

On a freezing November afternoon in Ulaanbaatar (Ulan Bator), I climbed the Zaisan hill on the southern end of town to survey the bleak landscape below. Black smoke from *gers* \hat{o} Oqpi qnkcp" hgnv" jqwugu \hat{o} dncpmgvf" vjg" xcmng{-" xgt{" nkvnng" eqwnf" dg" fkuetpgf" dg{ qpf" vjg" htq|gp" Tuul River. Chilling wind reminded me of the cold, harsh winter ahead. I thought I should have stayed at home after all because my pen froze solid, and I could not scribble a thing on the documents I carried up with me. These were records of Mongolia's perilous moves on the chessboard of giants: its strategy of survival between China and the Soviet Union, and its still poorly understood role in Asia's Cold War. These documents were collected from archival depositories and private collections in Ulaanbaatar and beyond, and were publicly rtgugpvf" hqt" vjg" Ltuv" vk o g" cv" vjg" *Mongolia and the Cold War* conference in March 2004.²

Now I wanted to read through these materials once again and put them into a proper context. Zaisan offered an almost perfect place for contemplation. The only sound structure here was a socialist-era monument paying tribute to the Red Army. This circular structure, vandalized by the inevitable autographs of visitors, features a mosaic portraying the heroic history of Soviet-Mongolian friendship from the Russian revolution to the space age. A Russian soldier towers over the structure, glaring towards Ulaanbaatar with the blank but resolute countenance demanded by socialist realist sculpture. Not even the thick smog from the *ger* district could shield the Chinese embassy from his stern gaze. The other side of the monument has been appropriated by the Mongolian mountain god - the *ovoo*, a tall pile of stones with blue Buddhist scarves tied here and there. This *ovoo* i tqyu" htq o" { gct" vq" { gct" J g" o ki j v" chygt" all prove to be the real ruler of Zaisan. I sat down near the *ovoo* and pulled out the documents.

These documents (printed below in translation) represent a small glimpse into Mongolia's complicated foreign relations during the last century. In earlier times, Mongolia was considered a menace to its neighbors: in the 13th century, both

Ej kpc" cpf" Twuukc" hgnm" wpfgt" vjg" Oqpi qnkcp" uyqt f" J qy xgt. after being conquered in the 17th century by the Manchus, vjg" ncpf" qh" vjg" Oqpi qnu" ycu" f kxkfgf" kpq" v yq" rctvu \hat{o} ecmgf" \hat{o} Qwvgt \hat{o} cpf" \hat{o} kppgt \hat{o} Oqpi qnk \hat{o} cpf" tgfwegf" vq" r tqxkpekn" uvc- tus. The inhabitants of Outer Mongolia enjoyed much greater autonomy than their compatriots across the border, and after the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Outer Mongolia asserted its right to nationhood. Weak and disorganized, the Mongolian religious leadership appealed for help from foreign countries, kpenwfkpi" vjg" Wpkvgf" Uvcvgul" Dwy" vjg" Ltuv" hqtgkip" vtqqr" vq" appear were Russian soldiers under the command of the notoriously cruel Baron Ungern who rode past the Zaisan hill in the winter of 1921. The "bloody baron" wore a Mongolian robe, practiced Buddhism, and perhaps planned to use Mongolia as jku" dcug" hqt" cpvk/ Dqu j g xkm" rwtuwkvul" J g" uqqp" gpicigf" kp" dcwng" with Chinese regular forces stationed in the capital and, while he defeated them, his triumph was short-lived, as he was pursued by Red Army regiments. In the process, the Bolshevik Red Army helped "liberate" Outer Mongolia from the "yoke of feudalism" and clear its path to socialism.

Vjg" Ltuv" { gct" qh" vjg" Oqpi qnkcp" Rgqrng \hat{o} Tgrwdnke" *cu" Outer Mongolia now called itself) proved tragic and tumultuous. Religious reforms were marked by the curtailment of Buddhism, demolition of temples, and mass execution of lamas. Expropriationist state policies undermined the livestock economy. Prosecution of mostly imagined "enemies of the state" and "Japanese spies" silenced all opposition. Mongolia followed closely in Soviet footsteps, and political initiative was severely constrained. Prime Ministers Peljidiin Genden and Anandiin Amar, who dared to oppose Stalin and criticize, if implicitly, Soviet policies, discovered the limits of Mongolia's independence: they were arrested and executed in Moscow in 1937 and 1941, respectively.³ By the 1940s, political power was in the hands of Soviet-supported Marshall Khorloogiin Choibalsan, Mongolia's "Stalin."

Despite his Soviet connection, Choibalsan did not lose sight qh" Oqpi qnkcp" pcvkqpcn" rwrtrug \hat{o} J g" jqrgrf" vq" y tguvng" kppgt"

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Oqpiqnk"htq o"Ejkcøu"eqpvtqm" Jg"enuq"ucdqvc igf"ghhqtvu"d{ " c"pw o dgt"qh" Oqpiqnkcp"kpvgmngewcnu"cpf" rqnkvkcn"Liwtgu"vq" accede to the Soviet Union.⁴ Choibalsan wanted a strong, unit- g" Oqpiqnk"qp"htkpf{n{ "vgtou" ykvj"vjg"Uqxkgvu" Jg"tgcupgf" that a closer relationship with the Soviet Union was a better option for Mongolia than being a Chinese province, since the Soviets supposedly did not pose a threat to the existence of the Mongolian nation.

China, on the other hand, posed a very real threat in the eyes of the Mongolian leadership. Indeed, were it not for the help of Russian bayonets, Mongolia might not have escaped the embrace of its southern neighbor. The Mongolian leaders' suspicions of China's designs were not erased by the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In the fall of 1949 vjg"vyq"eqwptku" guvcdnkujgf" fkrnq ocvke" tgnvkkpu." qhLekcn{ "

The claimed that it (was)317(China')56(s)317dutysto Mongoli:tröd uarenh

y(Ghina)140(thusa)140(hada)140(toa)140(arepaya)140(thea)140(debt.s.)JTJ/C2_0 1 Tf2.9440 -1.316 Td[03500044005200037810056004400C qxgte a *g" k² Oq ä p"guqpq oke" vkhLe nvkEu0"q ä p"

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conomic pressure to win Mongolia's neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split. Such pressure became particularly problematic for Ulaanbaatar because of its economic reliance on China and particularly on Chinese workers. Mikoyan had presciently warned Tsedenbal in March 1956 against over-reliance on Chinese

than he was willing to tell Zhou.

In the second part of the conversation, probably on 27 December, Zhou and Tsedenbal discussed the Sino-Soviet disagreements. The Chinese premier accused Tsedenbal of “blindly follow[ing]” the Soviet leadership and asked sarcastically whether he also “loyally follow[ed] Stalin.” Tsedenbal replied self-righteously: “We [Mongolians] are convinced in the rightness of the CPSU, we are deeply convinced in and committed to the endeavor carried out by the CPSU.” Tsedenbal Chinese premier complained that Mongolia only printed the Soviet side and ignored both the Chinese and Albanian materials that criticized Soviet “revisionism.” Tsedenbal in turn praised Soviet efforts to reach a compromise with Albania and blamed the Chinese for encouraging Tirana’s anti-Soviet rhetoric. In Tsedenbal’s view, “the Albanian question became a kind of a compass, a kind of a test of the sincerity of everyone towards the CPSU.” China had evidently failed the test and had abandoned Marxism-Leninism. Tsedenbal’s line on Albania was in fact tougher than Moscow’s policy at the time. Leonid Brezhnev, in an encounter with Chinese Ambassador Pan Zili in January 1963 (only days after Tsedenbal’s meeting with Zhou), diplomatically abstained from criticizing China’s handling of the Albanian issue and even asked for Beijing’s “help” in bringing Tirana back to its senses. Brezhnev asked “what bug has bitten the Albanians” and said that the Soviets did not want Albania “to become a reason for staining our relations with the CCP.”²⁹

Vugfgpdca" ycu" owej" oqtg" cdtwrv" cpf" fktgevl" Jg" gxgp" went as far as to “remind [Zhou] what constituted the ABCs of Marxism-Leninism,” implying that the Chinese premier had abandoned Marxism altogether. By a curious coincidence, only a week later Khrushchev also spoke about the “ABCs of communism” in a meeting with the Chinese ambassador. Dwv" wpmkg" Vugfgpdca." vjg" Uqxkgv" ngcftg" enck o gf" cp" chlpkv{ " of views and similarity of ideological conceptions with the Chinese.³⁰ Therefore, if Tsedenbal was a puppet in the Sino-Uqxkgv" urnkv." jg" ycu" fcpeki" vq" jku" qyp" wvpg-" jku" urnkv" ykvj" China was deeper and wider than ideology. Keeping China at bay was, in Tsedenbal’s mind, at the core of Mongolia’s strategy of national survival.

In July 1964, Mao suddenly announced that much of Siberia and the Far East once belonged to China and had been unfairly annexed by the Russian tsars.³¹

in Asia: Premier Alexei Kosygin travelled to China, North Vietnam, and North Korea in February 1965 in an effort to improve relations. There was a sense in Moscow that with underlying problems in Sino-Soviet relations could be over-estimated of the Soviet intent to respect their dissenting ideological views. Under such circumstances, sending troops to Mongolia would cause problems for Soviet diplomacy in Asia. Moreover, in late 1965 China was not yet as great a threat to the Soviet Union as it would become a few years later during the Cultural Revolution. Tensions had certainly escalated, but the Soviets continued to make offers of reconciliation to Beijing well into early 1966. It was not until the embassy siege crisis of August 1966 that the Chinese problem alarmed the Soviet leadership. Soviet troops in Mongolia as a measure of additional security against perceived Chinese militancy.

Tsedenbal expressed his concerns about the Chinese military build-up on the Sino-Mongolian border to Brezhnev when he visited Ulaanbaatar in January 1966 [Document #8]. Brezhnev relayed that the Soviet leadership “replied positively to the request of the MPRP CC about aid in strengthening the defense capabilities of the MPR.” That statement suggests that Moscow had agreed in principle to station forces in Mongolia. Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky was instructed to coordinate all details. The next record we have concerning Soviet forces in Mongolia comes a year later, on 4 February 1967, when the CPSU Politburo adopted Resolution P32/32op on “stationing Soviet forces on the territory of MPR” [Document #9]. This decision came on the heels of violent demonstrations in Beijing and the siege of the Soviet embassy by Red Guards. On the same day, the Politburo adopted several other decisions on strengthening Soviet forces in the Far East, in line with a reassessment of the Chinese threat. It appears that despite the earlier talks with Tsedenbal, it was only when the crisis point was reached in Sino-Soviet relations that the Soviet leadership decided to send troops to Mongolia. The

“BNMAU-yg Zuvlult Kholboot Ulsyn Bureldekhund Oruulakh Asuudal Tav’san n”, *Unen* No. 178, 17708 (31 July 1990): 3 and *Unen* No. 185, 17715 (8 August 1990), 3.

5. For a recent account of the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance see Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: the Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

6. As of 1966, Chinese aid to Mongolia amounted to 103.55 million rubles (67.5 million rubles in credits and 36.05 million rubles in grants). By comparison, China’s aid to North Korea for the same period amounted to 400.15 million rubles, and to North Vietnam - 496.8 million rubles (nearly 4 and 5 times higher, respectively). These figures do not include military aid. Regarding PRC aid to socialist countries (28 May 1966), See AVPRF; fond 0100, opis 59, papka 529, delo 37, list 27.

7. Ochirbat to Dashiin Adilbish (26 September 1956), Mongol Ulsyn Zasgiin Gazryn Arkhiv; fond 1, dans 4, kh/n 5, khuu 173.

8. Conversation between Vasily Pisarev and Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal (29 November 1954), AVPRF; fond 0111, opis 36, papka 235, delo 3, listy 57-58.

9. Report on trip to China in spring 1957, Surenjavyn Tuvshin’s personal archive. Surenjavyn Tuvshin is the grandson of Chimeddorjiin Surenjav.

10. Mao Zedong officially confirmed this position in his letter to Dashiin Damba dated 20 May 1957. See “Letter to Damba” in *Mao Zedong Wenji*, vol. 7 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993-9), 300.

11. This document was obtained from Surenjavyn Tuvshin, grandson of Chimeddorjiin Surenjav, and apparently represents recollections written by Surenjav many years later. In all likelihood, the account was based on original notes, but its reliability has not been verified.

12. Foreign Minister Sodnomyn Avarzed (1922-1989) reportedly opposed Vyacheslav Molotov’s demands for territorial concessions and subsequently lost his job for being “anti-Soviet.” The charges of anti-Sovietism were lifted in 1990, shortly after Avarzed died after being hit by a truck. Chuntyn Boldbaatar, *XX Zuuny Mongolyn Uls Turiin Zutgelmuud* (Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 2004): 13. See also Boldbaatar’s paper, “Was Sodnomyn Avarzed an Anti-Soviet?” presented at the CWIHP Conference on Mongolia and the Cold War, 19-20 March 2004, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

13. See Soviet records of these exchanges on pp. 144-145, 154 of this *Bulletin*. For an account of Mikoyan’s visit to China in January-February 1949, see Andrei Ledovsky, *SSSR i Stalin v Sudbakh Kitaya* (Moscow: Pamyatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 1999): 62. For a recent analysis of Mikoyan’s discussion of Mongolia with the Chinese leadership, see Xiaoyuan Liu’s paper, “The Structure of Bloc Politics: Stalin, Mao and Mongolia’s Independence” presented at the CWIHP Conference on Mongolia and the Cold War, 19-20 March 2004, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

14. During the CPSU CC Presidium (Politburo) meeting on 19 August 1964 Khrushchev and his colleagues recalled the details of

lai Nianpu, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997): 521; and Liu Chongwen et al., *Liu Shaoqi Nianpu: 1898-1969*, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998): 567.

24. Foreign Ministry Archive (Ulaanbaatar), fond 0,6, kh/n 39. Tsedenbal's meeting with Zhou is briefly discussed in Chuluuny Dalai and Irgy Shima, *Otnosheniya Mezhdur MNR i KNR, 1949-1985*, internal circulation (Prague and Ulaanbaatar: Oriental Institute of the

In response to Comrade Mikoyan's objection that he then con-
ukfgtgf"cpf"uvkm"dgkngxu"vjcv"Uvcnkp"ycu"tkijv."vjcv"kuôvjcv"
Uvcnkp"icxg"e"eqttgev"cpu ygt ô \jqw"Gpnc"uckf"vjcv."hqt o cmm{."



enctkŁgf"vjg"qtki kp"qh" {qwt" cpeguvqtu0"ku"kv"kp"UkdgtkcA

Qejkt dcv<"Cj#"Vjcv"ku" y jcv"vjg {"uc{#

Chairman: Siberia used to have the Gaoche [Tall Cart] nationality, it is said that they all sat upon great tall carts. Are the Gaoche nationality your ancestors?

Da: Old people say that when ancestors moved their homes, they used tall carts to move all their things.

Chairman: Do you have records of this?

Da: As for the records prior to the 12th century, we have pppg"pqy=" yg"jcxg"tgeqt fu"chvgt"vjg"35th century. The Soviet Union is helping us with work in this regard. Mongolia's pre-13th egpwwt {" jkuvqt {"ku" kpvk o cvgn {" tgnvcgf" vq" E jkpgug" jkuvqt {- therefore, in the future we will possibly need to conduct joint research with you in this regard.

Chairman: Very good. Today we talked about many things related to history.

Da: Our prospects are very bright, because we have fraternal aid from the Soviet Union and China. From now on, we will work even harder and more diligently.

Chairman: You should develop well.

Da: I again express our sincere gratitude. Your aid to us is great fraternal aid. We cannot look upon it as a "debt."

Chairman: But we think this way. We have equal coexistence with all countries. In the past, we oppressed you, therefore now we want to admit our mistake. We not only do it so with you but with all national minorities inside the country. In the past, we qrrtguugf"vjg o="vjgtghqtg. "kh" yg"pqy" fq"pq"cf o kv"qwt" o kuvcmgu. yg" ecppq" tqv" qww" I tgcv" J cp" pcvkqpcnkuv" vj kpmkp i" cpf" k o ringment [principles of] equality of nationalities. This is [our] basis, not pretty words. Isn't that so? In the past we oppressed you, but now you do not even have a word of complaint. The aid we are giving you is small. It is repayment of debt and not aid. Only vjku"yc {"ecp" yg"cvckp" o wwwcn"vtwuv0" [qw"uc {"öckfö ô vjku"ku"cnuq" iqqf=" y jgp" {qw"uc {"uq. {"qw"cnuq"gzrtguu"gswnkv {0

Da: We express gratitude for your aid, which you have given and will give to us. The Chinese and Mongolian working people's classes are a different matter.

Chairman: Some Chinese workers have gone to Mongolia. You should carry out propaganda work with them so that they do pqv"eqo o kv"vjg"g

Chairman: Do they have automation?

Da: They do not.

After the signing of the treaty and a large demonstration on 27 December the second conversation between Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai took place. Evidently, the Chinese side carefully prepared for this meeting since the conversation touched upon important principal questions that not only concern relations between the PRC and the MPR, and between the CCP and the MPRP, but also relations with other parties, including the CPSU.

Cv"vjg"dgi kppki "qh"vjkueqpxgtucvkqp." \jqw"Gpck"tg o ctmgf ô
eqpvkpwgf" Vugxgi okf ô vjcv" vjg"uki pki" qh" vjg"dqtfgt" vtgcv{"
between the PRC and the MPR had great meaning, not only
for our two countries but for other states as well, and would
Cv"v' g"dqOv i* dq I"O

again tried to prove that the Chinese were not to blame for any of this. Then, he started to say that the Chinese managed to agree on the border with almost all countries except for India, and started to praise the results of the negotiations between the PRC and the MPR.

These negotiations, he remarked, have been successfully concluded as a result of mutual understanding and mutual cooperation. The Chinese side, in order to consider Mongolia's interests, made appropriate concessions. [Zhou Enlai] expressed the hope that in the future, in possible border questions, both fraternal countries will meet each other half-way. For instance we hope that if there is a request from our side to allow the grazing of cattle on the Mongolian territory adjacent to the Chinese border, this will not become a big question. We, on our part, will also be happy to satisfy your requests. When this part of the conversation was about the nature of an interstate nature.

- 30" "Jg" vqnf" vjg" Ejkpgug" eq o tcfgu" vjcv" cu" qh" ncvg" vjg" workload of the railroad which passes through Mongolia into China and the freight of transit goods had decreased sharply. We would like to request an increase in the volume of freight by the Mongolian railroad if the Chinese comrades consider this possible.
- 40" "Jcxkpi" tgoctmgf" vjcv" vjg" rtgnk o kpet {"vcmmu" qh" vjg" trade experts had now been concluded, Tsedenbal pointed out that the Mongolian side is worried that the Chinese side will considerably decrease trade operations with Mongolia in 1963, and this breaks the framework already created for the mutual supply of goods. As a result of this, unexpectedly for the MPR, questions arise that could not be foreseen ahead of time. These questions are connected with the supply of the Mongolian factories with certain types of raw materials which used to come from China.
- 50" "Jg" gzrtguugf" i tcvkwf" vq" vjg" Ejkpgug" i xgtp o gpv" for help in construction work in the MPR, including sending workers from China. Tsedenbal remarked that currently 8,000 Chinese workers are working at different enterprises in the MPR together with Mongolian workers. Unfortunately, more and more frequently these workers refused certain types of work. They did not know the Mongolian language, and for this reason, too, some misunderstandings and troubles arise. Tsedenbal stressed that now, as well as in the near future, the MPR would have a great need for a workforce and that therefore Mongolia welcomed the presence of the Chinese workers at their enterprises. The Chinese workers at their enterprises presently in the MPR did not know the Mongolian language. Would it not be possible to send to the

MPR more workers from Chinese Inner Mongolia, who know the Mongolian language? This would be important as they would be able to work with greater productivity.

The conversation the Mongolian comrades raised three questions and that he would try to answer them. First, he said, I consider it necessary to remark that Mongolia supplied China with considerably fewer goods than what the PRC supplied to the MPR. We, indeed, were forced to decrease the supply of certain goods, especially cotton textiles, because we ourselves experienced drought and bad harvests that unfortunately happened in the last three years. Even if we did not export a gram of raw materials for the cotton textile industry abroad, and used it entirely for the production of textile, still these raw materials would only be enough to produce 3 meters of textiles per person. Generally speaking, Zhou Enlai said, we are now suffering ourselves, and we cannot promise to supply the cotton textile industry of the MPR with raw materials at the level of previous years. As far as rice, tea, silk, and to some extent wool are concerned, representatives discuss these questions among themselves.

Further, Zhou Enlai said that the MPR was asking to have 17 million rubles worth of goods (on the new price scale) supplied from the PRC. The PRC now, apparently, would only be able to supply 6 million rubles worth of goods.

Next year, continued Zhou Enlai, the Chinese side would try to increase the freight of goods via the railroad across Mongolia. As a result of this, the income of the MPR would increase to a certain extent. Then Zhou Enlai said that the Mongolian comrades promised to sell China 100,000 horses. We have certain questions amount to the Chinese asking to supply horses only across two border points. This makes the MPR's position more difficult. We are suggesting to the Chinese that we supply horses across Mongolia. What the Chinese suggest amounts to collecting horses from all corners of Mongolia at only two border points.

Secondly, Zhou Enlai touched on some issues of construction in the MPR and put the question in such a way that, allegedly, Mongolia, in implementing its plan, naturally ran into some difficulties. The fact that they would not have certain types of raw materials, would consider it appropriate to re-examine certain questions. The Chinese suggest to collect horses from all corners of Mongolia at only two border points. To implement the plan was a good wish, but one had to base oneself on the possibility of getting raw materials and other materials

enterprises. Therefore, Zhou Enlai advised, some enterprises should perhaps be frozen for a certain time.

Tsevegmid commented that in connection with the fairly well-formed attitude of the PRC toward Mongolia, the latter really since in accordance with this plan the Chinese were supposed to build 25 economic objectives. In order to carry out this construction work in Mongolia, besides the 8,000 Chinese workers who work together with the Mongolian workers, there are also 5,000 Chinese there independently, from the Chinese construction companies.

Third, Zhou Enlai touched on the question of the Chinese work-

As they were in touch with the Mongolian population, they are familiar with the Mongolian press, and this caused certain difficulties for the Mongolian population. Zhou Enlai stressed that a man was not an inanimate commodity [*mertvy tovar*], but a living, politically thinking individual. We brought our people up in such a way that if they did not like something, then they could give up work. Therefore, we allow such order [of things]. Now, let's look at the situation of the Chinese workers in Mongolia. What you publish in Mongolia disposed the Chinese workers critically. Do you do with these workers? Leave them in the MPR? But I already said these are people and not commodities.

Tsedenbal asked what, in the end, should be done about those workers who refuse to work.

Zhou Enlai replied that we should think about this together in order not to allow complications to arise in the relations between two neighboring states, the MPR and the PRC, because of this question. If the situation remained as it was, conditions would remain for the occurrence of troubles, misunderstandings, and unfavorable events.

Tsevegmid remarked that the conversation between Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai took on a more and more hostile form, and at times he even thought that the custom would be set aside and they would come to blows [*skhvatyatsya za grudki*].

Juchang declared the following. Above all, he said, Comrade Zhou Enlai gave us Mongolians a series of recommendations regarding difficulties arise at those sites that China is building, and also with those for which China, in accordance with previously reached agreements, had to supply appropriate goods, especially raw materials. Then, Tsedenbal remarked that the Chinese workers

thereby to slander the Soviet Union in a rude manner.

Further, Comrade Tsedenbal spoke about the Chinese work-

POLITBURO MEMBERS

T[sagaan-Lamyn] S. DUGERSUREN
N[yamyn] JAGVARAL
D[amdinjavyn] MAIDAR
D[emchigiin] MOLOMJAMTS
J[amsrangiin] SAMBUU
Yu[mjaagiyn] TSEDENBAL
L[uvtsantserengiin] TSEND

POLITBURO CANDIDATE MEMBERS

N. LUVSANRAVDAN
]ORTR"EE"Ugetgvct{"_D0"N J COUWTGP



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**Record of Conversation between Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal
and the PRC Ambassador to Mongolia, Zhang Canming,
24 September 1963**

*[Source: Mongol Ardyn Khuvsгалт Намын Архив, фонд 4,
dans 28, kh/n 182, kхuu. 70-80. Obtained and translated for
CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]*

received by Mao Zedong, who told Comrade Tsendenbal that "a country should be given aid until it becomes economically independent." At Mao Zedong's initiative, continued Zhou Enlai, we provided economic aid to the MPR, several treaties were signed (Tsevegmid said that at this time Zhou Enlai began to account in detail for the aid provided by China to Mongolia).

Then, Tsevegmid said, Zhou Enlai highlighted the question of the Chinese workers, stressing that various practical misunderstandings existed earlier, but the Chinese government did not pay attention to this because the ideological positions of both countries were generally the same. In recent times, continued Zhou Enlai, the question of the Chinese workers in the MPR became a sharp one, and this was explained by the ideological disagreements between the MPR and the PRC. We, Zhou Enlai said, strove not to transfer the inter-party disagreements in one spirit and you, in the MPR, in another spirit. Therefore when the Chinese workers met with the Mongolian workers, they had disagreements. This could take on an aggravated form, especially now, when the disagreements became open, because as a result of this the circle of people participating in the disagreements widened more and more. Already incidents had begun to occur (Zhou Enlai had in mind the murder of a Chinese worker at one of the construction sites in the MPR).

Under these circumstances, continued Zhou Enlai, the idea arose to return the Chinese workers to the motherland. We based ourselves on the fact that the departure of the Chinese workers would remove the ground on which our disagreements sprang up. If new Chinese workers were to be sent now and they were brought up in the spirit of our ideas, then this could lead to even greater disagreements than before, clashes may take place, [and] there might be even wider killings.

Your press was criticizing China, and what were the Chinese workers who do not agree with this criticism to do, especially since you already criticized the Chinese leaders[?] If herders were sent, this meant that the disagreements could spread even further, transfer to the countryside, and therefore the question about the sending of the Chinese workers should be temporarily postponed. Of course, said Zhou Enlai, this would to a certain extent harm the construction, but it would be necessary to do so.

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 abd to tongolian. tOne tmust twait tatinntsly656, one tmusttot tloe

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Tsevegmid also told me that the statement by Mao Zedong in the conversation with the Japanese socialists very much undermined the authority of the PRC and of Mao Zedong personally, that even the nationalists who did not agree on all the questions of the internal and external policies of the MPR leadership, [who] expressed doubts in the policy of the MPR leadership with regard to the Chinese leaders, now speak about the above-mentioned statement of Mao Zedong with indignation and resentment.

[...] Informing about all of the above, we would like to stress that the current Chinese approaches with regard to the MPR are part of an important, well thought-out new round of cunning, o qtg"tgŁpgf"vcevkecn"uvgru"cpf"cevkqpu"qh"vjg"Ejkgug"ngcftgship, directed towards widening the "swamp" in the socialist camp and in the communist movement, towards the separation of fraternal countries from the USSR (they insistently tried to create an impression among all the delegations from the socialist countries that they were the "sincere protectors" of the unity of the peoples of the socialist camp, many times and at all levels declaring that, allegedly, "disagreements are not the main thing, nobody dies from discussions, the main thing is unity," etc. [CCP CC Member] Peng Zhen had a conversation along these lines with a Polish delegation for over 4 hours qp"8"Qevdqg"í _"Vjg"Ejkgug"ctg"vt{kpi"ci ckp"vq"ktv"ykvj" the Germans, telling them that, allegedly, "you are the forward rqu"qh"vjg"uqekcnkv"ec o r"kp"vjg" Yguv."cpf" y g ô kp"vjg" Gcuu." therefore, we must be united." The top leadership of the PRC stubbornly worked with the Romanian delegation, though, as ambassador [Ambassador Dumitru] Georgiu told us, no joint documents were being planned.

Taking all of this into consideration, we would suppose it gzrgfkgp"vq." ykvj"cp" g{g"vq"vjg"pgzv" hgy" {gctu."urgekŁecn{ " look at the MPR question in terms of further securing its position as a loyal ally of the Soviet Union, of more effectively and systematically using it to frustrate plans of the Chinese leadership, especially of their play on racial and nationalist strings of so-called Afro-Asian unity. ([This should] include the question regarding measures for bringing closer to the CPSU, aside htq o" Vugfgpdcn." qvjgt." gurgekcn{" cwvjqtkvckxg." kpłwgpvcn" Oqpiqnkcp"ngcftg."uq"vjcv"vjg"Łt o pguu"qh"Uqxkgv/Oqpiqnkcp" relations depended to a lesser extent on one or two persons who are currently in power.)

Perhaps the time is ripe to look at the question of a visit of the leadership of the CPSU to the MPR, timing it to some big action with regard to the MPR which would strengthen and develop our alliance with it. At the same time, one must not fail to take into account the necessity of weakening a certain Mongolian fear in connection with the great power chauvinist pressure from the Chinese, which shows through in the conversations of the Mongolian comrades with us.

Vjg"co dcuucft"qh"vjg" ORT"Vugxgi okf."hqt"gzco rng."eqpŁ-

entially informed us that a partial mobilization is underway in the MPR (although for the Chinese and other foreigners they were inventing a version that under the pretext of mobilization into the army, countryside youths were being mobilized for industrial construction), that special posts had been installed on the Mongolian side to observe the actions of the Chinese on the border, etc. [...]

Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC
[Signature] S. Chervonenko

1. A Mongolian delegation headed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers S. Luvsan visited China in September-October 1964 to participate in the 15th anniversary celebrations of the PRC's founding.



Resolution of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee [MPRP CC] Politburo, 1 December 1965

[Source: *Mongol Ardyn Khuvsгалт Намын Архив, фонд 4, данс 28, kh/n 173b, khuu. 35-37. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko. The resolution was written in Mongolian and the addendum in Russian.*]

MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY
PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO
RESOLUTION

1 December Ulaanbaatar
1965 No.

QP"TGSGWUV"HQT"CkF"HTQO"VJG"UQXkGV"
WPKQP"VQ"UVTGP I V JGP"ORTøU"FGHG PUG"

MPRP Central Committee
Politburo RESOLVES:

Taking into consideration the deteriorating situation in the East, and the worsening international tensions, considers it appropriate to strengthen this country's defense. For this purpose, considers it appropriate to put a request to the Soviet Union's Communist Party Central Committee and the Soviet government to provide an appropriate unit from the Soviet Union armed forces to be stationed in this country and be maintained at their own expense.

MPRP Central Committee Politburo members, candidate members:

Ts. Dugersuren	D. Molomjamts
N. Jagvaral	J. Sambuu
S. Luvsan	Yu. Tsedenbal
D. Maidar	B. Lhamsuren
N. Luvsanravdan	

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USSR
Comrade KOSYGIN Alexei Nikolaevich
Fgct"Eqo tcf gu#"

Taking into consideration the deteriorating situation in the East, and the worsening international tensions, the MPRP CC and the MPR government are taking measures to strengthen the defence capabilities of the country. With generous help from the Soviet Union, we are equipping the Mongolian peo-

Vietnam War is a mystery within a riddle. Given the paucity of Vietnamese internal or archival sources, the use of substitute documentation, be it Chinese, Russian, or East European, is the only way to approach Vietnamese thinking. Moreover, the leadership of the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) not only was careful not to antagonize any of its many, mutually antagonistic allies, but also seemed to be skillful at disguising internal disagreements in its dealings with foreigners.

Khrushchev announced the meeting of the Editorial Board for 15 December.⁵ After Khrushchev's fall at the October Plenum, his successors Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin downgraded it to consultative status and rescheduled it for 1 March 1965. But for Mao, Khrushchev's call was the opening he had sought to gather like-minded parties in Beijing for the purposes of creating an anti-revisionist bloc against the Soviet Union [Document #3].

Realizing that a Sino-Soviet split might have detrimental

Chinese rejected all of them completely. As one Soviet participant later admitted, the proposals had come too quickly and did not take into account Chinese security needs.¹⁹ "J qy gxt." much of the Chinese argument was based on ideology, or was, as in the case of the Chinese claim that the Vietnamese did not agree with any of the proposals, an outright fabrication.

[Documents #6 and #10]

By late March of 1965, only a Sino-Soviet railroad transport agreement had been signed²⁰ while the US had been pouring weapons and troops into South Vietnam for months. Although "J cpqk" y cu" y knkpi" vq" eqpvkpwg" vjg" Li j v." vjg" ncem" qh" o knkvct{ " aid apparently caused problems **[Document #7]**. At the same time, the Chinese rejected a Soviet proposal of early April to carry out trilateral talks to solve the supply problems with the argument that the ideological differences between the CPSU and the CCP would not allow them to sit together with the Soviets at the same table **[Document # 9]**. Chinese obstructionism was clearly based on ideologically motivated reasons, which in turn frustrated the Vietnamese greatly **[Documents #8 and #10]**. After fruitless talks in Beijing in early April, a Vietnamese delegation headed by Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Thuy Thrinh left the Chinese capital for Moscow to ask for more aid **[Document #8]**. On their way back, the Chinese comrades accused them of cooperating with the Soviet revisionists **[Document #9]**.

"Vjg" eqpuvcpv" E jkpgug" r qng o keu ô uwe j" cu" vjg" enck o " vj cv" vjg" Uqxkgv" Wpkqp" y cu" tgp fgtkpi" kpuki plēcpv" ckf" **[Document #10]** ô eq o rgnngf" vjg" Uqxkgv" eq o tcfgu" vq" ugp f" c" ngvgt" **[Document #11]** to the fraternal parties to set the record straight on past and current aid to Vietnam. Together with the following document, it also alluded to Chinese obstructionism with regard to the use of Soviet military equipment once it had arrived in Vietnam. Vietnamese frustration about China's wpeq o rtq o kukpi" rqukvkqpu ô ðvjg" E jkpgug" ctg" tgc f{ " vq" Li j v" vq" the last Vietnamese but otherwise are content to be left alone by the Americans" **[Document #13]** ô jcu" dggp" eqttqdtcvgf" d{ " cp" kpvtgpcn" E jkpgug" uqwtg" y jkej" fg r nqtgu" vjg" Lemngpguu" of the Vietnamese comrades with regard to Soviet revisionism and to negotiations with the United States as well as expresses the need to lead them subtly back on the correct path.²¹

"C" ugtkgu" qh" xkukvu" d{ " Rjco" Xcp" Fqpi" cpf" Jq" Ejk" Okpj" to Beijing and Moscow in the fall of 1965 **[Documents #14 and #15]** "tgxgcn" vjg" kpetgcukpi" kp l w p e g" qh" vjg" cr r t q c e j k p i" Cultural Revolution on Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Jcxkpi" nghv" Dgklkpi" hqt" uqvwjgtp" E j k p c. " O c q" \ g f q p i" eqqmgf" up the fantasy of an all-out national liberation war against US imperialism throughout East Asia. Lacking any material basis vq" uwr r q t v" uwe j" c" o cuukxg" eqp l kev" geppq o kecm{ " qt" o knkvctkn{." vjg" E j k p g u g" n g c f g t" w u g f" d t c x c f q" v q" h w n l m" j k u" p g g f" q h" u v t g u u k p i" revolutionary cre11 Tfism 5re11 Tfism 5i4A0003s00470003s00470004A0003j04A0003at(toeFnrJ/C2_ation)-28(316 TD84.-7300(suppos)-4

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**Note on a Conversation by Tarka, Jurgas and Milc¹
at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, 10 September 1964
[Excerpts]**

*[Source: Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych
(Archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; AMSZ), Warsaw,
Poland, zespol 24/71, wiazka 2,teczka D. II Wietnam 2421,
2-4. Translated from Polish by Lorenz Lüthi.]*

[...]

The conversation took place in the embassy of the USSR on 2 September 1964 at the initiative of the Soviet comrades, especially of the military attaché, General Major Ivanov. Apart from him, the embassy counselor Soloviev was present, as well as the assistant attaché, a colonel of the air force.

[...]

We provided information to the Russians on the situation in the south after 5 August, according to the instructions of Comrade Ambassador. On the request by our interlocutors we added information we possessed on the basis of our knowledge of the topic of economic, political, religious, individual, and social relations with the South. The [Soviet] comrades were interested in, as deep and comprehensive as possible, an understanding of the problems. We feel that the comprehensive information was even more necessary for the development of each other's opinion on the perspectives of the evolving situation in Vietnam, and on the fundamental prospects of the warring parties. They themselves provided us with the following opinions:

1. Friendly relations between the DRV and China are currently almost absolute, mainly as a result of pressure from China. At present, they² are conducting an internal party campaign accusing the Soviet Union of insincere relations to Vietnam. They propagate the thesis that just at the present, when the DRV and the NLF are a few steps from victory, the

Remarks by the GDR Embassy in Hanoi on the Article in Hoc Tap No. 11/1964, 12 November 1964 [Excerpts]

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the Federal Archives (Foundation); SAPMO-BArch), Berlin, Germany, DY 30/IV A 2/20/442, 57-58. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

We have already informed you in a telegram about the publication of the article "Long Live the October Revolution in Tvuukcö"d{" J qpi "Ejwqpi."v jg"ykvj ftcycn"qh"vjcv"rkgeg"cu"ygm" as its basic contents. Now we send you a partial translation *uq o g"rtc i tcr ju"y kvjqw"uk i pkŁecpeg"ctg" o kuukpi +0¹

In this context we would like to summarize once more, how the withdrawal of the article occurred. Shortly after the publication of the piece, the Soviet ambassador [Ilya] Shcherbakov o cf g" c" xkukv"q"Rtk o g" Okpkuvgt"Rjc o "Xcp" Fqpi 0" J g"cumgf" y jcv" Cde. Pham Van Dong thought about this article. Cde. Pham Van Dong evaded a clear reply. In the following days, representatives of the editorial board of *Hoc Tap* visited diplomatic missions, removed the copies already delivered, and replaced them with new ones, from which the article had been cut out. When Cde. Shcherbakov shortly thereafter made a visit to v jg" Łtuv" EE" ugetgvct {" qh" v jg" XYR" Efg 0" Ng" Fwcp." v jg" ncwgt" remarked in the course of the conversation that the article had dggp" c" o kuvcmg." cpf" crqnq i k| g f" hqt" kv 0" J g" c f fg f" v jcv" v jgtg" ctg" people in the party, who have no understanding of the situation and thus make mistakes and shoot beyond the target.

...

Qp"36" Pq xg o dgt" v jg" r tguu" cvwce j 2" qh" v jg" J wpi ctkcp" g o dcu- sy, Cde. Benyei, told me that he knew from Cde. Fourniau,² a correspondent of *L'Humanité*, who the author of the article ycu 0" Efg 0" J qpi "Ejwqpi" ku" xkeg" fktgevt" qh" v jg" rgfc i qi kecn" wpxgtukv {" kp" J cpqk- j g" cr rctgpvn {" nkxgf" hqt" o qtg" v jcp" 32" { gctv" kp" Htcpeg" cpf" xkukvgf" c" Htgpej" uejqqn" v jgtg 0" J g" ku" uwr rqugf" to be very intelligent and knows the European situation well. J ku" ctv kengu." kp" Efg 0" Hqwtpkcw 0u" xky." ctg" cny c {" u" xgt {" kp vgt guv- ing, since he usually represents the line of the VWP leadership, dwv" uq o gv k o gu" tgxgcnu" fgvcknu" v jcv" r tqxkf g" pwcpegu" kp" qh Łekcn" policy.

Estimate by the Soviet embassy

The article was an open attack on the policy of the Soviet Union and, especially, the 20th and 22nd Party Congress.³ In China it is impossible to admit such mistakes or apologize for them. We agree with this opinion. We still have to wait [to see] how things develop. Yet, it is already clear, that at least on the surface a change in the attitude towards the USSR has occurred. Signs for this were, among others, that Cde. Le Duan stayed for a long time at the Soviet reception for the anniversary of the

November [October] Revolution and, while there, embraced a Soviet artist after she had sung a song in Vietnamese, and that, after a long time, speeches by Soviet comrades were published in the media (it relates to the speeches by comrades [CPSU Secretary General Leonid] Brezhnev and [Soviet Minister Council Chairman Alexei] Kosygin at the reception of the cosmonauts and the speeches by Cde. Brezhnev and [Soviet fghgpug" o kpkuvgt" Tqfkqp_ " Ocnkpxum {" qp" 9" Pq xg o dgt ô dqv j" verbatim).

1. The partial translation of the *Hoc Tap* article (not included here) is attached as an addendum to the original document.
2. Charles Fourniau was a journalist permanently accredited to the DRV from 1963 to 1965. Due to the political closeness of *L'Humanité* (the daily of the French Communist Party), he had some privileged access to information in Hanoi.
3. The 20th party congress took place in February 1956, the 22nd in October 1961. At both, Khrushchev denounced Stalin.

any concrete comment. Even at the dinner, to which he had been invited by the Soviet ambassador, the counselor Privalov, and their wives, it was impossible to direct the conversation towards concrete questions. The conversation remained within the framework of general, protocollary politeness. An invitation, which the Soviet ambassador made for the whole delegation, was accepted by Pham Van Dong only with hesitation, since he apparently wants to avoid any conversation on the subject of the DRV's foreign policy. It is also possible and probable that the DRV might return to the Chinese line. Comrade Privalov does not exclude the possibility that the withdrawn *Hoc Tap* article will be republished (maybe in reworked form). A short version has been published in the Chinese newspaper published here. It thus is necessary to follow the Vietnamese press attentively in this respect.

[...]

Comrade Privalov then asked if we knew about the meeting in Beijing in the context of the 15th anniversary of the PR China. When Comrade Bibow negated the question, Comrade Privalov explained: After 1 October a meeting of representatives of approximately ten countries (China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Korea, and others) occurred, on which the attitude of the communist parties of these countries were discussed in view of the meeting of the editorial board on 15 December. It exists with regard to [the creation of] this anti-imperialist bloc. A short while ago, the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of the DRV held a meeting on the implementation of the foreign policy. The meeting was chaired by [DRV Foreign Minister] Xuan Thuy. He claimed that the main task of foreign policy in the current situation was the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism, and formulated the aim to contribute to the creation of an anti-imperialist bloc, which was also directed against modern revisionism. Xuan Thuy's statements in that regard have been made accessible to the Soviet embassy. If they were still in the embassy, he was willing to make them available to

they are ready to support the DRV ("Four Chinese can stand on each square meter of the DRV"), they demand from the Vietnamese to focus on the South. Such comments have caused some Vietnamese to ponder [about the situation], and especially the South is disappointed, so that the NLF is again returning to carrying out individual actions, since it is not in a position to view the [Vietnamese] readiness to negotiations with the US in that context. They are even ready to talk about the neutralization of the South. In that respect, they think about a transitional solution in the form of a coalition government. In that respect, they mentioned two steps: 1. withdrawal of US troops from the country on the basis of the Geneva agreements. That means, they move away from the adventurist plans of the Chinese leaders. On the other hand, they carry out trilateral talks with military delegations from China and the DPRK. These talks probably had been prepared during the visit of [Korean Workers' Party General Secretary] Kim Il Sung a few weeks ago and now are carried out by the Korean defense minister. They assume that, in case of an aggression by the US, joint actions will be implemented, and that those will be coordinated, so that in this given case the Koreans start actions in the south of their country. Furthermore they believe that the Koreans can gather experience here [in Vietnam] for the implementation of a guerrilla war.

The Chinese try hard to build up a similar front, consisting of the countries of North Korea, China, the DRV and including Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia, opposite to the front of the US in East Asia, which stretches from South Korea to Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia. In this context, it is interesting to observe the attempts by the US vis-à-vis Great Britain to get pledges from the English imperialists to participate in the struggle in South Vietnam.

whole, they had nothing against the meeting on 1 March, but for understandable reasons could not participate.

The talks with the Vietnamese leaders have shown that certain ideological differences in opinion with the leadership of the DRV still continue to exist, and that, obviously, time is required for their resolution. This is also the opinion of the Vietnamese comrades themselves. At the same time they stressed that, following the decision of the October Plenum, they see real avenues for the solution of these differences in opinion.

According to the instructions of the CPSU CC, the instr Sovmes-1.266 -1.316 Td[(certadelega)-103(of82)-116 f18 so co8 h18 f18 so8 of

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**Oral Statement of the PRC Government, Transmitted
by PRC Vice Foreign Minister Liu Xiao to the**

its own troops in battle action. One can say that the US participates in equal parts in the operations of the South Vietnamese government troops. New is also the statement of the NLF and its right to accept aid from all sides. At the moment, the Vietnamese comrades state that it is not yet necessary, for example, for volunteers from other countries to join in. But it is necessary that the struggle is coordinated. Vietnam is a homogenous country and the Vietnamese nation is a homogenous nation, that's why the Vietnamese have the right to carry out this war jointly and to help each other. This attitude has not been that openly stressed by the Vietnamese in the past. Cde. Shcherbakov remarked that Cde. Giap has explained in a talk that "now the raids in the South have to be increased, regardless if the US is going to increase its attacks on the DRV." Since neither the NLF nor the DRV at the moment is ready [to carry out] major actions, [because], for example, the deliveries from the Soviet Union have not yet arrived, all measures now must be decided here. The enlarged Politburo meeting, which will deal with the new situation and the tasks for the party that will derive [from it], serves this purpose. The mobilization of youth and the declaration of a state of war will be debated. The national assembly will also take the necessary decisions. The 2nd Five-Year Plan will be discussed in this context as well. Qp"vjg"uwthceg."kv"ku"uwr rqugf"vq"dg"mgrv"cu"kv"ku."dvw"hqt"vjg"Łtuv" three years it will be altered into a Three-Year Plan for defense. All means, which have been set aside for the Five-Year Plan, will be subordinated to the interests of defense. Defense is now Łtuv" rtkqtkv{" Efg" Ujejgtdcmqx" cffgf" vjc" vjg" Xkgvpc o gug" comrades will probably approach the fraternal parties in the near future with a request for material aid. Furthermore a decision is being prepared [requiring] all South Vietnamese living in the DRV to go to the South.

The question of negotiations was estimated in the talks as follows: There are signs in the US that they attempt to establish contacts for future negotiations. Such tendencies could be seen in the speeches of [US President Lyndon] Johnson, [US Defense Secretary Robert] McNamara, and [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk. If the Vietnamese reject contacts, one has to reckon with a broader bombing of the DRV. With each day, one ecp"gzrgev"vjg"dq o dkp i"qh" Jcpqk"kp"vjcv"tgurvev."vjg"dq o dkp i"

of military targets and transportation routes will stand in the foreground, but next industrial centers in the North could be attacked as well. The near future will determine if it is possible to establish contacts.

Thus the following situation is unfolding:

The DRV has the right to defend its motherland. The Americans see that the DRV has not yet received aid. The attacks thus unfold without impunity. The situation is growing more and more complex, and if the Vietnamese lose their head, cu" Eq o tcfg" Ujejgtdcmqx" uckf." ökv" yknn" dg" fkhŁewnv" hqt" wu" vq" help." If the Vietnamese make decisions, they should inform the Soviet comrades and they should consult with them more often, so that we all know what we should do. One should expect that they speak openly, and that they don't hide their positions. Even Pham Van Dong has said only general things on the CC session cpf" r tqxkfgu"pq"eqpetvg"kpqto cvkqp" Jg"vqnf"Rjc o"Xcp" Fqpi" that the Vietnamese comrades should inform us regularly and

from Vietnam. Since this is not possible, one cannot reckon with peace in the current moment. The situation of the US

their aid. They promise, among other things, food, consumer goods, chemical fertilizer, and electrical appliances.

In further talks it was determined that there are different reasons for our disagreements with the Chinese and with the Vietnamese. Now it is relevant to analyze these reasons. Le Duan told Comrade Kosygin that the Vietnamese comrades have waited for a long time for a high-ranking Soviet delegation. On my remark that [Soviet Presidium Chairman] Comrade Mikoyan had visited the DRV, Comrade Shcherbakov replied that at that time Mikoyan had not yet as high a function as he [Le Duan] had. Comrade Shcherbakov said that he had given the necessary attention to developments in Vietnam. Comrade Le Duan did not hide his dissatisfaction with the Chinese leaders in the talks. There are three questions, where he does not understand the position of the Chinese.

1st, why they estimate the role of the national liberation movement higher than the role of the socialist camp.

2nd, why they estimate the role of the national liberation movement higher than the role of the socialist camp.

3rd, why the comrades in Beijing and Tirana believe they are the only true Marxists.

In the further discussion we talked about the existing differences between the Chinese and Vietnamese opinions which should be examined even further. The following differences in opinion were determined:

The Vietnamese are against a continuation of polemics [against the Soviet Union],

they are for a joint declaration,

they are for meetings on the highest level,

" [Le Duan] is not against contacts between the USSR and the US on a governmental level, but [insist that] one has to be careful,

they are not against contacts between the SU and the USSR, but what concerns relations between the communist parties and the LCY [League of Yugoslav Communists], a conference like in 1957/1960 must decide [this question].

Comrade Shcherbakov remarked that Comrade Pham Van Dong mentioned that the communists, in the interest of the unity of the communist world movement, must struggle bravely and decisively for the decisions of the two conferences in 1957 and 1960. One could acknowledge that the Vietnamese comrades on the basis of their complicated situation and in connection with the talks with representatives of the fraternal parties start to rethink

expand and strengthen its relations to a socialist country.

2. During the same talks, Le Duan proposed to coordinate aid supplies from the USSR and the PRC in trilateral negotiations. Such negotiations could lead to the joint coordination among all socialist countries. The Chinese side rejected the

in opinion with the CPSU are so big that it is not possible to sit at the [same] table.
to convene trilateral talks between the DRV, the USSR, and the PRC on the coordination of aid measures once more. For had talked with Liu Shaoqi and other old revolutionaries with whom he had personal relations.² Even these talks did not lead to an agreement on the coordination of aid measures.

4. The PRC apparently increased its aid offers to the DRV offered to the DRV:

- bigger aid supplies in the sphere of transport, i.e. railroad tracks, sleepers, track workers, repair corps, etc.

- bigger supplies of food, etc.

5. At the moment, the railroad from the Chinese border to that in the future it will have three rails, that means, it will be useable for Chinese-gauge as well as for Vietnamese-gauge railroad cars.³

Cai and Lang Son are supposed to be renewed and widened.

6. 100 to 130 Korean specialists, who wear the uniform of the DRV air force, allegedly have been living in the hotel for assumed that they are ground personnel and technicians.

1. This refers to the so-called 2nd United Front of 1937 between the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China and the Chinese communists in the anti-Japanese War.

2. Ho Chi Minh was in Beijing on 16 and 17 May 1965. For excerpts of these conversations, see Westad, et al., eds., "77 Conversations," p. 86-87.

3. China uses the a rail gauge of 1435 millimeters, while Vietnam uses a 1000 millimeter standard.



. 10

Oral Statement by the Head of the Department for the USSR and for the Countries of Eastern Europe of MFA PRC, Yu Zhan, Transmitted to the Embassy on 8 June 1965

[Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 58, delo 1, papka 516, 3-8. Translated from Russian by Lorenz Lüthi.]

On 12 May, the head of the Far Eastern Department of the Soviet MFA Sudarikov made to the PRC ambassador in the USSR Pan Zili a statement with regard to the talks, which had occurred from 13-21 April between the leaders of China and the former Soviet ambassador in the PRC.¹ This statement contains slanders against the CCP CC, the PRC government, and the leaders of China. We categorically reject this statement and give the following reply:

1. We always stood and [still] stand for the united struggle of the PRC, the Soviet Union, and the countries of the socialist

apparent request from the side of Vietnam, you requested from
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1 Tf0-24.61401.316 TDd[0053004F004400500 4800560013>370049005200

its readiness to postpone the deadlines for repayment of the DRV's main debt on Soviet loans.

Vjg"UqXkgv"Wpkqp"jcu"cnuq"uwr rnkgt"ukipkŁecpv"ckf"vq"vjg" DRV to strengthen its defense readiness. From 1953 to 1964, weapons and military equipment worth 200 million rubles were delivered at no cost. Aircraft, helicopters, small arms, cpvk/cktetchv"i wpu."Łgnf"ygerqpu."c o o wpkvkqp."vcpmu."ct o qtgf" personnel carriers, small anti-submarine vessels, torpedo boats, communication equipment, engineering and other military equipment has been delivered. The USSR provides aid at no cost for the construction of many military schools in the FTX"cpf"htq"vjg"vtckpki"qh"qhŁegtu"cu"y gnm"cu"qh" o ckpvGPCpeg" personnel for the equipment delivered.

In the face of the increasing US aggression against the DRV, the CPSU CC and the Soviet government have undertaken measures to enlarge the overall aid, especially the military aid to the DRV to strengthen its defense readiness.

Following the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin (August 1964), the government of the DRV has turned to the Soviet Union with the request to supply additional military aid for the strengthening of the battle equipment of the Vietnamese People's Army. The Soviet Union has discussed these requests and supplied the DRV with military aid worth 32 million rubles (artillery and small weapons) in October 1964.

In December 1964, the decision was taken to supply the DRV with additional aid at no cost in the form of SA-75 anti-aircraft missiles. Soviet military specialists were sent to the DRV to assemble these weapons and to train the Vietnamese personnel.

With the aim of aiding the government of the DRV in the defense against American aerial strikes, the CPSU CC has undertaken a series of measures. Following a request of the Vietnamese comrades, the proposal was put forward to them vq"eqxgt"vjg"tg ikqp"qh" J cpqk"cpf" J ckr j qpi" ykvj"UqXkgv"vtqqr" against aerial attacks. For that reason the Soviet government intended to send an anti-aircraft brigade and a squadron of interceptors of the type MiG-21. Around four thousand men of the Soviet armed forces were scheduled to come to the DRV for the handling of these modern aerial defense systems.

In the context of this aid to the DRV, the Soviet government turned to the government of the PRC on 25 February 1965, with the request to permit transports of goods and personnel through the territory of the PRC as well as to organize a speedy transit to the Vietnamese border.

Also, the request was made to provide an aerial corridor for the transport by airplane of the MiG-21 PF interceptor and other weapons, as well as [to provide] one or two airports near the Sino-Vietnamese border, in order to assemble the MiG-21 RH" vjgtg" cpf" rquukdn{" vq" uvcvkqp" UqXkgv" Łi j vgt" ckrncpqu" Moreover the request was made to take up measures to keep strict secrecy, so that these deliveries would not be discovered by the Americans.

Replying to the request of Comrade Pham Van Dong to supply urgently anti-aircraft guns by air, the Soviet government asked the PRC government on 27 February to allow the over-

Łki j v" cetquu"vjg"vgttkvqt{"qh"vjg"RTE"qh"67"JCpvqpqx_"CP/34" aircraft in order to transport the cargo.

The Chinese side has refused to implement these measures, which have been undertaken by the Soviet Union with the aim of [rendering] speedy and effective aid to the DRV for the struggle against aggression. We received a reply note from the PRC MFA, which consisted of a brusque refusal of the Soviet proposal. In order to justify somehow their position, the Chinese comrade claimed that the Soviet Union, through their aid deliveries to the DRV and the proposal to transport some of the equipment by air across China, tried to establish "Soviet control over the territory of China and Vietnam." Since the Chinese authorities have refused to agree to the transport of weapons via air, the military goods destined for the DRV had to be transported by rail, which, given the distance between the USSR and Vietnam, took a lot of time. The Vietnamese rgqrng"eqwnf"jcxg"egtvckpn{"dggp"urctgf"uwr gt Ł wqwu"ucetkŁegu." if the Soviet military equipment had arrived more quickly in the DRV.

The Politburo of the VWP CC and the DRV government welcomed the decision of the CPSU CC and the Soviet government to deliver additional air planes, tanks, anti-aircraft guns cpf" o cejkpg" i wpu."Łgnf" i wpu."pcxcu" xguugnu." tcfkq" vtcpu o kv- ters, tractors and other military equipment. At the same time, the Vietnamese leadership requested that [we] should send a small number of instructors, who could teach the use of Soviet military equipment to Vietnamese personnel on the spot within a certain time period (3 to 6 months), as well as quantitatively small crews instead of complete Soviet crews for the handling of anti-aircraft missiles.

With regard to the dispatch of a squadron of MiG-21 PF to the DRV, the Vietnamese comrades expressed that it would be better if these air planes would be handed over to the Vietnamese side. The DRV sesm, m, have lsm, of the
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and [Alexei N.] Kosygin.⁴ Their letter included general statements of proletarian internationalism under all circumstances, without any wavering from its duty," it was ready "to render military, economic, and political aid, according to the events, needs, and requests of the Vietnamese comrades."

The letter also said that the PRC and the DRV had already negotiated on "how universal aid and support must be granted to the Vietnamese people," and thus "there is no need to negotiate again." On the aid of the Soviet Union to Vietnam, the letter said also that "the aid rendered by the Soviet Union Soviet Union should help Vietnam, had to be decided by both sides, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, it had to be discussed by the Soviet Union and Vietnam in a bilateral meetings, and we have no reason to participate."

While the Chinese leaders refused to participate in a joint meeting, the VWP CC and the government of the DRV sent a delegation headed by Cde. Le Duan to Moscow. The CPSU considers the Soviet-Vietnamese negotiations, which happened on 11-17 April of this year, to be an important step on the path of a further coordination of the positions of the USSR and the DRV in the struggle against American imperialism, as a new, real contribution to the strengthening of the defense readiness of socialist Vietnam, [and] as aid for the people of South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese comrades asked for an increase of Soviet military aid during the negotiations in Moscow. Taking into account this request, the CPSU CC and the Soviet government decided to render new military aid to the DRV worth 145 [million] rubles at no cost. Various equipment of modern military technology has been assigned to the DRV, including engineering equipment for the construction of airports.

All in all the military aid of the Soviet Union for the DRV has reached at the current moment 486.5 mill. rubles, of which 300 mill. rubles have been provided in the last 3 to 4 months.

During the negotiations of the delegations of the CPSU CC and the VWP CC in April of this year in Moscow, the Vietnamese comrades were told that the Soviet Union will provide the DRV with larger quantities of materials and railroad technology, including 120 km of tracks, special scaffolds for the repair of bridges, necessary equipment for the repair of automated and semi-automated railroad equipment, track-laying machines, lifts, 300 cars, 40 movable power plants, etc., in case of the destruction of railroads. The value of this equipment is not included in the amounts mentioned in the negotiations in April this year.

At the moment, deliveries of Soviet military technology, equipment, and engineering goods to the DRV are made according to the agreements with the Chinese side in accordance with the agreements signed by the USSR and the DRV.

Apart from the aid supplies to the DRV, the Soviet Union also provides military aid to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Following a decision by the Soviet government, weapons worth 2.5 million rubles have been handed

over to the South Vietnamese patriots.

Last fall, the DRV received aid at no cost in the form of special technologies destined for the Vietnamese People's Army available as a result of the modernization [Umrüstung] [of the Vietnamese People's Army] should be handed over to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

It is well-known that the Soviet Union has expressed readiness to send Soviet volunteers to Vietnam.

The question of dispatching Soviet volunteers to Vietnam was discussed with the delegation of the DRV during the negotiations in Moscow. The Vietnamese comrades thanked the CPSU CC for the readiness to send Soviet people to the joint struggle of the Vietnamese against the American aggressors, but explained that at the moment there is no necessity to send volunteers to Vietnam.

The equipment for anti-aircraft defense and other weapons and military equipment, which the Soviet Union has provided to the DRV for the strengthening of its defense readiness and for the strengthening of the armed forces of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, have partially arrived in Vietnam. They have not yet entered action in full, because it will take some time until the Vietnamese troops have acquainted themselves with the special military equipment delivered and until they can use them successfully for the defense

ulation. See: T.G. Zazerskaia. *Soviet Specialists and the Formation of the Military-Industrial Complex of China (1949-1960)* [*Sovetskie spetsialisty i formirovanie voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa Kitaiia (1949-1960 goda)*] (St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University, 2000), 60, 67. From 1949-1959, China sent 11,000 students to the Soviet Union, see: Dmitrii Shepilov, *Not Having Sided* [*Nepriknuzhii*] (Moscow: Vagryus, 2001), 378. Afterwards, due to the ideological differences, the number of students sent to the Soviet Union dropped off dramatically.

3. "To the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Comrade Mao Zedong, to the Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Zhou Enlai," 3 April 1965, *AVP RF*, fond 100, opis 52, delo 13, papka 220, 18-19.

4. "Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and State Council of the People's Republic of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers," 11 April 1965, *SAPMO-BArch*, DY 30/3610, 5-8.



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**Note on a Conversation with an Unnamed
Representative of the International Department of the**



November 1965, *Current Background* 776, 1-17.

3. The 23rd CPSU Congress took place from 29 March to 8 April 1966.



. 15

Report by the Adviser to the Bulgarian Embassy in Beijing, Ivan Dimitrov, to the Bulgarian Ambassador, Khr. Stoichev, 14 December 1965

[Source: Arkhiv na Ministerstvoto na Vnishite Raboti (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Relations; AMVnR), Bulgaria,

Lorenz Lüthi.]

In recent times there has been much talk among the specialists of the socialist countries on the meeting between Mao Zedong and the Chinese leaders following:

It is said that at the beginning of the month of November the chairman of the minister council of the DRV, comrade, Rjco "Xcp" Fqpi. "ycu" qp" cp" wphEken" xkukv" vq" Ejkpc⁰¹ The conversation did not lead to any result whatsoever, considering that after his visit to Moscow,² he posed some questions which the Chinese leaders did not like, and, for that reason, he

Vqyctf" okf/Pqxgodgt" Jq" Ejk" Okpj" ygpv" ugetgm{" vq" China.³ The meeting with Mao Zedong took place in the city of Wuhan, where he [Mao] has resided repeatedly [in the past]. It

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Reception by Soviet Vice Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov for the General Director of the PRP FMA, Cde. Jerzy Michalowski, 24 January 1966

[Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 59, delo 5, papka 525, 1-6. Translated from Russian by Lorenz Lüthi.]

I received Comrade Michalowski [on 15 January 1966] at his request.

Michalowski said that in addition to the information on jku"vcnmu"kp"Dgklkpi"cpf"Jcpqk.¹ which he has already sent to Moscow, he would like to give his impression on the course of the talks on the whole. In his opinion, regardless of the lack of concrete results, the trip was useful. The Vietnamese comrades did not conceal their astonishment about the candid expositions of views, which were characteristic for the talks by Comrade Oke jcnqyumk"kp"Jcpqk"Vjg{"eqpuvcvvn{"uvtguugf"vjcv"vjg{"vtwuv" the Polish side and highly value its help and attention.

In the words of Comrade Michalowski, the character of the meetings and talks with the leaders of the DRV sharply contrasted with the reception that had been given in Beijing, when he conferred with the vice minister for foreign affairs of the PRC, Wang Bingnan, and the head of the PRC FMA department gpv." [w" \ jcp" Oke jcnqyumk"tg o ctmgf"vjcv"jg"dtkg {"nckf"qww" to them the contents of the talks with [US Ambassador-at-Nctig"Cxgtgm" Jcttko cp"kp"Yctucy."dww" fkf"pqv"uc{"cp{vjkip" about the Polish point of view. The Chinese sharply criticized the American 14 Points aimed at solving the Vietnamese problems, which they characterized as yet another trick, aimed at the masking of their preparations

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the Amwar]T40(Ami)1391(fa60(ietnames)T40(5mi)eteao)-840(5md)-940(Amat)-190(5me)-140(fa60(ietnamese)-350(5mcs).]TJT[(the ad

Comrade Shcherbakov explained, among others, the following:

Some questions related to the rise of aggression were planned to be discussed, questions with regard to negotiations and questions with regard to aid, which had remained open after [the visit of] the Le Thanh Nghi delegation.¹ Another task was to clarify the attitude of the Chinese, especially in relation to the publication of the article of 11 November 1965. Even the Vietnamese maintain that the moment has come to demonstrate close bonds to the Soviet comrades, and this especially with regard to the US 14 Points.²

Yet the [Vietnamese] views on the delegation were not uniform. Individual Vietnamese comrades, who stand for close bonds to China, had raised concerns about the visit. They gave reasons to ponder that the Soviet Union exerts some pressure on the DRV to force it to capitulate to the US imperialists. The forces, which were against the visit, spread the rumor that the SU wants to detach the DRV from the PR China [and that the SU wants] to receive the support of the DRV for the 23rd party congress. The proponents of the invitation eventually carried the day on the basis of the situation mentioned. The opponents to the visit of the delegation had to realize that their concerns ygtg" wplwuvkŁg f0" Cr rctgpwn { "Eq o tcf g" Vtwqpi "E jkpj" ycu" vjg" one who the most stubbornly raised ruckus against the delega- vkqp0" Dwv" jg" jcf" pq" kp ĩ wgepg" qp" vjg" cwkvwfg" qh" vjg" Rqnkvdtq." as all of the discussions were conducted in an extraordinary warmhearted and considerate way. Comrade Truong Chinh, as a delegation member, took part in the welcome of the [Soviet] delegation, but did not attend the discussions due to "health reasons," and did not receive, in his function as president of the national assembly, the delegation of deputies of the Supreme Soviet, which accompanied the Soviet delegation, but was replaced for the said reasons. In the same way, [National Assembly Standing Committee Vice-Chairman] Eq o tcf g" J qcp i "Xcp" J qcp." y j q" ku" qp" o g fkeca" vtgc v o gpv"] Kur] in China, was missing.

Hqwt"qt"Łxg" gpeqwpvgtu" jcf" dgpp" rncppgf0

While Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap reported on the military events in 1965, Comrade Pham Van Dong gave the general political report on the overall development and on the conclusions, which had been drawn during the December plenum.

[...]

On individual questions:

They [the Vietnamese] repeated that with their activities in the south they had wrecked an American attack. The NLF prevented the unfolding of actions by US units. The Soviet comrades replied that they believe that the Americans have not yet launched a major attack, but that only skirmishes [*Vorgefecht*] had occurred that had gone awry for the Americans. The Americans simply are not yet ready with their preparations for a major attack. It has also been revealed that their 11 bases have not yet been completely established. And they have rec- q i pk | g f" eqttgewn { " v jcv" v jgkt" hqtegu" ctg" pqv" { gv" uwhŁekgpv." cp f" v jcv" v jgtg" ctg" fkhŁewmvku" kp" Uqvwj" Xkgvpc o" ykvj" v jg" wug" qh"

modern technology, whose employment in South Vietnamese conditions is complicated. The Vietnamese comrades do not estimate the situation correctly. The American troops still need vj tgg" vq" Łxg" o qp v j u" qh" g z rgtk gpeg0

The Vietnamese comrades explained that they checked the weak and strong sides of the adversary, and that they know them now. The breakdown of the Saigon army and regime ecp" dg" pqvkegf=" v jcv" ku" y j { " v jg" C o g tkecpu" jcxg" u j qwnfgtgf" v jg" o quv" fkhŁewmv" dcwvng" vcumu0" V jg" o clqtkv { " qh" v jg" rgqrng" ctg" against the Americans. The moral strength is to be found with v jg" PNH." y j kng" v jg" Ł i j v k p i " o q t c n g" q h" v j g" C o g t k e c p u " c u " y g m " c u " of the Saigon troops is low. That's why they concluded that the American units can be beaten and defeated. Now, individual strikes are executed in order to break their measures step by step and to attack their bases. But since the US potential is big [and] that of the Vietnamese small, one cannot bring about a Dien Bien Phu.

The initiative is and remains in the hands of the NLF, even the diplomatic initiative. (The Soviet comrades expressed the view that this opinion is not correct and that they [the Vietnamese] overestimate their own strength, while they underestimate [the strength] of the Americans.) From that one has to conclude, the Vietnamese comrades said that the war will carry on and that it might come to a broadening of the war. They deduced that the bombing of the DRV in the past year had brought no victory for the US, while the defensive forces of the DRV on the basis of aid by the SU and the other socialist countries have increased multifold. The losses of and damage to the DRV are relatively small. The population has put up with the bombing, so that even here the losses are irrelevant. (According to the opinion of the Soviet comrades this does not conform to facts.)

The Vietnamese are not interested in broadening the war but want to limit it to South Vietnam. But the US wants to dnqemc f g" v j g" F T X" c p f" U q v w j" X k g v p c o " h t q o " v j g" u g c = " c p f" g x g p " blockade China as well as the roads to Laos. Furthermore, the J q] E j k " O k p j _ " V t c k n " k u " u w r r q u g f " v q ' d g " u o c u j g f 0

Further, it is planned to intervene in south and central Laos, whereas Thailand serves as jumping board, and the blockade of Cambodia supposedly has been tightened. That is why it is necessary to turn to the socialist countries for aid also in 1966. For 1966, the Vietnamese plan a series of raids in the south in order to convince the Americans that there is no question about their victory and that the solution of the Vietnam problem is only possible on the basis of the Vietnamese program. Following the [December] plenum, they are convinced of the correctness of their position. That's also what they wanted to

awaited. They think a lot, Pham Van Dong explained, about how a peaceful solution, a political solution could be brought about, and [how to determine] when the opportune moment has come. (In that regard, Comrade Shcherbakov remarked that it is new that they consider these questions, which had not been the case some months ago.) They are not against the [Soviet] and Polish comrades, but [actually] value them. In this respect, they also are different from the Chinese, Comrade Shcherbakov added, because they acknowledge the necessity of creating a diplomatic and political front against the Americans. They consider the 14 Points proposal as a step, one which does not bring anything new, but is only a bluff, because the Americans are in a complicated position. The Soviet comrades replied that one has to see it as a measure to escape the affair, because [the Americans] realize that there is nothing for them to win, and that maybe now the moment has come [for the Vietnamese] to take them by the word and to unmask [them]. This is not a capitulation, but a struggle with [the Americans]. Comrades explained, they themselves are not completely clear about, and they have made no decision yet. Thus they want to counsel with the Soviet and Chinese comrades, what [moment] should be judged as the right moment. Tentatively, they will keep up the contacts, but [they will] not rush. "We will always think about it."

UW6FTX" Tgnvcvkqpu

[...]

In general, the talks with the Vietnamese comrades were heartfelt and sincere, and there were many consenting declarations on basic questions. For example they said that they completely agree with the Soviet policy towards America and with the efforts of the Soviet comrades to maintain peace. The Soviet comrades estimate that [their] relations [with the Vietnamese] have improved through these bilateral talks and [the Vietnamese] among the Vietnamese comrades who did not say openly their opinion. They desired that we support the Vietnamese policy completely in the communique. They also wanted us to appreciate [würdigen] Chinese aid. The Soviet comrades pointed out that negotiations are taking place between the CPSU and the VWP, and thus a reference to Chinese aid is inappropriate. Furthermore they conveyed [the opinion] that the Vietnamese comrades should not underestimate the US with regard to its military strength. They [the Americans] are in a position to destroy Vietnam completely. It is in the interest of the socialist camp and of the struggle for peace that the war stays limited to South Vietnam, and the Soviet comrades believe that the Vietnamese comrades do not want to give the Americans the opportunity to broaden the war. In this respect the Soviet comrades proposed to increase the number of specialists who [could] strengthen and re-organize anti-aircraft defense. Moreover, they desire that the Soviet specialists have the opportunity to gather experience

the Chinese spread slander with regard to the policy of the SU. That's why they have sent to the NLF [their own] representatives, who were supposed to render pressure so that the NLF

y qwñf"pqv"ñkuvgp"vq" J cpqk."dgecwug"kv"ku" y cxgtp i 0

vkqp"vqygtu."cpf"rqy gthwn" fqqfki jvu" y jkej" dgc o gf" hct" kpvq"
the Chinese territory.

The only positive opportunity he sees rests in the increased support of all socialist countries for Vietnam. In the course of this joint support of all socialist countries for Vietnam and [in view of] the expected victory of Vietnam, relations could be relaxed and mutual trust slowly restored.

[...]

;0" Jg" fggou" cmm" cwg o rvu" d{ " egtvckp" rctvkgu" vq" o gfkcvg"
between the Soviet Union and the CCP, [or] between other rctvkgu."rtqdig o cvkef"Vjg"gzrgtkgpegu"qh" c"vkr"qh" c" Jwp ictkcp"
party delegation to the DPRK and, among others, its stay in China had proven that such attempts have more negative than positive results.

] I FT" c o dcuuc fqt" vq" vjg" FRTM" Jqtuv_ " Dtkg

1. Letter was sent on 28 December 1965, announcing the arrival of a special envoy, Jerzy Michalowski, to Beijing and Hanoi with the purpose of starting international peace talks. Letter is in AAN, KC PZPR, XI A/10, 681-682.



. 1

Telegram from GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Hegen to Ulbricht, Stoph, Honecker, and Axen, 8 July 1966

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/1222, 129-131. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

Dear comrades,

Enclosed I am sending you the copy of the telegram from our ambassador in Beijing, Comrade Bierbach, for your information.

With socialist greetings,

" " " " Jgigp

Enclosure

Fwtkpi" c" uvc{ "qh" Eq o tcf g" Jq" Ejk" Okpj" kp" vjg" RTE. ! the Chinese side rejected a political solution [of the Vietnam War] and stated that this problem can only be solved by the crossing of the 17th parallel. The troops of the DRV should advance more actively into South Vietnam while Chinese troops in the DRV will be strengthened ([China] has already made preparations for



cpv" itggvkpiu." ukipgf" d{ " Jq" Ejk" Okpj." Ng" Fwcp." cpf" Rjc o"
Van Dong, were sent to Mao and the corresponding persons
[in the CCP] in the previous year, the greetings this year were
only from CC to CC, without signatures. Furthermore, neither
members of the Politburo nor of the CC took part in the cel-
gdtcvkqpu"kp"Dgkkipi"qt" J cpqk0

kp iu"kp" J cpqk0

The Vietnamese comrades mentioned that the war potential of the Vietnamese People's Army grows in the course of repelling the American imperialist aggression. In that [struggle], aid from the socialist countries plays a big role. They underline

Vietnam problem are still not ripe, since the US intends to talk

among other things, rice for the provisioning of the population. According to the opinion of the [Czechoslovak] comrades, attitude, because otherwise effects will occur which they will experience negatively. But in personal talks, some Vietnamese comrades expressed that they don't agree with Chinese positions. The [Czechoslovak] comrades hold the opinion that a

[...]

1. For Czechoslovak evidence see James G. Hershberg, "A Half-Hearted Overture: Czechoslovakia, Kissinger, and Vietnam, Autumn 1966," in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., *Vietnam: The Search for Peace in the Johnson Years, 1964-1968* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 292-320.

. 24

Note of Comrade Bergold, [GDR] Ambassador in the DRV, with the Polish Ambassador in the DRV, Comrade Siedliecky, 10 November 1966

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/3667, 213-214. Translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.]

The visit had been requested by the Polish ambassador. After an exchange of opinion, he conveyed that the Polish delegation is not going to visit the DRV in November of 1966 but,

on his return [trip] from the 23rd CPSU Congress. The latter presented him with a list, on which all dates and places had been recorded, where Le Duan had made statements against the Chinese leaders. The Chinese comrades reject Le Duan. It the invitation by the Soviet comrades, which had been directed in order to prevent the position of the Chinese towards the DRV from worsening.

Analyzing the reports of the 23rd CPSU Congress, after the August Plenum (before Pham Van Dong's trip to the Soviet Union) Le Duan made statements on a couple of questions, which party cadres have posed. On the question of what he has to say about the Cultural Revolution, he replied: "We don't support the Cultural Revolution, but we are not going to do anything against it. We let [it be] the internal affair of the Chinese."

On the question of what he could say about the policy of the

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Jeffrey Herf (University of Maryland), **Walter Reich** (George Washington University)*Cold War International Broadcasting: Lessons Learned*[\(Video available\)](#)

25 May 2006

A. Ross Johnson (Public Policy Scholar) **R. Eugene Parta** (RFE/RL)

Henry Kissinger and the Dilemmas of American Power

(Video available)

27 June 2006

US messages later on, as well as their understanding of the role
Tq o cpkc" y cu"vq" rnc{ " y kv j kp" v j g" Y j kvg" J q w u g o u" k p k v k c v k x g l"

the US and China could discuss various issues in Warsaw.¹⁸

The 25th anniversary meeting at the UN in October 1970 offered the chance to renew the secret messages to the Chinese, again through the highest levels. Both Ceausescu and Yahya Khan came to New York and Washington, and both met the president on various issues, including reopening a channel of communication with the Chinese. Nixon sent the same message through both interlocutors: the US, and he personally, remained interested in discussing avenues of normalization with the Chinese leadership, including potential high-level meetings, an ease of trade and travel restrictions, and other issues short of full diplomatic relations. This, Nixon stressed in his discussion with Ceausescu, was to be accomplished at

and meeting with Mao in the Chinese press can also be interpreted as a message that the Chinese leadership was preparing the message. Kissinger later recalled that “the inscrutable Chairman was trying to convey something. [...] Eventually, I came to understand that Mao intended to symbolize that American relations now had his personal attention, but by that point it was a purely academic insight: we had missed the point where it mattered. Excessive subtlety had produced a failure of communication.”³⁷ But the message was also meant to be seen in China, and was also directed at the Chinese people.³⁸

When Ambassador Bogdan met Kissinger on 11 January 1970 to deliver the message from Zhou Enlai and the Chinese leadership, the cards had already been dealt. Nixon, hopeful that the Pakistani channel would continue to work better than the Romanian channel, told Kissinger to cool contacts with the Romanians as to “not appear too eager [to the Chinese] and wait for them [the Chinese] to respond to our initiative.”³⁹ No message was sent again through the Romanian channel. On 29 January, Bogdan called again on Kissinger to inquire, prior to his departure to Bucharest, if a response was forthcoming from the Chinese. Kissinger replied that the US was prepared to talk, wherever the Chinese were willing, and that the US was not committed to having discussions through the Warsaw channel.⁴⁰ This was simply a courtesy response to the Romanian ambassador. Part of the reason for the US reticence toward responding via Bucharest was a fear in Kissinger’s inner circle that the Romanian leadership had been penetrated by the Soviet intelligence services. Given the premium on secrecy the administration placed on the rapprochement with the PRC, the fear that the Soviets (and subsequently the media) would exploit the rapprochement between Beijing and Washington before the administration was ready to make it public effectively closed the door on the Romanian channel.⁴¹

Washington was not the only place where the Romanians found themselves excluded, as the Chinese also cut off communications through the Bucharest channel. On 23 March 1971, when Vice Premier Radulescu was again in Beijing to discuss the Chinese position on the Vietnam war, he informed Zhou of Bogdan’s discussion with Kissinger. Zhou simply thanked the Vice Premier, stating that similar messages had been delivered through other channels, and that, given the difference between the US and Chinese positions on Taiwan and Indochina, China had nothing to talk about with the United States.

It is also possible, though unlikely, that Ceausescu intentionally delayed the transmission of the message so as not to be faced with the possibility of being held responsible by Moscow for bringing the Chinese and the Americans together. That e needed to-shed addi 16

theoretically, in a higher position than Ceausescu—who was the Secretary General of the RCP—there was no doubt that Maurer was not, in any way, a contender to Ceausescu's power within the Party. The distinction is, however, important because of a quote that has been extensively publicized concerning Zhou's reaction to the message from Nixon through Khan: "this is the first time this message has been received from a head [of state], to a head, through a head."

16. Minutes of Conversation between I. Gh. Maurer and Zhou Enlai, Beijing, 7 September 1969, ANIC, CCRCP International Relations Section, folder 72/1969, p. 4-30; Republished in Budura, *op. cit.*, p. 943-59; available at www.cwihip.org.

17. Nixon had not explained how he would reassess the situation, and, so Maurer was unable to tell Zhou anything other than the fact that the White House would be reassessing its position vis-à-vis negotiations. It now appears likely that Nixon was referring to the 1969 "Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test" of October 1969, an attempt to test "the Mad-man theory" and push the Soviets to change their policy in Vietnam for fear that Nixon was ready to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam. For more information, see William Burr's analysis and Electronic Briefing Book at the National Security Archive www.nsarchive.org.

18. Zhou was making a reference to the possibility of opening up a dialogue with the Americans through ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, which while still ongoing on paper, had not been held for years. Minutes of Conversation between I. Gh. Maurer and Zhou Enlai, Beijing, 7 September 1969, ANIC, CCRCP International Relations Section, folder 72/1969, p. 6-30; Republished in Budura, *op. cit.*, p. 943-60; available at www.cwihip.org.

19. See Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965. New Chinese Evidence," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7, p. 232-42, and esp. 239-40;

20. Minutes of Conversation between I. Gh. Maurer and Zhou Enlai, Beijing, 11 September 1969, ANIC, CCRCP International Relations Section, folder 72/1969, pp. 35-65; Republished in Budura, *op. cit.*, p. 963-82; available at www.cwihip.org.

21. For a detailed discussion of the Chinese thinking on Sino-American rapprochement see "The Sino American Rapprochement, 1969-1972" in Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (UNC Press, 2001), p. 238-76. See also Nikolas Khoo, "Realism Redux: Investigating the Causes and Effects of Sino-US Rapprochement," *Cold War History*, 4:5, November 2005, p. 229-49.

22. Chen Jian, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

23. Memorandum of Conversation, "Conversation with the President," Sept 9, 1969, RG 59, SN 67-69, POL Chicom-USSR; copy from the National Security Archive.

24. US Embassy Cable 3706 to SecState, December 3, 1969, "Contact with the Communist Chinese," RG59, SN67-69, POL Chicom; copy from the National Security Archive.

25. Chen Jian, *op. cit.*, p. 251

26. Memorandum of Conversation, Agha Hilaly and Henry Kissinger, White House, December 19, 1969, NPMP, NSCF, box 624, Pakistan Vol. II; copy from the National Security Archive.

27. Memorandum of Conversation, Gheorghe Macovescu-Henry Kissinger, December 17, 1969, NPMP, NSCF, CF-Europe, Box 704, Folder Macovescu (Romania) [December 1969-November 1973].

28. Macovescu had been the lead Romanian Foreign Ministry official involved with in the Packers channel, and had traveled several times between Hanoi and Washington during the Romanian efforts to jump-start negotiations. The discussion on China accounts

for a mere 1.5 pages while the Vietnam discussion takes up two thirds of the nine pages memo.

29. For a discussion of the Pakistani channel and the messages sent during 1970. See Aijazuddin, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-44; see also Chen Jian, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

30. Memorandum of Conversation, Nicolae Ceausescu-Richard Nixon, Oval Office, October 26, 1970, NPMP, NSCF, box 936—VIP Visits.

31. Report by Gheroghe Radulescu to Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the RCP CC, "Regarding the visit of the Romanian governmental delegation in the PRC and DRV from 15 to 26 November 1970," 12 December 1970, ANIC, RCP CC Foreign Relations Section, 98/1970, p. 6-35; published in Budura, *op. cit.*, pp. 1021-42; available at www.cwihip.org. The text of the Chinese message is well known, and has been published repeatedly. See the text of the version given to the Romanians in the documents below. For the version given to the Pakistanis, see Aijazuddin, *op. cit.* As there was no break in the discussion with Radulescu—and thus Zhou Enlai had no chance to confer with Mao and Lin Biao—it should have been clear that the Chinese had received a similar message from other sources, and that the Romanians were, in effect, competing for the leadership of the channel to Beijing.

32. See Aijazuddin, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43. Aijazuddin gives the date of Zhou Enlai passing the message to Yahya Khan as Nov. 23, 1970. See also Chen Jian, *op. cit.*, p. 254. Using Chinese sources, Chen Jian gives the date of the conversation as 14 November 1970. It is likely that Khan transmitted Nixon's message on 14 November but he received his reply from Zhou to the message only on the 23rd.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 45; Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 700

34. Kissinger raises this possibility, Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 700; Chen Jian suggests that this was the reason why the Romanians and the Pakistani did not transmit the information, Chen Jian, *op. cit.*, p. 254. There is no mention of that request in Radulescu's report to Ceausescu—though certainly that could have been transmitted orally to Ceausescu prior to writing the report.

35. There is a mention of a meeting between Deputy FM Macovescu and Kissinger on 17 Dec 1970 in the FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XVII, pp. 239-240. Most likely that editorial note refers to the 17 December 1969 meeting between Macovescu and Kissinger. If indeed, a meeting took place between Macovescu and Kissinger in December 1970, Macovescu would have had to transmit the Chinese message to the White House.

36. Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, Re: Conversation with Ambassador Bogdan, 12 January 1971, NPMP, NSCF, box 1031, Exchanges leading up to the HAK Trip to China, Dec. 1969-July 1971 (1); copy from the National Security Archive.

37. Kissinger, *op. cit.*, 699.

38. Chen Jian, *op. cit.*, p. 256



to the Vietnamese problem falls under the jurisdiction of the Vietnamese comrades.

Qiao Guanhua expressed his opinion that the contradictions remaining between the US and the Saigon regime only concern secondary matters, while their principal positions continue to be identical (the American intention of staying in South Vietnam and the wish of the Saigon regime to support the Americans).

Referring to the National Liberation Front, the Deputy
Okpkuvgt" cuuguugf" vjcv" vjku" tgrtgugpvu" c" ukiplkŁecpv" rqnkvkecn"
and military force, adding, however, that the force will not be
ecrcdng"qh"tgcejkpi"kvu"t b \$

tile to China.

In our opinion, the American initiatives towards bilateral relations with China do not represent a new policy, but rather new methods of the Nixon administration, which realized that the US was not able to obtain results by promoting power politics vis-à-vis China. In fact, Nixon's policy is still reactionary, warlike, and hostile towards China.

The Chinese nation has not accepted the American policy towards China even in the past, when it was even less prepared both politically and economically. Thus, it will be even less disposed to accept this policy now.

In regards to the creation of two Chinas, even Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] is against this but, of course, also for other reasons. On one side, he aspires to regain China, and on the other side, he expresses the general feelings of Taiwan's population, which does not wish to live separately from China.

It is [interesting] to point out that the Soviets are vigorous example attesting to this is the participation of the Jiang-Jieshi-ists at a conference in Bulgaria. We consider that there is a possibility that the Soviet Union will send an ambassador to Taiwan."

In response to my remark that the main problem would be the American withdrawal from Taiwan, Qiao Guanhua pointed out that "prior to the American withdrawal from Taiwan and from the Taiwan Strait, a problem discussed at the ambassadorial level for over ten years, the tensions in Sino-American relations cannot be reduced [and] other matters cannot be dis-

the letter from the RCP Central Committee and expresses its gratitude for the extended invitation.

In addition, the letter contains the following [text]:

“As we know, the traitor cliques together with the Soviet revisionists will participate at the congress of your party. We do not wish to be seated next to them, these acolytes of American imperialism, traitors of Marxism-Leninism.

Under these circumstances we do not feel comfortable sending a party delegation to your congress. We hope that you will understand our motivation.

China and Romania are allies, the Romanian people and the Chinese people are allies, and the Chinese people will support, as in the past, your struggle to defend your country. We express our conviction that the relations between our countries will continue to grow.”

I assured Sheg Jian that I would immediately pass on the message of this letter in the country.

should be based on mutual respect, on respect for sovereignty, and on the right of every country and nation to develop independently, and that they are prepared to, and wish to, respect these rights of every nation.

J g"urqmg"vq"wu"cdqww"vjg"xkukv"vq"kpfc"cpf"Rcmkuvcp."cdqww"vjg"eqpegtpu"jg"jcf"tgi ctfkpi"vjg"eqp lkev"dgvyggp"kpfc"cpf" Pakistan, and conveyed that they were making use of extensive resources for arming themselves even though they had a low standard of living and could make better use of their resources vq"fgxgnqr"vjgkt"geppq okgu0" J qy xgt."vjg"ukwcvkqp"ycu"tcvjgt" complicated and he could not see signs that the conditions existed for these problems to be resolved. And so he got to China.

J g" cuugtvgf" vjcv" ceeqtfkpi" vq" vjg" C ogtkecp" xkgy." vjg" People's Republic of China leads an aggressive policy in its relations with neighbors and referred particularly to the border eqp lkev" ykvj"kpfc"cpf"E jkpgug"kpvgtxgpkqp"kp"Mtgc0

Jgtg"yg"dtqw i jv"wr"jkuvqt{"cpf"hwv jgt"fkuewuugf"vjg"kuuwgu0" Kissinger, being a historian, stated that there were no instances kp"kpfc0u" jkuvqt{" y jgp"kv"ngf"cp"ci i tguukxg"rqnke{0" Jgtg"vjg" Korean issue was also raised. I told them that the Chinese intervened there under special conditions, during war, but that after the armistice they withdrew, proving that the Chinese

ukipkŁecpegŃ

Ceausescu: One thing that I would like to point out is that generally, we were able to discuss most things openly with Nixon. In the toast I also mentioned Vietnam, however, with-
qww" o gpvkqkpi "vjcv"K" fkuwuugf"vju"vqrke" ykvj" jkoŃ" Jg"mpgy" beforehand what I would say during the toast about this and he did not say anything, but stayed and listened.

Naturally, they openly expressed their opinions as well. They simply concluded that this was the situation and that nothing more could be done.

As you saw, I took them to the market. They were quite lacking in the haughtiness that characterizes so many other leaders, even though he [Nixon] is the president of a great country, not only capitalist, because to be honest, today, from an economic uvcfrqkv."kv"ku"vjg" o quv"rqy gthwn"eqwvvt { "kp"vjg"y qtnfŃ" Jg"fkf" not come as if he was representing a great power, but went to the market and shook hands with all the grocers. From the perspective of social origin, he has a better background than some eqo o wpkuvuŃ" Jku"y khg"ku"c" o kpgtŃ"fcwi jvgŃŃ

Cde. Dumitru Coliu: At the lunch, I sat next to [Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J.] Sisco, and during discussions with him, he told us about his life, and he told us that: "You know, if I lived in Romania, I would be the best communist."
Jg"uckf" jku"hcvgjgt"ycu"c"rgcucpvŃ

Ceausescu: You know, they developed in a different way, they do not have the same feudal mentality of a bureaucratic liege [*birocratie boiereasca*_. "vjcv" {qw"ecp"Łpf" ykvj"uqog" communists. Of course, here is not only a question of people, but rather a question of the changes that are taking place in American society. The fact that they landed on the Moon, that vjg{ "tgcejgf"uwej" tguwvu"kp"uekpvkŁe"gzrñqtcvkqp."ecppqv"dg" without repercussions in the way people think. There, 70 percent of the population is made up of the working class. They are the most industrialized country. And, on top of that, the percent of intellectuals also grew, and these people cannot stop vjkpmkpi."ecppqv"dg" ykvj qww"kpŁwgpegŃŃ

I had a meeting with that group of American professors. There were about 50 professors there.

Stoica: All of them are simple people.

Ceausescu: I was looking at them, you would not believe that they were professors, based on how they dressed. Thus, from this point of view, we can learn some things from the imperialists. They were very modest, they asked questions, I answered them, at the end they applauded. I gave them that kpvgtxky."vjg"dgl .. guvj ¼

on border waterways, that the Soviet population and even the Soviet soldiers have a friendly attitude towards China.

The Soviets often talk about negotiations with China, but in practice they proceed in a different way. They prearranged incidents, even during the workings of the Joint Commission, concerning navigation on border waterways. The scope of these incidents was to delay the workings of the Commission. We made a great effort towards reaching an agreement at least in technical matters, which was obtained. According to the maps attached to the Sino-Soviet treaties, the region where tanks they interrupted circulation in that particular passage, which belongs to China and connects to Chinese districts. Under these conditions, the Chinese leadership continues to

Inside China's Cold War

in his opinion, if this escalation would tragically lead to a confrontation, this would be the most serious threat to world peace. I understood, according to Nixon's remarks, that he did not express it directly but he said it in such a way as to make his position known to the Russians.

On multiple occasions, Nixon expressed his wish and concern that the United States and China should begin to discuss the problems between them.

Of course, within the framework of these discussions, we deplored the fact that as a result of a series of prior acts, China did not participate in the United Nations, because in the end none of the major international issues could be resolved without China's participation. Considering this, we deemed as fair his wish to normalize relations with China. This was one of the problems. Of course, we could not discuss any actual means, but estimated that Nixon's intention of normalizing relations with China was a positive sign.

We explained to him: it seems to us that the analysis of the problems between the United States and China sets the tone of the discussion and we told him that we will communicate the discussion to the Chinese government. We also explained that the situation in Vietnam would have to be resolved through negotiations and that the United States would not try to decide whether they made a mistake or not by engaging in Vietnam or if they made a mistake in the way they conducted the Vietnam War, but the problem was how to resolve the situation.

For example, we discussed the fact that the United States had proposed to discuss absolutely any problem from the ten points of the provisional government to the four points of North Vietnam government and the eight points that we, the Americans, proposed, to any other point that could come up, but we want to discuss these to reach a conclusion and move forward. But for a while now we have been coming up against an attitude in which the Vietnamese realized that to apply their strategy: to delay the peace talks and to set in motion a military offensive in South Vietnam hoping that this way the American public opinion, which was against the war, would become increasingly strong and would force United States to capitulate and withdraw troops under unfavorable conditions." Nixon continued with the following remarks: "If the Vietnamese reached this conclusion, they are wrong. It is true that a good part of American public opinion wants the end of the Vietnam War, but we must not let this opinion lead us to a policy that would be harmful to the United States and the world. We must continue to discuss the problems between the United States and China and to work for a peaceful resolution of the Vietnam War."

to European security and the United Nations...and on this occa-
ukqp"K"vqn f"jk o<"ō J qy"fq" {qw"vj kpm" {qw" y kmn"dg"cdng"vq"uqnxg"



There are parties, as I have informed you about some of these at the time, serious parties, which consider that it would be in their interest to establish relations with the Chinese Communist Party. I am referring to the Spanish Communist Party, the Italian Communist Party and the Indian Marxist Communist Party with which I had a few meetings and which came to our Congress. I am referring to parties that are not necessarily big, but that hold a certain position, such as: the Communist Party from Reunion, a series of European communist parties, the English Communist Party, the one in Switzerland and the ones in the Nordic countries. We decided to develop contacts with these parties. I can honestly tell you, since our relations are based on complete sincerity, that the Chinese Communist Party could offer support in this process of building new relations within the workers' movement, against the infringement of principles of norms dictating relations, such as the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Maurer: We should be very clear about the Chinese Communist Party's Doctrine.

Niculescu Mizil: Limited sovereignty.

These are some interesting reactions and we think that, as far as we are concerned, we should closely follow and stimulate them.

egation on its own plane but had to travel on a foreign plane.

Yg"wpfgtuvcpf"xgt{"ygm"vjcv{"qw"ctg"kp"cfkhŁewm"ukwvcvkqp"}
Is it inevitable to have these Warsaw Pact maneuvers on your territory?

Maurer: Now I want to tell you one thing, so that we can dg"xgt{"engct"Yg"jcf"egtvckp"ci tgg o gpvu ô tgi ct fkp i "vjg"enctk-Łecvkqp"qh"vjg"Yctucy"Rcev"rtqdnig ou ô y jke j"ygtg"xgt{"tkikf" and gave the Soviets the right to do almost everything until the end. We asked that these agreements be abandoned and that a new agreement be signed that would ensure the rights of every state participating in the Warsaw Pact, [as well as] the [Military] Command. The discussions took approximately two years. They were very heated, but in the end we imposed our point of view that no troops can be deployed from one state or on the territory of a state without the consent of that state. Of course, this new agreement establishes joint exercises, in other words, the Command is responsible for organizing the preparation for battle of the armies participant in the Warsaw Pact. During this preparation, the armies do various exercises. We agreed on an exercise on our territory right before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which other states were meant to participate. Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, we decided to postpone the exercise until the fall of this year. Now they came and said: "it's time, let's do the exercise." Our Chief of v j g" I gpgtcn"Uvchh"ku"kp"Oqueqy"tki jv"pqy"J g"jcu"kpuvtwevkqpu" to show clearly that we cannot hold any military exercises this year because we had a series of [other military] activities [*serie de actiuni*_"uq" o knkvct {"gzgtkugu"ctg"qww"qh"vjg" swguvkqp"} J g" also has instructions to sustain the idea of staff exercises, only the commanders, on the map, without troops.

Niculescu Mizil: In any case, we told them that during the fall of this year we simply cannot do any exercises.

Maurer: And we wish to only have general staff exercises gxgp"kp"vjg"wreqokpi" {"gctu" J q y gxgt." y g"vj kpm"vjcv"wpvkn"vjg" very end we will push these exercises further and further. In any case, this is the position we are taking. It is clear that they cannot impose these exercises on us. It is true that the operating rules of the Command give it the right to organize exercises, but they do have a say in the way the exercises are done and in all these other aspects. Or, we are determined to push further the military exercises involving troops on our territory.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: I wish to thank you for this report at such a late hour. Even though there might be differences in our points of view, such a direct exchange of ideas between our countries is necessary. As you said earlier, when you will return here, we will talk more about a series of issues. Now I dtkg i {"y cpv"vq"fgcn"ykvj"egtvckp"kuuwgu}

First of all, regarding the Vietnamese issue. I can tell you clearly: whether the resistance movement against the Americans continues or whether the Paris talks continue, it all depends on the Vietnamese. We exchanged opinions on a couple topics with them, especially on the topic of South Vietnam cpf"vjg"tgukuvcpag"Łi jv"ci ckpu"vjg"C o gtkecpu"Vjku"gzecpi g" of ideas referred to the way we are going to support them and what we can learn from this. In regards to the way this war

will continue, what proportion it will have, greater or smaller, these are their problems. Considering that our countries are neighbors and that our nations are connected by a long, revolutionary friendship, it is natural for us to help them. Vietnam is a neighboring country and I told them that China represents the back of their front. The nation of South Vietnam, of only 14 million inhabitants, operating on a limited surface of only 170,000 km squared, has been able and continues to resist an army of over 1,100,000 soldiers, including 500,000 Americans. It is amazing that such a small country has been able to put up tgukuvcpag"ci ckpu"uwej"cdki"cto {"hqt"qxgt"Łxg" {"gctu"}

with unfavorable results for the Vietnamese people, the Soviets will be responsible for this, not us or you. If you would intervene in this matter, they would blame it on you. They would say that the Romanian comrades intervened in this matter and spoiled everything. You can express these good intentions, but without getting involved. We clearly told the Vietnamese them that if they will need our help in continuing this war, we will offer them this help, according to our possibilities.

Regarding the relations between China and the United States, you know that there are direct contracts between us and the Americans. You said it that, as a matter of fact, it is about China's place at the UN and Taiwan. We are discussing these problems with the Americans for the past 14 years. In any case, they know our position very well, and we know theirs. You put it very well that one day, sooner or later, these problems will be solved. Kennedy could not solve them. If Nixon won't solve them, there will be a Kennedy II and a Nixon II. In any case, Taiwan and have to recognize the fact that Taiwan is ours.

In regard to our relations with the Soviet Union, I can tell you concisely that the border incidents that took place in the past months have been deliberately provoked by the Soviets. Their goal is to divert the population's attention from domestic problems.

Qwt"Łtuv"rtkpekrng"ku"pqv"vq"rtqxqmg"cpf"vjg"ugeqpf"ku"vq" resolve issues through equitable treaties. You know that we sent a delegation to Khabarovsk. In the beginning, they did not want to reach an agreement in not even one of the techni- ecn"kuuwgu" Jqygxgt."yg"fkf"tgcej"cp"citggogpv"kp"vjg"gpff" They didn't foresee this so they proceeded to a number of calumnies.

Our attitude is based on not refusing negotiations, better said, on looking for equitable negotiations. We expressed this position in our declaration: until the issues are resolved the status quo shall be maintained and incidents shall be avoided. This is our position. During the last incident, which took

**Note of Conversation between Ion Gheorge Maurer and
Zhou Enlai, 11 September 1969**

[Source:

will weaken, it will become harder to put pressure on us.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: So you are seeing things different then
wu#

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: [gu#

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Fq" {qw"ugg"cpqvjgt"lwuvkŁecvkqp"vjcv"vjg{"
could use against you?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: For us, the situation will become very tense, very serious if the tension with you would become greater, because at this time, the Soviets would say to us: you [must] choose between China and the USSR. As a matter of fact, they already told us. At this invitation, we answered as always: we do not choose. We have good relations with China that we are seeking to develop, just like the relations with the other socialist countries. We want to develop relations with the USSR also. This is why we tell them: you can't pose the issue this way. We will not take a position against China. We believe that whoever takes a stance against China is making a mistake.

If the situation becomes very tense between you, then the problem would become more acute for us.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: Our party supports a relaxed evolution of relations with China, a point of view that we have always sustained.

There were also attempts to condemn China, but we opposed them. In Budapest, as part of the Warsaw Pact, so in a military alliance, an anti-Chinese resolution was proposed. Romania uckf<"pq#"Egcwuguew"cpf" Ocwtgt"qrrqugf"vjku"cpf"qduvtwevgf" the adoption of such a resolution. After that, a resolution on the issue of European security was adopted, which is something completely different. We clearly expressed our point of view in relation to China during the discussions between Brezhnev and Ceausescu: we have to take the approach of weakening vgpukqpu="vjg"rqnke{"qh"vgpukqpu"cpf"encujgu"cv"vjg"dqtfgt"fqgu" not serve well Romania or the Soviet Union.

Later, the international conference of communist parties took rnceg[] Vjg"gpvktg" yqtnf"mpqyu"vjcv" Tq ocpkc"Łt on{"uvqqf"wr"

the Presidium, the Executive Committee, and the Plenary of the Central Committee. The members in the leadership of the party went throughout the entire country: we discussed this with all social classes and found out that they are all supporting our position. We organized the workers' guards. We were unable to cope with the organization of all the people who wished to join the guards. These weapons are held until today in the workplace.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: It is very light armament, infantry type.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: What is the approximate size of these armed squads?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Approximately 300,000. Besides these, there are the army units. There is close collaboration between the military units and the patriot guards. The mobilization plans include: the troops of the armed forces, the militia, the Securitate, the armed guards, and the patriotic formations. We have now moved to the organiza-



laboration during peacetime and also certain attributes of the
to member countries concerning organization and armament,
after which the countries will make the decisions.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: Any measure regarding the armed forces is taken only by the government or the organizations responsible in that country.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Procedures for wartime are also outlined: the countries will assemble and decide how the commander will exercise his function. There are also special texts, in the sense that no foreign military unit can enter the territory of another country without the permission of that country and based on certain preliminary procedures showing the way to station and withdraw these [troops].

Cde. Kang Sheng: Usually, the Soviet Union does not respect these. They could respect them in the case of Romania, but when it comes to the other countries, what do you think?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I have doubts even when it

Cde. Kang Sheng:

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: We did not sign an act that they can use to come to our house whenever they want to.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Romania can therefore do something like this, but the other countries?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The other countries agreed with the draft statute that we fought against and did not accept.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: statute if pressure will be put on them?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I think that until the very end it is impossible for people who believe in socialism not to rise against this unjust policy. When and how this will take place, I don't know. In any case, there are signs. There is discontent there is discontent even in the Soviet Union. It is hard to say how widespread or strong these are, but there are signs of this discontent. I found out from certain reports that a few days ago in the Red Square there was a demonstration against the intervention in Czechoslovakia. It might have not been big, there might have not been ten thousand people, but the fact is that a number of people got together and demonstrated against the intervention in Czechoslovakia. This is a sign. Kang Sheng, know it too.

Cde. Kang Sheng: A number of writers from the magazines *Youth* and *New World* oppose the intervention in Czechoslovakia. On the other side, the magazine *October* is situated on the *Pravda* side.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: These phenomena don't occur only among writers. I saw some reports about an entire series of other categories. There is a strong enough opposition

J g"ujq yg f"kpvgtguv"cpf"nkuvpggf0"Pqv j kpi" ycu"eqpetgvgn{ "fku-
cussed, though. Nixon said that the United States is willing
vq"i g"kp"vqwe j" ykvj"cm"vjg"uvcvgu"vjcv" ycpv"vjku0" J g"ku" yknnkpi"
to speak with the other socialist countries the same way he
is discussing with Romania. The only problem that he raised
is that the United States has to participate in the organiza-
tion of European security. This is indeed a problem that many
Gwtqrgecp"uvcvgu" jcxg"tckugf="cn o quv"cm"Gwtqrgecp"uvcvgu"vjcv"
are not socialist that we talked to raised this issue: [i.e.] Italy,
Dgnikwo." J qmcpf."Fgp o ctm."cpf"Uy gfgp0

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Was the Soviet Union informed about your point of view?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Of course, the Soviet Union knows our point of view. Ceausescu informed the Soviet ambassador about the discussion with Nixon. But the Soviet Union knows our position even from before.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Is the Soviet Union unhappy with the fact that you are members of the Warsaw Pact but develop an independent foreign policy at the same time?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union tends to organize all acts of foreign policy. There was the tendency to create within the Warsaw Pact a branch that would decide, with a majority vote, foreign policy affairs. The tendency to establish supranational dqfkgu"gzkuvgf<"kp" o knkvct{ "chhcktu ô kp"vjg"qt i cpk|cvkqp"qh"vjg" Wpkvgf"Eq o o c p f o g p v="kp"geqpq o ke"chhcktu ô kp"vjg"qt i cpk|c-
tion of Comecon as a supranational body, as well as in external political affairs. We opposed all these tendencies and said: the treaty that established the Warsaw Pact shows that the participant countries will consult on matters that they deem important and that they agree to consult on. Therefore, every country, as an expression of its sovereignty, has the right to practice the foreign policy that it wishes to practice, taking in account the engagements it made. I think that the Soviet Union is unhappy with the fact that we are leading an independent foreign policy. We had a different position from the Soviet Union on an entire series of issues. To answer your question, I don't believe that the Soviet Union is pleased with us.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: There is some news showing that Nixon considers that he cannot monopolize European affairs through NATO and that he would wish to secure certain rights in Europe with the help of European security.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I couldn't answer. Many states, including members of NATO, embrace the idea of European security, in the sense that this has to be accomplished not through the understanding between two pacts, but through an understanding among all states. This point of view,

discuss.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: I would like to say a few things. First of all, how do we interpret the meeting that took place in Moscow? You are aware that the initiative of the meeting dates a long way back. We had a point of view that we maintained until the end, more exactly that the conditions for a meeting of communist and workers' parties are not met.

First of all, a large number of parties from socialist countries are missing, among them being some frontline parties in

ugg"wu"e"eqwrng"vk"o"gu"cpf"fkueuwgf"ykvj"Eq"o"tcfg"Egcwuguew=" he raised this issue. The Italian Communist Party, with which we have good relations and in whose press we can observe a process of reevaluating their position towards the Chinese Communist Party. Likewise, the Mexican Communist Party tckugf"vjku"kuuwg."vjg"Yqtmgtuø"Rctv{"kp"Uykv|gtncpf"ô"K"y"cu"kp" Switzerland a couple months ago and the comrades raised the issue of a possibility of contact with the Chinese Communist Party [while] the Communist Party from Reunion, whose sec-tgvct{"igpgtcm"yg"ogv"kp"J"cpqk."}tckugf"vjg"kuuwg."vjg"fc{"dghqtg" yesterday. Likewise, the Communist (Marxist) Party of India, which sent a delegate to our congress, mentioned that it wishes to have contact with the Chinese Communist Party. Also, the parties from Northern European countries, the Australian Communist Party and others.

We believe that it is our duty to inform you about this new element that has appeared in the communist movement, and vjcv."kp"e"ugtkgu"qh"rctvkgu."vjg"rtqeguu"qh"Łi"jvkpi"hq"vjg"qti-cnization of their relations based on certain new principles is also associated with the wish of normalizing relations with the Chinese Communist Party. We also reached the conclusion that we laid out for you, that the Chinese Communist Party can bring, by respecting its relations with other countries, an important contribution to this process of respecting, within the framework of the communist movement, of equality of rights, noninterference in other [countries'] affairs, mutual respect and independence of every party.

Jgtg"ku."kp"dtkgh."y"jcv"yg"y"kujgf"vq"vgm"{"qwo

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Indeed, there are tendencies in the communist movement towards the independent development of parties instead of joint actions. The communist movement is fgxgnqrkpi"kp"vjku"fkgtgevkppø"Vjgtg"ycu"cp"Kphqt"o"cvkxg"QhŁeg" that functioned in your country. Between 1957-1960 we made efforts to bring a contribution to the development of the movement through the convocation of meetings and the adoption of declarations. It proved, however, that the declarations did not play any role for the communist parties. It was exactly these declarations that some parties did not accept. Since then, every rctv{"fgxgnqr"kp"fgrgpfgpvm{"="vjgtg"ctg"rtqdn"o"u"vjcv"uq"og" ugg"kp"ppg"yc{"."qvjgtu"kp"cpqvjgt"yc{"="vjgtg"ctg"fkxgti"gpegu" from a theoretical standpoint. These are a result of the fact that imperialism is headed for a fall, while socialism [is headed] for a victory. There are common and distinct elements between us. Even the common elements have to be looked at creatively, taking in consideration the concrete conditions in every country, not in a dogmatic manner. From this perspective, the role of the Warsaw Pact is of enclosure, of restricting the development of the participant countries. The Warsaw Pact functions in the same way as NATO, CENTO [the Central Treaty Organization].

All these point out that the world is transitioning through a period of discord. The communist parties are proceeding through a trying period. It will be proved which parties are capable of leading the revolution.

The international meetings cannot solve the problems. We

understood your intentions of opposing China's condemnation at the meeting, creating an organization, promoting the principle of noninterference. Only these parties that maintain the principles of independence can lead the revolution. The parties that hqnmqy"qvjgtu"ecppqv"fq"vjku"ô"jqy"vjg"rctvkgu"htqo"Rcmkuvcp" or Bagdad are just like many others. Presently, parties have to follow a policy of bilateral relations. Otherwise, it would mean letting the revisionist Soviet party work its magic wand.

We told you that we are not interested in this meeting. We have different points of view in this matter. Think that vjgtg"ctg"eqwvptkgu"y"jgtg"vjgtg"ctg"o"qtg"rctvkgu="cevwcm{"."vku" is the way it was in Russia with the Bolshevik party. This is an inevitable problem in the development of the international communist movement, which has to go through this trial of the practice and that will show which grouping in that country is capable of leading the revolution. Even though we opposed the conference, Comrade Mao Zedong showed, several times, that we do not intend to call another conference. This is a matter of principle.

time, and asked Cde. Ceausescu to inform the PRC that the US fguktgu"vjg"fgxgnqr"geqpq o ke."vge jpkecn."cpf"uekgpvkŁe"dkncvgt-al relations. R. Nixon let it be known that, if Warsaw does not prove itself to be the right venue for Sino-American contacts, the venue can be changed.

During the meetings Cde. Ceausescu had with repre-ugpvckxgu"qh"vjg"Łpcepeken"cpf"kpfwuvtken"ektengu"kp"vjg"WU."c" clear concern was evident on their side for improving Sino-American relations.

It was expressed that, during discussions with R. Nixon concerning his speech at the UN, Cde. Ceausescu expressed his impression, and the impression of other heads of state, that vjg"WU"rtgukf gpv"ycu"urgekŁecm{"cfftguukp i"vjg"Uqxkgv"Wpkqp." in a way that implied that the US desires to discuss world problems exclusively with the USSR. Nixon denied such a thing, stating that it is not his intention to approach and resolve global problems this way, and stating that in the draft of his UN speech there was a passage that was favorable to the PRC, but that he took it out after his conversation with Gromyko, so as not to upset the Soviets.

In his response to the topics raised, Premier Zhou Enlai

Beijing.” Zhou Enlai continued by saying that “Nixon could go to Belgrade and Bucharest, so why would he not be able to come to Beijing?”

Cde. Zhou Enlai asked that we transmit to Cde. Ceausescu that the PRC leadership discussed the issue of Sino-American relations in the [CCP] Central Committee, together with Cdes. Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, and that [the above statement] is the position of the Chinese party and government.

[...] [CMEA and CSCE sections not translated] [...]

3. Certain topics presented by Cde. Zhou Enlai during the discussion with the Romanian delegation.

Premier Zhou Enlai also described certain Chinese considerations with respect to the state of Sino-Soviet relations, the rebirth of Japanese militarism, and [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] DPRK-USSR relations.

a. Regarding Sino-Soviet relations

Cde. Zhou Enlai stated that, during the meeting he had on 11 September 1969 with Cde. Alexei Kosygin, he discussed the issue of resolving border disputes “peacefully, without threats.” Concerning this, Cde. Zhou Enlai stated that: “the Chinese side suggested that, before the issues at hand be resolved, the

which expanded in 1965. This war is now carried out throughout Indochina, and there is a possibility that it be expanded to Thailand. Malaysia is also fearful that it might extend there.

Japan is not prepared for a global war, and even less so for a thermonuclear war. [Japan] is interested in the existence of limited wars. Presently, [Japan] is developing its naval and air forces with the declared goal of protecting the investments it has made abroad. The Japanese defense minister has publicly stated that the Malacca Strait is a vital [logistical] line for Japan. The same declaration was made prior to the start of the RcekLe"Yctf"

Japanese militarism is being reborn, step by step, and Japan must be seen as a base for defending American interests in the Far East and Asia.

In this issue, the DPRK, the PRC, and the Indochinese eqwptkgu ô Ec o dqfk. " tgrtgugpvf" d{ "]Ec o dqfkcp" ngc fgt" Norodom] Shianouk, and Laos, represented by the Pathet Ncq ô jcxg"eq o o qp"rqkpvu"qh"xkg ylö

Cde. Zhou Enlai referred to the problem of Japanese militarism in the context of Soviet-Japanese relations, stating the following: "On the occasion of the recent meeting I had with the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, I asked him: do you remember that we are part of an alliance, and against whom this alliance is directed? The Soviet ambassador replied that the alliance was created against Japanese militarism. Then I told him that, presently, the USSR has very intimate relations with the Japanese, that it opened Siberia's doors [to Japan], and that would lead to [economic] concessions. The Soviet ambassador said that there were no deals reached yet, and said that China [also] has intense economic relations with Japan. The Soviet ambassador was told that [Japan]"ku"vtcfkpi" ykvj"rtkxevg"Ët o u" from Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam.

When the Soviet ambassador stated that Japan was the aggressor country, and that there is a danger of future Japanese aggression, not only against China, but also against the Soviet Union, I told him that we cannot speak only of possible future aggression, since that danger exists even now. Japan is moving toward the rebirth of militarism, which constitutes a great danger for the [Far] East, for [North] Korea, for China, for [North] Vietnam. The US is planning for the withdrawal of a part of its armed forces from South Korea (approximate- n{"42.222"uqnfkgtu+. "Ëtuv."wpfgt"vjg"eqpfkvkqp"vjcv"Lc rcp"cpf" South Korea sign a military alliance, and second, under the

Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Mao Zedong in Beijing, 3 June 1971

[Source:

39/1971, p. 3-29; published in *Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974]*, ed. Ambassador Romulus Ioan Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 1064-71]. Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu.]

Cde. Mao Zedong: Welcome comrades.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu: Thank you very much. We thank you for the very warm welcome we received.

We would like to express our satisfaction with the possibility we have to visit the People's Republic of China, to meet with you and the other leaders of the Chinese party and state.

Mao: When was the last time you were here?

Ceausescu: Seven years [ago].

Mao: "kp"vjgug"ugxgp" {gctu"uq o g"vjkipi"jcxg"ejcpigf="fkf" {qw" notice this?

Ceausescu: We saw the people, hundreds of thousands of people, positive attitude and the joy of living displayed by the people, occupation with perfect education, to tie it to production, to life, to the construction of socialism.

Mao: "Vjcv"ku"vjg"yc {"y g"vjkp m"cdqww"kv"cu" y gmm="pqy" y g"ctg" experimenting.

At the same time, we have to continue to use older teachers

Ceausescu: We feel that the best way is to have relations based

give me any motives. Then I told him: if you no longer need University, to hold classes on Marxism-Leninism. Kosygin could not answer then. I have to conclude that such a country is not a good one. I will tell you one thing: we publish [their] articles in our press, but they do not publish our replies in their newspapers, by countries where there is a military-bureaucratic dictatorship, have to be repudiated. The entire Soviet people should know them, so they can repudiate them. But they did not publish them. In this instance, they are even behind some of our articles about them. Especially, I speak of the New York Times.

You have been in the United States of America, but all of us here, we have not been. We sent a ping-pong ball over there.

Ceausescu: It seems it was well placed.

Mao: Do you agree with this ball?

Ceausescu: We agree.

Mao: They are showing their agreement with this ball. What is so great about this delegation that was here said that we do not play ping-pong, especially since you have very good players.

Ceausescu: Yes, ping-pong is a very interesting game, especially since you have very good players.

Mao: They have done this thing chasing only prizes, thinking they are showing their agreement with this ball. What is so great about this delegation that was here said that we do not play ping-pong, especially since you have very good players.

Łgnf0"Kh"vjg{"ujcnn"eqog."{qw"yknn"Łijv"Łtuv"cpf"hqtgoquv0"

Ceausescu: We are a small country, but we do not want to live



Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 15 February 1963

[Source: XIX-J-1-j Korea, 6. doboz, 5/d, 0011/RT/1963. Obtained and translated for CWIHP and NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) by Balazs Szalontai]

The December session of the KWP [Korean Workers Party] Central Committee passed a resolution to reinforce the defense of the country. According to the resolution, a strong defense system must be established in the whole country, the population must be armed, and the country must be kept in a state of mobilization.

From what I hear, large-scale work is going on throughout the country. Shelters for the population are being built in the mountains. As the Soviet Ambassador informed me, Kim Il Sung explained to him in a conversation that the geographical conditions of the country (a mountainous terrain) give a certain advantage to them in case of an atomic war, for the mountains ward off the explosions to a substantial extent, and a lot of such bombs would be needed to wreak large-scale destruction in the country. The construction of these air-raid shelters is presumably related to this theory.

The Czechoslovak ambassador informed me that the Koreans propagated a theory that cited the South Vietnamese