

These Chinese documents, translated below as the result of an agreement between the Foreign Ministry Archive of the People's Republic of China (PRC) at the Woodrow Wilson Center, are of major importance for the study of the 1954 Geneva Conference. First, they shed new light on the causes, proceedings, and results of the 1954 Geneva Conference, especially on Beijing's policies as well as the considerations underlying them.

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, along with the process of China's "reform and opening to the outside world," scholars of Chinese Cold War history have gained new access to Chinese diplomatic archives. In many cases, scholars working on the Chinese Cold War history recently, the PRC's diplomatic archives remained closed to researchers. In many cases, scholars working on the Chinese Cold War history recently, the PRC's diplomatic archives remained closed to researchers. In many cases, scholars working on the Chinese Cold War history recently, the PRC's diplomatic archives remained closed to researchers.

ence at the Geneva Conference, revealing some key aspects of Beijing's decision-making and policy implementation before and during the conference. The documents indicate that, from a Chinese perspective, the conference provided the PRC with a valuable opportunity to appear at a major international forum. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in particular paid special attention to using the conference to announce that the "new China" had emerged as an important actor and prestigious force in international affairs. Zhou Enlai thus repeatedly emphasized internally that Beijing had to do everything possible to make the Geneva Conference a success.

The Chinese documents also show that the alliance relationship between China and the Soviet Union was quite intimate in 1954. Indeed, the Chinese experience at the Geneva conference and mutual support between Beijing and Moscow. It was Moscow that used the Berlin Foreign Ministers' meeting the Korean War and the First Indochina War. Prior to the conference, the Soviet leaders provided the Chinese with all kinds of advice, assisting Beijing's leaders to be ready for the PRC's debut at a major international gathering. The Soviet and Chinese leaders also conducted extensive discussions on how to coordinate their strategies at the conference, which resulted in a joint Chinese-Soviet strategy, especially toward the settlement of the Indochina issue.

During the conference, when the discussions on settling the Indochina issue nearly deadlocked largely because of the Viet Minh's unyielding attitudes toward such issues as zones and Cambodia separately, and withdrawing all foreign troops from Indochina, the Chinese and the Soviets closely consulted with each other, and jointly exerted great pressure upon their Vietnamese comrades. Consequently, the young Vietnamese communists had no other choice but to follow Beijing's and Moscow's advice to accept a peace accord that would divide parallel.

While cooperation and mutual support remained the main theme of Sino-Viet Minh relations at Geneva, the Chinese documents developed between the Chinese and the Vietnamese comrades over their aims and strategies. As indicated by the documents, the differences were mainly over the issues of whether or not to adopt a "dividing zones" approach toward settling the Indochina issue, and, if so, along which parallel to establish the demarcation line. The Vietnamese, especially in the wake of their hard-won military victory at Dien Bien Phu, were unwilling to accept a solution that would divide Vietnam, even if such division would only be temporary. When a demarcation solution seemed inevitable, they persisted in demanding that the demarcation line be drawn as far to the south as possible. It

tcfgu"Łpcnn{"ceegrvgf"vjg"39vj"Rctcnnngn0

cxckncdng"vq"uejqnctul0"Kv"ku"cr rctgpv"vjcv"hwvtv jgt"fgencuukŁecvkqp"
of these documents is much needed.

n January 2004, a large set of archival materials, which had

v j g" fkhLewvkgu" kpukfg" Htcpeg" cpf" v j g" eqpvtc fkevkqpu" dgvyggp" Htcpeg" cpf" C o gtkec. "uq" v j c" kv" y km" dg" dpggkLekc" hqt" v j g" rgqrng" in Indochina to carry out struggles for liberation. ... On the urgekLe" swgukqpu" tgnvcgf" vq" tguvqtkpi" rgceg" kp" kpfqejkpc. "cp" qp/ukvg" egcugLtg" ku" pqv" cu" iqqf" cu" c" flxkukqp" cnqpi" c" fg o ctection line between the south and north, such as the 16th parallel. J q y xgt. " qpn{ " v j tqw i j" o cp{ " uvtw i i ngu" ecp" uwe j" c" hexqctcdng" situation be achieved.

(4) The agenda of the Geneva Conference is set for discussing the Korea and Indochina questions, but it does not exclude fkuewukqp" qh" qvjgt" urgekLe" swgukqpu" rquukdn{ " vq" dg" tckugf"]cv" the conference]. At the conference, if there is the opportunity, we may put forward other urgent international issues that are favorable to relaxing the tense international situation. ... Therefore, apart from the Korea and Vietnam questions, we must prepare other materials and opinions concerning China, the Far East, and peace and security in Asia. In particular, [we must prepare for] effusive measures toward the development of economic relations, trade exchanges between various countries, and for further relaxing the tense international situation and breaking up the blockade and embargo by the US imperialists. Outside the conference, the mutual relations between China and Britain, China and France, and China and Canada will be touched upon, and we should make some preparations in this respect.



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Telegram, PRC Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian to the PRC Foreign Ministry, Zhou Enlai and the CCP Central Committee, "Reporting the Preliminary Opinions of Our Side on the Geneva Conference to the Soviet Side," 6 March 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048. P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top Secret)

Foreign Ministry, and Report to Zhou Enlai and the Central Committee:

I called upon [Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.]

Fci_ " Jco octumlqnf." vjg" kpukvwkqp" qh" vjg" Wpkvgf"
Pcvkqpu"ecp"dg"wugf0" Jqy gxgt." Oqnvqx"gorj cuk|gu"
that the United Nations should not be allowed to get
involved and that members of various delegations
should be able to use their own institutions, just like
the situation during the Berlin Conference.

- (6) Molotov says that the Soviet Union will start the preparatory work in the near future, and those involved will probably include [Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko, [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V.] Kuznetsov, [Soviet Foreign Ministry Collegium Member Nikolai T.] Fedorenko, and [K.V.] Novikov, head of the Southeast Asian Department [of the Soviet Foreign Ministry].
- (7) Concerning the procedure question of the conference, he believes that there will be many disputes over it after the beginning of the conference.
- (8) Comrade Molotov will ask Comrade Gromyko and others to make presentations to us on matters needing attention in attending an international conference.

Zhang Wentian

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**Telegram, Zhang Wentian to PRC Vice Foreign Minister
Li Kenong, Concerning the Soviet Suggestion on
Propaganda Work at Geneva, 6 April 1954**

*[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048-04; P1. Obtained by CWIHP
and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]*

Top secret

Comrade (Li) Kenong at the Foreign Ministry:

When Vice Minister of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov received me on the 3rd, he expressed the hope that our delegation at Geneva would make better efforts to carry out additional propaganda work and coordinate diplomatic work and coordinate diplomatic work in China. Such work could include showing movies, organizing speeches, small-size exhibitions, and cultural performances. The Premier instructs that you should immediately consider work on this.

should, in turn, express their support for the Korean delegation's positions one day after they speak. Therefore, I should also make a comprehensive statement myself. Right now I am reorganizing the drafts of the opening speech and two statements supporting the Korean delegation, and making changes based on several suggestions from the Soviet comrades. We will also present the principles for an Asian Indochina issue for the moment since we hope to con-

- (2) Regarding the issue of the chairman of the conference, we have already consulted with the Soviet Union and Britain in advance and decided that Thailand, the Soviet Union, and Britain should take the chair in turn. Thailand already acted as the interim chair when this afternoon's meeting started at 3:00 p.m. Afterwards, the United States proposed that the above three countries take turns as chair. It was instantly put to vote and adopted. The meeting was adjourned thereafter. This meeting took only 15 minutes. Speeches and discussion will start tomorrow.
- (3) Today Molotov introduced [British Foreign Secretary C] and greeted me.

Zhou Enlai
26 April [1954]



Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding a Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Eden, 1 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-03; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

Comrade Molotov invited me to meet with Eden yesterday afternoon, and we discussed the following questions:

- (1) The Korean issue. There is no meeting today on 1 May, and the conference will reopen on 3 May. Only the Turkish and Thai delegations made speeches yesterday morning. The meeting was adjourned in less than thirty minutes. Eden suggested holding a restricted session and said that "[the members] said that he had already talked to [US Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles about this, and he assumed that [French Foreign

Minister Georges] Bidault would not oppose it either. Molotov and I both agreed to hold the restricted session. We also asked British and Americans who are taking the initiative and sounding us out, and we should not react too positively except to agree to hold the meeting. Based on the general situation, I assume that Eden's proposal for a restricted session is related to Dulles' return to the US next week. Until now, no North Atlantic¹ country except Turkey has spoken yet to support Dulles during the discussion of the Korean issue. Although they could not scare anyone but themselves. The United States is attempting to form an alliance of invaders of Southeast France's request for more air support is being refused by Britain and the United States. In sum, it is now impossible for the United States to stop negotiations on the Indochina issue. Eisenhower's recent words showed his retreat and embarrassed Dulles. Therefore Dulles decided to run away [from the conference] and leave the problems to the Under Secretary of State, [General Walter Bedell] Smith. Eden said that Dulles had already decided to return to the US next week. Molotov responded that "it will increase the responsibilities of the four of us." The current situation shows that Eden will stay, and so will Bidault since [French Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States² Marc] Jacquet of the de Gaulle group and [French Foreign Ministry Political and Economic Affairs Assistant Director Roland Jacquin de] Margerie, who insists on the ending of the Indochina war, came to Geneva from France agreement on the Korean issue can be reached.

- (2) The Indochina issue. Eden said that "I will not use this as a condition for the issue of membership [of countries which should be invited to join the discussion], nor do I require you to answer me. I just want to ask if the Soviet and Chinese sides can push for the withdrawal of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu." Molotov said: "It can be solved if you discuss this with the Vietnamese delegation." I said: "It is better to have the two belligerent parties discuss this directly. The two belligerent parties in the Korean War used to discuss directly the issue of exchanging wounded and sick POWs before the armistice in Korea." Regarding the issue of membership, I said: "Five countries have already been invited to join the discussions on the Indochina issue. It is odd that the decision on the invitation of related countries on both sides has not yet been made. Obviously someone is preventing both sides from attending the negotiations." Eden said: "I am not preventing it." It seems that it will take another two days to solve the problem of membership.

- (3) The issue of Sino-British relations. When Molotov mentioned that China was complaining about unfairness in international affairs, Eden said: "Britain does recognize China. which does not recognize Britain. It is Britain which does not



political issue in Indochina. It is possible that Bidault intentionally left the political issue for Bao Dai at the next session, thus [allowing Bao Dai to] discuss it [while] pretending to be independent.

(2)

7th and threatened to do everything possible to support France and the three countries in Indochina in
tgukuvpi" qwvukfg" δci i tguukqp0δ" Jg" cnuq" uwr rqtvgf"
Htcepeg0u" rtqrqucn" hqt" c" egcugŁtg" cpf" hcxqtgf" ghg-
vkg" kpvgtpcvkqpcn" uwr gtxkukqp0" J qy gxgt.

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Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden, 14 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00091-02; P2-8. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Location: Premier Zhou's Residence

British Participants: Anthony Eden, [British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]

- Gfgp " Y jgtg"fq"{qw"Łpf"kpqswcnkv{A"
- Zhou Enlai: In that the French have not discussed the political questions of the military armistice.
- Eden: Oh, you are referring to this question. On this point, both sides have some accusations.
- Zhou Enlai: No, I am not referring to that. I meant that France had not answered Mr. Pham Van Dong's political proposal, while only recognizing Bao Dai as representing all of Vietnam and unifying Vietnam under him. This is a completely unreasonable thought.
- Eden: France would like to let the members of the Cuuqekcygf"Uvcygu"urgcm"Łtuv" O {"wpfgtuwcpfkpi"ku"vjcv"Htcepeg"oki jv"urgcm"Łtuv"vjku"chvgtpqpp"Yg"jqrq"vq"cejkgxg" oknkvt{"ct okuvkeg"Łtuv"cpf"vjgp" discuss the political questions. Perhaps military ct okuvkeg"ecp"dg"vjg"Łtuv"rtcevekn"swgukqp"vq"dg" discussed in the restricted sessions. The restricted sessions perhaps could be held next week, for the general debate will be continued this afternoon.
- Zhou Enlai: Regarding the proposal for restricted sessions, we will have to discuss this with the Soviet and Vietnamese delegations.
- Eden: Certainly, certainly.
- Zhou Enlai: I would like to know what your plans are for the restricted sessions.
- Eden: I am thinking that besides the heads of the delegations, the sessions would consist of only two or three advisors from each delegation. No account of the proceedings would be given to the press. We tried this method during the Berlin Conference, and it was very useful. The agreement to have the Geneva Conference was reached this way.
- Zhou Enlai: I would like to add something. China wants peaceful co-existence with all of its Asian neighbors. The recent agreement that China signed ykvj"kpfk"qp"vtc"fg"kp"Vkdgv"ku"uwŁekgpv"vq"fg o-onstrate this point. In the preamble, China and India stated mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, reciprocity on an equal basis, and peaceful co-existence.
- Eden: Right.
- Zhou Enlai: On the Korean question, we have also proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops, including the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. Only so can peace and security be guaranteed.
- Eden: I would like to say a few things as the British Foreign Secretary. We very much hope to see the four great powers, excuse me, I made a mistake. Yg"xgt{"owej"jqrq"vq"ugg"vjg"Łxg"itgcv"rqygtu." that is, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France, and the Soviet Union, work together to decrease international tensions and to conduct normal negotiations. But before this can be achieved, a resolution must be reached on the Indochina question. Indochina is important in itself, but what is more important is that this swgukqp"pqv"chhgev"vjg"tgnvckqpu"co qpi"vjg"Łxg" great powers.
- Zhou Enlai: China deserves the status of a great power. This is an existing fact. We are willing to work with others for world peace, particularly for peace in Asia. But I must say candidly that this must not be made a condition.
- Eden: No, I am not saying that it should be made a condition at all. I am only stating my opinion tgi ctfkpi"vjku"swgukqp"k"co"yqttkgf"vjcv"Jq" Ejk"Okpj"oki jv"dg"cumkpi"vqq"owej"Jg"oki jv" be able to get it, but if he were to do so, it would affect the relations for the great powers.
- Zhou Enlai:

**Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding the Second Restricted Session, 19 May 1954**

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0049. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

- (1) The second restricted session on Indochina, held yesterday [18 May], devoted all its time to the discussion on whether the question concerning Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with separately. The United States, Britain, and France and three... [original unreadable] countries stood together to emphasize that the Cambodia and Laos questions should be dealt with separately from the Vietnam question. There are no French troops in Cambodia and Laos, so only after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese People's Army will the issue be resolved. We absolutely cannot agree to this point. Pham Van Dong, Molotov, and I all spoke to rebut this point, pointing out that the armed struggle for national liberation by the Cambodian and Laotian people was caused by the military intervention of France. The resistance governments in Cambodia and Laos have their own troops. Therefore the territory of their own motherlands. There exists no such "issue" of withdrawing from Cambodia and Laos. Peace should be restored in all of Indochina, and peace should not just be restored in Vietnam. The questions involving the three countries cannot be discussed by separating them. The two sides debated for three hours and [the session] was adjourned without any result. The other side attempts to use this issue as the meeting, Molotov as chair [of the session] proposed that next day the Korea issue should be discussed. an impression would be created that the discussion on the Indochina issue failed immediately after its beginning, so he contended that discussion should be continued on the Indochina issue on the 19th. Our side has agreed to this.
- (2) In the previous several days the other side has used the sick and wounded soldiers at Dien Bien Phu as a means for political blackmail and has conducted a series of slanderous propaganda [activities]. To deal with this, we should publicize the facts and to expose the plots of the other side. Then the French delegation was questioned [on this issue] at a press conference it hosted. In particular, [the fact] that the French military resumed bom-

... has caused heated repercussions. Consequently, *Pravda* has published commentaries about this in the past few days. We are also organizing the reporters of the Xinhua News Agency to cooperate in our propaganda [efforts] and expose [the French]. In the propaganda battle, so long as we are able to command the material in a timely manner, we should be able to expose continuously the plots of the other side and to master the initiative.

- (3) The French delegation has appointed a person to contact the Vietnamese delegation. The contact will begin today.

Zhou Enlai
19 May 1954



introduced any plan for resolving the Korea issue. Probably they are discussing with Syngman Rhee and are waiting for Rhee's response.

- (3) I plan to pay a return visit to Eden on the morning of the 20th. The result of the conversation will be reported separately.

Zhou Enlai
20 May 1954

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**Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding the Situation at the Eighth Restricted Session,
30 May 1954**

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0049. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

- (1) At the restricted session on the Indochina issue yesterday, the three-point proposal concerning the meeting between the representatives of the two military commands at Geneva (see previous telegram [not printed]) was passed.
- (2) During the discussion, the other side continuously stressed that they preserved their own different opinions toward the Laos and Cambodia issue, stating that "the concentration of formal forces in Vietnam should not be detrimental to the political and economic integrity of Vietnam." [US Under Secretary of State General Walter Bedell] Smith particularly stated that the conference should have the right to make new decisions over the proposals put forward by the military representatives of the two sides on the Vietnam and Laos questions.
- (3) Pham Van Dong pointed out in his presentation that hqt"vjg"rwtrqug"qh"tgcejkpi" c"egcugŁtg"kv" ycu"cdulutely necessary to adjust zones, and he exposed that America's opposition to division of zones and C ogtkecau" go rjcuku" wrqp" wplŁecvkqp" ygtg" c

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If Foreign Ministers Zhou and Bidault invite each other and have dinner together, the Swiss security would know. All the Swiss policemen communicate through their network, and the information [about the meeting] would leak to the public. So our suggestion is that the two foreign ministers have a meeting after sunset, about 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. in the evening. Therefore, the foreign ministers can have a long conversation. If they would like to, they could talk until midnight or even 1:00 a.m. Regarding their meeting location, we suggest this mansion. The mansion is close to where both foreign ministers are staying. It is convenient for all of us. There are no neighbors around so there won't be any disruptions from outside. [We'd like to know] if Foreign Minister Zhou agrees [with the arrangement].

Wang Bingnan: What is your security plan?

Paul-Boncour: If we use Swiss security guards, the information will leak. So we suggest Foreign Minister Zhou use his own bodyguards. They may come to the mansion about 9:00 p.m.

Wang Bingnan: J qy "ku" O tDkfcwnv"eq o kpi" jgtgA

Paul-Boncour: J g"y kmn"eq o g" jgtg" jk o ugnh"V jg"Uy kuu"ugewirity guards as usual will notice that he has left his place. They won't, however, know where he is going. During the conference hours, the Swiss security guards always escort [Bidault] as they do for all the heads of the delegations. But, outside conference hours, Bidault goes out quite often by himself. On Sundays, when his chef took time off, he and Chauvel went to the countryside by themselves and ate at local restaurants. If Foreign Minister Zhou wants to use the Swiss security guards, we don't have a problem. We just don't feel it is the best way.

Wang Bingnan: J cu" O tDkfcwnv" gxgt"eq o g"vq"v jku" rncegA

Paul-Boncour: J g" jcu" pgxgt" dggp" jgtg" dghqtg" J qy gxgt." his wife has been here several times. I still have to repeat one of the points we discussed at the last meeting, that is, to keep the meeting absolutely secret before it starts. The two foreign ministers can decide themselves whether a press release or other documents may be necessary after their meeting.

(Chauvel arrived at this point.)

Chauvel: We can decide whether the Swiss security guards will come or not. If they don't come, they may just guess. If v j g f" f q" e q o g. "v j g f" y km" f g L p k v g n f" m p q y "v j g" y j q n g" c t t c p i g o g p w l" So it is better not to have them here.

Regarding the issue of who will attend the meeting from the delegations, the French participants will probably include Bidault, myself, and Mr. Guillermaz. We consider it proper not to have many participants from each delegation.

(After the meeting, Guillermaz said that it may be appropriate to add Paul-Boncour [to the list], since he is the host.)

Wang Bingnan: I will report all of your suggestions to the head of our delegation.

(2) The Issues at the Indochina Conference

Chauvel: At the last meeting, Mr. Molotov summarized and outlined the opinions from all sides. Mr. Smith suggested discussing the supervision issue only. The French delegation considers supervision a very complicated issue. If it can be resolved

L t u v. "v j g" e q p h t g p e g" k u" e g t v c k p n f" o c m k p i" i q q f" r t q i t g u u l

V j g" v y q" u r g e k L e" d w v" k o r q t v c p v" k u u w g u" c v" v j g" r t g u g p v" c t g" v q" reach a military agreement on troop regroupings, and to reach a political agreement on supervision. If these two problems are solved, other problems can be dealt with easily.

All of the six points proposed by the Chinese delegation should be discussed. We suggest discussing supervision, which we believe is a central issue. It doesn't mean that any other issues could not be discussed. If a positive result derives from the solution of the central issue, it will help the discussions on other issues.

We are very much impressed by the recent talks. Especially c v" v j g" o g g v k p i" { g u v g t f c { o y g" u c y" i g p w k p g" r t q i t g u u l

Wang Bingnan: I would also like to talk about our positions. We believe that:

30" V j g" L t u v" v c u m" k u" v q" u v q r" v j g" d n q q f u j g f" c p f" t g u w o g" r g c e g" in Indochina.

2. Different problems should be dealt with by adapting different methods.

3. Discussions must follow the importance of each issue c p f" v j g p" f g e k f g" y j k e j" k u u w g" u j q w n f" i q" L t u v l

60" C" e g c u g" L t g" e c p" d g" c e j k x g f" c h v g t" c m n" v j g" k u u w g u" c t g" f k u- c u s s e d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y.

The composition of the supervisory commission must d g" u r g e k L e c m n f" f k u e w u u g f" d f" d q v j" u k f g u l" Y g" d g n k g x g" v j c v" v j g" Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has two tasks:

30" F q o g u v k e c m n f" v q" r t g x g p v" e k x k n" e q p l k e w u" h t q o" q e e w t k p i" again.

2. Internationally, to stop entry of foreign troops and war materials into [the region].

Y g" c n u q" j c x g" e q p e g t p u" c d q w v" u q o g" u r g e k L e" r t q d n g o u" q h" supervision. Our position is that a supervisory location can d g" k f g p v k L g f" g k v j g t" k p n c p f" q t" k p" v g t t k v k t c n" y c v g t u" v q" k o r q u g" c" supervision. In short, what we hope for is to establish effective supervision.

The nine nations attending the conference¹ should play a role in guaranteeing the implementation of the agreed settlement. A neutral nation should be among other proper nations besides these nine conference nations. The six points proposed by our Foreign Minister Zhou on the 27th are not for restoring a temporary peace in Indochina, but necessary for establishing a lasting peace in the region. This peace will b e n g L v" C u k. " H t c p e g. " c p f" v j g" y q t n f l" Y g" j c x g" r q k p v g f" q w v" f w t k p i" the previous meeting that this war should not become complicated and internationalized. Mr. Paul-Boncour said that some French people intended to make the war more complicated by transferring the war issues to the United Nations. Y g" d g n k g x g" v j c v" v j k u" f q g u p o v" L v" k p v q" j u g t x g" v j g" p c v k q p c n" k p v g t- e s t s o f F r a n c e.

Mr. Pham Van Dong had said that France could still maintain its economic and cultural enterprises in Vietnam. After peace is reinstated, Vietnam will consider joining the French Union and build friendly relations with France.

The delegates from Laos and Cambodia also indicated that the Free Laos and Kampuchean Liberation Movements are not

strong forces. If this is true and their people support them, they won't worry any more after a peaceful order is established.

Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai stated that the United States had to accept a peace in Korea. It should not stop France from accepting peace now in Indochina. At the meeting yesterday, most of the delegates agreed to reach a settlement. It was said that the attitude of the American delegation would be neither supportive nor opposed. This is not helpful for the conference to reach an agreement.

Paul-Boncour: Please allow me to repeat to Mr. Chauvel

the supervision issue.

Since there is no one else around, hopefully we can exchange our opinions sincerely on these two existing and imminent
rtqdn g ou"kp"qtfgt"vq"tgcej"qwt"eqo oqp"iqcñ ô rgceg⁰"k"vj kpm"
that time is running out. If the quarrel continues, the situation

settlement, not a preparation for war. I have experienced two

been solved through the resolutions passed on the 29th. Our counterparts want to discuss in particular the following four points, especially the issues concerning international supervision and international guarantee.

(2) At the ninth restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 31st, our counterparts presented the issue of international supervision, as we expected. [Although] Smith did not present the issue of United Nations supervision at the meeting, he emphasized that the experience of the NNSC on Korea was not good and argued that our side did not act in good NNSC's work and made it impossible for the NNSC to carry out its work in communist[-controlled] areas. Smith especially emphasized that communist countries could not be neutral and cited several paragraphs from the letters that Switzerland and Sweden sent to the Military Armistice Commission on 4 May and 7 May to prove his argument. I immediately spoke Korean and Chinese sides do follow the armistice agreement, and Poland and Czechoslovakia are impartial. Several reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission are agreed to by Poland, Czechoslovakia and India. The biased ones are the the work of the Korean NNSC had been basically successful, from the side of the United Nations forces. I used facts listed in Poland's and Czechoslovakia's two reports on 15 April and 30 April to prove that the United Nations forces created [those] experience of the Korean NNSC for reference. I also made it clear that when we discuss the issue of supervision it should be done in relation to other points. Also, we should have a joint commission consisting of members of both belligerents to of the provisions of the [armistice] agreement. Gromyko spoke to support China's six-point proposal and explained and the organization of neutral nations' supervision, Gromyko suggested that India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan [should be the members]. Our counterparts did not respond to this on

- ple opposed it. A commission consisting entirely of Asian countries would have disadvantages (I gave the example that it would be inappropriate for China as an Asian country to have supervision of the Kashmir problem). This time around it would be best if the commission could include both Asian and European countries, as proposed by Gromyko.
- b. Eden expressed the wish that the representatives of the commanders-in-chief of both sides
 - c. Eden asked whether the conference would come
 - d. Eden said that since the United Kingdom has
4. I visited Bidault at 10:00 yesterday evening. On the one hand, Bidault explained that he wanted to reach
- other hand, he threatened that if an agreement could not be reached, there would be danger. I pointed out that the danger would be intervention by the United
- the things that concern us the most. Bidault expressed his hope that the representatives of the commanders-
- national supervision should be addressed as well. Although Bidault had said beforehand that he wanted to discuss some problems, he did not go deeply into the problems yesterday evening, nor did he bring up

Zhou Enlai
2 June 1954

confuse the non-neutrality of political thoughts with neutral nations that have not participated in the [Indochina] war. Eden made a statement and insisted that we should use we should set up a technical committee to discuss the issues of functions and structure of the NNSC. Eden also suggested that the NNSC should be composed of Asian nations and emphasized that the joint commission of both sides should be subject to the command of the NNSC. Molotov spoke to refute Smith's statement[:] "if Smith basically opposes communist countries joining the NNSC it means that he does not want to settle the problem. This attitude hampers the settlement. Such an attitude that denies all non-capitalist countries a role in the NNSC is close to the thoughts of the anti-communist league." Molotov also cited documents signed jointly by four member countries of the Korean NNSC acknowledging that the [he] explained that the NNSC was still effective despite these weaknesses and that the four countries could reach an agreement. The four neutral countries that the Soviet Union proposed included two Asian countries and two European countries. Among those countries, two of them had diplomatic relations with France and the other two with the Democratic of both sides.

(3) Our counterparts have not yet reached a consensus on the issue of the composition of the NNSC. They were unable to make any suggestions at the meeting. Based on newspaper [accounts], it seems that France does not agree with the Southeast Asian countries completely.

ing of the representatives of commanders of both sides in a separate telegram.

Zhou Enlai
3 June 1954

. 2

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,

said to Mr. Zhou Enlai there are currently two critical issues: (1) a decision on troop regrouping areas, and (2) supervision. Regarding the regrouping issue, military representatives from both sides have held three or four meetings. The Vietnamese commanders, however, only addressed principles but not

tions and even regression at the conference, and how to push the conference forward practically and realistically.

Chauvel: We can continue our conversations tomorrow and the next day. In short, I want to add several points. At the military meetings, the French staff presented the Laniel Proposal. Our purpose, however, was not to make the Vietnamese accept it, but to hope that the Vietnamese would tell us why they couldn't accept it and to let them provide detailed critiques on our proposal. In years, we have no understanding of each other. Therefore, a mutual understanding is desired at the present.

We believe that the most urgent problem at the present is the composition of the Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission. If this problem can be solved, other technical problems will be dealt with easily, and the conference will make much progress. During today's conversation, I present the French opinion. At our next meeting, hopefully, Mr. Wang Bingnan can talk about China's opinion on India and other countries. A conversation between two persons should be much easier for problem-solving. At least I believe so.

I must also emphasize my point on the local contact of military representatives. Although the past international agreements stated that principles were discussed at Geneva, and the details were discussed at local levels, they didn't say these meetings would begin at the same time. We still believe that an agreement of the bottom-line principles has to be reached at Geneva, before any local talk can possibly start on the spot. We promptly send the French staff to contact the Vietnamese.

Wang Bingnan: Over eight years the war has hurt feelings on both sides. A local contact may be the best way to heal the wounds and change the situation for the better.

Regarding the composition of the neutral nations commission, the Soviet Union has nominated four nations. We support

the Soviet proposal. Mr. Chauvel, could you tell me about the French opinion on the other neutral nations besides India?

Chauvel: I mentioned India because it is a very typical example of a neutral nation. Among other Asian nations, for



We will also provide materials to prove that the United States violated the armistice agreement and disrupted the NNSC. Concerning the propaganda issue, we plan to compare our conciliatory attitude and America's disruptive one during the conference. It will show clearly that our side is trying its best

Zhou Enlai
6 June 1954



. 30

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Concerning Consultations among the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese Delegations, 7 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-10; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

- (1) I hereby send for your examination the twelve terms on the united committee (the committee on military armistice), the supervision committee by neutral countries, and the question of international guarantee that had been decided upon by the three parties of the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam yesterday (see attached). It is planned that these terms will be raised by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the open session on the Indochina issue on the 8th. At the session on the 8th, I plan to make positive explanation of the six points concerning the basic principles in the military aspect that I put forward on 27 May, rebutting the mistaken points of the other side, and, in particular, criticizing the United States for blocking the progress of the conference. Pham Van Dong in his presentation plans to highlight the stand of our side on the political issue.
- (2) The telegram of the CCP Central Committee and the reply of the Vietnamese Workers Party have been conveyed to the Soviet Party Central Committee by Comrade Molotov yesterday. The three parties of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China exchanged opinions on these two telegrams yesterday.

Zhou Enlai
7 June 1954

Attachment [omitted]



. 31

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Replying to Zhou Enlai's 7 June 1954 Telegram, 7 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-10; P5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Comrade Zhou Enlai:

The telegram of 7 June has been received. We agree to the twelve terms on the united committee, the committee of supervision by neutral countries, and the question of international guarantee.

Central Committee
7 June 1954



. 32

Telegram, Li Kenong to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regarding the Chinese Delegation's Meeting with the Delegations of Various Popular French Organizations, 9 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00121-02; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

representatives at the most, and two or three at the least.

*4+ " Fwtkpi " vjg " o ggkpi u. " cm " vjg " fngi cvkqpu " wuwcm { " Łtu " expressed their full understanding and trust of China's policy for peace, and then showed their appreciation of China's efforts at the Geneva Conference. Some of them presented certain gifts (for example, candies and books on New China by the French Communist Party). Two of the delegations found the 1920 photos that the Chinese students celebrated the "Double Tens" at St. Etienne. They said the premier [Zhou Enlai] was there. One of the delegations presented us the receipts of French donation and aid to China during the Anti-Japanese War. They said that the receipts had been buried underground

Zhou Enlai
10 June 1954

military situation to slow progress. A military situation will cause negative political reactions. Do not continue the war while discussing peace, and do not use the war to antagonize the public feeling of the other side." On one hand, Bidault that the historical relationship between France and the three countries, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, was kept in mind. On the other hand, however, he said that he is opposed to mixing together discussion of military and political issues. agreement [would exist] if the Korean and Indochinese issues on the entire Asian issue if the discussions were conducted behind closed doors. I told him that the two issues certainly had impact on each other. They all should be solved, not just one, while leaving the other unsolved, or even trying to block any solution. Bidault said that he could avoid the impact of the development of the Indochinese issues on his may have to mention his conversation with me in his speech that would be sent to the Assembly on Wednesday (the 9th). down the complaints in the Assembly, but he was afraid of upsetting America. Bidault also told me that he may have to talk aggressively and offensively at the public meeting on be a problem for me to continue the communication with the Chinese delegation thereafter." During the conversation, Bidault emphasized that my opinion was very close to those with other people. I talked about the issues of neutral nation supervision, the experience of the Korean Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and veto rights. I also emphasized that both sides should follow the conciliatory spirits and look for their common points.

[15 characters excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

v j g"kp f k c p" f g n g i c v k q p o u" q r k p k q p u 0

Hkhvggp"fc{u"ciq."}kpfkcp"Rtkog"Okpkuygt"Lcycjctncn_"Pgjtw" cnuq"uvcvgf"rwdnken{"vjcv"Pqtvj"Mqtgcou"rqnkvecn"u{uvgo"ujqwnf" pqv"dg"hqtegf"qp"Uqvwj"Mqtgc0" Pgvjgt"ujqwnf"Uqvwj"Mqtgcou" rqnkvecn"u{uvgo"dg"hqtegf"qp"Pqtvj"Mqtgc0"Vjg{"owuv"uggm"c" way to coexist with each other peacefully. They should begin with cultural and economic issues, and solve their political problems thereafter.

Pqv"nqpi"ciq"yg"cpvkekrcvgf"vjcv"vjg"Htgpej"iqxgtpogpv" would face a crisis, therefore we asked Bidault to present this proposal so that the conference could note it for the record. Vjku"ku"Htcepegou"encko"qp"vjg"kuuwg"qh"rgceg"kp"Mqtgc0"Kv"ycu" simply a personal proposal before, however, now the French iqxgtpogpv"ku"wukpi"kv"hqt"vjg"Łtuv"vko"cu"c"rtqrucn"qh"kvu" qyp0"Vjg"Wpkvgf"Uvcvgu"ku"rtgrctkp"vq"kpukvg"vjg"qvjgt"Łhvggp" eqwvptkgu"vq"lqk"kv"vq"ucdqvcig"vjg"eqphgtgpeg"qp"vjg"kuuwg"qh" international supervision. If other countries decide to do so, France will agree with them.

*4+"Rcwn_"Tco cfkgt"ycpvu"vq"oggv"O0" \ j qw" Gpnc0

Former French Prime Minister Ramadier is a member of vjg"Uqekcnkuv"Rctv{0" Jg"ku"ewttgpn{"cvvgpfpki"c"eqphgtgpeg"qh" the International Labor Organization in Geneva and is also vjg"ejckt"qh"vjg"eqphgtgpeg0" Jg"ku"c"iqqf"htkppf"qh"o{"wpeng" Mr. [Joseph] Paul-Boncour (former prime minister from the Socialist Party), my wife and I are all very familiar with him. Jg"ykmm"tgvwtp"vq"Rctku"chvgt"vjg"eqphgtgpeg"cpf"vjg"tgqhg"ycpvu" vq"vcmg"vjku"qrrqtwvkv{"vq"oggv"O0" \ j qw" Gpnc0"Kh"O0" \ j qw" Gpnc"ci tggu."K"ykmm"cttcpig"cnwpej"qt"fkppgt"kp"c"tguvcwtpv"kp" the countryside so that two of them will be able to meet there. For the time of the meeting, we prefer next Sunday.

Wang Bingnan: "Cu"ht"cu"yg"mpqy."c"uguukqp"qp"vjg"Mqtgcp" kuuwg"ykmm"dg"jgnf"vq"oqttqy0" Pqy"K"yqwnf" cnuq"nkmg"vq"gzrtguu" some personal opinions:

(1) We have stated many times that this conference has pqvjkipi"vq"fq"ykvj"vjg"Wpkvgf" Pcvkqpu0" Cnvjqwi"j"vjku"kuuwg"ycu" fkuewuugf"ocp{"vko"gu"kp"vjg"Wpkvgf" Pcvkqpu" dghqgtg."pq"tguwnv" was reached there. Therefore, the Berlin Conference decided to hold the Geneva Conference.

*4+" Fkuewuukpi"vjg"Mqtgcp"kuuwg"cv"vjg"Wpkvgf" Pcvkqpu"ku" eqo"rngvgn{"fkhgtgpn"htqo"vjg"kuuwg"qh"tguvqtkpi" Ejkpcou"uvcvuu" cv"vjg"WP0"Vjg{"ujqwnf"pqv"dg"eqphwugf0

We believe that the Geneva Conference should reach a conclusion on the Korean issue. Since the delegations have all citggf"qp"uqog"dcwP \$ uqog ! pkv

O OO Og+ ukq uk ‡

uguukqp0" J q y gxgt."Htcpeg"ku"fkhhgtgp0"Htcpeg"y cpvu"vjg"eqphgt-
ence to succeed, not to fail.

Yg" jcxg" rtqng ou" vtcpuncvki" Otl" Oqnqvqx0u" fgvcngf"
proposals. Our two translators have been working on them
ukpeg"vjtgq"q0enqem"cpf"uvkm"jcxgp0v"Łpkujgf" {gv0"Vjgtghgtg."
Mr. [Jean] Chauvel cannot make any clear statement, simply
fgrgpfkpi"qp" y jcv"jg"jgctf"htq o"vjg"uguukqp0" Pgxgtvjgnguu."
Mr. Wang Bingnan should pay attention to one thing about
y jkej" Uokvj" ku" iqlpi" vq" ocmg" c" fkucrrqkpvkpi" tgrn{0" Jg"
uckf"vjcv" Oqnqvqx0u" rtqrqucnu" fkf"pqv"eqpvckp"cp{vjkipi"pgy0"
J q y gxgt."Ejcxwgn"gzrtguugf"vjcv"jg"ycu" ykmpki"vq"eqpukfgt"
vjg o"ectghwn{0" Jg" fkf"pqv" ycpv"vq"gcukn{ "rww" Oqnqvqx0u" rtq-
posals aside before they are discussed.

Wang Bingnan< Cnvjqwi j" Otl" Rcwn/Dqpeqwt" uckf" vjcv"
these were his personal opinions, I believe that they are similar
to our own.

Cu"htc"cu"K"mpqy."vjg" o knkvct{ "uguukqp"cnug" o c f g" i t g c v" r t q i -
ress, and the atmosphere of the session was very good, too.

Otl" Oqnqvqx0u" k o r q t v c p v" r t q r q u c n u" r c x g f" c" p g y" y c { " h q t"
vjg"eqphgtgpe0" Yg" y g n e q o g" O t l" E j c w x g n 0 u" c v k w f g" q h" e c t g h w n"
consideration. The United States said that there was nothing
pgy"kp"vjg"Uqxkgv"rtqrqucnu0"Kv"ujqyu"vjcv"vjg"C o g t k e c p u 0" r w t -
pose is to let the conference fail. They obstruct [the confer-
ence] immediately every time it makes progress. France is an
important concerned party. We hope that, as you said, France
wants the conference to succeed. Then we believe that the con-
ference must reach a conclusion.

Paul-Boncour: Unfortunately, France does not have a gov-
ernment anymore.¹ J q y gxgt."vjg"Htgpej" fnggicvkqp"cpf"K"cm"
hope to be able to organize a technical committee, which will
discuss the issue of supervision. This committee can discuss
kuuwgu"qh"vjg" o g o d g t u j k r" c p f" c w v j q t k v { " q h" v j g" P P U E 0" C h v g t" v j g"
discussion, it should submit its report to the conference like the
uguukqp"qh" o knkvct{ "gzrgtvu"fqgu0"Ceeqtfkpi"vq"vjg"Htgpej"eqp-
stitution, the president is the commander-in-chief of the three
c t o g f" u g t x k e g u 0" C n v j q w i j" j g" j c u" p q" c w v j q t k v { " v q" v c n m" c d q w v"
political issues, he can take responsibility for the military
issues of the armistice. The expert who is doing research on
the issue of supervision in France is [Counselor to the French
delegation] Colonel [Jacques] Guillermaz.

Wang Bingnan: Do you think that the restricted sessions or
vjg"gzrgtv"uguukqpu"ujqwnf"dg"eqpvkpwgfA

Paul-Boncour: I still cannot answer you now, because we
jcxg"vq"fkuewuu"Otl" Oqnqvqx0u"rtqrqucnu"Łtuv0

Wang Bingnan< J q y" n q p i" y k m n" k v" v c m g" v q" u g v" w r" v j g" p g y"
Htgpej" i q x g t p o g p v A" J q y" o c p { " e j c p e g u" f q g u"] H t g p e j"
P c v k p c n" C u u g o d n { " O g o d g t" R k g t t g_ " O g p f g u/ H t c p e g" j c x g" v q"
hqt o" c" e c d k p g v A

Paul-Boncour:"K"vj k p m"kv"ku"fkhlŁewn"vq" hqt o" c" p g y" e c d k p g v 0"
It will take longer. I hope that Mendes-France will be success-
ful, however, I think he will fail.

Currently, the French delegation is responsible to the
president. The negotiation of the armistice issue is led by
Chauvel, [French Chief of the Special Staff of the Secretary

[military] bases in Laos and Cambodia. On the contrary, Mr. Gfep"uckf"vjcv"kh"yg"eqwnf"tgeej"cp"ci tgg o gpv."vjku"ci tgg o gpv" yknn"dg"i wetcpgggf"d{"cm"rctvkekrcpvu0"Pqy"K"yknn"i gv"dcem"vq"vjg" kpuvtwekqpu"htqo" Otl"Gfep0" Yg"fgLpkvgn{"ecppqv"eqo rtqokug" qp"vjg"ykvjftcyen"qh"cm"kpxcflpi"vtqqrul" Otl"Gfep"cumgf"og"vq" explain to the ambassador, and also to inform the prime minister, vjcv"vqo qttqy0"oggvkpi"qp"vjg"Ncqu"cpf"Ec o dqfkc"kuuwgu"oki jv" be a very important one. If we can solve the problem on which yg"ecppqv"eqo rtqokug." Otl"Gfep"jqrqu"vjcv"yg"yknn"vjgtgchvgt" be able to solve the Laos and Cambodia issues and to let all participants guarantee this solution.

The advantage of our current conference is that it is a place of discussion, and in fact the Chinese delegation has already

ugpvgf"qwt" o kpk o w o " r t r q r u c n 0 " U r g e k L e c m { . " v j c v " v j g " p k p g v g g p " e q w p v t k g u " u j q w n f " k u u w g " c " l q k p v " u v c v g o g p v " k p f k e c v k p i " c " e q o o q p " d e s i r e t o a c h i e v e t h e p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e K o r e a n i s s u e q p " v j g " d c u k u " q h " g u v c d n k u j k p i " c " w p k L g f . " k p f g r g p f g p v . " c p f " f g o q - e t c v k e " e q w p v t { " q h " M q t g c 0 " k " r q k p v g f " q w v " v j c v " k h " v j g { " t g l g e v g f " v j k u " r t r q r u c n . " v j g k t " t g l g e v k q p " q h " p g i q v k v k q p u " e q w n f " q p n { " j c x g " c p " u n f a v o r a b l e e f f e c t o n f u t u r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e s . T h i s m i n i m u m p r o p o s a l o b v i o u s l y t h r o w o u r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n t o c o n - h w u k q p 0 " C h v g t " f g d c v k p i " d c e m " c p f " h q t v j "] c o q p i " v j g o u g n x g u . " v j g " B e l g i a n d e l e g a t e s t a t e d t h a t h e w a s n o t o p p o s e d t o t h e s p i r i t q h " o { " r t r q r u c n " c p f " y c u " t g c f { " v q " c e e g r v " k v 0 " G f g p " c i t g g f " y k v j " v j g " D g n i k e p " f g n g i c v g o u " u v c v g o g p v " c p f " c u m g f " v j g " f g n g i c v k q p u " k h " h e c o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e h a d a l r e a d y a c c e p t e d E j k p c o u " r t r q r u c n 0 " P q d q f { " y c u " t g u r q p f k p i " c v " v j g " v k o g 0 " U o k v j " r c p k e m g f " c p f " k o o g f k c v g n { " v q m " v j g " l q q t " j k o u g n h " y k v j " c " u v c v g - o g p v " c i c k p u v " w u 0 " G f g p " v j g p " t g x t u g f " j k o u g n h " c p f " u c k f " v j c v " v j g " e q p h g t g p e g " j c f " p q " r t q e g f w t g " h q t " x q v k p i 0 " J g " r q k p v g f " q w v " v j c v " t h e c o n f e r e n c e w o u l d n o t b e a b l e t o r e a c h a g r e e m e n t o n a n y o f t h e p r o p o s a l s , a n d i t w a s o n l y p o s s i b l e t o n o t e t h e p r o p o s a l s a s p a r t o f t h e r e c o r d o f t h e c o n f e r e n c e . I i m m e d i a t e l y p r a i s e d v j g " D g n i k e p " f g n g i c v g o u " u r k t k v " q h " e q p e k n k c v k q p " c p f " u c k f " v j c v " k v " y c u " c u a q " y q t v j " p q v k p i " v j c v " E j c k t o c p " G f g p " c u m g f " v j g " f g n g i c - v k q p u " v q " e q p u g p v " v q " E j k p c o u " n e u v " r t r q r u c n 0 " C v " v j g " u c o g " v k o g . " K " c r i t i c i z e d t h e o p p o s i t i o n a n d o b s t r u c t i o n o f t h e U S d e l e g a t i o n a n d p o i n t e d o u t h o w t h e U S d e l e g a t i o n h a d b e e n p r e v e n t i n g t h e G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e f r o m b e i n g a b l e t o a r r i v e a t e v e n a o k p k o c n " c i t g g o g p v 0 " C v " v j g " g p f " G f g p " f g e n c t g f " v j c v " v j g " e q p - f e r e n c e w o u l d n o t e n o t e a l l p r o p o s a l s a n d s t a t e m e n t s a s p a r t o f v j g " t g e q t f " c p f " v j c v " v j g " o g g v k p i " y c u " c f l q w t p g f 0 " k p " u w o . " v j g " U q x k g v . " M q t g c p . " c p f " E j k p g u g " f g n g i c v k q p u 0 " t g r g c v g f " g h h q t v u " f k u - t w r v g f " q w t " e q w p v g t r c t v u 0 " c t t e p i g o g p v " c p f " e q o r n g v g n { " g z r q u g f " C o g t k e c o u " f g e k u k q p " v q " u c d q v c i g " v j g " e q p h g t g p e g 0 "

*5+ " C v " v j k u " r q k p v " v j g " u g u u k q p u " q p " v j g " M q t g c p " k u u w g " g p f f 0 " Y g " a r e c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e D P R K , c p f " E j k p c . " v j g " v j t g g " e q w p v t k g u " q h " q w t " u k f g . " u j q w n f " k u u w g " c " l q k p v " s t a t e m e n t o r i s s u e s t a t e m e n t s s e p a r a t e l y a f t e r w e r e t u r n t o o u r c o u n t r i e s s u m m a r i z i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o n t h e K o r e a n i s s u e a t t h e G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h e m t o t h e w h o l e w o r l d .

\ j q w " G p n c k
39 " L w p g " 3 ; 7 6

Minutes, Meeting between Zhou Enlai and the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey (Summary), 18 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206- 00008-07; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Time: 3: "Lwpg"3; 76."34<22"r0o0"vq"34<67"r0o0

Attendees on the Chinese side: \ j qw" Gpnc k."] RTE" Hqtgk i p" Okpkvut{ "C o g t k e c p" c p f" C w u v t n k p" C h h c k t u" F g r c t v o g p v" Director] Ke Bainian, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)

Attendees on the Australian side: Casey, Lauren (staff of vj g" C w u v t n k p" n g i c v k q p" c v" U c k i q p+ "

1. Regarding the Korean issue:

Ecug{ " L t u v" c u u w t g f" w u" v j c v" j g" j c f" p g x g t" v j q w i j v" c d q w v" excluding China in the future from the discussions on the Mqtgcp" k u u w g" J g" v j g p" u c k f" v j c v" v j g" Mqtgcp" k u u w g" k u" e w t t g p v n { " c" o g u u" K v" v j g t g h q t g" r t q x g f" f k h L e w n v" h q t" u w e j" c" d k i" e q p h g t- g p e g" c u" v j k u" q p g" v q" u q n x g" v j g" r t q d n g o" J g" u c k f" v j c v" j g" q t k i k- p c m n { " v j q w i j v" v j c v" g x g p" k h" P q t v j" c p f" U q w v j" M q t g c" e q w n f" p q v" d g" w p k L g f" u j q t v n { " c v" n g c u v" u q o g" v g o r q t c t { " o g c u w t g u" e q w n f" be taken. For example, [measures on the issues of] trade, eq o o w p k e c v k q p" c p f" u q" q p" d g v y g g p" v j g" P q t v j" c p f" v j g" U q w v j" J q y g x g t" p q y" v j g" P q t v j" c p f" v j g" U q w v j" c t g" n k m g" q k n" c p f" y c v g t" [and] do not mix.

Hqtgk i p" O k p k u v g t" \ j q w" u c k f" y g" c n u q" j q r g" v j c v" v j g" P q t v j" c p f" U q w v j" y k m n" p q v" e q p v k p w g" L i j v k p i" g c e j" q v j g t" k p u v g c f" y g" y c p v" v j g o" v q" i g v" e n q u g t" J q y g x g t" c u" O t" Ecug{ " m p q y u" U q w v j" M q t g c o u" c v k w f g" k u" x g t { " w p t g c u q p c d n g" q p" v j g u g" k u u w g u" C h v g t" v j g" u k z v g p g" e q w p v t k u" r w d n k u" j g f" v j g" l q k p v" f g e n c t c v k q p" v j g" U q w v j" Korean delegation immediately made a statement saying that k v" y q w n f" p q" n q p i g t" d g" t g u v t c k p g f" d { " v j g" M q t g c p" Y c t" C t o k u v k e g" C i t g g o g p v" V j k u" u v c v g o g p v" p q v" q p n { " g o d c t t c u u g f" v j g" q v j g t" members of the sixteen countries but even Smith.

Casey said that that was right and they were very angry about that, too.

40" T g i c t f k p i" v j g" k u u w g u" q h" v j g" t g e q i p k v k q p" q h" E j k p c" c p f" v j g" W p k v g f" P c v k q p u

Ecug{ " u c k f" v j c v" e w t t g p v n { " v j g t g" y g t g" u v k m n" x c t k q w u" f k h L e w n- t i e s to overcome. Therefore, it was still too early to discuss v j g" k u u w g u" q h" t g e q i p k v k q p" c p f" v j g" W p k v g f" P c v k q p u" J g" u c k f" v j c v" j g" d e n k g x g u" v j c v" H q t g k i p" O k p k u v g t" \ j q w" w p f g t u v c p f u" r q n k v k e c n" issues and other issues in the world.

Hqtgk i p" O k p k u v g t" \ j q w" u c k f" < " K v" f q g u" p q v" o c v g t" J q y g x g t" O t" Casey should know that we have complaints about these issues.

Ecug{ " c u m g f" y j c v" f k f" { q w" o g e p" d { " d e q o r n c k p v o A

Hqtgk i p" O k p k u v g t" \ j q w" u c k f" v j c v" E j k p c" y c u" f g r t k x g f" q h" the authority and status to which it was entitled at the United P c v k q p u

Casey said that, nevertheless, the improvement of Sino- D t k v k u j" t g n c v k q p u" c e j k g x g f" c v" v j k u" v k o g" y c u" x g t { " r t q L v e d n g" K h"] y g_ " v c m g" c" n k v n g" d k v" n q p i g t" c p f" w u g" v k o g" v q" ÷ j g c n. Ø"] K_ " d e n k g x g"

v j c v" v j g" u k y w c v k q p" y k m n" i g v" d g v v g t" J g" u c k f" j g" w p f g t u v c p f u" v j c v" the Chinese people know about "the time cure."

Hqtgk i p" O k p k u v g t" \ j q w" u c k f" v j c v" v j g" k o r t q x g o g p v" q h" U k p q / British relations was an achievement. I believe that it can also help to deepen the understanding of the countries of the British Commonwealth toward China through the improvement of U k p q / D t k v k u j" t g n c v k q p u" O t" Ecug{ " l w u v" u c k f" v j c v" v j g" E j k p g u g" r g q r n g" m p q y" c d q w v" v j g" ÷ v k o g" e w t g. Ø" v j k u" o g e p u" v j c v" O t" Ecug{ " has some understanding of the Chinese people.

Casey said that he believes that the improvement of Sino- British relations will deepen the understanding of the countries of the British Commonwealth toward China as well.

3. The Indochina issue.

Casey said that as far as he knows the discussion on the Indochina issue made progress because of Foreign Minister \ j q w u" r t q r q c u u" O

" H q t g k i p" O k p k u v g t" \ j q w" d t k g l { " t g r g c v g f" v q" E c u g { " y j c v" j g" j c f" f k u e w u u g f" y k v j" G f g p" H q t" g z c o r n g"] y g_ " j q r g" v j c v" N c q u" c p f" c O p " m m c O " O O

Łxg {gctu0"Vjg"Rgqrngou"Tgrwdnke"qh"Ej kpc" yknn"pqv"eqpfwev"cp" invasion, nor should Mr. Casey have any doubts about that.

Ecug{"uckf"vjcv"jg"ycu"incf"vq"jgct"vjcv0"Jg"cnuq"uckf"vjcv"jg" dngkxg"vjcv"kv"yknn"pqv"dg"fkhlēwnv"hqt"dqv"ukfgu"vq"tgcej"cp" agreement as long as China does not establish military bases.

Hqtgkip"Okpkuvgt" \jqw"cumgf" Fkf" {qw"ogcp"vjcv"kh"Ej kpc" guvednku"jgu" o knkvct{"dcugu"kp"KpfqejkpcA" Jqy"eqwnf"Ej kpc"iq" vq"Kpfqejkpc"cpf" guvednku"j" o knkvct{"dcugu"vjgtgA" Yg"dngkxg" that no foreign countries should establish military bases in Indochina.

Ecug{"uckf"vjcv"y jcv"jg"lwuv"ogcpv"ycu"vjcv"Ej kpc"ujqwnf" not establish military bases inside the Chinese territory near Indochina. Then he said, they [the Western nations], including Cwuvtnkc."guvednku"j" o knkvct{"dcugu"hqt"vjg"rwtrequg"qh" fghgpug." pqv"ci i tguukqp0" Jqy"ygxt."kv"ycu"rtqdcn{"fkhlēwnv"hqt"Hqtgkip" Okpkuvgt" \jqw"vq"ceegr"vjku"gzrncpcvkqp0

Hqtgkip" Okpkuvgt" \jqw"uckf."kv" yknn" dg" fkhlēwnv" hqt" wu" vq" koci kpg"vjcv"Cwuvtnkc" yqwnf" iq"cpf" guvednku"j" o knkvct{"dcugu" everywhere alone if the United States had not established mili- vct{"dcugu"kp"vjg"y guvgtp"Rcekē" Qeegcp"cpf" cmm"qxgt"Cukc0" Yg" believe that only the military bases established in our own countries can be called defensive ones. Military bases estab- nku"jg"kp"qvjgt"eqwpvktgu0"vgttkvqtkgu"ctg"hqt"ci i tguukxg"tgcucpu0" Vjku"ku"qwt"fgLpkvkqp0

Casey said, you should not think that the United States is that bad.

Hqtgkip"Okpkuvgt" \jqw"uckf."kv"ku"vjg"Wpkvgf"Uvcvgu"vjcv"jcu" dggp"vcnkp"i"c"jqwkng"cvkwvfg"vq"yctfu"wu"hqt"vjg"rcuv"Łxg" {gctu0 Hqtgkip" Okpkuvgt" \jqw"eqpvkpwgf."cnvjqwi"j" O0" Ecug{"cpf"K" can discuss all other issues, we have different understandings qh"vjg" Wpkvgf"Uvcvgu0" Jqy"ygxt."vjku" yknn"pqv" chhgev"tgncvkqpu" dgyv"ggp"Ej kpc"cpf"Cwuvtnkc0



. 41

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning the Meeting at Nanning, 20 June 1954, 11:00 p.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Eq o tefg"Gpnck

[qwt"vngng i tc o"qh"5<22"r0 o0."42"Łwpg"jcu"dggp"tgegkxgf0 *3+" "

*XYR+_"Vtwqpi"Ej"kpj"cpf"]I gpgtcn_"Xq"Piw{gp" Ikr."cu"
well as Comrades [Chief PRC advisor to the VWP] Luo
Guibo and Wei Guoqing to discuss the situation related to
the negotiation and the question of the division of zones,
so that consensus will be reached and that progress will be
made in the negotiations at Geneva. We are of the opinion
that this meeting is necessary, and we agree with Comrade
\\jqw"Gpnc"øu"qrkpkqu0"Rngcug"cum"Eq o tcfgu" Jq"Ejk"Okpj."

. 44

**Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Jean] Chauvel, 22
June 1954**

*[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-04; P1-5. Obtained by CWIHP
and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]*

Time: 44"Lwpg.



reached an agreement in principle about the military meetings. They will meet and talk intensively in the next three weeks. Currently, the meetings of the belligerent states became the center of the conference. France and Vietnam are the most important parties from both sides. Our desire is a direct contact of both sides and a signed settlement [to be reached] soon. Cnn"vjg"pcvkqpu"cv"vjg"eqphgtgpeg."kpenwfkpi"Ej kpc."ctg"yknkpi"vq"ocmg"eqpvtkdwwkqpu"vq"igpwkpg"rtqitguu."cpf"Jctg_"Łto"vq"oppose any obstruction or destruction.

These are the main points of my opinion.

Mendes-France:"Vjg"Rtgokgtou"rqkpvu"jgnr"og"tgenk|g"vjcv"vjg"Rtgokgtou"vjw"ijvu"qp"vjg"kuuwgu"ctg"xgt{"engctf"Qh"eqwtug."K"ecpov"tgurqpf"vq"gxgt{"rqkpv."dww"uq"og"rctvkewmct"rqkpvu"ujqwnf"be discussed carefully. What made me glad is that our opinions are pretty close on the main points. I heard that the discussions on Laos and Cambodia have made some progress in the past several days. I also know that the progress was achieved mostly through the efforts by the delegation under the leadership qh"Rtgokgt" \ jw0"K"dgkngx"vjcv"yg"fqpv"jcxg"cp{"wpuqncdng"problems between us over the issues of Laos and Cambodia.

Cu"vjg"Rtgokgt"ogpvkqpgf."eqrkpi"ykvj"vjg"fqoguvke"rtqdl-
lems in Laos and Cambodia also requires international super-
xkukqp0"Egtvckpn{."c"uqnwvkqp"tgswktgu"uqog"yqtm."dww"K"fqpv"
vj kpm"kv"ku"vq"fkLewnv"vq"Łpf"qwv0

Vjg"rtqdn"og"kp"Xkvpc"o"ku"fkhhgtgpv0"Vjg"Rtgokgt"lwuv"
uckf"vjcv"kv"ku"vq"ijgt0"Cpf"vjgp"vjg"ukvvcvkqp"ku"pqv"qrvk"okuvke"
because the war has been [going on] in that country for so long.
Moreover, as the Premier said, the two governments there have
their own administrations and armies. The Vietnamese people
\$ t khcf"n p"qw qqw cf"n pf"

to e vd

ha tnha

r csa

oŁtscaa

ri o selean

\$ hiwcv0"

\$ hcf"n p"qw qqw cxn0" p p khiwcv0

\$ "p wxkhp"



that everything is for peace and friendship. We fully agree with this point.

Mendes-France: I have more contacts later on. I am really happy about this meeting. I really want to come here and meet you.

I have another practical question, that is, what we are going to do about the new cabinet.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Prime Minister can make a suggestion, please.

Mendes-France: I agree with a news release draft suggested by Mr. Chauvel: "We had a frank conversation on the issue of peace in Indochina, not a negotiation. This conversation may lead to our desire that the Geneva Conference will achieve genuine progress." It seems that not too much besides this can be said.

Zhou Enlai: It is good not to say too much.

Mendes-France: Mr. Chauvel often later on.

Zhou Enlai: I have a wish. Within the next three weeks, if Mr. Mendes-France comes to Geneva or has other opportunities, I hope you can make a contact with Mr. Pham Van Dong, head of the delegation.

**Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the
CCP Central Committee, and Convey to Zhou Enlai, Zhang
Wentian and [PRC Vice Foreign Minister] Wang Jiaxiang,
Concerning the Content of a Meeting between the Soviet,
Chinese, and Vietnamese Delegations, 26 June 1954¹**

*[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-34; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP
and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]*

(Top secret)

Chairman, Comrade, and the Central Committee, and convey
to Zhou, Zhang, and Wang:

At 5:30 this afternoon, the Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese
delegations met to study the plan prepared by the Vietnamese
side concerning division and adjustment of zones in Vietnam
and Laos. Concerning Vietnam, the plan introduced by Comrade
Pham Van Dong is that the enemy will withdraw from the north-
ern plain and [PingZhaoTian], and that our troops in Quang
Nam area will withdraw from the southern and central region.
Qwt"oczko"wo"]iqcn_ku"vjg"nkpgh"htqo"Vw{"Jqc, [JiaoYao], and
Pleiku, along Route 19, to the Vietnamese-Cambodian border
*dgv"yggp"vjg"35vj"cpf"36vj"rctc"mngnu="vjg"ogfkw"o"iqcn"ku"vjg"
15th parallel, and the minimum is the 16th parallel. At today's
meeting with the chief military negotiators from the two sides
the French side already introduced the principles that its gov-
ernment would follow concerning the dividing line in Vietnam
(that is, withdrawing completely from the north, dividing the
nkpgh"cnqpi"vjg"3:vj"rctc"mngn."cpf"*wukpi"Jckrjqpi"qpn{"hqt"vjg"
rwrqug"qh"ykvjftcycn="Htcpegou"oknkvt{"pgiqkcvqt"}Jgpt{"
Fgnvkg"yknn"iq"dcem"vq"Rctku"vq"igv"kpvtwevkqpu"vqfc{"="cpf"vjg"
two sides have agreed to discuss the situation in Vietnam next
Monday (the 28th). Considering these three developments, the
Vietnamese side should not delay putting forward the maximum
plan. But in order for negotiations to be carried out smoothly, it
is necessary to combine introducing the political, military, and
economic situation in the three countries of Indochina with the
settlement plans, and present them simultaneously, as this will
be more advantageous. Concerning Laos, the division of zones
plan presented by Comrade Pham Van Dong focuses on pursu-
ing Sam Neua, Phong Sali, and such new liberation zone as
[MengKe] and [MengWei] in upper Laos, and strive to expand
vjg"]PcpJwJg_"ctgc"*vqyctf"vjg"ygu"gzrcpf"v j O

. 53

Telegram, PRC Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry, "Preparing a Plane for Delivering Documents to Nanning," 25 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P10. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Foreign Ministry:

The Premier instructs that the documents carried by [PRC Foreign Ministry Messenger] Shan Daxin must be delivered to Nanning by the 29th. The Shan group of two will leave Oqueqy"cpf"i{"vq"Dgklkp"i"qp"vjg"48vj0"Rngcug"rtgrctg"c"urg-cial plane to wait for Shan to arrive in Beijing, and he will ko o gfkcvgn{"dg"i"qyp"vq"Peppkp"i."uq"vjcv"kv"yknm"dg"i wctcpvggf" that the documents will be delivered on time.

The Embassy in the Soviet Union
25 June 1954



. 54

Telegram, Wang Bingnan to PRC Foreign Ministry Cf o kpkvutcvkxg"QhŁeg."47"Łwpg"3;76

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P11. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Vjg"Cf o kpkvutcvkxg"QhŁeg"qh"vjg"Hqtgkip"Okpkvut{<

(1)

. 5

Vngi tc o."RTE"Hqtgkip"Okpkvvt{"Cf o kpkvvtcvkxg"QhLeg"vq"
Li Kenong, 27 June 1954, 3:00 p.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P13. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Vice Minister Li:

Messenger Comrade Shan Daxin has just arrived. The three bags of documents have been delivered respectively to Li Qi and Director Zhang Zhen of the Department of Military Operations by specially arranged personnel and automobiles. [PRC Foreign Ministry Messenger] Xiao Qing and Shan Fczkp" y kmn" vcmg" vjg" rncpg" vq" ugpf" J qcp i" Xcp" J qcp" cpf" jku" seven-person group to Nanning, and will deliver the other bag to Premier Zhou Enlai. So this special report.

Hqtgkip"Okpkvvt{"Cf o kpkvvtcvkxg"QhLeg
27 June 1954, 3:00 p.m.



. 5

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Li Kenong, 27 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P17. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Vice Minister Li:

Because of the sincere invitation by the prime minister of Burma, Premier [and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC] Zhou [Enlai] has decided to stay one more day in Burma and will not return home until the 30th. The meeting at Nanning thus will also be postponed for one day. So this special report.

The Foreign Ministry
27 June 1954



. 5

**Telegram, PRC Department of Military Operations
Director Zhang Zhen to PRC Military Advisor to the PRC
Geneva Conference Delegation Lei Yingfu, 28 June 1954**

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P14. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Comrade Lei Yingfu:

The documents (those top secret) from you have been conveyed to us by Comrade Wang Yin of the Foreign Ministry today.

Zhang Zhen
28 June 1954



. 5

**Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and
vjg"Egyptci"Eq o o kvvgg."ōDtkgŁpi"qp"vjg"Oggvki"d{"vjg"
Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese Delegations," 29 June
1954**

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-37; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Record number:
(top secret)

Chairman, Comrade, and the Central Committee, Zhou [Enlai],
Zhang [Wentian], and Wang [Jiaxiang]:

The Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese delegations, following the usual practice, held a joint meeting at 11:00 a.m. on 29 June. The main points of the meeting are reported here as follows:

- (1) Comrade [Vasily V.] Kuznetsov mentions that he had a meeting yesterday afternoon with [Jean] Chauvel, head of the French delegation. Chauvel said that the proposed solution put forward by the Vietnamese side at the meeting by the chief military representatives of the two sides on the 28th was much too demanding, which made him very uneasy. Chauvel further said vjcv"cu"vjku"y cu"vjg"Łtuw" o ggvkpi . "kv"ku"pcvwtci"vjcv"vjg" [the Vietnamese] asked for a higher payout of debts, and this... [the sentence ends abruptly]

Kuznetsov said that you [Chauvel] proposed the 18th parallel, and that would not work.

As a matter of fact, the central part of Vietnam has a small population and is not so much of value, why do they want to have it? Kuznetsov then asked: If it is not of high value, why do you not mention it? Kuznetsov further says: I hope that you will give a comprehensive presentation about the situation of the three countries, so that the question will be settled.

- (2) At today's meeting, Comrade Pham Van Dong at one point introduced the idea of discussing economic interests further, and discussing about the zone division issue less. Kuznetsov does not say much about this issue, only says that they will give further consideration to it. Our delegation then had an internal discussion, and we are of the opinion that at the present time the zone division issue remains a key issue concerning Vietnam and Laos, to ask for too little

will be disadvantageous, and to ask for too much will block the realization of an overall agreement. Therefore, we hope that the meeting at Nanning should make an early decision on this issue and inform the Vietnamese delegation as early as possible, so that the negotiation process will be pushed forward.

Li Kenong,
29 June 1954

. 3

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the CCP Central Committee, "A Brief Report on the Meetings at Liuzhou," 3 July 1954, 1:00 p.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-03; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman, Comrade Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee, and convey to Ambassador Zhang [Wentian] and Minister Wang [Jiaxing] in Moscow, and Vice Minister Li [Kenong] in Geneva:

I arrived in Guangzhou on the morning of 30 June. Because of the change in the weather and careless eating I suffered from cp"wrugv"uvq ocej0"K"vqqm"e"fc{ "qh"tguv"kp" Iwcp i |jqw."cpf" Igy" and arrived in Liuzhou at noon of 2 July. On the same day I o gv"ykvj "Eqo tcfgu" Fkpi"]Jq" Ejk" Okpj_-]Xkgv" Okpj" I gpgtcn_ "Xq"]P iw{gp" Ikr_" Jqcp i"]Xcp" Jqcp_" Nwq"]I wkdq_" Ygk" Guoqing, [Guangxi Province Governor] Chen Manyuan, and [PRC military advisor to the VWP] Xie Fang, and had a brief conversation with Comrade Ding. I have read the telegrams from the Central Committee via the Provincial Committee. Those telegrams that are conveyed to the friends are being read by them in turn.

Vjku" Ltuv" oggvkpi" ycu" jgnf" vjku" oqtpkpi." cpf" Eqo tcfg" Vo made a comprehensive presentation. The meeting will be continued in the afternoon, and Wei Guoqing will make a supplementary presentation. It is planned that at the meeting in the evening, I will report on the experience at the Geneva Conference and also on the current international situation. The important issues should wait to be resolved (at the meeting of) the 4th. /t.00480003}TJ/TT3 1 Tf--28(/)-. -10(dto(i07(w)-10(i)-10(l)-I-28(/)-.-13M0 0(ebS)-10(e)-10()-83(s)-10(h)-10(10()-2-10

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**Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-First Restricted
Session, 7 July 1954**

*[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and
translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]*

Chairman Mao [Zedong], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, Comrade
[Zhou] Enlai and the Central Committee:

K"urqmg"Łtuv"cv"vjg"43uv"tguvtkvgf"uguukqp"qp"vjg"kpfaqejkpc"
issue on the 6th. I explained our position on the issue of the
relationship between the joint commission and the NNSC, the
issue of the compulsory nature of [the recommendations of]
the NNSC, the issue of voting procedures and the composition

pointed out that the Cambodian delegation stated on 8 June that Cambodia had no intention of allowing foreign countries to establish bases within its territory.

(3) In consideration of the relationship between Laos, Cambodia and the French Union, [I said] that we can discuss Laos' and Cambodia's needs for French [military] instructors and technicians. At last, I said that issues concerning the quantity and type of defensive weapons should also be included in discussions between the representatives of the two commands based on agreements.

Pham Van Dong made an overall statement on the issue of supervision. [Jean] Chauvel spoke to support the American

Royal government as well, a common solution could be found. Likewise, our wish and policies on restoring peace in Indochina have won support from India, Burma, and some countries in the Colombo Conference.¹ Mr. Eden must have read the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese joint statements. I believe that these two statements would promote peace in Indochina. In these statements, we have also said that we would not reject the participation of any country in the

formal meetings, and I believe you must have known [about that].

Zhou Enlai: Yes, but we will have to hold a session at the end to conclude the conference.

Eden: Yes, if there is something to make public, of course, a plenary session will have to be held. I must say good-bye now, for Mr. Molotov is going to see me soon.

1. *Editor's Note:* The Colombo Conference, held 28 April—2 May 1954, was convened by Ceylonese Prime Minister John Kotelawa, and included Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali.



Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden, 17 July 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0006. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 17 July 1954, 11:30 a.m. to 12:40 p.m.

Location: Eden's residence

Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Li Mgpqpi." Jwcp"Zkcp i."Rw"Uj qwe jcp i "kpvgrtrgvgt"cpf"pqf" taker)

British Participants: Anthony Eden, William D. Allen, Anthony Rumbold, Ford (interpreter)

Eden: Last night we had a talk, and I think you have learned the contents of it. It seems that the biggest questions are those of demarcation and the date of the elections. Other issues can all be resolved.

\ jqw"Gpnck<" "[gu." Ot" Oqnvqx" jcu" pqvkLgf" o g" Vjg" vj tgg" of you had a long talk on these two questions, and I believe a solution can be found in the end. Therefore, I would like to discuss another question with you today. It is the question of a Southeast Asian defense pact. Since the Paris talks, there has been much information from various sources, as well as a lot of publicity. Does the United States intend to sabotage the reaching of an agreement on restoring peace in Indochina with this question? Rumor has it that the three Indochinese states [Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam] will be included in this pact. If this were to be so, then peace would have no meaning other than preparation for new hostilities. So

I would like to ask Your Excellency directly, for K"eqwnf"qdvckp"Łtuv/jcpf"kpht o cvkqp"htq o " [qwt" Excellency.

Eden: There has been no sudden change regarding this question. As I have said in Parliament, two issues are involved here.

First, to be honest with you, the US might not like any agreement that could be possibly reached here. But we are hoping that they will at least like it enough that they will issue a statement. This is what we are trying our best to urge them to do. Then every one of us will likewise issue a statement to support the agreement. Your Excellency mentioned that you would like the Colombo Conference countries to be involved, and perhaps they can issue a statement, too. Thus the arrangements made here could be reinforced.

Secondly, our Southeast Asia pact with the US [SEATO]: this is a defensive arrangement. A research group is evaluating it in Washington. This is an arrangement that is symmetrical to the Sino-Soviet alliance, and it is defensive just like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with duties exactly like those in NATO.

As to the other point you asked about, I can only give you a personal answer. So far as I understand, there has been no proposal for the three Indochinese states to join in the Southeast Asian pact, but as sovereign states they are free [to do so]. They can issue statements for the conference to notice.

Many things will depend on how we solve the questions here. If an arrangement could be made that is acceptable to all of us, then the cv o qur jgtg" yknn" k o r tqxg" cpf" eqpŁfgpeg" yknn" increase. I hope that Laos and Cambodia could become a "buffer" for both of us. So I hope that Your Excellency could help us obtain a guarantee that Laos and Cambodia will be independent. fgpv"V jku" y c {"eqpŁfgpeg" yknn" i tq y"l"

[Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

It is precisely for this reason that I am delighted to hear the Premier say that the introduction of arms should be allowed into Laos and Cambodia for self-defense. This illustrates that the two countries can be independent. This has been i tgcvn {"kpŁwgpvkn"l" " " " " K"ecp"uc {" ykvj" o wej"eqpŁfgpeg"vjcv"vjg"WU" has no intention of establishing military bases in either of the countries.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you, Mr. Eden, for your explanations. In order for an agreement to be reached on the issue of restoring peace in Indochina, this ques- vkqp" pggfgf" vq" dg" enctkŁgf" cv" vjku" k o rqtvcpv"

and opposing any sabotage of the agreement, then it would be a Locarno-style arrangement. Perhaps we should not use the term "Locarno."

I agree with you that not only the participating countries in the Geneva Conference, but also the Colombo Conference countries should be involved in this arrangement.

I do not see how such an arrangement would be incompatible with a NATO-style Southeast Asian pact. The Southeast Asian pact is concerned with a potential situation.

An important issue at the Paris talks was to ask the Americans to come here. We hope that as a result of coming here, they will feel delighted and issue a statement to honor the agreement reached here, agree not to undermine the agreement, and to oppose anyone else sabotaging the

unity in Southeast Asia, then we oppose them. We are in favor of peace and against disunity. This is our attitude.

Eden: The Southeast Asian pact is not a new idea, and it was not invented at the Paris talks but has been around for some time. I have just said that the better we do things here, the less we need to consider defensive arrangements.

Zhou Enlai: You can say that sentence in reverse: if someone tries to create disunity, it would bring trouble to achieving peace.

Eden: In any event, relations between our countries are good. Please do not worry about this.

1. *Editor's Note:* Eden had proposed a "Locarno type" system for guaranteeing the security of neutral states through collective defense. "Locarno" references the 1925 Locarno Treaties.



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Minutes of Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Jean] Chauvel, 13 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-05; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Time: 7:00 p.m., 13 July 1954

Location: Premier Zhou's hotel suite

Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, [PRC Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Department Director-General] Chen Jiakang, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermez, and one translator

Chauvel: "The current solution is not for separate governments. The fourth part of this document is about limiting the armed forces in Laos and Cambodia. The discussion of this issue is beyond the responsibilities of the military representatives of Laos, Cambodia, and the Vietnamese government. It should belong to the nine-nation conference. Therefore, after this document is read at the conference, the representatives of Laos and Cambodia will be invited to make a statement. Their statement will be included in the document. It seems the best way to handle the situation."

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Mr. [Pierre] Mendes-France also talked to Mr. Pham Van Dong about this issue. Mr. Pham Van Dong believes that this

document 1(a9000300 l-ocudo7nW5.559 lhr)5463(M0el-ocudnPhau nPhau3n4z ots)259 la [(M0el-ocudnPhio[14eanhIhen(Pha0931(of)alkenK005

about. This problem causes us concern. Our wish is that a restoration of peace will be realized in Indochina, and that Laos and Cambodia will become peaceful, independent, friendly, and neutral countries. If they join America's alliance and establish American bases, then the restoration of peace becomes meaningless. According to our conversations in the past meetings, I think it shouldn't happen like this. But there are so many rumors out there, as if Paris has some kind of promise. Thus, I'd like to talk to Mr. Prime Minister directly and frankly.

Mendes-France: I appreciate that Mr. Premier recalls our conversations in the past meetings and intends to maintain a consistent stance. I also want to maintain my previous position.

After our two meetings, as Mr. Premier knows, there has been a change in the situation. I think it is necessary to discuss this with you. I will be in Paris in the next few days. I would like to see you and discuss the situation in detail.

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**Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and
[Laotian Foreign Minister Phoui] Sananikone (Summary),
18 July 1954**

ernment. This is a good way to handle it.

As far as I know, no one has ever considered Laos [in the same way] as Vietnam. The delimitation of concentration areas is simply a temporary idea. Laos only has one Royal government. This is not a division of the country. After the withdrawal of all foreign forces, Laos can therefore become a peaceful, be supervised in the future. Therefore, Laos's security can be guaranteed. During the armistice period, defensive weapons that Laos needs to import can be decided on through negotiations. The foreign minister said on 16 June that [members of] the resistance will be able to enjoy all civil rights and will be accepted to work [for the government?]. This is very good. Resistance forces mostly have fought the French troops. Now we need to help them and unite them. It will be great if the Royal government and Mr. Souphanouvong can meet in Laos and deal with these issues. You should start uniting them not only after the elections but also before the elections. Since Laos is a small country, it should try even harder to unite all forces within the country. I think that Mr. Pham Van Dong also shares the same thoughts.

Sananikone: I appreciate the Prime Minister's invaluable advice. It is a good basis for us to consider [those issues] carefully. We have discussed with Mr. Pham Van Dong a meeting between our prime minister [Prince Souvanna Phouma] and his brother [Prince Souphanouvong]. [We believe that] if the military conference here does not make any progress it will not Minister believes that it is the right time for the brothers to meet, we are willing to help. In sum, our prime minister is very willing to talk directly with his brother.

Zhou Enlai: It is best [if they can] discuss internal issues directly. Mr. Pham Van Dong is simply the representative of the Laotian resistance movement and cannot discuss details. Therefore, the sooner that they meet locally the better. You are

points to which the Prime Minister referred. We will be back after we have reached some conclusions. We know that the Prime Minister is very busy, and we have already taken up too much of his time, please excuse us.

1. *Editor's Note:* 'King' here refers to Sisavang Vong, King of Laos.



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**Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-third Restricted
Session, 19 July 1954**

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

*3+" Gfgp" ugpv"]Jctqnf_" Eceekc" vq" eqog" cpf" oggv" ykvj" Ambassador [to the Soviet Union] Zheng [Wentian] on vjg" o qtpkpi"qh"vjg"3:vj0"Eceekc"Łtuv"uckf"vjcv"jg"ycpvf"vq" establishment of foreign military bases in the three countries ticipation of the three countries in a Southeast Asia defense dqtfgt"yknn"dg"eqpŁt o gf"kp"gvjgt"vjg"ct o kuvkeg"ci tgg o gpv"qt" tain delegate [meaning US Under Secretary of State General British delegation will not create tension.

(2) At the same time, Eden also met with Comrade Molotov and gave the same opinions. Comrade Molotov - kpi"vq"uwrrqtv"jku"]rncp"vq_"guvcdnkuj"c"egcugŁtg"qp"vjg"42vj0"

ing was adjourned. Neither Comrade Pham Van Dong nor I used the texts of the statements we prepared. The meeting began tensely but ended in a relaxed mood. We do not necessarily need to put any pressure on the conference since the United States made their position clear, Britain and France began showing a true spirit of conciliation, and the issue of composition has been solved. We will try to fend off [our counterparts on] other issues in these two days. If our counterparts are willing to keep making compromises, we believe that we can reach the agreement on the 20th.

Zhou Enlai
19 July 1954



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Minutes of Conversation between Zhang Wentian and [Harold] Caccia, 18 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00093-02; P1-5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 18 July 1954, 12:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m.

Location: Villa of the Chinese delegation

Chinese Participants: [Ambassador to the Soviet Union
cpf"Xkeg"Okpkuvgt"qh"Hqtgkip"Chhcktu_"\jcpj"Ygpvkcp."Jwcp"
Xiang, Zhang Wenjin (interpreter)

British Participants: [Deputy Under Secretary for Foreign
Chhcktu"hqt"Cf o kpkuvtcvkqp"Jctqnf_"Eceekc."Hqtf"*kpvgrtrtgvgt+

Caccia said that Eden had dispatched him because the day before Premier Zhou had mentioned certain issues regarding the Southeast Asian pact. Eden had contacted his friends and allies, and it could be said now that if the two sides could reach an agreement here, then the inclusion of the three Indochinese states in the Southeast Asian pact [Vietnam,

Laos, Cambodia] absolutely would not be mentioned. The British side believed that in the resolution to be reached, these states would be neutralized so that they would not form any alliance with any side.

Ambassador Zhang then asked the question of foreign

groups will be formed. The Chinese delegation can rest reassured that the British delegation will never do anything to heat up the temperature, and it hopes that the Chinese delegation will adopt the same attitude.

Ambassador Zhang said that the Chinese delegation also hopes to see everyone come closer rather than standing divided, but both sides must be willing to come closer. For example, the reason why the demarcation question has dragged on is that although the Vietnamese side has conceded to the 16th paral-

conveyed the message to [Pierre] Mendes-France.
The French side thinks that France has made con-

people there are accustomed to local life, and the question should be solved there. The other part of the people can be transferred north. As to regrouping in the north, the question is relatively easy. We suggest that we protect the resistance force as best we can, and grant them all civic rights, but no special political rights.

" " Ncqu"ku" c" ygcm"eqwpt{"=" yg"cm" ci tgg" vjcv"kv" eqwnf" dg" totally independent. What needs to be avoided now is that we should not give Laos and other countries the impression that just as a country is acquiring independence, people begin to consider dividing it up and marking out administrative regions with special positions. The real independence of Laos should be guaranteed, and it should not be threatened either from within or htqo" ykvjqwv."qvjgt ykug"kv" yqwnf" jcxg" c"pgi cvkxg"kpłw-ence on Asia and on other areas. I hope Your Excellency the Premier would pay attention to this.

Zhou Enlai: I said in a talk with Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden in June that there should be a regrouping area for the resistance force in Laos. But this is different from the situation in Vietnam. In Vietnam, there are two regroup- kpi"ctgcu"cpf"vyq"iqxgtpogpvu0"Ykvjkc"urgekLe"rgtkf" they control their respective areas. But the regrouping areas in Vietnam are only a provisional solution, and vjku"fqgu"pqv"jcto"tgwplŁecvkqpl"Vjg"rtqrqugf"gnxgp" tgi tqwrkpi" rkpvu"kp"Ncqu" yknn"pqv"dtkpi "cdqww"uvcdknkv {"="

ters north of Route 9. If the other side still refuses to accept

ed eleven points). With respect to their local administration, it is their own domestic affairs that should be discussed through the local contacts between Royal government and resistance force representatives. Mendes-France said that the regrouping points could be reduced, but it would become complicated if all the troops had to move from the south to the north for regrouping since the resistance forces were all over the country. Determining certain regrouping points in the south may be considered, since most people over there have become used to the way of their local life, so that it should be solved locally. I said that the eleven points for regrouping in Laos would not bring peace and stability, and could cause troops that should group together, not disperse to eleven points. They should be protected. After their assembly, they will gradually participate in the life of the state under international supervision. Laos is different from Vietnam. Its Royal government will be responsible for the armed forces so that they will not worry. If someone doesn't want to go to the north, the resistance movement and Royal government could send representatives to meet and discuss this matter. Then Eden asked me whether I oppose one regrouping area in the south. I didn't answer him. Lastly, Mendes-France said that our opinions are not too far apart and that [we should] let the experts regrouping areas be in the northwest, and said that there still may be a regrouping area in the south. The

- (2) After my meeting with Mendes-France and Eden, Eden's assistant, Caccia, who came with Eden, stayed and talked to Ambassador [to the Soviet Union and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC] Zhang [Wentian] about the problem of drawing have Route 9. "If this cannot be not negotiable, we also demanded to have enough areas north of Route ;"kp"qtfgt"vq"ugewtg"vjg"]Htgpej"vtqqrud_"uchgv{" Jg" suggested that one of the two rivers between Route 9 and the 18th parallel could be chosen as the line. Regarding the election date, he proposed it [be held] during 1956. Talking about the military alliance, Caccia described the position of [the United Kingdom and British Commonwealth] as the following. If an agreement accepted by all the delegations were reached here and the agreement stipulates that the three countries of Indochina [Vietnam,

Cambodia, Laos] cannot participate in any military pact, Britain thereby believes that the three countries are not supposed to be invited [to the Southeast Asian military pact]. And Britain itself won't [invite them].

- Jg"uckf"vjcv"Ncqu"cpf"Ec o dqfkc"y qwnf" o cmg"vjgk" [own] announcements respectively, saying that they will not join any military alliance.
- (3) The delegations of the Soviet Union, China, and Xkgvpc o "jcxg"fkuewuugf"vjg"Łpcn"rtqrqcn"vjku"chvgt-noon, and have presented it to Britain. The main points of the proposal have been telegraphed [to Beijing] yesterday.
- (4) I met [V.K. Krishna] Menon this evening. I told him about the proposal that had been presented to Britain.

**Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and
Cambodian Foreign Minister Tep Phan (Summary), 20
July 1954 [Excerpt]**

*[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0008. Obtained by CWIHP and
translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]*

Time: 20 July 1954, 11:00 a.m. to 12:45 p.m.

Place: Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's residence

[Attendees on] the Chinese side: Zhou Enlai, Chen Dingmin
(interpreter and recorder)

[Attendees on] the Cambodian side: Vgr"Rjcp."J gcf"qh"
Cambodian military delegation at the Geneva Conference,
Nhiek] Tioulong, [personal delegate to the King of Cambodia]
Sam Sary, Thao Lenam.

Zhou Enlai:

issue of the means of transportation, [we believe that] all these issues can be solved since you have already said that you are willing to cooperate.

Regarding internal issues, you should categorize all the soldiers in Cambodia taking their wishes into consideration. Some of them originally lived there and do not want to leave. Uq o g"qh"vjg o"ctg"htq o"Eqe jkpe jkpc0" J qy g xgt."]{qw_"ujqwnf" not discriminate against them. If some of them hope to stay kp"Ec o dqfkc." {qw"uwtgn{"ecppq"gzrgn"vjg o0" J qy g xgt." vjg{" should obey the Kingdom's laws.

Tiulong: Do you mean those elements who joined the resistance movement? People who enter Cambodia from

Co16 Td[oi4ambo_P...]PB~..0PZUBUÖBQ1a1m00000R:ZPR:Ä1 R%uwy,225(m23Jw225>82(w)5120(ho23Jw225e20(ho23JaC)5(w)5120(

Jqyqxtg."kv"ejcpi g f"chvgt"vjg"Wpkvgf"Uvcvgu"gzewfgf"Dtkvku j"
kp f w g p e g"]htq o"Ej k p c_"chvgt"Yqtnf"Yct"KK0"

Tep Phan: I understand that.

Zhou Enlai: It is good that you understand it. The time for the meeting is approaching. I hope that you can reach an agreement with the Vietnamese delegation regarding these issues at the meeting in the afternoon. We will also push the Vietnamese side forward so that the meeting can be successful.

Tep Phan: Thank you very much for your help. [*Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*]

Zhou Enlai: I am sure that Vietnam does not have any such kpvgpvkqp0"Ejckto cp"Jq"Ejk"Okpj"Łton{"enctkŁgf"vjg"rqvkvkqp" of Vietnam when I met with him on the Guangxi border this vk o g0" J g" r t q o k u g f" v j c v" X k v p c o" y q w n f" p q v" k p x c f g" c p {" e q w p - tries because an invasion is destined to fail. I am telling you the truth since we are all relatives.

Tep Phan: Yes. We need to protect our independence dgecwug" y g" y c p v" v q" u w t x k x g0" Q w t" u k v w c v k q p" k u" x g t {" f k h L e w n v" since our neighbors, such as Thailand and Vietnam, are all big countries. Since our country is a small country, we have no intention of attacking others and only hope that we can survive. In addition, the religion in which we believe does not allow us to attack others.

Zhou Enlai: Your situation is relatively good. The conference will publish a joint statement to guarantee [the armistice], and you have the support of the participants of the Colombo Conference [India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma]. It is much better than [the situation in] Korea.

Tioulong: I understand this. Cambodia will be a new country after peace is restored. As in China, all the people [of Cambodia] need to make efforts to build up [our country]. The Chinese and Cambodian people also have a blood relationship. For example, I myself have Chinese blood. My grandfather is Chinese. You can tell that from my name. My [last] name is Tioulong.

Zhou Enlai: Very good.

Tioulong: Our peasants cultivate [crops] and merchants do business. We all hope to live in peace. It will make our economy develop. We are currently opening up wasteland for development.

Zhou Enlai: We all want peace. The Chinese people are also conducting peaceful development.

Tep Phan: The help we get from you can speed up the achievement of the agreement, and will therefore help us obtain peace and independence. We will need China's help at all different levels in the future.

Zhou Enlai: Yes. We also welcome you to come to visit China in the future if you have the chance.

Tep Phan: We would love to. Thank you.

Zhou Enlai: We will even have diplomatic relations in the future.

Tep Phan: Yes. (Standing at the door and leaving.)

Tep Phan: We appreciate the Prime Minister's help. We hope that Cambodia will become an independent and free

country and will peacefully coexist with all its neighbors after peace is restored.

Zhou Enlai: I also hope that the friendship between the people of our two countries will be improved.



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**Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai,
Concerning Policies and Measures in the Struggle against
the United States and Jiang Jieshi after the Geneva
Conference, 27 July 1954**

[*Source: PRCFMA 206-00048-11; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.*]

Ambassador Zhang [Wentian], convey to Premier Zhou (top secret)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

The Central Committee recently discussed the situation related to the Geneva Conference, and it believes that after the agreements in Korea and Indochina, the United States is unwilling to accept its failure at the Geneva Conference, and will inevitably continue to carry out the policy of creating international tension for the purpose of further taking over o q t g" u r j g t g u" q h" k p f w g p e g" h t q o" D t k v c k p" c p f" H t c p e g." q h" g z r c p f - ing military bases for preparing for war, and remaining hostile to our Organization of Defense, and of rearming Japan. The United States will surely continue to use Taiwan to carry out pirate-style robberies of ships from various countries coming to our country, and it is likely to expand the sphere of blockade of our country to the areas off the Guangdong coast and to the Gulf of Tonkin area. Recently the United States and Jiang Jieshi have been discussing signing a US-Jiang treaty of defense, and the United States has repeatedly increased military aid to the Jiang bandits in Taiwan. All of this is worthy of our main attention. According to public information, it seems as if the United States still has some concerns about signing a US-Jiang treaty q h" f g h g p u g." c p f" k v" u g g o u" c u" k h" v j g {" j c x g" p q v" o c f g" c" L p c n" f g e k - sion. But if the United States and Jiang sign such a treaty, the relationship between us and the United States will be tense for c" n q p i" r g t k q f." c p f" k v" d g e q o g u" o q t g" f k h L e w n v"] h q t" v j g" t g n c v k q p - ship] to turn around. Therefore, the central task of our struggle against the United States at present is to break up the US-Jiang treaty of defense and the Southeast Asian treaty of defense.

We believe that after the victorious conclusion of the war of liberation on our mainland and the victorious armistice of the Korean War, now we are still facing another war, that is, the war against the Jiang Jieshi bandit bloc in Taiwan. Now we are still facing a task, that is, the task of liberating Taiwan. After

try in a timely manner (we were late by about six months). We failed to take necessary measures and make effective efforts in military affairs, on the diplomatic front, and also in our propaganda to serve this task. If we do not highlight this task now, and if we do not work for it [in the future], we are committing a serious political mistake. The introduction of the task is not just for the purpose of undermining the American-Jiang plot to sign the task we mean to raise the political consciousness and political stir up our people's revolutionary enthusiasm, thus promoting our nation's socialist reconstruction. In addition, we can use this and learn how to carry out maritime struggle.

Toward this issue the Central Committee has adopted the following measures:

*3+ We must liberate Taiwan and exposing the Americans and Jiang has already begun at home. We are also prepared to issue a open statement about the Taiwan issue in the name of the foreign minister after your return to Beijing, which will be followed by a joint statement by the representatives of various parties. Then, in accordance with the two statements, broad, profound, and prolonged propaganda and education will be carried out among the people of the whole country. In addition, we are organizing

*4+ already issued a special instruction for enhancing naval and air operations against the Jiang bandits in coastal areas. In the meantime, it is strictly regulated that the operation targets of our navy and air force should be restricted to Jiang Jieshi's military planes and vessels, and, toward American planes and warships, unless under the circumstance that they attack our troops, they are not permitted to take the initiative for attacks. The shooting down of a British transporter close to Yulin on 23 July was a mistake that is completely possible to be avoided. Apart from taking diplomatic measures to manage this, we also should use this accident to carry out serious education among our troops.

(3) Considering that our struggles against the Americans and Jiang in the coastal area will be a matter of a very long period, and that our troops lack the capacity and experience for maritime struggles, it should become a long-range task to enhance the construction of our navy and air force. Our navy should follow a and our air force should learn to carry out

operations over the sea. In order to meet the needs of the struggle at the present time with urgency, we plan to increase orders for naval and air force equipment from the Soviet Union in the next three years. The Military Commission has put forward an order

he documents printed below, while only fragments of a more substantial record of the 1954 Geneva Conference, offer partial illumination of the degree of co-ordination between the communist participants, of their negotiating tactics, and of the posture adopted by Soviet foreign minister and delegation chief Vyacheslav M. Molotov in his discussions with his French and British counterparts Pierre Mendes-France and Anthony Eden.¹

The two key issues at the conference concerning Indochina were the temporary line of demarcation to be drawn in Vietnam, and the timing of the elections which were to unify Vietnam. Molotov was aware that the Chinese, participants at the conference with security interests of their own, had held internal

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From the Journal of [Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.] Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation between Molotov and PRC Ambassador [to the Soviet Union] Zhang Wentian, 6 March 1954¹

[Source: AVPRF f. 6, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 7. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

RTE" Godcuu{" Eqwpugnnqt" Jg" Dcq/Zkcp" cpf"]Uqxkgv"
Foreign Ministry Collegium Member Nikolai T.] Fedorenko
were present.

Zhang Wentian says that Cdes. [CCP CC Vice Chairman] Liu Shaoqi, [PRC Premier and Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai, [PRC Vice-Chairman] Zhu De, and other CCP CC members have requested that their greetings be passed to Cde. Molotov.

Molotov thanks them.

Zhang Wentian reports that the PRC government and the Chinese people, noting the considerable success of the Soviet delegation at the Berlin Conference, support the decision adopted about convening the Geneva Conference.

Jg"uc{u"vjcv."cnvjqwi j"vjg"C ogtkecpu" ykmn"vt{"vq" ytgem"vjg"
Geneva Conference, the representatives of the democratic camp will try to make full use of the conference in order to lessen international tensions.

Jg"uvtguugu"vjcv"vjg"RTE"ku"kpvgpv"qp"vcmkpi"cp"cevkxg"rctv"
in the Geneva Conference and thinks that if no great successes are achieved at it, then any success here will be important since a path for active participation in international affairs is being opened for the PRC.

Molotov expresses approval of the PRC's intention to take an active part in the Geneva Conference.

Zhang Wentian says that in connection with the Geneva Conference, Nam Il, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea minister of foreign affairs, arrived in Beijing on 5 March at the invitation of the PRC government.

Vietnamese delegation.

Molotov says that this issue ought to be carefully considered.

Zhang Wentian explores the possibility of a discussion of other issues at the Geneva Conference such as, for example, the issues of Taiwan, the [re]armament of Japan, the US military agreement with Pakistan, and others.

Molotov says that the possibility of a discussion of these issues ought to be studied but it seems to him that such a possibility is by no means precluded.

Zhang Wentian reports that, bearing in mind the agreement of the four [foreign] ministers in Berlin,³ Zhou Enlai is preparing for a trip to Geneva to take part in the conference, considering that the representative of the Soviet Union will be Cde. Molotov.

Molotov acknowledges the agreement in Berlin on this issue and adds that possibly the ministers will not participate in the conference to the end since it will be protracted.

Zhang Wentian explains the advisability of the PRC, DPRK, and Vietnamese delegations coming to Moscow for several days in the middle of April (between the 10th and the 20th) to coordinate their positions at the Geneva Conference.

Molotov says that such a meeting would be necessary and useful for the matter.

J g"gzr tguugu"eqpŁfgpeg"vj cv"vj g"Ej kpgug"cp f"Mqtgcp"eq o-rades are prepared to discuss the Korean issue in a suitable hcujkqp"kp cu o wej"cu"vj g{"ctg"dgv

Bulganin
Kaganovich
Mikoyan
Saburov
Pervukhin

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1. *Editor's Note:* The document bears the stamp RF Foreign Policy Archive, 06/13a/25/7, /signature/ V. Molotov, Distributed to CPSU CC Presidium members.

2. *Editor's Note*

chairmen of the Geneva Conference, it would be desirable for him to know the opinion of the other representatives about a day acceptable to everyone to convene the Conference of Ministers the method for the further work of the Conference. Molotov adds that it is possible that private conversations might turn out to be useful at this stage of the conference. Molotov asks what day would be convenient for the Prime Minister.

Mendes-France replies that the chairmen set the nearest date for the Conference of Ministers, and that he is ready for the opening of the conference on any following day. Mendes-France says that, in his opinion, at the present stage of the talks



Molotov notes that time ought to be valued.

In conclusion Mendes-France thanks Molotov for the cordial reception and asks Molotov's permission to display initiative in organizing another meeting with him.

Molotov says that he is ready to meet with Mendes-France at any time.

Present from the Soviet delegation were V. V. Kuznetsov
 cpf" U0" C0" Xkqj i tcfqx=" htq o" vjg" Htgpej" fngg icvkqp."]Lgcp_ Chauvel and [de la Tournelle].

Recorded by /signature/
 K. Starikov



. 4

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation at Dinner in Honor of French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mendes-France, 15 July 1954, 8:30 p.m.¹

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov asks whether Mendes-France received the changes and additions that the Soviet delegation made to the draft declaration drawn up by the French delegation.

Mendes-France says that right now the French delegation is familiarizing itself with the changes made by the Soviet delegation and that apparently it will accordingly send its amended draft tomorrow. The draft of the Soviet delegation can serve as a basis, although a number of issues still [handwritten: need discussion]. It can already be said now that the changes by the Soviet delegation are essentially based on the principle of an equal approach to the situation in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, whereas the situation in these countries is different and requires a different approach.

Molotov notes that basic principles are described in the beginning and then the particulars of the situation in each country are examined in the draft sent to Mendes-France by the Soviet delegation.

Mendes-France suggest discussing the issue of elections and their timing. If a very close date is chosen to hold elections then it can turn out that the elections will be held in a situation when all the necessary conditions have not yet been established and they will not lead to a genuine solution of the issue qh"vjg"wpkLecvkqp"qh"Xkgvpc o0"kh."j q y gxgt."c"fcvg"ku"guvcdnkj g f"

which is too distant this could cause legitimate discontent on the part of the population of Vietnam. Therefore it would be dgwgt"vq" fgLpg"vjg" o ckp" rtkpek rngu"cv"vjg" I gpgxc"Eqphgtgpeg" on which an exact date for the elections would be set.

~~Molotov notes that the Soviet delegation draft does not envision the setting of an exact date for the elections but iden- vLgu"e"vkog"nk o kv"fwtkpi" yjkej"vjgug"ngewkqpu"ctg"vq"dg"jgnf0~~

~~Mendes-France says that is one and the same thing, for a time limit is for practical purposes usually a [one illegible word handwritten above] date. The decision of the Geneva Conference could indicate that the elections ought not be delayed without special reason and determine which bodies ought to be established, under what kind of monitoring the elections are to be held, and what conditions are needed for there to be a possibility of establishing this date.~~

Molotov says that time for the elections ought to be clearly established in the Geneva Conference declaration. With Xkgvpc o "fkxkfgf"kpqv"v y q" rctvu."]kvu_ "rgqrng"y kmm"gzrgev" c" fgL- pkvg"cpu ygt"vq"vjg" swguvkqp"qh"vjg"eqwvpt {0u"wpkLecvkqp"htq o" the Geneva Conference.

Mendes-France" vj kpmu" vj cv" kv" ku" uwkLekgpv" vq" kpfkcvg"

to discuss in such tripartite meetings.

~~Mendes-France~~ says that [*Translator's note*: An arrow indicates that Mendes-France's paragraph above is to be inserted at this point]. All issues concerning the establishment of peace in Vietnam ought to be discussed at such tripartite meetings. Vjku" yqwnf" rtqxf" cp" qrrqtvpkv{ "vq" oqtg"geukn{ "Lpf" eq o-promise solutions, make concessions on individual issues by compensating on others, etc.



made a great step forward in trying to reach an agreement. One cannot fail to take into account that it was hard for the DRV to give up its own longtime region and to do this required great force of conviction.

Mendes-France replied says that if it is hard for the DRV to give up its own region in central Vietnam then it might have kept this region for itself on condition of appropriate compensation for France in the north. Another solution is, of course, possible: both sides remain in their places, but such solution might undermine the principle of an exchange of territory.

Molotov said that, in making a concession from the 13th to the 16th parallels, the DRV naturally ought to stop at such a line where there would be appropriate territorial compensation from the French side. As regards the use of Route 9, then an agreement might be found which is more in keeping with the interests of both sides.

Mendes-France repeated that he considers the concession of the delta as such compensation.

Molotov says that the concession of the delta, including concession from the 13th to 16th parallels but is in keeping with the DRV concession of south Vietnam and also the concessions on a number of other issues. If it were possible to come to an agreement about the French giving up the delta, including...

Mendes-France again repeated that he views giving up the delta as a very important concession which is not compensated by all the concessions made by the DRV in the southern part of Vietnam, and right now he does not see any concessions which the DRV might make in exchange for the French giving up...

Molotov says that he is ready to explain the point of view of Pham Van Dong about this issue again.

Mendes-France repeats that he cannot envision such a solution to the issue which would mean the French would give up region between the 16th and the 13th or 14th parallels to the DRV for suitable compensation in the north, for this would at least agree with the status quo in this region. If Pham Van Dong agrees to locate the line of demarcation at the 18th parallel...

Molotov says that he is ready meet with Mendes-France and Eden tomorrow, but if Mendes-France has questions right

now, he can discuss them right now, [handwritten: that he can explain the point of view of Pham Van Dong about this issue again].

Mendes-France says that he would like [one handwritten word illegible] to discuss the issue of monitoring, but the French delegation has still not prepared its draft proposals. The work on this draft is proceeding well, and it is hoped that [handwritten: the draft] might be sent to the Soviet delegation tomorrow.

Molotov says that in the French draft declaration there is a tghgtgpeg"vq" c" egcug/Ltg" c i tgg o gpv=" j q y g x g t" v j g" Uq x k g v" f g n- egation has not yet received the draft of such an agreement.

Mendes-France says that the French delegation is working on a number of documents right now which it would submit to the other delegations for discussion in the near future. It is possible that not all the documents will be agreed upon and adopted on an agreement in principle about the most important remaining issues be concluded by 19 or 20 July. The other documents o k i j v" d g" L p k u j g f" c h v g t" 3 ; " q t" 4 2" L w n { 0 " A t t h i s p o i n t h e r e p e a t e d v j c v" u e w e j" c" f g c f n k p g" j c f" d g g p" u g v" d { " R c t n k c o g p v=" j g" y q w n f" p q v"

. 5

**From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of
Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 16
July 1954**

*[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul
Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]*

Molotov

Molotov then asks what questions Pham Van Dong intends to discuss during today's meeting with Mendes-France.

Pham Van Dong says he prefers to touch on the main issues about Indochina, primarily the questions about the elections and the line of demarcation. Pham Van Dong added that he y kmn" kpukuv" qp" ugvvkpi" fgŁpkvg" vk o gu" hqt" j qnfpki" gngevkqpu" kp" accordance with the exchange of opinions between us and also on locating the line of demarcation at the 16th parallel.

Zhou Enlai says that we will probably be able to reach agreement on the issues mentioned above in the next few days but one more very important issue remains which ought not be overlooked. This is the issue of the creation of an American military bloc in Southeast Asia. Zhou Enlai stresses that there is reason to suspect that the US, Britain, and France have in principle achieved some sort of agreement among themselves about this question. If the Americans manage to draw Bao Dai's Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into a military bloc then the agreement we have drafted about prohibiting the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of the states mentioned would lose the importance which we attach to it. Zhou Enlai added that in a conversation with Nehru in India and in a

**From the Journal of Molotov: Top Secret Memorandum
of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 17
July 1954, 3:30 p.m.**

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, l. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov asks Pham Van Dong about his conversations with [British Foreign Minister Anthony] Eden and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia [Tep Phan].

Pham Van Dong says that in conversations with Eden and the representative of Cambodia he had mainly touched on foreign military bases in Bao Dai Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and the issues of a military bloc in Southeast Asia. Both Eden and the minister of foreign affairs of Cambodia declared that the US supposedly did not intend to create military bases on these countries also did not want foreign military bases to be created on their territory. In reply to a question about the possibility of the Americans involving Bao Dai Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the military bloc they are planning in Southeast Asia, Eden and the representative of Cambodia replied that they did not give the Americans their agreement to this and did not intend to do this in the future. They added that it was another matter if the three "Associated States" were subjected to aggression. Regarding the creation of a military bloc in Southeast Asia Eden said that the US has been acting in this direction for a long time and that nothing new was added to this in Paris. Eden added that the aforementioned bloc being created by the Americans was supposedly of a defensive nature.

Pham Van Dong said that he had taken a sharply critical position with respect to the creation of foreign military bases in Bao Dai Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and also with respect to the creation of military blocs in Southeast Asia in this conversation with Eden and the representative of Cambodia.

Zhou Enlai says that in the new version of the draft declaration, there is no provision prohibiting the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia and that this provision is also not in the draft documents about Laos and Cambodia.



It seems to me, continues Molotov, that, in stressing the importance of the issues regarding Laos and Cambodia, [we] are the Vietnamese issues.

Eden agrees with this, but says that from the point of view of the Western delegations there is a difference between Laos and Cambodia on the one hand and the issue of Vietnam on the other, since, in the opinion of the Western delegations, there

Molotov says that in yesterday's conversation with him, Molotov, Smith mentioned his, Smith's, or Dulles' possible

Molotov asks Eden what, in his opinion, are the primary

Eden replies that it is hard for him to answer this question

importance to this question. Now, however, he seems to be holding to the opposite point of view. As regards the Soviet delegation, it is agreeable not to exaggerate the importance of this question.

Eden says that the question of monitoring still has great importance but its resolution might be made easier thanks to the improvement of relations between the sides.

Eden notes that much work has to be invested in the matter of coordinating the decisions of the Geneva Conference both regarding Vietnam as well as Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov says that the French have not displayed special initiative in solving these issues. It was possibly explained by that the matter will now proceed more quickly.

Eden notes that French governments are different [than other

v j g" r t g u g p v" v k o g" c" u q w t e g" q h" o k n k v c t { " e q p i k e v" g z k u u" k p" q p n { " q p g" r i c e g. " V c k y c p" = " y k v j" " W U" i q x g t p o g p v" c k f. " v j g" L k c p i" L k g u j k" e n k s w g" i s c o m m i t t i n g o u t r a g e s a t s e a, r a i d i n g C h i n e s e t e r r i t o r y, a n d g u a n g p v k c m n { " e q o o k v k p i" j q u v k n g" c e v u" c i c k p u v" E j k p c =

To strengthen the defense of the Chinese coastline. The navy and air force will need to be strengthened to do this. The Chinese Armed Forces must be ready at any moment to halt a x k q n c v k q p" q h" v j g" o c t k v k o g" q t" c k t" d q w p f c t k g u" q h" E j k p c =

To achieve the failure of the organization of an aggressive bloc in Southeast Asia. To do this means tearing their allies away from the US and exacerbating of the differences between the US and other capitalist countries.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov replies that he heard the ideas of Zhou Enlai with pleasure and says that questions about measures connected with the international situation are examined and decided in the CPSU CC. Cde. Zhou Enlai's statements deserve great attention. The goal of disrupting the conclusion of a pact between the US and Jiang Jieshi is correct. The question of Taiwan is undoubtedly a critically important problem h q t" E j k p c l" J g" c i t g g u" y k v j" \ j q w" G p n c k o u" e q o o g p v" v j c v" v j g" i q c n" of achieving an exacerbation of the differences between the US and other bourgeois countries is important.

Cde. Zhou Enlai informs [Malenkov] of the conversations with the Indonesian ambassadors in Delhi, Rangoon, and Beijing: they invited him to visit Indonesia. Zhou Enlai could not avail himself of this invitation since he was soon to return to the Geneva Conference. During Zhou Enlai's stay in Geneva, the Indonesian minister of foreign affairs, who was in the Netherlands, sent the Indonesian ambassador in Paris to Zhou and repeated the invitation to visit Indonesia. It has become clear from conversations with Indonesian ambassadors that the time has come for a decision to conclude a non-aggression pact with China. Zhou Enlai proposed that a draft of this pact be developed in Beijing by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the Indonesian ambassador in order for it to be possible to sign it during Zhou Enlai's visit to Jakarta. Zhou Enlai is supposed to visit Indonesia in August.

E f g l" I o l" O c n g p m q x" y k u j g u" j k o" u w e e g u u l" J g" c i t g g u" y k v j" \ j q w" Enlai's comment about Indonesia and says that the inclusion of Indonesia in the American bloc being forged in Southeast Asia e c p p q" d g" r g t o k v g f l" J g" v c m m u" d t k g i { " c d q w w" e q p x g t u c v k q p u" y k v j" [Chairman of the All-India Peace Council Dr. Saifuddin] Kitchlu and Subandrio, the Indonesian ambassador to the USSR, noting in this context that India, and, to a certain degree, Indonesia are i t c x k v c k p i" v q y c t f" c" t c r r t q e j g o g p v" y k v j" v j g" R T E" c p f" W U U T l" J g" stresses that the conclusion of a Sino-Indian agreement is a quite successful step by the PRC government. The principles on which this agreement is based are being propagandized in the Soviet press in every possible way.

Cde. Zhou Enlai informs [Malenkov] of a conversation with V.K. Krishna Menon, the Indian [permanent] representative to the UN, about the issue of Korea. Menon suggested that elections be held separately in North and South Korea, after which a national M q t g c p" d q f { " y q w n f" d g" h q t o g f l" O g p q p" v t k g f" v q" c m u q" L p f" q w" y j c v" the Chinese reaction would be if the United Nations expressed a desire to convene a Geneva conference again to discuss the M q t g c p" k u u w g l" J g" \ j q w" G p n c k. " t g r n k g f" v q" O g p q p" v j c v" E j k p c" y q w n f" support the idea of convening a Geneva Conference in order to e q p v k p w g" v j g" f k u e w u u k q p" q h" v j g" M q t g c p" k u u w g l" J g" v j k p m u" v j c v. " k h" c" Geneva conference were convened again, its membership would have to be expanded, inviting India to participate in it.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov says that Menon also raised this question with Cde. Molotov.

Zhou Enlai says that in connection with the intention of the PRC government to accelerate the strengthening of coastal defense it will evidently have to reexamine existing plans to develop the navy and air force. Zhou Enlai plans to immediately deal with this question on return to Beijing.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov notes that strengthening the defense of the Chinese coast, the navy, and the air force is an important goal.

Referring to the fact that the Soviet military comrades recommend that a long-range heavy bomber division (of TU-4s) be created in China, Cde. Zhou Enlai says that, in the opinion of the Chinese military, these aircraft are obsolete and it is desirable for a division of long-range aircraft to be equipped with jet technology.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov replies that the Soviet military comrades will look into this issue.

Cde. Zhou Enlai asks whether the PRC government might expect the arrival of a government delegation of senior Soviet e q o t c f g u" k p" D g k l k p i" v q" e n g d t c v g" v j g" L h v j" c p p k x g t u c t { " q h" v j g" Chinese People's Republic. If such a delegation can be sent v j g p" v j g" R T E" i q x g t p o g p v" y k m n" u g p f" c p" q h" L e k c n" k p x k v c k q p l

Cde. G. M. Malenkov replies that, of course, a delegation will d g" u g p v" = " v j g" E R U W" E E" y k m n" f g v g t o k p g" v j g" e q o r q u k v k q p" q h" u w e j" a delegation.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov asks that greetings be sent to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and the other comrades in the CCP CC.

Recorded by M. Kapitsa
Authenticated by: [illegible signature]

Distributed to members
of the CPSU CC Presidium
12 August 1954
to Cde. V. M. Molotov

