

## SOVIET NUCLEAR HISTORY

primarily with two topics: the structure and development of Soviet nuclear forces, and Soviet thinking about nuclear war and the role of nuclear weapons in war. Some of these works retain considerable value, but the range of issues they could examine was necessarily limited.

Cold War strategic arms race. The authors were describing an important problem: so long as primary sources were unavailable, academic and government analysts interested in explaining Soviet military policy had to resort to "inferences drawn by long chains of logic" to interpret the scattered data available to

**INSIDE:**

SOVIET SCIENCE SOURCES	2
MOSCOW'S BIGGEST BOMB	3
STALIN'S SECRET ORDER	5
RESPONSE: KOREAN WAR ORIGINS	21
KGB vs. CIA	22
GERMANY & THE COLD WAR: CWIHP CONFERENCE REPORT	

### **Nuclear Weapons after Stalin's Death: Moscow Enters the H-Bomb Age**

**by Yuri Smirnov and Vladislav Zubok**

By the time Stalin died, on 5 March 1953, the Soviet Union had become a nuclear power whose army was preparing to receive, in several months, its first atomic weapons.<sup>1</sup> The task set by Stalin, to liquidate the U.S. atomic monopoly and to develop the Soviets' own nuclear arsenal, was "overfulfilled" on 12 August 1953, when the USSR successfully tested the world's first transportable hydrogen bomb. The work on this bomb had been in progress since 1948, and Stalin failed by only five months to live to see his triumph.<sup>2</sup>

*continued on page 14*

*continued on page 9*

**STALIN AND THE BOMB***continued from page 1*

can or British policy, for example. Two books, by Arnold Kramish and George Modelski, were published in 1959 setting out what was known about the Soviet atomic project, and about the people and institutions involved.<sup>2</sup> These books provided useful information on the early stages of Soviet nuclear research, but were inevitably thin on nuclear weapons development.

The gap between what we knew about U.S. and British policy on the one hand, and Soviet policy on the other, widened in the 1960s and 1970s as more works on Western policy—including detailed official histories of the British and American projects—were published on the basis of archival research.<sup>3</sup> No parallel publications appeared in the Soviet Union; the most informative Soviet work of this period was Igor Golovin's biography of Igor Kurchatov, who was scientific director of the Soviet nuclear project from its inception in 1943 to his death in 1960.<sup>4</sup> Golovin, who was Kurchatov's deputy in the 1950s, based his book on interviews with people who had worked with Kurchatov and known him well (the opening pages of the book, for example,

were written by Kurchatov's brother-in-law, Kirill Sinel'nikov). His book is far more informative than other Soviet publications of the period, but it does not compare with the work of Richard Hewlett and Margaret Gowing and their colleagues. Some useful works on nuclear science and the atomic industry appeared in the Soviet Union at about the same time.<sup>5</sup> In 1976, Herbert York's classic *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* was published, throwing important light on Soviet thermonuclear weapons development.<sup>6</sup> Apart from the books by Kramish, Modelski, and York, two papers I wrote on early Soviet nuclear history during a year's fellowship in the International Security Studies Program of the Wilson Center in 1978-79 were, as far as I know, the only studies to appear in English on that history.<sup>7</sup>

Since 1980, and especially in the last four or five years, a great deal of new material has become available on the history of the Soviet project. New books have been published in Russia and the West; the Soviet and Russian press has carried many articles by, and interviews with, participants in the project; some key documents have been published; and some relevant archives—though

not yet the most important ones—have become accessible to researchers.<sup>8</sup> There is as yet no comprehensive history of the Soviet project in Russian; recent work has been devoted to clarifying particular aspects of Soviet nuclear history. Nevertheless, this has now become a fruitful area for research, and significant studies may be expected in the coming years.

What sources are now available for the study of Soviet nuclear history? The answer depends on what aspect one wants to study. In my book I examine three main issues: the development of Soviet nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles; the relationship between scientists and the political leadership; and the impact of nuclear weapons on Soviet foreign and military policies. These issues are often treated separately in studies of Western policies, but I chose to weave them together for two reasons, one practical and one substantive. The practical reason is that sources for the Soviet project are still, in spite of greater openness, very much more fragmentary than those for the American or British projects. I hoped that viewing the project from different angles would make up for some of the deficiencies in the sources. The substantive reason is that, as I hope the

### **Cold War Soviet Science: Manuscripts and Oral Histories**

by **Ronald Doel and Caroline Moseley**

The end of the Cold War has stimulated new interest in the history of science in the Soviet Union. While several Western historians have produced important studies of various aspects of Soviet science, until recently such works relied largely on published Soviet information; and while Soviet scholars had greater access to archival materials, political pressures kept analyses of twentieth-century Soviet science limited to internal technical developments. Since the advent of *glasnost* in the late 1980s, however, contacts between Western and Eastern scientists and historians has increased dramatically, and scholars have begun the important task of evaluating Soviet-era and East European science within social, intellectual, and political contexts. This process has been aided by two developments. Archivists in the United States and the former Soviet republics have begun collaborating

to assess archival sources for the physical and biological sciences in the former Soviet Union; and greater freedom of travel and speech has enabled historians to conduct an unprecedented number of oral history interviews with leading scientists and their families in the former Soviet republics.

For more than two decades, the Center for History of Physics of the American Institute of Physics (AIP), now located in College Park, Maryland, has sponsored oral history interviews with scientists in most branches of the physical sciences, including physics, astrophysics, and geophysics; these interviews are housed within its Niels Bohr Library. Its staff has also gathered information on the papers of scientists and scientific institutions throughout the world. In addition, the AIP houses several small collections of manuscript and printed materials on the history of Soviet science. These sources are described in greater detail below.

**I. Archival Sources.** Beginning in the late 1980s, the Center for History of Physics has employed some highly qualified researchers, including the Russian historian Alexei

Kozhevnikov, to assess archival holdings for scientists and scientific institutions throughout the former Soviet Union and East European nations. Information about known archival collections is found in a database operated by the Center, the International Catalog of Sources for the History of Physics and Allied Sciences (ICOS). Currently the ICOS database contains records of 45 collections which have been preserved in 10 different repositories in the former Soviet Union. One of these repositories, the Archives of the St. Petersburg branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is a particularly rich source of physics-related collections. Its holdings include the papers of Evgenij Gross, Abram Ioffe, Wladimir Kistiakowsky, Yuri Krutkov, and others.

**II. Oral History Sources.** For several decades, the Center for History of Physics has sponsored oral history interviews with physicists, astrophysicists, meteorologists, geophysicists, and members of related disciplines. Over 600 interviews are available at the Center; transcripts are available for many


*continued on page 13*

are two collections of memoirs about him; some of these are not very interesting, but others are highly informative about aspects of the project.<sup>16</sup> There is an excellent study of Kurchatov and his research before he was appointed scientific director of the project.<sup>17</sup> Many of the memoirs portray Kurchatov as a hero, but there is enough material to make possible a more nuanced picture of the man.

A great deal has been written about the Leningrad school of physics from which Kurchatov and other key figures in the nuclear project came: Abram Ioffe, the founder of this school;<sup>18</sup> N.N. Semenov, who created the Institute of Chemical Physics from which the first members of the weapons group were drawn;<sup>19</sup> Iu. B. Khariton, who headed the work on weapons design and development from 1943 on;<sup>20</sup> Ia. B. Zel'dovich, who headed the theoretical work on weapons design;<sup>21</sup> I.K. Kikoin, who was responsible for the gaseous diffusion method of isotope separation;<sup>22</sup> L.A. Artsimovich, who took charge of electromagnetic isotope separation;<sup>23</sup> G.N. Flerov, who discovered spontaneous fission;<sup>24</sup> and A.P. Aleksandrov, who occupied several important positions in the project.<sup>25</sup>

Similar materials are available for other scientists in the project. Vladimir Vernadskii,

a mineralogist with broad scientific inter- /F5 1 T







clouded by the impossibility of distinguishing Sudoplatov's recollections from what has been added by his co-authors.

The controversy about Sudoplatov's book has produced one benefit: the release of the memorandum (prepared by Sudoplatov) from Beria to Stalin about the visit of the Soviet physicist Iakov Terletskii to Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in November 1945 (see the translation on pages 50-51, 57-59). It is good to have this memorandum published, but the way in which it has become public illustrates some of the problems that researchers face in working on the history of the Soviet nuclear program. It can be quite misleading to have individual documents plucked out of the archives, without a sense for the context in which they were filed. In this case we are fortunate that Terletskii left a detailed account of his visit to Bohr, and that Aage Bohr, Niels Bohr's son, who was present at the meetings between Bohr and Terletskii, is alive and able to give his account of what transpired.<sup>46</sup> Even so, Beria's memorandum needs careful interpretation. Some of Bohr's answers to Terletskii's questions are garbled, which makes one wonder how the memorandum was put together.<sup>47</sup> In question 10, for example, Bohr refers to a half-life of 7,000 years, which is close to the half-life of plutonium-240 from all processes, not for spontaneous fission (which is what he was asked about). Answer 22 does not seem to make much sense, as several physicists, including Aage Bohr, himself a Nobel Laureate, have pointed out. Finally, conclusions should not be drawn from the document without comparing it with the Smyth Report, the official account of the Manhattan Project which had been published by the U.S. government in August 1945.<sup>48</sup> It is clear that Bohr, in his answers to Terletskii, did not go beyond what had already been revealed by the Smyth Report.

Russian historians of science are now working intensively on the history of the Soviet nuclear project. They have already written a great deal about the history of Soviet physics, and about the communities from which the leading figures in the nuclear

pari (The nuclear 9n trg525s)qluc.162 TwJ T\* of -1.highTw (wr johic Ma.8 t/Foovt hfcument wt he wVoh s1.2.8 -1.i D OD 0voznani Twi tekhn  
w\* f sonensivelyumeGr7ayko(lils(whmhi -0bas1 Tw.8 -1..irhow thansap.006 F Tw4f Bo96 2 (ptoncluealed by th12th.-0.councaueen rl5j It is c

the end of civilization; I had to rely on secondary sources that quoted excerpts from the speeches. Nevertheless the greater openness of the immediate post-Stalin years is very clearly reflected in the archives. It is the last four years of Stalin's life that remain the most opaque and difficult period of Soviet foreign policy.

The same pattern holds for the study of military policy. New materials are now available on the development of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and also on the impact of nuclear weapons on post-Stalin military thought.<sup>57</sup> But the great military buildup of 1949-53 has not yet been illuminated either by archival materials or by studies by Russian military historians. This period requires new sources and research.

For the first time, researchers on these topics in recent years have been able to interview senior Soviet participants in the relevant events. Clearly, interviews are a notoriously difficult source, because people's memories are so often unreliable. Yet I found them enormously helpful—more so, in fact, than is evident from the notes in the book, because people I talked to helped me to evaluate what I had read, pointed me to new materials and questions, and gave me documents. Still, it was not always possible to cross-check what I was told with documentary sources, so I had to be careful in the use I made of interviews. I should note also that cooperation with Russian colleagues working in the same area was extremely helpful: they shared materials, ideas, and advice very generously.

In spite of the difficulties, Soviet nuclear history has now become an exciting area for research. It is intrinsically interesting because the issues it raises are of great importance, and because the people involved were remarkable. It is important for the history of the Cold War, and for the way in which we think about the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations.

A couple of years before completing my book I asked myself whether I should wait until new material appeared before finishing. I decided not to do so, mainly because I thought I had a more or less clear picture of what I wanted to say, and also because I thought a general map of the terrain might be useful to others working in this area. The history of the Soviet nuclear program is not likely to be exhausted by one account, any more than one book provides

everything one needs to know about U.S. nuclear history. Nevertheless, I was pleasantly surprised by the evidence that has become available about the development of the weapons themselves, about the community of scientists who built the weapons, about the role of espionage, about the management of the project, and about the effect of the bomb on the military and foreign policies of Stalin and the post-Stalin leaders. The story is an important one, not merely for understanding the arms race and the Cold War, but also for understanding Soviet society and the survival in that society of the traditions of the Russian intelligentsia, per-

- Kurchatovskii institut, 1993). (Most of this was published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1993, under the title "The Khariton Version.") Iu. Khariton, "Iadernoe oruzhie SSSR: prishlo iz Amerikii ili sozdano samostoiatel'no?" ["Nuclear weapons of the USSR: did they come from America or were they created independently?"], *Izvestiia*, 8 December 1992.
21. Ia.B. Zel'dovich, *Izbrannye trudy* [*Selected Works*], 2 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1984, 1985). A volume of memoirs about Zel'dovich was published under the title *Znakomyi neznakomyi Zel'dovich* [*The Known and unknown Zeldovich*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1994).
22. *Vospominaniia ob akademike Isaake Konstantinovich Kikoine* [*Reminiscences of academic Isaac Konstantinovich Kikoin*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1991).
23. *Vospominaniia ob akademike L.A. Artsimoviche* [*Reminiscences of the academic L.A. Artsimovich*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1981).
24. G.N. Flerov, "Vsemu my mozhem pouchit'sia u Kurchatova" ["We can learn everything from Kurchatov"], in A.P. Aleksandrov, ed., *Vospominaniia ob Igore Vasil'eviche Kurchatove* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988). Flerov talked to many people about his role in the initiation of the Soviet project, and his account of his letter to Stalin in the spring of 1942 has been widely reported in the popular Soviet literature. The most reliable of these popular accounts are two books by Sergei Snegov: *Tvortsy* [*Creators*] (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1979); and *Prometei raskovannyi* [*Prometheus unbound*] (Moscow: Detskaia literatura, 1980), which are based on extensive interviews with project participants. The books were recommended to me by Flerov, as well as by others in the Soviet project. They are now curiosities rather than useful sources, in view of the material that subsequently became available.
25. A.P. Aleskandrov, "Gody s Kurchatovym," *Nauka i zhizn'* [*Science and life*] 2 (1983).
26. Vernadskii's statements on atomic energy are scattered throughout his writings. For early thoughts on the significance of atomic energy see V.I. Vernadskii, *Ocherki i rechi* [*Essays and speeches*] (Petrograd: Nauchnoe khimikotekhnicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1922). A wartime memorandum is published in *Priroda* 4 (1975). The most important sources are Vernadskii's diaries and correspondence in the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences; some relevant correspondence can be found in the Vernadsky Collection in the Russian Archives, Butler Library, Columbia University. See I.I. Mochalov, *Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1982); Kendall E. Bailes, *Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions: V.I. Vernadsky and his Scientific School, 1863-1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
27. *Akademik V.G. Khlopin: Ocherki, vospominaniia sovremennikov* [*Academician V.G. Khlopin: Essays, memoirs of contemporaries*] (Leningrad: Nauka, 1987); F.I. Vol'fson, N.S. Zontov, G.R. Shushaniia, *Dmitrii Ivanovich Shcherbakov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987).
28. A valuable collection, for example, is P.N. Lebedev Physics Institute, *Andrei Sakharov: Facets of a Life* (Gif-sur-Yvette: Editions Frontières, 1991). The English translation is very poor, but the volume is not yet available in Russian. [Ed. note: A Sakharov archive, containing materials smuggled out of the Soviet Union during his dissident years, has been established at Brandeis University.]
29. Among relevant articles that he has already published are: "Fizika universitetskaia i akademicheskaia" ["Physics in the university and the academy"], *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* [*Questions in the history of science and technology*] 2 (1991), and "S chego'nachinalos' sovetskaia vodorodnaia bomba" ["What started the Soviet hydrogen bomb"], *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* 1 (1993).
30. V.A. Tsukerman and Z.M. Azarkh, "Liudi i vzryvy" ["People and explosions"], *Zvezda* [*Star*] 9-11 (1990). These memoirs were published before Arzamas-16 could be mentioned by name.
31. M.G. Pervukhin, "U istokov uranovoi epopei" ["The origins of the uranium epic"], *Tekhnika-molodezhi* [*Technology of Youth*] 6, 7 (1975); "Pervye gody atomnogo proekta" ["The first years of the atomic project"], *Khimiia i zhizn'* [*Chemistry and life*] 5 (1985).
32. N.A. Dollezhal', *U istokov rukotvornogo mira* [*The origins of the hand-made world*] (Moscow: Znanie, 1989).
33. E.P. Slavskii, "Kogda strana stoiala na plechakh iadernykh titanov" ["When the country was standing on the shoulders of nuclear titans"], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* 9 (1993), 13-24.
34. P.L. Kapitsa, *Pis'ma o nauke* [*Letters on science*] (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989); see also J.W. Boag, P.E. Rubinin, and D. Shoenberg, eds., *Kapitsa in Cambridge and Moscow* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1990). In December 1945 Kapitsa sent Molotov the outline of an article on atomic energy that he wanted to publish. For this see P.L. Kapitsa, "Pis'mo Molotovu" ["Letter to Molotov"], *Vestnik Ministerstva Innostrannykh Del SSSR* [*Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs*] 10 (1990).
35. Nikolaus Riehl, *10 Jahre im goldenen Käfig: Erlebnisse beim Aufbau der Sowjetischen Uran-Industrie* [*10 Years in the Golden Cage: Adventures in the Construction of the Soviet Uranium Industry*] (Stuttgart: Riederer, 1988).
36. Max Steenbeck, *Impulse und Wirkungen* [*Impulses and Influences*] (Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1977); Heinz Barwich, *Das Rote Atom* [*The Red Atom*] (Munich and Berne: Scherz Verlag, 1967); Manfred Von Ardenne,



not believe that he tried to stop publication for personal reasons.

No one objected to the publication of the 12 non-design documents, which by themselves make it clear that Soviet scientists obtained extensive information from espionage. Unfortunately, by the time the ban on publication was issued, it was too late for the journal to remove the two design-rich documents in question. Through no fault of its own, the journal was put in an extremely awkward position.

Students of Soviet history hope that all the documents will appear before long, perhaps with excisions in the two documents on bomb design. What is needed is a procedure for declassifying historically important documents, even if they contain sensitive information—by removing the sensitive portions before publication. The Ministry of Atomic Power should institute a procedure of this kind. The KGB had reviewed these documents, but apparently only to insure that they would not reveal information about intelligence sources or methods, not to check the sensitivity of the weapon information they contained.

Mike Moore, editor of the *Bulletin*, wrote in his May [1993] "Editor's Note" that "those who live longest write history." In a certain sense this is true. It is only because he survived the end of the Cold War that Khariton has been able to write about the Soviet nuclear weapons program. His account is invaluable because he was one of the key people in the program from the very beginning. He has not used his recollections to aggrandize himself or to exaggerate the role that he played in nuclear weapon development. This increases the value of his testimony; and it is made more valuable by the fact that the history of the Soviet nuclear project is encrusted with legend and myth. Moore is incorrect if he means that Khariton has tried to shut out other accounts of the Soviet project.]

41. Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatolii Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness — A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), app. 2, pp. 436-67.

42. A.S. Feklisov, "Podvig Klausu Fuksa" ["The feat of Klaus Fuchs"], *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military-historical journal]* 12 (1990), and 1 (1991); A.A. Iatskov, "Atom i razvedka" ["The atom and reconnaissance"], *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* 3 (1992); Sudoplatov et al., *Special Tasks*.

43. There has been, for some years, a running battle between the KGB and the physics community about the Soviet atomic project. Some former KGB officials have claimed that Soviet physicists made no contribution to the development of the atomic or hydrogen bombs, and that everything was done on the basis of intelligence material. The physicists have acknowledged the important role of intelligence in Soviet atomic bomb development, but have argued that the intelligence could have been checked and used only by competent physicists, and have asserted, moreover, that intelligence did not help in the development of Soviet thermonuclear weapons.

44. See the review by Thomas Powers in *The New York Review of Books* 41:11 (9 June 1994), 10-17; and my review in *Science* 264 (27 May 1994), 1346-47.

45. Sudoplatov gives an exaggerated view of the size and scope of the project during the war.

46. Ia.P. Terletskii, "Operatsiia 'Dopros Nil'sa Bora'"

["Operation 'Interrogation of Niels Bohr'"], in *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* 2 (1994); Press Statement by Aage Bohr, 27 April 1994.

47. [Ed. note: In an interview for a documentary ("The Red Bomb") broadcast on the Discovery Channel in September 1994, Terletsky recalled that he did not take notes during his meetings with Bohr, which may explain errors appearing in a memorandum composed subsequently.]

48. Henry deWolf Smyth, *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb Under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945*, available in a 1989 reprint edition published by Stanford University Press.

49. "Za Kulisami tikhookeanskoi bitvy (iaponosovetskie kontakty v 1945 g.)" ["Behind the scenes of the Pacific battle (Japanese-Soviet contacts in 1945)"], *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR* (15 October 1990); Boris N. Slavinsky, "The Soviet Occupation of the Kurile Islands and the Plans for the Capture of Northern Hokkaido," *Japan Forum*, April 1993; Kathryn Weathersby, "New Findings on the Korean War," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18; and Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-58.

50. A.A. Gromyko, *Pamiatnoe [Memories]*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990).

51. N.V. Novikov, *Vospominaniia diplomata: zapiski 1938-1947 [Reminiscences of a diplomat: diaries 1938-1947]* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989).

52. *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva [One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov: from the notebook of F. Chuyev]* (Moscow: Terra, 1991). An English-language edition was published by Ivan R. Dee (Chicago) in 1993.

53. As yet unpublished.

54. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Chen Jian provides a useful survey of Chinese sources in *The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War* (Washington D.C.: Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 1, 1992).

55. *Voennaia Mysl' [Military Thought]* ran a series of articles on the tactical use of nuclear weapons.

56. "Delo Beriia" ["The problem of Beria"], *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, 1, 2 (1991).

57. See, e.g., A.Iu. Ishlinskii, ed., *Akademik S.P. Korolev: uchenyi, inzhener, chelovek [Academician S.P. Korolev: scientist, engineer, man]* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986); M.V. Kel'dysh, *Izbrannye trudy: Raketnaia tekhnika i kosmonavtika [Selected Works: Rocket technology and cosmonautics]* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988); and B.P. Ivanov, "Atomnyi vzryv u poselka Totkskoe" ["Atomic explosion in Totksky Settlement"], *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* 12 (1991).

*David Holloway is Professor of Political Science, and co-director of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, at Stanford University.*

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in HISTORICAL ABSTRACTS and AMERICA: HISTORY AND LIFE.

## SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

*continued from page 1*

them.<sup>2</sup> And to a great extent, that data, whether leaked/declassified or not, had been filtered through the U.S. intelligence system. Under those circumstances, interpretive efforts were always constrained; the relative opacity of Soviet defense policymaking made it difficult to ascertain, much less evaluate, the relevant "facts." This made it easy for analysts to fall back on Cold War ideology and habits such as "mirror imaging," which could easily lead to misunderstanding. Thus, educated guesswork and perceptions alone, severed from the deeper understanding that primary sources can provide, shaped the American public's understanding of Soviet military decision-making, policies, and programs for the entire Cold War period.

Even with the end of the Cold War and new evidence from Russian archives, historians and political scientists must still rely on perceptions. Despite the significant openings in the files of the Foreign Ministry and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the culture of secrecy continues to limit access to Soviet-era military records. Although retired military officers are willing to share their recollections of key events, lack of access to Russian military archives means that a crucial portion of Cold War territory cannot be explored systematically.<sup>3</sup> Thus, historians cannot investigate the way that the Soviet military leadership saw the world at the end of World War II, much less during crisis and non-crisis periods of the Cold War.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, given the important role that the military had in the state apparatus, lack of access adds to the difficulty of understanding Soviet national security decision-making during the Stalin and Khrushchev eras, and the years in between and since.

If Soviet military records on nuclear weapons issues ever become available they will undoubtedly greatly enhance our ability to address broad areas of Moscow's Cold War strategies and policies. In the meantime, researchers will benefit from the guidance provided and questions raised in a declassified history prepared under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense in the late 1970s. As a result of a request made in 1974 by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, an interdisciplinary team comprising historian Ernest May of Harvard

and American policy remains excised.<sup>6</sup>

In spite of the redactions, the general line of argument remains relatively transparent. But rather than summarizing or assessing the study as a whole, this article discusses some of the questions raised in the chapters on Soviet-era defense planning and decision-making, strategic nuclear policy, and force deployments, particularly during the 1940s and 50s. The lack of primary sources on the Soviet side forced the authors to rely on “speculation and inference” using data from a variety of secondary sources and highly classified intelligence reports. Nevertheless, MSW produced some rich and provocative material on the range of motives that may have informed Stalin’s postwar military policy, the 1949-52 military buildup, Khrushchev’s strategic priorities, the Berlin/Cuban crises, and the mid-1960s ICBM buildup, among other issues. These analyses merit careful pondering by historians and political scientists alike.

The authors believe that Stalin expected an “antagonistic” relationship with Washington, yet also suggest that his postwar military decisions provided “little provocation” for a “stepped up competition in armaments.” Thus, taking into account postwar demobilization, Soviet forces were large enough to maintain domestic security, stabilize the East European sphere of influence, and possibly to support West European Com-

4ine of beionrces caiof osal on the Eae

producing a modern and powerful arsenal. This, they suggest, may have dovetailed with Stalin's conviction that nuclear weapons were relevant to supporting Soviet foreign policy rather than for actual military use. That emphasis was also consistent with Soviet military doctrine prior to the mid-1950s, which either ignored or downplayed the role of nuclear weapons and emphasized instead "permanently operating factors" such as national morale and cohesion.<sup>14</sup>

Central to MSW's study is their discussion of the mid-to-late 1950s, which they see as a formative period for Soviet strategic doctrine and weapons systems. At that time the political and military leadership revised official doctrine about nuclear war; rather than minimizing the problem of a preemptive nuclear attack, they began to treat it as the preeminent danger and emphasized the importance of ready forces and preparation as well as arms control. More or less concurrently, the Soviets began to scale down their long-range bomber program and redirect resources toward ICBM and IRBM development. They did not, however, accelerate the latter; worried about the costs of military competition, they decided to make large investments slowly.<sup>15</sup>

MSW's interpretation of these developments, which fed into U.S. decisions to hasten ICBM and SLBM programs, raises important questions that deserve further exploration when Russian Defense Ministry archives become available. The authors contend that during the mid-'50s Soviet leaders concluded that bombers were useful for deterring an attack but not for "damage limitation," i. e., for the "defensive purpose of minimizing the harm an enemy nation could do." Believing that Washington was far ahead of them in ability to launch a crippling strategic attack, and perhaps overestimating U.S. air defense capacities, the Soviets reasoned that missiles, not bombers, could help them solve their problems, MSW suggest. Missiles, unlike bomber aircraft, were more or less unstoppable and could reach their targets quickly. While acknowledging the importance of various organizational and technological considerations, along with the persuasive abilities of rocket designer Sergei P. Korolev, MSW argue that a preoccupation with the "strategic defensive" was fundamental to explaining the shift in resources from bombers to missiles.<sup>16</sup>

The authors present a stimulating inter-

pretation of Nikita Khrushchev's unsuccessful "missile diplomacy" of the late 1950s and early '60s, an issue that has been of great interest to scholars.<sup>17</sup> For MSW, Khrushchev's missile rattling needs to be understood in terms of military pressure on him to reverse his policy of restraint on military spending. Noting that the bulk of Soviet effort lay in MRBMs and not ICBMs (such as the SS-7 and SS-8), they suggest that Khrushchev was content to pursue a "second best strategic posture" that could meet potential threats on the Eurasian periphery, in particular West Germany and China. At the same time, restraint on ICBM development might have been a way to encourage Washington to disengage from Western Europe. Alternatively, the Soviets may also have had a problem in meeting their ICBM production goals. In this context, perhaps Khrushchev and the Soviet military found a "strategic bluff" as useful and necessary for meeting political goals as well as for concealing the weakness in their strategic posture.<sup>18</sup>

Without access to Soviet military and Presidential archives, MSW's hypotheses cannot be adequately tested; this problem is no less true for their reading of the early 1960s U.S.-Soviet crises—especially the Cuban Missile Crisis—and their impact on Soviet ICBM deployments in the following years. Like many analysts, the authors see the Soviet decision to deploy the MRBMs as motivated in part to defend Cuba and in part to offset U.S. strategic superiority, which had put Soviet nuclear forces in a situation that was "little short of desperate."<sup>19</sup> But they are puzzled by the military logic, noting that the small force of missiles would have "been inadequate to destroy enough of the American strategic strike capability to preclude severe retaliatory damage" to the Soviet Union. MSW provide two possible answers to this problem. One possibility is that the Soviets believed that their deployment was adequate to deter Washington in a crisis: the U.S. would avoid a confrontation rather than risking a few cities. The other, admittedly speculative, is that prospective targets were U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) command and control facilities that could not be reached from Soviet territory. With their MRBMs in Cuba, and in keeping with the Soviet's strategic defensive orientation, they could hinder a "fully coordinated" U.S. first strike.<sup>20</sup>

MSW relate Khrushchev's decisions on Cuba to a struggle with his Presidium colleagues over strategic force levels. Losing political clout after the U-2 affair and the retreat from the Berlin ultimatum (to sign a peace treaty with East Germany that would isolate West Berlin) in October 1961, Khrushchev was under greater pressure to allocate more resources to ICBMs. In this context, he may have seen the Cuban deployment as a way to contain military spending while giving the military more coverage of critical targets in the United States. Thus, "targeting the SAC command structure would help explain why the Soviets would undertake the very risky Cuban venture."<sup>21</sup>

Whatever the purposes of the deployment may have been, MSW argue that the Missile Crisis' outcome, with Moscow forced to back down and withdraw the missiles, acted as a "catalyst" by bringing to the surface latent dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's "second best" approach if not his concern with Germany and China. Thus, U.S. "strategic pressure" touched off a two-year-long debate involving a major decision for significant deployments of third generation ICBM systems: the SS-7 and SS-8 were abandoned and more resources poured into the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs. Moreover, the Soviets decided to develop the "Yankee class" submarine missile system. By 1965, MSW propose, the Soviets had completed basic decisions on force levels which remained relatively stable in the following years. And they further suggest that the intention behind these decisions was not strategic dominance or even serious "counterforce" capabilities, as the CIA's "Team B" maintained in the mid-70s'. Rather, a basic purpose may have been parity with the United States. Indeed, if its priority was MRBM deployments on their territorial periphery, the Kremlin may well have seen parity as sufficient to support their political interests in a future crisis.<sup>22</sup>

Besides their overall assessment of the mid-1960s decisions, MSW raise specific questions about the characteristics of the missile deployments. For example, they are uncertain whether the Soviets developed the relatively inexpensive SS-11 ICBM in a "crash program" after the Cuban Missile Crisis or in 1961, becoming important later. In addition, solid information is not available on what the missile designers and the military had in mind when they developed

and deployed the heavy SS-9 ICBM. Returning to their earlier line of argument about command-and-control targeting, MSW use circumstantial evidence to conjecture that the SS-9's mission may have been to disable the command-and-control system of the U.S. Minuteman missile complex. Perhaps that is why the Pentagon found the SS-9s worrisome; thus, one purpose of Johnson and Nixon-era SALT strategy was to "seek to dissuade the Soviet Union from further large-scale deployments."<sup>23</sup>

MSW raise a host of other interesting questions about Soviet decision-making in such areas as arms control, anti-ballistic

ground force levels during the 1940s-'50s, see, e.g., Matthew Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," *International Security* 7:1 (Winter 1982/83), 110-138; and John Duffield, "The Soviet Military Threat to Western Europe: US Estimates in the 1950s and 1960s," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15 (June 1992), 208-27. During 1993 and 1994, knowledge of National Intelligence Estimates of the USSR greatly increased when the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence turned over copies of many Soviet-related NIEs to the National Archives and published two useful compendia in its "CIA Cold War Record Series": Scott A. Koch, ed., *Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959* (Washington, D.C.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), and Michael Warner, ed., *The CIA Under Harry Truman* (Washington, D.C.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994). These collections were released in conjunction with CIA-sponsored academic conferences on "Teaching Intelligence" (October 1993) and the Truman era (March 1994). Strategic forces estimates from the years of the "missile gap" controversy and later periods are scheduled to be the subject of additional declassification releases and another conference, to be held at Harvard University in December 1994.

10. *Ibid.*, 257. Kathryn Weathersby of Florida State University is now preparing a major study of the role of the Korean question in Soviet policy during 1949 and 1950.

11. *Ibid.*, 250. Others may argue that the first example was the Soviet atomic bomb program.

12. *Ibid.*, 810-11.

13. *Ibid.*, 257, 277-78. For background on Soviet antimissile programs during the 1950s and 60s, see Sayre Stevens, "The Soviet BDM Program," in Ashton B. Carter and David Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), esp. 182-201.

14. *Ibid.*, 280-83, 299, 302. For Stalin and nuclear weapons, see Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*.

15. *Ibid.*, 315-33. See also Garthoff, *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine*, 34-35, 42, which emphasizes ideas about deterrence in the new military thinking.

16. *History*, 331-33. Information provided to the CIA by GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky supports the strategically defensive character of Soviet policy: according to the CIA officials who reviewed the Penkovsky "take," it reaffirmed that the "prime Soviet intelligence objective is to furnish early warning of foreign attack." See Jerrold Schecter and Peter S. Deribian, *The Spy Who Saved the World* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 195.

17. See, e.g., David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 84-86.

18. *History*, 334-92. For Penkovsky's explanation of Khrushchev's boasting, see Schecter and Deribian, *The Spy Who Saved the World*, 273-74.

19. See, e.g., Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*, rev. ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989), 20-21. For "desperate," see *History*, 475.

20. *Ibid.*, 474-86, 664-65. The first interpretation is consistent with Garthoff's reading (*Reflections*, 20-

H3e -0dnej4ITS1fcae(Hise6m8l7W0eMvn4:l0a.p2 1[(02Klk.d5il85oEbNl(Hise6m8loPbCffTDatTcof.-f1f11fc3tTD -ctrioiat3j .l)af t338poDMe)fTDatTcof.-fn5iyrtki38pTjfo0Me)



capacity, which would annually generate, besides the electric power, about 130-200 kilograms of plutonium a year, an amount sufficient to produce “dozens” of atomic bombs. “Moreover, the production of atomic bombs from these materials is a process

How can it be asserted [Molotov added] that civilization could perish in an atomic war?...Can we make the peoples believe that in the event of war all must perish? Then why should we build socialism, why worry about tomorrow? It would be better to supply everyone with coffins now...You see to what absurdities, to what harmful things, mistakes on political issues can lead.<sup>18</sup>

It remains unclear, at least so far as Khrushchev was concerned, whether this criticism was merely a means to discredit Malenkov as a leader or was instead a manifestation of genuine loyalty to dogmatic tenets. It is known, however, that Khrushchev, who ousted Malenkov in February 1955 from the post of head of state, and then pushed Molotov aside from the helm of foreign policy, soon revealed that he shared the same estimate of the danger of thermonuclear war he had recently condemned. The East-West summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955, where Khrushchev already acted as the real leader of the Soviet delegation, demonstrated this as well.

During the summit, a memorable one-on-one conversation took place, with only Soviet interpreter Oleg Troyanovsky present, between Eisenhower and Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Georgi Zhukov—two famous military leaders of the Second World War. Each had a clear understanding of the power of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower was first to show how much the growth of nuclear armaments worried him, stressing that “now, with the appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons, many notions that were correct in the past have changed. War in modern conditions with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapon became even more senseless than ever before.” Zhukov agreed and noted that “he personally saw how lethal this weapon is.” (Zhukov, in September 1954, had supervised a military exercise in the southern Urals at Totkskoye, during which a 20-kiloton atomic bomb was dropped from a plane and 44,000 soldiers immediately thereafter staged a mock battle at the test site to simulate nuclear war under “realistic” conditions.<sup>19</sup>)

Eisenhower continued: “Even scientists do not know what would happen if, say, in the course of one month 200 hydrogen

bombs would explode and if the conditions would favor the spread of atomic dust.” In his answer Zhukov stressed that he “personally favors the liquidation of atomic and hydrogen weapons” and noted that “if in the first days of war the United States would drop 300-400 bombs on the USSR,” and the Soviet Union retaliated in kind, “then one can imagine what would happen to the atmosphere.”<sup>20</sup>

One is struck by the realism and responsibility of two professional military men who had become prominent statesmen. Still, Zhukov had undoubtedly spoken with Khrushchev’s advice and consent.

Therefore, one may infer that the physicists’ warnings had reached their target. The Geneva Summit, Khrushchev recalled many years later, “convinced us once again, that there was no pre-war situation in existence at that time, and our enemies were afraid of us in the same way as we were of them.”<sup>21</sup>

No wonder that, already, in the documents adopted by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the thesis of the inevitability of a new world war resulting from the aggressive encroachments of imperialism and new “warmongers” was replaced with the thesis of durable “peaceful coexistence between different social systems.”

In subsequent years, profoundly concerned about the threat of thermonuclear war, Kurchatov did not cease his efforts to enlighten the country’s leadership about nuclear danger. “Early in 1957,” Andrei Sakharov recalled, “Kurchatov suggested... that I write something about the effects of radiation from the so-called clean bomb.”<sup>22</sup>

Sakharov’s investigation enhanced understanding of the extreme danger of atmospheric nuclear tests not only to present, but to future generations. He estimated that the overall number of possible victims from the radiation impact of each megaton of nuclear explosion might approach 10,000 in the course of several thousand years following the test. His article ended with a seminal recommendation: “Halting the tests will directly save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, and it also promises even greater indirect benefits, reducing international tensions and the risk of nuclear war, the fundamental danger of our times.”<sup>23</sup>

Even before this article’s publication in a scientific journal in July 1958, Sakharov, again at Kurchatov’s suggestion, wrote another article on the dangers of atmospheric

testing for a wide audience. It was translated into major languages and published, with the aim of reaching foreign readers, by many Soviet journals distributed abroad. In this campaign one again senses Kurchatov’s purposeful activity, but, what is especially significant, even Khrushchev’s personal involvement. As Sakharov recalled: “Khrushchev himself authorized the publication of my articles. Kurchatov discussed the matter twice with him and then referred some minor suggested editorial changes to me...Khrushchev approved the revised versions at the end of June and they were sent off immediately to the editors.”<sup>24</sup>

On 31 March 1958, Khrushchev announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing—a move that may well have been influenced not only by the immediate political calculus, but also by the considerations of Soviet atomic physicists. In this context the words that Kurchatov spoke at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 15 January 1960, three weeks before his sudden death—when he professed his “deep faith and firm knowledge that the Soviet people, and government would channel to the benefit of mankind”<sup>25</sup> the achievements of atomic science—should be understood as an urgent plea to his country’s leaders.


But, as the Soviet missile and nuclear arsenal continued to grow and develop, it began to figure increasingly prominently, and menacingly, as an element of Soviet power diplomacy. This happened, for instance, at the climax of the Suez crisis in November 1956, when Moscow reminded British and French leaders of their nations’ vulnerability to Soviet rockets if they did not withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory. Khrushchev and his supporters spoke later with pride about the good results allegedly produced by this flexing of nuclear muscles. Speaking on 24 June 1957 at a CC CPSU Plenum, Mikoyan (at Khrushchev’s prompting) recalled: “We were strong enough to keep troops in Hungary and to warn the imperialists that, if they would not stop the war in Egypt, it might come to the use of missile armaments from our side. All acknowledge that with this we decided the fate of Egypt.”<sup>26</sup>

Khrushchev’s realization that the USSR had become a mighty nuclear power tempted the Soviet leader not only to play a sometimes tough game, but even to launch dangerous, reckless adventures, most egre-





1. Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Jeffrey J. Sands, *Soviet Nuclear Weapons, 1989* (Russian edition) (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1992), 8.
2. Stalin's role in launching the Soviet nuclear program is well described and amply documented in David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). The deliverability of the thermonuclear weapon tested in August 1953 is noted in Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 307. The United States first tested the thermonuclear concepts employed in its hydrogen bombs by detonating a non-deliverable device on the island of Eniwetok in the South Pacific on 1 November 1952; and first tested a deliverable hydrogen bomb in March 1954.
3. See transcript of the 3 July 1953 CC CPSU Plenum in *Izvestia TsK KPSS* [News of the CC CPSU] 2 (1991), 166-170; for an English translation of the July 1953 CC CPSU Plenum transcripts, see D.M. Stickle, ed., Jean Farrow, trans., *The Beria Affair* (Commack, NY: Nova Sciences Publishers, Inc., 1993), quotation on p. 130.
4. "The last 'anti-party' group. A stenographic report of the June 1957 Plenary Meeting of the CC CPSU," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* [Historical Archive] 4 (1993), 4.
5. Malyshev specifically suggested that the article could be signed by Academicians A.N. Nesmeianov, A.F. Ioffe, D.V. Skobel'tsin, and A.I. Oparin.
6. Memorandum of V. Malyshev to N. Khrushchev, 1 April 1954, enclosing Kurchatov, et al., n.d. but apparently late March 1954, "The Danger of Atomic War and President Eisenhower's Proposal" ["Opasnosti atomnoi voyny i predlozhenie prezidenta Eizenkhauera"], Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), fond 5, opis 30, delo 126, listy [pp.] 38ff.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 40, 41.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-44. The physicists' arguments against the "Atoms for Peace" plan were incorporated into the formal Soviet rejection of the proposal conveyed by Foreign Minister Molotov to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles later that spring. See Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, chap. 16.
9. [Ed. note: This account of the 1954 tests draws on Jonathan M. Weisgall, *Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 302-307; Herbert F. York, *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 85-86; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 168-82, and Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, Vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 1985), 168-73.]
10. Kurchatov et al., "The Danger of Atomic War...", p. 39.
11. Speech of Comrade G.M. Malenkov, *Pravda*, 13 March 1954.
12. Speech of Comrade A.I. Mikoyan, *Kommunist* (Yerevan), 12 March 1954.
13. *Izvestia*, 27 April 1954.
14. See Andrei Malenkov, *O moiem otse Georgii Malenkov* [About my father, Georgi Malenkov] (Moscow: NTS Teknoekos, 1992), 115-17; Iu. V. Aksiotin and O.V. Volobuev, *XX s'ezd KPSS: novatsii i dogmy* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), 60-61; L.A. Openkin, "Na istoricheskompereput'e," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* 1 (1990), 116; and Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 338-39.
15. Aksiotin and Volobuev, *XX s'ezd KPSS*, 60.
16. Malenkov, *O moiem otse Georgii Malenkov*, 115.
17. Openkin, "Na istoricheskompereput'e," 116.
18. Aksiotin and Volobuev, *XX s'ezd KPSS*, 61.



## 50-MEGATON BLAST

*continued from page 3*

that the bomb design had worked.

Meanwhile, both aircraft and documentary crews observing the test were subjected to a most graphic experience. As one cameraman recalled: "The clouds beneath the aircraft and in the distance were lit up by the powerful flash. The sea of light spread under the hatch and even clouds began to glow and became transparent. At that moment, our aircraft emerged from between two cloud layers and down below in the gap a huge bright orange ball was emerging. The ball was powerful and arrogant like Jupiter. Slowly and silently it crept upwards.... Having broken through the thick layer of clouds it kept growing. It seemed to suck the whole earth into it. The spectacle was fantastic, unreal, supernatural."<sup>3</sup> Another cameraman saw "a powerful white flash over the horizon and after a long period of time he heard a remote, indistinct and heavy blow, as if the earth has been killed!"<sup>4</sup>

Some time after the explosion, photographs were taken of ground zero. "The ground surface of the island has been

the middle of July 1961, we began the development of this device. Some time thereafter, its actual construction and assembly began. Andrei Sakharov called the planned test “the crux of the program.”

The Soviet government made no secret of the planned superblast. On the contrary, it gave the world ample warning about the upcoming event and, in an unprecedented step, made public the power of the bomb under development. This leak corresponded to the goals of the political power game.

By October 24, the final report, including the proposed design of the bomb and the theoretical and design calculations, was com-



“The crisis years” of 1960-1962 are remembered as a peak of the Cold War, an apogee of the bipolar confrontation. Many consider them even more dangerous than the Korean War, when the military forces of West and East clashed and almost slipped into a global conflict. The early 1960s were all the more frightening since the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were engaged in a fierce nuclear arms race, and two more states, Great Britain and France, had developed small nuclear arsenals of their own. By the end of the period the edge in this race clearly belonged to the United States such that, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington had at least nine times as many deliverable nuclear

munist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), whose archives, unlike those of the KGB, have in part at least become accessible to scholars and the public.<sup>4</sup>

For all their fascination, the internal KGB documents cited in this article should also be treated with a good deal of caution. They contain references to events, plans, individuals, and explicit or implicit relationships that are uncorroborated and should be carefully investigated and cross-checked with other evidence before their accuracy and significance can be confidently gauged. Many of the assertions contained in the documents will require, in particular, collation with relevant materials in the archives of other governments and intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, and analysis by specialists in the history of intelligence. Many names in the documents are transliterated from the Russian after being transliterated from other languages, and the spelling may not be accurate. Moreover, in assessing reports by KGB leaders to Khrushchev, readers should recall the tendency of bureaucrats in any government to exaggerate capabilities or accomplishments to a superior, a provoclivity that may be accentuated when, as in this period, there is intense pressure to produce results. Finally, in addition to remembering the lack of systematic access to KGB and CIA archives, those who evaluate the documents that *do* become available must keep in mind that evidence on crucial matters may have been deliberately destroyed, distorted, fabricated, or simply never committed to paper. All of these caveats should simply serve as reminders that however revealing these materials are, much additional research will be needed before a balanced and informed evaluation of the role of intelligence agencies and activities in the Cold War, on all sides, can be attained.

### **The KGB reports to Khrushchev**

On 14 February 1961, Nikita S. Khrushchev received an annual report of the KGB marked “Top Secret—Highly Sensitive.”<sup>5</sup> Only Khrushchev could decide who among the top Soviet leadership might see the report, in which the Collegium of the KGB informed him as the First Secretary of the CC CPSU and as a Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR about the achievements of Soviet foreign intelligence during

1960.

In this period, Khrushchev was told, 375 foreign agents were recruited, and 32 officers of the State Security were transferred abroad and legalized. The stations abroad obtained, among others, position and background papers prepared by Western governments for the summit conference in Paris in May 1960, including materials on the German and Berlin questions, disarmament, and other issues. They also provided the Soviet leadership with “documentary evidence about military-political planning of some Western powers and the NATO alliance as whole; [...] on the plan of deployment of armed forces of these countries through 1960-63; evidence on preparation by the USA of an economic blockade of and military intervention against Cuba”—the last a possible allusion to preparations for the forthcoming April 1961 CIA-supported invasion by anti-Castro Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs.<sup>6</sup>

The sheer numbers conveyed the vast extent of information with which the KGB flooded the tiny group of Soviet leaders. During one year alone it prepared and presented 4,144 reports and 68 weekly and monthly informational bulletins to the Party’s Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers; 4,370 documentary materials

1940s, when the Soviets obtained detailed information on the wartime Anglo-American atomic bomb project, and it continued to be important as Cold War sanctions and barriers cut the Soviets off from Western technologies and industrial machinery.

During 1960, the KGB's scientific-technical intelligence service reported that it stole, bought, and smuggled from the West 8,029 classified technologies, blueprints, and schemas, as well as 1,311 different samples of equipment.<sup>10</sup> A special target in this regard was, of course, the United States. On 7 April 1960, the Central Committee had directed the KGB to prepare a "prospective working plan of the intelligence service of the Committee of State Security at the Council of Ministers against the United States of America."<sup>11</sup> The plan, presented on 10 March 1961, postulated a wide array of measures.<sup>12</sup> Among them were efforts to insinuate agents into U.S. scientific-technical centers, universities, industrial corporations, and other institutions specializing in missile building, electronics, aircraft, and special chemistry. The KGB planned to use "third countries" as a springboard for this penetration campaign. Its agents in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan were to worm their way into scientific, industrial, and military research and consulting institutions of these countries with access to American know-how or subcontracting to U.S. military agencies. Agents residing in England, Austria,

B925mai -i



Molody (Gordon Arnold Lonsdale) were encouraged to engage in lucrative businesses in the West and then funnel the profits into KGB foreign accounts.<sup>20</sup>

A special division of the KGB was busy fabricating disinformation on the production in the United States of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the development of new means of mass destruction. Faked documents, innuendo, and gossip were used to undercut U.S. positions and influence among delegations of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries in the United Nations and “to promote disorganization of the American voting machine in the struc-

with the plane "Lockheed U-2" caused an aggravation of existing tensions between the CIA and other USA intelligence services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and also provoked protests by the American public and certain members of the Congress, who are demanding investigation of the CIA activities.

The Committee of state security considers it advisable to make use of this newly complex situation and to carry out the following measures targeted at further discrediting CIA activity and compromising its leader Allen DULLES:

1. In order to activate a campaign by DULLES' political and personal opponents:

a) to mail to them anonymous letters using the names of CIA officials criticizing its activity and the authoritarian leadership of DULLES;

b) to prepare a dossier which will contain publications from the foreign press and declarations of officials who criticized the CIA and DULLES personally, and to send it, using the name of one of members of the Democratic Party, to the Fulbright Committee [the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations] which is conducting an investigation into CIA activities in relation to the failure of the summit;

c) to send to some members of Congress, to the Fulbright Committee, and to the FBI specially prepared memos from two or three officials of the State Department with attached private letters, received (allegedly) from now deceased American diplomats, which would demonstrate CIA involvement in domestic decision-making, the persecution of foreign diplomats who took an objective stand, and which also would point out that, for narrow bureaucratic purposes, the CIA puts deliberately false data into information for the State Department;

d) to study the possibility and, if the opportunity presents itself, to prepare and disseminate through appropriate channels a document by former USA Secretary of State F. DULLES, which would make it clear that he exploited the resources of A. DULLES as leader of the CIA to fabricate compromising materials on his private and political adversaries;

e) to prepare, publish and disseminate abroad a satirical pamphlet on A. DULLES, using the American writer Albert KAHN who currently stays in Moscow to write the pamphlet.<sup>31</sup>

2. With the aim of further exposing the activities of American intelligence in the eyes of the public and to create preconditions with which the FBI and other USA intelligence services could substantiate their opinion about the CIA's inability to conduct effective intelligence:

a) to fabricate the failure of an American agent "Fyodorov," dropped in the Soviet Union by plane in 1952 and used by organs of the KGB in an operational game with the adversary.

To publish in the Soviet press an announcement about the arrest of "Fyodorov" as an American agent and, if necessary, to arrange a press-

conference about this affair;

b) to agree with Polish friends about the exposure of the operational game led by the organs of the KGB along with the MSS PPR [Ministry of State Security of the Polish People's Republic] with a "conduit" on the payroll of American intelligence of the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN)- "Melnikovists." To this end to bring back to Poland the Polish MSS agent "Boleslav," planted in the course of this game on the OUN "conduit," and to arrange for him to speak to the press and radio about subversive activity by American intelligence

made use of the Iranian newspapers "Fahrman" and "Etelliat," specifically mentioning the names of their agents (Abbas SHAHENDEH, Jalal NEMATOLLAKHI);

d) to publish articles in the foreign press showing the interference of American intelligence in the domestic affairs of other states, using as an example the illegal American police organization in Italy, found and liquidated at the end of 1959, that "worked on" Italian political parties under the direction of one of the diplomats at the American embassy;

e) to prepare and publicize a document by an American intelligence officer in Japan Robert EMMENSE in the form of a report to the USA ambassador [to Japan Douglas] MACARTHUR [II] into which information will be inserted about a decision allegedly taken by American intelligence to relocate "Lockheed U-2" planes temporarily to Japan, and then, in secrecy from the Japanese government, to return them to their old bases.

7. To work out measures which, upon implementation, would demonstrate the failure of the CIA efforts to actively on a concrete factual basis use various émigré centers for subversive work against countries in the socialist camp.

In particular, using the example of the anti-Soviet organization "The Union of the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" (SBONR), to discredit in the eyes of American taxpayers the activities of American intelligence

ments to the CIA (and in February 1964 he, too, would defect). The scale tilted abruptly in the CIA's favor.

### **The Crisis in Berlin...and in the KGB**

The disastrous wave of betrayal and defections in the KGB occurred at a moment of maximum international tension between the Moscow and the West, marked by the Berlin and the Cuban crises. This was not simply a coincidence. In the cases of some double-agents and defectors, among them Penkovsky and Nosenko, psychological and ideological, not material motives, prevailed. As Khrushchev raised the ante, bluffing against Washington, some informed mem-



conviction that the Soviet Union firmly intends to use force in response to military provocations of Western powers and has at its disposal all necessary combat means.” The KGB took upon itself the task “to inform Western intelligence through unofficial channels that the Soviet Union has taken necessary measures to strengthen its troops in the GDR and to arm them with more modern tactical missiles, newer tanks, and other armaments sufficient for the delivery of a quick and crushing response strike on the adversary.”

Through the same channels KGB intended “to increase the adversary’s belief in the high maneuverability and mobility of Soviet armed forces and their readiness, in case the West unleashes an armed conflict in Germany, to move within a minimal time up to the battle lines of the European theater. To convey as a proof thereof that this summer, during the exercises in the Near-Carpathian and other military districts, some divisions demonstrated an average speed of advancement of about 110-130 km per day.”

Along the lines of Shelepin’s proposal, the KGB’s military-industrial consultants suggested other disinformation steps. Perhaps echoing Khrushchev’s boast that his missiles could “hit a fly in the sky,” the Committee proposed to convey to U.S. intelligence the information that during its recent series of atomic tests—in Sept.-Oct. 1961—the Soviet Union successfully “tested a superpowerful thermonuclear warhead, along with a system of detecting and eliminating the adversary’s missiles in the air.”

The KGB laboratories fabricated “evidence” for U.S. intelligence about “the solution in the Soviet Union of the problem of constructing simple but powerful and user-convenient atomic engines for submarines which allow in the short run increasing con-








199/10c, 3 October 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, ll. 23-27.

35. Shelepin to CC CPSU, 25 February 1961, in *ibid.*, ll. 28-29.

36. See memorandum of conversation, "Tripartite Meeting on Berlin and Germany" (D. Rusk, Lord Home, M. Couve de Murville), 5 August 1961, Berlin Crisis collection, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

37. Lt.-Gen. A. Rogov to Marshal Malinovsky, 24 August 1961, TsKhSD, fond 5, opis 30, delo 365, ll.



## New Research on the GDR

by Christian F. Ostermann

The Germans, as the British historian Mary Fulbrook recently pointed out, have “peculiarly vitriolic and problematic ways of ‘reckoning with the past.’”<sup>1</sup> A case in point is the way in which Germans have confronted the archival remnants of the German Democratic Republic. The first four years after the collapse of the GDR witnessed everything from the destruction and confiscation of historical records, including police raids on and calls for the complete closing of the East German communist party (SED) archives, to parliamentary investigating committees, to the establishment of new research institutions, and—more recently—to the opening of almost all records of the former GDR.<sup>2</sup> The following essay covers some of the more recent developments of interest to Cold War historians.<sup>3</sup>

### The Ministry of State Security Records

Politically, the most controversial legacy of the SED regime was the records of the former Ministry for State Security (MfS/

Stasi), many of them saved by citizens' groups from being destroyed by Stasi employees in the GDR's last days. Extremely sensitive for privacy and security reasons, the MfS records were entrusted by the German Unification Treaty of 1990 to the *Sonderbeauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Unterlagen des ehemaligen Staatssicherheitsdienstes* (Special Commissioner of the Federal Government for the Files of the former State Security Service, usually referred to as the “Gauck Agency” after its director, Joachim Gauck).<sup>4</sup>

In December 1991, access to the records was granted on the basis of the “Stasi Records Law” (StUG). The Stasi files are located in the central archives of the former MfS in Berlin and in various regional (district) archives. According to the StUG, the Stasi records, encompassing more than 500,000 feet of documents, are open to all interested researchers. Exemptions exist, however, for documents of supranational organizations and foreign countries and files relating to intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence,

*continued on page 39*

East German Archives and Migration (and Migration) IS (EAST) Berlin and the German Soviet, A German, Russian, S, M, D

Coldo

in

t G

Participants developed by the Potsdam for two

months during the (445-49 Soviet occupation) Tj T\* 01144 Two (German archive; these meetings were held by

## End the Cold War: From East-bloc Archives

### Hershberg

From the Potsdam Conference to the crumbling of the Cold War's symbol, greatest prize, covert battleground, and now, with the "German Democratic Republic" a reality, to explore East Germany's once-secret archives (and thus better understand some of the crucial events of the Cold War).

The Oral History Project (CWIHP) held an international conference on the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from the East, and other scholars working in newly-available archives. The conference, which took place at the University of Essen on June 20-21, 1994, featured papers on the 1948-49 Berlin Blockade, the 1952 Stalin Notes, the 1953 German uprising, and the 1958-62 Berlin Crisis. The conference included days of discussions on the internal history of East Germany (and the GDR period) and on the status of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The conference was organized by the Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien at the University of Essen, created after 1989 to foster scholarship on GDR history, and was supported by generous grants from the Nuclear History Foundation.

As has been the case in CWIHP-sponsored conferences elsewhere, the "new" topics generated lively exchanges that reflected the consequences of communist rule in Germany and its end. There was particularly vigorous debate about the future of Germany.

## LEADERSHIP, 7 APRIL 1952: "FOR YOUR OWN STATE"

One of the central issues in Cold War historiography concerns the famous speech that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave the Western Powers his terms for a settlement. Khrushchev offered German unification and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Western Powers remain neutral. Debate continues on whether Khrushchev's offer was a genuine attempt to reach a general settlement with the West, or a tactical move to gain a strategic advantage.

## The GDR Oral History Project

by A. James McAdams

In November 1994, the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University opens a major new archive, a collection of over 80 oral histories of leading politicians and policymakers from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).<sup>1</sup> The collection has been compiled by the GDR Oral History Project, whose aim was to record on tape some of the still vivid memories of the former leaders of East Germany, so that in 50 or 100 years (the amount of time Socialist Unity Party [SED] general secretary Erich Honecker predicted the Berlin Wall would last) future students of German history would have a unique source for assessing the driving motivations of the individuals who once made up the country's dominant political culture. Of course, no series of interviews alone can realistically relate the entire history of a state. Nevertheless, the researchers felt they could preserve for posterity a segment of that experience by interviewing a select group of individuals who could reasonably be characterized as the East German political elite.

In particular, the Oral History Project chose to interview four types of politically significant individuals. The first group included well-known SED representatives, such as former members of the ruling politburo and central committee, like Kurt Hager, Karl Schirdewan, Günther Kleiber, Herbert Häber, Werner Eberlein, Egon Krenz, and Gerhard Schürer. The second, broader group consisted largely of members of the party and state apparatus representing a sample of policy implementors from diplomats to department heads from key departments of the SED central committee (such as Agitation and Propaganda and International Affairs) and sections of state ministries (such as the foreign ministry department charged with East German-Soviet relations). Our third group of interviewees comprised so-called policymaking intellectuals. This disparate group, with representatives ranging from economist Jürgen Kuczynski to socialist theoretician Otto Reinhold, primarily included individuals who had some tangential

*continued on page 43*

## New Evidence on Khrushchev's 1958 Berlin Ultimatum

Translation and Commentary by Hope M. Harrison

The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1961 has long been seen as "Khrushchev's crisis," but at last there is some documentation indicating that at least the initiation of the crisis really was the Soviet leader's personal handiwork. Remaining in Berlin after the Cold War International History Project's conference on the "Soviet Union, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from Eastern Archives" in Essen and Potsdam, Germany on 28 June-2 July 1994, I was fortunate enough<sup>1</sup> to be one of the first scholars to gain access to the freshly-opened archives of the former East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>2</sup> While working in this archive, I found in the files of State Secretary Otto Winzer a document, translated below, written by the East German ambassador to Moscow, Johannes König, and dated 4 December 1958. In the document, König summarized information he gleaned from various Soviet Foreign Ministry officials about the process leading up to Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's

speech of 10 November 1958 and notes of 27 November 1958, which launched the Berlin Crisis.

In Khrushchev's November 10 speech, at a Soviet-Polish friendship meeting in the Sports Palace in Moscow, he asserted that the Western powers were using West Berlin as an outpost from which to launch aggressive maneuvers against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other countries of the socialist camp, including Poland. The impending atomic armament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), he declared, threatened to further exacerbate this situation. Khrushchev stated that the Western powers had broken all quadripartite agreements concerning Germany, particularly the agreement for the demilitarization of Germany, and that the only part of the Potsdam Agreement the West continued to honor was the part stipulating the four-power occupation of Berlin. This situation, in which the West used West Berlin for aggressive pur-

*continued on page 36*

**KHRUSHCHEV'S ULTIMATUM***continued from page 35*

poses against the East, could not go on any longer, he declared, and the situation in Berlin, "the capital of the GDR," must be normalized.<sup>3</sup>

In lengthy notes to the Western powers on November 27, Khrushchev elaborated on what he had in mind to "normalize" the situation in Berlin. Khrushchev's proposals were seen as an ultimatum in the West, especially because they set a six-month deadline for negotiations. Khrushchev reiterated in stronger and more detailed language what he had said on November 10 and then declared that he viewed the former agreements on Berlin as null and void. He insisted that a peace treaty be signed with Germany and that West Berlin be made into a "free" and demilitarized city. If sufficient progress on these issues had not been achieved among the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France within six months, Moscow would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and transfer to it control over the access routes between West Berlin (which was located 110 miles inside East German territory) and West Germany. Khrushchev stressed that East Germany was a sovereign country which deserved to control its own territory. Preliminary talks had already been held with the East Germans on this issue, and as soon as the free-city of West Berlin was created, the East Germans would be ready to sign an agreement guaranteeing free access into and out of West Berlin, so long as there was no hostile activity emanating from West Berlin eastwards.<sup>4</sup>

The Berlin Crisis, initiated by Khrushchev's ultimatum, continued through the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and perhaps even through the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Khrushchev's motivations for starting the Berlin Crisis undoubtedly included the stabilization and strengthening of the GDR, a slowing or stopping of the process of the nuclearization of the West German Bundeswehr, and a recognition by the Western powers of the Soviet Union as an equal and of the Soviet gains in Eastern Europe during and after World War II as legitimate.<sup>5</sup> Khrushchev's aggressive tactics probably stemmed from a desire to avoid being outnumbered as the one socialist power

[Soviet] Foreign Ministry and had a conversation with Comrade [Ivan I.] Il'ichev, the head of the Third European Department. He also commented, when I turned the conversation to the insufficient coverage of the GDR election campaign [for the 16 November 1958 Volkskammer (parliament) and local government elections] by the Soviet press, that Comrade Khrushchev's speech would contain important statements with regard to the German question. He told me nothing about what it would deal with. It was, however, obvious that the comrades of the Third European Department were informed excellently about the contents of Comrade Khrushchev's speech.

After the speech was held and had called forth the well-known echo in Bonn and the capitals of the three Western powers,<sup>12</sup> the entire Third European Department of the MID was occupied exclusively with preparing the next steps. I think that I am not mistaken in the assumption that ideas about concrete steps developed gradually at first and perhaps were subject to certain changes.

We know from information from comrades of the Third European Department that the entire Department was occupied for days with studying all agreements, arrangements, protocols, etc., which were concluded or made between the occupying powers with regard to West Berlin since 1945 so as to prepare arguments for shattering assertions made by Bonn and the governments of the Western powers and so as to make from these [i.e., old agreements, etc.—H.H.] concrete proposals for the next steps for carrying out the measures announced in Comrade Khrushchev's speech.

The MID was essentially finished with this work on 19 November 1958.<sup>13</sup> According to information from Soviet comrades, the work on the comprehensive document was finished on this day and the document was submitted to the Council of Ministers for ratification. On this occasion, we learned that this document was supposed to comprise about 20 pages and was supposed to be presented to the three Western Powers, the GDR and West Germany soon. Thus, at this time we did not yet learn that there were 3 different documents.<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet comrades who gave us this news for "personal information" emphasized that they probably would not be telling us anything new, since "Berlin is informed and surely the same practice must exist with us as on the Soviet side, namely that the ambassador concerned absolutely must be informed about such issues regularly."

This comment: "You have of course already been informed by Berlin" was made to me a few other times so as to make clear that we should not expect official information on the part of the local [i.e., Moscow] MID.

In the conversation we conducted with the relevant Soviet comrades, it was said that a com-

prehensive argumentation was provided in the planned document for establishing the repeal of the agreements concerning Berlin (of September 1944, May 1945, and the Bolz-Zorin<sup>15</sup> exchange of letters [of September 1955]) and that these functions would be transferred to the competence of the GDR. With this it was already mentioned that it is planned to hold official negotiations with the GDR on this. At the same time a hint was made that the Soviet Union would probably not be averse if it should prove to be expedient and necessary also to speak with the Western powers about this issue.

In the negotiations with the GDR, the issue of the transfer or the taking over of the relevant functions will be discussed. The key question in this is when, i.e., at which point in time and how the whole thing should be carried out. Our leading comrades, with whom consultations have taken place, also expressed the view that in this one must not place too much haste on the day, but must go forward gradually, step by step.<sup>16</sup>

In this conversation the Soviet comrade in question thought [very realistically, as it turned out—H.H.] that the Berlin issue would remain at the center of attention for at least one year if not even longer. On this issue hard conflicts with the Western powers will arise.<sup>17</sup>

To my comment: "The Western powers will not want to conduct a war for the sake of Berlin" followed the answer: "Our Presidium proceeds from the same assumption." My comment that ultimately the issue would come to a crisis for the West as a prestige issue and that therefore in my opinion everything must be done so as to facilitate retreat for the Western powers on this issue was acknowledged as correct.

In this connection it was noted by the Soviet comrade that the issue of great significance is what should happen with West Berlin after an eventual withdrawal of the Western troops. This issue plays a large role in the considerations of the Soviet comrades.

Thus, in this conversation, the issue of the transformation of West Berlin into a free city was not yet dealt with.

It was emphasized that in this connection public opinion is also of great significance. One cannot resolve this issue if one has not prepared the basis for this within the population. A correct argumentation vis-à-vis the population so as to win them over for the planned steps is thus of great importance.

In this connection, it was also mentioned that Comrade Khrushchev personally gave extraordinarily great attention to the preparation of the new steps regarding the Berlin question. He personally participated in the preparation of the documents. He submitted to the comrades of the Third European Department his thoughts on the entire problem on several type-written pages which he had personally dictated and asked the comrades to observe this point of view in the

composition of the documents and the determination of particular measures.

Comrade Khrushchev personally received on 19 November for a discussion several responsible officials of the Third European Department of the MID who were occupied with the Berlin issue and spoke with them in great detail about the entire problem.

The first mention that the Soviet proposals would include the demilitarization and neutralization of West Berlin was made to me by Comrade Il'ichev on 22 November when I sought him out on another matter. He again emphasized that he wanted to give me "exclusively for my personal information" several hints about the contents of the planned documents. In this connection he mentioned that it was planned to propose giving West Berlin the status of a free city.

Comrade Il'ichev emphasized on this occasion that the Soviet side was ready to negotiate with the three Western powers on the Berlin question, but only on the basis of the enforcement of the Potsdam Agreement in West Germany, [including] for example, demilitarization, denazification, decartellization, repeal of the prohibition of the KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands], etc.

Concerning further actions regarding Berlin, Comrade Il'ichev also emphasized that these would proceed step by step.

To my question as to whether the planned documents would be given to all nations which took place in the war against Germany, Comrade Il'ichev answered that they would be given only to the three Western powers as well as to Berlin and Bonn. To my question as to whether the delivery would occur in Moscow or Berlin and Bonn, Comrade Il'ichev answered, "probably in Berlin."

After the delivery of the documents, they will wait 2-3 weeks so as to digest the reaction of the other side and then take a new step.<sup>18</sup>

Regarding the negotiations with the GDR or the transfer to the GDR of the functions which are still being exercised by the Soviet side, this will also probably proceed gradually.

I asked Comrade Il'ichev again about the contents of the talks between [Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Andrei] Smirnov and [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer. Comrade Il'ichev confirmed that Smirnov had sought this talk. He once again merely explained the point of view which was expressed in Comrade Khrushchev's speech of 10 November 1958. Regarding this, Adenauer responded that he could not understand Soviet foreign policy. Precisely now when the first signs of a détente were noticeable at the Geneva negotiations,<sup>19</sup> the Soviet government would create new tension with its statement concerning Berlin.

An explanation of why Smirnov conducted this conversation at all in view of the fact that the Soviet government stands by the point of view





1992.<sup>7</sup> The committee, headed by Rainer Eppelmann of the ruling Christian Democratic Party (CDU), consisted of parliament members and historians (among them Bernd Faulenbach, Alexander Fischer, Karl Wilhelm Fricke, Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Hermann Weber, and Manfred Wilke). According to a motion passed by the Bundestag on 20 May 1992, the committee was to “make contributions to the political-historical analysis and political-moral evaluation” of the SED-dictatorship.<sup>8</sup>

This was to include, in particular: (1) the structures, strategies, and instruments of the SED-dictatorship (e.g., the relationship of SED and state, the structure of the state security organs, the role of the “bourgeois bloc parties,” and the militarization of East German society); (2) the significance of ideology and integrating factors such as Marxism-Leninism and anti-fascism (as well as the role of education, literature, and the arts); (3) human rights violations, acts and mechanisms of repression, and the possibility for further restitution of victims; (4) the variety and potential of resistance and opposition movements; (5) the role of the churches; (6) the impact of the international G

Similarly, the role of the former “bourgeois” political parties in the GDR, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), proved to be highly controversial. The report contains excellent sections on the East German resistance movement, the MfS, and the early history of the GDR. In its final section, the report gives a brief survey of the Germany-related holdings of various Russian archives as well as criteria for the use of the SED and MfS records.

Of the 148 expert studies to be published along with the hearings in 1995, the most interesting for Cold War historians include the following (only short title given): War Damages and Reparations (L. Baar/W. Matschke); Deutschlandpolitik of the SPD/FDP Coalition 1969-1982 (W. Bleek); State and Party Rule in the GDR (G. Brunner); War Damage and Reparations (Ch. Buchheim); Political Upheaval in Eastern Europe and Its Significance for the Opposition Movement in the GDR (G. Dalos); On the Use of the MfS Records (R. Engelmann); “Special Camps” of the Soviet Occupation Power, 1945-1950 (G. Finn); The Wall Syndrome—Impact of the Wall on the GDR Population (H.-J. Fischbeck); Germany as an Object of Allied Policy, 1941-1949 (A. Fischer/M. Rissmann); Reports of the Soviet High Commission in Germany 1953/1954: Documents from the Archives for Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (J. Foitzik); German Question and the Germans: Attitudes Among East German Youth (P. Förster); International Framework of Deutschlandpolitik, 1949-1955 (H. Graml); Deutschlandpolitik of the SPD/FDP Coalition, 1969-1982 (J. Hacker); Case Study: 9 November 1989 (H.-H. Hertle); The Self-Representation of the GDR in International Human Rights Organizations (K. Ipsen); Deutschlandpolitik of the CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition, 1982-1989 (W. Jäger); Deutschlandpolitik of the Adenauer Governments (C. Kleßmann); Opposition in the GDR, From the Honecker Era to the Polish Revolution 1980/81 (C. Kleßmann); West German Political Parties and the GDR Opposition (W. Knabe); Patriotism and National Identity among East Germans (A. Köhler); NVA [the East German New People’s Army], 1956-1990 (P.J. Lapp); Deutschland-politik of the Erhard Government and the Great Coalition (W. Link); International Conditions of Deutschland-politik, 1961-1989 (W.

Loth); The Berlin Problem—the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961/62 (D. Mahncke); Cooperation between MfS and KGB (B. Marquardt); Political Upheaval in Eastern Europe and Its Significance for the Opposition Movement in the GDR (L. Mehlhorn); Alternative Culture and State Security, 1976-1989 (K. Michael); Deutschlandpolitik of the Adenauer Governments (R. Morsey); Western Policy of the SED (H.-P. Müller); The Role of the Bloc Parties (Ch. Nehrig); Opposition Within the SED (W. Otto); Establishment of the GDR as a “Core Area of Germany” and the All-German Claims of KPD and SED (M. Overesch); Role and Significance of the Bloc Parties (G. Papcke); the “National” Policy of the KPD/SED (W. Pfeiler); Deutschlandpolitik of the CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition, 1982-1989 (H. Potthoff); Transformation of the Party System 1945-1950 (M. Richter); Role and Significance of the Bloc Parties (M. Richter); Deutschlandpolitik of the SED (K.H. Schmidt); The Integration of the GDR into COMECON (A. Schüler); Influence of the SED on West German Political Parties (J. Stadt); Opposition within the LDPD (S. Suckut); Operation “Recovery”: The Crushing of the Prague Spring as Reflected in the MfS Records (M. Tantscher); The Round Table and the Deposing of the SED: Impediments on the Way to Free Elections (U. Thaysen); On the Function of Marxism-Leninism (H. Weber/L. Lange); The German Question: Continuity and Changes in West German Public Opinion, 1945/49-1990 (W. Weidenfeld). While the expert studies are officially not yet available, transcripts of the hearings can be obtained from the Bundestag.<sup>13</sup>

#### **Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv**

Next to the Stasi files, the records of the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED), comprising over 26,000 ft. of documents, as well as the records of former Communist front organizations such as the Free German Youth (FDJ), the Democratic Women’s League (DFB), the Cultural League, the National Democratic Party (NDPD), the Foundation for Soviet-German Friendship, and the Free German Union Federation (FDGB), constitute the most important sources for the history of the GDR.



These records are now in the custody of an independent foundation within the Federal Archives system, the *Stiftung* “Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen [SAPMO] der DDR im Bundesarchiv,” created in April 1992 and fully established in January 1993 according to an amendment to the Federal Archives Law.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, in contrast, to the 1991-1992 period—when the SED records were by and large still in the hands of the successor organization to the SED empire, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), and located in the Central Party Archives in the former “Institute for Marxism-Leninism” (IML)—full access to the SED papers has now been assured with the establishment of the foundation and its integration into the Federal Archives. Even the internal archive of the SED politburo is now accessible to researchers. There are few restrictions on the use of

tory of the GDR in Western Germany, organized an international symposium in February 1992 on "White Spots in the History of the World Communism: Stalinist Purges and Terror in the European Communist Parties since the 1930s."<sup>23</sup> In 1993, the Mannheim Center edited a systematic listing of current research projects pertaining to GDR history. Published by the Deutscher Bundestag as "Forschungsprojekte zur DDR-Geschichte" in 1994, it lists 759 such projects, 51 of which fall into the categories "The German Question," GDR foreign relations, and GDR military history.<sup>24</sup> Researchers interested in registering their project should contact the Mannheim Center. The Center's main current project is a six-volume history of the GDR, 1945-1990, based on the new sources. In 1993, the institute started publishing "Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismus-forschung" [Yearbook for Historical Research on Communism] and is continuing a document collection on "Opposition and Resistance in the GDR." Other projects include a history of the FDJ, 1945-1965 (U. Maehlert); a history of the Deutschlandpolitik of the bloc parties; and a study of the role of anti-fascism in the early years of the GDR.<sup>25</sup>

Another organization on the GDR research scene is the **Forschungsverbund SED-Staat**<sup>26</sup> at the Free University of Berlin, a research association established in 1992 under the energetic guidance of Manfred Wilke and Klaus Schroeder. The Forschungsverbund was a deliberate effort to break with the prevailing tradition of Western research on the GDR, a tradition which had come to de-emphasize the fundamental difference in political values in favor of a reductionist understanding of the East-West German rivalry as the competition of two models of modern industrial society both determined by technological processes. In contrast, the Forschungsverbund concentrates its research on the SED's totalitarian rule. Current projects deal with the establishment of the SED (M. Wilke); the relationship of the SED and MfS (M. Görtemaker); the central SED apparatus and the establishment and stabilization of the GDR dictatorship (K. Schroeder, M. Wilke); the SED's relationship with the churches (M. Wilke); Communist science policy in Berlin after 1945 (B. Rabehl, J. Staadt); the SED and August 21, 1968 (M. Wilke); the Deutschlandpolitik of the SED

(K. Schroeder, M. Wilke); opposition within the GDR since the 1980s (K. Schroeder); and a number of aspects of GDR industrial development. Most recently, the Forschungsverbund published a documentary collection on the plans of the Moscow-based KPD leadership<sup>27</sup> and a collection of essays on "The History and Transformation of the SED State."<sup>28</sup> The association is preparing major editions of the SED's role in the 1968 Czech Crisis as well as in 1980-81 Polish Crisis and on the "crisis summits" of the Warsaw Pact. At the **Federal Institute for Russian, East European and International Studies** (BIOst) in Cologne, a federally-funded research institute, F. Oldenburg is engaged in a larger study on Soviet-GDR relations in the 1980s, and G. Wettig is researching Soviet policy in Germany in the late 1940s and early 1950s as well as the Soviet role during the collapse of the GDR.<sup>29</sup> The **Archiv des deutschen Liberalismus** of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Gummersbach has completed a research project on the history of the LDPD 1945-1952, and in December 1993 hosted a colloquium on "Bourgeois Parties in the GDR, 1945-1953." Apart from the records of the (West) German Free Democratic Party (FDP), the archives now houses the records of the former LDPD, accessible for the years 1945-1990. The institute grants dissertation fellowships.<sup>30</sup>

1. Mary Fulbrook, "New *Historikerstreit*, Missed Opportunity or New Beginning," *German History* 12:2 (1994), 203.

2. Hope M. Harrison, "Inside the SED Archives: A Researcher's Diary," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 20-21, 28-32.

3. For the development prior to 1993 see Axel Frohn, "Archives in the New German Länder," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 20-21, 25-27, and Notes by Stephen Connors, *ibid.*, 27.

4. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, "Zur Nutzung und Auswertung

## GDR ORAL HISTORY

*continued from page 35*

relationship to policymaking; we particularly emphasized former members of SED policy institutes, such as the Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of Politics and Economics. Finally, as the Oral History Project grew, we decided to develop a fourth group of interviewees in order to cast light upon the transition from the GDR to unified Germany. This category was drawn from former dissidents who became politicians, including such wide-ranging personalities as Markus Meckel, Lothar de Maiziere, Jens Reich, and Wolfgang Ullmann.

From the outset, the project's organizers were confronted with a question that all oral historians face: how to find an appropriate balance between the competing norms of "richness" and "rigor." Rigor involves the kind of rigidly-structured interviews that lend themselves to social scientific generalization and even quantification; richness, in contrast, favors the unique political and personal story of each individual to be interviewed. On the side of rigor, we provided all of our interviewees with a concrete set of core questions to guarantee that the interviews would not be entirely random. Nearly all those interviewed were asked previously formulated questions about their family background and social class, particu

qual andwch Honli0.094 Tusly

spect foro their famil0.0oconfronies, and eacparticussoand Wolfgangforo ts in ohhDR. Nwies (with richdportckel class, mo6 (Sev06)

continu7\* 0.siTroubtedly0 were

their own conclusions about the honesty and sincerity of each interview. Occasionally, we detected moments of outright dishonesty. Sometimes our interviewees simply refused to talk about embarrassing moments in their lives (e.g., association with the Stasi). There was also a recurring tendency for younger individuals, or those lowest on the old hierarchy, to portray themselves as something they were not before 1989—such as closet reformists or enthusiastic Gorbachev supporters. There were also frequent lapses of memory; some older interviewees remembered the "anti-fascist struggles" of the late 1920s with absolute clarity, but could not recall the 1950s at all.

These sorts of problems afflict all oral histories. Yet, there were many moments when we could not help but be struck by the candor of our interviewees. Many showed a surprising readiness to talk about issues that we expected to be embarrassing to them. The best example of this was the Berlin Wall, which they nearly always defended in animated terms. From the first days of the interview project, there was also a telling recognition among the leading representatives of the SED elite that they had lost the battle with the West and that they were beginning to accept this reality. Thus, there was none of the crazed rambling and denial that one found in previously published interviews (with richdportckel class, mo6 (Sev06)). Among several interviewees, there was even a notable respect for their former opponents, such as the East German dissident Bärbel Bohley, and the late West German Green Petra Kelly. Undoubtedly, there were many points where one wanted more self-criticism from our discussion partners. Yet, some of our interviewees wondered whether this same quality would have been available from comparable politicians in the West. As one eastern German interviewer reflected: "Any political elite has to confront issues involving moral integrity in the daily course of its activities, and each individual must make his peace with truth as he can."

Our second preconception was that we could use such interviews to uncover new facts about the GDR. No doubt, anyone listening to the hundreds of hours of tapes in this collection will encounter a number of interesting facts about distinct events in the East German past (for example, about the mysterious death of planning minister Erich Apel in 1965, about the lack of East German



sembled. Nor do we know of any similar efforts to capture the memories of comparable political elites in other East European states, although the Hoover Institution is now beginning a similar interview project on the old Soviet elite. Therefore, we hope that the Oral History Project will inspire researchers seeking to lay the foundations for future scholarship on countries as diverse as Poland, Romania, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia.

Once the GDR Oral History Project is formally opened in November 1994, all interviews in the collection will be equally accessible to interested scholars, provided that interviewees have not previously requested copyright restrictions on the use of the material. For further information on the collection, contact:

Dr. Elena Danielson  
Hoover Institution for War, Revolution,  
and Peace  
Stanford University  
Stanford, CA 94305-6010  
Phone: 415-723-3428; Fax: 415-723-1687  
E-mail: Danielson@Hoover.Stanford.edu

Prof. A. James McAdams  
Helen Kellogg Institute for International  
Studies  
University of Notre Dame  
Notre Dame, IN 46556  
Phone: 219-631-7119; Fax: 219-631-6717  
E-mail: A.J.McAdams.5@ND.edu

1. The GDR Oral History Project was initiated in 1990 by Professor A. James McAdams of the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. It was made possible largely through the financial assistance of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Other supporters included the Center for German Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the John Foster Dulles Program in Leadership Studies at Princeton University. The Hoover Institution is currently supporting the transcription of all of the interviews in the collection. The GDR Oral History Project would not have been possible without the generous assistance of a number of experts on the history of the GDR. Aside from A. James McAdams, interviewers for the project included Thomas Banchoff, Heinrich Bortfeldt, Catherine Epstein, Dan Hamilton, Gerd Kaiser, Jeffrey Kopstein, Olga Sandler, Matthew Siena, John Torpey, and Klaus Zechmeister. Elena Danielson of the Hoover Archives played a central role in the project, cataloguing all of the interviews and arranging for their transcription.

*A. James McAdams is Associate Professor of Government and International Relations at the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame and the author of Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton University Press, 1993).*

## SOVIET OCCUPATION

*continued from page 34*

viet zone, but have been unable to document how and why these events occurred.

The career of Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) S. I. Tiul'panov is central to any analysis of Soviet decisionmaking in the eastern zone. Tiul'panov was in charge of the Propaganda (later Information) Administration of SVAG, and he dominated the political life of the Soviet zone as no other Russian (or for that matter East German) figure. One can argue about the extent of his power and the reasons why he was able to exert so much influence on the course of events. But there can be little question that his machinations can be detected behind virtually every major political development in the zone. A clear understanding of Tiul'panov's responsibilities and activities would go a long way towards elucidating the dynamics of Soviet influence in Germany in the early postwar years.

The partial opening of the Russian archives over the past three years has made possible a much more reliable rendition of Tiul'panov's work in the eastern zone. In particular, the former Central Party archives in Moscow, now called the Russian Storage Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents (RTsKhIDNI), which contain the records of the CPSU Central Committee through 1952, contain important communications between Tiul'panov and his Central Committee bosses. We learn from these communications that Tiul'panov was under constant investigation by his superiors in Moscow and that his goals and methods of work were repeatedly questioned by party officials. His reports and those of his superiors make it possible to tear down the monolithic facade presented to the outside world (and to the Germans) by Soviet Military Headquarters in Karlshorst. Historians have known that Tiul'panov fell into disfavor in the late summer of 1949 and that he was removed from his position shortly before the creation of the GDR in October. But they have been able only to speculate about the reasons why this happened. With the opening of the Central Committee archives and the willingness of the Tiul'panov family to turn over documents related to S. I. Tiul'panov's career to Russian historians, the puzzle associated with Tiul'panov's removal can also be solved.

The following excerpts have been trans-

lated from a recent collection of documents on Tiul'panov and SVAG, published in Moscow and edited by Bernd Bonwetsch, Gennadii Bordiugov and Norman Naimark: *SVAG: Upravlenie propagandy (informatsii) i S. I. Tiul'panov 1945-1949: Sbornik dokumentov* [SVAG: The Propaganda (Information) Administration and S. I. Tiul'panov 1945-1949: A Document Collection] (Moscow: "Rossiia Molodaia," 1994), 255 pp. The collection comprises primarily materials from RTsKhIDNI, *fond 17, opis' 128*, but also contains several documents from other *opisy* and from the Tiul'panov family archive. The translated excerpts from the first document printed below provide a glimpse into Tiul'panov's understanding of his political tasks in the fall of 1946. Here, Tiul'panov provides a frank assessment of the parties and personalities important to furthering the Soviet cause in Germany. The second document is a translation of the 17 September 1949 report recommending his removal and detailing the trumped-up charges against him. As best we know, Tiul'panov was recalled from Berlin to Moscow at the end of September, shortly before the GDR's official creation.

I would like to thank Andrei Ustinov for his help with the translation from the Russian. As a rambling stenographic report, the translation of the first document required considerable editing.

**Document I: From S. Tiul'panov's Report at the Meeting of the Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to Evaluate the Activities of the Propaganda Administration of SVAG — Stenographic Report, September 16, 1946**

... What is the situation in the party itself today?

— I believe that in no way should even the SED's victory in the district elections be overestimated. There are a number of obvious major shortcomings that threaten the worker, Marxist, and pro-Soviet nature of the SED, which it strived to attain at the outset and remain important in its work [today].

Most importantly, since the unification [of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in the SED in April 1946] there has been a noticeable decline in party work within the SED itself. There is a marked political passivity among the former members of the SPD, which will long be felt among members of the SED. The Social Democrats still feel frustrated by the attitudes of our apparatus; the commandants have treated them

ism among some former Communists. This sectarianism is expressed in conversations, which are held in private apartments and sometimes during the course of [party] meetings. [They say] that we [Communists] have forfeited our revolutionary positions, that we alone would have succeeded much better had there been no SED, and that the Social Democrats are not to be trusted. Here is an example for you: once one of my instructors came and said: "I am a Communist, so it's not even worth talking to him [a Social Democrat], you can tell him by sight." These are the words of the Secretary of the most powerful organization [in Berlin] and this kind of attitude is cultivated by [Hermann] Matern. This is not to mention [Waldemar] Schmidt, who has gone so far as to invent the existence of a spy apparatus among Communists [allegedly] to inform on Social Democrats [in the SED]. This is over now, but serious problems remain.

At the moment, it is hard to evaluate the strength of sectarianism among the [former] Communists, but one could estimate that in the Berlin organization approximately 10 percent [of the members] are so discontented that they are ready to join another group in order to break off with the SED. The problem is less serious in other regions. From the point of view of the Communists [in the SED] the party is considered to be more solid [than among former Social Democrats]. But there is the danger that these Social Democrats hold key positions, and their group has much more power. It is impossible to evaluate the phenomenon of sectarianism in a simple manner, because, at the same time, the right wing [the Social Democrats] dreams of the day when it will be able to drop out of the SED. [They] have established contacts with the Zehlendorf [SPD] organization (we even have names) and with the [Western] Allies.

Nothing is simple. The same [Otto] Buchwitz, who completely supported the unification, supervised the process in Saxony, and had

6 Tw (munists, but as Tw sev7 TDrad smocra Tw2-privsns, wh craz,







## CWIHP CONFERENCE

*continued from page 35*

significance of Soviet overtures toward the West to resolve the German Question both before and after Stalin's death in 1953. Some scholars (such as Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth of Essen University) contended that new evidence from the GDR archives, such as the notes of SED leader Wilhelm Pieck, suggest that Moscow's proposals constituted a serious opportunity to unify Germany on acceptable terms—and, by implication, to end the division of Europe and the Cold War itself—but others argued that recent disclosures from Soviet archives confirmed the opposite, that they were advanced as a propaganda tactic to undermine the Western Alliance's plans to arm West Germany.

At Potsdam, U.S. and German scholars addressed topics that were virtually taboo during the GDR era, such as the regime's attitudes toward Jews and the legacies of the Nazi era, and the misdeeds of Soviet occupying forces, including widespread instances of rape. In addition, representatives of various German archives containing GDR materials discussed the status of their holdings. The conference program follows:

**“The Soviet Union, Germany, and the Cold War (significance itself—but others argued that they were, virtually taboo during the GDR era, such as the regime's attitudes toward Jews and the legacies of the Nazi era, and the misdeeds of Soviet occupying forces, including widespread instances of rape. In addition, representatives of various German archives containing GDR materials discussed the status of their holdings. The conference program follows:”**

**“Archival and Recent Research on the Early History of the Soviet Occupied Zone and the German Democratic Republic,” 1-2 July 1994, Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien (FSP), Potsdam**

Panel 1: Details of the Internal Development of the Soviet Occupied Zone in East Germany. (Chair: Jurgen Kocka, Director, FSP); Papers: David Pike (U. of North Carolina/Chapel Hill), “The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied and Early East Germany, 1945-1954”; N. Naimark (Stanford U.), “‘About the Russians and about Us’: Russian-German relations in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949” ; Ian Lipinsky (Bonn U.), “Soviet Special Camps in Germany, 1945-49: a Model for Allied Internment Practice or for the Soviet Gulag System?”; Jurgen Danyel (FSP), “The Soviet Occupied Zone's Connection with the Nazi Past—Decreed anti-Fascism as the Basis of Legitimacy for the German Democratic Republic's Founding Generation”; Peter Walther (FSP), “The German Academy of Sciences in Berlin as the Collective Scholarly Society and National Research Organization of the Soviet Occupied Zone in the German Democratic Republic, 1946-1955”

Panel 2: “The Archives and Research on the History of the Soviet Occupied Zone and the Early German Democratic Republic. Chair: Prof. Kahlenberg, President of the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz; Papers: Hermann Schreyer, Bundesarchiv, Abt.ig, Potsdam: Zentrale Überlieferungen der Staatlichen Überlieferungen der Länder unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Landes Brandenburg; Renate Schwarzel, Berlin: Überlieferungen der Betriebsarchive (angefragt); Sigrun Muhl-Benninghaus, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin: Zentrale Überlieferungen der Parteien und Massenorganisationen; Hartmund Sander, Evangelische Zentralarchiv, Berlin: Kirchliche Quellenerlieferungen am Beispiel der Evangelischen Kirche; Jochen Hecht (Referatsleiter AR 1, Abt. Archivbestände beim Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR): “Die archivalische Hinterlassenschaft des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR, Sicherung, Erschließung, Nutzbarmachung”

Panel 3: The Cold War and the Development of the Early GDR. Chair: J. Hershberg (CWIHP); Papers: Jeffrey Herf (Seminar für wissenschaftliche Politik, Freiburg U., and Inst. for Advanced Study, Princeton), “East German Communists and the Jewish Question: The Case of Paul Merker”; Mario Kessler (FSP), “Responsibility for Guilt and Restitution. The SED Policy and the Jews in the Soviet Occupation Zone, 1945-1949”; Catherine Epstein (Ctr. for European Studies, Harvard U.), “‘Esteemed

*continued on page 85*