are many years before you. You have already set a record in terms of the length of time that you have been in office. I hope you will achieve greater results in this respect in the future.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I am the doyen among the first and general secretaries of the communist parties in the socialist countries.¹² I dare say that I am the vice-doyen head of state in the world. It is only the Japanese emperor [Hirohito] that has had a longer term in office than I do.¹³ I'll paraphrase a Latin American writer so that I can explain to you the nature of my struggle against time:

Time is a river that keeps undermining me,
yet I am a river as well.
Time is a tiger that tears me apart,
yet I am a tiger as well.
Time is a fire that burns me
yet I am a fire as well.

Unfortunately time is a reality, and I am Todor Zhivkov—a servant of God.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: These words were so beautiful. I hope that despite your position of vice-doyen after Hirohito, you will become doyen in terms of your impact on public opinion, since Hirohito is much older than you.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: His power is different in nature from mine. There is a difference, a small one, but yet a difference. Even more so since our church tower is smaller than theirs. Fortunately or unfortunately, we are a small country at the center of the Balkan peninsula. Now we are having the chance to meet a representative of a country with a high church tower; I therefore have the pleasure to give you the floor.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: I thank you for giving me the floor. Let me start with a comment on our first issue, namely the eco-

nomie transformation in your country. This obviously tends towards the economic model of our world. [...]

Please allow me to tell you something about the goal of my visit. I was empowered by President [Ronald] Reagan and State Secretary [George] Shultz to deal with Eastern European countries. The two visits to this part of the world are part of my job. I visited Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary in November. Bulgaria was the last country I had left to visit during my tour of Eastern Europe, after Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The goal of my visit is to listen to these countries' official positions, and understand them and get to know them; moreover, I bear in mind the fact that US relations with these

I would like to start with the relations between our two countries. I would like to point out that these relations should not be considered in the light of their development so far. Their development up to now is not relevant; we should put an end to past relations and view the problems from a different perspective and thus find their adequate solution.

Would we be able to change perspective and solve the problems relating to both bilateral and international affairs from a different position? That is the major question.

The reasons for the different positions are in both parties—I mean on a global scale. This is the opposite stance on various issues and the stereotype on your part.

Will we be able to overcome our prejudiced stereotyping

ments on the US in your press. Since it is diplomacy and good relations that suffer when there is a hostile campaign in the press against either party. [...]

Please let me express my view on an issue; I regard it as the most essential message to bring home to you, the Bulgarian State. This is the issue of human rights and human freedoms. I think that all major differences stem from this issue; it is in this sphere that mutual understanding is most difficult to reach....

TODOR ZHIVKOV: The question of our killing imams and closing down mosques was raised. We asked for more facts. We even showed to the public that the imams who were allegedly killed, were alive. So that means that they have been killed and then they were resurrected. No imam in Bulgaria has been mistreated, neither has any mosque been closed down; all mosques are open to the public instead.

Therefore such an accusation is irrelevant. Another question that has been put forth is the ethnic minority of Turks in Bulgaria.¹⁶ A lot of nationalities have been flowing into the US and Europe, whereas none have come to Bulgaria. Bulgaria had never conquered anyone else's territory. On the contrary—Bulgarian territories have been conquered.

that our relations with the Soviet Union are of interest to you. We are pursuing complete normalization of our relations with the Soviet Union. We would like the relations between the two great neighboring socialist countries to be normalized as soon as possible. The whole world would benefit from this.

A central issue in the normalizing of these relations is the so-called Kampuchea [Cambodia] problem.¹⁹ The Soviet Union supports sending Vietnamese troops to Kampuchea, whereas China provides assistance for Kampuchea's resistance movement. This war has been going on for eight years now. Its coming to an end seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Unless this Kampuchea problem is solved, one can hardly speak of normalizing relations. There is one point of heated debate in the relations between the Soviet Union and China, and that is the Kampuchea problem.

On the other hand, there has been progress in our relations with the Soviet Union in other spheres of life. I think that there will be a step forward in our relations in terms of politics. It all depends on solving the Kampuchea problem.

The factor determining the deterioration of our relations with Vietnam was the occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese troops. Regardless of the [Vietnamese] motives, the fact is that a country has openly sent troops to occupy territories of a weaker neighboring country. By no means can this be considered a correct act. Therefore China cannot support Vietnam on this important international issue; that is why Vietnam considers China to be its greatest enemy and has adopted an anti-Chinese policy. Those who have artificially created this problem must find its solution. If the Vietnamese troops withdraw, the relations between Vietnam and China will [again] become normal. I don't think there will be any progress in these relations unless Vietnam changes its policy of aggression towards China.

We rely on Vietnam's new leaders. We hope they will adopt a sensible and reasonable policy. This war appears to be a catastrophe for the Vietnamese people; it should therefore be brought to an end. It is not in line with the people's interests. A lot of problems will be easy to solve once they have withdrawn their troops from Kampuchea. The relations between China and Vietnam on the one hand, and China and the Soviet Union on the other, will improve. Vietnam's relations with the countries of South East Asia will be normalized. Vietnam's national economy can expand only in a peaceful environment. This is what I wanted to tell you on foreign relations.

You informed us about the policy you pursue on the Balkans to do away with all nuclear and chemical weapons. We can well understand the Bulgarian people's striving for constructing socialism under peaceful circumstances. We are impressed with the effort you put into lessening tensions in the region. Turning the Balkans into a region free of nuclear weapons is a task for the peoples living there.

I took too long to make my comments. Thank you for your attention.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Thank you for the interesting information.

As for our government, we follow what you do in the country and all the reforms you undertake. We can [only] follow these at a distance, of course; and we are neither in charge of any of these changes, nor can we contribute in any way. We would like to congratulate you on all reforms and the significant results you have achieved in China's development, its economic development in particular, and raising the people's living standard. I would like to point out that there is no relevant difference between our views of the state's role as owner and the role of the economic agent as proprietor. I am deeply convinced that the economic policy we are pursuing will yield good results both in China and in Bulgaria in the future. We have to share our experience and account for the results achieved. We will readily share our experience with you and study yours.

[...]

I would like to talk now as one of the veterans of the Communist movement, not in the capacity of secretary general of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. When I was elected first secretary a long time ago, I was of the middle-aged generation; when I met Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in Moscow later [in November 1957], I was the youngest first secretary. My youth is over now. I most sincerely hope that a way to normalize the relations between China and the Soviet Union will be found. We share common aims and ideals. These relations should be settled and regulated and this should happen within my life span. I know this might sound egoistic, yet I would be most honest and sincere in my satisfaction if these relations [problems] could be settled. A lot of problems have arisen; these were accumulated in the course of our historical development. Certain problems have been created by ourselves. Both sides have made mistakes. There should be a way to stand above these problems that might hinder our relations and get us nowhere, regional problems in particular. Let us find a way to solve the regional problems, so that they will not determine our relations. Settling the regional problems should be considered a prerequisite for regulating our relations. Regional problems should be tackled in the course of a friendly dialogue. We could reach an agreement on all other issues. This is my deepest wish both as a Communist and as a veteran.

On Kampuchea, I don't know whether you're aware of the fact that I am the first general secretary who visited Kampuchea in 1979.²⁰ I was on a one-day visit. I visited Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. Vietnam's new leaders expressed their willingness to take China's interests into consideration. A dialogue and a solution to the problems should be sought. I am not one to make suggestions, yet I know that dialogue is a necessary tool. As far as I can see, there is a willingness on the part of Vietnam's leaders to begin talks.

As for Vietnam's economic situation at the time of my visit, I must say it was extremely severe. I guess you know that better than I do. Let us find a way to eliminate this obstacle, so that it will not hinder the relations between China and the Soviet Union. I know that the problems will be solved when there are talks. There are a lot of outstanding problems that cannot be solved at once; being realists we are aware of

this.

As for the cooperation between China and Bulgaria, we are ready to stimulate its further development. Bulgaria is a small country; however, we are Georgi Dimitrov's party, and, as I already pointed out, we will follow his legacy. If it was not for this conflict, China would be the most popular country in Bulgaria after the Soviet Union. I believe this will happen. We have had close relations with the Soviet Union in the course of our historical development. The second country, gaining such popularity, is China. You can see how a conflict may hinder our relations. I hope we will forget all this. For it is often the case that the dead save the living. Let us not allow what is already dead to pull us downwards. Our relations should be frank and open, sincere and brotherly of a communist type. We are willing to further develop our cooperation. Please come and visit Bulgaria. We are a small, yet dynamically developing country.



DOCUMENT No. 6
Memorandum of Conversation of Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov with Chinese Leader Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, 7 May 1987

[Source: Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 60, File 395. Obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Kalina Bratanova.]

DENG XIAOPING: You already had talks with comrade Zhao Ziyang and comrade Li Sinyan. They have informed you of the problems we are solving at present. I've been less busy than they have, since they do the everyday routine work.

We are both veterans. Our meeting today can be called the meeting of the veterans. I mean only the two of us, not any of the other of the participants.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We are veterans of the communist movement in general, not only the one in our countries.

DENG XIAOPING: Veterans are called to do more work for the sake of their people, their countries and the communist movement in general. We have made a lot of mistakes in the past, we have even let conflicts break out. The problems must be solved within our life span. Yugoslavia's former president [Josip Broz] Tito, who visited China in 1977, had talks with me then.²¹ I told him: It is true that we had rows in the past, we made mistakes; yet I cannot claim that we have always been right in our judgments.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I absolutely agree with you: the most important task that is before us, the veterans, is to solve the problems and not leave such a bad legacy to the generations to come.

I am very happy that I have the opportunity to visit

China and meet you. I will never forget you and Pan Dzyan; I have known you since our meeting in Moscow in 1957.²² He came to Bulgaria then.

DENG XIAOPING: We met in 1957.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Yes, we met at the conference in Moscow. There was even a very nice meeting we had; I would like to remind you of it, so that our comrades from Bulgaria hear about it. I'll tell you what happened. We had some problems with our comrades from Poland at one of these conferences. The latter made several statements, which were considered to be generally negative in attitude. All participants that then took the floor exposed [Polish leader W³adys³aw] Gomu³ka to severe criticism, but they would not explicitly say his name. Since I was the youngest first secretary then, I fiercely criticized him. Then you came to our delegation and gave us some Chinese tea. Mao turned to me to congratulate me for my speech. He told me I was very smart and clever. "I completely agree with you," he said, "When socialism is a well-established system on a global scale, I'll propose that you become chairman of the World Socialist Federation." I'm telling you that story because I just want to let my comrades know about Mao's evaluation of my work; while my merits haven't been recognized in Bulgaria yet...

DENG XIAOPING: I feel healthy, however, a man of my age never knows when he will leave forever to meet Marx.

I am glad that under comrade Zhivkov's leadership there reigns an atmosphere of sustained political peace and stability. There has been a sustained economic development as well. Maybe nature favors you, maybe the people have created such a favorable economic environment. Yet we have gone through a lot of up and downs in our development. We can claim that when the People's Republic of China was established in the early 1950's, both countries were at the same level of economic development. China was probably poorer than Bulgaria. There were certain cataclysms in Bulgaria that must be the reason for its sustained economic growth.

We made leftist mistakes. In 1957 we struggled against the rightist elements, in 1958 there was "the Great Leap" in the people's commune. We were rash and reckless to a certain extent both in terms of our economic measures and the political activities; there was a leftist tendency. All this was true for our policy in terms of the international communist movement. It is leftist as well. The "Great Leap" resulted in a severe three-year slump. Other factors related to the sphere of international affairs, of course; I won't dwell on these, since you know them. I have in mind the fact that the Soviet Union declared about a hundred bilateral agreements with us null and void. This brought about serious hardships. Yet the major reason for our hardships was our leftist policy. We managed to cope with the slump and restore our previous level of economic development.

In 1962 a meeting was held with 7,000 participants, including all first secretaries of the regional committees. As a result, our economy grew steadily in the period from 1962 to

1965. In 1966, however, the Cultural Revolution began, which lasted ten years. There were serious drawbacks throughout these ten years, both in political and economic terms. One can say that upon the establishment of the People's Republic of China in the late 1950's, in the period 1958 - 1978, the country's development in social terms was stagnated. The annual income of a peasant was about 60 ioans. The average salary of a worker was also about 60 ioans in this period. There was some development in this period. For example it was then that we produced nuclear missiles, weapons and a satellite, [but] social development was stagnant on the whole. It was as late as 1978, when the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee was held; the experience gained throughout the 29-year period was summarized, conclusions were arrived at; on the basis of these present day policy was developed. [...]

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I have the pleasure to fulfill a task assigned to me by our party leadership and government: I would like to greet you personally and wish you health and great results. Most of our leaders know you and have met you. I would therefore like to send their best regards and wishes for your health.

Let me once again express my deepest gratitude for your invitation to come and visit your country, for the extreme attentiveness and hospitality towards me and those accompanying me.

DENG XIAOPING: Our contacts and relations are of prime importance. Your country is a small one, yet your experience is very important. The reforms in your country started almost 20 years earlier than ours. Bearing in mind the specificity of your own economic environment, you have been carrying out reforms in a secret manner, I would say.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: You are very precise in your judgment. No one has formulated it like this.

DENG XIAOPING: It's not easy to carry out such reforms.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We have not been hiding. Nothing can be hidden under the sun. I am optimistic and am indeed very glad that our relations of cooperation and fraternity will be restored; we used to enjoy such healthy relations up to the events you just spoke of.

DENG XIAOPING: We must look forward to what's ahead of us.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Yes, it is our future relations that we must consider. Many things took place, some inevitable and objective in nature; others were the result of our own mistakes and weaknesses. Nevertheless we must look ahead.

DENG XIAOPING: That's right.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We follow the events taking place in your

country and all the deep reforms that have been carried out ever since the historical Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party [in December 1978]. We were deeply impressed with the way you managed to cope with the problem of malnutrition and starvation and provide food for 1 billion and 20 million people within such a short period. It is true that your people have not become wealthy, yet you managed to provide food for them, and there are products in the department stores.

The second thing that draws one's attention is that you made a breakthrough in establishing a free market economy. Weead.

Mr. Zhivkov, I suggest that tomorrow we organize a meeting with our foreign ministers so that we can discuss the problems concerning our countries, as well as certain global and European issues. [...]

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I think that our present meeting will be fruitful and I am optimistic about it. There are many favorable opportunities so that our delegations can carry out serious work. My and your mission consists of stating our support to and to approval of the results achieved.

I agree to the agenda you offered, I do not mind our delegations starting work today, and our meeting being held tomorrow to discuss certain aspects of our bilateral cooperation, the problems on the Balkans, as well as global and European issues.

We are now meeting as friends and there are no problems between us that might break up our relations. On the contrary: all that has been achieved so far provides solid grounds for our further progress. I believe that we will live up to our wonderful peoples' expectations. Watching your people today and in the past during my previous visits, and, taking into consideration our people, I see that they are very much alike, sharing common views and feelings. And it is often the case that we, heads of state, mislead them; I do not mean you and me in particular, I have in mind heads of state in general.

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: Mr. Zhivkov, first of all I would like to thank you for the warm words. Talking about our problems, I must point out that PASOK [Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement], during its 8-year term of office, brought about our people's advancement along the road to peace, democracy and progress. PASOK mainly succeeded in balancing the economic development of the urban and the rural areas. It's equally pleasant to live in the countryside and in the big cities of Greece. It's even better to live in the village. This was not the situation even ten years ago. This is what determines our positive attitude towards you, as you yourself defined it. There is indeed a feeling of respect and love that we cherish towards you.

I would like to mention some other simple truths.

Our government contributed to laying the basis of sus-

right course; the first clouds have appeared, however; we must do something to clear them away so that the sun can once again shine along our path. Many negative qualities may be attributed to Reagan; yet we must admit that he manifested the political courage to move on and give effect to disarmament. I cannot perceive the same courage in the present US administration.

I hope that if we take our time to talk and reach agreements feasible for our two small countries, we will no doubt contribute to strengthening world peace. Apart from that, we shall take advantage of all the favorable opportunities of our small countries to stimulate the further development of our bilateral relations.

I am happy with your words, Mr. President, that neither the [18 June 1989 national] elections in Greece, nor my short illness were an obstacle to holding our meeting.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Thank you for everything you said. We shall obviously carry out a more detailed discussion of these issues tomorrow.

Let me make a brief comment on certain issues as well.

I do share your view of the newly established international situation that causes us concern and results in slowing down disarmament. I don't know whether the major factor in this situation is the new US administration's policy of delaying talks with the Soviet Union. All statements, made prior to the talks, are the cause of our concern. An issue that causes concern is about tactical nuclear weapons. What do these weapons suggest? If our two countries have such weapons deployed, then we can destroy each other within a couple of hours. Conventional weapons have reached the level of nuclear weapons in terms of their destructive power. The question is: will we find the appropriate ways and means to preserve the achievements in disarmament so far, or will we push this disarmament process back? This is indeed a question that cannot but cause our concern. We do hope, however, that there are forces both in Europe and the US that will create a new mode of historical thinking, adequate for the new realities, so as to prevent at any cost a thermonuclear

opment and growth. Nowadays the state is the economic agent standing both at the input and output of the economic system. It should not intervene in the middle. These are the imperatives of cybernetics. The state must not intervene in the activities of the firms. Similar reforms are to be carried out in agriculture. An upcoming plenum of our Party on the 4 and 5 May is dedicated to agriculture issues. Our next step will be introducing publishing houses as individual agents in the sphere of culture, etc.

We have set up several hundred firms so far; they will provide the major framework within which our economy will work. Tens of thousands of firms will be established with the respective legal structures: liabilities and responsibilities. The socialist state will stand at the input and output of the economic system. We can thus show you a wealth of companies. Over 100 firms took part in the Hanover Fair, and several hundred representatives of West Germany's firms attended our forum for businessmen.

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: The EEC [European Economic Community] has been dealing with the issue of firms. What you just said about the economic organization of firms is of interest to us; I would like to add something more to the topic at our meeting tomorrow; it will not be anything new actually, simply an elaboration of what you said.

I suggest that we now end our talks, since we will have the opportunity to go on tomorrow. Let's go and attend the cocktail and have an official lunch.

NOTES

¹ Gandhi visited Bulgaria in October 1967 during a trip through Eastern Europe.

² The meeting of the Commonwealth nations took place in London in January 1969.

³ Likely reference to the 13th annual meeting of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in April 1968.

⁴ Gandhi began an extensive tour of Latin America in September 1968.

⁵ "National Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation," set up by the hardline leaders of Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, Syria and the PLO in Tripoli in December 1977 to oppose reconciliation and a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel raised by Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat's November 1977 surprise trip to Jerusalem.

⁶

of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mansur R. Kikhia, to the United Nations Secretary-General, published in United Nations, GENERAL ASSEMBLY/Thirty-fifth session/Items 24 and 26 of the preliminary list/Question of Palestine/The Situation in the Middle East, A/35/188, S/13912, 29 April 1980.

⁷ Zhivkov visited Libya in late December 1976.

⁸ Following the collapse of talks with Jordan's King Hussein, Arafat unexpectedly would pay an unexpected 48-hour official visit to Bulgaria in April 1983. He had previously visited Bulgaria in February 1973 and July 1979.

⁹ Several students were reportedly injured. *New York Times*, 29 May 1980, p. A15.

¹⁰ In response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers on 12 December 1979 adopted a "double-track" decision. NATO would deploy in Europe 572 US Pershing II missiles and ground-launched Cruise missiles, all with single warheads. In addition, a broad set of initiatives would be launched to further the course of arms control and confidence-building so as to improve mutual security and cooperation in Europe as a whole.

¹¹ Whitehead visited Bulgaria as part of a trip through Eastern Europe in January-February 1987. Whitehead's reportedly personal decision to include Bulgaria in his itinerary had been controversial amid continuing suspicion of Bulgaria's complicity in the May 1981 assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II.

¹² Zhivkov had been first secretary of the BCP since 1954.

¹³ Hirohito had been in office since 1926; Zhivkov since 1971.

¹⁴ See footnote 1.

¹⁵ See footnote 1.

¹⁶ Beginning in December 1984, Bulgaria was internationally accused of the forced "Bulgarization of its ethnic Turkish minority in parts of southern and eastern Bulgaria.

¹⁷ Zhao Ziyang paid a return visit to Bulgaria during a five-country 18-day tour to Eastern Europe in June 1987.

¹⁸ Following the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, "the April Policy" signified the results of the plenary meeting of the BCP CC in April 1956 during which Todor Zhivkov seized full power within the Communist Party leadership.

¹⁹ A late 1978 Vietnamese invasion drove the ruling Khmer Rouge into the countryside and touched off more than a decade of fighting.

²⁰ Zhivkov visited Cambodia in the fall of 1979 in an effort to demonstrate the Kremlin's diplomatic support for the new rulers in Phnom Penh.

²¹ Tito paid a state visit to the People's Republic of China on 1-10 September 1987.

²² Deng Xiaoping and Todor Zhivkov met at the November 1957 celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

²³ West Germany was pressing the United States and NATO for speedy negotiations with Moscow on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

²⁴ Reference to the conventional arms talks in Vienna since March 1989.

The George Washington Cold War Group (GWCW), the Cold War Research Center in Budapest, and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) sponsored the international conference on “**New Evidence from Central and East European Archives on the Cold War in Asia**” in Budapest on 30 October-2 November 2003. The conference, held at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, sought to provide a forum for the discussion of new findings on the Cold War in Asia from the archives of the former communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Participants included scholars and graduate students from around the world who have recently mined the Central and Eastern European archives, most of which are far more readily accessible than comparable archives in Russia or Asia. The conference was made possible by a generous grant from the Henry Luce Foundation. Additional support was provided by the 1956 Institute, the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies, the National Security Archive, the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Temple University’s Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, the U.C. Santa Barbara Center on Cold War Studies, and the University of Virginia’s Miller Center and History Department.

On Friday, 31 October, after a gracious welcome from both **James Goldgeier** (GWCW) as well as the local hosts of the conference, represented by **Csaba Békés** of the Cold War History Research Center (Budapest), the conference moved quickly into the first task for the morning: two paper panels on new evidence about the relationship between the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China. The first panel, focusing on the pivotal year 1956 and chaired by **Malcolm Byrne** (National Security Archive), led off with a presentation by **Dr. Sergo Mikoyan**. Utilizing his father’s personal papers, Dr. Mikoyan outlined Anastas Mikoyan’s numerous trips to China, beginning with an intriguing account of Mikoyan’s first meeting with Mao in February 1949 and including tidbits from further contacts with the Chinese in the mid-1950s through the early 1960s. It is clear that these private papers offer a wealth of new information on the intricacies of the Chinese-Soviet relationship during this period. The participants were left hoping that the documents hinted at in Dr. Mikoyan’s paper would be made public in the near future.

The next paper, presented by **Peter Vamos** (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), focused more specifically on China’s influence on events in Hungary during 1956 and in the normalization process following the Hungarian Revolution. Utilizing Hungarian documents from the 1950s and early 1960s, he added new but inconclusive evidence on the Chinese influence on the 1 November 1956 Soviet decision to send

troops back into Budapest, as well as an interesting anecdote about the use of Chinese students in Hungary as a source of reporting to Beijing on the events. Independent, Canada-based scholar **Lezek Gluchowski** presented new findings from the Polish archives on the Chinese-Polish relationship from 1956-1964, focusing particularly on the support given by the Chinese to temper Khrushchev’s rage against the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) in 1956. Gluchowski also analyzed the initially close relationship between Mao and Gomulka in their shared opposition to the Kremlin. Eventually, Gluchowski concluded, this relationship between the Poles and the Chinese would cool as Poland sided with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet split.

The second panel of the morning, chaired by **James Hershberg** (GWCW), focused on the East European-Chinese relationship through the Sino-Soviet rift. The panel began with a paper presented by **Carmen Rijnoveanu** of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History in Bucharest (TPolitical Tf2P8T30.0148o tT0.000ntmNove8T31.2 TD0.hich Tw[

Belgrade-based scholar **Ragna Boden's** "The Atheistic and the Muslim State—Islam in the Service of Soviet Policy towards Indonesia (1954-1964)" demonstrated how religious themes and images entered into propaganda about the socialist man in a Muslim state. Boden also showed how religion acted as a category in Soviet foreign policy-making, how in-itself it was a political concern and a factor in shaping party power in Indonesia. Looking at the Non-Aligned Movement, Belgrade scholars **Ljubodrag Dimic's** and **Svetozar Rajak's** "Meeting of the Like-Minded: Tito's first trip to India and Burma" draws connections between the Non-Aligned movement and Yugoslav 'deviationism' that complicated bloc relations and challenged regionalism and geographic constraints. They show how Tito's 1954 visit with Nehru (Indian Prime Minister), in a key step on the path to the Bandung Conference the following spring, established principles that encompassed both European values of activism with Indian methods and approaches that emphasized neutralism and pacifism. It was this synthesis that gave the non-aligned movement strength and allowed it to resonate with developing and newly independent nations.

Finally, **Sergey Radchenko's** paper "The Kremlin's Leash, the Mongolian Nationalism, and the Chinese Connection" brought nationalism and national history to bear on Cold War history. He unearthed the story of a 1964 attempted coup against Mongolian leader Tsedenbal and shows how Mongolian nationalism, with its historic suspiciousness of the Chinese, was used by Tsedenbal against his potential ousters. Using interviews and documents from Mongolia, Radchenko's paper demonstrated the importance of national history in the outcomes and contours of Cold War history.

A sample of the documents declassified and translated for the conference is published here. Additional findings for the Budapest conference, including many other translated documents from Central and East European archives on the Cold War in Asia, will be featured in a special issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, to be jointly produced by CWIHP and GWCW.

Yvette Chin, Gregory Domber, and Malgorzata Gnoinska are Ph. D. students in the History department at the George Washington University. Mircea Munteanu is a also Ph. D. student in the History Department at GWU and coordinator of the Romania Initiative at CWIHP.

DOCUMENT No. 1

Record of Conversation between Polish Premier J. Cyrankiewicz and Chinese Leader Mao Zedong, 8 April 1957

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, sygnatura XI A 130, Dept. V China 074/13/58. Obtained by Douglas Selvage; translated by Malgorzata Gnoinska.]

Warsaw 4.15.1957

People's Republic of Poland
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Secretariat [of]
I Secretary of the CC PUWP
Cde. Wl. Gomulka.

Local

Upon the instruction of Comrade Minister Rapacki, the Secretariat is sending [you] the minutes of the conversation with Comrade Mao Zedong along with the attachment which was brought back according to the cable by Comrade Katz-Suchy.

Secretariat
Signature
/W. Lewandowska/

Minutes of the Conversation carried out by the Leader of the Polish Governmental Delegation in China, the PPR Premier J. Cyrankiewicz, with the Leader of the PRC, Mao Zedong, on 4.8.1957 in the Headquarters of Mao Zedong.

First, Premier Cyrankiewicz passed on greetings for Cde. Ch0.012

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portions between industry and agriculture arose. We did not carry out the plan of raising the standard of living, which caused discontent [displeasure] among the masses. Many errors were made in agriculture. We are currently fixing these

tation and were developing during the period when we were under occupation. Some categories of our workers earn less than before the war. It causes dissatisfaction. Another source of discontent is that we promised more than we could give. People do not want to be cheated. Today we are saying that the improvement of living conditions depends on the working class and the people.

MAO ZEDONG: This is correct. We know that Cde. Gomulka and other comrades from the leadership emphasize in their pronouncements that raising the standard of living depends on the efforts of the working masses. Do all workers understand this?

CYRANKIEWICZ: Now better than before because we are telling them even the bitter truth. The party must be strong in order to have a bond with the working class. The current efforts are aimed in the direction of an ideological strengthening of the Party.

MAO ZEDONG: This is necessary. We are currently working on this as well. It is necessary to strengthen the political work and the ideological leadership among the workers, peasants and the academic youth.

CYRANKIEWICZ: Before we did not use this to convince, but we gave orders. This is a big task of the Party.

MAO ZEDONG: One has to know how to talk to the masses. Some don't know how to do this. They know how to give orders. There is a lack of conviction in their pronouncements. Our party is strengthening the work in this area. We have to treat the nation differently, [we have to treat] differently the class enemy. It is easy to violate the border here. The Party seasoned itself in the class struggle. That is why it has experience in fighting the class enemy. Some, if they only find divergences in the bosom of the nation, accuse for enmity instead of convincing that they are using a method of administrative pressure. We have to differentiate these two kinds of divergences with total clarity. The classicists talked little about these two kinds of divergences. Force must be used against the enemy. As for the nation, a method of clever persuasion must be used.

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will take place in Czechoslovakia in May, and in the GDR in June.

MAO ZEDONG: This is very good. This will give further opportunity to exchange views. If there are differences in the views, then it doesn't matter. One has to leave the matter up to time. There is no need, however, to drag out the matter outside. To an article, for example, immediately answer with an article.

CYRANKIEWICZ: We also think so. We criticized the pronouncements of [Yugoslav leader Josip Broz] Tito in Pula. We told the Yugoslav comrades about this.

MAO ZEDONG: The pronouncements of Tito [and] Kardelj do not have support.

CYRANKIEWICZ: I would like to bring up yet another matter. The Party, the Government, the Polish people warmly invite Cde. Mao Zedong to Poland.

MAO ZEDONG: Thank you. I have received the invitation.

CYRANKIEWICZ: We invited [you] in November of last year. We believe that you will accept the invitation. Your visit in Poland will be a momentous event for the Polish nation.

MAO ZEDONG: In principle, the visit has been agreed upon. All is left is setting the date.

Prepared by:

/E. Sluczanski/

Shanghai, 12 April 1957



DOCUMENT No. 2

Information from Krem Bosev, Charge d'Affairs of the Bulgarian Embassy in Beijing [1970]

[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, Record 26, File 3330. Translated by Borislav Stanimiro.]

INFORMATION

From Krum Bosev, Charge d'affaires of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in Beijing

Concerning: the Chinese position on the Cambodian events.

The Chinese position on the Cambodian events taken

against the regime of Lon Nol–Matack and in favor of Sihanouk is known to be very cautious and has been developed gradually and continuously in favor of [Prince Norodom] Sihanouk, probably under the pressure of the Vietnamese leadership.

In a talk with comrade Elizavetin, the deputy chief of the department for the East European countries, Li Lian-Xi, has emphasized that the Chinese position had been clearly expressed in the announcement of "Xinhua" on 16 March [1970] about the meeting between [Chinese Premier] Zhou Enlai and

DOCUMENT No. 3**Memorandum of Conversation between the Romanian Party and Government Delegation Led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev, 27 September 1964**

[Source: State Archives, CC RCP files, Chancellery, 55/1964, pp. 2-5. Translated by Mircea Munteanu.]

The party and government delegation led by I. G. Maurer stopped in Moscow for a few hours on its way to Beijing. N. S. Khrushchev invited [the delegation] to lunch.

E[mil] Bondaras and P[aul] Niculescu-Mizil also participated from the Romanian side.

A[natoly] N. Kosygin, V. P. Mdjavanadze, V. V. Kuzhnetsov, L. N. Tolkunov, and E. D. Karpeshchenko (translator) were present from the Soviet side.

T. Sinu and G. Marin (translator) participated on behalf of the Romanian embassy.

The lunch was organized by the Guest House of the CPSU CC and the Council of Ministers at 1500 hours. The lunch was followed by discussions which lasted until 2000 hours.

During the lunch, the following issues were discussed:

1. N. S. Khrushchev made a presentation of situation in agriculture for the current year, citing typical (*characteristique*) statistics for all the union republics and some of the regions.

[Khrushchev] spoke of a very good wheat production this year, stating that this year, taking into account the surface, it was a record production.

In 1964, the Soviet Union will not have to import wheat, and in the next four years it hopes to create a one year reserve.

2. Cde. I. Gh. Maurer informed [the Soviet leadership] of the beginning of construction at the Iron Gates hydroelectric plant. He mentioned that a Romanian delegation of specialists [hydroelectric engineers] will arrive in the Soviet Union in the first half of October of this year to negotiate the purchase of [needed] machines. A. N. Kosygin, interrupted the discussion and said that [the Soviets] are prepared for the beginning of the negotiations.

3. N. S. Khrushchev spoke of his visit to an experimental weapons test site. Without going into details, he spoke of a new defensive weapon developed recently by Soviet itndeers] will aeshchenko -1.8 -o.06 Tcloscow TD-0.0006 T5 Tcaw(face, -2-

5. After lunch N. S. Khrushchev continued the discussion, concentrating on the issue of disagreements with the Chinese over the [Sino-Soviet] border. He stated that before *Pravda* published the discussions between Mao Zedong with the Japanese Socialists and the article regarding the position of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government sent a telegram to the Chinese government attempting to confirm the facts published in the Japanese media.

The answer received [from the Chinese]—Khrushchev continued—let it be understood that what was published in the Japanese press was correct.

Khrushchev presented the issue of the territorial conflict as an issue that reached a climactic point. (N. S.

it, mentioning the times when the USSR was the only socialist country.

He said that he does not understand the [North] Korean position, who in theory have adopted the same position, but practically are demanding [economic] aid, [often] proposing deals that are not mutually advantageous. [Khrushchev] continued, stating that he supports intra-socialist economic relations based on the principle of equality and on mutual advantage, and that the CPSU leadership took numerous steps to rectify the flawed practices of Stalin's regime. He gave the *Sovroms* as examples, which—Khrushchev said—“are driving you Romanians up the wall every time you hear about them.”