

INSIDE THE WARSAW PACT

New Findings on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution

By Csaba Békés

Since the revolutionary changes in 1989 and the 1990 free elections in Hungary, the majority of archival sources in Hungary on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution have become available to scholars. Similarly, a number of Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav archival documents have been discovered and released. Although the Soviet sources, which are of utmost importance, are still largely unavailable, some helpful clues to Soviet decision-making and actions have been provided through articles published in the former Soviet Union in the last few months.

As a result of declassification trends in East-Central Europe, as well as the release of numerous Western sources on 1956 during the latter part of the 1980s, members of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and other scholars in Hungary and abroad have already produced articles presenting hitherto unknown data, important evidence and new interpretations. This article will summarize some of the most significant findings of scholars concerning 1956.*

Internal Aspects of the Revolution

Many authors in recent years have attempted to define the *character* of the revolt. These studies were recently enhanced by the research of Dr. György Litván, director of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Budapest, who has

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New Sources on the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia

By Mark Kramer

(First of two parts)

Few events in the 74-year history of Soviet foreign policy have been subjected to as much scrutiny as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Countless books, monographs, and articles about the invasion (and the events preceding and following it) have appeared in the West.¹ Some authors, such as H. Gordon Skilling,

have put together massive studies of the whole Prague Spring, the crisis in the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet-led invasion.² Other scholars have chosen to focus on specific aspects of the events within Czechoslovakia, such as the role of Slovak nationalism in the reform movement.³ Still others, including Karen Dawisha, Jiri Valenta, and Condoleezza Rice, have written lengthy analyses of the Soviet Union's response to the Prague Spring.⁴ Amidst this voluminous literature, one might justifiably ask whether there is much new that can be learned about the 1968 crisis and invasion.

Until the late 1980s, most of what was known about the events surrounding the Prague Spring, especially about the Soviet Union's role, came from official and unofficial materials published either before the invasion or shortly thereafter. By the time Skilling and Dawisha completed their authoritative studies (in 1976 and 1984, respectively), there seemed little prospect of coming up with many additional insights unless Western scholars could gain access to Soviet and East European archives. Whether those archives would ever be accessible was a matter of doubt, however. In-

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The Official (West) German Report:

Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations From the East German Archives

[Editor's note: Following the reunification of Germany in October 1990, the Federal Republic moved swiftly to take possession of the records of the East German National People's Army (NVA). Last February, after its staff had time to review those archives, the German Defense Ministry released an official report on its findings, entitled, "Military Planning of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe: A Study." The report is reprinted in full, with permission, along with a foreword by the Federal Defense Minister. It has been annotated and translated by Mark Kramer, a research associate of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University and the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University. (Footnotes in the original text are marked by superscripted numbers; translator's notes are indicated by the alphabetical superscript.)]

ing October 23-30, the campaign which began on November 4 included three army corps consisting of at least 60,000 Soviet soldiers and officers. According to Soviet sources, 669 Soviet soldiers and officers were killed in the fighting, 1,450 were wounded and 51 were declared missing. The same sources claim that there were approximately 4,000 Hungarian victims—a number somewhat higher than had been estimated by Hungarian scholars (V. Muszatov).

Another clarification due to newly available documentation concerns the role of the Yugoslav leaders in the revolution, which was previously unclear. It now appears that the Yugoslavs cooperated with the Soviets in eliminating Imre Nagy and his colleagues from Hungarian political life by offering them asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest (László Varga, Budapest Municipal Archives; Pierre Maurer, Lausanne, Switzerland).

Recently opened Polish sources also provide interesting new information. They show that the Political Committee of the Polish United Workers Party condemned the use of Soviet troops in Hungary on November 1, but modified its position during subsequent days, presumably because of the Hungarian government's unacceptable decision to leave the Warsaw Pact and declaration of Hungary's neutrality (János Tischler, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Budapest).

Western reaction to the revolution is now understood more clearly because of the recent declassification of Western documents. Among the most significant releases is a July 1956 policy paper adopted by the U.S. National Security Council, in which the United States government disavowed any political and military intervention in the Soviet satellites. This position was maintained throughout the events in Poland and Hungary in October-November of the same year (John C. Campbell, Columbia University). Similarly, newly available documents disprove Communist allegations that the U.S., Great Britain, France, and NATO were responsible for instigating the revolution. On the contrary, the Western powers were caught by surprise with news of the revolt in

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deed, given the sensitivity of the topic, the closed nature of the Soviet and East European societies, and the lack of any procedures in the Eastern bloc for requesting the declassification of documents (even for purely historical purposes), the chances of obtaining secret archival materials about the Prague Spring seemed all but non-existent as recently as five to six years ago.

It is true, of course, that even before the advent of “glasnost” and the collapse of the Communist bloc, valuable new sources about the events of 1968 were turning up from time to time. For example, a lengthy and revealing interview with Josef Smrkovsky, one of Alexander Dubcek’s closest aides throughout the Prague Spring, was published in 1975, one year after Smrkovsky’s death.⁵ Similarly, in 1978 two outstanding retrospective accounts—one by Jiri Hajek, the Czechoslovak foreign minister in 1968, and the other by Zdenek Mlynar, a top adviser to Dubcek during most of the crisis—were published in the West.⁶ Both

Leninism, were recently consolidated in the huge “Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation” (*Tsentr khraniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii*, or TsKhSD) at Staraya Ploshchad, the former headquarters of the CPSU Central Committee. Because virtually all of the relevant files at TsKhSD are still classified and the procedures for declassification have yet to be worked out, it remains to be seen whether (and when) materials about the Prague Spring will be released. But if Russian officials do follow through on their pledge, it will be quarters

on the events of 1968, the archives are still useful in conveying a sense of the Warsaw Pact's status during the Prague Spring.

Until recently, the **United States** was by far the most valuable source of new

slovakia had collapsed, any remaining inhibitions that Soviet and East European journalists may have felt about interviewing senior participants in the 1968 crisis evaporated. Interviews with Dubcek began appearing as frequently as the ex-KSC leader

who played key roles in the Czechoslovak crisis, as well as with lower-ranking participants, increased exponentially from the mid-1980s on. As recently as 1986-87, it was virtually impossible to find a Soviet official who would talk candidly about the Prague Spring or Moscow's role in the crisis. The invasion was still invariably depicted as a necessary step to thwart the machinations of "internal counterrevolutionaries and external reactionary forces." Some senior officials, such as Gromyko and Marshal Sergei Akhromeev (of the Soviet General Staff), continued to speak in those terms until the day they died. As late as June 1991 the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Yazov (who was arrested two months later for his part in the failed coup attempt), staunchly defended Soviet actions in August 1968 and claimed that no "invasion" had taken place.³⁶

roboration is not always possible.

5. Memoirs and Other First-Hand Accounts

Since the late 1980s a plethora of new memoirs and first-hand accounts of the Czechoslovak crisis have appeared in both Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as in the West. Not surprisingly, the quality of these publications varies widely. Some of the memoirs by former Soviet officials provide little more than canned apologies for Soviet military intervention in 1968. This was the approach taken by the long-time Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, who neglected even to mention the invasion in the two-volume (893-page) Russian edition of his memoirs, published in 1988.⁴² At the urging of his Western publisher, Gromyko included a few brief paragraphs about the Czechoslovak crisis in the English version of his memoirs, but these paragraphs were merely a turgid and cliché-ridden justification of the Soviet Union's actions.⁴³ Anyone hoping for new insights about the crisis will miss nothing by skipping Gromyko's book.

Fortunately, most other recent accounts by former Soviet officials are of greater value. Of particular interest is a brief article by Valerii Musatov, a former CPSU Central Committee staffer, which appeared in the weekly *Novoe vremya*.⁴⁴ Musatov commented on the internal deliberations and political wrangling in Moscow (as best he could discern them via his limited access to top bodies), and discussed the role that East European governments played in the lead-up to the invasion. His account not only provides a useful context for understanding the decision to intervene, but also includes some fascinating new details. A lengthier treatment of the crisis that has also proven extremely worthwhile is in a recent book co-authored by Oleg Gordievskii, a former

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1990, "Na konec tydne," 3; and "Alexander Dubcek vzpomina (4)," *Obcansky denik* (Prague), 24 August 1990, "Na konec tydne," 3. See also, *inter alia*, "Smotret vpered," *Moskovskie novosti* (Moscow) 50, 10 December 1989, 8; interview in *Mlada fronta* (Prague), 27 November 1989, 1; "Aleksandr Dubcek: 'Ya dumayu bolshe o budushchem, chem o proshlom,'" *Trud* (Moscow), 18 March 1990, 3; and "Vspominaya sozhzhennye adresa: A. Dubcek ob istorii sovetskochekhoslovatskikh otnoshenii," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 19 May 1990, 5.

29. For a small sample, see the interview with Zdenek Mlynar in "Vlast i obshchestvo," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 27 December 1989, 7; the interview with Jiri Hajek in *Mlada fronta* (Prague), 2 December 1989, 2; the interview with Cestmir Cisar in *Pravda* (Bratislava), 5 December 1989, 3; the interview with Lubomir Strougal in *Pravda* (Bratislava), 16 January 1990, 4; and the interview with Pyotr Shelest in *Moskovskii komsomolets* (Moscow), 30 August 1990.

30. "Yanosh Kadar o 'Prazhskoi vesne'," *Kommunist* (Moscow) 7 (May 1990), 96-103.

31. See, for example, the interview with Oleg Kalugin, a former major-general in the KGB, in "Otkrovennost' vozmozhna, lish kogda za tobou zakroetsya dver: General KGB o KGB," *Moskovskie novosti* (Moscow) 25 (24 June 1990), 11; "General-major Oleg Kalugin: 'KGB poka ne menyaet printsipov'," *Komsomolskaya pravda* (Moscow), 20 June 1990, 2; and "Lubyanka: Deistvuyushchie litsa i pokroviteli," *Sobesednik* (Moscow) 36 (September 1990), 6.

32. "Cheloveku svoistvenno oshibatsya...: Uroki istorii," *Komsomolskaya pravda* (Moscow), 19 October 1989, 2.

33. See Chuck Sudetic, "Bulgarian Communist Stalwart Says He'd Do It Differently," *New York Times*, 28 November 1990, A-8.

34. See, for example, "Vtoroi marshrut Kolumba: Politicheskii portret Aleksandra Dubcheka," *Pravda* (Moscow), 3 December 1991, 5; interview with Dubcek in *Narodna obroda* (Bratislava), 9 July 1991, 9; interview with Hajek in "Ostavatsya lyudmi: 23 goda spustya 'Izvestiya' prinosyat svoi izvineniya byvshemu ministru inostrannykh del Chekhoslovakii (1968 g.)," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 30 May 1991, 5; interview with Cernik in "Bumerang 'Prazhskoi vesnoi,'" *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 21 August 1990, 5; and interview with former deputy interior minister Jaroslav Kl1ng 'Prazhskoir minod

Times, 21 September 1989, A-8.

39. Their observations went beyond what was available in a published interview with a former Polish soldier, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, who recounted his experiences during the invasion; see "Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," *Kultura* (Paris) 4/475 (April 1987), esp. pp. 10-12.

40. For an early Western assessment of this matter, see George Gomori, "Hungarian and Polish Attitudes on Czechoslovakia, 1968," in E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslav Pielkalkiewicz, eds., *The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1972), esp. p. 9. For similar problems with East German troops, see Thomas M. Forster, *Die NVA: Kernstück der Landesverteidigung der DDR* (Cologne: Markus-Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 1979), 93.

41. To cite but one example, the late Romanian diplomat Corneliu Bogdan, whom I interviewed in Washington, D.C. in March 1989, was able to provide a thoughtful account of Romania's policy before and after the invasion.

42. A. Gromyko, *Pamyatnoe*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988).

43. Andrei Gromyko, *Memoirs*, trans. by Harry Shukman (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 232-233.

44. "The Inside Story of the Invasion," *Novoe vremya* (Moscow) 16 (April 1992), 16-20.

45. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievskii, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), esp. pp. 481-90.

46. Petro G. Grigorenko, *Memoirs*, trans. by Thomas P. Whitney (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), esp. pp. 357-59.

47. Bohumil Simon, "Takovi jsme byli: Fragment vyprávění o událostech deseti dnů, které rovněž otřásl svět," in Jiri Borek, ed., *Srpen 1968* (Prague: Edice Literatury Faktu, 1990), 169-96; Oldrich Cernik, "Kak eto bylo: Byvshii Predsedatel pravitelstva ChSSR o sobytiyakh avgusta 1968 goda," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 5 December 1989, 5; and Cestmir Cisar, *Přítvrzení*

the actual use of the weapons. Although the extent, target distribution, and depth of nuclear strikes still corresponded to the usual picture of a massive attack, a new development in 1988 was the planned massive use of operational-tactical and tactical missiles equipped with conventional cassette-warheads (i.e., reentry vehicles carrying a number of smaller, non-nuclear munitions).

Not until 1990 did the political changes in the GDR appear to have affected the training and exercise postures of the NVA. By then, the use of nuclear weapons was no longer an integral part of the NVA's exercises; instead, nuclear operations were left for procedural exercises geared toward specialists.

This kind of exercise on the planning and release of nuclear arms, as seen, for example, in parts of the staff exercise "Staff Training- 89," provided for the devastation of border areas in Schleswig-Holstein by 76 nuclear weapons, including some of high

destructive yield. Although there is very extensive information about the operational-tactical planning and military-technical aspects of nuclear weapons use, there is no documentation regarding the political decision-making process involved. In particular, there are no indications of the exact release provisions for the use of nuclear weapons, other than the well-known fact that the basic decision on when to "go nuclear" lay in the hands of the CPSU General Secretary.^F

The participation of other Warsaw Pact states in nuclear planning also remains obscure. As former officials of the ex-Defense Ministry of the GDR have indicated, non-Soviet members of the WP did not learn anything about real Soviet planning outside the exercises.^G

3. Deception of the Military and the Public About the Intentions, Military Strength and Defense Preparations of NATO

To conform with the Warsaw Pact's fundamental assumptions about the enemy, the operational planning of the Pact had to depict the intentions and capabilities of NATO's armed forces in an extremely exaggerated and false way. This campaign of falsification included statements and assertions about:

- * NATO's defense system;
- * NATO's planning for nuclear use; and
- * assessments of NATO's strength and intentions to attack.

Depiction of NATO's Defense System

NATO long ago prepared an in-depth defense system along the borders of the Warsaw Pact. For many years, this system barely figured at all in the exercises and staff planning documents of the NVA intelligence director. The system was kept secret from the participants in exercises, and therefore had no influence on the Warsaw Pact's offensive operations. Not until 1987 did the

first general references to NATO's system appear in NVA documents, and the system was not fully described until 1990.

In earlier years, indications of NATO's defense planning would already have been apparent to a patient and thorough reader of the military-geographical descriptions and specialized maps prepared by NVA scouts. These documents, however, were available to only a very small and restricted group of people.

In 1986 a colonel at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy departed from earlier treatments of the subject when he wrote about the so-called "Luxembourg Operational Direction" (sic!):

NATO has devoted great attention to the preparation and construction of defenses and barriers. . . . A high concentration of defenses . . . is in place at a depth of some 50 to 70 km just west of the borders of the GDR and CSSR.⁸

These defenses could be found in spe-

cialized maps as early as 1982—that is, at the high-point of the Warsaw Pact's offensive wargames. But all such maps, along with the statement cited above and any documents on this theme, were classified as top secret, and were therefore available to only an exclusive circle of people.

It is clear, however, that the NVA's so-called Intelligence Directorate did not subscribe to its own obvious falsifications. Intelligence chiefs at senior levels of command possessed a "Catalog of Intelligence Features," which was based on the NVA's assessment of NATO's mobilization and alert plans.⁹ Among other things, the catalog provided a meticulous list of known indicators of an attack and the corresponding warning times.

For example, the catalog accurately reported that at Alert Level II (4-6 days before war would start), the depth of NATO's frontier defenses might extend up to 100 kilometers. Such information would be crucial for

preparations to destroy and disable those defenses.

This detailed catalog, prepared as of 1982, had only one drawback: It was intended for only a very restricted group of officers in certain high-level command positions; and, on security grounds, it was not to be circulated further. A footnote on the very first page explicitly prohibited readers from relying on or quoting from the catalog because the material was so highly classified.

Depiction of NATO's Plans for the Use of Nuclear Weapons

At least as early as 1973, the GDR political leadership was well aware of NATO's approach to the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁰ That year, the NVA's intelligence director wrote, on the basis of his knowledge of the WINTEX-73 exercise, the following assessment: "WINTEX-73: . . . a further gradation of nuclear weapons use, even at the latest possible moment after a

100-km invading depth was achieved by Warsaw Pact troops”

An internal report prepared by the deputy director of intelligence, General Gottwald, for the defense minister in 1988 confirms that he had a completely accurate understanding of the policy that NATO had long maintained regarding the possible selective use of nuclear weapons.¹¹ An attentive reader of the report would note that “NATO’s military strategy [is] oriented more strongly toward a selective use of nuclear weapons.”

the WP's approach to the serious investigation of ways of conducting defensive operations. The training exercise is fully documented, and includes even the results of the participants.

6. Chief of the NVA's Main Staff, Colonel-General Streletz, in a report to his minister in follow-up briefings to Soyuz-83. From the exercise documents of Soyuz-83.

7. The following have been analyzed: "Staff Training-79" (see also note 4); "Comrades-in-Arms-80" (see also note 2); "Staff-Training-89" and "-90" of the Neubrandenburg (5th) Military District; the service book of a staff officer at the information directorate for "88/89"; the "Barricade-90" exercise of the heads of missile and artillery forces of the 5th Military District; and the command staff exercise "Sever-88" of the 5th Military District. Overall, they present a constant picture of nuclear planning in the 5th Military District.

8. Copies and originals of military-geographical depictions of operational directions (used as training material at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy) are at the Office for Information Sources of the Bundeswehr (ANBw). These pertain specifically to the "Jutland Operational Direction" and the "Coasts and Luxembourg Operational Direction" for 1986-88, from which the section on "Military-Political Significance" was cited.

9. An original copy of the "Catalog of Intelligence Features" is available at the ANBw. This catalog was intended only for senior officers of the Intelligence Directorate, and thus permits excellent comparisons with what was available to personnel outside the directorate and at lower levels of command.

10. The following are from minutes of GDR National Defense Council meetings.

11. These documents, from the ANBw publishing house, provide an overview of NATO strategy from 1967 on, with predictions through the year 2000. Starting in August 1988, NATO's nuclear policy was depicted relatively accurately, but the specter of a short-warning attack by NATO was preserved.

12. This document, from the ANBw's Documents of the NVA Intelligence Directorate, is entirely dedicated to the presentation of figures supporting the notion that NATO's activities and intentions were aggressive. By means of frequent "arithmetical adjustments," it gives an absolutely false assessment of NATO's force strength.

13. In the Soyuz-83 documents. See note 3.

14. This scenario is found in all documents on the enemy's status. The force estimates were corrected in 1988-89, but the assumption that NATO's intentions were aggressive was maintained until the final exercise, planned for September 1990 ("North Wind-90" in the 5th Military District; the documents on "North Wind-90" are at the ANBw).

15. Speechnotes of the head of military intelligence in the NVA, for a meeting of the heads of WP military intelligence in 1983.


16. Soyuz-83 is an example of this point. Senior members of the National Defense Council (such as E. Honecker) must have recalled that analyses of earlier WINTEX maneuvers (e.g., the 1973 exercises at the Council's 43rd Session, the 1977 exercises at the 51st Session) yielded an entirely different picture, with NATO inferior by a ratio of 2-to-3 vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. Honecker also received unembellished reports about the status and force levels of NATO and the Bundeswehr from the State Security Ministry; these provided him with a timely military assessment independent of the Ministry of National Defense.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

A. In Soviet military parlance, a Front was defined as "an operational-strategic formation of the armed forces ... which is designated to carry out operational-strategic missions along a single strategic direction or along several operational directions in a continental theater of military operations." See S.F. Akhromeev, ed., *Voennyl entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), 787. The size of a Front would vary considerably depending on its specific mission, but it could include as many as 200,000-300,000 troops. For further information about Soviet levels of command, see Christopher W. Donnelly, *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* (London: Jane's Information Group, 1988), 213-18.

B. There is a small inaccuracy here. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov had been commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact until 1976, when he was appointed chief of the Soviet General Staff. At the time of this exercises ("Soyuz-78," held in Romania), Marshal Viktor Kulikov was commander-in-chief of the Pact. The exercise was under Kulikov's, not Ogarkov's command.

C. For a broader discussion of the Czechoslovak army's ma3 the fJ 0 -s spern rame was -





New Sources on the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962 for gaining access to internal documentation

By William Burr*

The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1962 is one of the most under-studied Cold War crises in the scholarly literature.¹ This relative inattention cannot be due to lack of interest, as the Crisis was marked by dramatic and extraordinary developments, including Khrushchev's nuclear saber rattling, Kennedy's military mobilization in the summer of 1961, the erection of the Berlin Wall that August, and the October 1961 tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie. Rather, the fundamental reason for scholarly neglect has been the dearth of primary sources. In contrast to the relative ease with which researchers have won declassification of documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis,² efforts to obtain the release of key documents on the Berlin Crisis have been repeatedly blocked by U.S. government agencies. Until recently, U.S. decision-making on policy toward Berlin remained elusive, since researchers could only rely on heavily screened files at the National Archives and presidential libraries, and on the memoirs of participants.

And—again, until recently—prospects

Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, may help resolve the mystery of whether the U.S. buildup induced Khrushchev to pull back.²⁶

Soviet files could also clarify the degree to which the Berlin problem influenced

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equipment, and the mounting number of inquiries regarding legal and property questions, especially rehabilitation and expropriation matters, greatly increased the workload of the archives' personnel. An additional task will be the compilation of new or updated inventories and finding aids.

The former *Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Dienststelle Potsdam*, has been integrated into the *Bundesarchiv* and now forms its Sections III and V (*Deutsches Reich*, 1867/71-1945, and *Deutsche Demokratische Republik*, 1945/49-1990, respectively). Thus, the records of most of East Germany's central governmental agencies have become part of the holdings of the *Bundesarchiv*. Exceptions are the records of the East Ger-

tween the East German *Länder* and the three Western zones; and the very important records of the *Länder* ministries of the interior, which, as levers of power, were controlled by Communist functionaries who made the decisions about personnel and were responsible for the fundamental changes in the East German economic, legal, and educational system. Interestingly enough, there are no records in these files on the unconstitutional abolition of the East German *Länder* and the establishment of the districts, which was planned and carried out by the ministries of the interior. Records from the plebiscite in Saxony in 1946, which are also in this collection, reveal how the Soviet-German stock companies were founded, which, under the pressure of the occupying power, transferred economically crucial heavy industry plants from German to Soviet-dominated ownership, but no material could be found on the enormous East German reparation payments to the Soviet Union. There is hope, however, that some *Länder* provenances may be recovered from the files of the Central Office for Reparations (*Zentrales Amt für Reparationen*) and the East German ministries.

The archival materials of the district administrations (1952-1990) form the second highly significant record group in the East German *Landes-* and *Staatsarchive* for the history of the GDR. It is cut by the mc TD 0.iz TD4 Tteducaope, howe

council of the city of Leipzig and its districts (*Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt Leipzig, 1945-1970*, and *Stadtbezirksversammlungen und Rat der Stadtbezirke, 1957-1970*).

The Institute is preparing a second, enlarged edition of its *Guide to Inventories and Finding Aids of German Archives* and, as much as possible, will pay special attention to the published as well as unpublished material of East German archives that was not available at the time when the guide's first edition was compiled.

* These observations are based on the Institute's correspondence with German archives and the following materials: Joachim Gauck, *Die Stasi Akten: Das unheimliche Erbe der DDR*, bearbeitet von Margarete Steinhausen und Hubertus Knabe (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1991); Friedrich Beck, "Archive und archivalische Quellenlage in den neuen Bundesländern zur zeitgeschichtlichen Forschung," in *Der Archivar* 44 (1991):411-28; Friedrich P. Kahlenberg, "Das Bundesarchiv nach dem 3. Oktober 1990," in *ibid.*, 525-36; Mitchell G. Ash and Ulrich Geyer, "The Current Situation in the Archives of the New German States," in *Arbeitskreis Nachkriegsgeschichte—Newsletter* 3 (Winter 1991):2-5; John Connelly, "Working in the East German Archives," in *ibid.*, 6-7; "Gesetz über die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, StUG) vom 20. Dezember 1991," in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Teil I, Nr. 67 (December 28, 1991); and recent articles in various German Newspapers and magazines.

Notes by Stephen Connors:

1. Immediately following World War II, the national archives in each of the four occupied zones—American, French, British, and Soviet—concentrated their efforts on securing the archives that had been damaged during the war. On the Länder level, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia established new archives under the control of the Ministries of culture or the Prime Minister's office. In East Germany, the Central Archive set up in Potsdam on 8 May 1946 became East Germany's Reichs-Archiv, or national archive, but only within the Soviet zone. Later renamed the German Central Archive, it soon housed materials from the Secret Archive, or Geheimes Staatsarchiv, which was the former Central Archive for Prussia.

In West Germany, the Bundesarchiv, or Federal Archive, was established in Koblenz in June 1952. The Federal Archive soon obtained most of the archival collections of the former German Reich within the territory of the new Federal Republic, as well as the collections of the Allied Occupation Forces, which included the files of the former Reich, the Nazi Party, and the Wehrmacht. From 1947 until 1957, there were regular professional contacts between East German and West German archivists. Quite remarkably, both the Central Archive in Potsdam and the Federal Archive in Koblenz, keeping in mind the possibility of eventual reunification, developed technical archival improvements that could be implemented at both locations.

Unfortunately, as the Cold War progressed, the GDR stopped its archivists from attending German Archival Days, especially designed to maintain high levels of professional archival cooperation. By 1961, with ten-

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giving up their ideas, just as the Soviet Union also won't give up its ideas. The

archives to see what is going on. Every morning they say the police and the dogs are still there with the state lawyers who are going through documents; they don't know when the archives will reopen. The police remove the dogs after a couple of days.²²

April 21, 1992

The archives reopened on April 15. The state lawyers are still here, although working on a different floor. Up in the cafeteria for lunch, the woman at the cash register says, "Oh, you're back again." I say, "Yes, the archives were closed for a while. How are you?" "Not very well. Things aren't very good here, because there is no business. No one could come when the police were here, and now it's vacation, so there aren't very many people."

April 28, 1992

The state lawyers are still here reading in their own private room; no one knows for how long. There is still speculation as to whether the archives will remain open after funding runs out in June. Then the challenge will be to stay open until next January, when they are to be absorbed by Bundesarchiv (the German Federal Archive in Koblenz) and be run by a new independent foundation (*Stiftung*) that is being created for archives of former East German parties.

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30. The staff is selling boxes of glasses. It's sad. More people will be unemployed.

Had a long talk today with a (west) German graduate student, who has also been working in the SED archives. He had heard from a researcher who interviewed a former high-ranking official that most sensitive discussions weren't recorded in writing, including Ulbricht's communications with the Soviets. He said that the officials were old friends with the Soviets, so they just talked. Also, apparently the East Germans weren't allowed to take any notes in meetings with Soviets, although Wilhelm Pieck supposedly took a lot of his secretly at night afterward. At a conference in 1953, Fred Oelßner described recent meetings with a Soviet delegation at which "our friends" (the term used by the East Germans to refer to the Soviets) forbade the East Germans to take notes.²⁴

We also discussed the sensation of Wollweber's memoirs referring over and over to the Soviet Chefberater (chief advisor) and how Herrstadt just swept all that kind of information under the rug. This student also said that the archives saved some key documents to be published suddenly and with great fanfare in the journal *Beiträge zur Geschichte* or elsewhere. He said he knows of a key document, that it is here, but he can't get it because some SED/PDS person is going to publish it, and the archivists want to wait for that. He also said that connections can determine what you get to see in the archives (e.g. Potsdam) and in the Gauck Behörde/Stasi Archives.

August 27, 1992

IN RE: ALGER HISS

Editor's note: The opening of the Russian archives has prompted a re-examination of one of the Cold War's most controversial and mystifying episodes — the case of Alger Hiss. A former State Department official during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, Hiss was accused in the summer of 1948 of having been a Soviet spy. The charge was lodged by an editor of *Time* magazine (and a penitent former Communist Party member) named Whittaker Chambers during hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Hiss, at the time the head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, vehemently denied the charges. The case, which gripped public attention for months, occurred against a backdrop of worsening Cold War tensions, and contributed to the atmosphere in which the intense domestic anti-Communism of the McCarthy era thrived. It also gave a boost to the career of a first-term Republican member of HUAC, Rep. Richard M. Nixon, who championed Chambers' cause. Hiss himself, after unsuccessfully suing Chambers for slander, was convicted of perjury (the statute of limitations on the espionage charge had expired) in January 1950 and imprisoned. But his guilt or innocence has never been conclusively proven — or at least, unanimously agreed upon — and has remained a matter of fierce dispute among historians and partisans of the era. (For a detailed account, which concludes that Hiss was guilty, see Allen Weinstein, *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982); for a countering view, see Victor A. Navasky, "Weinstein, Hiss, and the Transformation of Historical Ambiguity into Cold War Verity," in Athan G. Theoharis, ed., *Beyond the Hiss Case: The FBI, Congress, and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), 215-45.)

Hiss, now 88, has long campaigned to establish his innocence. Last summer, after the collapse of the Soviet Union had improved prospects for the

opening of previously unavailable archives, he wrote to the head of the Russian

commission 16 1 Tf11/4/92, -6. William F. JTJcklethe

<u>Volume</u>	<u>Publication</u>		<u>Print</u>	<u>Fiche</u>
	<u>Target</u>	<u>Complete</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Pages</u>
1946-50 Intelligence	9/94		1520	
1946-50 (Supp.) Intelligence Supp.)				

Translated and Introduced by Mark Kramer

In August 1968 a small group of pro-Moscow hardliners in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, led by Vasil Bilak, wrote two letters requesting urgent assistance from the Soviet Union to thwart the imminent "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia. Both letters were addressed to Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), and both were written in Russian to ensure that they would be read promptly. The first (and more important) letter was signed by Bilak and four of his colleagues: Drahomir Kolder, Alois Indra, Oldrich Svestka, and Antonin Kapek. The second letter was signed only by Kapek on behalf of the others. The first letter was secretly handed over to Brezhnev at the Bratislava conference on 3 August 1968 by an intermediary who worked for Kolder. Brezhnev cited the letter when he met in Moscow with the leaders of East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria on 18 August, the day after the CPSU Politburo decided to proceed with the invasion. Brezhnev proposed to his East European colleagues that the letter be used with minor modifications (the deletion of the last paragraph, and a change in the address) as a formal justification for the impending military intervention. All the

participants supported the idea, and the letter did indeed become a pretext for the invasion. The second letter, which reached Brezhnev on August 19, urged the CPSU to respond positively to the first letter; but as it turned out this appeal was no longer necessary. By then the decision to invade had already been made.

Both letters had long been known to exist, but the precise texts had remained sealed in the Soviet archives (in a folder marked "NEVER TO BE OPENED") until July 1992, when Russian president Boris Yeltsin finally handed over copies to the Czechoslovak government. The full text of the letter is provided here in translation from the Czech version which was published in *Hospodarske noviny*, 17 July 1992. Of the five signatories of this letter, only Bilak is still alive. Bilak was indicted on several counts in 1992, including charges of treason for his part in the "letter of invitation," but it is unclear whether he will ever be convicted. The Prague daily *Lidove noviny* has reported that unless Bilak, who is a Slovak, is tried and sentenced before the end of 1992, he is likely to receive amnesty from the Slovak government when the Czechoslovak state splits apart

Nachteil sowjetischer Archive" [Uses and Disadvantages of the Soviet Archives], *Osteuropa (Zeitschrift fuer Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens)* 7 (July 1992), 595-608.)

Russian State University the Humanities, incorporating the former Moscow State Historico-Archival Institute, seeks to be a center for historical and archival work; affiliated "People's Archive" collects documents from "common people." (Natalya Basovskaya, "The Russian State University for the Humanities: A New Home for Archival Scholarship in Russia," *American Archivist* 55 (Winter 1992), 126-31.)

Russian Foreign Ministry and international advisory group organized by Norwegian Nobel Institute reach agreement on guidelines for declassification and access to documents; reports of advisory panel member and text of guidelines. (Odd Arne Westad, "The Foreign Policy Archives of Russia: New Regulations For Declassification and Access," *SHAFR Newsletter* 23:2 (June 1992), 1-10; William Taubman, "Archival Affairs: Russian Foreign Policy Archives: New Regulations on Declassification and Access." *AAASS Newsletter* 32:4 (Sept. 1992), 1-2.)

Crown Publishing Group announces pact with Russian intelligence service for exclusive access to KGB documents for use in books on major Cold War events. (Jeffrey A. Frank, "The Spies Out In the Sunshine," *WP*, 6/25/92.)

Yale University Press announces agreement with Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History (formerly the Central Party Archive) to publish document collections. (Yale University Press press release, 7/27/92.)

Stanford University history professor affiliated with Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace project to microfilm and publish Soviet archival records responds to Russian criticisms. (Terence Emmons, "I Don't Quite Understand You, Gentlemen..." 6/26/92, in *AAASS Newsletter* 32:4 (Sept. 1992), 3, 5.) Report on Hoover Institution activities, including archives agreement, in former Soviet Union. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Stanford Weekly*, 7/9/92.)

Rudolph Pikhov, head of Russian government archives committee, says "presidential archive" will be divided into two sections; materials covering the 1920s-1960s are to be returned to the archives, but more recent data are "undoubtedly essential to the head of state's work." ("Demons from Pandora's Box," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 7/11/92, in *FBIS-SOV-92-136*, 7/15/92.)

Scholar describes experiences attempting to study KGB documents in Moscow on events surrounding the Soviet invasion of Hungary. (Charles Gati, "New Russia, Old Lies," *NYT*, 7/11/92.)

Russian government puts classified documents on display; *Izvestia* cites party archives for 1923-26 in reporting that American industrialist Armand Hammer once carried \$34,000 in cash from Moscow to the U.S. Communist Party. ("Top Secrets' Tell of Soviet Obsessiveness," *WP*, 6/12/92.)

Exhibition of Soviet documents opens at Library of Congress; examples reprinted. (Serge Schmemmann, "From Deep in the Soviet Files, Facts, Footnotes, Even (Maybe) Real History"; "A Grim Record: Hatred, Starvation, an Execution, More Hatred, Chernobyl"; *NYT* 6/15/92; John Wagner, "Secret Soviet Documents Go On Display," *WP*, 6/16/92.)

Lithuania

Russian officials return to the Lithuania around 50,000 KGB files containing information on Lithuanians exiled to Siberia by the Soviets, details on

those persecuted by the KGB, and the data on indmdwgre1 w Tj T*yKGB docj T* -1.1 (Newsletter)Tj1ungar9 T GFootnotes

