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Translation and Commentary by Kathryn Weathersby

War, 1950-53, and the Armistice Negotiations," is one such find. It is a survey of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the Korean War that was compiled in 1966 by so far unidentified members of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive. The apparent purpose of this internal history was to provide background information for the small group of Soviet officials who were at that time engaged in discussions with the People's



THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations

by Mark Kramer
(Second of two parts)

The first part of this two-part article provided a brief review of the vast amount of material that has been released over the past few years regarding the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.[1] The aim of this part is to offer a preliminary look at some of the new interpretations that can be derived from the wealth of fresh evidence, including newly available materials from East European and former Soviet archives.

The first question to be asked is whether the documents and memoirs that have recently become available or soon will be available are likely to force drastic changes in the historical record. Does the new evidence compel Western scholars to rethink their whole understanding of the Czechoslovak crisis? Will older analyses of the subject have to be discarded? Occasionally, historical disclosures do bring about fundamental changes in traditional interpretations of events. Such was the case, for example, with the revelations in the mid-1970s about the crucial role of code-breaking and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in the U.S. and British efforts in World War II.[2] Military histories that had failed to take due account of this factor — which is to say, all histories up to that point — were suddenly rendered obsolete, or at least were in need of major revision. Will the same hold true for existing accounts of the 1968 crisis and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia?

For now, no definitive answer to this question is possible because not all the evidence is yet in. In particular, there are still several key archives in Moscow — the Presidential Archive, the KGB archives, and the military archives — with reams of crucial documents about the crisis that are still almost wholly untapped. If these items are released, they may produce revelations that will necessitate far-reaching changes in previous accounts, especially about the process of consensus-building in the Soviet Politburo during the spring and summer of 1968. A good deal of caution is therefore in order. Nevertheless, the evidence that has emerged up to now suggests that, for the most part, the best analyses produced by Western scholars in the pre-glasnost era will stand up very well. There are, of course, innumerable details that have to be revised, and, as indicated below, details can often be important. But except for a few more sweeping changes that may be necessary (as will be discussed in the final section of this article), prevailing conceptions of the crisis and of the Soviet-led invasion have not been greatly altered thus far by the declassified documents, new memoirs, and other evidence that has recently come to light.

The fact that drastic changes have not been required in the broad historical record is in part attributable to the insight and meticulous research that Western scholars earlier brought to bear on the topic. The events of 1968 attracted some of the best analysts in the field, and it shows in the quality of their work. Another reason that pre-glasnost scholarship has stood up well, however, is that Western observers had access to far more primary material about the Czechoslovak crisis than they normally had about key events in Soviet foreign policy. Scholars were able to make good use, for example, of documents that were brought out of Czechoslovakia shortly after the invasion.[3] They also were able to draw on the first-hand observations contained in published interviews with and commentaries by leading figures in the crisis, such as Josef Smrkovsky, Jiri Hajek, Jiri Pelikan, and Zdenek Hejzlar.[4] Moreover, by the mid- to late 1970s a growing number of memoirs by former Czechoslovak officials were available in the West. Books by Hajek, Zdenek Mlynar, and Pelikan, among others, and accounts by senior Czechoslovak intelligence agents who fled to the West, provided Western scholars with valuable evidence that they could not otherwise have hoped to obtain, short of gaining access to Soviet and East European archives.[5] Indeed, to cite but one example, it is striking how accurate Smrkovsky's and Mlynar's versions of the Cierna nad Tisou, Bratislava, and Moscow negotiations proved to be when judged against actual documents and transcripts from those meetings. The same high standards are evident in retrospective accounts written in the late 1960s and early 1970s by East European and Soviet emigres who had served as interpreters at one or more of the conferences and meetings in 1968.[6]

All these different sources may not have been a substitute for materials contained in archives, but, taken cumulatively, they gave Western scholars a body of evidence incomparably richer than the meager details known about most other Soviet foreign policy decisions. It is not wholly surprising, then, that pre-glasnost analyses of the Czechoslovak crisis have fared remarkably well amidst the flood of post-Communist revelations.

Still, if it is true that documents released since 1989 have not undermined our basic understanding of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, it is also true that earlier treatments of certain key aspects of the crisis need to be revised to take account of new evidence. The revised interpretations of these matters can help provide a clearer picture of the crisis as a whole. Obviously, the discussion that follows is not intended to be an exhaustive compilation of changes necessitated by evidence that has emerged over the past few years, but it should give a reasonable idea of the importance that seemingly narrow aspects of the crisis can have when seen in a new light. Many other topics not discussed here—including the influence of hard-line East European leaders; the role of prominent officials such as Janos Kadar, Aleksei Kosygin, and Yurii Andropov; East-West military and diplomatic relations before and during the invasion; Soviet/East European military preparations; Brezhnev's contacts with Dubcek; and the post-invasion talks between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—will be covered in other analyses by the present author scheduled for publication in the near future.[7]

1. The "Letters of Invitation" to Brezhnev

During the latter stages of the 1968 crisis, a small group of hard-line officials in the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC), led by the Slovak Communist Party chief, Vasil Bil'ak, did their best to promote Soviet military intervention, though without being so overt about the matter (until the invasion occurred) that they would provoke a backlash and charges of treason against themselves. Bil'ak and his two main colleagues, Alois Indra and Drahomir Kolder, secretly passed on information to Leonid Brezhnev and others in the Soviet Politburo, depicting the situation in the most alarming terms possible. They and their allies in the Czechoslovak army and state security (StB, for *Statni bezpecnost*) organs were the ones who

first informed the Soviet authorities about the interest that General Vaclav Prchlik, the head of the KSC's Military Administrative Department, had expressed in organizing armed resistance to a possible invasion. Newly released evidence also confirms that Bil'ak's group colluded with senior East European officials, especially the East German and Polish leaders, Walter Ulbricht and Wladyslaw Gomulka, in forming a wider anti-Dubcek coalition.[8] Their aim throughout was to persuade the Soviet Union to remove the KSC First Secretary, Alexander Dubcek, and put an end to the Prague Spring.

Yet, despite these efforts, Bil'ak acknowledged in his memoirs that as late as mid-August he and the other hard-liners feared that the Soviet Union might refrain from intervening and instead cut some sort of deal with Dubcek.[9] To forestall any arrangement that would leave even a semi-reformist government in place, one of Bil'ak's associates, Antonin Kapek, wrote a letter to Brezhnev during the Cierna nad Tisou meeting at the end of July. Kapek urged the Soviet leader to "extend fraternal assistance to our Party and our whole nation in dealing a rebuff" to the "anti-socialist and anti-Soviet" forces that had taken over the KSC and were posing a "serious danger to the very fate of socialism" in Czechoslovakia.[10] Because Kapek was the lone signatory of the letter and only a candidate member of the KSC Presidium, his appeal presumably carried relatively little weight. It is not clear when or even whether the letter was transmitted to Brezhnev, or what the Soviet leader did with it if in fact he received it.

Far more significant was a collective "letter of invitation" that Bil'ak's hard-line group addressed to Brezhnev a few days later, during the multilateral conference at Bratislava on 3 August. This second letter, which was signed by Bil'ak, Indra, Kolder,

the CPSU Politburo archives. The folder containing the letters was stamped "TOP SECRET" and was personally sealed by the head of the CPSU General Department, Konstantin Chernenko, with the following instructions: "To be preserved in the Politburo Archive. Not to be opened without my express permission." Rumors about these "letters of invitation" circulated for many years after August 1968, but in the absence of the documents themselves, it was unclear whether such letters had actually existed.

Dubcek was handled in an unorthodox manner. Contrary to normal procedures, the telegram was not directly addressed to anyone and was not signed by Zhivkov. The coolness of Bulgaria's response to Dubcek's election was conspicuous enough that it even drew a protest from Soviet diplomats, who called the Bulgarian actions "hasty and basically improper" and urged the Bulgarian authorities "to treat [Dubcek's] election the same way we have treated changes of leadership in other fraternal parties."[27]

Nevertheless, it seems clear that the unease felt by Zhivkov and other Bulgarian officials about Dubcek's election was not due to any forebodings of drastic policy changes to come in Czechoslovakia. Instead, the Bulgarian leader was apparently discomfited by the manner in which Novotny was replaced. Normally, such a step would have been "recommended" by the KSC Presidium and then obediently ratified by the Central Committee; but in late 1967 and early 1968 the KSC Presidium was deadlocked. Consequently, Novotny's fate was determined by a vote of the full KSC Central Committee. For understandable reasons, this unusual way of ousting the long-time KSC First Secretary was disconcerting for Zhivkov, who had come to power at around the same time that Novotny did in the early 1950s. Although some Bulgarian officials may have had genuine concerns about Dubcek's "bourgeois nationalism" (a charge leveled by Novotny), the real motivation behind Bulgaria's less-than-friendly response to the events in Czechoslovakia in early 1968 was undoubtedly Zhivkov's fear that a similar leadership change could occur in Bulgaria.

Hence, the initial Bulgarian response to Dubcek's election does not in itself bear out Mladenov's claim about "early antagonism." Only if Bulgarian officials had continued to express deep hostility toward the events in Czechoslovakia during the first few months of 1968 would Mladenov's interpretation be vindicated. Yet the evidence on this score, rather than confirming Mladenov's view, undercuts it. The public record shows that Gomulka was the first East-bloc leader to declare, in a lengthy speech on 19 March, that "imperialist reaction and enemies of socialism" were behind the Prague Spring.[28] No comparable public statements from Zhivkov appeared until several months later, in mid-July.[29] The tightly-controlled Bulgarian press, in fact, was notable for its favorable coverage of Dubcek and the Prague Spring during the first half of 1968. Bulgarian leaders eschewed polemics long after scathing commentaries had begun appearing regularly in the media of both Poland and East Germany.[30]

The belatedness of Bulgaria's "antagonism" toward the Prague Spring is also evident in newly declassified materials from former Soviet and East European archives. During the first few months of 1968, Bulgarian officials voiced almost no misgivings at all about the reforms in Czechoslovakia; and the one or two complaints they did have were muted.[31] Not until April and May did Bulgarian assessments of the Prague Spring take on a somewhat more negative tone.[32] Although it might be argued that Bulgaria's low-key approach to the Czechoslovak reforms during the first few months of 1968 was simply a matter of discretion, new archival materials do not bear this out. After all, Bulgarian leaders at the time were never hesitant about expressing harsh criticism of events in both Romania and Yugoslavia.[33]

A similar picture of Bulgarian policy vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia emerges from the once-secret transcripts and summaries of the multilateral East-bloc conferences at Dresden and Moscow in the spring of 1968. These documents confirm that Gomulka and Ulbricht, not Zhivkov, led the way in opposing the Czechoslovak reforms. At the Dresden conference in late March, which Zhivkov did not attend because of a scheduling conflict, Gomulka and Ulbricht vehemently depicted the events in Czechoslovakia as outright "counterrevolution."[34] No one else at the conference, not even Bil'ak, was yet ready to go that far. Certainly there is no evidence that Zhivkov's representatives at the conference joined—much less preceded—Gomulka and Ulbricht in portraying the situation in such dire terms. On the contrary, the Bulgarian participants' brief remarks at the Dresden conference seemed moderate compared to the harsh statements made by their East German, Polish, and even Soviet colleagues. Much the same was true of the Moscow conference in early May, where Ulbricht and Gomulka stepped up their previous denunciations of the "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia and demanded that immediate action be taken.[35] Zhivkov, by contrast, was still not willing to resort to such strident language, despite the misgivings he was feeling by that time. His scattered comments at the meeting were notable only for how little they revealed about his position.

In short, there is no evidence that substantiates—and much new evidence that contravenes—Mladenov's assertion that Zhivkov was out in front of all his Warsaw Pact colleagues in advocating the use of military force against Czechoslovakia.

At the same time, evidence that has recently come to light suggesting that Zhivkov did begin shifting to a hard-line position earlier than most Western scholars had assumed. In late May 1968, two weeks after the conference in Moscow, Zhivkov transmitted a secret "Report Concerning the Situation in Czechoslovakia" and an "information bulletin" on the same topic to the Soviet ambassador in Sofia, A. M. Puzanov.[36] The report and the bulletin were prepared by the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense and the Bulgarian State Security forces, respectively, and both items received Zhivkov's official endorsement. The two documents expressed strong opposition to the reforms in Czechoslovakia, often in crudely anti-Semitic terms, and adverted several times to the possible need for military intervention. To be sure, except for the anti-Semitic remarks, the tone of the two reports was not as hysterical as some of the statements that Ulbricht and Gomulka had been making; among other things, Bulgarian officials still expressed confidence that "healthy forces" (i.e., orthodox Communists) could prevail in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, unlike the strident criticisms voiced by East German and Polish leaders, neither of the Bulgarian documents was intended for public consumption. Nevertheless, anyone in Moscow who read the materials would have had little doubt that as of May, Zhivkov had become decidedly hostile to the Prague Spring and to Dubcek personally.

By the time of the Warsaw conference several weeks later, Zhivkov had aligned himself unambiguously with the extreme Ulbricht-Gomulka point of view.[37] Even then, however, the Bulgarian leader was not as vitriolic or obsessive in his condemnations of the Prague Spring as either Ulbricht or Gomulka was. Moreover, it is unlikely that Zhivkov's adoption of an uncompromising stance had any real influence on his Soviet or East European counterparts. Judging from transcripts of the multilateral con-

ferences in 1968, it does not seem that the other Warsaw Pact leaders ever took Zhivkov particularly seriously or looked to him for advice. Kadar, in fact, had not even wanted Bulgaria to participate in the conferences at all, lest the assembled Warsaw Pact states give the impression that they were trying to isolate Romania. Kadar urged that attendance at the meetings be limited to the four East-bloc countries bordering on Czechoslovakia.[38] Ultimately, this suggestion was not heeded, and Bulgarian leaders ended up taking part in all the multilateral conferences; but that was only because Brezhnev approved their attendance, presumably believing he could use the Bulgarian representatives as a wedge for his own views. The fact that some of the participants were willing to exclude the Bulgarians altogether provides ample confirmation of the peripheral nature of Zhivkov's role.

It is not surprising, then, that Zhivkov would have been disinclined to stake out a firm position during the first several months of 1968, until he had a better idea of where the prevailing sentiment in Moscow would lead. Ulbricht and Gomulka could fulminate all they wished about the situation in Czechoslovakia, but it would not have mattered from Bulgaria's standpoint unless Brezhnev eventually moved in their direction as well. Not until the five-power conference in Moscow in early May was the extent of Soviet displeasure with Dubcek and the Prague Spring fully evident to Zhivkov. By the time of the Warsaw meeting in mid-July, as Kadar later acknowledged, "the ranks of the supporters of military intervention had increased" on the Soviet Politburo;[39] hence, it was only natural that at this point Zhivkov, too, placed himself squarely on the interventionists' side.

From then on, any qualms or hesitation that Zhivkov may have had in the first part of 1968 were cast aside. As the sentiment in Moscow shifted steadily in favor of military intervention, Zhivkov shifted his own position accordingly, adding his own peculiar anti-Semitic twists. This pattern belies the claim he made many years later, in the interview in 1990, about his supposed aversion to using military force in August 1968. All evidence suggests that Zhivkov's recent attempts to portray Bulgaria as a reluctant participant in the invasion cannot be taken seriously. The Bulgarian leader's real attitude at the time can be gauged from a secret message he transmitted to the CPSU Politburo in early August 1968, just before the Bratislava meeting:

> Despite the results of the bilateral negotiations at Cierna nad Tisou [which had just concluded], the situation in Czechoslovakia and the entire history and development of events give no reason to believe that the current leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party will be able to change things for the better. . . . To improve the situation in Czechoslovakia and save the Communist party and socialist achievements, we must use all possible and necessary means, including the Warsaw Pact's armed forces. . . . If we do not manage to turn events around, it will be a catastrophe — a blow against the Soviet Union, against our socialist countries, against the international Communist movement, and against the development of our socialist countries. . . . The Warsaw Pact forces will be severely weakened, and that will be a grave threat to the GDR, Hungary, and Poland. . . . Our opinion [in Bulgaria] is: Force the Czechoslovak leadership to capitulate. If they refuse to give in, then take other extreme measures.[40]

Although Zhivkov may not have been the earliest advocate of military intervention in 1968, he was certainly ready to embrace that option enthusiastically when the time came, especially if it would earn him Moscow's approval. In this matter, as in most others, the Bulgarian leader's main objective was to support whatever position would ingratiate him with his Soviet counterparts.

3. The Role of the KGB

Recent disclosures have borne out earlier assumptions that the KGB acquired undue influence during the 1968 crisis. It has long been known that senior intelligence officials in both Czechoslovakia and the USSR deliberately offered alarming assessments of the Prague Spring, in part because they feared that NATO was exploiting the situation. In the mid-1970s, former agents from the KGB and the Czechoslovak State Security forces (StB) revealed that accurate information about the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 often was not sent on to the proper authorities in Moscow.[41] These disclosures were recently corroborated by a former KGB station chief in Washington, D.C., Oleg Kalugin, who described the problems he encountered when trying to present a balanced assessment of the crisis:

> It's no secret that the KGB played an important role in many decisions concerning foreign policy matters. This applies to the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. The KGB stirred up fears among the country's leadership that Czechoslovakia could fall victim to NATO aggression or a coup unless certain actions were undertaken promptly. At about the same time, I reported from Washington that the CIA was not involved in the developments of the Prague Spring. But my attempt at an even-handed report simply did not fit in with the KGB's concept of the way events were shaping up in Czechoslovakia, and therefore never got beyond the KGB. My information was wasted.[42]

Kalugin also reported that he "found out a year later, when [he] went on leave to Moscow, that the leadership of the KGB had given instructions in 1968 that [his] messages should be destroyed and not shown to anyone."[43] The same apparently happened with a few other KGB analysts who tried to

Other new disclosures by Oleg Gordievskii, who, like Kalugin, was a high-ranking KGB official until the mid-1980s, indicate that the KGB's role in the Czechoslovak crisis went well beyond the distortion and manipulation of intelligence. Gordievskii confirms earlier reports by a former StB official, Frantisek August, that large numbers of Soviet and pro-Soviet agents were responsible for secretly monitoring the activities of senior KSC officials and employees of the StB from early 1968 on.[46] Constant surveillance was maintained through a variety of techniques, including wiretaps, eavesdropping devices, signals intelligence, and reports by collaborators in Prague. Among the collaborators were a few top Czechoslovak officials (e.g., the deputy interior minister, Viliam Salgovic) and some well-placed members of the KSC's clerical staff (e.g., one of Smrkovsky's secretaries). Furthermore, according to Gordievskii, nearly three dozen KGB agents posing as Western tourists were dispatched to Czechoslovakia to collect whatever information they could from "counterrevolutionaries" within the KSC.[47] Other Soviet agents, led by General N. Skripo, who visited Czechoslovakia in May and June for an ostensible reunion with old wartime comrades, performed secret military reconnaissance missions that proved crucial later on.[48] The political and military intelligence that the KGB gathered from these various sources was useful not only before and during the invasion, but also afterwards in removing the StB and KSC officials who had been supportive of Dubcek.[49]

In addition to keeping close track of the situation in Czechoslovakia, the KGB performed numerous other covert functions during the 1968 crisis. The agents who had been sent as "tourists" to collect information in Czechoslovakia were also responsible for carrying out provocations, such as putting up posters calling on Czechs and Slovaks to rise up against Communism and pull out of the Warsaw Pact, as in Hungary in 1956. The "tourists" also planted caches of American-made arms in western Bohemia near the German border, leaving them to be "discovered" and played up in the Soviet press as "evidence" of an impending CIA-sponsored coup or insurrection.[50] During the invasion itself, the KGB took on a supporting combat role. Militarized security units accompanied regular army troops into Czechoslovakia, though the KGB forces tended to be ill-suited for their missions.[51] The use of these special operations troops (*Spetsnaz*) was still valuable, however, in highlighting improvements that were needed and in drawing les-

situation in Czechoslovakia with alarm.

The perception within the KGB that the Prague Spring was a threat to both the external and internal security of the Soviet Union helps explain why several high-ranking officials in the agency were among the earliest and most adamant proponents of military intervention in Czechoslovakia.[63] To be sure, support for an invasion was by no means unanimous among senior KGB officials, as recent evidence has made clear. Those responsible for foreign operations tended to be especially hesitant about resorting to military force.[64] Nevertheless, there is little doubt that all top KGB personnel were dismayed by the "excesses" of the Prague Spring, and hoped that the reforms could be halted and reversed. Even officials reluctant to go along with an invasion began to lose patience when Pavel continued removing pro-Soviet agents in the StB and Interior Ministry.

Thus, over time, the number of top-ranking KGB personnel who believed that a military response would be necessary grew substantially. The problem with this trend, however, is that it compromised the agency's role as a source of (relatively) unbiased information for the highest political authorities. Once senior officials in the KGB, including Yurii Andropov, had decided to press for an invasion, they resorted to the manipulation and distortion of intelligence to bolster their case. In particular, they and Chervonenko badly misled top Soviet officials about the support that a post-invasion regime would command from the Czechoslovak population.[65] Although a more balanced flow of information would probably not have changed any minds in the CPSU Politburo during the final vote on the invasion, accurate reports from the KGB might have caused Soviet leaders to think more carefully about the enormous difficulty of reestablishing political (as opposed to military) control.

4. Military Motivations and Concerns

Western analysts have long suspected that military-strategic considerations figured prominently in the Soviet Union's response to the Prague Spring.[66] Well before the 1968 crisis, Soviet military commanders had believed that the lack of a permanent Soviet troop presence in Czechoslovakia (in contrast to the large deployments in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary) seriously impeded the Warsaw Pact's military preparations against NATO. Soviet requests to station a Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia had been turned down on numerous occasions in the 1950s and 1960s by Gottwald and Novotny, but Soviet leaders had not given up their hopes of gaining a permanent presence on Czechoslovak territory, as the events of 1968 revealed. At several points during the crisis, top-ranking Soviet officers such as Marshal Ivan Yakubovskii, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, urged the Czechoslovak government to accept the "temporary" deployment of a Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia.[67] Officials in Prague rejected these Soviet demands, but Western analysts have long maintained that Moscow's desire to gain a large-scale troop presence contributed to the Soviet High Command's implicit and explicit support for armed intervention.[68] As it turned out, of course, the invasion did result in the establishment of a "Central Group of Soviet Forces" numbering some 75,000-80,000 soldiers, which remained on Czechoslovak soil until July 1991.

What has become clearer over the last few years, however, is that the primary issue for the Soviet military in 1968 was not simply whether the Czechoslovak government would agree to a Soviet troop presence *per se* (though that was certainly a key matter in its own right), but whether the Prague Spring would disrupt arrangements that had been secretly codified in the early to mid-1960s for "joint" nuclear weapons deployments. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish armed forces began receiving nuclear-capable aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles from Moscow.[69] Shortly thereafter, the Bulgarian and Hungarian armies also obtained nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles from the Soviet Union; and even the Romanian military was eventually supplied with nuclear-capable FROG-7 and Scud-B missiles. These new East European weapons were officially described as components of the "Warsaw Pact's joint nuclear forces" and used for simulated nuclear missions during Pact exercises; but Western analysts have always assumed that nuclear warheads for the delivery systems remained under exclusive Soviet control, and that the delivery vehicles also would have come under direct Soviet command in wartime if they were equipped with nuclear charges. Such an arrangement would have left East European officials with no say at all in the use of the Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal. As for the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that Soviet forces themselves deployed in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary, the lack of East European input was thought to be even more conspicuous, as Soviet leaders rejected all proposals for the establishment of a "dual-key" system along the lines that NATO worked out in the mid-1960s.

Evidence that has recently come to light strongly confirms this earlier speculation about nuclear command-and-control procedures in the Warsaw Pact. It is now known that Moscow secretly arranged in the mid-1960s to station nuclear warheads under strict Soviet control on Polish, East German, and Hungarian territory, where the three extant Groups of Soviet Forces were already firmly entrenched. All the agreements on this matter were bilateral, but were described as being "within the framework of the Warsaw Pact."[70] The nuclear warheads were to be fitted to delivery vehicles belonging to Soviet troops stationed in the East European countries; and some of the warheads may also have been intended for weapons employed by the local armies under direct Soviet command. As in the past, all decisions on when to "go nuclear" were reserved for Soviet political and military leaders.[71]

In the case of Czechoslovakia, however, the nuclear issue had always seemed more problematic because no Soviet troops had been stationed there since 1945. The presence of several hundred thousand Soviet forces in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary facilitated the closely-guarded deployment of nuclear warheads in those countries. If the Soviet Union had been unable to store nuclear warheads under similar conditions in Czechoslovakia for wartime use, a serious gap would have been left in the center of the Warsaw Pact's nuclear front line against NATO. Even if plans had been made to ship large quantities of nuclear warheads under Soviet control to Czechoslovakia during a crisis, the execution of such plans would probably have been detected by NATO and might have triggered a preemptive strike against the Warsaw Pact. These considerations led a prominent Western analyst, Lawrence Whetten, to conclude soon after the invasion that "the absence of Soviet troops" in Czechoslovakia had been "a glaring weakness in the Pact's defenses"

because it resulted in a "lack of nuclear preparedness."[72] He surmised that this "weakest link" in the Warsaw Pact—the inability to deploy nuclear warheads on Czechoslovak territory because of the lack of Soviet troops there—was one of the key factors behind the Soviet Politburo's decision to undertake military intervention. Numerous other Western analysts have concurred with Whetten's arguments.

There is, to be sure, a good deal of merit to these claims, but classified documents obtained from the Czechoslovak ministry of defense in the spring of 1991 reveal that the matter was more complicated than Whetten implied. It now turns out that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed two agreements, one in August 1961 and the other in February 1962, entitling the USSR to dispatch nuclear warheads immediately to Czechoslovakia in the event of an emergency. Those agreements in themselves would not have detracted from Whetten's analysis, but they were followed in December 1965 by a "Treaty Between the Governments of the USSR and CSSR on Measures to Increase the Combat Readiness of Missile Forces," which was signed by the then-Soviet defense minister, Rodion Malinovskii, and his Czechoslovak counterpart, Bohumir Lomsky.[73] The treaty provided for the stationing of nuclear warheads at three sites in western Czechoslovakia — at Bela pod Bezdezem, Bilina, and Misov — under exclusive Soviet control. The reinforced storage bunkers for the nuclear warheads and the housing for elite KGB units assigned to guard the weapons were to be constructed jointly by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, with the construction and operating costs of all the facilities to be picked up by the Czechoslovak government. A senior Czechoslovak defense ministry official later confirmed that "the procedures for the defense and protection of these special-purpose storage centers for nuclear weapons were such that no one from our side had permission to enter, and even Soviet officials who were not directly responsible for guarding and operating the buildings were not allowed in."[74]

Construction of the facilities was originally due to be completed by the end of 1967, but unforeseen delays prevented the storage bunkers from being ready until sometime in 1969.[75] Work on the buildings was supposed to continue during the Prague Spring, but Soviet officials obviously worried that the reformist trends would derail plans to finish the construction and to begin storing nuclear warheads. The implications of any such threat to the projected deployment of nuclear weapons in Czechoslovakia were enormous. Before the Prague Spring, the Soviet High Command might have agreed — if only reluctantly — to rely on Czechoslovak forces, rather than Soviet troops, to protect the three nuclear depots in western Bohemia, which were to be kept under tight KGB control as well. After all, until 1968 Soviet commanders had no reason to question the steadfast loyalty of senior officers in the Czechoslovak People's Army (CLA).[76] The CLA was the most impressive of the East European armed forces, and Soviet "representatives" were present at all levels of command. These factors might have been enough to induce Soviet military and political leaders to live without a full-fledged Group of Soviet Forces on Czechoslovak territory even after the planned storage of nuclear warheads had begun.

Once the Prague Spring was under way,

slovakia gave an even sharper edge than usual to the Soviet attacks. An authoritative article in the main Soviet military newspaper, *Krasnaya zvezda*, claimed that Prchlik was "so blinded by 'liberalization' that [he] ... is even prepared to debate publicly the most confidential state and military matters."[84] Such matters obviously included Czechoslovakia's plans to accept Soviet nuclear warheads. The same point was emphasized in classified letters to Dubcek that Marshal Yakubovskii and other Soviet leaders sent to protest Prchlik's remarks.[85] They accused the general of having "divulged top-secret information regarding the deployment of the Joint Armed Forces" and of having "revealed top-secret provisions in interstate treaties." Soviet leaders demanded that Czechoslovakia "immediately live up to its allied obligations" and prevent any further "disclosure of interstate secrets that bear on the security of the socialist countries."[86] Those "obligations" to protect "interstate secrets" applied, above all, to the bilateral treaties on nuclear weapons.

The concern that Soviet leaders had about the proposed nuclear weapons sites in Czechoslovakia—and about Czechoslovakia's policy more generally—increased still further when it turned out that Prchlik, rather than being fired ignominiously, was merely reassigned to other military-related duties. In his new capacity, the general was even able to continue working on drafts of the national security Action Program, an arrangement that infuriated Soviet officials when they found out about it. Soviet leaders were equally dismayed that neither the KSC nor the Czechoslovak defense ministry would formally repudiate any of Prchlik's comments until 15 August, a month after the general's news conference. In the meantime, Prchlik received an outpouring of public admiration and expressions of support from many of his colleagues and subordinates in the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry. Needless to say, these reactions produced even greater Soviet consternation and led to serious doubts in Moscow about Czechoslovakia's military alignment.[87]

Thus, well before the invasion in August 1968, Soviet Army commanders had lost all confidence in their Czechoslovak counterparts and had become convinced that the risks of deploying nuclear warheads on Czechoslovak soil would be too great unless the storage sites were converted into larger bases for Soviet forces. Indeed, judging by the location and scale of Soviet troop movements during the crisis, the Pact's "exercises" seem to have been intended, in part, to protect the three sites chosen as nuclear weapons depots. Soviet concerns about the security of the depots had been growing rapidly since the early spring of 1968, when it was announced that Czechoslovak border guards had dismantled a series of barbed-wire and electrical fences along the border with West Germany.[88] These concerns gave rise by mid-1968 to "deep anxiety and fear" in Moscow about the "laxity of those responsible for Czechoslovakia's western frontiers."[89] From then on, Soviet leaders were determined to rectify "the absolutely abnormal and dangerous situation on Czechoslovakia's borders with the FRG and Austria," which was enabling "imperialist spies and subversive elements to carry out subversive activities in a region where large-scale defense forces of the Warsaw Pact governments are deployed."[90] Moscow's perception that Czechoslovak officials were not "displaying the concern and vigilance needed to protect the common security interests of the socialist countries" hardly boded well for the stringent security arrangements that would soon be required for the USSR's three proposed nuclear weapons sites in Czechoslovakia.

In retrospect, then, it is clear that the real issue at stake in 1968 was not whether the Soviet Union would be formally entitled to store nuclear munitions in Czechoslovakia. That question had been settled in Moscow's favor as far back as 1965.[91] What mattered, instead, was whether the Soviet High Command could be confident about the physical security of the weapons without a direct, large-scale Soviet troop presence. Until 1968, Soviet commanders might have had that degree of confidence; but from early 1968 on, their confidence was shattered. Well before the invasion, the situation in Czechoslovakia had become so desperate (from Moscow's standpoint) that Soviet military officers were no longer willing to accept anything less than the deployment of a "Central Group of Soviet Forces" on Czechoslovak territory.

5. Casualties During the Invasion and Occupation

Western analysts have long known that several dozen Czechoslovak citizens died during the invasion and that hundreds more were wounded, but the precise figures were not disclosed until very recently. The data were compiled in a lengthy report prepared by the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry in late 1968 at the request of the General Procurator's office. When the report was completed, it was classified "top secret" and was distributed in only five numbered copies.[92] The newly published text reveals that "82 Czechoslovak citizens were killed, 300 were severely wounded, and 500 suffered minor wounds at the hands of the occupiers between 21 August and 28 September 1968." From 29 September through 18 October, an additional 18 Czechoslovak citizens were killed and 35 more were severely wounded by the occupying troops. In short, a total of 100 civilian deaths and 335 severe woundings, as well as hundreds of minor woundings, were caused by the reimposition of Soviet military control over Czechoslovakia. The report, which provided brief biographical information about all the civilians who died, noted that the invading forces had used artillery, machine guns, and submachine guns to subdue crowds. It also pointed out that the 435 Czechoslovak citizens who were killed or severely wounded were not "using firearms of their own against the foreign soldiers."[93]

As for casualties suffered by the Warsaw Pact forces, a relatively small number (around 20) were killed, but only one of these deaths — that of a Bulgarian soldier — came at the hands of Czechoslovak citizens. Most of the deaths among Soviet troops were caused either by traffic accidents or by "so-called extraordinary events that accompany every large-scale troop movement."[94] In addition, a handful of Soviet soldiers were sentenced to death by firing squad for having refused to go along with the invasion; and a few others committed suicide.[95]

Given the scale of "Operation Danube-68" (as the invasion was code-named), the number of casualties on both sides was remarkably low. At the time, even Czechoslovak officials were surprised and pleased at how few civilians died or were wounded. Secret reports prepared for the KSC Presidium several weeks after the invasion had noted the acute tensions that still existed

troops to overcome the peaceful resistance they encountered from ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, and the large number of serious accidents and fights that ensued, did not lead to an "explosion" or to the "massacre" that some in Prague had feared.

ISSUES NEEDING FURTHER EXPLORATION

As new archival materials become available in Moscow and elsewhere, it will be possible to look in much greater depth at several issues that remain largely mysterious even now. No doubt, some of these issues cannot be fully resolved because the requisite documentation either never existed or has been destroyed. Unfortunately, some key materials in the East European archives appear to be missing or to have been tampered with, and the same is undoubtedly true on an even larger scale in Russia.[97] Nevertheless, as new evidence emerges, Western scholars should be able to develop a clearer understanding of at least some of the key issues listed below. A more elaborate discussion of these issues, and the questions about them that need to be answered, will be included in other works in preparation by the present author.[98]

1. Consensus-Building in Moscow

Precisely how the CPSU Politburo arrived at a consensus in favor of military intervention in the spring and summer of 1968 may never be known with certainty. But if Soviet archives that have been off-limits up to now are rendered more accessible, Western and Russian scholars should gain a better understanding of the process. Among the documents that would be especially valuable in filling in gaps would be the transcript of the CPSU Politburo meeting on 15-17 August, the transcript of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 9-10 April, the full transcript of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 17 July, the transcripts of all CPSU Politburo meetings (whether formal or informal) between mid-June and mid-August, and materials compiled by special "commissions" of the CPSU Politburo that were established to deal with the crisis. Crucial documentation is also likely to exist in the personal files of leaders such as Brezhnev, Suslov, Kosygin, and Podgornyi.

In addition to the question of how the consensus emerged, a related issue of particular interest is whether anyone on the CPSU Politburo dissented from the final decision to intervene. The fact that a three-day session of the Politburo was required before the decision was reached suggests that at least one or two members, and possibly more, still had serious reservations. In his speech to East European Communist Party leaders just after the conclusion of the CPSU Politburo's session, Brezhnev averred that he and his colleagues had "considered these questions [about Czechoslovakia] from all angles" during their three-day meeting and had made a "profound analysis" of what should be done.[99] This formulation certainly implies that at least a few members of the Politburo, at some point, expressed doubts about the wisdom of the invasion. Although Brezhnev went on to say that the Politburo and Secretariat "unanimously adopted the decision to lend military assistance to the healthy forces" in the KSC, the word he used for "unanimously," *edinodushno*, implies unanimity of spirit and not necessarily unanimity of actual voting. (This ambiguity would not be present if Brezhnev had used the word *edinoglasno*, which also translates into English as "unanimously.") The distinction is a fine one and it may be reading too much into what Brezhnev said, but his speech does not absolutely foreclose the possibility that dissenting votes were cast. Only if we can gain access to the full transcript of the CPSU Politburo meeting will it be possible to resolve the issue conclusively.

There is no way to tell, unfortunately, when the transcript might be released (assuming it exists), but in the interim scholars need not just sit around waiting. There are several leads, albeit tenuous ones, that are well worth exploring. An important article in 1989 by Pyotr Rodionov, who was then first deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, stated that at least one member of the Soviet Politburo, Gennadii Voronov, had opposed the decision to intervene, believing it was "deeply mistaken" and "misguided."[100] Voronov himself subsequently denied that he had voted against the invasion, and his denial has to be taken seriously.[101] Because Rodionov argued that Voronov displayed "great personal bravery" in opposing the decision, it must have been tempting for Voronov either to support Rodionov's claim (assuming that it is accurate) or just to have said nothing (if it is inaccurate). Voronov had nothing to gain by issuing a denial, apart from wanting to set the record straight. Still, Voronov did acknowledge that he had expressed certain qualms about the decision—"Whom was it really so necessary for us to defend, and from whom?"—in a speech he gave to the Novosibirsk regional Party committee shortly after the invasion.[102] Closer examination of Voronov's role throughout the crisis is thus very much in order.

2. The Ukrainian Factor

Western analysts have long appreciated that the potential for instability in Ukraine was one of the major factors contributing to the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia.[103] But there is much about Ukraine's role in the decision, including the extent to which Ukrainian party chief Petro Shelest was maneuvering for Brezhnev's job, that will remain unclear until the Soviet and Ukrainian archives are fully opened. The Ukrainian government's declared intention to release virtually all the records of the Ukrainian Communist Party is encouraging, but it remains to be seen how this will work out in practice. It also remains to be seen whether the requisite documents in Moscow, especially items from the personal files of Shelest, Vladimir Shcherbitskii, and Brezhnev in the Presidential Archive, will be made available.

3. A Nuclear Alert?

Until the late 1980s, Western scholars and government officials had assumed that the Soviet Union had never put its nuclear forces on full combat alert, even during the Cuban missile crisis. In late 1989, however, an excerpt was released from a secret U.S. intelligence report claiming that Brezhnev ordered a nuclear alert during the invasion of Czechoslovakia.[104] That claim has since been endorsed by a leading American specialist on nuclear command-and-control, Bruce Blair, in a lengthy book on nuclear operational procedures. Blair argues that the incident in August 1968 was one of several times that the Soviet Union put its nuclear forces on combat alert.[105] A dissenting view has been expressed, however, by a retired Soviet general, Ivan Ershov, the deputy commander of the 1968 invasion. In an interview in early 1993, Ershov conceded

that "Soviet political and military leaders considered a nuclear alert in 1968," but added that they "immediately and decisively rejected the idea" because "we knew that NATO wasn't going to interfere, and no one could figure out any other purpose that an alert would serve."[106] Ershov also argued that one reason the invading force was so large was that nuclear weapons were excluded from any part in the operation.

The evidence, in my view, tends to support Ershov's position, at least so far; but new documents from military and intelligence archives in both East and West, as well as from the Presidential Archive in Moscow, will be needed to clarify and resolve this crucial issue.

4. The Soviet-Romanian Standoff

The Soviet Union's decision not to invade Romania in late August 1968 is often attributed to the Romanians' readiness to defend against an invasion.[107] However, newly declassified evidence from both East and West suggests that the standoff between the Soviet Union and Romania just after the invasion of Czechoslovakia was in fact resolved mainly because both sides understood the potential dangers of a confrontation and skillfully defused the crisis. Rather than putting their military forces on full alert to "back up their stated intention to resist invasion," the Romanian authorities, according to the new evidence, did just the opposite as they sought to avoid any "provocative" steps that would give Moscow a pretext for intervention.[108] Similarly, the Soviet Army refrained from exerting direct military pressure against Romania and from taking other steps that would give the appearance of offensive intent. If the picture emerging from this new evidence is accurate—and there is reason to believe it is—much more research needs to be done on the Soviet-Romanian standoff as a case study in crisis management.

5. Was the Invasion Preventable?

It is still unclear whether Dubcek and his colleagues, or outside powers such as the NATO countries, could have taken steps in 1968 to prevent or deter the invasion while allowing the reform program to continue. Some observers maintain that if Dubcek had gone along with full-scale preparations to resist an invasion, the Soviet Union would have backed down, as it did in Yugoslavia in 1948 or Poland in 1956.[109] Others believe, however, that any attempt which Dubcek might have made to have the Czechoslovak army prepare a genuine defense against Soviet military intervention would merely have accelerated the timetable for the invasion, leading in the end to a bloodbath.[110] Similar differences of view exist about what the influence of NATO, and above all the United States, might have been. These issues, as counterfactuals, can never be fully resolved, but new evidence about Soviet and East European motivations can certainly shed greater light on them and contribute to our understanding of the crisis more generally.

1. Mark Kramer, "New Sources on the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," Cold War International History Project *Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 1, 4-13.
2. On this point, see Harold C. Deutsch, "The Historical Impact of Revealing the Ultra Secret," *Parameters* 7:3 (September 1977), 15-32; and Roger J. Spiller, "Some Implications of ULTRA," *Military Affairs* 40:2 (April 1976), 49-54. For a more guarded view, see Martin Blumenson, "Intelligence and World War II: Will 'Ultra' Rewrite History?" *Army* 28:8 (August 1978), 42-48. For further background on the significance of the code-breaking operations, see Ronald Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); F. H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, Vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), 159-90; John Winton, *Ultra at Sea: How Breaking the Nazi Code Affected Allied Naval Strategy* (New York: Morrow, 1988); and Gordon Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *Miracle at Midway* (New York: Penguin, 1983), 383-87. Even now, new evidence continues to emerge about the scope and impact of Operations ULTRA and MAGIC. The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), a body that almost never releases anything about any topic, recently declassified hundreds of pages of documents showing how the United States broke the codes of its wartime allies as well as of its enemies through Operation MAGIC. The historical importance of these documents can hardly be overstated. See Tim Weiner, "U.S. Spied on Its World War II Allies," *New York Times*, 11 August 1993, A-9. For an invaluable collection of 21 documents on other aspects of Operation MAGIC released earlier (in the 1980s) by the NSA, see Ronald H. Spector, ed., *Listening to the Enemy: Key Documents on the Role of Communications Intelligence in the War with Japan* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1988).
3. These documents would include such things as Historicky ustav CSAV, *Sedm prazskych dnu, 21.-27. srpen 1968: Dokumentace* (Prague, September 1968); Jiri Pelikan, ed., *The Secret Vysocany Congress: Pro-3thince,.*

Hospodarske noviny (Prague), 17 July 1992, 1-2. The text of the letter was in Russian to ensure that it would be read expeditiously. In his memoirs, Bil'ak forthrightly acknowledges that he passed on a letter at Bratislava urging the CPSU and the Soviet Army to lend "fraternal assistance"; see Pame*ti Vasila Bil'aka*, 2:88. An English translation of the letter can be found in the Cold War International History Project *Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 35.

12. The account here is based on an interview with Shelest transcribed in Leonid Shinkarev, "Kto priglasil v Pragu sovetskie tanki? Novye dokumenty o sobytiyakh avgusta 68-go," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 17 July 1992, 7. The fact that Bil'ak and the others chose this indirect and highly secretive method of transmitting the letter to Brezhnev confirms how uncertain they still were that the Soviet Union would actually invade. If the Soviet authorities had agreed in the end to some non-military solution, the hard-liners in the KSC did not want it known that they had been calling for armed intervention. When Bil'ak was questioned about the matter in 1990, he claimed that some sort of letter was passed on to Brezhnev at Bratislava by a covert intermediary, Radko Kaska, who was a member of the KSC Central Committee staff and an aide to Kolder. Bil'ak added, however, that he did not know anything about the letter and had not signed it. The glaring discrepancies in Bil'ak's story undercut his version of how the letter was transmitted and give credence to Shelest's testimony.

13. "Perechen' dokumentov iz arkhiva Politbyuro TsK KPSS o sobytiyakh v Chekhoslovakii, 1968 g." (SECRET) 6 February 1991, in Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii (hereinafter, TsKhSD), the Moscow archive containing the post-1952 CPSU Central Committee records, F. 89, Per. 11, Dok. 76, L. 3. For the transcript of Brezhnev's phone conversation with Dubcek, see "Telefonicky rozhovor L. Brezneva s A. Dubcekem, 9.8.1968," in Archiv Kom., Z/S 8.

14. Among other sources, see "Stenograficky zaznam schuzky Varsavske petky v Moskve dne 18.8.1968 k rozhodnuti o intervenci a projednani planu," in Archiv Kom., Z/S 22, pp. 392-93.

15. Ibid., 393-94. According to Shelest, Bil'ak gave him a list of these "healthy forces" along with the "letter of invitation" on the evening of 3 August. See the interview with Shelest in Leonid Shinkarev, "Avgustovskoe bezumie: K 25-letiyu vvoda voisk v Chekhoslovakiyu," *Izvestiya*, 21 August 1993, 10.

16. "Kdo pozval okupacni vojska," 1-2.

17. "Zvaci dopis: V cele s Indrou a Bil'akem," *Lidove noviny* (Prague), 19 January 1991, 1-2.

18. "Vpad byl neodvratny: V srpnu 1968 melo byt zatceno na ctyricet' tisic cechu a slovaku," *Mlada fronta* (Prague), 21 August 1990, 1.

19. Interview in *Magyarorszag* (Budapest) 28 (14 July 1989), 5.

20. "Obrashchenie gruppy chlenov TsK KPCh, pravitel'stva i Natsional'nogo sobraniya ChSSR," *Pravda* (Moscow), 22 August 1968, 1, 4. The editor-in-chief of *Pravda* at the time, Mikhail Zimyanin, recently revealed how the appeal from these unnamed "Czecho-

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continued from page 1

tudes toward the PRC in 1966, but more importantly it provides the first documentary evidence of the planning of the North Korean attack on South Korea on 25 June 1950, a pivotal event in the Cold War whose origins have until now remained obscure.

The identification and release of this document was the result of fruitful collaboration between archivists and historians that distinguished the conference held in Moscow last January. Archivists M. Yu. Prozumenshchikov and I.N. Shevchuk of the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (the Central Committee archive for post-1952 documents) cited this document in a footnote to the excellent survey of documentary sources on Sino-Soviet ties in the 1950s they prepared for the conference.

knowledge and approval of the North Korean plan.[12] The brief statement that the Chinese government adopted the decision to send volunteers to Korea "under pressure from Stalin" is also the first documentary evidence we have of Stalin's pressuring the PRC to intervene in the Korean War. It is far from conclusive, however; since such a claim supports the Soviet criticism of the PRC that is the focus of this survey, it is entirely possible that the writers stretched an ambiguous statement by Stalin into "pressure" to intervene. A recently-published telegram from Mao to Stalin on 2 October 1950 reveals that Mao immediately informed Stalin of the decision of the Chinese Communist Party leadership to send Chinese troops to Korea, but the Chinese sources do not reveal communications from Stalin to Mao.[13]

The implicit criticism of the PRC for intervening in Korea only to protect its own security and the lengthy discussion of the tensions between the PRC and DPRK were no doubt an attempt to disparage the Chinese effort in Korea in order to counter criticism of what was in fact very weak Soviet support for the DPRK. Although Stalin provided North Korea with arms and equipment, once the United States entered the war he took great pains to distance the Soviet Union from the fighting. And despite heavy bombing of North Korea by the Americans in the fall of 1950, the Soviet Union did not intervene to defend its client state. When Stalin did at last covertly send military forces to Korea, in the spring of 1951, he did so only in support of Chinese forces, to whom he was bound by a mutual defense treaty.[14]

It is interesting that this document cites the participation of Soviet military advisers and the provision of military equipment, but does not mention the participation of Soviet pilots and anti-aircraft personnel. According to several memoir accounts published recently in Russia, the Soviet military forces eventually sent to Korea were substantial, though still tiny in comparison with the Chinese military commitment.[15] The omission of such information from this otherwise quite forthcoming report reinforces accounts by several participants of the extreme measures taken by the Soviet government to keep the extent of its military involvement in the Korean War a secret,[16] an effort motivated by Stalin's fear of direct conflict with the United States.

Finally, this document provides support for the conclusion that it was the death of Stalin rather than U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons that finally brought a breakthrough in the negotiations for an armistice to end the Korean War. While serving as Secretary of State under Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles claimed that it was the new administration's "unmistakable warning" to Beijing that it would use nuclear weapons against China that finally brought an end to the war, a claim Eisenhower repeated in his memoirs.[17] However, the threats communicated by the Eisenhower administration were made in May 1953, two months after Soviet leaders discussed with Zhou Enlai the need to conclude an armistice rapidly and dispatched a representative to the DPRK to facilitate this result. This report is circumspect in its discussion of this subject, but it indicates that as soon as Stalin was no longer part of the decisionmaking, the Soviets, Chinese and North Koreans were able quickly to reach an agreement to end the conflict. If further evidence proves this conclusion to be true, it will have significant implications for our understanding of the relationship among Stalin, Mao, and Kim, as well as for the study of "atomic diplomacy."

Prospects are fairly encouraging for finding answers soon to many of the remaining questions about the Soviet role in the Korean War. The Soviet Foreign Ministry archive, through a project funded by the International Archives Support Fund, has begun systematically to declassify its records, proceeding in five year blocks. For the first year of the project, Oct. 1992 - Sept. 1993, the archive planned to declassify records from 1945-50 and 1917-21, and the following year those for 1951-55 and 1922-26. So far, the declassification work is on schedule and the results are encouraging; a large percentage of the files are being declassified. The most important exception is the archive's continuing reluctance to release deciphered telegrams, a critically important category of documents.

The Defense Ministry archive is currently declassifying its documents on the Korean War, in response to President Yeltsin's promise to South Korea in November 1992 that Soviet records on the war would be opened. The Presidential Archive is also planning to release a collection of documents on the Korean War. These are scheduled to be published in the November 1993 issue of a new journal, *Istochnik: Documents of Russian History*, which is under the general editorship of Rudolf G. Pikhoia, director of the State Archival Service of the Russian Government.[18]

The following text is a translation from a handwritten copy of the original, which I wrote in the archives in January 1993. I was unable to obtain a photocopy of the document because the archive staff said that it did not have the technical means to make a photocopy from microfilm. Since the archive closed its reading room in April 1993, I have been unable to fill in the brief sections I omitted from my hand-written copy, which are marked here with brackets.

* * * * * *

TOP SECRET

mb-04339/gs 9 August 1966

copies to: Brezhnev (2), Kosygin (2), Gromyko, Kuznetsov, Kovalev, Kornienko, Sudarikov, IDU, UVI, OIuVA (2), file (2)

On the Korean War, 1950-53, and the Armistice Negotiations

I. [Background to and Preparations for First Stage of the War]

After separate elections in 1948 in South Korea and the formation of the puppet government of Rhee Syngman, on the one hand, and the formation of the DPRK, on the other, relations between the North and the South of the country were sharply aggravated. The Seoul regime, as well as the DPRK, declared its claim to be the authority in all of Korea. The situation at the 38th parallel became even more tense in 1948 after the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Korea.

During this period, Kim Il Sung and other Korean leaders were firmly determined to unify the country by military means, without devoting the necessary attention to studying the possibility that existed at that time for peaceful reunification through the broad development of the democratic movement in South Korea.

In the DPRK, a people's army was created which in manpower and equipment significantly surpassed the armed forces of South Korea. By January 1, 1950, the total number of DPRK troops was 110,000; new divisions were hastily being formed.[19]

Calculating that the USA would not enter a war over South Korea, Kim Il Sung persistently pressed for agreement from Stalin and Mao Zedong to reunify the country by military means. (telegrams #4-51, 233, 1950)

Stalin at first treated the persistent appeals of Kim Il Sung with reserve, noting that "such a large affair in relation to South Korea ... needs much preparation," but he did not object in principle. The final agreement to support the plans of the Koreans was given by Stalin at the time of

Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow in March-April 1950. Following this, in May, Kim Il Sung visited Beijing and secured the support of Mao.

The Korean government envisioned realizing its goal in three stages:
1) concentration of troops near the 38th parallel
2) issuing an appeal to the South for peaceful unification
3) initiating military activity after the South's rejection of the proposal for peaceful unification.

At Stalin's order, all requests of the North Koreans for delivery of arms and equipment for the formation of additional units of the KPA [Korean People's Army] were quickly met. The Chinese leadership sent to Korea a division formed from Koreans who had been serving in the Chinese army, and promised to send food aid and to transfer one army closer to Korea "in case the Japanese enter on the side of South Korea." (telegram 362, 1950)

By the end of May 1950 the General Staff of the KPA together with Soviet military advisers announced the readiness of the Korean army to begin concentration at the 38th parallel. At the insistence of Kim Il Sung, the beginning of military activity was scheduled for June 25, 1950. (telegram 408, 1950)

By the time of the attack, the North Korean armed forces had significant superiority over the South Koreans. The correlation of forces between South and North Korea was as follows: in number of troops 1:2; number of guns 1:2; machine-guns 1:7; submachine guns, 1:13; tanks 1:6.5; planes 1:6. The operational plan of the KPA envisioned that Korean troops would advance 15-20 kilometers per day and would in the main complete military activity within 22-27 days. (telegram 468, 1950)

[Here follows a brief factual account of the course of the war through October 1950, from the initial successes of the KPA in June, July, and August, through their near defeat following the U.S./U.N. amphibious landing at Inchon in September-K.W.] During this period, which was an ordeal for the Korean people, the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party and the government of the DPRK worked strenuously on the formation of new military units, using the territory of China as well for this purpose. The most steadfast of the KPA units that were surrounded in the South carried on partisan combat in the mountains.

II. Entry of the Chinese into the Korean War

During Kim Il Sung's visit to Beijing in May 1950, Mao Zedong, in conversation with him, underscored his conviction that the Americans would not become engaged in a war "for such a small territory as Korea" and stated that the Chinese government would transfer one of their armies to the region of Mukden in order to render the necessary assistance in case the South Koreans drew Japanese soldiers into military action. The Chinese leadership based their cal-

resolve the unification of Korea by military means. Both the Chinese and the Korean leaders equally were forced to acknowledge this. After preliminary consultations with the Chinese and Koreans, the Soviet government on June 23, 1951, put forward a proposal for settling the military conflict in Korea. "As a first step," the Soviet representative declared, "it would be necessary to begin negotiations for a cease-fire, for an armistice with a mutual withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel." This proposal attracted universal attention.

On June 27, 1951, the American Ambassador [to Moscow Alan G.] Kirk visited A.A. Gromyko (at that time deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR) and appealed to him with a number of questions in connection with these proposals. Elucidating to Kirk the position of the Soviet government, Comrade Gromyko indicated that the negotiations on the armistice must be conducted by representatives of the joint American command and the command of the South Korean troops, on one side, and by representatives of the command of the Korean People's Army and the command of the Chinese volunteers, on the other. Comrade Gromyko noted that the negotiations must be limited to military questions and first of all the question of a cease-fire.

On June 29, Ridgway, who was at that time the commander of the "U.N. troops" in Korea, appealed over the radio to the commander of the

Origins of the Korean War, 1945-50: New Evidence From Russian Archives."

12. Tworecently published accounts of Kim's April 1950 visit to Beijing based on Chinese memoirs and interviews give conflicting accounts: Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *China Quarterly* 121 (March 1990), 100; and Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War," Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1991), 1, 20-21.

13. See Li Xiaobing, Wang Xi, and Chen Jian, "Mao's Dispatch of Chinese Troops to Korea: Forty-Six Telegrams, July-October 1950," *Chinese Historians* 5:1 (Spring 1992), 67-68.

14. For details, see Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-50: New Evidence From Russian Archives."

15. Lieutenant-General Georgi Lobov, who commanded the 64th Corps in Korea, has estimated that from 1952 until the end of the war in 1953, the corps numbered about 26,000 personnel. Interview with G. Lobov, "Blank Spots of History: In the Skies of North Korea," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavitka* 10 (Oct. 1990), 30-31, 34, in JPRS-UAC-91-003 (28 June 1991), 27-31. Also see Aleksandr Smorchkov, "Speak Korean in Battle," *Komsomolskava Pravda,* 9 June 1990; A. Roshchin, "During the Cold War on the East River," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,* Jan. 1990, 131-39; interview with Aleksandr Smorchkov, Moscow International Broadcast Service in Korean, 11 June 1990, translated in FBIS-SOV-90-121 (22 June 1990), 9-10; and B.S. Abakumov, "Sovetskie letchiki v nebe Korei," *Voprosy Istorii,* Jan. 1993, 129-39.

16. See, e.g., the interview with Lobov cited above.

17. James Sheply, "How Dulles Averted War," *Life*, 16 January 1956, 70-72; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963), 179-80. Furthermore, as Roger Dingman has shown, the United States had been threatening to use nuclear weapons throughout the war. For discussions of this debate see Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," *International Security* 13:3 (Winter 1988/89), 50-91, and Rosemary Foot, "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," *International Security* 13:3 (Winter 1988/89), 92-112.

18. For a translation of these documents see my forthcoming article, "The Soviet Union and the Korean War: New Evidence from the Soviet Archives," in the winter 1993-94 issue of *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*.

19. This figure is higher than the estimates of U.S. intelligence, according to which by June 25 the KPA numbered between 87,500 and 99,000 men. See the discussion of these figures in Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II*, 452-53.

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Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) would have seemed utterly fanciful. Although the most important archives in Moscow are still sealed off and access to the Central Committee and Foreign Ministry collections is still highly problematic, the Russian government has made at least some effort to release materials to researchers from both Russia and abroad. When I first went to the Central Committee archives and the Foreign Ministry archives in 1992 I assumed I would have to fight constant battles to get the documents I wanted. But soon after I began working there, I found that the main problem I was having was just the opposite: namely, how to cope with the thousands of pages of materials they were quite readily bringing me. Even after some three months of work in those archives, the difficulty of absorbing everything remained as acute as ever. For a brief while I even began to suspect that Strachey was justified in regarding ignorance as a scholarly virtue.

That feeling quickly dissipated, however, when the situation at the archive containing the post-1952 holdings of the Central Committee took a sharp turn for the worse in the spring of 1993. The abrupt dismissal of one of the top archival officials, Vladimir Chernous, in February 1993 was the first sign of an impending clampdown. Chernous had been a prominent advocate of greater openness in the CPSU archives. Two months later the director of that same Central Committee repository, Rem Usikov, was also fired after being accused of "laxness in enforcing regulations on access to confidential material."[2] Although Usikov had been a long-time CPSU functionary and was never a proponent of opening up the archives, he had gone along — if only grudgingly — with the more relaxed policy that was introduced in the latter half of 1992 and early 1993.[3] Thus, his ouster and the initial charges lodged against him were a further indicator that a period of retrenchment was under way. The extent of the retrenchment soon became clearer when Usikov's successor, Anatolii Prokopenko, did away with all the procedures that had been adopted in 1992 to make the archive more accessible. The new director's intention of adhering to what he described as a "more restrictive approach" was well summed up in a remark he made during a conversation in May 1993: "Yes, these documents have been declassified, but that doesn't mean people should be allowed to look at them."[4] In the span of just a few days, all the progress at the Central Committee archives that had been achieved since August 1991 seemed to come undone, perhaps irreparably.

Fortunately, this adverse trend did not greatly affect the Foreign Ministry archives, where the degree of access for scholars continued gradually to expand. Although the main reading room at the Foreign Ministry was closed temporarily in mid-1993 (a smaller, temporary one was then opened following complaints from researchers), this was done mainly so that renovations and a much-needed expansion of the room could be completed. The clampdown at the CPSU archives may have engendered a somewhat more cautious atmosphere at the Foreign Ministry, but the trend at the latter was still toward greater openness.

Furthermore, even at the post-1952 Central Committee archives the situation as of mid-1993 was by no means hopeless. In the past, Prokopenko espoused a distinctly liberal view of the need to curb "senseless, deliberately obstructive, and phony" restrictions on "supposedly classified" materials, arguing that "only a small number of these documents genuinely contain secrets."[5] At one point he even quit his job as director of the USSR's "Special Archive" — the repository in which captured document collections and other highly sensitive items were stored — because he could no longer put up with the "extremely ignorant people" in the Main Archival Directorate (Glavarkhiv) who "insist on keeping everything secret."[6] Moreover, in conversations with Cold War International History Project officials in July 1993, both Prokopenko and other archival authorities expressed a willingness to continue cooperation with foreign researchers and projects. Hence, even before Prokopenko was replaced because of health reasons by Natalia Tomilina in September, there were some grounds for optimism that the setback at the former CPSU archives would be only temporary.

Nevertheless, even if the regressive steps that Prokopenko implemented in the spring of 1993 are eventually reversed by his successors, the sudden change of policy was a sobering reminder of how little the Russian authorities understand about the way a government archive is supposed to operate. In

the West, state archives are expected to be independent of day-to-day political considerations, and the archivists are responsible for assisting scholars in historical research. Documents in the archives are considered to be part of the public domain and are thus freely accessible to all who work there. In Russia, by contrast, none of these conditions yet holds true. Archival policy in Russia is still determined by the prevailing political winds, and professional archivists find themselves obliged to respond to the demands and whims of high-level bureaucrats. The notion that archival materials and other official records belong to something called the "public domain" is still alien in Russia. Access to documents often depends instead on political connections or, in some cases, on who offers the highest bid. Although the degree of political manipulation and interference at the Russian archives is not as great now as it was during the Soviet era, most of the official repositories in Moscow still fall woefully short of acceptable standards of professional integrity.[7]

Some Russian and Western observers have expressed hope that the situation will improve, at least somewhat, now that a comprehensive "Law on Archival Collections of the Russian Federation," to regulate all the far-flung state repositories in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and elsewhere, is finally in place.[8] This law was under consideration for several years (initially by the Soviet legislature and more recently by the Russian parliament), and the version of it that was approved in July 1993 was somewhat better than expected, especially compared to other measures adopted by the Russian parliament in the wake of the April 1993 referendum. Still, there is little reason to believe that the archival law will improve matters much in the absence of a broader, well-developed legal system in Russia. Indeed, some features of the new law could actually be used to tighten up, rather than loosen, existing restrictions on archival access.[9] An ominous precedent along these lines was nearly set in July 1993 when the Russian legislature approved a new "Law on State Secrets" in a second reading.[10] If Russian President Boris Yeltsin had signed the secrecy law, as he did with the archival legislation, it could have been used to seal off vast quantities of information indefinitely.

Whatever the ultimate effect of the archival law may be, the broad changes set in motion by the dissolution of the Russian parliament in September 1993 and the defeat of the hard-line rebellion in Moscow in early October do offer greater reason for hope that access to the Russian archives will improve again. The leeway for reform in the wake of Yeltsin's victory over his opponents should alleviate the concerns that some Russian officials, including those in the archives, had about exposing themselves to reprisals by hard-line forces. Conditions at the archives also are likely to improve if the Russian Security Ministry (the main successor to the Soviet KGB) is drastically scaled back and restructured, as has been proposed.[11] By all accounts, hard-line officials from the Security Ministry were among those most responsible for the clampdown at the archives in the spring of 1993. An overhaul of the Ministry that leaves it a good deal weaker will almost certainly be beneficial for those hoping to work in the archives. Whether such an overhaul will be lasting is a different matter, however. After all, the Soviet/Russian security organs were restructured, pared back, and deprived of some of their key functions right after the August 1991 coup attempt, but they were soon able to reclaim almost all of their lost powers and preroga-

archives suggests that any gaps which may have been created are modest compared to the evidence that was *not* destroyed.

A potentially more vexing problem comes from documents that never existed at all — that is, from decisions which were made without leaving an explicit "paper trail" of written orders, notes, or transcripts of deliberations. The methodological pitfalls associated with this phenomenon can be seen outside the Soviet field in the works of certain historians who have examined Hitler's decision to order the mass destruction of European Jews. Because Hitler himself refrained from committing the extermination policy to paper (leaving that to subordinates like Himmler, Heydrich, and Eichmann) and resorted to euphemisms when describing the policy in his speeches, a few "revisionist" historians such as David Irving have argued that the Holocaust went on without Hitler's knowledge or approval.[16] This thesis has been decisively refuted by a large number of historians both inside and outside Germany, but the very fact that Irving can make his claims — no matter how tendentious they may seem — underscores the way the lack of written records on particular matters can be abused and manipulated by historians.[17]

To a certain extent at least, this same problem is bound to arise with the former Soviet archives. In a country like the Soviet Union, where "telephone justice" (i.e., telephone calls from top CPSU officials to state functionaries ordering them how to resolve specific issues) and "word-of-mouth-only" decision-making long prevailed, one is apt to find important activities or decisions that were not committed to paper. This may well be the case, for example, with the assassination in 1934 of the head of the Leningrad party, Sergei Kirov. Although most historians agree that Stalin himself ordered the murder, no written order to that effect has yet been located, and it is likely that none exists.[18] Problems of this sort also crop up from time to time in the study of Soviet foreign policy. Deliberations about key foreign policy decisions, both during and after the Stalinist era, did not always get recorded in full. Such may be the case, for example, with the decision in 1962 to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. Although a vast amount of evidence about the Cuban missile crisis has recently come to light, there is little reason to expect that documents will emerge explaining precisely what the Soviet leadership hoped to gain from the missile deployments.[19]

Nevertheless, despite the obstacles caused by gaps in the written record (especially from the Stalin era), these need not hinder efforts to understand Soviet history. For one thing, in a country that was as obsessed with record-keeping of all sorts as the Soviet Union was, the documentation of most events and decisions was far more extensive than one would find virtually anywhere else. Shortly before the archives were opened, a few Western scholars had speculated that access to Soviet repositories would be of only limited value because the records in Moscow "are probably sparse."[20] Even a brief stint at the ex-Soviet archives will show how unfounded this claim was. Far from being "sparse," the archives in Moscow are overflowing with documents and information that will greatly enrich our historical understanding. What is more, even when genuine gaps in the record exist, one can always try to work around them. The specific order for Kirov's assassination may not have been put down on paper, but an enormous amount of other evidence points to Stalin's complicity, as Robert Conquest and others have demonstrated. If freer access is granted to the most important archives in Moscow (i.e., the Presidential Archive, the military archives, and the KGB archives), the amount of documentation that will help fill in gaps will only increase.

Furthermore, even though some gaps are likely to remain once all the archives have been opened, that will not necessarily inhibit scholarly endeavors. No matter how complete or incomplete the written record may be in any particular instance, there will always be room for legitimate differences of interpretation. New documentary evidence can help narrow those differences and cast doubt on certain interpretations — which is precisely why archival research is valuable — but it would be naive to think that the archives alone will generate a grand scholarly consensus on every important matter. With or without greater access to the former Soviet archives, disagreements about how to interpret specific events and documents will persist in the future.

This is not to say, however, that the importance of archival research should be discounted; quite the contrary. The opportunity to examine declassified Soviet documents and the latest memoirs by ex-Soviet officials may not be a panacea, but it is the only way we are going to obtain a better understanding of Soviet history. Archival evidence and new memoirs can bring to light previously unknown data; and, equally important, they can corroborate or undercut interpretations that had long been taken for granted. Several years ago John Lewis Gaddis noted the value of declassified materials for the study of U.S. foreign policy, and his remarks seem even more apposite now, *mutatis mutandis*, for the study of *Soviet* foreign policy:

> I am familiar with the argument that the [New York] *Times* is usually two steps ahead of the Central Intelligence Agency in any event, and that access to internal government documents would not substantially alter our knowledge of what is going on at any given point. But that is simply not true: anyone who has looked carefully at declassified government documents from the post-1945 era will know how inadequate the public record is as a guide to what was actually happening. . . . And even when the public record does faithfully reflect what goes on behind the scenes, the psychology of many policymakers — at least those who believe that nothing is worth reading unless it is stamped "top secret" — might well cause them to discount generalizations based
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confident assumptions about what could be gleaned from open sources have not been borne out by the new documentary evidence in Moscow. On the contrary, we can now see from the Russian archives that the divergence between the "public record" and "what was actually happening" in Soviet foreign policy was, if anything, even wider than one might have expected.[24]

Thus, for scholars who hope to be more knowledgeable and more accurate about the topics they are exploring, access to declassified Soviet documents will be of great benefit. The potential value of the new archival sources is apparent from the way the earlier release of American and West European documents enriched our understanding of Stalin's foreign policy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when "post-revisionist" scholars began reexamining the Soviet Union's role in the early Cold War years, they were able to exploit newly declassified Western materials to bridge at least part of the gap between the "public record" and "what was actually happening."[25] The opportunity to take advantage of this evidence helped ensure that the post-revisionist works surpassed all previous studies in the field, both in nuance and in scope. Needless to say, the likelihood of further advances is even greater now that declassified documents will be available not only from Western countries but from Moscow as well.

Already, in fact, new evidence from the ex-Soviet archives has shed a good deal of light on key topics in Soviet domestic affairs and foreign policy. For example, recently declassified materials confirm that Stalin played a direct and expansive role in the mass repressions of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, contrary to what some Western "revisionist" historians had been arguing.[26] The new evidence also undercuts the revisionists' claims that the scale of the Stalinist repressions was much smaller than earlier Western estimates had suggested. It turns out that the earlier estimates, far from being too high, may in some cases have significantly *understated* the actual number of victims.[27] With regard to foreign policy, declassified materials have helped clarify such important issues as the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet role in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and Moscow's decision to invade Afghanistan. On this last topic, for example, many hundreds of pages of newly released documents indicate that Soviet leaders in December 1979 were well aware of the potential difficulties that Soviet troops might encounter, but were convinced that all those problems could be overcome relatively easily.[28]

As more documents are declassified in the future, our understanding of many other issues is also bound to improve. Materials from the Presidential Archive, the military archives, and the KGB archives, which are not yet freely available, should be especially valuable in helping to clarify some of the most mysterious and controversial topics. To be sure, scholars will have to be cautious about what they find in the archives, and will have to resist some of the methodological pitfalls discussed below. Also, it is worth stressing again that new evidence, no matter how important, cannot guarantee a scholarly consensus. The room for legitimate disagreement may narrow considerably, but differences over the best way to interpret complex events will inevitably remain. Yet, despite all these caveats, it is clear that the opening of the ex-Soviet archives has provided immense opportunities for scholars.

New Archival Collections

Until late 1991, the central state archives of the Soviet Union were administered by the Main Archival Directorate (Glavarkhiv) of the Soviet Council of Ministers. Glavarkhiv also supervised several thousand regional and local archives in the USSR. The CPSU archives, however, were managed separately by the party itself. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism was responsible for the Central Party Archive, while the Central Committee apparatus supervised its own 140 archives as well as those of the Secretariat. Documents from the Politburo, as noted below, were stored in a special archive in the Kremlin, under the direct control of the CPSU General Secretary.

Following the aborted coup in August 1991 and the dissolution of the USSR four months later, the archives in Moscow were extensively reorganized. Glavarkhiv was abolished, and almost all of its vast staff and bureaucratic apparatus, including its specialized archival research institute, were transferred intact to the newly created Russian State Committee on Archival Affairs (Roskomarkhiv). The 15 central state archives in Russia that had been administered by Glavarkhiv were placed under the direct jurisdiction of Roskomarkhiv. Most of the nearly 2,200 other state archives in Russia — including 47 republican archives, 170 regional sites, and 1,981 provincial and local repositories — also came under the new agency's indirect control, though they were accorded much greater autonomy than they ever were permitted when they had to report to Glavarkhiv.[29] As of late 1992, the 17federal archives under Roskomarkhiv's direct control housed some 65.3 million files, comprising many billions of pages of documents. The other state archives in Russia — at the republic, regional, and provincial levels — accounted for another 138.7 million files, with billions more pages of documents.

In early 1993, Roskomarkhiv was reorganized and renamed the "State Archival Service of Russia" (Rosarkhiv), in accordance with a governmental decree signed in late December 1992.[30] The change of name and restructuring of the agency were intended to place Rosarkhiv on a par, both symbolically and substantively, with other federal agencies such as the Russian External Intelligence Service (RSVR). The current director of Rosarkhiv is Rudolf Pikhoya, who was formerly the prorector of the university in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg), where he became acquainted with the then-first secretary of the Sverdlovsk branch of the CPSU, Boris Yeltsin. It was also in Sverdlovsk that Pikhoya got to know a faculty member, Gennadii Burbulis, who later became a top aide to Yeltsin. Thus, it is not surprising that Yeltsin would have chosen Pikhoya to supervise Russia's archives, a post that is far more politically sensitive than it would be in most countries. Nor is it surprising that as the head of Rosarkhiv, Pikhoya has been unusually attentive to the political interests of Yeltsin, not only by releasing documents that are embarrassing to Yeltsin's opponents (especially Mikhail Gorbachev), but also by serving as a presidential envoy when materials have been turned over to foreign countries.[31]

Although Pikhoya is the leading archival official in Russia, his agency does not yet have jurisdiction over some of the most important archival collections, including the CPSU Politburo's records. Rosarkhiv does, however, have control over the rest of the former CPSU archives in Moscow, which are now divided between two major sites: the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents of Recent History (RTsKhIDNI), which includes the former

Central Party Archive and other CPSU holdings through October 1952; and the much larger Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), which includes all CPSU Central Committee holdings from October 1952 through the end of the Soviet regime in December 1991.[32] Even though the two repositories are both subordinate to Rosarkhiv and are geographically propinquitous to one another, there seems to be relatively little interaction or collaboration between them.

Together, the former CPSU archives include some 30 million files with more than six billion pages of documents accumulated by the Central Party Archive and the Central Committee apparatus (Fond No. 5), plus a smaller number of documents pertaining to the CPSU Secretariat (Fond No. 4). For the most part these documents, especially those in Fond No. 5, key "inputs" into the decision-making process, rather than how decisions were actually made at the top levels. The materials collected by the Central Committee apparatus include a vast number of items produced by the Foreign Ministry, KGB, Defense Ministry, and other state agencies, copies of which were routinely sent to the relevant CPSU departments. RTsKhIDNI's holdings also include the voluminous files of the Comintern (Fond No. 495), the Soviet-sponsored organization that coordinated and directed international communist activities until it was formally dissolved in 1943.

In general, the documents from the post-October 1952 period at TsKhSD are better organized than the older documents stored at RTsKhIDNI; but the finding aids at RTsKhIDNI, which have now been listed in a computerized data base, are elaborate enough to compensate for most deficiencies in organization. (The main exception is the Comintern files, for which finding aids are unavailable.) The finding aids at TsKhSD are also of superb quality, even by Western standards. Researchers at the archives can look up whatever files they need under the appropriate Central Committee departments, relevant timeframe, and even specific topics. Whether requests to look at the files will be granted is, of course, a different matter, especially at TsKhSD.

The archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), which were recently renamed the "Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation" (AVPRF), are not under Rosarkhiv's jurisdiction and thus have operated along somewhat different lines. In accordance with the liberal and pro-Western orientation of Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, the AVPRF was the first of the former Soviet archives to open its postwar holdings to outside researchers, despite resistance by some archivists within the ministry. (Some noteworthy progress toward opening the MID archives had already begun under the final three Soviet foreign ministers—Eduard Shevardnadze, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, and Boris Pankin, especially Pankin and Shevardnadze—whose outlook was similar to Kozyrev's.) Although the declassification procedures at the AVPRF are still cumbersome and slow, the archive overall has become increasingly accessible since mid-1992 and has remained so even while the CPSU archives have been retrenching. This auspicious trend at MID is at least partly attributable to the existence of a multi-country arrangement that has helped foster an institutionalized framework for the AVPRF, as will be discussed below.

The bulk of the AVPRF's holdings consists of cables, reports, and other documents generated either at Soviet embassies or within the ministry's own departments and agencies.[33] Although many of the cables and reports are routine and uninformative, others contain important transcripts of conversations with foreign leaders or cogent assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet policy. A special division of the AVPRF, Fond No. 59, contains all the ciphered (i.e., supersecret) cables transmitted to and from Soviet embassies over the years, but this entire division, unfortunately, is still off limits.[34] Even without access to the most sensitive items, however, researchers are bound to come across plenty of valuable documents in the AVPRF.

The main problem with the Foreign Ministry archives, in fact, is not that materials are inaccessible, but that no finding aids of any sort have been disseminated. This deficiency has compelled researchers to depend entirely, or almost entirely, on archival employees to find out what is available on a particular subject. Even the best-intentioned and most capable archivists will not be able to provide the comprehensive coverage one can get by perusing finding aids such as those at the Central Committee archives. Moreover, the lack of finding aids at the AVPRF precludes the serendipitous discovery of materials closely (or not so closely) related to the researcher's project, which the archivist may not realize would be of interest. Although officials in charge of the Foreign Ministry archives are aware of the problems caused by the lack of finding aids, they say that severe funding constraints have prevented them from taking remedial steps. Among other things, they would have to pay for the reproduction of dozens of inventories (*opisi*), and would have to hire and pay additional staff (retired senior diplomats) to scrutinize and declassify every page of the *opisi*. Some rudimentary finding aids, including lists of *fonds* and *opisi*, are supposed to be compiled in 1993 and 1994, and more elaborate materials should be available by 1995 or 1996. Those measures will certainly help, but the utility of the AVPRF will be limited until it provides finding aids comparable to those at the CPSU archives.

As illuminating as the former Central Party Archive, the former Central Committee archives, and the Foreign Ministry archives may be, they are not the most important repositories in Moscow. Scholars hoping to understand how decisions were made at the highest levels, as opposed to the "inputs" into the decision-making process, must look elsewhere.[35] All transcripts and notes from the CPSU Politburo's meetings, all materials in the vast personal files of top Soviet officials, and all other items deemed to be of greatest sensitivity are in the Kremlin Archive (Fond No. 3), which during Mikhail Gorbachev's time was reorganized, expanded, and renamed the "Presidential Archive."[36] During the final years of the Soviet regime, countless documents that had been stored in the CPSU archives were removed from their files and transferred permanently to the Presidential Archive, in keeping with Gorbachev's broader efforts to shift power from the central party apparatus to the state presidency. The rest of the CPSU holdings have been under the jurisdiction of Roskomarkhiv/Rosarkhiv since late August 1991, but the Presidential Archive has remained independent. In December 1991 the outgoing Soviet president (Gorbachev) relinquished control of the Presidential Archive to the Russian president, and it has been under Yeltsin's direct supervision ever since.

No change in that status is envisaged any time soon under the new archival law, even though there have been periodic inti-

mations that the Presidential Archive would be surbordinated to the archival service. In late 1991 and early 1992, Pikhoya and other senior archival officials maintained that the entire holdings of the Presidential Archive would soon be transferred to repositories controlled by Roskomarkhiv.[37] Nothing of the sort actually occurred. In the winter and spring of 1993, Pikhoya again averred that all "historical" items in the Presidential Archive would be turned over by the end of the year to TsKhSD and RTsKhIDNI.[38] Whether that will be the case is questionable, however. Although it seems likely that a substantial portion of the documents in the Presidential Archive *will* eventually be reassigned to Rosarkhiv, the new archival law does not mandate any such transfer in a fixed time period.[39] Moreover, even if the law did set a time limit, the schedule that Pikhoya proposed is far too compressed and subject to disruption by the recent turmoil at the former CPSU archives and by the expense involved in relocating such large quantities of materi-

same token, the huge sum that Crown is doling out ($1 million) creates a disincentive for the RSVR to release any of its other materials for public use in the future unless comparable monetary inducements are forthcoming. Finally, the deal pertains only to the holdings of the RSVR, which for obvious reasons are the easiest for the Russian government to withhold on grounds of "national security." Crown will have no access at all to the much larger central archives controlled by the Security Ministry.[49]

The unavailability of documents from Soviet military archives is an equally serious obstacle to researchers, especially for those studying postwar Soviet foreign policy. Soviet military documents have long been scattered among several archives in or near Moscow and St. Petersburg, including the General Staff Archives (IATsGSVS), the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO), the Archive of the Main Intelligence Directorate (AGRU), the Central Naval Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsVMAMO), the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), the Russian State Military-Historical Archive (RGVIA), and the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGAVMF).[50] The first four of these repositories contain highly classified military items from World War II and the post-1945 period, and all four archives are independent of Rosarkhiv. Although the other three sites — RGVA, RGVIA, and RGAVMF — are now under Rosarkhiv's supervision, their holdings are less sensitive than those at the first four archives and they do not include any materials from the post-1941 period. Thus, all military documents from the Cold War era are outside Rosarkhiv's jurisdiction.

By the mid- to late 1980s a few researchers were able to gain partial access to military holdings from the early Soviet period, especially the revolutionary and civil war years. Eventually, some scattered collections from as late as World War II also were released.[51] Moreover, in early 1989 a five-volume annotated list of nearly 34,000 *fonds* in the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (TsGASA, the former name of RGVA), covering the years from 1917 to 1941, was declassified. Subsequently, the list was authorized for commercial distribution in the West.[52] All these measures, however, still fell far short of the access that serious scholars would need. A fitting illustration of how closed and secretive the military archives remained even at the height of glasnost came in 1990 when one of the most trusted Soviet military historians, General Dmitrii Volkogonov, publicly complained that he and other senior officers at the Soviet Defense Ministry's own Institute of Military History were being denied access to holdings from World War II and earlier.[53]

In the post-Soviet era, the kind of problem that Volkogonov cited may have ebbed, but military documents from the post-1945 period have remained as tightly sealed as ever, and the military intelligence (GRU)

to abide by the agreement, but it is difficult to square that pledge with some of his actions, especially his decision to deny or limit access to Fond No. 89.[71]

For Western scholars not associated with CWIHP, the task of working in the former CPSU archives has been more arduous still. Although all scholars were supposed to have access to materials released in connection with the CWIHP-TsKhSD-IVI project, those materials were deemed to be "classified" until they were formally released.[72] Consequently, researchers not affiliated with the CWIHP venture (or with one of the other Western deals with Roskomarkhiv/ Rosarkhiv) almost invariably found that they were denied access to materials at TsKhSD, despite CWIHP's repeated requests that all scholars receive equal access to released materials. Although this situation should have been rectified once thousands of documents were "declassified" for the CWIHP-TsKhSD-IVI participants, it is not yet clear whether TsKhSD will live up to its obligations. Certainly the archive's rigidity in providing access to some researchers but no access at all to others in 1992 and early 1993 was a telltale sign of the much more vexing problems to come in the spring and summer of 1993. Those problems will be discussed at greater length in the next section.

A collaborative project that has been more durable, at least so far, is an effort to link the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a panel known as the International Academic Advisory Group (IAAG). This multinational undertaking is sponsored by the Norwegian Nobel Institute, which has helped raise funds of more than $100,000 for the archive from Japanese and U.S. donors, and administered by the International Archives Assistance Fund (IASF). The arrangement provides for four senior Western scholars (Odd Arne Westad from Norway, William Taubman from the United States, Jonathan Haslam from Great Britain, and Gerhard Wettig from Germany) to serve on a joint board with archivists and historians from MID. The panel, which is chaired by Westad and has Sven Holtsmark of the IASF as its secretary, has assisted the AVPRF in applying for funds from Western and Japanese sources to help ameliorate specific features of the archive that are most deficient (e.g., finding aids, the size and working conditions of the reading room, and salaries for the staff). The funding allotments themselves give the IAAG considerable leverage over the AVPRF's priorities, and the panel also can make recommendations for other improvements as it sees fit, especially regarding declassification procedures.

Among the concrete results of the IAAG's work was the establishment of a set of guidelines for declassifying and releasing materials, which the group presented to the Foreign Ministry collegium in March 1992. Their proposals were adopted largely intact the following month, when the Foreign Ministry published new sets of rules for archival declassification and access.[73] The new regulations stipulate that the AVPRF must make items older than 30 years available as soon as possible except when doing so would "demonstrably impede" Russia's security or cause "danger or distress" to individuals. Although these clauses are phrased so broadly that they may be susceptible to abuse, the IAAG has been careful to monitor the implementation of the new rules and to recommend improvements when needed. Despite relatively slow progress in spurring the AVPRF to release and produce more finding aids, and to declassify deciphered telegrams, the international advisory panel has generally been successful in fostering a climate of greater openness.

Another collaborative project that has been valuable in helping to open up some of the most important Russian archives is the renewed publication — after a 30-year hiatus — of *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, which covers the latest developments in archival affairs. The journal's chief editor is A. A. Chernobaev, and the editorial board, chaired by Pikhoya, consists of distinguished Russian, American, British, and German scholars and archival officials, who are able to ensure that *Istoricheskii arkhiv* meets high professional standards. Two prominent U.S. specialists connected with the Hoover project — the deputy director of the Hoover Institu-

Note on the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation

by Vladimir V. Sokolov and Sven G. Holtsmark

For students of the history of international relations since 1917, the gradual opening up of the collection of the *Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation* (AVPRF, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii) means exciting new challenges and opportunities. For the first time it is now possible to start detailed and in-depth studies of the Soviet foreign policy making process based on a kind of material which is, after all, not altogether different from what one expects to find in the Foreign Ministry archives of other great powers.

The AVPRF was built up with the single aim of serving the needs of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus. This is reflected in the way the archive is organized, and in the absence of a system of finding aids created for the purpose of allowing external users easy access to relevant documentation. Contrary to what is common practice in western countries, external users are assisted by staff members whose primary task is to respond to requests from the Ministry's own users of the archival collections.

In the transformation process now underway in the AVPRF, the following points are worth noting. Declassification is being carried out on a comprehensive and chronological basis, starting from both 1917 and 1945. As of September 1993, materials covering the periods 1917-1922 and 1945-50 will be basically declassified. Declassification of the periods 1922-27 and 1951-55 is scheduled to be completed by September 1994.

The declassification process encompasses all major *fondy* of the archives. One should be aware, however, that the ordinary *fondy* do not contain deciphered telegrams. All such telegrams are located in a special collection, which is subject to declassification and access rules of its own. Nonetheless, declassification of this collection is underway for the period 1917-1941, but external users of the archive should not expect to be able to make substantial use of this part of the archive's holdings for the time being. One should be aware, however, that a significant number of telegrams as well as documents from other collections have been declassified on an *ad hoc* basis in order to provide documentation on some of the so-called *white spots* of Soviet external relations, such as Soviet policy towards Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

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tion, Charles Palm, and the Librarian of Congress, James Billington — are on the journal's editorial board, as are all three of the Russian archival officials (Pikhoya, Volkogonov, and Nikolai Pokrovskii) who are most directly involved in the Hoover project. Initial funding for the revival of the journal came from Rosarkhiv, with supplementary aid from the Cultural Initiative Fund and the Center for Democracy. Eventually, the publishing effort is to become part of the larger scholarly programs associated with the Hoover-Rosarkhiv deal. The previous version of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* was published for eight years during the post-Stalin "thaw," but was abruptly closed down in 1962 because of its boldness in featuring controversial documents.[74] Unlike that earlier version, the new journal is independent in its editorial judgments and enjoys discretion to print whatever documents it can obtain.

The first issue of the new *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, designated as Issue No. 1 for 1992, appeared in early 1993. It contained some 220 densely-printed pages of recently declassified documents, along with thoughtful introductions and annotations for all the items covered. Most of the documentation came from TsKhSD, RTsKhIDNI, or one of the 15 state archives under Rosarkhiv's direct jurisdiction. Nothing was included from the KGB and Defense Ministry archives or even from the AVPRF, but a few items from the Presidential Archive were published, and the editors promised to obtain more documents from that key repository in the future. Although most of the materials in



ploshchad'") and is described as the opening segment of "Series I — Directories and Informational Materials." The entire issue consists of a directory of more than 1,000 documents released from the Presidential Archive and TsKhSD for the trial of the CPSU at the Constitutional Court. The 140-page directory provides an annotated list of documents in chronological order from March 1940 through December 1991. The vast bulk of the documents come from the Gorbachev period, especially the years 1989 to 1991, which account for roughly 62 percent of the total. Because the directory includes detailed subject and name indexes, it is an incomparably better finding aid than the scattered, disorganized lists for Fond No. 89 at TsKhSD, which previously were the only means available of keeping track of what had been turned over to the Court. One can only hope that future issues of *Arkhivno-informatsionnyi byulleten'* will, as promised, offer additional compendia of the holdings of Fond No. 89 that are as convenient to use as this directory is.

The journal *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, as well as its new supplement, is obviously not — and does not pretend to be — a substitute for on-site research in the archives, but it certainly is a welcome successor to the now-defunct *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* ("News of the CPSU CC"), which featured a few new documents every month when it was published between 1989 and August 1991.[75] *Istoricheskii arkhiv* goes far beyond that and thus helps compensate for the clampdown at TsKhSD and the continued lack of free access to other key archives. In particular, the publication of materials from the Presidential Archive enables researchers to peruse valuable documents that would otherwise be unavailable. Although the new journal and supplement may not be able to live up to their projected publication schedules of six and four issues a year, respectively (only one issue of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* was put out for 1992, and the first for 1993 was not published until May), they both should be appearing more frequently once the inevitable delays associated with the start-up of an ambitious new project have been overcome.[76]

covered only the POWs whose "progressive political leanings" made them willing to "condemn the unjust and aggressive war that the United States is waging in Vietnam." At least some of these 368 prisoners were due to be "released in the near future to bring pressure to bear on the Nixon administration" and "to demonstrate our [i.e., North Vietnam's] good intentions in this matter." The other 837 American POWs, including

Soviet government begin owning up to some of its earlier misdeeds. No doubt, the same is likely to be true of the Vietnamese regime. This is not to say that attempts to follow up on the POW issue in Hanoi are pointless, but at least for now the chances of obtaining meaningful documentation are far greater in Russia than in Vietnam.

The potential value of materials stored in the Russian archives was demonstrated in September 1993, when a second document was disclosed that suggested the North Vietnamese authorities deliberately under-reported the number of prisoners they were holding in the early 1970s. This document was a translation of a report presented by a senior North Vietnamese official, Hoang Anh, to a plenum of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's Central Committee in early 1971.[85] The official claimed that Hanoi was holding 735 U.S. "pilots," but had published the names of only 368 as a "diplomatic step," adding that these 368 would be released as soon as Washington agreed to withdraw all its forces from Vietnam and

ers and Soviet diplomats (which turned out to be perfectly routine and above-board); and the unauthorized and misattributed publication in London of extracts from diaries by Josef Goebbels that had been stored in the Moscow archives.[91] After each of these episodes, Russian archival officials briefly enforced stricter regulations, but they did not abandon the general trend toward greater openness. The reaction to the "Morris affair" was very different insofar as it severely disrupted and reversed almost all the positive steps that had been implemented. Although the clampdown is not likely to be permanent, it was a disheartening step backward that threatened to inhibit the development of a sound archival policy in Russia.

The reimposition of a "strict regime" (*strogii rezhim*) at TsKhSD may also hinder any further clarification of the two translated documents, at least for some time to come. This is unfortunate for both scholarly and practical reasons. Western commentators have focused almost exclusively on the statistics in the translated reports or on the position that General Quang may have occupied in September 1972, but other aspects of the Quang document, particularly Ivashutin's introductory memorandum, are far more tantalizing. We may never know whether there was an authentic report in Vietnamese by General Quang, but we already know that Ivashutin's memorandum is authentic and that he regarded the figure of 1,205 U.S. POWs to be accurate. We need to find out why. Similarly, Ivashutin's memorandum has a handwritten notation on it from Konstantin Katushev, the CPSU Secretary responsible for ties with other ruling Communist parties, to Igor Ognetov, the head of the sector for North Vietnam.[92] Katushev instructed Ognetov to "prepare, on an urgent basis, a short note for the CPSU CC Politburo about the prisoners of war." The fact that Katushev, as the most senior official in Moscow with day-to-day responsibility for Vietnam, recognized the importance of Quang's remarks about the POWs should give pause to anyone who is tempted to dismiss the figures out of hand.

Another aspect of the Quang document that needs to be clarified is the brief cover sheet from Ognetov, which apparently is in response to Katushev's handwritten note.[93] Ivashutin's memorandum was prepared in late November 1972, and Katushev's notation was made on or about 1 December. Ognetov's typed message, dated 6 February 1973, merely observes that "the instruction [presumably a reference to Katushev's handwritten instruction] has been overtaken by events" and that "comrade K. F. Katushev has been informed."[94] This simple, two-line message raises a host of intriguing questions: Why did Ognetov wait more than two months before responding to Katushev's "urgent" order? Did Ognetov prepare a "short note" for the Politburo in the interim, as he was instructed? If so, what did it say and what happened to it? What were the "events" that Ognetov believed had "overtaken" the instruction from Katushev? Among the possible answers to this last question are: (1) the signing of the Paris peace accords on 27 January 1973, which provided for the release of all American POWs; (2) the issuance of lists that same day by the U.S. State Department and the North Vietnamese government of the 591 American prisoners who were eventually set free under Operation Homecoming; and (3) a top-level meeting of the Soviet and North Vietnamese Communist parties in Moscow on 30 January 1973, which involved both Katushev and one of his closest aides, Oleg Rakhmanin, along with all the members of the CPSU Politburo.[95] Are these the "events" that Ognetov had in mind, and if so, what bearing did they have on the much higher number of prisoners cited in the translated report? (The list of 591 POWs represented the 368 whose capture had been publicly acknowledged before September 1972, plus the 223 Americans who were taken prisoner after that date, mainly during the Christmas bombings of North Vietnam.) How much credibility did Ognetov attach to the higher figures?

Until these sorts of questions are answered, it will be impossible to arrive at any firm conclusions about the data cited in the two translations. Even if the figures of 735 and 1,205 turn out to be much too high, a smaller discrepancy would still be worth exploring, on the off chance that some of the POWs are still alive. Nevertheless, it will be extremely difficult to further investigate the matter so long as the clampdown at TsKhSD continues. One would need free access to such things as the "short note" to the CPSU Politburo that Ognetov was ordered to "prepare on an urgent basis," the Politburo's deliberations about the Paris peace accords, and the secret transcripts from the Soviet-North Vietnamese meetings of 30 January 1973. These and other documents must exist at either TsKhSD or the Presidential Archive. But rather than allowing outside experts and scholars to find materials that would shed greater light on the issue, Russian archival officials have taken the counterproductive and irrational step of trying to prevent researchers from doing their work. Unfortunately, the whole episode suggests we may have to wait years before a genuine archival system emerges in Russia. In a country where democracy is still so rudimentary and tenuous, the status of the archives is bound to remain problematic.

Methodological Pitfalls

Having been denied access to archival materials in Moscow for so long, scholars who are now finally being permitted to examine Soviet documents may be tempted to draw sweeping conclusions from what they find. In some cases these conclusions are likely to be justified, but a good deal of caution is in order. Part of the problem, as E. H. Carr noted more than 30 years ago, is the tendency of historians to be overly impressed by what they find on paper:

> The nineteenth-century fetishism of facts was completed and justified by a fetishism of documents. The documents were the Ark of the Covenant in the temple of facts. The reverent historian approached them with bowed head and spoke of them in awed tones. If you find it in the documents, it is so. But what, when we get down to it, do these documents — the decrees, the treaties, the rent-rolls, the blue books, the official correspondence, the private letters and diaries — actually tell us? No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought — what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he himself thought he thought.[96]

There is a danger that scholars will become so engrossed by what they come across in documents marked with the "strogo sekretno" (strictly secret) or "sovershenno sekretno" (top secret) stamp that they will not approach these materials with the same degree of detachment they would exercise when considering most other forms of historical evidence. The novelty of looking through

the Soviet documents does quickly fade, but even the most seasoned of researchers cannot help but be struck, at least momentarily, when a highly classified report or memorandum turns up with a handwritten notation by the CPSU General Secretary or some other leading member of the Soviet Politburo.

Hence, the need for circumspection in dealing with materials from the ex-Soviet archives can hardly be overemphasized. Among other things worth bearing in mind is that, as TsKhSD's former director acknowledged, "far from all the documents that flowed into the Central Committee departments from elsewhere or that were prepared within the CC's own apparatus are accurate, complete, and 100 percent reliable."[97] As illuminating as the use of archival sources may be, it can be counterproductive if researchers fail to take account of the possibility that certain documents are either deliberately or inadvertently misleading or inaccurate. Ideally, information contained

may seem because of the difficulty of telling who read what and how much impact it had. Even when we can ascertain that a particular document did go up to the CPSU Politburo — perhaps by seeing annotations in the margins, or by finding a routing list with initials appended — there may still be little way of determining what role the item played. This point was well illustrated by a document that was transmitted to the Soviet Politburo in late December 1974 concerning the situation in Vietnam. The document was a draft response from Leonid Brezhnev to the North Vietnamese Communist party first secretary, Le Duan; and it was passed to the head of the CPSU General Department, Konstantin Chernenko, by one of Brezhnev's top aides, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, with the following message attached: "To Comrade Chernenko. Leonid Il'ich asked for a vote on this proposal (*He has not read the text.*)."[105] How common this sort of practice was is unclear, but it is safe to assume that Brezhnev and other members of the CPSU Politburo, especially those who were elderly and infirm, would frequently sign off on documents that they had not read.[106] That raises serious problems for scholars who hope to trace the decision-making process on specific issues and events.

In some instances this matter can be handled by searching for connections between presumed inputs and the subsequent evolution of Soviet policy. In the case of the Vietnam War, for example, Soviet leaders usually paid relatively little attention except when the conflict directly affected U.S.-Soviet relations. Instead, they tended to rely heavily on middle-ranking officials to lay out policy guidelines and recommend decisions on all but the most important matters.[107] Thus, when we come across proposals from the Central Committee apparatus or the Foreign Ministry that were subsequently incorporated with few or no changes in the Politburo's decisions about Vietnam, we can deduce that these inputs were of key importance at top levels.

Unfortunately, though, the nature of inputs for most issues is not as clear-cut. Moreover, even when documents produced at middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy correspond precisely with the decisions that were made by the Politburo, researchers must beware of inferring too much about those documents. It was a common practice among Soviet bureaucrats — a practice by no means unique to the Soviet Union, of course — to ingratiate themselves with top officials by writing elaborate policy "recommendations" for decisions that had already been made. The "recommendations," not surprisingly, would coincide with and strongly reinforce the preferences of CPSU leaders. This could often be seen, for example, in dispatches from Soviet ambassadors, who would set out recommendations for policies that they knew or suspected had already been, or were about to be, adopted. These dispatches can be interpreted in one of two ways: either (1) the ambassador was so far "out of the loop" on key decisions that he did not know what policies had already been adopted by the Politburo; or (2) the ambassador was putting himself on record as having "recommended" the decisions that were already made.[108] In either case, the practice is bound to cause problems for scholars who are seeking to weigh the significance of particular inputs. Checking the date of the

Reykjavik summit in October 1986, which reveal how close the two sides came to achieving an agreement far more ambitious than either had anticipated or even wanted.[113]

Ideally, if free access to the most important archives in Moscow is eventually granted to scholars, the publication of documents will no longer be so essential. Until that time, however, the use of published documents will be a crucial supplement to on-site archival research.

The reliance on published documentation is only one of the methodological problems caused by the continued unavailability of materials in the Presidential Archive, the postwar military archives, and the KGB and GRU archives. Another obvious pitfall is the temptation to "look for one's keys where the streetlight is," i.e., to ascribe excessive importance to the documents that *are* available. Not only are the items stored at TsKhSD and the AVPRF merely "inputs" into the decision-making process; they are not necessarily even the most important inputs. Unfortunately, researchers have not been able to examine all the relevant inputs, much less observe how (or whether) those inputs were used when decisions were actually made. Without access to the KGB and GRU archives, for example, scholars rarely get to see documents produced by either of the ex-Soviet intelligence organs, particularly the highly sensitive reports that might have had a crucial bearing on certain decisions. Much the same is true of vital inputs generated by the Soviet High Command and General Staff in the form of contingency plans, threat assessments, and recommendations for military options. Needless to say, this deficiency creates serious gaps in accounts of particular events and decisions.

Equally important, the unavailability of materials produced by certain agencies in Moscow can lead researchers to exaggerate the policy-making role of other agencies whose documents they do get a chance to examine. This already applies, in some cases, to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, whose documents are available not only at the AVPRF but also in abundance at TsKhSD. By emphasizing the Foreign Ministry's inputs into particular decisions, and by necessarily having much less to say about inputs from the KGB and GRU, scholars may end up offering highly skewed depictions of what went on. It is important to bear in mind, therefore, that in many cases the Foreign Ministry's role was actually quite limited. This was especially true on matters concerning relations with other Communist countries (Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, etc.), where party-to-party ties tended to be far more important than state-to-state interactions. On certain other issues, such as U.S.-Soviet relations and policy toward Africa, the Foreign Ministry did play a significant role, but even in these instances it is essential that the ministry's influence not be overstated.

One final pitfall for scholars working in the Russian archives is the occasional tendency either to reinvent the wheel or to attack straw men. Some of the participants in the CWIHP's conference in January 1993 seemed to find it remarkable that Soviet allies and clients in Eastern Europe and the Third World often tried to influence Soviet policy. Why this came as such a startling revelation is unclear. Should it really have been surprising to find that the "tail occasionally tried to wag the dog"?[114] Surely archival research was not a prerequisite for arriving at such an obvious conclusion. As far back as the early 1960s Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote a whole book about the "desatellitization" of Eastern Europe, noting how the increased heterogeneity among the Warsaw Pact states in the post-Stalin era had led to fissures in the bloc.[115] Other scholars offered similar analyses of the unexpected challenges that arose from one-time Soviet allies and clients such as Yugoslavia, China, Albania, and Egypt. No archival research was needed to see that the "tail" and the "dog" were frequently at odds.

Furthermore, by focusing so single-mindedly on instances in which the tail tried to wag the dog, researchers may gloss over or underestimate how successful the dog often was in wagging its tail. A distinguished British scholar recently noted that "research involves the shedding, not the confirmation, of our preconceptions. If historians go to the archives expecting certain answers to their questions, careful study of the evidence will almost invariably change their minds. It will alter not merely their answers but their questions."[116] Scholars who go to the archives in Moscow expecting to find evidence of conflict and bargaining between the Soviet Union and its allies will no doubt succeed in their task. It is not difficult to come across evidence of such phenomena. But these scholars must also be able to explain why unity and conformity so often prevailed, and why it was the Soviet Union that usually ended up "calling the shots." During the 1968 crisis in Czechoslo-

nado deportirovat'" (Moscow: Druzhba narodov, 1992); and the documentary series published under the rubric "O masshtabakh repressii v Krasnoi Armii v predvoennye gody," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), 1, 2, 3, and 5 (January, February, March, and May 1993), 56-63, 71-80, 25-32, and 59-65, respectively.

27. See, for example, Valerii Kovalev, "Kto zhe rasstrelival v Kuropatakh?" *Krasnaya zvezda*, 20 May 1993, 1; Vera Tolz, "Ministry of Security Official Gives New Figures for Stalin's Victims," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:18 (1 May 1992), 8-10; and E. V. Tsaplin, "Arkhivnye materialy o chisle zaklyuchennykh v kontse 30-kh godov," *Voprosy istorii* 4-5 (April-May 1991), 157-63.

28. See, for example, "Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal'neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane," No. P149/XIV (TOP SECRET — SPECIAL DOSSIER), 12 April 1979, in TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 14, Dokument 27; "Vypiska iz protokola No. 150 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 aprelya 1979 goda: O netselesoobraznosti uchastiya sovetskikh ekipazhei boevykh vertoletov v podavlenii kontrrevolyutsionnykh vystuplenii v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan," No. P150/93 (TOP SECRET — SPECIAL DOSSIER), 21 April 1979, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 28; and "Vypiska iz protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistana," No. P177/151 (WORD OF MOUTH ONLY — TOP SECRET — SPECIAL DOSSIER), 27 December 1979, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 32. For one of many recent first-hand accounts of the decision, see G.M. Kornienko, "Kak prinimalis'

archival materials shown to outside scholars must be considered declassified, regardless of their formal status. Moreover, they noted that as a practical matter the released documents had already been widely circulated and in some cases published, and that in any event CWIHP had no ability or right to control the scholars who had seen TsKhSD materials. CWIHP representatives expressed readiness to consider new terms for future cooperation, but said restrictions could not be placed retroactively on materials previously released to scholars who had conducted research in good faith under the terms of the original agreement.

72. This points to one of the many oddities of the current archival situation in Moscow. From mid-1992 until early 1993 scholars associated with the Wilson Center project were permitted to examine documents at the CPSU archives and take as detailed notes as they wished, but the Russian archival authorities still considered the documents to be formally classified until a Declassification Commission approved their declassification. (See previous footnotes.) Other peculiarities of the Russian notion of declassification are evident in A. V. Elpat'evskii, "O rassekrechivanii arkhivnykh fondov," *Otechestvennye arkhivy* 70:5 (September-October 1992), 15-20.

73. See "The Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation: Regulations for Declassification" and "The Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation: Regulations for Access," both in *AAASS Newsletter* 32:4 (September 1992), 1-2 and 2, respectively.

74. V. D. Esakov, "O zakrytii zhurnala 'Istoricheskii arkhiv' v 1962 g.," *Otechestvennye arkhivy* 70:4 (July-August 1992), 32-42. For another useful essay, accompanied by fascinating documents that reveal the extent of high-level CPSU interference in the functioning of the original version of *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, see "Sud'ba zhurnala: 'Istoricheskii arkhiv' v 1955-1962 gg.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 1 (1992), 194-211.

75. Among the numerous documents published in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, perhaps the most intriguing was a lengthy transcript of the Central Committee plenum held immediately after the downfall of Lavrentii Beria, the notorious secret police chief, in June 1953. See "Delo Beria," *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* 1 and 2 (January and February 1991), 140-214 and 147-208, respectively.

76. The projected number of issues per annum of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* was given as 12 in the first issue and reduced to six by the second issue. A figure of three to four seems more realistic.

77. General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Main Intelligence Directorate, "Doklad zamestitelya nachal'nika Genshtaba VNA General-leitenanta Chan Van Kuanga na zasedanii Politbyuro TsK PTV, 15 sentyabrya 1972 goda (Perevod s v'etnamskogo)," Copy No. 6 (TOP SECRET), November 1972, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 64, D. 478, Ll. 183-208.

78. The account here is based on my first-hand observations of what went on both before and after Morris discovered the document. I was working in the TsKhSD reading room at the time he found the section on POWs, and he promptly showed it to me. Like him, I immediately recognized the importance of the document, and I helped him do an on-the-spot translation into English of key passages, especially some of the handwriting on the cover memoranda. For Morris' account of these events, see "The Vietnamese Know How to Count," *Washington Post*, 18 April 1993, C7; "Quangmire," *The New Republic* 208:22 (31 May 1993), 18-19; "Ghosts in the Archives," *Washington Post*, 12 Sep-

Mlynar, and Josef Smrkovsky: *Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek*, trans. and ed. by Jiri Hochman (New York: Kodansha International, 1993), 168; Zdenek Mlynar, *Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus* (Koln: Eurpaisches Verlagsanstalt, 1978), 151-52; and "Nedokonceny rozhovor: Mluvi Josef Smrkovsky," *Listy: Casopis ceskoslovenske socialisticke opozice* (Rome) 4:2 (March 1975), 13-14. Dubcek's memoir says Kosygin uttered the slurs, whereas Mlynar and Smrkovsky both point to Shelest.

100. The disjuncture of the transcript suggests that this latter scenario is what transpired, but the renumbering of the pages prevents any conclusive determination.

101. See Mark Kramer, "Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?" *International Security* 15:1 (Summer 1990), 212-18, with a response by Bruce Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch. See further comments about these shortcomings in Mark Kramer, "New Sources on the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia" (Part One), *Cold War International History Project Bulletin 2* (Fall 1992), 8, 11.

102. McCarthy's remark came during an interview with Dick Cavett in early 1980. See Herbert Mitgang, "Miss Hellman Suing a Critic for 2.25 Million," *New York Times*, 16 February 1980, 12. During the Stalin era, many Soviet leaders attained this level of mendacity, and even more recently a few ex-officials in Moscow — Andrei Gromyko and Valentin Falin, to name two — came reasonably close.

103. Even when numerous accounts are available, there may be contradictions and discrepancies that cannot be resolved. This is the case so far with the question of whether the Soviet Union would have invaded Poland in December 1981 if the Polish president, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, had been unable or unwilling to impose martial law. For sharply divergent views on this matter from key participants in the crisis, see Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny — dlaczego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Les chaines et le refuge* (Paris: Lattes, 1992); Stanislaw Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje* (Wroclaw: BGW, 1991); the interview with Ryszard Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," *Kultura* (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), 3-57; Mieczylaw Rakowski, *Jak to sie stalo* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991); A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow) 9 (September 1992), 46-57; and Vitalii Pavlov, *Wspomnienia rezydenta KGB w Polsce* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993). The only way the matter will be resolved — if it ever will be — is through the release of more documents from the Presidential Archive. Some extremely valuable documents have already been declassified (as cited in note 111 *infra*), but these do not conclusively settle the matter. In other cases where first-hand accounts conflict, there may be little or no chance of ever getting documentation that could clarify things. To cite one of countless examples, it has long been thought that at a meeting in December 1967 between the CPSU General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, and top Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) officials, Brezhnev declared "*Eto vashe delo*" ("This is your own affair") when he was asked to intervene in the KSC's leadership dispute. Brezhnev certainly said things to that effect, but whether he actually uttered this phrase is unclear. Alexander Dubcek, who was present at the meeting, later was unsure whether Brezhnev had used the expression. Other prominent ex-KSC officials, such as Josef Smrkovsky and Jiri Pelikan, did believe Brezhnev had used the three words, but neither of them was actually present at the meeting. Whatever Brezhnev did or did not say, the phrase has become a part of the standard lore about the Prague Spring.

104. Interview with former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Brown University, 25 May 1991.

105. Emphasis added. This document, dated 24 December 1974, is sealed off in a "Special Dossier" (*Osobaya papka*), but is cited by Il'ya Gaiduk in footnote 34 of his manuscript "V'etnamskaya voina i sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya," presented at the CWIHP-IVI-TsKhSD conference in Moscow, 12-15 January 1993.

106. Shevardnadze supported this general proposition in an interview at Brown University, 25 May 1991.

107. See Gaiduk, "V'etnamskaya voina i sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya." I do not entirely agree, however, with the emphasis Gaiduk places on the Foreign Ministry's role in particular. In relations with a Communist country like North Vietnam, the key factor was party-to-party ties, which were supervised by the CPSU Central Committee department responsible for intra-bloc affairs. Foreign Ministry inputs, in most cases, probably came via the Central Committee department rather than directly to the Politburo.

108. A telling example of this phenomenon arose with a lengthy report transmitted by the Soviet ambassador in Romania, A. V. Basov, in September 1968. The report, entitled "On Certain Problems in Soviet-Romanian Relations in Light of the Positions Adopted by the Leadership of the RCP vis-a-vis the Events in Czechoslovakia," analyzed Romania's stance during the Czechoslovak crisis and offered numerous recommendations at the end for Soviet policy toward Romania. A one-page attachment to the report, from G. Kiselev, the deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, tersely remarked that "the majority of issues raised in the report and the concrete proposals of the embassy were already decided on in the CPSU Central Committee" nearly a week before the report was submitted. Kiselev noted that "the position of the embassy does not diverge from the CPSU CC's decisions," and he backed up his point by listing each of the recommendations in the report and correlating it with an earlier decision by the Politburo. For the report and Kiselev's memorandum (described as "Supplement to Document No. 27116"), see "TsK KPSS: O nekotorykh problemakh sovetsko-rumynskikh otnoshenii v svete pozitsii, zanyatoi rukovodstvom RKP v svyazi s sobytiyami v Chekhoslovakii," Report No. 686 (TOP SECRET) to the CPSU CC Politburo, 23 September 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D.339, Ll. 106-121.

109. See Carr, *What Is History?* 16-19, esp. 18-19.

110. The potential for problems is adumbrated in the Russian government's Decree No. 838 ("O realizatsii gosudarstvennoi politiki v arkhivnom dele"), which indicates that plans are underway to "publish historical sources and scholarly-informational literature during the period from 1994 to 2000, taking account of prospective directions in which the country's historical scholarship might develop, the growth of national and historical consciousness of Russians ["*rossiyan*"], and the spiritual renewal of Russia. The aim of these publications will be to show Russia's role and place in the history of world civilization and world culture and its influence on world society."

111. "Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81," *Gazeta wyborcza* (Warsaw), 12-13 December 1992, 10-11; and "Dokumenty Komisji Suslowa," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 26 August 1993, 19-20. See also the invaluable collection of transcripts of Polish Politburo meetings from 1980-81: Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc," 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992).

112. For citations of some of the recently published items, see my article on "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis" in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

113. The transcripts were published in four segments under the general rubric "Iz Arkhiva Gorbacheva (Besedy M. S. Gorbacheva s R. Reiganom v Reik'yavike 11-12 oktyabrya 1986 g.)." See "Pervaya beseda (pervonachal'no naedine) — utrom 11 oktyabrya 1986 g.," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (Moscow) 4 (April 1993), 79-90; "Vtoraya beseda (dnem 11 oktyabrya 1986 g.)," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* 5 (May 1993), 81-90; "Tret'yaya beseda (utrom 12 oktyabrya 1986 g.)," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* 7 (July 1993), 88-104, and "Chetvertaya beseda (dnem 12 oktyabrya 1986 g.)," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* 8 (August 1993), 68-78.

114. I use this metaphor here because it came up repeatedly at the conference. Unfortunately, as several speakers discovered, there is no good translation of the metaphor into Russian or other Slavic languages.

115. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

116. Blair Worden, "Lyrical Historian," *The New York Review of Books* 40:13 (15 July 1993), 12.

117. The new study is Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 1993). Weathersby's nuanced presentation by no means discounts the importance of the dog's own desire and ability to wag its tail, but she gives greater emphasis to the tail's initiative.

118. See, e.g., the two-part interview with Korotkov in *Yonhap* (Seoul), 22 and 23 June 1993, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Central Eurasia: Daily Report*, FBIS-SOV-93-118 and FBIS-SOV-93-119, 22 and 23 June 1993, 11-12, 14, respectively; and "Secrets of the Korean War: Forty Years Later, Evidence Points to Stalin's Deep Involvement," *U.S. News & World Report*, 9 August 1993, 45-47. Korotkov has prepared a book-length manuscript on the topic entitled "Poslednyaya voina Generalissimo" ("The Generalissimo's Final War").

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D E

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SOVIET COMMAND AUTHORITY, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

by Mark Kramer

Over the last several years, a group of American scholars have been reexamining the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. This collaborative project, which included five major conferences between 1987 and 1992, was organized initially by James Blight and David Welch and more recently by Blight and Bruce Allyn.[1] Their research has yielded many important findings and has shed new light on events that we thought we already "knew" perfectly well. Blight, Allyn, and Welch have performed a valuable service for both historians and political scientists.

Nevertheless, the fruitfulness of their work has at times been eroded by their desire to portray the Cuban missile crisis in as dangerous a light as possible. On at least a few occasions, they have been tempted to seize upon startling "revelations" that do not correspond with what actually happened. The result has been greater confusion than before about certain aspects of the crisis, especially regarding the Soviet Union's role.

The potential for increased confusion has been illustrated most recently by the controversy surrounding the issue of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. This issue first emerged at the conference in Havana in January 1992, where the speakers from the former Soviet Union included General Anatolii Gribkov, who headed a directorate within the Soviet General Staff's Main Operations Directorate in 1962.[2] (In that capacity Gribkov helped coordinate Operation "Anadyr," the Soviet code-name for the missile deployments.) Many of those attending the Havana conference, such as the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., construed Gribkov's presentation to mean that Soviet troops in Cuba in October 1962 "were ready to fire tactical nuclear missiles at an invading force without getting clearance from Moscow."[3] Gribkov's testimony at the conference was in fact more guarded and cryptic than Schlesinger implied, but most of the American participants (especially those who had to depend on English translations) interpreted the general's remarks in the same way that Schlesinger did. Although a few of the Americans remained decidedly skeptical about the thrust of Gribkov's presentation, the large majority were apparently willing to accept the notion that the commander of Soviet troops had full authority during the crisis to launch tactical nuclear strikes against attacking U.S. forces.

The main purpose of this article is to refute that notion, drawing on recently declassified archival materials and new first-hand accounts. The article also will make clear that the recent controversy surrounding the tactical nuclear weapons issue should induce greater circumspection in the future regarding what we "learn" about the Cuban missile crisis. The first part of the article will consider how and why a fundamental misunderstanding arose in this case, and the second part will invoke newly released evidence to demonstrate that Soviet commanders in October 1962, far from having unlimited authority to use tactical nuclear missiles as they saw fit, were in fact categorically forbidden to use such weapons under any circumstances without explicit orders from Moscow. The brief concluding part of the article will touch upon the broader methodological implications of the controversy.

Scholarly Indiscretions

From the outset there was ample reason to be extremely cautious about Gribkov's testimony (or at least the conclusions that were derived from his testimony). For one thing, Gribkov offered no supporting documentation when he spoke at Havana, nor did he provide any afterwards. By contrast, key documents *were* available at the time of the conference that should have generated profound skepticism about the notion that Soviet commanders were authorized to launch nuclear strikes during the crisis without clearance from Moscow. (I will have more to say about these documents below.) If important documentary evidence is at hand that strongly supports a given position, common sense would tell us to be wary of a conflicting position that is supported by no documentation at all. Furthermore, Gribkov was the only Soviet participant at any of the conferences who had ever implied that Soviet officers could have ordered nuclear strikes on their own during the crisis. That in itself would not be sufficient grounds to reject his purported "disclosures," but at the very least it should have induced skepticism and caution on the part of the American participants.

Circumspection is in order whenever scholars make use of oral history, but it was particularly crucial when dealing with Gribkov's testimony, for this was not a trivial matter. It was an assertion that, if proven credible, could have altered our traditional understanding of the Cuban missile crisis. Surely it would have behooved the American organizers of the Havana conference to await at least some corroborating evidence before they made too much of this important but unproven "finding."

The organizers, after all, were not unaware of the perils of inferring too much from oral history. One of their earlier conferences had offered a sobering precedent of the way dramatic "revelations" can turn out to be unfounded. At the conference in Moscow in January 1989 the former Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatolii Dobrynin, startled the American participants when he claimed he had met secretly with Robert Kennedy on the 26th of October 1962 as well as the 27th. This disclosure, if it had been accurate, would have required substantial changes in the historical record of the crisis.[4] But we now know that Dobrynin's claim was not accurate, as the ex-ambassador himself later acknowledged with considerable embarrassment.[5] This false alarm should have spawned greater caution on the part of those who may have

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KRAMER VS. KRAMER:
Or, How Can You Have Revisionism in the Absence of Orthodoxy?

by James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch

"Almost everything in this statement is inaccurate"—Mark Kramer

Gadflies and devil's advocates perform a valuable academic service. They prevent hasty analysis, inadequate circumspection, and premature closure. We would like to take this opportunity to thank our colleague Mark Kramer for shouldering the gadfly's burden for the past five years as our detailed investigation of the Cuban missile crisis has evolved. His skepticism at every step of the way has been a useful reminder to us that deeply-rooted beliefs die hard.

Nevertheless, it is with some sadness that we pen these words, because there would have been no need for us to reply if Kramer had confined himself to presenting the en-

tion at the conference, even though he claimed to be relying on a "General Staff document." Bruce Allyn and James Blight followed up on the general's remarks by attempting to track down this purported "document" in Russia. Allyn did eventually obtain a brief excerpt from it, dated June 1962, which contained the draft of an order from the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, to Pliyev. The draft order stipulated that if a U.S. invasion occurred and communications between Moscow and Cuba were severed, Pliyev should decide on his own whether "to use tactical nuclear Luna missiles as a means of local war for the destruction of the enemy on land and on the coast."[18] In a letter to *The New York Times* printed in November 1992, Allyn and Blight quoted this passage as evidence for their view that Pliyev was authorized to use tactical nuclear weapons during the Cuban missile crisis.

Closer examination shows, however, that the document they cited has no bearing on the matter. The draft order was never signed by Malinovskii and thus was never implemented or sent.[19] The operational directive that *was* actually approved and transmitted to Pliyev in September 1962 expressly prohibited the use of tactical nuclear weapons (and even the issuance of nuclear warheads for such weapons) without authorization from Moscow. This directive was sent out several weeks before the crisis, but it remained in effect all the way through, as will be shown below.

Even if Allyn and Blight had been correct in arguing that Pliyev was given discretion in September 1962 to order the use of

10. John E. Mulligan, "'62 Crisis Could Have Been a 'Disaster,'" *Providence Journal*, 22 January 1992, A-4. See also Martin Tolchin, "U.S. Underestimated Soviet Force in Cuba During '62 Missile Crisis," *New York Times*, 15 January 1992, A-11; and Don Oberdorfer, "Cuban Missile Crisis More Volatile Than Thought," *Washington Post*, 14 January 1992, A-1, A-16.
11. For Garthoff's cautious assessment, see his "The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 1 (Spring 1992), 2-4. Newhouse's account was published in "A Reporter at Large: Socialism or Death," *The New Yorker*, 27 April 1992, 52 ff., esp. 69-71.
12. Kim A. McDonald, "Cuba Said to Have Nuclear Warheads During 1962 Crisis," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 38:21 (29 January 1992), A-9.
13. Tad Szulc, "Cuba '62: A Brush with Armageddon," *Washington Post Book World* 22:46 (15 November 1992), 10.
14. "The Missiles of October," ABC News Special Report, 16 October 1992, typescript, 38. This program, which gave pride of place to the tactical nuclear weapons issue, was remarkable for how carelessly it discussed Soviet policy. To cite but one example, Jennings asserted early in the broadcast that until 1962 the Soviet Union had "never before moved missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads outside its own borders" (15). In fact, the Soviet Union had shipped nuclear-capable Frog and Scud missiles to the East European members of the Warsaw Pact before 1962.
15. George Ball, "Present After the Creation," *New York Review of Books* 39:24 (17 December 1992), 11.
16. See, e.g., Stephen M. Meyer, *Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces, Part II: Capabilities and Implications*, Adelphi Paper 188 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1983/4), 30-31.
17. U.S. intelligence analysts discovered as early as 27 October 1962 that Frog delivery vehicles were present in Cuba, but the presence of nuclear warheads for the missiles was never confirmed. See "Supplement 7 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba," prepared by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, 27 October 1962, 2; reproduced in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962* (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, October 1992), 325. A recent book based on retrospective analyses of U.S. aerial reconnaissance — Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, 1991), esp. 538-48 — indicates that nuclear warheads were present in special vans at Mariel, but the implication is that these warheads were exclusively for the SS-4s. A recent article by a senior Russian military officer claims that 102 tactical nuclear warheads were present in Cuba for nearly two months in 1962, from 4 October until 1 December. These allegedly included 12 warheads slated for use on the "Frog" missiles, 80 warheads for tactical cruise missiles, 6 gravity bombs, and 4 nuclear naval mines. See Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dukuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 6 November 1992, 2. In an interview with the author (12 January 1993), Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov, who was in charge of the Soviet Union's "central nuclear base" in Cuba during the crisis, also maintained that 12 nuclear warheads had been shipped to the island for the "Frog" missiles. All these claims are eminently plausible, but so far there is no direct evidence to substantiate them.
18. "Anadyr," Soviet General Staff Archives, File 6, Volume 2, p. 144; cited by Blight and Allyn in their letter to the editor, *New York Times*, 2 November 1992, A-20.
19. See the interview with Gribkov and the preceding remarks in Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," *Krasnaya zvezda,* 6 November 1992, 2.
20. Ibid. (emphasis added)
21. "Karibskii krizis" (Part 3), 35. See also "Karibskii krizis" (Part 4), 5.
22. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," p. 2.
23. Ibid.
24. The full document was published in Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchaev, "Operatsiya 'Anadyr'," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 October 1992, 3. The original text with handwritten notations is reproduced alongside an interview with General Dmitrii Volkogonov in "Operatsiya 'Anadyr'," *Trud* (Moscow), 27 October 1992, 3.
25. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2 (emphasis added). The same wording is reported by Gribkov in "Karibskii krizis" (Part 3), 35.
26. Cited in Anatolii Dokuchaev, "Voina ozhidalas' s rassvetom," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 May 1993, 2. This article presents two intriguing accounts of, and new archival materials on, the downing of the U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane on 27 October. The local decision to shoot down the aircraft clearly seems to have exceeded what the rules of engagement at the time (as laid out in Malinovskii's cable) permitted, and this factor undoubtedly contributed to Khrushchev's determination to bring the crisis to an end before events spun out of control. But that in no way implies that the proscription on the use of nuclear weapons could have been evaded in the same manner. It was precisely to ensure that such evasion could *not* occur that a host of overlapping procedural safeguards were in place for nuclear weapons. No such procedures would have been feasible or desirable for non-nuclear armaments, which explains why an unauthorized use of air defenses was possible (though even in this limited case, as Dokuchaev's article makes clear, the employment of the weapons was extremely difficult to carry out). Thus, although the downing of the U-2 highlighted the potential dangers of the Cuban missile crisis, there is no basis for arguing that the incident revealed anything about the durability of the Soviet nuclear command structure during the crisis. On the contrary, all the evidence cited below suggests that the nuclear command structure proved just as effective in October 1962 as one would have hoped.
27. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2.
28. On the safeguards for Soviet nuclear weapons at the time, see Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket, eds., *Managing Nuclear Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 487, 491-92.
29. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2.
30. Ibid.
31. "The Missiles of October," ABC News Special Report, 16 October 1992. See also Robert S. McNamara, "One Minute to Doomsday," *New York Times*, 19 October 1992, A-25.
32. "Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda," *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR* (Moscow) 24 (31 December 1990), 67-80.
33. See, e.g., Oleg Troyanovskii, "Karibskii krizis: Vzglyad s kremlya," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow) 3 (March 1992), 109-110.
34. See, e.g., Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), esp. ch. 10.
35. "Karibskii krizis: Vzglyad s kremlya," 112. Among the recently declassified documents bearing out this view, see "Iz telegrammy iz Gavany o besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro," 20 November 1962, reproduced in "Dialog v Gavane. Karibskii krizis: Dokumenty," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* 1 (January 1993), 149.
36. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2 (emphasis added).
37. For a survey of items released at the Central Committee archive-the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation-and a brief list of far more valuable items that are still unavailable, see the paper by A. M. Petrov and V. V. Poznyakov, "Kubinskii raketnyi krizis v dokumentakh TsKhSD," January 1993, presented at the Cold War International History Project conference in Moscow, 12-15 January 1993. Among the holdings of the Central Committee archive pertaining to the crisis are dozens of files in Fond 5, Opisy 30, 33, 35, 36, 47, 50, and 55; and Fond 4, Opis 14. Files in the Foreign Ministry archive are concentrated in Fond 104, Opisy 12 and 17. These holdings, unfortunately, shed no light at all on the main questions discussed here.

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relies—Gen. Gribkov himself—Kramer considers untrustworthy. He describes Gribkov's current position as an "admission" and a "retraction," strongly implying that Gribkov originally lied. If Gribkov was not a credible witness then, he is not a credible witness now. Moreover, one reason why Kramer did not regard Gribkov as credible at Havana was that Gribkov "offered no supporting documentation at any point." Gribkov has yet to provide any supporting documentation of Khrushchev's rescindment.

Perhaps Kramer is impressed by the testimony of Garbuz and Beloborodov. Yet Kramer does not tell us why these gentlemen would be credible witnesses if Gribkov is not. Neither has provided any documentation for his claims, and one of them—Beloborodov—initially professed to confirm the version of events that Gribkov related at the Havana conference.[3] In print, Kramer has disparaged *mere* oral testimony and has cautioned against the Soviets' proclivity to portray their foreign and defense policies in the most favorable light possible.[4] Why is he not suspicious that Garbuz and Beloborodov are attempting to shelter Soviet policy from a charge of gross recklessness, particularly in view of the fact that the tone of the article in which their claims appear is strongly defensive in this regard?[5]

Perhaps Kramer regards as conclusive the "documentary evidence" upon which he dwells and that he notes was available at the time of the Havana conference itself: to wit, the letters Khrushchev wrote to Castro immediately after the acute phase of the crisis, which "confirm that Khrushchev was profoundly disinclined to tolerate any prospect of nuclear exchange." We agree that Khrushchev's letters evince a strong horror of nuclear war; but nowhere do they mention tactical nuclear weapons or command authority, and therefore they do not constitute "evidence" for or against any particular command-and-control arrangement. Indeed, Khrushchev's horror of nuclear war is well-known and has been thoroughly documented. But this only renders all the more puzzling Khrushchev's decision to deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba in the first place.[6] It renders almost unintelligible his original standing orders to Pliyev (as they currently appear) pre-delegating authority to use tactical nuclear weapons. Khrushchev's letters to Castro raise questions; they do not provide answers. What fuels one fire cannot extinguish another. Kramer's appeal to Khrushchev's letters, therefore, is an epistemological *faux pas*.

Kramer has argued himself into a curious corner. He professes not to accept uncorroborated oral testimony; he is inclined to suspect Soviets of dissimulation; he has seen no documentation to support his position; his sole supporting circumstantial argument is fallacious (the appeal to Khrushchev's letters to Castro); and yet he insists that the matter is closed. Is his certainty a function of his confidence in some deduction from prior principles? That would be strange, too; for as Kramer himself notes, it would have been *standard practice* for Pliyev to have predelegated authority to use the tactical nuclear weapons under his command.[7] If Kramer were to reason instead simply from Khrushchev's aversion to nuclear war, he would never get beyond the very deployment of missiles to Cuba that precipitated the crisis in the first place. We must confess that we are baffled at Kramer's confidence, and we are mystified as to its grounds. We are concerned, too, by the possibility that Kramer selectively accepts as "evidence" only testimony that confirms his hunches.

For our part, we remain unsure as to the details of Pliyev's standing orders. While we are sensitive to the drawbacks of oral history,[8] we are not inclined to dismiss out of hand the testimony of those whose historical roles and responsibilities suggest that they should be in a position to speak to the issues authoritatively, and until we see disconfirming evidence or contradictory testimony from someone better positioned to know, we are willing to accept the accounts of such people provisionally. At the time of the Havana conference, Gen. Gribkov was the first person ever to address the question of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons and command arrangements, and his role as administrative head of the Soviet General Staff's main operations directorate in 1962 (under Gen. Semyon Ivanov) certainly gave him a more authoritative voice than had yet been heard on any aspect of the Soviet deployment.[9] Accordingly, we tentatively credited his claims (a careful review of the works Kramer cites intending to substantiate his protestations that we accepted Gribkov's claims absolutely and uncritically will reveal that we have been careful to refer to Gribkov's claims only as *claims*, not as

case, we are troubled by the fact that we have not yet seen any satisfactory documentation of Garbuz's claim, and we are concerned by a number of lingering riddles in the story of the Soviet nuclear deployment to Cuba. Dokuchaev's *Krasnaya zvezda* article in which Garbuz's claims appear, for instance, purports to be authoritative, yet includes a number of startling and/or puzzling assertions. Consider four:

- Dokuchaev claims that the Soviet Union shipped at least 162 nuclear weapons to Cuba—60 for the SS-4 and SS-5 strategic missiles, 80 for tactical cruise missiles, 12 for *Luna* (FROG) missiles, 6 gravity bombs for "airplanes" (i.e., Il-28 "Beagle" jet light bombers), and 4 nuclear mines.[13] These claims are unprecedented, and contradict the testimony of several Soviets—including that of Gribkov at the Havana conference—that the Soviet Union never intended to provide nuclear weapons for the Il-28 bombers.
- Dokuchaev also claims that on October 26, Pliyev ordered the nuclear warheads in Cuba moved out of storage and closer to their delivery vehicles. This claim, too, is unprecedented, and seems to contradict Beloborodov's claim in the same article that he "did not receive any signals to give out the ammunition either for the medium range missiles or for the tactical weapons."
- Dokuchaev claims that the freighter *Indigirka* conveyed 162 nuclear warheads from Severomorsk (near Murmansk) to Mariel, but refers to it as a "diesel-electric ship"—a description that only makes sense when applied to submarines.[14]
- Dokuchaev refers to Beloborodov as a retired "Air Force" Lieutenant General, but also as the commander of the central nuclear base in Cuba. It is curious that a mere colonel would have held such an important position, and particularly curious that he would have been attached to the air force rather than to the Strategic Rocket Forces or the KGB.

These mysteries, coupled with lingering inconsistencies in Soviet testimony,[15] make it difficult to know how much confidence to place in any particular set of claims. Our efforts to get to the bottom of issues such as these have not yet borne the desired fruit. Increasingly, we have begun to suspect that Russian military intelligence has placed limits on how much—and what—our interlocutors may say.[16] At this point, we believe it is useful to weigh competing accounts and consider their implications; but until we see hard evidence that enables us to resolve important issues, prudence requires that we remain circumspect in our judgments of historical fact.

Nuclear Danger During the Crisis

It is impossible to know in any objective sense exactly how "dangerous" the Cuban missile crisis was, because it is impossible to fix a probability to the likelihood that the crisis would have escalated to strategic nuclear war.[17] We agree with Kramer that Kennedy and Khrushchev attempted to minimize this danger during the crisis—up to a point (both could have reduced the danger even further: Kennedy by forswearing compellence altogether and deciding to live with Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba; Khrushchev by agreeing to withdraw them without delay). Most significantly, for present purposes, we believe that some time after

highly unlikely that air strikes alone would have destroyed them all.[21] Not even the vastly-more sophisticated U.S. Air Force of 1991 succeeded in destroying all of Saddam Hussein's FROG-era Scud missile launchers in the open desert of Western Iraq; far less likely was it that the U.S. Air Force of 1962 would have destroyed all (or even most) of Pliyev's FROGs in the jungles of Cuba. Moreover, U.S. military plans called for a full week of air operations before a landing would even begin.[22] The landing itself would have taken days, and the campaign to subdue Cuban forces weeks or months at least.[23] Beloborodov's troops could have removed their tactical nuclear warheads from storage and transported them 250 or 300 kilometers to their launchers in a matter of hours.

While Kramer may have confidence in the integrity of chains of command and in U.S. military capabilities, neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev evinced such confidence during the crisis itself. We have argued elsewhere that the sober circumspection with which they conducted themselves in the week of 22-28 October 1962 was in large part a function of their *lack* of confidence in the utility and controllability of military force.[24] We wonder whether Kramer is as well-placed to judge these matters as Kennedy and Khrushchev, who had to live through the most frightening week of the nuclear age, shouldering the burden of responsibility not only for their nations but for humanity as a whole, bearing witness time and again to the limits of their control over the organizations under their nominal authority. Kennedy and Khrushchev were scared. If they had been confident in their ability to control events, they would have had no reason to be.

It was *because* they were scared that they shied away from more intransigent positions and more aggressive actions. Thus, ironically, Kramer's confidence that the actual risks of nuclear war were far lower than we (and others, such as McNamara) maintain—resting as it does on Khrushchev's aversion to nuclear war and his desire (and ability) to keep Pliyev on a tight rein—is directly a function of considerations to which Kramer is oblivious and whose relevance he implicitly denies. Is he nonetheless correct to chastise us for "regard[ing] the crisis as more dangerous than it actually was"? It is difficult to spot an exaggeration of something unquantifiable, such as the danger of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis. We are confident, however, that the crisis was the single most dangerous event of the nuclear age; that the presence of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba only increased the danger; and that a cavalier attitude toward nuclear risk, grounded in a weak understanding of history, of civil-military relations, of command-and-control, and of military operations, is in itself potentially a very dangerous thing.[25]

The Duties of Scholars

We wholeheartedly endorse Kramer's view that it is "important for scholars to be circumspect when evaluating new revelations" about important events such as the Cuban missile crisis, and that "[i]t is always better to err on the side of caution." For that reason, we are unwilling to share in Kramer's confidence that the matter of Pliyev's command authority is settled and that the crisis was far less dangerous than we had thought.[26] We agree, too, that scholars should not encourage sensationalism. Well do we recall our struggle to rein in the extravagant claims of journalists at various times in the course of our research: for example, when Dean Rusk revealed for the first time that, at the height of the crisis, President Kennedy set in train a contingency for a public trade of U.S. missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba; when we published transcripts of Kennedy's secret October 27 cabinet room audio tapes; and when we began to learn for the first time details of Soviet decision-making in the crisis. We further believe that scholars have a duty to ask questions not only of others, but also of themselves, and to be willing to revise their judgments in the light of changing information. We believe our record speaks for itself in this regard. Readers will find many interesting contrasts, for example, between the first and second editions of *On the Brink*, reflecting the progress of our research. Our latest effort (*Cuba On the Brink*) is equally circumspect, and treats the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and command authority carefully.

We further believe that scholars have a duty to conduct their research with a genuine spirit of inquiry, and when they disagree with one another, to identify and explore the substance of their disagreements in a serious academic fashion. Argument *ad hominem* has no place in this endeavor. We regret that Kramer ventured beyond substance to question our motives. We will not repeat the error—Kramer's motives escape us—but we categorically reject his claim that "the fruitfulness of their work has at times been eroded by their desire to portray the Cuban missile crisis in as dangerous a light as possible." We have no such desire. We cannot even imagine what ends would be served by deliberately exaggerating the danger of the crisis. In any case, even if we had such a desire, the Cuban missile crisis needs no embellishment from us. We also dismiss as unfounded Kramer's charge that "[o]n at least a few occasions, they have been tempted

alia, Kramer writes: "On the Soviet side, the question of ulterior motives is far more intractable [than on the U.S. side]" (213); "[Certain] weaknesses of oral history—both the lapses of memory and the attempts to slant things or mislead—can be compensated for if adequate documentary evidence is available. On the American side, that is certainly possible ... On the Soviet side, the ability to cross-check and verify the

[Ed. note: The previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin *(Fall 1992, pp. 1, 13-19) contained an English translation of a report ("Military Planning of the Warsaw Pact: A Study") issued by the Defense Ministry of the Federal Republic of German analyzing materials of the East German New People's Army which fell into West German hands after the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989-90. Below is a response to that report by a prominent (West) German scholar, Dr. Gerhard Wettig of the Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien in Cologne. For a recent detailed analysis of GDR military documents pertaining to Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, readers are also referred to the report of Lt. Col. Harald Nielsen,* The East German Armed Forces in Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations *(Ebenhausen, Germany: Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Forschungsinstitut fuer Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, July 1993); the report by Nielsen, an SWP consultant, was prepared and translated into English for the Sandia National Laboratories (Livermore, CA 94551-0960 and Albuquerque, NM 87185) through a contract with Orion Research.]*

WARSAW PACT PLANNING IN CENTRAL EUROPE: THE CURRENT STAGE OF RESEARCH

by Gerhard Wettig

Issue 2 of the Cold War International History Project *Bulletin* contained a translation of the German Defense Ministry report on the above topic. What was missing, however, was a more detailed explanation of what was precisely underlying the report. As an analyst who has been working in the field before the report came out, I feel that the following context is worth noting:

1. The report is official in character only in the sense that the German Defense Ministry has transmitted it to the public. The message it transmits reflects essentially the perceptions of the military officer who wrote the report.
2. The West German Bundeswehr did not get hold of NVA [New People's Army] documents that revealed Warsaw Pact military strategy directly. All such materials had been removed before the Bundeswehr entered the NVA premises. As a result, the West Germans found evidence but only on how the East German military were instructed to perform in military exercises, maneuvers, etc. This kind of material provides merely circumstantial evidence, i.e., it is a basis but for indirect inferences.
3. The German Defense Ministry report, therefore, must be understood as containing inferences drawn by the author. It is conceivable that other analysts who saw and evaluated the underlying source basis might have drawn different inferences on some points.
4. If one compares the German Defense Ministry report with Western, particularly U.S., analyses of Warsaw Pact military strategy published before 1989/90 on the basis of the source material then available (which included, inter alia, confidential documents such as Soviet General Staff Academy lectures[1]), a fundamental difference emerges. While the German Defense Ministry report infers that the Warsaw Pact's plans for an immediate and rapid military offensive against the European defenses of NATO had envisaged early first use of nuclear weaponry under any conditions, preceding Western analyses had concluded that, at some date in the late 1960s[2] or early 1970s[3], the Soviet military leadership decided in favor of a non-nuclear blitzkrieg provided that the Western enemy refrained from using nuclear weapons. The reason for this change of mind was seen in the Soviet military's growing awareness that use of nuclear weaponry would slow down rather than speed up Warsaw Pact military advances to the shores of the North Atlantic.
5. The kind of indirect evidence underlying the German Defense Ministry report appears insufficient to make mandatory its author's inference that, in the event of East-West war, the Warsaw Pact had a definite intention to use nuclear weapons first even if the Western side were expected to abstain from their use. The demonstrable fact that military preparations were made to initiate nuclear first use in case that this contingency would impose itself, does not necessarily imply that nuclear first use was the preferred course of military action.

Consequently, research on the role of nuclear weapons in Warsaw Pact offensive strategy must continue. Both the German Defense Ministry material and documents originating from former Warsaw Pact countries other than the GDR need further analysis on this question.

Notes

1. See *The Voroshilov Lectures. Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy. Issues of Soviet Military Strategy*, edit by Graham Hall Turbiville, Jr., compiled by Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, intro. by Raymond L. Garthoff (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, vol. I: June 1989; vol. II: December 1990). A number of U.S. analysts were able to use these source materials (which represent the version of Soviet military strategy lectured to non-Warsaw Pact attendants of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy) many years prior to publication. In the meantime, the previously confidential Soviet General Staff journal *Voennaya mysl'* has also become available to research and offers valuable insight.
2. See Michael McGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 28-29, 379-405.
3. See Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Military Strategy," *Orbis* 27:3 (Fall 1983), 695-739; John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Military th ba95 T

AVPRF

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Finding aids: copies of the original *opisi* will gradually be made available to external users. As a first stage parts of the *opisi* will be copied upon request, with the copies delivered for use in the reading room. However, the AVPRF is already beginning to make copies of the *opisi* on a chronological and comprehensive basis. Users of the archives should be aware that a list of *fondy* is available in the archive's reading room, together with a copy of the archive's *indexation system*. The index is indispensable in order to make sure that one receives all relevant *dela* from a given *fond*. A preliminary *Putevoditel* to the archives is scheduled to be available in the reading room from September 1993.

A new *reading room* with approximately 25 seats will open to external users from September this year. [Ed. note: The opening date was reportedly moved back to mid-October 1993.]

These positive developments notwithstanding, the archives continue to struggle with serious difficulties, often of an organizational and financial nature. For instance, documents are not stored in the same building as the reading room, and the moving of *dela* between the buildings is mostly done on foot, due to the lack of a car. The *fondokhraniteli*, who respond to external users' requests, must give priority to orders from the Ministry's own staff. Last but not least, the organizational framework is set up to serve internal, not external, users. Users should consider such factors in order to establish a positive working relationship with the *fondokhraniteli* and the other staff members.

Even under these somewhat adverse conditions, and pending full availability of the opisi, research in the AVPRF can yield rich results (depending on the time available for, and the persistence of, the researcher). The absence of certain kinds of top-level documents (Politburo, etc.) is balanced by the presence of extensive materials throwing light on the decision making process and the formation of Soviet policy within the MID bureaucracy.

One important key to success is the keeping of exact records of *opisi*, *papki*, *dela*, and the *index number*. If this is done properly and the topic of research is geographically defined, one can determine with a high degree of certainty whether one has been shown all clearly relevant *dela* within a given *fond* for a given year. The reason for this is that, within *fondy* of a general nature (for instance fond 06, the secret *fond* of Molotov's secretariat), *dela* covering relations with a given country are basically located in blocks of *dela* with consecutive numbers; the index indicating the beginning and the end of the geographical block. Within both these blocks and the purely geographic *fondy*, i.e. the *fondy* of the *referentury* and other geographically defined units, the *index* provides a rough key to where one might expect to find relevant materials. New users should start with a comprehensive search of the respective geographical units, and then continue with the relevant parts of the Minister's secretariat. The collections of the Deputy Ministers also contain highly valuable materials, and it is important, therefore, to identify the *Zamministry* who dealt with the topic under research. There are, of course, special fondy of major international conferences, and also *fondy* covering Soviet par-

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in "Avantyuristicheskie plany Pentagona i TsRU," *Pravda*, 19 July 1968, 4.

51. Historicky ustav CSAV, *Sedm prazskych dnu*, 53-54. See also Andrew and Gordievskii, *KGB*, 487.

52. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Special Operations Command, *Special Operations: Military Lessons from Six Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Fall 1982), 205-12.

53. Memorandum No. 2613-Ts (TOP SECRET) from S. Tsvigun, deputy chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU Secretariat, 19 November 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 311, Ll. 137-140.

54. Ibid., L. 137.

55. Mlynar, *Nachtfrost*, 112-14. See also Pavel Tigrid, *La chute irresistible d'Alexander Dubcek* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1969), 62-64.

56. August and Rees, *Red Star Over Prague*, 127-28.

57. Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*, 196.

58. Karel Kaplan, "Zamysleni nad politickymi procesy," *Nova mysl*

98. See references in note 7, *supra*.
99. "Stenograficky zaznam schuzky varsavske petky v Moskve dne 18.8.1968 k rozhodnuti o intervenci a projednani planu," p. 398.
100. Pyotr Rodionov, "Kak nachinalsya zastoi? Iz zametok istorika partii," *Znamya* (Moscow) 8 (August 1989), 182-210. During the 1968 crisis, Rodionov was the second highest-ranking CPSU official in Georgia.
101. Interview with Voronov in Yu. V. Aksyutin, ed., *L. I. Brezhnev: Materialy k biografii* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), 189-90.
102. Ibid., 190. This speech was one of the pieces of evidence that Rodionov adduced in support of his claims about Voronov.
103. For ample evidence, see Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*, Occasional Paper No. 6 (Canberra: Australian National University's Research School of Social Sciences, 1970).
104. R. Jeffrey Smith and Patrick Tyler, "To the Brink of War in the Prague Spring," *Washington Post*, 29 August 1989, A-23.
105. Bruce G. Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), 25, 179-80.
106. Interview with author, Moscow, 24 January 1993.
107. This is, for example, a central argument in Christopher Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981).
108. Memorandum for Walt Rostow from William L. Lemnitzer (TOP SECRET), 6 September 1968, declassified 15 August 1990 under Mandatory Review Case No. 89-41, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereinafter LBJPL), Austin, Texas. Among other Western documents pertaining to this issue, see U.S. Department of State, Czech Task Force, "Situation Report 1500 Hours EDT" (SECRET), 6 September 1968, pp. 1-2, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S. Department of State, Czech Task Force, "Situation Report, 1200 hours EDT" (SECRET), 24 August 1968, p. 1, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/

lated Khrushchev's suspicions of China's trustworthiness as an ally.

Other points worth noting in the conversation are Mao's views on conflicts within the capitalist camp, his forthright description of the strength of Tibetan nationalism, and his amazing ability to imagine a global picture of alliances and conflicts which few other contemporary leaders would recognize. Introduction by Odd Arne Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University.

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From the journal of
ANTONOV, S.F. Top Secret, Copy 3
"21 October 1959"

Summary of a conversation
with the Chairman of the CC CPC
[Central Committee Communist Party of China] Mao-Tse Tung
on 14 October 1959

In accordance with instructions I visited Mao Tse-Tung and gave him confidential information about Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the USA. Handing Mao Tse-Tung the text of the information, I told him that according to the Chinese press and to comments of Chinese comrades, the conviction had developed at the Embassy that our Chinese friends approve of the results of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the USA. Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, in reply, said that they fully approve of this foreign policy step of the CPSU, and that they have no differences in evaluation of the significance of this trip. In a half-joking tone, I asked Mao Tse-Tung whether one could consider that on this question we are united on all ten fingers. Mao Tse-Tung said, that it is so, and added, that in general, whenever we have some sort of disagreements, they consist of just one finger out of ten, or more precisely, just half a finger. Regarding that, he continued, if there are some disagreements between us, then they are not of permanent character, but are partial and temporary. On most questions we are united on all ten fingers. Sometimes, it may appear that our disagreements are on many fingers of the Soviet Union, which over 22 years [1918-1940--ed.] did not take military measures to return the Baltic states to the ranks of the USSR. However, while not starting a war over Taiwan, we will always say and pronounce, that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese People's Republic.

In 1958, continued Mao Tse-Tung, the Chinese People's Republic, as is well known, shelled the coastal islands in the Straits of Taiwan. This was after the Americans fell into a difficult situation in the Middle East. In last year's situation, added Mao Tse-Tung, this step proved useful by adding to the American difficulties. Mao Tse-Tung said further, that the Chiangkaishisti [Nationalist Chinese] themselves wanted and had requested that such a shelling be conducted. It is true, that during the first days after the shelling had begun Chiang-Kai Shek experienced some doubts regarding the fact that the CPR might intend to occupy the islands of Quemoy and Matsu as a result of the shelling, however, Chiang-Kai Shek soon, in the words of Mao Tse-Tung, became convinced that the government of the CPR had no such intentions. The same was true regarding the Americans, continued Mao Tse-Tung; for two weeks they thought that the PLAC (People's Liberation Army of China) intended to conquer the islands, but then they understood that this was not included in the plans of the government of the CPR.

Mao Tse-Tung further emphasized, that the Chinese friends began from the fact the USA would not begin a war over the coastal islands. Besides that, he added, last year's shelling of the islands was undertaken when certain concrete conditions prevailed. At the present time, noted Mao Tse-Tung, the situation was already different.

Having further on his own initiative broached the question of the border conflict between India and the Chinese People's Republic, Mao Tse-Tung underlined: "We never, under any circumstances, will move beyond the Himalayas. That is completely ruled out. This is an argument over inconsequential pieces of territory."

Nehru is now trying to use the armed incident which took place on the border, Mao Tse-Tung said further. He is pursuing a three-part goal: First, he is trying to deliver a blow to the Communist Party of India; second, to ease for India the conditions for the receipt of economic aid from the Western powers, in particular from the USA; and third, to obstruct the spread of influence of the CPR and the socialist camp on the Indian people.

Further, Mao Tse-Tung touched on the situation in Tibet, pointing out that at the present time Tibet had set out toward democratic reformation, and precisely that more than anything frightens Nehru. It is necessary to note, continued Mao Tse-Tung, that the popular masses of Tibet had met these reforms with great enthusiasm. During

the Tibetan events approximately 12 thousand people had left for India, of whom reactionary elements, large landowners-serfholders, reactionary lamas, stewards of landed estates and so on made up around 6-7 thousand. Around 5 thousand people ran off to India under compulsion, deception, or threat. These refugees at the present time are manifesting a desire to return to China. Of all the serfholders-landowners of Tibet, around 80 percent took part in the revolt, and many of them ran off to India. However, some of the landowners remained in Tibet. Regarding those landowners who remained, remarked Mao Tse-Tung, certain measures had been taken aimed at giving them, after reforms, the possibility of maintaining their long-term existence.

Characterizing the situation in Tibet, Mao Tse-Tung tried hard to emphasize that it is to a great degree unique. "The Dalai Lama is a god, not a man," said Mao Tse-Tung — "in any case he is seen that way by the majority of the Tibetan population." Mao Tse-Tung said further that it is even better that the Dalai Lama left for India, insofar as if he had remained in Tibet the masses of Tibetan peasants could not raise themselves to the realization of democratic reform. If, continued Mao Tse-Tung, we had arrested the Dalai Lama, that would have called the population of Tibet forth into rebellion. This is difficult even for Chinese from other parts of our country to understand, added Mao Tse-Tung; only in Tibet do we have a situation like this. Not in inner Mongolia, nor in Sinkiang, nor in other regions of the CPR where national minorities live, do similar situations exist. Nonetheless, hate and ill-feeling toward serfowners had been building up for a long time among the Tibetan peasantry, and now, when the majority of landowners had left, and land is being given to the peasants, they raised themselves up and heatedly approve of the democratic reforms which are now under way.

Mao Tse-Tung said that really, the situation in Tibet, evidently, is complicated, there are present various social and economic structures. Mao Tse-Tung said that overall in China up until the present time there are even colonies of foreign states, like Macao. A small country, like Portugal, 400 years ago grabbed from China this chunk of land. How should we proceed in this case? The CC CPC considered this question, and worked out a course, which for now consists of not touching Macao.

"And so, when they say that the Chinese are war-like," noted Mao Tse-Tung, "one cannot accept this as true, but sometimes in a certain case it is expedient to show an opponent one's own firmness. Last year, for example, during the Middle Eastern crisis the U.S. State Department published a memorandum in which it made against the CPR various accusations of aggression in Korea, in Vietnam, and so on. However, the USA ended up in isolation. After our shelling of the coastal islands the Americans did not assume the obligation of defending Quemoy and Matsu, they took a passive position." It might seem, continued Mao Tse-Tung, that here there is a sort of very tricky and unclear matter, but in fact everything is clear enough. Of course, he added, all this is said relevant to the situation which obtained in the autumn of last year. Now, already, there is no sense in continuing these measures. Overall, it is possible to consider the measures we took last year, continued Mao Tse-Tung, as one of the links in a chain of those troubles, which were created for the Americans. Another link in this chain was the advancement of the Berlin question by the Soviet Union.

In the Middle-Eastern crisis, and the shelling of the islands, and the broaching of the Berlin question—these are all events which have caused trouble for the Americans. These events made possible the achievement of several goals which you posit in Europe, noted Mao Tse-Tung. "And

tory is not big, its population also not large, however, the Americans fear losing it very much, clutching it in all sorts of ways, evidently fearing that their exit from West Berlin will lead to a decrease in their international authority, and that as a result of losing West Berlin they can lose everything else.

Regarding an evaluation of the perspectives for settling the problem of West Berlin, said Mao Tse-Tung further, he, Mao Tse-Tung, thinks that Western powers will begin, evidently, to decrease their occupation forces in Western Berlin. It is possible, that in the longterm, in about 10 years, or over a slightly longer term, the Westerners will be obligated to relinquish West Berlin entirely.

Mao Tse-Tung repeated that the Americans fear very much giving anything up. Therefore, he continued, also in the Far East we for now will not touch them, even in places where they are weak, like Macao or Quemoy. Generally, the Americans don't want us to touch them anywhere, even to the slightest degree, don't want us to touch any territory which is under the influence of capitalism. And why should we harass them, continued Mao Tse-Tung. We ourselves have a large territory, and we can take 20 or 30 years, or even more, to live and develop, and ultimately achieve a full victory over capitalism.

Overall, the international situation is favorable for the socialist camp, underlined Mao Tse-Tung. He said: "Comrade Khrushchev and the CC CPSU undertook good measures in relation to the United States of America." The imperialists, Mao Tse-Tung added, have many weaknesses. They have serious internal contradictions. A rapid swell in the anti-imperialist liberation movement is occurring in Africa and Latin America. As far as Asia is concerned, continued Mao Tse-Tung, here on the surface there is a certain decline [in the movement], explainable by the fact that in many countries of Asia the national bourgeoisie has already taken power. This has not taken place in Africa and Latin America. These two continents present for the USA, England, and France a source of trouble and tasks which are difficult to solve.

Right then, Mao Tse-Tung again said that during the meetings with Comrade Khrushchev in Peking he had already articulated the thought (on the way from the airport to the residence), that at the present time West Germany and Japan represent the main danger to us and to the matter of peace. America, England, and France, it can be said, support the maintenance of the status quo. Therefore, a relaxation of relations with the USA, England, and France is possible. And in certain cases the possibility even of joint efforts with these capitalist powers against West Germany and Japan is not excluded. West Germany, said Mao Tse-Tung, represents a danger not only for

vividly the mood and dilemma of the Soviet leader at the peak of the crisis. His address graphically reveals the contortions he had to go through when taking the decision to build the Wall. But one thing that stands out in this text is Khrushchev's political realism even at the moment of his boldest gambling. He did not want to drive Kennedy into a corner, cognizant of domestic pressures on him
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"We have means [to retaliate]. Kennedy himself acknowledged, that there is equality of forces, i.e. the Soviet Union has as many hydrogen and atomic weapons as they have. I agree with that, [although] we did not crunch numbers. [But, if you recognize that] let us speak about equal opportunities. Instead they [Western leaders] behave as if they were a father dealing with a toddler: if it doesn't come their way, they threaten to pull our ears [*natrepat' ushi*]. (p. 148) We already passed that age, we wear long trousers, not short ones." (p. 149)

"I told Fanfani yesterday: '...I don't believe, though, there will be war. What am I counting on? I believe in your [Western leaders'] common sense. Do you know who will argue most against war? Adenauer. [Because, if the war starts] there will not be a single stone left in place in Germany...'" (p. 150)

[War between the USSR and the United States, Khrushchev allegedly told Fanfani, is] "hardly possible, because it would be a duel of ballistic intercontinental missiles. We are strong on that... American would be at a disadvantage to start a war with this weapon... They know it and admit it... America can unleash a war from its military bases they have on [Italian] territory. Consequently we consider you as our hostages." (p. 151)

[British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Moscow in 1959 and told Khrushchev that war was impossible. Khrushchev presumes that Western leaders continue to act on that conviction.] "Macmillan could not have lost his mind since then. He considered war impossible then and, suddenly, now he changes his mind? No, no. The outcome of modern war will be decided by atomic weapons. Does it make sense if there is one more division or less? If the entire French army cannot cope with the Algerians, armed with knives, then how do they expect to scare us with a division? It is ludicrous, not frightening. *[De Gaulle admitted to our Ambassador a couple of weeks ago, Khrushchev says, that he did not want the reunification of Germany.]* He pays lip service to it [reunification] because it is in Adenauer's interests. Nobody wants reunification of Germany —neither France, nor England, nor Italy, nor America." (pp. 151- 52)

[Khrushchev said he told McCloy:] "Listen, why is it that you cannot shake hands with Ulbricht? I shook hands with Adenauer and I am ready to do it again. Do you believe that your Adenauer is better than our Ulbricht? We praise our commodity." (p. 153)

[If Western powers refuse to sign a treaty with the GDR, then, as Khrushchev said to McCloy:] "You will have no access [to West Berlin]. If you fly and violate [the aerial space over the GDR], we will down your planes, you must know it." (p. 155)

"Why we were so blunt? Comrades, we have to demonstrate to them our will and decisiveness...." (p. 156)

[What is the difference between the two parties of "monopoly capital," the Democrats and the Republicans? Khrushchev admitted that real difference is small] "but some distinctive features exist, one cannot deny it, since otherwise we wouldn't have been politicians, but agitators, who say, that there is capitalism and working class, so one has to blame damned bourgeoisie and that's it. Only Albanians understand it this way...." (p. 156)

"Can we clash? Possibly...I told Fanfani, that [the American state] is a barely governed state... Kennedy himself hardly influences the direction and development of policies [*politiki*] in the American state...The American Senate and other [state] organizations are very similar to our Veche of Novgorod... One party there defeated the other when it tore off half of the beards of another party... They shouted, yelled, pulled each other beards, and in such a way resolved the question who was right." (pp. 156-57)

"Hence anything is possible in the United States. War is also possible. They can unleash it. There are more stable situations in England, France, Italy, Germany. I would even say that, when our 'friend' [John Foster] Dulles was alive, they had more stability [in the United States]. I told McCloy about it." (p. 157)

[Dulles was the enemy who] "resolved to bring us down to submission [*sognut v baranii rog*], but he was afraid of war. He would reach the brink, as he put it himself, but he would never leap over the brink, and [nevertheless] retained his credibility." (p. 158)

"If Kennedy says it, he will be called a coward. But Dulles had never been called this way, [and people believed when he said] it had not to be done in American interests. Who could suspect Dulles? The man was anything but a coward. As for Kennedy, he is rather an unknown quantity in politics. So I feel empathy with him in his situation, because he is too much of a lightweight both for the Republicans as well as for the Democrats. And the state is too big, the state is powerful, and it poses certain dangers."

"I think you will not suspect I am sympathetic to Dulles, only for the fact that he is no longer with us, so my sympathy cannot seek any goals." (p. 159)

"I understand, comrades, and share this state of mind, that our enthusiasm for peaceful construction acts as poison, weaken our muscles and our will." (p. 160)

"We got ourselves carried away with peaceful construction and, I believe, we are going too far. I will not name countries. This is the internal matter of each of the socialist states." *[But the Soviet Union had had to bail out some of them in the past by]* "taking gold out of its coffers."

(signed) P. Ivashutin
"23" August 1966
No. 46722

(Source: SCCD, F. 5, Op. 58, D. 262, LI. 237-38.)

* * * * *

FROM THE DAYBOOK OF ZORIN, V.A.
Secret, Copy # 2
"28" February 1969

Initial #203

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

with the head of the DRV delegation Comrade Xuan Thuy and the head of the NLFSV delegation Comrade Tran Buu Kiem at the Paris negotiations

21 February 1969

Today I visited the residence of the DRV delegation, where a talk with Comrades Xuan Thuy and Tran Buu Kiem took place.

1. I briefly informed the Vietnamese comrades about the latest statements of the American representative, C. Vance, during the conversation with the Advisor-Envoy of the Embassy Comrade Oberemko, V.I. on February 15 of this year and about French perceptions, expressed by the acting head of the Asia department of the French Foreign Ministry, Delayer (sic) (without direct reference to him) during a talk with Comrade Utkin, the counselor at the Embassy, on February 18 of this year, about questions related to a settlement in Vietnam. The Vietnamese comrades thanked me for this information, which they received with great interest.

2. Referring to the fact that within the next few days I plan to pay a return visit to C. Lodge, the head of the USA delegation at the Paris negotiations, I tried to find out if my interlocutors thought we should, before President Nixon's arrival to Paris, ask C. Lodge some questions which would be interesting to the Vietnamese comrades, in order to push the U.S. toward a political settlement. I also asked if the Vietnamese comrades had any questions for the French, taking into consideration that De Gaulle is likely to discuss the Vietnamese question with R. Nixon.

In response to this, my interlocutor made the following observations:

a) Having remarked that the U.S. does not now want to consider serious issues at the negotiations, Comrade Tran Buu Kiem said that Richard Nixon is trying to strengthen the Saigon regime and its army and only then to work toward the resolution of essential questions. But the situation in South Vietnam will change and the U.S. will not realize its goals. Now the USA is taking measures to provide security in the cities. The Americans have to face new difficulties now, caused by the growth of the movement of various strata of the urban population. This movement has not only a nationalist character, but appears to be broader, with its main aim being the restoration of peace in the country, the dismissal of Nguyen van Thieu, Nguyen Cao Ky, and Tran van Huong from power, and the creation of a "Cabinet of Peace."

The delegations of the NLFSV and the DRV, he went on, have already put forward the proposals which are necessary to discuss in order to come to a political resolution of the problems, and had clearly expressed their positions on political and military issues, but the USA is trying first of all to solve military questions, to improve its position in South Vietnam in order to conduct the negotiations from a position of strength.

b) Comrade Xuan Thuy, having agreed with the ideas expressed by Comrade Tran Buu Kiem, stressed that R. Nixon, like Johnson, wants to solve the Vietnamese problem from a position of strength, and that the U.S. is continuing to strengthen the puppet regime, intending to stay in Vietnam even after its troops are withdrawn in order to carry out its neo-colonial policy, using the puppets.

The Americans don't yet have a concrete plan for settling the Vietnamese problem. The concrete suggestions which they put forward during the first meetings (I mean C. Lodge's proposal to start discussing problems connected with the demilitarized zone, withdrawal of foreign troops and exchange of prisoners of war) are aimed at talking, not at actually solving the problem, at putting off its decision. The Americans understand that if the questions which they have put forward are not resolved, they will have a chance to strengthen the Saigon regime. The USA is forcing consideration of military questions in order to put pressure on the DRV and NLFSV.

As for the position of France on the Vietnam question; the French, according to Comrade Xuan Thuy, want the USA to leave South Vietnam and France to return there, but not in the same role which it played before. Obviously the French, during their negotiations with R. Nixon, will somehow push him in this direction.

Then Comrade Xuan Thuy said that the following could be said in the talk with C. Lodge:

— The DRV and NLFSV want to solve the Vietnam problem on the basis of the achievement of true independence, not on the basis on which the U.S. wants to solve it.
— Should the U.S. continue to act from a position of strength, the Vietnamese people will not agree with this, and will go on struggling against U.S. aggression.
—If the U.S. wants to solve the Vietnam problem, it has to start talking with the NLFSV. If it doesn't happen the Vietnam problem will not be solved. So far the USA and Saigon speak only with the DRV at the negotiations, and don't want to talk with NLFSV.
— If the USA doesn't agree to a complete and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from South Vietnam and continues the war, it will suffer even greater military losses.

As for concrete questions and approaches to their decision, in the opinion of Comrades Xuan Thuy and Tran Buu Kiem the proper time to discuss them with the Americans still hasn't arrived.

3. During an exchange of opinions on certain aspects of the Vietnam problem, some questions were raised on our initiative (to find out the position of the Vietnamese comrades). These included "the Peace Cabinet," the gradual withdrawal of American troops, the elimination of American bases and the cessation of military operations.

In this respect the Vietnamese comrades expressed the following ideas:

a) Comrade Tran Buu Kiem explained that participants in the opposition movement to the Saigon regime treat the Thieu-Ky-Huong government as a war government, capable only of serving the war. This movement and its demands confirm the NLFSV idea about the creation of the "Cabinet of Peace;" therefore the NLFSV supports this movement. The NLFSV also supports people whom this movement puts forward as candidates to be included in the "Cabinet of

a comment to the effect that President Nixon knows about my departure to the USSR and that this meeting was organized with the President's knowledge, so that, while in Moscow, the Soviet

purposeless. I further expressed the hope that the Nixon government would act much more actively towards Bonn in order to achieve their early signing of the agreement.

Kissinger in fact did not deny that at the present time they are not putting in this sense any sort of serious pressure on Bonn. He tried to justify it as a response to the "dragging out of our answer" to Nixon's proposal as to the simultaneous ratification of the agreement by the USSR and the USA. In Kissinger's words, the leaders in Bonn, besides referring to the election campaign in the FRG, assert to the Americans that they, the West Germans, feel no need to hurry so long as the USSR itself has not ratified the agreement.

Overall from the conversation on this question arises the impression that Nixon, apparently, detects in our leaning against his proposal for simultaneous ratification more our disinclination in the present situation (the CPSU plenum, the sharpening of Soviet-Chinese disagreements) to demonstrate by taking such an act unity of actions with him, Nixon, than the conviction on our part that the absence of our ratification puts any sort of pressure on the FRG. (Kissinger in various ways asserted that the failure of the USSR and the USA to ratify the agreement actually helps those powers in the FRG who are against the agreement.)

Overall, judging by our observations, it is evidently possible with a sufficient degree of confidence to say, that the USA itself will not in the near future conclusively ratify the agreement or put strong pressure on the FRG, as long as we have not agreed with Nixon's above-mentioned proposal or have not reacted to it in a more concrete manner than we have up until now. (In the opinion of the Embassy, it is not advisable to drag out the review of this agreement by the commissions of the Supreme Soviet. In an extreme case, the agreement could be ratified with a special proviso regarding the necessity that the FRG adhere to it.)

Speaking about other areas where, in Nixon's opinion, Soviet-American contacts and bilateral exchange of opinions should develop, Kissinger cited the problem of a Near Eastern settlement, questions of strategic nuclear arms control, and, in the long-term, the gradual development of our trade relations.

Touching on the Near East, Kissinger said that Nixon thinks that if in general it is possible to do anything now, in order to bring this tangled and extremely complex problem closer to a decision, then this can be accomplished only through an unpublicized exchange of opinions between the USSR and USA, who know what their "clients" want and to some extent share their views, but need not be under the thumb of their clients.

In Kissinger's words, in the near future (he has recently finished working out his "plan of action" on the Vietnam question and hopes soon to review and approve directives to the prospective Soviet-American strategic arms negotiations) Nixon intends personally to make a more detailed study of the concrete possibilities for a Near Eastern settlement. Besides the recent meeting with the King of Jordan, a meeting with the Israeli premier Golda Meir is planned for this month. With her, the American government intends, in particular, to consider the developing situation, especially in light of the on-going bilateral Soviet-American exchange of opinions and taking into account the Soviet answer, which is eagerly awaited in Washington and which soon should be received, after Soviet minister A.A. Gromyko returns to Moscow from his visit to Cairo (the conversation with Kissinger took place during this visit).

During the ensuing discussion of Near Eastern affairs, Kissinger shied away from consideration of concrete questions which I raised, saying that he himself had not yet studied these questions deeply because he had been occupied with Vietnam, but that he will be ready, if necessary, in about a month or a month and a half, to become "personally involved" in the Soviet-American relations on these questions, but that he will not substitute for [Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph] Sisco on the details. He, Kissinger, can secretly meet with me for the all-sided consideration of "key questions" which we might raise, and then present his personal report and recommendations to the President. This report, in Kissinger's

restraint of Beijing's expansionist aspirations.

questions, prepares the agenda and materials for consideration by the National Security Council under the chairmanship of the President (this organ under Nixon began to work regularly, meeting no more rarely than once or twice a week). As recognized by Nixon himself, at my last meeting with him, Kissinger every week "pesters" him (that is, meets with him) significantly more often than any other aide.

Judging by my personal observations and compared with, for example, the relation of President Johnson with his aide [Walt] Rostow, I can say that Kissinger conducts himself much more freely than his predecessors in the presence of the President: one feels the certain confidence of a man who has won for himself a solid position at the White House (at the State Department they say directly that if "Henry"—Kissinger's first name—speaks against that or some other proposal, then Nixon will most probably reject it).

Kissinger himself, though he is a smart and erudite person, is at the same time extremely vain and in conversations with me, especially during a private lunch (we have established a pretty good personal relationship), not averse to boasting about his influence. During our last conversation he, for example, without any excessive humility, announced that in all of Washington "only two people can answer precisely at any given moment about the position of the USA on this or that question: these are President Nixon and he, Kissinger." Regarding this he suggested to me that if it is necessary to precisely define something really important "for the correct understanding in Moscow of Nixon's policy on a concrete question," I should quietly appeal directly to him.

I should say that he himself readily welcomes the Soviet Ambassador or visits us in the Embassy for a private conversation immediately following a request from our side. He himself often takes the initiative to arrange such meetings. Evidently, he also cites all this as a confidential channel of communication with the Soviet side in order to strengthen his own personal position with Nixon. In this connection I should mention that Kissinger holds under his own personal control all communication of members of his staff with our Embassy personnel, and sternly requires that all such conversations are reported directly to him, and if he considers it necessary, that he himself report to the President. Most recently, his tendency to limit the number of such communications and subsume them all into the flow of his personal contacts with the Soviet Ambassador has been noticeable.

Evidently, it would be expedient over time to more and more actively develop and use the channel with Kissinger in order to influence and through him drive home directly to President Nixon our points of view on various important questions, especially in situations where a certain delicacy is called for or where any sort of publicity is undesirable, which is often not possible to achieve when acting through the State Department. It goes without saying that we will as always have to handle routine and official matters, especially those where it is necessary to fix our position, through ordinary diplomatic channels. Secretary of State Rogers has noticeably begun to gather strength and operate more actively in the area of American foreign policy, leaning on the wide apparat of the State Department and Foreign Service. And all the same, it is necessary to take into account that Kissinger's influence on the formulation of Nixon's foreign policy course, judging by all our observations and information in our possession, for now remains commanding.

A. DOBRYNIN

(Source: SCCD, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 558, Ll. 92-105.)

**Document Six:
Soviet Policy in Afghanistan, 1979:
A Grim Assessment**

The following CPSU Central Committee document, dated 1 April 1979 and signed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, KGB chief Yurii Andropov, and CC International Department head Boris Ponomarev, provides a strikingly candid assessment of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan that the Soviet Politburo confronted in spring 1979. The report attributes the increasing success of the Islamic opposition (i.e., the Afghan Mujaheddin*) to the "miscalculations and mistakes" of the PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) regime that seized power following the April 1978 "revolution." The PDPA's draconian social measures and "unjustified repression" are cited as key factors responsible for the alienation of the army ("which still remains the main basis for the regime") and the general populace. The document reveals that the Soviet leadership has earlier rebuffed a PDPA request for direct military support in response to fighting in the provincial city of Herat and correctly predicts "the serious political consequences which would have followed if the Soviet side had granted their request...."*

Nevertheless, despite these cautionary words, seven months later the Soviet Governments did approve direct military intervention in Afghanistan to enforce the continuation of communist rule in Kabul. (For a detailed analysis of Soviet policy in Afghanistan in 1978-79, using newly available CPSU CC materials, see the forthcoming article by Odd Arne Westad of the Norwegian Nobel Institute in the February 1994 issue of International History Review.*) Introduction by Robert S. Litwak, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; translation by Loren Utkin; document provided by Mark Kramer.*

* * * * * *

[The report was found attached to the following cover memorandum:]

Return within 3 days to the CC CPSS — *Proletariat of the world unite!*

of the working class, facing the forces expressing the interests of the gentry-feudal class, the bourgeoisie, and the most reactionary part of the clergy on the other.

The Afghan reactionary forces are very skillfully taking advantage of the almost complete illiteracy of the population, complex inter-

political support to the new government, as well as widespread economic and military assistance and has been participating in the training of skilled personnel from the first days following the victory of the April revolution. Large numbers of advisers and specialists were sent to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government to assist in solving the problems faced by the DRA leadership.

Taking into account the recent additional decisions, in order to continue this work it is necessary:

1. To continue to support the leadership of the DRA in improving the combat efficiency and political awareness of the Afghan army, ensuring its loyalty and dedication to the revolutionary leadership, and in strengthening and improving the efficiency of the security organs, including the border patrol.

It should be noted that in connection with the latest events, large amounts of arms and military technology have been sent and an additional amount will be sent into Afghanistan. In addition, the training of military specialists for the armed forces of the DRA has been expanded in military academies in Afghanistan itself as well as in the Soviet Union. It should be emphasized that modern and effective mastering of the supplied weapons and technology is essential. The same applies to aid provided to the security organs.

2. As much as is possible, to examine and solve problems connected with provided economic assistance to Afghanistan, especially that which would accelerate and strengthen the political position of the revolutionary-democratic regime in the country. To advise the Afghan leadership on developing the principal sectors of the economy which would strengthen the productive capacity of the country, resolve social problems, and provide employment to the population.

3. In contacts with the leadership of the DRA at all levels to always emphasize the importance of widening the political base which supports the party and the government. The importance of the consecutive implementation of the planned reforms, such as land reform, should be instilled in the leaders of the DRA. This has to be done carefully, devoting essential attention to the political and ideological side of reform. For example, the peasants should be convinced that they are getting the land only because of the revolution and will lose it if they will not protect the revolutionary authority. Similar explanations should be made in cases of other socio-economic reforms.

To widen the political base of the PDPA, the Afghan leadership should be made to understand that it is essential to gradually create electoral organs, yet, of course, the leading role of the party should be maintained and strengthened in the state and political structure of the country. They should also understand that it is advisable to develop and enact a constitution which will secure the democratic rights of the people and regulate the activity of the state organs.

4. It should be emphasized to the Afghan leadership that as the party ranks grow numerically, it is crucial to maintain the unity of the party leadership and membership. They should also be reminded about the advisability of collective decision-making on the most important issues along party and state lines. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the leadership of DRA should be given practical assistance in establishing the party organization, spreading mass information, and preparing party and state cadres.

5. To continue to draw the attention of the Afghan leadership to the necessity of carrying out appropriate work among the Muslim clergy of the country in order to fractionalize it and reduce the influence of reactionary Muslim leaders on the people. This influence could be diminished by encouraging religious freedom and demonstrating that the new power does not persecute the clergy as a class, but only punishes those who act against the revolutionary system.

6. The DRA leaders should be convinced of the necessity of the introduction and strict observance of law and order, based on revolutionary legality, as well as the necessity of a more reasonable approach to the use of repressive measures. This does not mean, however, that repressive measures should not be used against true infidels or those who engage in active counterrevolutionary activity. A person's fate should not be decided on the basis of circumstantial and unverifiable evidence, or verdict by two- and three-man commissions, without a true investigation and trial. This applies both to party and military cadres.

7. Considering the importance of personal contacts in communicating our views and thoughts on the above questions to the DRA leadership, visits on various levels should be practiced on a more regular basis in order to normalize the situation in Afghanistan.

8. To continue, along official diplomatic and special channels, to work against the interference of other countries, particular neighboring ones, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

9. To help Afghan friends conduct political work among the people, including radio propaganda, which due to the high percentage of illiteracy plays a special role in Afghanistan.

In our propaganda concerning Afghanistan, the traditional friendship and wide base of mutually beneficial cooperation between our two countries should be emphasized. This relationship not only exists today, but will continue to develop in the future. The achievements in socio-economic development of the Central Asian republics during the Soviet period should be described in a wide and clearly understandable manner; these republics should be used as an example to demonstrate the falsity of assertions concerning repression of religious expression, the Muslim faith included.

10. To periodically inform brother socialist countries about our steps in aiding the leadership of DRA in stabilizing the situation in the country, thereby orienting them to render similar political and material support of Afghanistan.

Concrete proposals on the above positions, as well as any other measures, will be included as needed.

Please review these materials.

A. Gromyko. Y. Andropov. D. Ustinov. B. Ponomarev.

April 1, 1979
No 279/gs
No 25-S-576

(Source: SCCD, Fond 89, perechen [list] 14, dokument 28.)

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Ann E. Robertson
Public Information Manager
International Research & Exchanges

The Update *section summarizes items in the popular and scholarly press containing new information on Cold War history emanating from the former Communist bloc. Readers are invited to alert CWIHP of relevant citations.*

Abbreviations:
AAASS = American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies
CDSP = Current Digest of the Soviet Press
DA = Deutschland Archiv
FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Service
MN = Moscow News
NYT =New York Times
RFE/RL= Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
SHAFR = Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
VfZ = Viertelsjahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte
WP =Washington Post

1986 g.)," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnaya otnosheniya* 8 (August 1993), 68-78.)

Previously unpublished Aug. 1988 letter from Andrei Sakharov to Mikhail Gorbachev regarding Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. (Yelena G. Bonner, intro., "'There Couldn't Be a More Severe Blow Dealt to Perestroika': Andrei Sakharov's Unposted Letter," *Nevisamaya Gazeta/Independent Newspaper* (English ed.) 2:14-15 (Nov.-Dec. 1992), 7.)

Soviet nuclear submarine sunk in North Atlantic in 1989 unlikely to pose contamination hazard, scientists say. (William J. Broad, "Hazard is Doubted from Sunken Sub," *NYT*, 9/5/93, see also "Two Soviet 'Nuclear Wrecks' in Baltic Sea," *FBIS-WEU-93-029*, 16 February 1993, 13.)

Former Soviet and American advisers recount Cold War's end at Princeton conference. ("SDI, Chernobyl Helped End Cold War, Conference Told," *WP*, 2/27/93.)

Publications: The Soviet Ministry of Interior's final, secretly published crime statistics: *USSR Crime Statistics and Summaries: 1989 and 1990*, trans. Joseph Serio, for. Timothy Heleniak (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1993); *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev*, ed. and intro. Albert Resis (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993); European Workshop of International Historical Research on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism, *The International Newsletter of Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism*, Vol. 1, 1993, No. 1/2 (Akademie Verlag GmbH, Leipziger Str. 3-4, P.O. Box 12 33, D-1086 Berlin, tel.: (030) 2 23 60; fax: (030) 223 6387), contains data on archives, libraries, sources, scholarly cooperation.

KAL-007 Investigations:

Russian government releases secret documents and transcripts relating to 1983 downing of Korean airliner. (*Izvestia*, 10/15/92, 1, 3.) Analysis of new materials indicates Korean pilots were unaware that plane was off course or being tailed, and fails to disclose who gave Soviet interceptor the order to fire; Yeltsin's motives in releasing materials also assessed. (John W.R. Lepingwell, "Opening the KAL-007 Black Box: New Documents and Old Questions," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:44 (11/6/92), 20-26.)

Yeltsin gives South Korea additional materials, also promises materials on outbreak of Korean War. (*Korea Times* (Seoul), 11/15/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-221, 11/16/92, 10-11; Itar-Tass, 11/19/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-224, 11/19/92, 9; see also *Literaturnaya Gazeta*

Former *Washington Post* reporter Dusko Doder denies charge reported in *Time* magazine that he accepted $1,000 from KGB while working in Moscow. ("Ex-Post Correspondent Disputes Report of KGB Ties," *WP*, 12/20/92.)

Russia's Foreign Intelligence service denies a Soviet defector's claim that former *WP* Moscow Bureau Chief Dusko Doder had accepted payment from the KGB. ("Ex-Post Reporter's File Fails to Back Defector," *WP*, 2/26/93)

Review of recently released data on Soviet intelligence operations, including translations of selected documents. ("Research Note: Recently Released Material on Soviet Intelligence Operations," *Intelligence and National Security* 8:2 (April 1993), 238-49.)

KGB documents during August 1991 coup attempt published. ("KGB in action," *New Times International* 36 (1991), 18-19.)

In excerpt from memoir (Novosti Publishers), Vadim Bakatin, briefly head of the KGB in late 1991, defends decision to give information to American ambassador detailing Soviet bugging of US embassy building in Moscow; notes 1969 USSR leadership decision to approve spying. (Vadim Bakatin, "'Getting rid of the KGB,'" *MN* (English edition) 34 (22-29 Aug. 1992), 16, also in FBIS-USR-92-126, 10/2/92, 2-5.)

Debate on Hiss case continues. (Letters, *NYT*, 11/13/92; Anthony Hiss, "Personal History," *The New Yorker* 68:39 (11/16/92), 100ff.; Russian historian Volkogonov qualifies earlier categorical assertion that Soviet archives proved Hiss was not a spy, ackowledging he had not had access to all relevant archives; Hiss, declaring

preme Soviet directive, "On the Provisional Order for Access to Archival Documents and their Use," 6/19/92, *AAASS Newsletter* 32:5 (Nov. 1992), 6-7.)

Text of Yeltsin decree number 658 dated 23 June 1992 to declassify government records documenting repressions and infringements of human rights. (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 6/27/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-131, 7/8/92.)

Russian presidential representatives present "special files" to Constitutional Court to support ban on Communist Party. (Itar-Tass, 7/3/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-133-S, 7/10/92.) Special files said to reveal party's "criminal nature." (*Izvestia*, 7/14/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-138-S, 7/17/92, 21.) Prosecutor discloses CPSU document on party archives storage procedure, signed by party central committee deputy general secretary V. Ivashko on 29 March 1991, indicating that "25 million cases from the CPSU archives have been done away with to save the party's face." (Interfax, 7/13/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-138-S, 7/17/92, 12.) Russian presidential representative S. Shakray alleges destruction took place immediate after failure of August 1991 coup. (Moscow Russian Television Network report, 7/21/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-148-S, 7/31/92, 4.)

Critical analysis of Russian government's politically-motivated selective declassification of historical archives to discredit Communist Party, Gorbachev. (Vera Tolz and Julia Wishnevsky, "The Russian Government Declassifies CPSU Documents, *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:26 (6/26/92), 8-11.) Use of presidential archives in trial of CPSU discussed; contents of March 1985 Politburo meeting at which Gorbachev elected cited. (David Remnick, "Report from Moscow: The Trial of the Old Regime," *The New Yorker*, 11/30/92, 104-21.)

Selective use of KGB archives against political enemies assailed. (Leonid Mlechin, "Archive dust," *New Times International* 24 (1991), 10-11.)

Neizvestnaya Rossiya-20 Vek [*The Unknown Russia—The 20th Century*], containing documents from CPSU, KGB, and Kremlin archives, published by Moscow Archives Association in association with Historic Heritage publishers. (Moscow Mayak Radio, 8/25/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-167, 8/27/92.)

Developments concerning effort by Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace to microfilm Soviet archives and finding aids. ("*Roskomarkhiv*-Hoover Project," *AAASS Newsletter* 32:5 (Nov. 1992), 8; "Roskomarkhiv, Hoover Continue Work on Joint Microfilm Project," *Hoover Institution Newsletter*, Fall 1992, 12.)

Report on developments concerning KGB and Presidential archives. (Ella Maksimov, "The Rights of Victims and Rights of History Are Clashing as KGB Archives Are Being Opened," *Izvestia*, 11/27/92, in FBIS-USR-92-157, 12/9/92, 1-2.)

Interview with senior Russian archives official V. Kozlov on agreement with Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace to microfilm CPSU archives, beginning with inventory of Central Committee information service. ("Secrets for General Consumption," *Pravda*, 10/22/92, in FBIS-USR-92-150, 11/23/92, 50.)

Russian state military archives reportedly declassify documents from years 1918-1960, including materials from the Cheka, OGPU, and NKVD secret police, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. (Moscow Mayak Radio Network, 11/8/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-217, 11/9/92, 33.)

Russian Defense Ministry announces that it declassified more than 500 documents in 1992 on the Cuban Missile Crisis, the fate of U.S. personnel shot down over the Soviet Union, and other Cold War issues. (Interfax, 1/10/93, and "Defense Ministry Declassifies Its Shadowy Operations," *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 1/10/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-006, 1/11/93, 19; "Secrecy Seal Lifted," *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 1/27/93, in FBIS-USR-93-014, 2/5/93, 5.) Defense Ministry also vows to declassify files on Soviet role in the Korean War. (Itar-Tass, 1/10/93, cited in AP dispatch, "Moscow to Reveal Korea War Role," *International Herald-Tribune*, 1/12/93.)

Documents beginning to emerge from Presidential or Kremlin archives, including originals of secret protocols to 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. (Lev Bezmensky, "Greatest secret of the Party Secretaries," *New Times International* 46 (Nov. 1992), 25-27; also *Novosti*, 10/29/92, in *RFE/RL Daily Report* 211 (11/2/92), 1; O. Latsis, "Original Protocols to Shameful Pact," *Izvestia*, 10/30/92, in CDSP 44:44, (12/2/92), 22, cites reports on Ostankino television and ABC network and complains that foreign media received access before Russians.)

Analysis of newly released documents from Russian archives on Soviet massacre of Polish officers in 1940; release seen in context of trial of CPSU and Yeltsin-Gorbachev rivalry. (Vera Tolz, "The Katyn Documents and the CPSU Hearings," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:44 (11/6/92), 27-33; also *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:43 (10/30/92), 71.) More on Katyn documents, including translation of March 1940 Beria memorandum requesting Stalin's approval for shooting of 25,700 Polish captives. (Louisa Vinton, "The Katyn Documents: Politics and History," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2:4 (1/22/93), 19-31; see also "The Decision to Execute was Taken in the CC [Central Committee]," *MN* 43 (10/25/92), and "The Special File Discloses the Mysteries of the Politburo," *Izvestia*

Belarus

Belarus KGB opens special archives to staff archivists from republican Council of Ministers; 40,000 volumes expected to be transferred. (Itar-Tass, 7/13/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-136, 7/15/92, 55.)

Belarus KGB chief Eduard Shirkovskiy opposes release of six-volume file on Lee Harvey Oswald unless declassified by parliament; says reports show that Oswald, who joined hunting and fishing club while briefly residing in Minsk after defecting to USSR, was "not a particularly good marksman" and denies any KGB role in assassination of Kennedy. (Interfax and Itar-Tass reports, 8/4/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-151 (8/5/92), 68.)

Baltic States

KGB document allegedly shows KGB influence over Stockholm-based Baltic Institute, which denies report. (Stockholm Radio, 5/24/93, in *Baltic Independent* (Tallinn), 5/28/93, in FBIS-USR-93-090 (7/19/93), 86-87.)

Estonia

Report on status of Estonian KGB and Interior Ministry archives, transfer to state archives. (*Paevaleht* (Tallinn), 6/3/93, in FBIS-USR-93-078 (6/23/93), 102-03.)

Estonian archives used in new account of resistance movement following Soviet occupation. (Mart Laar, trans. Tiina Ets, *War in the Woods: Estonia's struggle for survival, 1944-1956* (Washington, D.C.: Compass).

Latvia

Analysis of why files of Latvian KGB have not yet led to investigations; notes journal *Pilsonis* has begun publishing KGB staff employee lists. (Dainis Lemsonoks, "KGB Employees: In *Pilsonis* or In 'Bags,'" *Saime* (Riga), 7/12/92, in FBIS-USR-92-133, 10/19/92, 107-108.)

Latvian State Archives obtain 40,000 case files from former USSR KGB archives. (Riga Radio, 8/24/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-166, 8/26/92, 57.)

Contents of Latvia KGB archives to be disclosed

a divided Germany," *New Times International* 44 (1990), 35.)

Socialist Unity Party (SED) archives disclose new data on Stalin's policies and plans for post-war Germany. (R.C. Raack, "Stalin Plans his Post-War Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28 (1993), 53-73.)

Hans-Uwe Feige describes the problems faced by the Soviet Military Administration in Germany in "Aspekte der Hochschulpolitik der Sowjetischen Militaeradministration in Deutschland (1945-1948)" (Aspects of the SMAD's German High School Policy from 1945-48), *DA* 11 (Nov. 1992), 1169-80.

Using Soviet archives, Jan Foitzik analyzes the speech of Soviet Politburo member Andrei Zdanov at the September 1947 founding conference of the Cominform; text appended. *(ZfG,* 4 (1993), 329ff.) Foitzik traces the development of the Cominform in "Die Bildung des Kominform-Bueros 1947 im Lichte neuer Quellen" (The Formation of the Kominform Office in 1947 in the Light of New Sources), *ZfG* 12 (Dec. 1992), 1109ff. For a comparison of Stalin's purges of the Eastern European Communist Parties, see Foitzik's "Die stalinistischen 'Saeuberungen' in den ostmitteleuropaeischen kommunistischen Parteien. Ein vergleichender Ueberblick," *ZfG* 8 (Aug. 1992), 737ff.

Developments within the GDR during June 1953 revolt analyzed in Udo Wengst, "Der Aufstand am 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR. Aus den Stimmungsberichten der Kreis-und Bezirksverbaende der Ost-CDU im Juni und Juli 1953," [The Uprising of June 17, 1953 in the GDR. From Internal Reports by the East German Christian Democratic Party (Ost-CDU)in June and July 1953], *VfZ* 2 (April 1993), 277-322.)

Discussion of materials found in the Gesellschaft fuer Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft (DSF) (Society for German-Soviet Friendship) archive. (Lothar Dralle, "Das DSF-Archiv als Quelle zur Geschichte der DDR—Der Volksaufstand vom 17. Juni 1953" [The DSF Archive as a Source for the History of East Germany—The People's Rebellion of June 17, 1953], *DA* 8 (Aug. 1992), 837-45.)

Gerhard Wettig raises new questions about Soviet intentions regarding Germany immediately after Stalin's death in "Sowjetische Wiedervereinigungsbemuehungen im ausgehenden Fruehjahr 1953? Neue Aufschluesse ueber ein altes Problem" (Soviet Reunification Efforts in the Spring of 1953. New Disclosures on an Old Problem), *DA* 9 (Sept. 1992), 943-58; see also Berlin historian Elke Scherstjanoi's rebuttal of Wettig's "The Stalin Note of March 10, 1952 as an Historical Problem" *(DA* 2, Feb. 1992), in *DA* 8 (Aug. 1992), 858-65.

Two analyses of recent evidence on Soviet policy toward Germany shortly before and after Stalin's death. (Gerhard Wettig, "Zum Stand der Forschung ueber Berijas Duetschland-Politik im Fruehjahr 1953," *DA* 26:6 (June 1993), 674-82; Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. Maerz 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Aussenministeriums," *DA* 26:7 (July 1993), 786-805.)

SED ideological propaganda efforts to stigmatize the FRG from 1960-63 as a "Nazi state" revealed. (Michael Lemke, "Kampagnen gegen Bonn. Die Systemkrise der DDR und die West-Propaganda der SED 1960-63" [Propaganda Campaign Against Bonn. Political Crisis and Inner German Propaganda in the GDR 1960-1963], *VfZ* 2 (April 1993), 153-74.)

Peace plan proposal printed in the *Abend post und Milwaukee Deutsche Zeitung* (*Evening News and Milwaukee German Magazine*) from 12 February 1959 recently found in the Central Party Archive of the Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement in Berlin. (Ernst Laboor, "Ein vergessener Friedensvertragsentwurf fuer Deutschland1959" (A Forgotten Peace Plan Proposal for Germany in 1959), *ZfG* 3 (March 1993), 233-38.)

Stasi secret police records reveal East German role in conducting anti-Semitic campaign in West Germany in early '60s to discredit Bonn; files also document East German aid to Arab states against Israel. (Marc Fischer, "E. Germany Ran Antisemite Campaign in West in '60s," *WP*, 2/28/93, A25.)

Report on Stasi efforts to recruit Catholic priests and infiltrate lay organizations in former GDR ("Pornos fuer Kolping" (a German Catholic lay organization), *Der Spiegel*, 4/5/93, 76ff.)

Recently released SED, Stasi, and church archival documents show that evangelical priest Oskar Bruesewitz immolated himself in 1976 because of doubts about the SED regime and his own Church, not because he was an outcast and disturbed, as the government and church leaders claimed. ("Ich opfere mich" (I offer myself), *Der Spiegel*, 3/22/93, 94ff. See also *Das Fanal: Das Opfer des Pfarrers Bruesewitz und die evangelische Kirche*

months. ("Das reale Bild war eben katastraphal!" (The Real Picture was Catastrophic!), *DA* 10 (Oct. 1992),1031-39.)

Report on the 18 September 1992 conference sponsored by the Berlin Historical Commission: "DDR Akten und Quellenkritik" (The GDR Files and the Critique of Sources), *DA* 11 (Nov. 1992), 1202-03.

Previously secret East German dissertations available. (Wilhelm Bleek and Lothar Mertens, "Verborgene Quellen in der Humboldt-Universitaet" (Concealed Sources at Humboldt University), *DA* 11 Nov. 1992, 1181-90.)

Publications: Gerhard Lange, *Katholische Kirche—Sozialistischer Staat DDR, Dokumente, und oeffentliche Aeusserungen 1945-1990.* (The Catholic Church: The East German Socialist State, Documents, and Public Statements from 1945-1990), (Leipzig: St. Benno, 1992). Craig R. Whitney, *Spy Trader: Germany's Devil's Advocate and the Darkest Secrets of the Cold War* (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1993); Gerd Meyer, *Die DDR—Machtelite in der Aera Honecker. (East Germany—Power Elites in the Era of Honecker*) (Tuebingen: A. Francke Verlag, 1991). Wolfgang Rueddenklau, *Stoerenfried. DDR-Opposition 1986-89* (*Mischief-makers. GDR Opposition 1986-89*) (Berlin: BasisDruck Verlag, 1992). Jochen Cerny, *Wer War Wer—DDR. Ein biographisches Lexikon.* (Who Was Who in the GDR. A Biographical Lexicon), (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1992.) Books on the Stasi Foundation Law: Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ed., *Wann bricht schon mal ein Staat zusammen! dtv dokumente: Die Debatte uber die Stasi-Akten auf dem 39. Jistorikertag 1992* (Munich: DTV, 1993). Klaus Stoltenberg *Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz. Kommentar.* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992) and Johannes Weberling *Stasi-Unterlagen Gesetz. Kommentar* (Koeln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1993.)

Hungary

Yugoslavia gives Hungary documents related to the 1956 events in Hungary, in particular the fate of officials who took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest after the Soviet invasion. (MTI report, 10/29/92, in *RFE/RL Daily Report* 210 (10/30/92), 6.)

Several documents of the former Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party were to be made available to the public beginning on 1 September 1992 when law passed by parliament the previous December goes into effect; those seeking to use archival materials less than 30 years old must apply to the Ministry of Education and Culture. (Radio Budapest, 8/28/92, in *RFE/RL Daily Report* 167 (9/1/92), 5; *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:36 (9/11/92), 77.)

Yeltsin turns over Soviet documents on 1956 invasion, declaring that "citizens of Hungary and Russia, too, must know the whole truth about that tragic time." ("Yeltsin Gives Hungary Soviet Files on Revolt," *NYT*, 11/12/92.) Documents still leave significant gaps in understanding Soviet decision to invade, Hungarian scholars say. ("Russian Papers Shed Little Light on Hungary," *NYT*, 3/25/93, A15.)

Dilemmas of dealing with Hungary's communist past reviewed; destruction of files of intelligence unit which monitored dissidents (3/3 department) cited as objection to screening past members from government posts. (Edith Oltay, "Hungary Attempts to Deal With Its Past," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2:18 (4/30/93), 6-10.)

Poland

Poland hands over documents to Russia on Soviet-Polish 1919-20 war as part of archival exchange. (Viktor Zamyatin, "Polish Archivists Take Reciprocal Step: Poland Hands Over Archives to Russia," *Kommersant-Daily*, 11/6/92, in FBIS-USR-92-155, 12/4/92, 101; N. Yermolovich, "Archival Documents Delivered by the Polish Disappoint," *Izvestia*, 12/28/92, 7.)

Profile of Col. Ryszard Kuklinsi, who defected with intelligence data to U.S. in 1981 and is now subject of controversy in his homeland. (Benjamin Weiser, "A Question of Loyalty," *WP Magazine*, 12/13/92, 8-13, 24-30.)

Manfred Wilke and Michael Kubina discuss the SED-Politburo's reaction to the rise of Solidarity in Poland in 1980-81; Honecker to Brezhnev letter of November 1980 appealing for intervention included. ("Die Lage in Polen ist schlimmer als 1968 in der CSSR'" (The Situation in Poland is worse than 1968 in Czechoslovakia), *DA* 3 (March 1993), 335-40.) See also Manfred Wilke, Peter Erler, Martin Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, and Han-Peter Mueller *SED-Politbuero und polnische Krise 1980-82. Aus den Protokollen des Politbueros des ZK der SED zu Polen, den innerdeutschen Beziehungen und der Wirtschaftskrise der DDR. (The SED Politburo and the Polish Crisis of 1980-82. From the Protocols of the Central Committee of the SED Politiburo on Poland, inner-German Relations, and the Economic Crises of the GDR)*, Band 1: 1980. (Berlin, 1993). (Arbeitspapiere des

People's Republic of China

Interview with Stalin's back channel envoy to Mao in 1948-50. (S.N. Goncharov, interview with I.V. Kovalev, trans. Craig Seibert, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 10:4 (Winter 1991-92), 45-76.) For a response from Mao's former interpreter, see Li Haiwen (trans. Wang Xi), "A Distortion of History: An Interview with Shi Ze about Kovalev's Recollections," *Chinese Historians* 5:2 (Fall 1992), 59-64.

Chinese Historians 5:2 (Fall 1992) also contains Zhai Qiang, "Britain, the United States, and the Jinmen-Mazu Crisis," 25-48; and Li Xiaobing and Glenn Tracy, trans., "Mao's Telegrams during the Korean War, October-December 1950," 65-85.

Account of PRC ties to Vietnamese communists during war against French, based on newly available Chinese sources. (Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-54," *China Quarterly* 133 (March 1993), 85-110.)

Analysis of mystery of Defense Minister Lin Biao's death in 1971 plane crash. (Alexander Chudodeyev, "The mystery of plane number 256," *New Times International* 32 (1991), 36-38.)

Review of early U.S.-Communist Chinese contacts. (Chen Jian, "The Ward Case and the Emergence of Sino-American Confrontation, 1948-1950," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 30 (July 1993), 149-70.)

Advance notices circulating for biography of Deng Xiaoping written by his daughter, Deng Rong. (Nicholas D. Kristof, "Life of Deng, By Daughter, Diverts China," *NYT*, 8/18/93.)

A new group, the Society for Scholars of Sino-U.S. Relations has been founded in Beijing; the group, associated with the Chinese Association for American Studies, announces plans to hold a symposium on the study of Sino-U.S. relations in China; for further information contact:

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China Exchange News: A Review of Education, Science, and Academic Relations with the PRC
Committee on Scholarly Communication with China
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Publications: HUA Qingzhao, *From Yalta to Panmunjom: Truman's Diplomacy and the Four Powers, 1945-1953* (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993). William W. Moss, "Archives in the People's Republic of China: A Brief Introduction for American Scholars and Archivists" (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, June 1993).

Vietnam

See references in POW-MIA Inquiry section.

Publications: Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, *Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Two Reports* (CWIHP Working Paper No. 7); Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., *The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Larry Rottmann, *Voices from the Ho Chi Minh Trail: Poetry of America and Vietnam*, 1965-1993 (Event Horizon Press).

POW-MIA Issues

Report on Soviet archives findings on Americans missing after April 1950 shoot-down of U.S. B-29. (Valery Rudnev, "50 Years After Tragedy Over Baltic," *Izvestia*, 8/29/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-173, 16-18.)

Several Americans held on Soviet soil after World War II were "summarily executed" on Stalin's orders, but none remain in Soviet custody, Yeltsin informs U.S. Senate panel. ("Yeltsin Aide Tells of G.I.'s Held in Wartime Camps," *NYT* 11/12/92; Thomas W. Lippman, "Stalin Executed Some Americans After WWII, Yeltsin Writes," *WP*, 11/12/92; A. Shalnev, "The Stalinist Regime Executed the Americans Without Due Process," *Izvestia*, 11/12/92, 4; text of Yeltsin's statement and other articles: Itar-Tass, 11/12/92, and *Izvestia*,

Proof of Lies," *NYT*, 4/14/93; Steven A. Holmes, "Debate Rises on Hanoi P.O.W. Report," *NYT*, 4/16/93; Anthony Flint, "Harvard researcher defends accuracy of POW report," *Boston Globe*, 4/16/93; Stephen Engelberg, "Old M.I.A. Theory Is Given a New Life," *NYT*, 20; "Who Was Left Behind?" *Time*, 4/26/93, 39; Philip Shenon, "Hanoi Offers Documents on P.O.W.'s," *NYT*,