

## ATOMIC ESPIONAGE AND ITS SOVIET “WITNESSES”

by Vladislav Zubok

No trial jury should render a guilty verdict without solid evidence, and neither should scholars. Therefore historians and scientists reacted with deep skepticism when in his recently-published memoir, *Special Tasks*, Pavel Sudoplatov, a notorious operative of Stalin’s secret service, asserted that the KGB received secret atomic information from several eminent scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr.<sup>1</sup> Sudoplatov’s claim that Bohr had knowingly given sensitive atomic data to a Soviet intelligence operative in November 1945, thereby helping the USSR to start its first controlled nuclear chain reaction for the production of weapons-grade plutonium,<sup>2</sup> generated particular surprise and disbelief given the renowned Danish physicist’s towering reputation for integrity and loyalty in the scientific world.

Only two months after Sudoplatov’s “revelations,” however, an important piece of contemporary evidence surfaced. Sudoplatov’s original 1945 memorandum to Stalin via Lavrenty Beria, retrieved from “Stalin’s File” (*papka Stalina*) in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF)<sup>3</sup>, refutes the allegation that Bohr improperly helped the Soviet atomic program and clandestinely passed secret Manhattan Project data to Beria’s messengers. Notwithstanding journalistic claims to the contrary,<sup>4</sup> Sudoplatov’s contention that the approach to Bohr was “essential to starting the Soviet reactor” has proved to be a mere fantasy.

The cloud over Bohr should have been dispelled, but a larger question remains unanswered: how should one judge the claims of a group of “witnesses” from the Soviet secret police, intelligence, and elsewhere who have recently commented on Soviet espionage activities in 1941-1949 and their significance for Moscow’s atomic program? The situation evokes an old Russian proverb: “Lying like an eyewitness.” Indeed, the claims of these “witnesses” are suspect for a number of reasons, including the possibility of hidden agendas, personal biases, and the corrosive effect of time on human memories even when there is no deliberate intention to distort them, a danger that is particularly acute when people attempt to recall events concerning a subject beyond their expertise and comprehension.

That seems to be the major problem of most KGB commentators on atomic espionage, especially since only a tiny group of intelligence officers at various stages controlled the Kremlin’s atomic “networks” in the United States (Gaik Ovakimian, Leonid Kvasnikov, Anatoli Yatskov, Semen Semyonov) and in Great Britain (Vladimir Barkovsky, Alexander Feklisov). And even they, at the time of their operational work, were nothing more than conveyor belts of technical data between foreign sources and Soviet scientists.

The scientific head of the Soviet atomic program, Igor Kurchatov, sometimes with the help of his closest colleagues, formulated requests for technical information. Only he, and after August 1945 other members of the Scientific-Technical Council of the Soviet atomic



## ZUBOK

*continued from page 50*

and even tensions between the intelligence community and the community of atomic scientists in the former Soviet Union.

For much of the Cold War, the Soviet intelligence elite believed firmly that its activities contributed to the prevention of war and to a stable peace in the dangerous nuclear era. The "old-boys club" of the KGB's First Directorate viewed its role in the breaking of the U.S. atomic monopoly with increasing pride, and the appearance of (mostly Western) books on the Cold War which described Western plans for "atomic warfare" against the USSR augmented this feeling and deepened the desire for further successes.<sup>8</sup>

In time, those perceptions and dimming recollections blurred together into "memories." Feklisov's book, for instance, is the first in a series of publications, linked with the Association of Russian Intelligence Veterans, ostensibly intended to promote a serious, unsensational view of the history of Soviet intelligence. The book takes into account some published documents as well as the criticism of the earlier journalistic publications on this subject by Yuli Khariton and other nuclear veterans. Nevertheless, it adds to the list of errors and oddities. Feklisov asserts that the Smyth Report (August 1945) contained "disinformation, in order to lead astray scientists from other countries and, first and foremost, the USSR" in their atomic research.<sup>9</sup> He also alleges that Robert Oppenheimer, director of the secret wartime weapons lab at Los Alamos, "asked to include" Fuchs in the British scientific mission that came to the United States to participate in the Manhattan Project. Oppenheimer, according to Feklisov, also "refused to sign" the Smyth Report because it was "one-sided and deluding."<sup>10</sup> None of these "facts" survive serious scrutiny, but they provide telling indicators of the Soviet intelligence community's perceptions of the motivation of the U.S. government and foreign atomic scientists.

In another episode described in the book, Fuchs allegedly told Feklisov during their secret meeting in February 1949: "The team of Kurchatov is advancing full speed to the goal. . . . From your questions it is absolutely clear that soon the whole world will hear a voice of the Soviet 'baby.'" It is indeed possible that Feklisov learned about the

impending Soviet test from his "source." But it is highly improbable that Feklisov would reveal to Fuchs the name of the head of the Soviet "team."

On the same page Fuchs "tells" Feklisov: "I am sure that the Soviet comrades, of course, will be able to build an atomic bomb without foreign assistance. But...I want the Soviet government to save material resources and reduce the time of construction of nuclear weapons."<sup>11</sup>

The thesis that intelligence gave the Soviet project a "short cut" on its road to the bomb is the strongest argument of "atomic" intelligence veterans. Yet, even this assertion is questioned by the scientific director of Arzamas-16 (the long-secret Soviet nuclear weapons design laboratory), Yuli Khariton, who points out that in spite of a good haul of atomic secrets in 1945, the obtained materials "still required an enormous amount of work on a great scale by our physicists before they could be 'put to use.'"<sup>12</sup> And Stalin himself, when he met Kurchatov on 25 January 1946, told the physicist not to spare resources, but to conduct "works broadly, on the Russian scale."<sup>13</sup>

At least one of Feklisov's "memories" (that Oppenheimer was instrumental in bringing Fuchs to Los Alamos) was "shared" by Pavel Sudoplatov.<sup>14</sup> Yet, it is important to distinguish between *Special Tasks* and the memoirs of "atomic" intelligence officers like Feklisov. Sudoplatov's "oral history," when it strays beyond the limits of his expertise or immediate experience, hangs on the thread of half-forgotten, half-distorted hearsay. Time pressure on the authors (who squeezed out the book between August 1992 and late 1993),<sup>15</sup> plus their extraordinary secretiveness, evidently precluded serious fact-checking. And Sudoplatov's experience with the atomic intelligence was far more shallow than the publicity surrounding the book implied. He headed Department "S," an intelligence arm of the Special Committee, the board in charge of the atomic project, for only a year, from September 1945 to October 1946, and it is even questionable whether he had access to operational files.<sup>16</sup>

Sudoplatov implies that he had developed good relations with atomic scientists (among them Kurchatov, Kikoin, and Alikhanov) by treating them to "lunches and cocktail parties in a Western style."<sup>17</sup> Indeed, he may have been trying to dispel fear


that the scientists, justifiably, felt towards the henchmen under the Stalin-Beria-Merkulov command, who suddenly became their collaborators and supervisors.

After a brief stint in Department "S," Sudoplatov plunged back into a familiar world of sabotage, disinformation games, and assassinations-on-request. In a word, he continued to link his career to a repressive, murderous arm of the NKVD-KGB.<sup>18</sup> The arrogance, cynicism, and mistrust of intellectuals of many people from this branch contrasted with the cultural sophistication found among most officers from the technical-scientific intelligence service. The eminent Soviet physicist Pyotr Kapitsgence o.-Nial T

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espionage, Sergo Beria stepped into this mine-field in an ill-conceived attempt to rehabilitate his father, with the confidence of a desperado who has nothing to lose.

Hence his laughable allegation that Robert Oppenheimer lived “at the end of 1939” at Beria’s 2y,ha near Moscow



**SMIRNOV**

*continued from page 51*

Committee on Problem Number One because of his conflict with Beria, Voznesensky, and Kurchatov. Since Bohr had turned down Kapitsa's invi-

Terletsky was still waiting for his meeting with Bohr, it had already been prepared for publication. Therefore, Terletsky's assertion, having on November 16 received from Bohr a copy of the "Smyth Report," that "we were, excuse me, the first Soviet people who had seen it,"<sup>12</sup> turns out to be untrue. As Bohr's biographers have pointed out, when he returned to Denmark from the USA in late August 1945, he brought a copy of the Smyth Report with him.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, Bohr acquainted colleagues at his institute with it, and the Association of Engineers of Denmark even persuaded him to give a lecture on the topic. And though he asked journalists to refrain from exaggerations, the extraordinary information which had become generally available produced such a strong impression that one Copenhagen newspaper reported the lecture under the headline: "Professor Bohr reveals the secret of the atomic bomb."<sup>14</sup> The lecture which provoked so much fuss took place on 3 October 1945, over a month before Bohr's meetings with Terletsky.<sup>15</sup>

Now Beria's report to Stalin about the meeting with Bohr has been declassified, and anyone can see, by comparing it with the Smyth Report, that Bohr's answers, as well as the questions put to him (which is especially noteworthy and surprising!), practically do not exceed the parameters of generally accessible information. I used the word "practically" because, being a theoretical physicist, Bohr in two or three cases permitted himself some short general theoretical remarks, which even so did not convey any

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think that Bohr, knowing about the concern over his activities in powerful quarters, could allow himself even the tiniest carelessness when he met Terletsky and his companions. Now the following information emerges, according to recent reports in Danish newspapers.<sup>22</sup> The middle man in the organization of Bohr's meeting with the Soviet agents who were visiting Copenhagen was not, as is asserted in the Sudoplatov book,<sup>23</sup> the Danish writer Martin Andersen Nekse; rather it was a professor at Copenhagen University, Mogens Fog, a former minister of the government and reportedly a secret member of the Danish Communist Party, who viewed the Soviet Union sympathetically. In early November 1945, Fog asked Bohr whether he could meet confidentially with a Soviet physicist who had come to Copenhagen with a letter from Kapitsa. Bohr replied that any sort of secret meeting was out of the question, and agreed only to a completely open conversation. Niels Bohr's son, Aage Bohr, writing in the Danish press, related other details, noting that Bohr had immediately alerted not only the Danish intelligence service to the approaching meeting, but also British and even U.S. intelligence. According to Aage Bohr, he had participated in all of his father's meetings with Terletsky and, though neither of them took any notes in either meeting, "father ascribed great significance to the fact that another person was present and later could explain what had actually happened. Moreover, in January 1946 the leader of the American atomic project, General L. R. Groves, had sent a special agent to Denmark in order to clarify the details, and Niels Bohr had said that Terletsky had requested information about nuclear weapons."<sup>24</sup>

But there was one more reason for Bohr to understand the situation. He could hardly have refused to meet any of the Soviet physicists if they happened to be in Copenhagen, especially as Terletsky had a letter of recommendation to Bohr from his old friend Academician Pyotr Leonidovich Kapitsa. One must assume that this probably was the principal "appropriate pretext" about which Beria reported to Stalin. At the insistence of Beria, with whom Kapitsa's relations had already been ruined, Kapitsa had written a letter to Bohr dated 22 October 1945 which introduced "the young Russian physicist Terletsky" as a "capable professor of Moscow University." Kapitsa stressed

that Terletsky "will explain to you the goals of his foreign tour."<sup>25</sup> Yet in his letter Kapitsa did *not* call Terletsky his friend, as would be customary in other circumstances. Thus an important element, a kind of password in the developed style of friendly scientific correspondence, was missing, and this may well have alarmed Bohr (it immediately attracted the notice of Kapitsa's widow, Anna Alekseevna, when she saw the letter).<sup>26</sup>

As Kapitsa's former associate, P. Rubinin, later noted, this letter cost Pyotr Leonidovich a lot: he could not but suffer, understanding that he had been exploited (and probably not for the last time) by Beria.<sup>27</sup> The cup turned out to be overfilled and the letter to Bohr became the last drop. A month later, Kapitsa sent his famous letter to Stalin in which he gave a sharply negative evaluation of Beria and declared further cooperation with him impossible. And a month after that, Kapitsa was discharged from work on the atomic bomb and fell into long disfavor.

Now the reader can judge what is left of Sudoplatov's fantasies about the meeting with Bohr and how they relate to real facts. Veterans of "atomic" espionage should understand a simple thing: nobody is denying or diminishing the role played by the intelligence services in the furthering of the Soviet atomic program. But so this role does not turn into a caricature, the "atomic" spies themselves more than anyone must play their part. They need to accept that only competent specialists, particularly physicists familiar with the nuclear weapons field, together with veterans of the atomic project, can accurately say which espionage materials played a positive role and contributed concretely, and which proved useless or even counterproductive (there were such too!).

Terletsky, recalling his meeting with Bohr nearly 30 years later, noted: "Bohr said that in his opinion, all countries should have the atomic bomb, particularly Russia. Only the spread of this powerful weapon to various countries could guarantee that it wouldn't be used in the future."<sup>28</sup> It is not surprising that this distorted thesis was appropriated by certain Russian journalists and that Niels Bohr was rapidly transformed into a supporter and propagandizer of the idea of global nuclear proliferation. (I am not speaking here about the entirely curious article "The Bomb," published in *Moskovskii kom-somolets*,<sup>30</sup> the author of which, having become a victim of his own technical incompe-

tence, got it into his head to demonstrate that while Bohr was "not a spy, not a KGB agent," he had evidently been moved by his idealistic conceptions to relate to Terletsky "priceless and top secret information."<sup>29</sup>)

At the same time, in the document sent by Beria to Stalin about Terletsky's conversation with Bohr and which, naturally, was not put together without Terletsky's participation, there is no evidence that Bohr made any such comments. On the contrary, while he spoke about the necessity of the "exchange of scientific discoveries and the internationalization of scientific achievements," Bohr, at the same time, referring to the atomic bomb, supported the "establishment of international control over all countries" as the only method of defense against it. Of course, over the course of three decades Terletsky could forget the essence of Bohr's remarks and distort them, and for him it was just a hop and a skip to a top secret document. More important, the formulation of the answers ascribed to Bohr in the document which lay on Stalin's desk, cannot be accepted as irreproachable and precise, given the way Terletsky himself described their preparation: "All day Arutunov and I tried to reconstruct Bohr's answers from memory. This turned out not to be such a simple task, since Arutunov, despite his phenomenally trained memory, while not understanding the subject had been in no position to remember everything verbatim, while I didn't understand everything from Arutunov's translation and had to recall how Bohr's answers had sounded in English; after all, passively I knew some English, like everyone who had finished the Physics Faculty [FizFak] at MGU."<sup>31</sup>

From all this it is clear that in order to evaluate Bohr's position on the atomic bomb we had best base ourselves on his own publications. In his June 1950 "Open Letter to the United Nations," which most fully and clearly articulated his views on the issue under discussion, Bohr stressed that "any great technical undertaking, whether industrial or military, should have become open for international control." In the same letter he stands up for the necessity of "universal access to full information about scientific discoveries," including "the industrial exploitation of the sources of atomic energy."<sup>32</sup> In other words, atomic weapons under international control, and the scientific achievements for the benefit of all mankind.

[Voprosi istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki, hereafter VIET] (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences "Nauki") 2 (1994), 38-39.

13. Moore, *Niels Bohr*, 416.

14. Moore, *Niels Bohr*, 417.

15. Terletsky, "Operation 'Interrogation of Niels Bohr,'" *VIET* 2 (1994), 44.

16. Smyth, *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes*, 28.

17. Ralph Lapp, *New Power* (Moscow: IL, 1954), 42.

18. Presenting such a conclusion as a document of required evaluation of the results of Terletsky's mission, Kurchatov evidently limited himself to a compliment suitable to the occasion. He could not do otherwise, recognizing that Beria, the main organizer of the entire operation, was not only the chief of the country's intelligence and punitive organs, but also was at the same time the main administrator of the Soviet atomic project, i.e., his immediate superior.


19. Moore, *Niels Bohr*, 386-88. [Ed. note: The fullest account and analysis of Bohr's efforts to convince U.S. and British leaders prior to Hiroshima of the need to inform Stalin about the Manhattan Project officially in the hope of heading off a postwar nuclear arms race may be found in Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York: Knopf, 1975); citations from 1987 Vintage edition, , 416.





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We note that during the war the Germans applied much effort in order to carry out processes with heavy water, but they did not manage to collect the amount of heavy water sufficient to start a



## MORE DOCUMENTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES

The previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (*Issue 3, Fall 1993*, pp. 1, 55-69) contained a selection of translated documents from the Russian archives on Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War, and here the series continues. Several documents were provided by the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD, or TsKhSD, its Russian acronym), the archive containing the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central Committee, in connection with the January 1993 conference in Moscow organized by CWIHP in cooperation with TsKhSD and the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Scholars working with CWIHP provided others, including several from a special TsKhSD collection known as Fond 89, which contains Soviet documents declassified for the 1992 Constitutional Court trial of the CPSU and other special occasions. The CWIHP Bulletin hopes to publish more translated documents from the archives of the USSR/CPSU and other former communist states in forthcoming issues, and welcomes submissions of documents (and short introductions) from scholars conducting research in East-bloc archives.

### I. Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, 1950—"Clarifications"

In the spring of 1950, the most tightly held secret in the world was that preparations were going forward for North Korea to launch a massive military assault on South Korea in a concerted drive to unify the peninsula, divided since the end of World War II, under communist rule. For decades, scholars could only guess at the dynamics of the mystery-shrouded exchanges among the leaders of North Korea, the USSR, and the newly-established People's Republic of China. However, the previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin included a declassified document from the Russian archives clearly indicating that North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had repeatedly petitioned Soviet leadership for its blessing to launch the attack, and that he finally received a green light from Stalin during his visit to Moscow in April 1950. In that document, a 1966 internal Soviet Foreign Ministry report, it was

also stated that following this meeting in Moscow, in May 1950, "Kim Il Sung visited Beijing and secured the support of Mao." (See "New Findings on the Korean War," translation and commentary by Kathryn Weathersby, <http://www.ablisfur-htly.com>)

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Soviet Foreign Ministry report, 1966, *Internal Documents of the CPSU Central Committee*, 1993, pp. 1, 55-69.







*Democratic challenger in 1952 and 1956, to be “the most acceptable” candidate to succeed Eisenhower, and the most likely to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. (Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 507; Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 488.)*

*But the twice-defeated Stevenson had rejected a third bid, and at the July 1960 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles, Kennedy had emerged as his party’s standard-bearer to take on Republican candidate Richard Nixon. Nevertheless, for the Soviet leader, choosing a favorite in the U.S. presidential campaign was easy. Khrushchev saw Nixon, his antagonist in the “Kitchen Debate” at a 1959 Moscow trade fair, as an “aggressive” anti-communist who “owed his career to that devil of darkness McCarthy”—and Khrushchev’s post-Camp David fondness for the Eisenhower Admin-*

*national questions, especially Berlin, that would lead to some of the sharpest crises of the Cold War, yet also the desire to reduce the danger of nuclear war and the flexibility to seek a dramatic improvement in relations once circumstances changed, these latter qualities would animate the relaxation in superpower ties in 1963, epitomized by JFK's American University speech and the signing of a limited test-ban treaty, that was cut short by Kennedy's assassination. Introduction by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP director; document provided by Vladislav M. Zubok, National Security Archive, Washington, DC; translation by Benjamin Aldrich-Moody.*

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To Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

I send an analysis on Kennedy which is of interest, sent by the USSR Embassy in the USA (by charge d'affaires Comrade Smirnovsky)

A. Gromyko

3 August 1960

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#### **JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY**

(John Fitzgerald Kennedy) [English in original—ed.]

/Political character sketch/

John F. Kennedy was born on 29 May 1917 in Brookline, a suburb of Boston, Massachusetts, in a rich family of Irish extraction.

Kennedy received his secondary education in private schools. After finishing high school in 1935 he spent a semester studying in England in the London School of Economics, then studied for some time at Princeton University /USA/, from which he transferred to Harvard University /USA/, which he completed with honors in 1940 with a degree in political science. In 1940 Kennedy attended a course of lectures in the trade-and-commerce department of Stanford University.

Not long before the Second World War Kennedy visited a series of countries in Latin America, the Near East, and Europe, including the Soviet Union.

In 1941, Kennedy voluntarily entered the Navy, where he served until 1945, commanding a motor torpedo-boat in the Pacific military theater. In 1943 he was injured. [He was] Awarded a medal for displaying heroism in saving the lives of the members of his crew.

After demobilization Kennedy got involved

in journalism; he was present in 1945 at the first conference of the UN in San Francisco and at the Potsdam conference in the capacity of a special correspondent of the agency "International News Service."

In November of 1946, Kennedy was elected United States Congressman from the Democratic party in one of the districts of the state of Massachusetts; in 1948 and in 1950 he was re-elected to Congress from this same district.

In 1952, Kennedy was elected to the USA Senate from Massachusetts, having beaten his Republican opponent, Senator Henry Lodge, by a wide margin. In 1958 Kennedy is elected Senator for another term. He is a member of two important committees in the Senate — the Committee on Foreign Affairs, where he chairs the Subcommittee on International Organizations, and the Committee on Labor Affairs and Social Welfare, in which he chairs the Subcommittee on Labor Affairs, as well as being a member of the Joint Economic Committee in Congress.

At the convention of the Democratic Party in 1956, Kennedy was a candidate amongst the contenders for the post of USA vice-president, although he was defeated.

Immediately after this, that is in 1956, Kennedy began actively preparing to declare his candidacy for the Presidency of the US in the 1960 elections, having composed in past years a branching and well-organized personal political machine. (According to the press, Kennedy at this time had already expended more than two million dollars on his election campaign.)

In the end, despite initial serious doubts in Democratic Party circles about his candidacy, doubts which stemmed from Kennedy's belonging to the Catholic Church and his relative youth, at the Democratic Party convention which took place in Los Angeles from 11 - 15 July, Kennedy prevailed, having amassed on the first ballot 806



activity.

At the same time, Kennedy advocates an increase of unemployment benefits and federal government aid to regions especially burdened with unemployment, as well as a hike in the legal minimum wage and a widening of the group falling under the minimum wage law.

In the issue of civil rights Kennedy quite logically advocates granting Negroes rights equal with Whites' in all areas of life, observing, however, "proper procedure," i.e. to be implemented by administrative power in compliance with the relevant laws.

In keeping with the general Democratic emphasis on implementing different social programs, Kennedy supports federal allocations for the construction of homes with low rents and slum liquidation; he stands for federal aid to construct school buildings and increase salaries for school teachers and instructors in higher education; for increasing pension sizes; for medical aid to the elderly along the lines of a social service.

#### **Kennedy's position on USA foreign policy issues**

On issues of USA foreign policy and, above all, on the aspect of chief importance in foreign policy—relations between the USA and the USSR, Kennedy's position, like his position on domestic policy in the USA is quite contradictory.

Kennedy views relations between the USA and USSR as relations of constant struggle and rivalry, which, on different levels can, however, in his opinion, take on different concrete forms.

Considering that in the world there is a conflict of "basic national interests" of the USA and USSR and that because of this one cannot expect fundamental change in their relations, Kennedy nevertheless grants the possibility of a mutually acceptable settlement of these relations on the basis of a mutual effort to avoid nuclear war. For this reason Kennedy, in principle, advocates talks with the Soviet Union, rejecting as "too fatalistic" the opinion that "you can't trust" the Soviet Union, that it "doesn't observe treaties," etc.

In connection with this Kennedy openly criticizes the position of the USA government and the West as a whole on the question of disarmament, pointing out the West's lack of a concrete plan in this area. For his part, he proposed to create in the USA a single government organ which would develop a "viable program of disarmament" as well as plans for the transition of the American economy from a military to a peaceful orientation and different programs of international cooperation in the socio-economic sphere. However, in speaking about the need for the United States to develop a realistic plan for disarmament, Kennedy has in

mind not some far-reaching program of full liquidation of armaments and military forces of the two states, but instead, again some plan to control existing armaments and military forces with just some reductions.

Kennedy quite logically argues for attaining an agreement on halting nuclear weapons testing, believing that the renewal of these tests could compromise the military position of the USA in view of the threat of widening the circle of countries possessing nuclear weapons. In his letter of 30 April 1960 Kennedy informed Eisenhower that if he, Kennedy, were elected president he would renew the moratorium on all underground nuclear tests, if an agreement about such a moratorium were to be attained between interested countries during Eisenhower's administration.

During the course of events connected with the provocative flights of American U-2 airplanes and the ensuing disruption of the summit conference, from Kennedy came the announcement that in the President's place he would not have allowed such flights on the eve of the summit, and in the situation developing in Paris would have considered it possible to apologize to the USSR for the flights /but not to punish the guilty parties, since in this situation he himself was guilty/.

While placing blame for the fact of the disruption of the summit with the Soviet Union, nevertheless Kennedy sees the fundamental reason for what happened in the fact that the Soviet Union, in his opinion, actually found it more advantageous to use the incident with the U-2 plane for the maximum political effect, rather than going to a summit under conditions when the USA, as Kennedy admits, came to the summit completely unprepared for serious and wide-ranging bilateral talks.

However, Kennedy sees the main reason for the USA's inability, given present conditions, to conduct such talks with the USSR in the USA's loss of a "position of strength" over the past 7-8 years. Kennedy considers the restoration of this "position of strength" the main task facing the USA and a necessary precondition for renewing high-level talks with the USSR. "Until this task is completed," states Kennedy, "there is no sense in returning to a summit meeting." And further: "Above all we must make sure that henceforward we conduct talks from a position of strength—of military strength, economic strength, strength of ideas, and strength of purpose."

In keeping with this conception, Kennedy, having earlier been a supporter of big defense spending "until the attainment of an agreement on disarmament," now in all his public statements emphasizes the absolute necessity of strengthening the USA military capability, not shying away from a significant increase on defense spending. With the goal of liquidating the present gap in USA-USSR "nuclear strike capability," Kennedy proposes implementing a program of "constant vigilance" for USA strategic aircraft, reorganiz-

ing the system of USA bases, inside the country and abroad, and simultaneously accelerating the development and expanding production of different missiles. At the same time, Kennedy proposes modernizing conventional forces once having made them maximally mobile and able to fight "lesser wars" at any point on the globe.

In this way, while in principle advocating a search for a *modus vivendi* in USA-USSR relations in order to avoid worldwide military conflict, Kennedy at the same time stands for such paths to a *modus vivendi* which in practice signify a speeding-up of the arms race and, therefore, a further straining of the international situation with all the consequences that result from this.

On such issues as the Berlin question, Kennedy's position is outright bellicose: he openly announces that the USA should sooner start a nuclear war than leave Berlin, since "being squeezed out of Germany, and being squeezed out of Europe, which means being squeezed out of Asia and Africa, and then we're /the USA/ next." He sees the possibility of involving the UN in some capacity in the Berlin question only as a means of strengthening the position of the Western powers in West Berlin, not as a way of replacing them there.

Kennedy considers the policy of the former Republican administration of "liberating" the countries of people's democracy [i.e. East European Soviet Satellites—ed.] as unrealistic and having suffered complete failure. However, he is not inclined to admit on this basis the irreversibility of the changes in those countries. He proposes simply to conduct a more flexible policy in relation to countries of people's democracy, trying gradually to weaken their economic and ideological ties with the Soviet Union by granting them America "aid," widened trade, tourism, student and professional exchanges, by creating American information centers in those countries, and so on. Kennedy was, in particular, the initiator of a Senate amendment to the famous "Battle bill" in order to grant the President wide discretion in granting economic "aid" to European countries of people's democracy. Kennedy reserves a special place for Poland in the plan to detach countries from the socialist camp, considering it the weakest link in the group.

Kennedy also considers the USA policy toward the People's Republic of China to be a failure, insofar as it was unable to achieve its basic goal—the subversion of the country's new order. While admitting the necessity of "re-evaluating" USA policy toward the PRC, Kennedy doesn't propose, however, that the USA quickly recognize the PRC *de jure* and lift its opposition to the PRC's admission to the UN, raising in this connection the usual provisos about the PRC's "aggression" and so on. At this point he only advocates drawing in the PRC to talks about the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, insofar as this

is dictated by practical necessity, and, following this, also about the establishment of cultural and economic contracts between the USA and PRC. In regards to this Kennedy does not conceal the fact that he sees such contacts above all as a means of penetrating the PRC and collecting information about its internal condition. While advocating a “reduction in tensions in the region of Taiwan” and a refusal to “defend” the Chinese coastal islands of Matsu and Quemoy, Kennedy supports continued USA occupation of Taiwan itself and readiness to “defend” the island.

In keeping with his general stand on strengthening the position of the USA in the world,

*the repository for the post-1952 archives of the former CPSU Central Committee.*

*The report's conclusions about the "spill-over" from Czechoslovakia are extremely important because they go against conventional wisdom. Western observers have generally assumed that Soviet students were indifferent to hostile toward the Prague Spring. Although ferment and rebelliousness were rife in 1968—in France, in the United States, and even Poland—the prevailing view has been that Soviet students were notable mainly for their political apathy. But if the author of this report and the KGB's "other sources" are correct, the mood among Soviet students in 1968 was far more restive than previously believed. The Czechoslovakian reforms, according to the report, were of great interest to Soviet students in Odessa. The author noted that only a small number of the students he had encountered were opposed to the reforms, whereas a large majority favored the Prague Spring and hoped that similar changes might*

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of the CPSU, March 17 [and 18 and 19], 1979), “Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh” [“On the Aggravation of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and On Our Possible Measures”], translations by Mark H. Doctoroff, CWIHP; see also Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, rev. ed., pp. 992-93.)

*On March 20, Taraki traveled to Moscow to plead in person with Soviet leaders for renewed economic and military support to overcome the Afghan government’s domestic enemies. The records of the ensuing conversations make clear that the prime question on the agenda was Kabul’s request for external military intervention. Prior to seeing Brezhnev, Taraki met first with Prime Minister Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitri F. Ustinov, and Politburo member Boris N. Ponomarev. Buoyed by reports that troops loyal to him were regaining control in Herat, Taraki listened as Kosygin explained the Politburo’s decision—vowing eternal Soviet-Afghan friendship and enhanced Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military aid, but urging the Afghans to be self-reliant when it came to actual fighting (using an eerily*



A.A.Gromyko, D.F.Ustinov and B.N.Ponomarev.

L.I. BREZHNEV. Over the last few days we have been watching with alarm the development of events in Afghanistan. From what you said in conversation with our comrades, it seems the Afghan friends are gravely alarmed as well.

We must take steps to correct the situation that has developed and eliminate the threat to the new order in the DRA. And not only eliminate the threat, but also work to strengthen the gains of the April revolution.

As we see it, it is very important to widen the base which supports the leadership of the party and the country. First of all, of great importance here is the unity of your party, mutual trust, and ideological-political solidarity throughout its ranks from top to bottom.

It is worth thinking about creating a single national front under the aegis of the People's democratic party of Afghanistan as the recog-



than the political work of the government representatives in the area. This point is of exceptional importance not only in Herat, but in the rest of the country as well.

Appropriate work must be done with the clergy in order to split their ranks; this could well be achieved by getting at least apart of the clergy, if not to actually support the government openly, then to at least not speak out against it. This could be best of all achieved by showing that the new government is not trying to persecute the leaders and representatives of the clergy, but only those who speak out against the revolutionary government.

And now for the question of the possibility of deploying soviet military forces in Afghanistan. We examined this question from every angle, weighed it carefully, and, I will tell you frankly: this should not be done. This would only play into the hands of the enemies—yours and ours. You already had a more detailed discussion of this question with our comrades.

Obviously, to announce publicly—either for us or for you—that we are not intent on doing this is, for understandable reasons, not advisable.

We will give you all necessary political support. Already, we are addressing Pakistan and Iran with strong warnings not to interfere in the internal matters of Afghanistan.

It would be well if soviet economic aid, especially things like the delivery of 100 thousand tons of wheat and the increase in the price of natural gas supplied [exported] by Afghanistan, were made known to the Afghan people in the necessary manner, using the means of mass information. This is of foremost importance in strengthening the position of the Afghan government.

The arms and military technology that we are additionally supplying you with will increase the strength of the Afghan army. However, this will only be true if the arms are placed in trustworthy hands and not in the hands of the enemy.

As you have asked, we have sent you numerous advisers and specialists both in military and other matters. You have working for you 500 generals and officers. If necessary, we can send an additional number of party workers, as well as 150-200 officers.

One more question: how do you explain the fact that, despite the complications in the situation and the deployment of a thousand armed people from Iran and Pakistan, your borders with these countries were, in effect, open, and it seems even now are not closed? This is an abnormal situation, and, in our opinion, it should be fixed.

Finally, I would like to emphasize once more that in the current situation the most important factor will be the ability to draw greater circles of the population to your side through political and economic means. It is important to also re-examine the arsenal of methods utilized and eliminate those that may cause legitimate alarm in people and give them a desire to protest.

N.M. TARAKI. With regard to creating a single national front in Afghanistan, I would like to say that it essentially exists in the shape of party, komsomol, trade unions and other mass public organizations, which function under the leadership of the People's democratic party of Afghanistan. However, it cannot yet firmly establish itself in the socio-political life of Afghanistan because of its economic backwardness and as yet insufficient level of political development in a certain part of the population.

However, under the current situation the leadership of the country cannot avoid the use of extreme measures when dealing with accomplices of international imperialism and reactionism. The repressive measures taken against ranks of representatives of the clergy, Maoists, and other persons partaking in open combat against the new people's government are completely in accordance with the law and no one turns to persecution without lawfully establishing the guilt of the accused.

The Afghan people do not want war with Iran and Pakistan, but if war does break out, then it will not be to their advantage—the Pashtuns and Baluchis would be on the side of Afghanistan. I would like to point out that the present government of Pakistan, and not without the help of China, is trying to play an important role in the incitement of anti-Afghan elements, including Afghanis showing up in Pakistan. Our party and government are trying to react calmly to these aspirations on the part of Pakistan and not worsen the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The question of closing our borders with Iran and Pakistan is rather difficult. We are unable to do this because of the absence of the necessary means. Besides, the closing of the Afghan-Pakistan border would create discontent among Afghani and Pakistani Pashtuns and Baluchis who maintain close family ties, and in the final result would significantly damage the prestige of the current government in Afghanistan.

30 copies.  
21.III.79. [21 March 1979]

x) This record has not been seen by the participants.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 25.)

*Moscow's dissatisfaction with the Afghan leadership and its handling of events and concern with its lack of support among the Afghan people was evident in a 1 April 1979 special report for the Politburo prepared after Taraki's visit by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev and reprinted in the previous issue of the Cold War*

International History Project Bulletin (*Issue 3*, pp. 67-69). *That report reaffirmed the correctness of the Soviet refusal to send military forces to repress the "counter-revolution." But despite the repression of the Herat rebellion the anti-government activity persisted and so did Kabul's desire for direct Soviet military support. Shortly after his return to Kabul, Taraki was replaced as prime minister by his Khalq deputy, Hafizullah Amin. In April, Amin reiterated the now familiar appeal to Moscow for Soviet helicopter pilots for use against rebel forces, eliciting the following Politburo response, together with the instructions sent to the chief Soviet military adviser in Kabul for transmission to Amin.*

\* \* \* \* \*

*Proletariat of all countries, unite!*

Subject to return in the course of 3 days  
to CC CPSU (General office, 1st sector)  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL FILE

P150/93

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Smirnyukov.

Extract from protocol #150 of the CC CPSU  
Politburo session  
from 21 April 1979

On the inexpediency of the participation of soviet military helicopter crews in the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

1. To agree with the proposal on this question submitted in the memorandum by the Ministry of Defense on 18 April 1979, #318/3/0430.
2. To ratify the draft of instructions to the chief military adviser in the DRA (attached).

SECRETARY of CC

\* \* \* \* \*

[attached] to article 93 protocol # 150

Top Secret  
SPECIAL FILE



\* \* \* \* \*

[Handwritten]

[stamp:] Top Secret



nuclear missiles. Maybe we should all think about that idea and make it an official proposal—join the talks about the nuclear missiles in Europe with the talks about the limitation on all the strategic nuclear weapons. We also should think when and where to bring up this proposal. I think that MFA and the Ministry of Defense will decide on that problem.

We have to open up a wider network to win public opinion, to mobilize public opinion of the Western countries of Europe and America against the location of the nuclear weapons in Europe and against a new arms race, that's being forced by the American administration. The behavior of Japan, and especially of the president [Yasuhiro] Nakasone worries me. He completely took the side of the more aggressive part of the Western countries, and he completely supports Reagan's actions. Because of that we should consider some sort of compromise in our relations with Japan. For example: we could think about joint exploitation of several small islands, that have no strategic importance. Maybe there will be other suggestions. I, personally, think that Japan could initiate more active cooperation with the Soviet Union in the economic sphere.

The next point concerns China. I think that the Chinese aren't going to move any further on their positions. But all our data shows that they could increase their trade with USSR. They did offer us a trade agreement for this year, that substantially increases our goods exchange[compared to] the previous years of trading with China. Because of that we might have to send comrade [First Deputy Prime Minister Ivan V.] Arkhipov to China to conduct a series of talks and to "feel the ground." And if we succeed in improving our economic ties with China through cultural, sports, and other organizations, it could be considered a big step ahead.

Now about the Middle East. To say that the events in the Middle East don't bother us would be wrong. The fact is that we have very good relations with Syria. But Syria argues against the agreement that was made between Israel and Lebanon, Syria has no friendly relations with Iraq. Recently Syria has been facing minor problems with PLO, and in particular with [PLO Chairman Yasser] Arafat. In one word—here is a problem we have to think about.

If you look at our propaganda, you can come to a conclusion that it's quite calm when it comes to strategic preparations of NATO. That's true, we shouldn't scare people with war. But in our propaganda we should show more brightly and fully the military actions of the Reagan administration and the supporting countries of Western Europe, which in other words means disclosing in full scale the aggressive character of the enemy. We need that, so we could use facts to mobilize the soviet people for the fulfillment



GRISHIN. On our meeting we should call socialist countries to active counteraction toward imperialistic countries. About the invitation of Romania, I am for it, though there's no guarantee they will sign the resolution. They behave very badly. Not long ago, as it was known, Ceausescu hosted [conservative West German politician, Bavarian state premier Franz

*Chebrikov and Prime Minister Nikolai A.  
Tikhonov—lament the damage that*











the Soviet invasions of those countries in 1956 and 1968, respectively), Poland (about Soviet policy on the 1980-81 crisis), and South Korea (about Moscow's role in the Korean War and the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007).<sup>3</sup>

These actions have undoubtedly contributed to the historical record, but have also drawn allegations of politicization and favoritism. The dispute was long mostly limited to scholarly circles, but burst into public view in July 1994 when an *Izvestia* article criticized APRF practices.<sup>4</sup> Citing the examples of new journals which had published APRF materials without appropriate citations, journalist Ella Maksimova complained that despite promised reforms, "the Presidential Archive (the former Politburo Archive) works according to the same super-secret regime, inaccessible to the mass of researchers [and] even [its] very existence...is not advertised."

Maksimova wrote that in 1992 Roskomarkhiv (now Rosarkhiv) chairman R. G. Pikhoia, head of the Presidential Administration S.A. Filatov, Volkogonov, and APRF director A.V. Korotkov appealed to Yeltsin to transfer to state archives 12,000 of the rumored 100-150,000 files in the APRF, "thus removing grounds for political speculation connected with the preservation of historical materials in archives which are closed to researchers." Yeltsin reportedly responded:

"I agree. Please carry out the necessary work." If the President had limited himself to this resolution, it would have been possible to hope that everything, little by little, would gradually be returned to society. However, on the list of *fondy* alongside No. 1 (Party Congresses, 1947-1986) and No. 2 (Plenums of the CC VPK (b) and the CC CPSU 1941-1990) a decisive "No" was printed in that same presidential hand.

Rather than blaming Yeltsin, Maksimova surmised that someone had stood at his "elbow whispering that 'it's dangerous, it's not worth it.'" Maksimova said access to the APRF currently depended on users' "presence in the President's circle, their political weight and connections," and noted that the APRF had been excluded from a presidential order mandating that most state ministries, after periods of "temporary storage," transfer their files to permanent state archives, which are, the article said, "generally accessible and open to the public." She concluded:

There are in the world some confidential archives for use by a narrow circle, but they are private. A confidential state archive violates a basic principle of democracy—free access to information. It is a dangerous precedent, especially in the current situation, when, alas, not all of society is eager to dig itself out of the prison of lies of its 70-year history.

The Presidential Archive remains an oasis of the socialist system of information privileges. The Party Archive, although out-

lawed, fell outside all currently valid laws. The collection of original documentation of the country's ruling state-political organ, which was the focus of the main organizing ideas, drafts, and decisions which determined over seventy years the life of the people and the world, has been desiccated and held in isolation from scholarship.

It's regrettable that this has all been done in the name of the President, in his domain, and with his help. One wants to believe that he's done it unintentionally, and was ill-informed.

The article provoked an uproar, to judge from subsequent comments by Russian scholars and archivists. Scholars named in the article as receiving privileged access denied any impropriety.<sup>5</sup> The issues raised in the article were, for the most part, not new, since scholars, journalists, archivists, and others had clamored for quicker and fuller access to the APRF almost from the moment the collection's existence became known. Still, the ensuing controversy helped prompt a reconsideration of the APRF's status that resulted, in September, in a presidential decree requiring the transfer of APRF materials to state archives in 1994-95 and established a new commission to declassify CPSU documents (see below). Both archivists and researchers greeted the p T w ( m i s s i o n t o

to researchers, who until now have had to make requests to archive staff who then consulted internal finding aids.<sup>8</sup> Some possible progress was also reported on the question of photocopying fees and procedures, about which some scholars have complained. Despite such apparently positive steps, however, it was uncertain whether the results to date were sufficient enable the international advisory group to raise additional funds.

Several AVP RF staff members have created an organization to assist researchers and support the archive's work. The International Diplomatic Archives Association, headed by Bukharkin, was organized in 1993 to help researchers, on a contractual basis, locate and submit for declassification desired archival materials related to the history of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy. (It should be stressed that it is not necessary to be a member of the association to conduct research at the archive.) The association also aids publication projects of MID materials, modernizing archive facilities, and involving retired diplomats to expedite declassification.<sup>9</sup>

At the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), headed by Sergei V. Mironenko, which contain records of many Soviet-era ministries, a project has been launched with the University of Pittsburgh to publish detailed guides to document collections of interest to Cold War historians. The Russian Publications Project's Russian Archive Series includes guides to "special files" (*osoboye papki*) of the Interior Ministry and secret police, beginning with V.A. Kozlov and S.V. Mironenko, eds., *"Special Files" for I.V. Stalin: Materials of the Secretariat of the NKVD-MVD of the USSR, 1944-1953, Archive of Contemporary Russian History*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Blagovest, 1993). Projected volumes are: vol. 2, *Molotov's "Special Files," 1944-1955*; vol. 3, *Khrushchev's "Special Files," 1944-59*; vol. 4, *Malenkov's "Special Files," 1944-55*; vol. 5, *Beria's "Special Files," 1944-53*; vol. 6, *Guide to Correspondence between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Foreign Ministry, 1944-59*. The project has also published a guide to holdings of the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History (RTsKhIDNI), which contains CC CPSU files up to 1952: J. Arch Getty and V.P. Kozlov, eds., *The State Archival Service of the Russian Federation: Russian Center for Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History (formerly the Central Party Archive): A Research Guide*, (Moscow: Blagovest, 1993).<sup>10</sup>

A more problematic situation persists regarding access to Cold War-era Soviet military documents, although in March 1994 Russian Defense Ministry officials participated in a Pentagon-sponsored conference on declassifying NATO and Warsaw Pact Cold War records, and some Soviet General Staff files on the Korean War, Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, and other Cold War events have been declassified in con-

nection with specific conferences or projects. The files of the former KGB remain tightly controlled as well, with limited exceptions for families of victims of repression and an agreement with Crown Books to publish a series of books based on selected KGB documents.

Several recent U.S. initiatives to enhance ties with Russian archives should also be noted. In November 1994, CWIHP brought three Russian archival leaders to the United States for meetings with scholars and archivists. The three were Igor V. Lebedev, Director, Department of History and Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation; D. G. Tolitna, Director, State Archive of the Russian Federation; and G. G. Tolitna, Director, State Archive of the Russian Federation. The project was organized in Philadelphia.

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\* the appointment of N. G. Tomilina as director, rather than acting director, of TsKhSD;

\* the continuation of the "Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and State" project to microfilm finding aids and selected documents from GARF, RTsKhIDNI, and TsKhSD, undertaken by the Russian State Archives Service and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; according to Chadwyck-Healey, the project's distributor, a catalogue listing the first 1,000 reels of microfilm is now available;<sup>21</sup>

\* Yale University Press has started a publications series, *Annals of Communism*, presenting documents from several Russian archives;<sup>22</sup>

\* RTsKhIDNI and the Dutch company IDC have launched a project to microfilm the Comintern Archive and make the collection available on microfiche by 1997;<sup>23</sup>

\* RTsKhIDNI and the Feltrinelli Foundation (Milan) have cooperated to publish the minutes of the Cominform Conferences, 1947-49;<sup>24</sup>

\* Raymond L. Garthoff (Brookings Institution) has published two works that, collectively, constitute a major effort to integrate several years of recent disclosures from Russian sources and archives into almost three decades of Cold War history: a revised edition of *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, and *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*, both published in 1994 by Brookings;

\* with the closure of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Munich due to U.S. government budget cuts, operations are being moved and reorganized on a semi-private basis via the U.S. Board for International Broadcasting and the Open Society Institute; the RFE/RL historical archives will be located in Budapest, while contemporary materials and activities will be centered at OMRI in Prague; the *RFE/RL Research Report* has discontinued publication, but OMRI plans in January 1995 to begin a new, weekly journal, *Societies in Transition*.<sup>25</sup>

1. See Mark Kramer, "Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls," *Cold War International History Project Newsletter*, 1995.





The Update section summarizes items in the popular and scholarly press containing new information on Cold War history and the former Communist bloc. Researchers are urged to alert CWIHP to relevant citations.

Abbreviations:

DA = Deutschland Archiv

FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Service

NYT = New York Times

RFE/RL = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

VfZ = Vierteljahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte

WP = Washington Post

ZfG = Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft

### Russia/Former Soviet Union

Survey of questions, evidence, and historiography concerning Stalin, USSR, and Cold War origins, by two Russian historians. (V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, "The Soviet Union," in David Reynolds, *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 53-76.)

Russian archives, particularly Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History, offer insights into history Soviet ties to CPUSA; article focuses on Comintern files on Minnesota Communists. (John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, "Researching Minnesota History in Moscow," *Minnesota History: The Quarterly of the Minnesota Historical Society* 54/1 (Spring 1994), 2-15.)

Second largest camp system in USSR gulag from 1939-53, the GUPVI, examined. (Stefan Karner, "Die sowjetische Hauptverwaltung fuer Kriegsgefangene und Internierte. Ein Zwischenbericht." ["The Soviet Main Administration for POWs and Internees: An Interim Report"], *VfZ* 3 (July 1994), 447-72.)

Ministry of Defense document on Wallenberg's arrest in 1945 located. (Ella Maksimova, "Wallenberg is Dead; Unfortunately, the Proof is Sufficient," *Izvestia*, 6/3/93.)

Zhdanov papers, other archival sources inform analysis of why the "Big Bear"—the USSR—"knocked more than once on the Finnish door, [but] never tried to come in by force" in 1944-47. (Jukka Navakivi, "A Decisive Armistic 1944-1947: Why Was Finland Not Sovietized?" *Scandinavian Journal of History* 19 (1994), 91-115.)

Jukka Nevakivi, ed., *Finnish-Soviet Relations 1944-1948* (Helsinki: Department of Political History, University of Helsinki, 1994), contains papers, many based on Russian archival sources, prepared for a seminar in Helsinki on 21-25 March 1994 organized by the Department of

Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Malashenko concerning 1956 Hungarian events, including his role in developing military plans ("Compass") during uprising; initial decision to withdraw Soviet troops on October 31; and subsequent invasion. (E.I.



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Radushevsky, "Escape of the Century," *Moscow News* 49, 11/19/93, 14.)

Author discusses CIA's 1981 secret operation "Ivy Bells" in Sea of Okhotsk. (N. Burbiga, "A Fishy Day at the CIA," *Izvestia*, 3/1/94.)

Ex-spy Oleg Nechiporenko discusses arrest of Aldrich Ames in context of US-Soviet intelligence dealings in 1980s. (V. Ivanidze, "The Scandal about a Mole in the CIA from the Point of View of Russian Intelligence," *Izvestia*, 3/2/94.)

Malcolm Toon, co-chair of commission, reports that Soviet pilots in Korean War tried to down U.S. F-86 fighter jets safely and two were captured and brought to Moscow; question remains whether more important data awaits discovery in Russian archives. (R. Boudreaux, "U.S. Gets



Merker, expelled from the party and arrested as an alleged Western spy in the 1950s; SED persecution of Merker laid in part to his sympathies for Jewish causes. ("Der Geheimprozess" ["The Secret Process"]) (*Die Zeit* 41 (10/14/94), 7-8.)

More debate on 1952 Stalin Notes: Manfred Kittel, "Genesis einer Legend. Die Discussion um die Stalin-Noten in der Bundesrepublik 1952-1958" ["Genesis of a Legend: The Stalin Notes in the German Debate on Reunification, 1952-1958"], *VfZ* 3 (July 1993), 355-90; Michael Gehler, "Kurzvertrag fuer Oesterreich? Die westliche Staatsvertrags-Diplomatie und die Stalin-Noten von 1952" ["Abbreviated Treaty for Austria? West Allied Policy in Light of the Stalin Notes of 1952"], *VfZ* 2 (April 1994), 243-79; Gerhard Wettig, "Die Deutschland—Note vom 10. Maerz auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Aussenministeriums" ["The Germany Note of 10 March 1952 on the Basis of Diplomatic Files from the Russian Foreign Ministry"], *DA* 7 (July 1993), 786-805; Elke Scherstjanoi, "Zur aktuellen Debatte um die Stalin-Note 1952" ["On the Actual Debate Regarding the Stalin Note of 1952"], *DA* 2 (Feb. 1994), 181-5; Gerhard Wettig, Elke Scherstjanoi, in "Neue Gesichtspunkte zur sowjetischen Maerz-Note von 1952?" ["New Points of View on the Soviet Note from March 1952?"], *DA* 4 (April 1994), 416-21; Gerhard Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification: Archival Evidence on Soviet Foreign Policy in Spring 1952," *Historical Journal* (Cambridge, Eng.) 37:2 (1994), 411-419; Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. Marz 1952 nach sowjetischen Akten," *Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung bis zum Tode Stalina*, Studien zur Deutschlandfrage, Vol. 13 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1994), 283-111. Tj 0 -1.389 TD 0.211nificaTD 0.2oporViewn Tum Tode St TD (HisL-1.389 TDn6 -1.16s.att1a2r.052i5133 Tw 1102 Tw (Foreign Poli

Leadership and the Vienna CSCE Process 1986-1989”], *DA* 8 (Aug. 1993), 905-914.

Notes found in GDR archive of 10-11 Nov. 1986 socialist bloc conference in which Gorbachev privately broke from Brezhnev doctrine, affirming “independence of the party in each country, their right to make sovereign decisions, their own responsibility toward their own people,” and stating that the USSR would not intervene to keep socialist leaderships in power. (Reprinted with commentary by Daniel Kuechenmeister and Gerd-Ruediger Stephan, *ZfG* 8 (Aug. 1994), 713-21.)

Analysis of Gorbachev’s policies on German unification, using transcripts and correspondence from SED archives to illuminate his contacts with Honecker. (Hannes Adomeit, “‘Midwife of History’ or ‘Sorcerer’s Apprentice’? Gorbachev, German Unification and the Collapse of Empire” (forthcoming in *Post-Soviet Affairs*.)

German translation of two documents from CPSU CC archives dealing with Soviet relations with the PDS, hand-over of SED archives to Bundesarchiv, authored by Valentin Falin (10/18/90) and Nikolai Portugalov (3/13/91). (Vera Ammer, trans., “Streng geheim!” [“Top Secret!”], *DA* 2 (Feb. 1994), 222-4.)

Publications: Manfred Wilke, Peter Erler, Horst Laude, eds., “*Nach Hitler kommen wir.*” *Dokumente zur Programmatik der Moskauer KPD-Fuehrung 1944/45 fuer Nachkriegsdeutschland* [“After Hitler We Come”: Documents on the Program of the Moscow KPD Leadership from 1944-45 for Germany after the War] (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994); Gerhard Keiderling, ed., “*Gruppe Ulbricht*” in *Berlin April bis Juni 1945. Von den Vorbereitungen im Sommer 1944 bis zur Wiedergruendung der KPD im Juni 1945* [The “Ulbricht Group” in Berlin from April-June 1945: From the Early Preparations in the Summer of 1944 until the Re-Founding of the KPD in 1945] (Berlin: Verlag Arno Spitz GmbH, Berlin, 1993); Guenter Benser and Hans-Joachim Krusch, eds., *Dokumente zur Geschichte der kommunistischen Bewegung in Deutschland, Bd. 1: Protokolle des Secretariats des ZK der KPD Juli 1945 bis April 1946* [Documents on the Communist Movement in Germany, Part 1: Protocols of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party from July 1945 to April 1946] (Munich, 1993); Alexander Fischer

CM.5 format, eds.

*(fortsetzung, 1. Schritt)*



Officials 1962: On the Personal Structure of the Ministry of State Security," *DA* 9 (Sept. 1994), 940-53.)

Federal Office of Criminal Investigation report discloses evidence of 24 secret meetings between Stasi, Red Army Faction in 1978-84; 69-page, Aug. 1992 report prepared in connection with prosecution of ex-Stasi agents. (*Die Welt*, 9/

testers. (*RFE/RL News Briefs* 2:48 (22-26 Nov 1993), 13.) Mass grave discovered on Budapest Expo site containing 50 skeletons, mostly of young people; officials date it to between World War II and 1956. (Hungarian Radio, 1/13/94, cited in *RFE/RL News Briefs* 3:4 (10-21 Jan 1994), 18.) In first arrests ever connected to crushing of 1956 revolution, Budapest Attorney General's office announces arrest of "a number of persons" in massacre of eight persons in unarmed crowd in Eger on 12/12/56. (*RFE/RL News Briefs* 3:7 (7-11 Feb 1994), 17-18.) Hungarian militia members accused of firing into unarmed crowd in city of Salgotarjan on 12/8/56, killing 46, deny guilt before Budapest District Court hearing. (MTI, cited in *RFE/RL News Briefs* 3:28

