

1980-81 crisis, though from a quite different angle, will be included in my Working Paper on "The Soviet Union, Jaruzelski, and the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981," which is scheduled to be issued by the Cold War International History Project later this year. Appendices to the Working Paper will feature many other documents I have translated from the Russian, Polish, Czech, and German archives. Soon thereafter, I will be putting together a book-length study and collection of new materials pertaining to the Polish crisis.

### Overview of New Sources

Since 1989, a huge quantity of documents and memoirs about the Soviet Union's role in the 1980-81 crisis have become available. An invaluable account, which appeared even before the Communist regime in Warsaw had collapsed, is the interview with the former Polish colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," *Kultura* (Paris) 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 3-57. Kuklinski was one of five senior officers on the Polish General Staff who were responsible for drawing up plans for martial law in 1980-81. During that time he was also a spy for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and he was able to provide the United States with unparalleled access to all the military secrets of the Warsaw Pact until November 1981, when he was forced to flee. He now lives under an assumed name in the United States. Other indispensable memoirs and first-hand accounts include Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Les chaines et le refuge* (Paris: Lattes, 1992); Stanislaw Kania,

began in September 1992, and six sessions were convened in 1992 and the first half of 1993. The transcripts of these initial hearings were published, along with supporting documentation, in *Sad nad autorami stanu wojennego przed Komisja Odpowiedzialności Konstytucyjnej* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993), Vol. 1: *Oskarżenia wyjasnienia obrona*. Additional volumes cover the subsequent hearings, which for the most part went over similar ground. Especially valuable are the documents collected and released by the Commission.

Important interviews with, and articles by, high-ranking Soviet and East European military officers who were involved in the preparations for an invasion of Poland include "Juz siedzielismy w czolgach: Z generalem majorem Stanislawem Prochazka rozmawia Leszek Mazan," *Polityka* 37 (15 September 1990), 13; "Generalmajor S. Prochazka z wojske obrody rika: 'Meli jsme okupovat Polsko,'" *Zemedske noviny* (Prague), 16 August 1990, 1; "Misja skonczona: Wywiad z generalem Wiktorem Dubyninem, dowodca wojsk bylego ZSRR w Polsce," *Gazeta wyborcza*, 14-15 March 1992, 8-9; Maj.-General Vladimir Dudnik,

"Tainy 'temnoi komnaty,'" *Moskovskie novosti* 14 (5 April 1992), 17; and "Vladislav Achalov: Takoe vpechatlenie, chto nikto nikogdanikogo nichemu ne uchil," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 7 February 1995, 7. References to other items of this sort can be found in my forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper.

Of the vast number of Soviet and East European documents that have been released, including many transcripts of CPSU Politburo meetings during the crisis, only a relatively small number have been published, but these have been of great importance. Two of the most valuable sets of documents, including selected transcripts of CPSU Politburo meetings, top-secret communications between Brezhnev and Jaruzelski, internal CPSU CC documents, and other items, were published in Polish in 1992 and 1993: "Dokumenty 'Komisji Suslowa,'" *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 August 1993, 1, 19-20; and "Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81," *Gazeta wyborcza*, 12-13 December 1992, 10-11.<sup>1</sup> Another source of comparable significance is the 660-page collection of transcripts of all the relevant Polish Politburo meetings during the crisis: Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura*

*Politycznego: PZPRa "Solidarnosc," 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992). Yet another invaluable source is a multi-volume collection of documents culled from the former East German Communist party and Stasi archives, which is being put out by a team led by Manfred Wilke at the Free University of Berlin under the title *SED-Politburo und polnische Krise 1980/1982*. The first volume, *Band 1: 1980*, Working Paper No. 3 (Berlin: Forschungsverbund SED-Staat, 1993) covers events through the end of 1980.<sup>2</sup> Another extremely useful volume, *Die SED contra Polen: Die Planung der SED-Führung zur Vorbereitung einer Invasion in Polen 1980/81*, was published by Akademie Verlag for the same research institute in 1994. Valuable citations from Bulgarian documents can be found in "Eventualna interventsia sreshchu Polsha e mozhela da stane 'vtori kurvav Afganistan,'" *Duma* (Sofia), 20 November 1990, 3.

Unpublished Soviet and East European documents pertaining to the 1980-81 crisis vastly outnumber the ones that have been published. In Warsaw, some of the most valuable unpublished materials are readily available in the main Archive of Modern Records (*Archiwum Akt Nowych*), which contains both Party and governmental documents. Many other items, however, are still in the possession of the Commission to Investigate Documents Pertaining to Martial Law (*Komisja resortowej badajacej dokumentacje zwiazana ze stanem wojennym*). Unfortunately, almost all the files of the Polish Defense Ministry and Internal Affairs Ministry from 1980-81 are still sealed off. In Moscow, many vital unpublished items, including numerous CPSU Politburo transcripts that were not published in either of the two Polish-language collections cited above, are available in Fond 89 at the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (*Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii*, or TsKhSD). Many of these transcripts are cited below. Other items at TsKhSD, in *Fond 5, Opis' 84*, as well as at the Presidential Archive (*Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, or APRF), the foreign intelligence archive, and the military archives, are now off-limits. The documents in the Presidential Archive, foreign intelligence archive, and military archives have never been accessible to the public, but at TsKhSD I did have an opportunity to pore through many items

## Polish leadership," 3 September 1980

To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector)

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL DOSSIER  
EYES ONLY

No. P/213/38

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Rakhmanin

Extract from Protocol No. 213 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo on 3 September 1980

On theses for the discussion with representatives of the Polish leadership.

To endorse the theses for the discussion with representatives of the Polish leadership (see attached).

CC SECRETARY

Regarding point 38 of Prot. No. 213

To be transmitted by the KGB in encrypted form to the designated point.

1. To give a precise evaluation of and take a clear position on the agreement with the so-called "United Strike Committees" (ZKS) in Gdansk and Szczecin.

The agreement concluded by the PPR government, and endorsed by the plenum of the PZPR CC, exacts a high political and economic price for the "regulation" it achieves.





the option of invading Poland was necessarily on the agenda in Moscow and most of the East European capitals. Elaborate plans for a large-scale military intervention were drafted by the Soviet General Staff, with input from Soviet officers on the Main Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command. The operation was to be spearheaded by an initial contingent of fifteen Soviet tank and motorized-infantry divisions moving in from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic, Carpathian, and Belorussian Military Districts.<sup>24</sup> These troops were to be accompanied by three Czechoslovak and East German divisions, with at least another dozen Soviet divisions as reinforcements. The Soviet Union wanted to provide a veneer of multilateralism for any prospective intervention in Poland, as was done with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The participation of two divisions from Czechoslovakia and one from East Germany was deemed sufficient for that purpose. The political complexities of involving troops from either Romania or Hungary would have been too great. Despite the harsh criticism that Romanian and Hungarian leaders had been expressing about Solidarity, neither country was likely to be enthusiastic about an invasion. In the case of Bulgaria, the difficulty was logistical rather than political. The authorities in Sofia strongly endorsed the plans for an invasion, but were not asked to contribute troops because “the northward movement [of Bulgarian forces] would have been too conspicuous,” tipping off both the Poles and the West.<sup>25</sup>

The plans for an invasion soon gave rise to a number of concrete military preparations. As early as August 1980 the Soviet Army was ordered to “requisition up to 100,000 military reservists and 15,000 vehicles from the civilian economy” and to place all regular units in military districts and Groups of Forces adjoining Poland on “full combat alert.”<sup>26</sup> Some units were taken off alert in February 1981, but most remained fully mobilized until the crisis was over. They were linked together by a vast communications network, which was secretly put into place during the “Comrade-in-Arms-80” and “Soyuz-81” exercises.<sup>27</sup> The exercises also permitted Soviet commanders and military intelligence officers to acquire detailed information about the routes and targets in Poland that would

be most suitable for invading forces, especially for the Soviet airborne units that would have to seize major buildings, transportation networks, and communications facilities in Warsaw.<sup>28</sup> The reconnaissance they gathered proved crucial when the Soviet General Staff modified its plans in late 1980 and 1981. Most of the revisions began just after the “Soyuz-81” maneuvers in April 1981, when a comprehensive new “action plan” was drafted. The final adjustments were made by mid-November. From that point on, the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German forces simply “waited for a signal from Moscow to move in”—a signal that never arrived.<sup>29</sup>

The revised planning and preparations were thoroughly tested in fourteen joint military exercises held during the crisis, including seven bilateral maneuvers of Soviet and Polish troops. The maneuvers were designed in part to exert pressure on the Polish leadership and population and to divert Solidarity’s attention from the buildup of the ZOMO security forces, but they also enabled Soviet commanders to gauge how quickly the Polish army could be “neutralized” by incoming Warsaw Pact troops.<sup>30</sup> The large number of bilateral exercises and meetings in 1980-81 was a notable contrast to 1968, when the Soviet Union tended to emphasize multilateral negotiations and maneuvers. This disparity was attributable in part to the greater confidence that Soviet leaders had when dealing with Jaruzelski than they ever had in their dealings with Alexander Dubcek. The “joint” leverage that was deemed necessary in 1968 was of much less relevance in 1980-81. Furthermore, in 1968 the Soviet Union did not yet have a permanent “Group of Soviet Forces” stationed on Czechoslovak territory, whereas in Poland in 1980-81 the Soviet Union already had a long-standing troop presence. The USSR’s Northern Group of Forces in Poland provided a convenient focus during the crisis for both military planning and coercive diplomacy.

The Soviet Union’s efforts to maintain close bilateral ties with the Polish army went only so far, however. Despite Jaruzelski’s persistent requests that Polish troops be included as an integral part of an invading force (and that East German forces be excluded, for obvious historical reasons), officials in Moscow decided early on that the Polish army as a whole was too unpredictable to be used in a “joint” Warsaw Pact

crackdown.<sup>31</sup> Soviet military planners took for granted that Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces would have to intervene *against* the Polish army. Although Brezhnev and his colleagues trusted the highest-ranking Polish officers and were willing to rely on certain elite units of the Polish army, they were under no illusions that Polish conscripts would obey orders to shoot at their fellow citizens. The dominant view in Moscow was that Polish soldiers who had been drafted in 1980 or 1981 were already “under Solidarity’s sway” and would “refuse to carry out their duties and even go over to the side of the anti-socialist forces if the situation deteriorates.”<sup>32</sup> Soviet officials also assumed that the reliability of the Polish officer corps might itself be problematic:

Some of the younger commanders and officers [in Poland] have discussed whether they should obey all combat orders, even those calling for mass ac-

suggests that at least some top officials in Moscow were willing to resort to force if necessary. As early as November 1980, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov had become so disenchanted that he openly questioned whether “constant pressure on the Polish leadership” would ever be sufficient, and he urged that military exercises be increased “to make clear that we have forces ready” to move in at short notice.<sup>34</sup> Avid support of a military solution also came from Soviet allies in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Documents from the former East German and Czechoslovak archives attest to the vigorous efforts that hard-line East European leaders made to convince the Soviet Politburo of the necessity of military intervention in Poland. In particular, the East German Communist party leader, Erich Honecker, repeatedly drew parallels with the crises of 1953, 1956, and 1968, arguing that “the situation in Poland is much worse and more dangerous” than those earlier episodes.<sup>35</sup> Shortly before an emergency meeting in Moscow of Warsaw Pact leaders in early December 1980, he joined with his Czechoslovak and Bulgarian coun-

terparts, Gustav Husak and Todor Zhivkov, in emphasizing that a failure to undertake decisive military action against the “counterrevolutionary forces in People’s Poland” would lead to “the death of socialism in Poland” and pose a burgeoning threat to the whole socialist commonwealth.<sup>36</sup> At the meeting itself, Honecker offered further denunciations of the events in Poland, and Husak repeatedly likened the situation to the “counterrevolutionary intrigues” in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Although these warnings had little effect on the Soviet participants—who still believed that the Polish authorities should be given more time “to rectify the situation on their own and to normalize it”—Honecker and Husak were hardly about to give in.<sup>37</sup> In February 1981 they persuaded the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, to support their calls for a joint military operation to “thwart the Polish counterrevolution once and for all,” and they issued many similar appeals over the next several months.<sup>38</sup>

Despite this aggressive campaign by the East European proponents of military intervention, Brezhnev and the other members of the CPSU Politburo were well aware

of how difficult and costly a prospective invasion would be. When the issue came up at a Soviet Politburo meeting in late October 1981, even hard-liners such as Ustinov and the KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, had to concede that “it would be impossible now for us to send troops into Poland.” They and their colleagues agreed that the Soviet Union “must steadfastly adhere to [its] line not to send in troops.”<sup>39</sup> The same position was expressed by all the members of the Soviet Politburo on 10 December 1981, according to the available transcript of the meeting, just three days before martial law was imposed. Although Andropov and Ustinov affirmed that the Soviet Union “must fortify [its] military garrisons in Poland” and “do something to protect the lines of communication between the USSR and the GDR” if circumstances so warranted, no one at the meeting dissented from Mikhail Suslov’s view that “there can be no consideration at all of sending in troops” because such a step “would be a catastrophe.”<sup>40</sup> Suslov’s position on this matter carried particular weight because he was the head of a special Politburo commission set up in late August 1980

**THE SED POLITBURO  
AND THE POLISH CRISIS**  
by the SED-State Research Group  
(translated by Mark Kramer)

Manfred Wilke, Peter Erier, Martin Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, and Hans-Peter Muller, *The SED Politburo and the Polish Crisis, 1980/1982*, Volume I: 1980. SED-State Research Group Working Paper No. 3/1993. Berlin, 1993.

During a state visit by the president of the Republic of Poland, Lech Walesa, to the Federal Republic of Germany in early 1992, federal [German] president Richard von Weizsacker lauded the gains that the Polish people and the Polish head-of-state had made for the cause of freedom in Europe. “As the head of a trade union you overcame despotism, regained freedom for your own people, and made a decisive contribution to the European revolution of freedom.” (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bulletin No. 34, Bonn, 2 April 1992, p. 325.) In retrospect, the Polish crisis at the beginning of

the 1980s can be regarded as a prelude to the end of the whole Soviet empire. SED officials recognized this danger and did everything in their power to forestall such a development. *Moreover, they pushed for intervention by the Warsaw Pact states in the same way that step was taken during the Prague crisis of 1968.*

With the publication of “The SED Politburo and the Polish Crisis, 1980/1982, Volume I: 1980,” which Prof. Dr. Manfred Wilke, Peter Erier, Martin Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, and Dr. Hans-Peter Muller compiled in 1992 at the Free University of Berlin under the auspices of the “SED-State Research Group,” documents are now available showing how the SED Politburo wanted to suppress the Polish people’s struggle for national self-determination and democratization. The materials, which have never been released before, come for the most part from holdings of the “Politburo” collection in the formerly secret archives of the SED Central Committee (CC).

For the SED, the drama of the “Polish crisis” began with the signing of the Gdansk Accords between the heads of the Inter-Factory Strike Committee and the Polish

government on 30 August 1980. This agreement was regarded by the SED Politburo to be a product of counterrevolution. As seen by Honecker and his closest associates, the leadership of the PZPR had capitulated to the striking workers. The SED leaders began to question whether and to what extent the PZPR could enforce its leading role in Poland (cf.: Central Party Archives [ZPA] J IV 2/2 A - 2346.) The decision to allow freer trade unions and the right to strike was unacceptable to the Politburo of the SED CC: “*To construe strikes as an expression of ‘workers’ genuine interests’ is impermissible in our view. No one other than the Party itself, with the aid of scientific socialism, can express and realize the class interests of the Party.*” (ZPA J IV 2/2 A-2368.)

At the end of September 1980, the International Department of the SED CC carried out a detailed analysis of the situation in Poland, which included, among other things, a “comparative assessment of the programs and stated demands of the anti-socialist forces in the

to “keep a close watch on the unfolding situation in Poland.”





**THE WARSAW PACT AND THE  
POLISH CRISIS OF 1980-81:**



D. F. Ustinov, and K. Yu. Chernenko to the CPSU Politburo, in APRF/Osobaya Papka.

27. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," 54.

28. "Vladislav Achalov: Takoe vpechatlenie, chto nikto nikogda nikogo nichemu ne uchil," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (Moscow), 7 February 1995, 7.

29. Maj.-General Vladimir Dudnik, "Tainy 'temnoi komnaty'," *Moskovskie novosti* 14 (5 April 1992), 17;

and "Juz siedzielismy w czolgach: Z generalem majorem Stanislawem Prochazka, rozmawia Leszek Mazan," *Polityka* (Warsaw) 37 (15 September 1990), 13. See also "Generalmajor S. Prochazka z vojenske obrodyrika: 'Melij sme okupovat Polsko'," *Zemedelske noviny* (Prague), 16 August 1990, 1.

30. "O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," Cable No. 183 (TOP SECRET), 14 June 1981, from V. Zelenov, Soviet consul-general in Gdansk, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19.

31. Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," 22-24.

32. "Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda," L. 6; and "O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," L. 18.

33. "O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," L. 19.

34. "Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81," 10.

35. See, e.g., "Vermerk uber ein Gesprach des Generalsekretars des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politburos und Sekretar des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei," 20 November 1980, in SAPMDB, ZPA, J, IV 2/2 A/2363.

36. "Anlage Nr. 2 zum Protokoll Nr. 48 vom 28.11.1980," in SAPMDB, ZPA, J, IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5.

37. For the Soviet Politburo's assessment of the meeting, see "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 11 dekabrya 1980 goda: 1. Ob itogakh vstrechi rukovodyashchikh deyatelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora, sostoyavsheisya v Moskve 5 dekabrya 1980 goda," 11 December 1980, Rabochaya zapis' (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 59, Ll. 1-3.

38. "'Wir Bruderlander stehen fest,'" *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg) 42 (19 October 1992), 95, 97, 99.

39. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabryadan'skom a iz protokola," -1.cc ggakh vstrecpoezdki 16.37gRdoda," -1.ehtovez0v.001 drazdelenii 522ZaseGit GChSSt G



*mended the violent suppression of the Polish opposition analogous to the crises of 1953, 1956, and 1968.*

Referring to economic and military interests, Brezhnev emphasized in his summary report that “*the situation in Poland and the danger hanging over Poland are not*



cisively rebuffing all attempts to use nationalism in the propagation of anti-socialist and anti-Soviet sentiments, as well as all attempts to misrepresent the history of Soviet-Polish relations and the nature of cooperation between the USSR and the PPR;

—launch relentless counterpropaganda against the efforts to water down the class content of socialist patriotism under the slogan of “All Poles in the world are brothers,” as well as the efforts to idealize the pre-revolutionary past of Poland; and

—in the political struggle against anti-socialist elements, carry out the appropriate attacks against them, rather than merely going on the defensive.

3 September 1980

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**CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract), 23 April 1981; CPSU CC Politburo Commission Report, “On the Development of the Situation in Poland and Certain Steps on Our Part,” 16 April 1981; and CPSU CC-Approved Plan of “Measures to Assist the PZPR [Polish United Workers’ Party] in the Organization and Ideological Strengthening of the Party”**

To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector)

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL DOSSIER

No. P7/VII

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Chernenko, Ponomarev, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Zamyatin, and Rakhmanin — whole package; Afanas’ev, V., Lapin, Losev, Pastukhov, Shibaev, Pegov, Tyazhel’nikov, and Shauro — pt. 2

Extract from Protocol No. 7 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo on 23 April 1981

On the development of the situation in Poland and certain steps on our part.

1. To approve the ideas put forth in the note of the CPSU CC Politburo Commission on the Polish question (see attached).

2. To affirm a plan of measures to lend assistance to the PZPR leadership in the organi-

zational and ideological strengthening of the party (see attached).

CC SECRETARY

On point VII of Prot. No. 7

Top Secret  
SPECIAL DOSSIER

To the CPSU CC

On the Development of the Situation in Poland and Certain Steps on Our Part

The internal political crisis in Poland is of a prolonged nature. To a significant degree the PZPR has lost control over the processes under way in society. At the same time, “Solidarity” has been transformed into an organized political force, which is able to paralyze the activity of the party and state organs and take *de facto* power into its own hands. If the opposition has not yet done that, then that is primarily because of its fear that Soviet troops would be introduced and because of its hopes that it can achieve its aims without bloodshed and by means of a creeping counterrevolution.<sup>1</sup>

At the session of the Sejm [Parliament—ed.] on 10 April, the Polish leadership did not dare to raise the matter of decisive actions against the anti-socialist forces. The leadership clearly is unable and does not want to depart from the line adopted to overcome the crisis with the aid of political means.

True, in the report to the Sejm by Comrade Jaruzelski there were a number of provisions in the spirit of the recommendations continually expressed to the Polish comrades by our side. However, they were put forth not in the form of orders, but merely as appeals and suggestions. The compromise nature of the report is also abundantly evident from the fact that it was received calmly and did not provoke a confrontation of the sort that our friends had feared.

Looking upon the results of the Sejm as a modest but initial success, Comrade Kania and his colleagues now are somewhat stepping up their actions to bolster the authority of the party. They have given speeches at a number of large industrial enterprises and have held a meeting with workers and peasants and members of the PZPR CC. On 25 April a regular plenum of the CC is to be held. The preparation of documents is under way for the IX Congress of the PZPR, which must be held by 20 July of this year. Certain steps are being taken by the government with the aim of somehow rectifying the situation in the economy.

Despite this it is obvious to everyone that the lull following the session of the Sejm is ephemeral. The opponent has gone along with it purely out of tactical considerations, while continuing to mount his forces for the infliction of new strikes against the party.

“Solidarity” as a whole and its separate links are preparing their next attempt to blackmail the authorities by setting forth various demands of an overwhelmingly political nature. Signs of a stratification in the leadership of this trade union organization do not yet provide any basis for





tional-party work and the CPSU CC Department are to hold a conference in May-June 1981 for representatives from corresponding oblast and municipal committees of the CPSU to discuss urgent questions of ties between local party organs of the CPSU and PZPR.

By agreement with the PZPR CC, send to Poland in May-June 1981 a group of senior officials from the central council of the branch trade unions headed by the secretary of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, who will familiarize themselves with the state of affairs in the Polish trade union movement and make on-site studies of the opportunities for political support of the branch trade unions and for increased cooperation between them and the Soviet trade unions.

Instruct the CPSU Komsomol CC to present a set of measures by 5 May 1981 on ways to strengthen our influence within the youth movement in Poland.

The Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, the Soviet Veterans' Committee, and the Committee of Soviet Women are to continue pursuing the set of measures agreed on with the native Polish organizations and to offer them the necessary help.

Taking account of the complex situation in the creative unions of the PPR, the Unions of Writers, Journalists, Composers, Artists, and Filmmakers of the USSR are to carry out exchanges with them via party organizations.

Send a group from the USSR State Committee on Television and Radio (headed by the chairman of the committee, Comrade Lapin) to the PPR in May 1981 for consultations regarding Soviet broadcasts to the PPR and the refinement of plans for cooperation in 1981.

In April-May 1981 the editors of the newspapers "Pravda," "Izvestiya," and "Trud" are to send a group of publicists (1 or more) to Poland to prepare materials, including exposés and denunciations, about the activity of anti-socialist forces.

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**Brezhnev-Jaruzelski Telephone  
Conversation, 19 October 1981**

To be returned  
to the CPSU CC  
(General Depart-  
ment, 1st sector)  
No. P1942

Distributed to the members  
of the CPSU CC Politburo,  
members of the CPSU CC  
Politburo, and CPSU CC  
secretaries

To the CPSU CC

I am conveying notes from a telephone conversation with Comrade W. Jaruzelski on 19

October of this year.

L. BREZHNEV

19 October 1981

Secret

NOTES FROM A TELEPHONE  
CONVERSATION

between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and Comrade  
W. Jaruzelski

19 October 1981

The Kremlin

L. I. BREZHNEV. Hello, Wojciech.

W. JARUZELSKI. Hello, my dear, deeply esteemed Leonid Ilyich.

L. I. BREZHNEV. Dear Wojciech, we already sent you an official greeting, but I wanted to congratulate you personally on your election to the post of First Secretary of the PZPR CC.

It was appropriate of you to give your consent to such a decision. In the PZPR right now there is no other individual whose authority is equal to yours; this is evident from the results of the vote at the plenum. We understand that very difficult tasks now stand before you. But we are convinced that you will cope with them and will do everything to overcome the severe ailments afflicting your country.

I think, right now, as it seems to me, the most important thing is for you to gather around yourself some reliable assistants from the ranks of committed and worthy Communists and to rally them, spurring the whole party into action and instilling it with the spirit of struggle. This, in the literal sense of the word, is the key to success.

And, of course, it is important, without wasting time, to take the decisive measures you intend to use against the counterrevolution. We hope that everyone now, both in Poland and abroad, will sense that things in your country will move along differently.

We wish you good health and success!

W. JARUZELSKI. Thank you very much, dear Leonid Ilyich, for the greeting and above all for the confidence you have in me. I want to tell you frankly that I had some inner misgivings about accepting this post and agreed to do so only because I knew that you support me and that you were in favor of this decision. If this had not been so, I never would have agreed to it. This is a very burdensome and very difficult task in such a complicated situation in the country, in which I now find myself both as prime minister and as minister of defense. But I understand that this is proper and necessary if you personally believe so.

L. I. BREZHNEV. Wojciech, we long ago

believed so. We long ago spoke about this to our friends.

W. JARUZELSKI. And for that reason I consented. I will do all I can, Leonid Ilyich, both as a Communist and as a soldier, to improve things and to achieve a turnaround in the situation in the country and in our party. I understand and fully agree with you that one of the crucial things right now is the selection of leadership both in the party and in the government. And for that reason I deferred any final resolution of personnel matters until the next plenum, which we will be holding within several days. This way, I can think carefully about these matters and consult with others, ending up with a comprehensive decision and not simply scattered personnel changes.

L. I. BREZHNEV. Personnel matters are very important both at the center and in the outlying regions.

W. JARUZELSKI. This issue will be resolved in the outlying regions as well. Of course this must occur in parallel with the strengthening of the party in the spirit of a stepped-up struggle. In the appropriate situation we must apply decisive actions in order to wage battle where we are confident of achieving success.

I'm now heading over to a session of the Military Council of the Armed Forces at the Ministry of Defense. There I will also be putting forth appropriate tasks. We will broadly include the army in all spheres of the life of the country.

Yesterday, after the plenum, I held a meeting with the first secretaries of the provincial committees and said that they should not take umbrage at the fact that we will be including people from the armed forces in the implementation of certain processes and will be expanding meetings between the officer corps and the working class in order to exert direct influence on the workers and shield them from the influence of "Solidarity." Of course, we are not changing our general direction in the sense that we are struggling to win back to our side the healthy forces of the nation who have gone astray and joined "Solidarity," and simultaneously we will be combating the adversary and, of course, doing so in such a way that it will produce results.

Today I am meeting with your ambassador. I will try to go over certain questions with him in greater detail and will be asking for your suggestions on some questions which he, no doubt, will convey to you.<sup>2</sup>

In keeping you informed of all the decisions we reach, we will simultaneously let you know what has motivated our decision-making in particular cases.

Right now the greatest complications in our country arise from the situation at the market. In connection with this we have been experiencing many strikes and protests, some organized by "Solidarity" and others that are simply elemental. This very much complicates efforts to carry out

measures that must be implemented and complicates our work, since the mood in society is indifferent. But we will be trying to do everything possible to improve the situation.

This is what I wanted initially to convey to you and to keep you informed about.

Once again I want to thank you very much for your kind words.

L. I. BREZHNEV. I again wish you, Wojciech, the best of health and the best of success.

W. JARUZELSKI. Thank you. Good-bye.

\* \* \* \* \*

**CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract) and  
Text of Oral Message from Brezhnev to  
Jaruzelski, 21 November 1981**

To be returned within 3 days to the  
CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector)  
Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P37/21

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromykov, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Baibakov, Zamyatin, and Smirtyukov.

Extract from Protocol No. 37 of the session of the  
CPSU CC Politburo  
on 21 November 1981

On the reception in the USSR of a party-state  
delegation from the PPR and an oral message  
from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to Comrade W.  
Jaruzelski.

1. To affirm the text of an oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, who instructed the Soviet ambassador in Poland to transmit it to Comrade W. Jaruzelski (see attached).

2. To acknowledge the desirability of receiving in the USSR a party-state delegation from the PPR headed by Comrade W. Jaruzelski on 14-15 December 1981.

To affirm the composition of the Soviet delegation at the talks with the Polish delegation: Comrades L. I. Brezhnev (head of the delegation), M. A. Suslov, Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, and K. V. Rusakov.

3. By 1 December the CPSU CC Department, the USSR Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the USSR KGB, and USSR Gosplan are to prepare all necessary materials for the talks with the Polish party-state delegations, including a draft communiqué for the press.

The CPSU CC Department and the USSR Foreign Ministry are to set forth recommendations concerning organizational measures connected with the reception of a Polish delegation in the USSR.

CC SECRETARY

Regarding point 21 of Prot. No. 37

Secret

WARSAW

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pay a visit to Comrade W. Jaruzelski and, citing your instructions, transmit to him the following oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev:

“Esteemed Comrade Jaruzelski!

“We have attentively considered your proposal to visit Moscow at the head of a party-state delegation that would include the heads of the parties allied with the PZPR, and we agree with it. As far as the timeframe is concerned, the visit might take place on 14-15 December, assuming

ing a division of power among the PZPR, ‘Solidarity,’ and the church, with the result that socialism would collapse. It is also clear that they are exploiting their current influence among the masses to establish a huge advantage in the upcoming elections for the national councils, thus continuing their path toward the legal seizure of power in the country.

“This, it seems to me, implies that it will be fundamentally important for the leading role of the PZPR to be greatly strengthened in the ‘Front of National Accord,’ as well as for the participants in the Front to recognize the PPR Constitution, socialism, and Poland’s international alliances. Will these things be done in the Statutes and other documents of the Front, and more important will they be guaranteed in practice? What do you propose to do about the elections for local organs of power, bearing in mind the risk of the party’s destruction?”

“In this connection another urgent matter arises. During many of our discussions we have emphasized the same theme over and over: We are not opposed to agreements. But such agreements must not make concessions to the enemies of socialism. And the key thing is that the agreements must not become ends in themselves. Along with measures you take to gain support among the popular masses and the different political forces, you must also take decisive actions against the sworn enemies of the popular order. You agreed with this way of framing the question and spoke yourself about your intention of struggling for the hearts and minds of the workers while at the same time attacking the class enemy.

“But now the impression emerges that you’re focusing only on the first part of this two-part formula. We know that there are still people in the leadership of your party who are still pinning all their hopes on a continuation of the bankrupt course of Kania. It would be dangerous to succumb to their entreaties. It is now absolutely clear that without a resolute struggle against the class enemy, it will be impossible to save socialism in Poland. The essential question is not whether there will be a confrontation or not, but who will begin it and by what means it will be carried out, as well as who will seize the initiative.

“I’d like to emphasize that when we speak about a confrontation, we believe it is contingent on a struggle to lure back to the side of the PZPR the workers and toiling masses who have fallen under the influence of ‘Solidarity’ and who now occupy a passive position and bide their time, waiting for things to sort themselves out at the top.<sup>4</sup>

“You and I, Wojciech Wladyslawovich, have both experienced war and we know that the strategy of fighting is crucially dependent on the question of time. This is directly related to the adverse situation that has now emerged in Poland. The leaders of the anti-socialist forces, who long ago were already gradually, and in some

places openly, preparing for a decisive onslaught, are now seeking to time it for the moment when they will have an overwhelming advantage. In particular, they are placing great stakes on the fact that a new group of recruits will be entering the army who have been worked on by ‘Solidarity.’<sup>5</sup> Doesn’t this suggest to you that a failure to take harsh measures against the counterrevolution right away will cost you invaluable time?”

“The key question is how to isolate the sworn enemies of socialism. Until that is done, nothing will change. Moreover, such an overtly counter-revolutionary organization as the ‘Confederation for an Independent Poland’ (KPN) is enlisting new supporters and is able to function legally. It’s obvious that this has been possible because the party is in fact losing control over the judicial organs, as is evident from the whole episode with the trial of Moczulski and the other leaders of KPN.

“I want to share with you some thoughts about one further matter of great urgency. It’s obvious that any actions in defense of socialism demand in the first instance a vigorous struggle for the Marxist-Leninist character of the PZPR and an increase in its combat readiness. After the 4th plenum of the PZPR CC, signs began to appear that the party organizations were springing back to life. It is important to step up this work and to prevent the local Communists from falling back into their state of passivity and hopelessness. And for this what is needed most of all is for the members of the party to be able to believe that words and deeds will no longer diverge, and that the leadership is intent on firmly and consistently implementing decisions that have been adopted.

“The strengthening of the PZPR depends also on a clear-cut line with regard to different currents of thought among its ranks. In your country some have argued that there now exist three basic directions in the party—the left, the right, and the center—and they have recommended the severance of all ties with the leftists and rightists, leaving them completely isolated by the force of the blows. This is a dangerous recommendation. Who is it, after all, that is being branded “leftists” or “hardliners”? Why, the Communists who have long been supportive of Marxist-Leninist positions, while in no way dismissing the need to rectify mistakes and distortions that have been committed. And who are the so-called rightists? These are the people who espouse revisionist views and ultimately become members of ‘Solidarity.’ It is clear that any sort of actions against staunch Communists would be suicide for the PZPR as a Communist party. And it is just as clear that until you get rid of the revisionists, including the ones in the party leadership who are trying to uphold the previous capitulationist line, they will weigh on you like a heavy burden.

“I believe these considerations provide the key to a solution of the mounting problems with

personnel. I am convinced that by working with your comrades who are oriented toward the “leftists,” and by giving them your support, you will find that it is precisely these people who provide a sound basis for the struggle to overcome the crisis.

“Esteemed Wojciech Wladyslawovich! Having raised, for your benefit, several matters that are troubling us, and having offered you my views, I naturally have left aside a number of problems that can be considered during a face-to-face meeting.<sup>6</sup>

L. BREZHNEV”

Confirm transmittal by telegram.

\* \* \* \* \*

**CPSU CC Politburo transcript,  
10 December 1981**

Top Secret  
Single Copy  
(Working Notes)

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO

10 December 1981

Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.

Also taking part: Comrades Yu. V. Andropov, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel’she, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev, B. N. Ponomarev, M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I. Dolgikh, K. V. Rusakov.

I. On the question of the situation in Poland

BREZHNEV. This question is not listed on our agenda. But I think that the session of the Politburo should begin with this matter, since we have specially dispatched Comrades [Head of Gosplan Nikolai] Baibakov and [Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Viktor] Kulikov to Poland to meet with the Polish comrades and go over certain matters of the utmost urgency. On 8 December, Comrade Kulikov provided us with information about the discussions he held in Warsaw, and yesterday, 9 December, Comrade Baibakov communicated from Warsaw that he had held a discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. From these meetings and subsequent discussions held by Comrade Baibakov, it is apparent that the Polish comrades hope to receive roughly 1.5 billion dollars’ worth of additional supplies and materials from the USSR and other socialist countries in the first quarter of the coming year.<sup>7</sup> This will include iron ore, non-ferrous metals, fertilizer, oil, tires, grain, etc.

In making this request, as you see, the Polish

comrades have in mind that shipments of goods from the USSR to Poland in 1982 will be mainly for the purpose of the USSR to Poland in 1982.<sup>8</sup>

If we speak, for example, about reserves of grain, the Poles in this year has accumulated more than 2 million tons. The population is not going hungry. Urban dwellers ride out to the markets and buy up all they products they need. And there are ample supplies of them.

As is known, by the Politburo's decision and at the request of the Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand tons of meat. Of these promised 30 thousand tons, 15 thousand have already been shipped abroad. It should be added that the produce, in this case meat, is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. During the transport of this produce to the Polish stations, genuine sabotage has been taking place. Poles have been expressing highly obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even begin to keep count of all the insults that have been directed against us.

Viewing the situation from the standpoint of the balance of payments, the Poles want to introduce a moratorium on the payment of their debt to Western countries. If they declare a moratorium, then all Polish vessels in the waters of other states or in harbor, and all other Polish property in the countries to which Poland owes debts, will be seized. For this reason the Poles have given instructions to the captains of ships to refrain from entering ports and to stay in neutral waters.

Now I will offer several words about my discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. He reaffirmed the request made earlier by Obodowski regarding the delivery of goods. Then in the evening I again went to Jaruzelski's office, accompanied by our ambassador and Comrade Kulikov. Also taking part in this discussion were Obodowski and the PZPR CC secretary who handles these matters. Jaruzelski was in a highly agitated state. It seemed that he had been deeply disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop Glemp, who, as is known, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish authorities. True, Jaruzelski promptly responded that in the event of untoward activities by "Solidarity," they will detain all hostile elements.

As far as the party organizations are concerned, they are ruined and inactive in the outlying regions. And with regard to the party as a whole, Jaruzelski said that in essence it no longer exists. The country is being destroyed, and the outlying regions are not receiving any sort of reinforcement, because the Central Committee and government are not giving firm and clear-cut instructions. Jaruzelski himself has been transformed into a man who is extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities.

RUSAKOV. Comrade Baibakov has cor-

rectly described the situation regarding the Polish economy. What, then, should we be doing now? It seems to me that we should deliver to Poland the goods provided for under the economic agreements, but that these deliveries should not exceed the quantity of goods we delivered in the first quarter of last year.

BREZHNEV. And are we able to give this much now?

BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, it can be given only by drawing on state reserves or at the expense of deliveries to the internal market.

RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries from the provincial committees. As Comrade Aristov<sup>9</sup> reported, the secretaries of the provincial committees are completely baffled by Jaruzelski's speech, which did not present a clear, straightforward line. No one knows what will happen over the next few days. There was a conversation about "Operation X." At first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12 December, and then this was changed to the night of 12-13. And now they're already saying it won't be until around the 20th. What is envisaged is that the chairman of the State Council, Jablonski, will appear on radio and television and declare the introduction of martial law. At the same time, Jaruzelski said that the law on the introduction of martial law can be implemented only after it is considered by the Sejm, and the next session of the Sejm is not scheduled until 15 December. Thus, everything has become very complicated. The agenda of the Sejm has already been published, and it makes no mention of the introduction of martial law. But even if the government does intend to introduce martial law, "Solidarity" knows this very well and, for its part, has been preparing all necessary measures to cope with that.

Jaruzelski himself says that he intends to deliver an address to the Polish nation. But in his address he won't be speaking about the party. Instead he will appeal to Polish nationalist sentiments. Jaruzelski has talked about the need to proclaim a military dictatorship, of the sort that existed under Pilsudski.<sup>10</sup> He indicated that the Poles will accept this more readily than something else.

As far as officials like Olszowski are concerned, they recently have begun to act more decisively; and one might add that at the session of the Politburo where the decision was made to introduce martial law and adopt more resolute measures against extremist figures in "Solidarity," the vote was unanimous and no one expressed a word of opposition.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, Jaruzelski intends to keep in close touch about this matter with his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the resistance put up by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades

hope to receive assistance from other countries, up to and including the introduction of armed forces on the territory of Poland. Jaruzelski is basing this hope on the speech by Comrade Kulikov, who reportedly said that the USSR and other socialist countries would indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed forces. However, as far as I know, Comrade Kulikov did not say this directly, but merely repeated the words voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our determination not to leave Poland in the lurch.

If we consider what is going on in the provinces, one must candidly say that the strength of the party organizations there has been completely dissipated. To a certain degree the administrative apparatus there is still functioning, but in effect all power has now been transferred to the hands of "Solidarity." In his recent statements, Jaruzelski is apparently trying to pull the wool over our eyes, because his words fail to reflect a proper analysis. If the Polish comrades don't quickly get organized, prepare themselves, and resist the onslaught of "Solidarity," they will have no success at all in improving the situation in Poland.

ANDROPOV. From the discussions with Jaruzelski it's clear that they have not yet reached a firm consensus about the introduction of martial law. Despite the unanimous vote by the PZPR CC Politburo on the need to introduce martial law, we still haven't seen concrete measures on the part of the leadership. The extremists in "Solidarity" are attacking the Polish leadership by the throat. The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its position, which in essence is now completely supportive of "Solidarity."

Of course in these circumstances the Polish comrades must act swiftly in launching "Operation X" and carrying it out. At the same time, Jaruzelski declares that we will resort to "Operation X" when "Solidarity" forces us to do so. This is a very disturbing sign, particularly because the latest session of the PZPR CC Politburo and the decision it adopted to introduce martial law had suggested that the Politburo was beginning to act more decisively. All the members of the Politburo expressed support for decisive action. This decision put pressure on Jaruzelski, and he is now compelled to find some way of extricating himself. Yesterday I spoke with Milewski and asked him what measures they intended and when it would be done. He replied that he simply doesn't know about "Operation X" and about the concrete timeframe in which it would be carried out. Thus, it would seem that either Jaruzelski is concealing from his comrades the plan of concrete action, or he is simply abandoning the idea of carrying out this step.

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On Information about the Polish question for the  
leaders of the fraternal countries.

To affirm the draft instructions to the Soviet  
ambassadors in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR,  
Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, the Republic of Cuba,  
Vietnam, and Laos (see attached).

CC SECRETARY

Regarding point 26 of Prot. No. 40

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retary of State Cyrus Vance, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, and on the Soviet/Russian side, former First Deputy Foreign Ministry Georgy M. Kornienko, former ambassadors Anatoly Dobrynin and Oleg Troyanovsky, and former Warsaw Pact commander Gen. Anatoly Gribkov. Project activities so far have included a planning meeting, held at Pocantico, New York, in October 1992; a conference on "SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust," on 6-9 May 1994 at the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia; a small oral history session on Soviet Policy in the Third World, in which Kornienko and former CPSU Central Committee (CC) International Department official Karen N. Brutents participated, held at Lysebu, Norway, in October 1994; and a conference on "Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1977-1980," on 23-26 March 1995 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; an additional conference, focussing on the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the collapse of detente in 1979-80, is planned for Oslo, Norway. (A related workshop on the Polish Crisis, 1980-81, is being organized by NSA and CWIHP in conjunction with the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw.)

For each conference, an effort is made to open and declassify new U.S. and Russian archival documents for the dual purpose of contributing to the conference discussion--which is subsequently transcribed and published--and to scholarly research and publications. The declassified documents are generally available at the os2g,

The fact that, toward the end of the Ford presidency, Soviet-American relations seemed to have been set back, meant that the Soviet leadership would be particularly interested in his opponent in the 1976 elections, Jimmy Carter. And although he was a political figure who was completely unknown in the USSR, and although his pre-election statements, as Moscow fully realized, did not necessarily reflect his real views, many of his statements favorably influenced the mood of the Soviet leadership. These included his critical view of Ford's refusal to use the term "détente," his criticism of Ford for putting on ice the negotiations to conclude SALT-2 on the basis of the 1974 Vladivostok accords, and his statements in favor of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a complete ban on testing, and supporting a reductions in nuclear weapons and their abolition. A

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and Brzezinski, there were noticeable differences regarding the American position on strategic offensive weapons. The transformation of Carter's position—from willingness to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the basis of the Vladivostok accords to ambitious “deep cuts”—can be explained by a series of factors. First, a sincere desire of the President himself to move as rapidly as possible to radical reductions in strategic weapons. Second, a desire by the Pentagon, supported by Brzezinski, to utilize this romantic breakthrough by Carter to significantly alter what was done in strategic arms limitations under Nixon and Ford, that is, to alter it for the unilateral advantage of the USA. Third, the influence on the President of Senator Henry Jackson and those who shared his views, who conditioned their support for a possible SALT-2 Treaty with demands regarding its content such that putting such demands forward by the American side could prevent the attainment of a treaty, which in fact is what they wanted. Fourth, although Vance, Warnke and those who shared their views considered it preferable to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the basis of the Vladivostok accords, they apparently did not fully realize, and in any case did not succeed in making Carter aware, what a psychological shock for Brezhnev was his [Carter's] rejection of Vladivostok.

Incidentally, knowing well the mood of the Soviet leaders at that time, I can with confidence say that if Carter, as he originally promised, had in March 1977 shown a willingness to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the basis of Vladivostok, and his proposal regarding “deep cuts” had been presented as an aim for subsequent negotiations, then the SALT-2 Treaty, with approximately the same content as was signed in 1979, could have been completed at the end of 1977 or beginning of 1978. And it is not excluded that the following SALT-3 Treaty, encompassing significant reductions in strategic weapons, could have been worked out already before the end of Carter's term as President. However, the possibility for such a favorable development of events was lost and the process of preparing the SALT-2 Treaty was much longer and more difficult.

For Carter's March 1977 initiative on “deep cuts” meant not only the loss of two or three months in a mechanical sense. After the propaganda noise accompanying the March initiative, returning to the “Vladivostok track” for Carter himself was a very difficult matter because of prestige and political considerations, since it looked like a defeat and retreat. This caused many additional difficulties in the subsequent negotiations, without which the process of working out the SALT-2 Treaty probably

would have been quicker and simpler. Therefore if you consider that the main motive of Carter in the rash decision in March 1977 was his sincere desire for quicker and more radical steps in disarmament, then this is one of those cases to which applies the Russian saying “the best is the enemy of the good.” A good impulse led to an opposite result.

1. [Ed. note: Documentation of Harriman's 20 September 1976 conversation with Brezhnev can be found in the Harriman Papers, Library of Congress (LC), Washington, D.C.]
2. [Ed. note: For Harriman's version of this meeting, see “Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin at my House in Washington on the Evening of November 4, 1976,” Harriman Papers, LC.]
3. [Ed. note: See “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation—WAH and President-Elect Jimmy Carter, Tuesday, November 16, 1976,” Harriman, LC].
4. [Ed. note: Additional documentation on Carter-Brezhnev oral communications during the transition period can be found in the Harriman Papers, LC, including Harriman's record of the 1 December 1976 conversation. A translation of Dobrynin's declassified report of the meeting is reprinted below.]
5. [Ed. note: See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 161.]

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*Georgiy M. Kornienko was First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union; this article is drawn from a chapter of his Russian-language memoirs, The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant (Moscow: International Relations, 1994).*

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### **CLINTON SIGNS FIRST POST-COLD WAR EXECUTIVE ORDER ON DECLASSIFICATION**

[Ed. note: On 17 April 1995, after two years of public hearings, private lobbying, interagency wrangling, and several revised (and leaked) drafts, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the first post-Cold War presidential executive ordering modifying the country's declassification system.

Amid concerns by scholars that the order would be too restrictive and fears in some government quarters that the rules would be too lax, Clinton's order, replac-

**Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin's Conversation  
with Averell Harriman, December 1, 1976**Embassy of the USSR in the USA  
Washington, D.C.Top secret  
Copy No. 1From the Journal  
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with A. HARRIMAN

December 1, 1976

On December 1 Harriman came to visit me.

I. He said that he had met with J. Carter on Monday, November 29, at his (i.e. Carter's) home in the city of Plains (state of Georgia). As had been agreed, he, Harriman, had brought to Carter's attention the messages which had been brought from Moscow on behalf of L.I. Brezhnev,<sup>1</sup>

areas to which Mr. Brezhnev had referred. With good will on both sides, President-elect Carter believes, progress can be made in the matter of cooperation between the USA and the USSR, which will strengthen peace in the whole world.

Harriman said further—continuing to read—that Carter is very satisfied with the tone of the General Secretary's message. Noting that before he assumes the post of President he is not in a position to conduct negotiations, Carter at the same time declared that when he receives the authority, he will quickly and insistently act to achieve an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons. Carter added that he would like to be sure that limitations will be mutually advantageous and that the relative power of the two sides will not be changed during the process of reductions. In addition he stressed that a means must be found to assure our peoples that the agreement will be fulfilled.

The current problems in the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons are too technical for him to comment on at the present time, and he, Carter, cannot, it goes without saying, be bound by the past negotiations. At the same time

that in the matter of 29, the side of the USSR has had the time to do this has been done over the past two years.

Further Harriman said that Carter hopes that the negotiations on limiting strategic weapons will be concluded at a summit meeting, i.e. at a personal meeting between him, Carter, and L.I. Brezhnev.

Carter thinks that the negotiations which will begin after he assumes the post of President would be accelerated if it would be possible to maintain the practice, which had justified itself in the past, of dispatching at the decisive moment in the negotiations a special trusted representative of the President to set forth the President's proposals and thoughts personally to General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev.

Harriman further reported in confidence that Carter had asked him whether L.I. Brezhnev would accept an invitation if he, Carter, invites the General Secretary to come to the United States for the final stage of the negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons.

Harriman, in his words, had expressed to Carter his own opinion to the effect that he hopes that L.I. Brezhnev will accept such an invitation, insofar as there is already established a definite order of visits of the countries' leaders to each other for summit meetings, and it was now the President's turn to invite the General Secretary to the United States.

2. During the conversation with Harriman, in relation to his comments about J. Carter's attitude about strategic arms limitation negotia-

tions, I inquired of Harriman whether he could not in a more detailed way set forth Carter's position on that question. In particular, I asked him what, concretely, did Carter have in mind when he publicly offered a proposal for a "freeze" in strategic weapons: within what temporal, quantitative, or qualitative framework was he operating.

Harriman said that he had asked that type of question in his conversation with Carter. However, Carter had answered him that for the time being he had on that issue only ideas and convictions of a general character which seemed important to him, but he still had not precisely formulated comprehensive, integrated positions.

He intends to formulate such a position when he names his chosen candidates to the posts of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Aide to the President for National Security Affairs, whom he would, as one of his highest priorities, instruct to work out this position, which would encompass the complex political and technical aspects of the entire problem.

I directed Harriman's attention to that point in the thoughts of Carter which he had transmitted to me. Brezhnev (Carter) had said that the DoD must be bound by past strategic arms limitation negotiations. I said that an approach like that is incomprehensible, if it is fraught with serious complications for future negotiations. All previous negotiations had been conducted on behalf of the United States, of the country as a whole and the arrival of a new President should not mean breaking off everything positive that had been achieved before him. I reminded Harriman that I had pointed this out to him at our previous meeting, when, in accordance with instructions certain considerations from Moscow had been expounded to him for transmittal to Carter.

Harriman said that he had recalled this when he was speaking to Carter, and had specially directed his attention to that circumstance.

Carter had answered him, Harriman, that he understands this point, and that he had therefore included in his responding thoughts to L.I. Brezhnev the comment that he will take the work that has been done at the SALT negotiations over the last two years fully into account. However, at the same time, he, Carter, would like to reserve for himself the right to express certain possible new thoughts or correctives which might occur to him in the context of finishing up a final agreement, especially if they might promote the resolution of the remaining disputed issues. In principle he wants to reserve for himself such a possibility.

3. During the conversation Harriman underlined that Carter is very interested in the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which



the following letter from L.I. Brezhnev to President J. Carter:

“To His Excellency  
James E. Carter  
The President of the United States of America

Dear Mister President,

I want on my own behalf and on behalf of my colleagues in the leadership to congratulate you once more on your assumption of the position of the President of the United States.

I attentively familiarized myself with your letter of January 26, and find it in general constructive and hope inspiring. We accepted with satisfaction confirmation of the fact that the goal

February 4, 1977

In Vance's own opinion, it is a good letter. It will be given to the President today.

Ambassador of the USSR in the USA  
[signature]

/A. DOBRYNIN/

*[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]*

\* \* \* \* \*

**Carter's Letter to Brezhnev,  
February 14, 1977**

TOP SECRET  
Copy No. 1

THE USSR EMBASSY IN THE USA  
Washington, D.C.

From the journal  
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with Assistant to the President  
Z. Brzezinski

February 15, 1977

T RR in the USA



ments, but I treat them only as steps on the way to the common goal of bringing a total halt to nuclear testing. Until then our government will observe these unratified agreements.

As far as I know there were proposals in the past to demilitarize the Indian Ocean, and these proposals were not seriously studied. I asked my colleagues to study the the Indian Ocean question thoroughly, so that we will be ready to speak more specifically about the possibility of reaching an agreement, which could promote universal peace. I ask you to inform me of your concrete ideas on this matter. I presume that in such a situation it makes sense to pay particular attention to the military activity of both countries in this region. This, as it seems, is that obvious case where mutual profit calls for a balanced agreement leading to a general reduction of military efforts in the whole region.

As you know from my public statements, I intend energetically to continue attempts to reduce the sale and transfer of conventional weapons to countries of the third world and I hope that you will join these efforts. It seems to me a senseless competition and we, as the main suppliers, are particularly responsible for placing a limit to such transfers. Obviously other providers should also be involved in these efforts, and we will widen the discussion of the question to include them.

I also welcome your aspiration to move the Vienna negotiations on reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe forward more energetically until they are at the minimum acceptable levels. We are very concerned about what seems to be an extreme increase of your military power in East Europe. At the present time we are reviewing our positions on this issue and at the same time are instructing our delegation to continue to study the data which have been presented by both sides.

These are the questions, which, I hope, Mr. Vance will be able to discuss in more detail after we complete our own analysis. We will, of course, consult with our NATO allies about everything while we conduct this concrete analysis.

I would like to make one observation regarding the four-power agreement. As you know, we think that this agreement applies to all of Berlin, and not just to West Berlin. For us, the observation of both the letter and the spirit of this agreement is very important. We make every effort to avoid sensitive issues, but we must insist that this agreement, which is so vital to our ability to develop peaceful relations in Europe, is observed in full. Recently, it seems, there has been observed a growing inclination to create new aggravations and limits in Berlin, which could upset the delicate political balance which exists there. I hope that you will cooperate in eliminating these tense situations.

We expect cooperation in the realization of further steps toward the fulfillment of the agree-

ments reached in Helsinki relating to human rights. As I said to Ambassador Dobrynin, we hope that all aspects of these agreements can be realized. It is not our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. We do not wish to create problems with the Soviet Union, but it will be necessary for our Administration from time to time to publicly express the sincere and deep feelings which our people and I feel. Our obligation to help promote human rights will not be expressed in an extreme form or by means not proportional to achieving reasonable results. We would also welcome, of course, personal, confidential exchanges of views on these delicate questions.

I noted your response to my previous observations relating to the importance of improving trade and economic relations. Your open remarks on this issue correspond to a spirit of directness which I admire, but we have to do something practical in order to remove barriers. From my side, I intend to do everything that I can to achieve mutually beneficial trade, but you are aware of certain restrictions imposed by Congress, which I must take into account.

Permit me to say a few words about our efforts to improve the situation in other areas, where there exists disagreements and potential conflicts. In the Near East, we intend to begin direct negotiations with the sides in that region, and I hope to energetically develop a process of achieving a fair and solid settlement. Mr. Vance will be happy to have the opportunity in his conversations at the end of March to learn your view on this question, including aspects which reflect our direct interest as co-sponsors of the Geneva conference.

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*mentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; translation by  
Mark H. Doctoroff.]*

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**Brezhnev's Letter to Carter,  
February 25, 1977**

Embassy of the USSR in the USA

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 1

Washington, D.C

From the Journal  
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with the USA Secretary of State

C. VANCE

February 26, 1977

I met with Secretary of State Vance and asked  
him to pass on as directed the letter of L.I.  
Brezhnev of February 25, 1977 to President Carter.

“Dear Mr. President,

I attentively studied your letter of February  
14 of this year. I want to talk sincerely about the  
impression and the ideas which it provoked here

We hope to see exactly this kind of a responsible approach when the Secretary of State Vance comes to Moscow.

This refers to the problem of strategic weapons limitation as well as to other questions, connected with stopping the arms race. We definitely are counting on the American side supporting our proposals, including the proposal to ban creation of new kinds and systems of weapons of mass destruction, to ban chemical weapons, and to conclude a world treaty on non-use of force. Our proposals on this and some other questions, including that of the Indian Ocean, were presented many times and concretely, in particular, in the United Nations. Keeping in mind the interests of international security and strengthening of peace, we could also discuss questions raised in your letter, such as: warning of missile launch tests, reduction of selling and supply of conventional weapons to the "third world" countries, and others.

We give much importance to the agreement on reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe without prejudice to the security of any of the sides.

Yet a one-sided approach is evident as far as your letter and negotiations in Vienna are concerned. This is the only way to treat, for example, the statements that the American side views its positions in regard to the Vienna negotiations with the air of some kind of "concern with excessive increase" of military power in East Europe. Not only is an objective evaluation of the real situation missing here, but also the constructive proposals, which were put forward by the USSR and other countries-participants in the negotiations and directed at achieving progress at the Vienna negotiations, are completely ignored. We are ready now and in the future for a search for solutions and outcomes, a search which does not imply that someone will receive unilateral advantages. But if we are expected to unilaterally reduce our defensive capabilities and thus put ourselves and our allies into an unequal position, such expectations will lead nowhere.

It is impossible to agree with the evaluation of the situation relating to fulfillment of the Four-power agreement which is given in the letter. The USSR never encroached and does not encroach now on the special status of Western Berlin, and the appeal for support in lifting tension in that region is directed to the wrong address. The fact that complications still arise there is connected with the completely definite policy carried out by the FRG with the connivance of three western states, and is which is practically directed at dissolving the Four-powers treaty and its cornerstone resolution—that West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and cannot be governed by it. But the attempts to break this resolution are a very slippery path leading to aggravation of the situation. We

believe that the Four-power treaty should be strictly and faultlessly observed by all interested sides, and we will in every way strive to avoid returning to the period when Western Berlin was a constant source of dangerous friction and conflicts.

Without going into details, I will say that your letter does not indicate any changes in the USA approach to such questions as settlement in the Near East or improvement in the sphere of trade-economic relations between our countries, which could bear witness to an intention to move to their successful settlement.

And finally. In the letter the question of so called "human rights" is raised again. Our qualification of the essence of this matter and of the behavior of American Administration in this respect has just been reported through our Ambassador. This is our principle position. We have no intention to enforce our customs on your country or other countries, but we will not allow interference in our internal affairs, no matter what kind of pseudo-humane pretence is used for the purpose. We will firmly react to any attempts of this kind.

And how should we treat such a situation, when the President of the USA sends a letter to the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and at the same time starts the correspondence with a renegade, who proclaimed himself to be an enemy of the Soviet State and who stands against normal, good relations between the USSR and the USA?<sup>3</sup> We would not like our patience to be tested while dealing with any matters of foreign policy, including the questions of Soviet-American relations. The Soviet Union must not be dealt with like that.

These are the thoughts, Mr. President, which my colleagues and I had in connection with your letter. I did not choose smooth phrases, though they might have been more pleasant. The things we talk about are too serious to leave space for any kind of ambiguity or reticence.

My letter is a product of sincere concern about the present and future of our relations, and it is this main idea that I want with all directness and trust to bring to you.

I hope that with an understanding of the elevated responsibility which is placed on the leadership of our two countries we will be able to provide the forward development of Soviet-American relations along the way of peace, in the interests of our and all other people.

With respect,

L. Brezhnev

February 25, 1977"

Vance read the text of the letter attentively twice and then said the following.

"Personally I welcome such direct, plain-

speaking language of the General Secretary. Our President still approaches certain international problems too lightly. For example, I told him several times, referring to the conversation with you (the Soviet Ambassador) and to the history of negotiations on the whole, that the Soviet government gives very much importance to solving of the question on cruise missiles. He doesn't pay much attention, in his striving to conclude an agreement without long negotiations on remaining contradictory questions, thinking that these questions can be put off for "later." I told him that it is not so, but... (Vance waved his hands to indicate that he did not manage to persuade the President that he was right).

I hope that the direct letter from L.I. Brezhnev, Vance went on, will make the President look at the situation in a somewhat different way.

I, of course, do not fully agree with what is written in the letter, but I hope that it is this kind of letter that the President needs to receive now."<sup>4</sup>(...)

The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA  
(signature)

/A. Dobrynin/

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **Carter's Letter to Brezhnev, March 4, 1977**

Embassy of the USSR in the USA

Top secret  
Copy No. 1

Washington, D.C.

From the Journal  
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.

#### RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with Z. BRZEZINSKI

March 5, 1977

This morning Brzezinski handed me (Vance was away) the text of President Carter's letter to L.I. Brezhnev of March 4, 1977.

"To His Excellency  
Leonid I. Brezhnev  
General Secretary  
of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party  
of the Soviet Union  
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

Your letter of February 25 raised in me some concern because of its moderately sharp tone, because in it there was no recognition of my own good intentions, and because it did not contain any positive answer to the concrete proposals which were set forth in my previous letter. Differences between our countries are deep enough and I hope that you and I will never aggravate them with doubts regarding our respective personal motives.

The fact is that neither in Vladivostok, nor during the subsequent negotiations, was any final agreement achieved on the question of cruise missiles and the bomber "Backfire". I am sure that such agreements can be achieved in the future, and I am committed to achieving them. I understand your concern about postponing these questions until future negotiations, yet I believe that we will gain a definite benefit in that we will give an impulse toward a quicker resolution of an agreement, and I want to stress that postponement of these two controversial questions would be aimed only at expediting a quicker agreement, with all its positive political consequences. I am also sure that with a mutual demonstration of good will we should be able to reach an agreement on such questions as conventional weapons, tactical nuclear arms and throw weight.

Not for a minute do I allow myself to underestimate the difficulties which stand in our way. Solving these problems will demand determination, patience and decisiveness. Keeping precisely this in mind, I wanted to make two more suggestions, and both of which aim at resolving the disagreements between us.

First of all, I think it would be extremely useful, if you shared with us your own views on a significant reduction of strategic forces levels which we could achieve in the next four or five years. During previous negotiations on strategic weapons limitation, we were inclined to take small steps in the direction of a vague future; I propose that instead of this we now strive to define a concrete, longer-term goal, towards which we later could advance step by step with a greater guarantee of success.

Second, the quick conclusion of official agreement between us regarding the problems on which, as it seems, both sides are inclined to agree would facilitate our search for stable mutual understanding. We should use the fact that we have an agreement, or could achieve quick agreement on such questions as:

- a) limiting the number of strategic delivery vehicles to 2400 items (or a mutually acceptable lower level);
- b) limiting the number of launchers equipped with MIRV to the level of 1320 items (or a mutually acceptable lower level);

- c) a resolution on mutually satisfactory verification;
- d) advance warning of missile tests;
- e) a universal test ban, including a temporary resolution regarding the completion of the current peaceful programs;
- f) an agreement not to arm satellites and not to develop a capability to eliminate or damage the satellites;
- g) demilitarization of the Indian ocean;
- h) a limitation on civil defense measures;
- i) mutual restraint in selling weapons to third world countries;
- j) a ban on mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Of course, the above list is not a complete one, and other relatively non-controversial questions could easily be added to it. The main thing is to move forward without delay on those questions on which we can reach an agreement, thus creating the impulse necessary to get down to work on the more intractable issues straight after that.

We are working on these problems with maximum energy, preparing for Secretary of State Vance's talks with you in Moscow.

L.I. Brezhnev.

Dear Mr. President,

Having become acquainted with your letter of March 4, I would like once again to set forth the essence of our understanding of the situation regarding the preparation of the agreement (for the period until 1985) on limitation of offensive strategic weapons and in more detail to explain our position on the concrete questions which so far remain unresolved.

Let me start with several general considerations. We, it goes without saying, are in favor of concluding an agreement as quickly as possible, without delay. But an effort to do that on the basis of some sort of artificial, simplified variant will hardly accelerate the matter, if we have in mind the goal which we have posed for ourselves, that is: to genuinely limit strategic weapons, guided by the principle of not inflicting any loss on either of the contracting sides. In exactly the same way, the preparation of an



## THE SUDOPLATOV CONTROVERSY:

The Authors of *SPECIAL TASKS* Respond to Critics

[Ed. note: The previous issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin* (Issue 4, Fall 1994) contained several articles that expressed criticisms of a book by former KGB officer Pavel Sudoplatov—*Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster*, by Pavel and Anatolii Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1994)—particularly its assertion that several leading scientists involved in the Manhattan Project, including Enrico Fermi, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr, knowingly and improperly provided secret atomic information to Soviet espionage. At the time, the *Bulletin* invited Sudoplatov or his co-authors to respond in the next issue, and they do so below, in letters from the Schecters, from Pavel Sudoplatov (for the paperback edition of *Special Tasks*), and from Stanford University professor Robert Conquest, who contributed the foreword to *Special Tasks*. As before, the *Bulletin* welcomes contributions from anyone wishing to contribute evidence to the debate, or to respond to statements contained in the letters below, in future issues.]

April 21, 1995

TO THE EDITOR:

A year after the publication of *SPECIAL TASKS* by Pavel A. Sudoplatov, and the media uproar it evoked, not one of Sudoplatov's critics has shown him to be mistaken in any significant aspect of his revelation of how Soviet atomic espionage was conducted.

In the *CWIHP Bulletin*, fall 1994, three critics were given extensive space to attack the validity of Sudoplatov's account without providing any opportunity for opposing views to be stated examining the validity of their criticisms. There was no presentation from those who consider Sudoplatov's oral history a major contribution to understanding the Stalin period and atomic espionage. David Holloway, Yuri Smirnov and Vlad Zubok, each with their own unstated agenda, dismiss both Sudoplatov's account of Soviet atomic espionage and the Bohr documents that verify a part of it. Attacks on

Sudoplatov's character are not substantive rebuttal. It is rather curious that David Holloway, who at great length explains the difficulties of meshing the sources of his scholarship, refuses to listen to the one living participant who, because of the senior role he played, has a unique perspective on how the parts of the story fit together.

The publication of *SPECIAL TASKS* brought forth a latent and angry battle in Moscow over who should take credit for the success of the Soviet atomic bomb. Lining up against Sudoplatov and his co-workers were scientists who feared that they would lose the honors and credit they received for their contribution. Yuri Smirnov is the leader of this group. Standing beside them are present day Russian intelligence officers, successors to the KGB, who had their own publishing contract to tell the atomic espionage story and were under pressure to produce documentation on their alleged super-spy Perseus. On Sudoplatov's side, able to verify pieces of the story, were elderly intelligence veterans, fearful of coming forward because of threats to their pensions.

This angry debate spilled over into the American media. Writers like Holloway and Richard Rhodes, who had done significant research among scientists, but were unable to come up with primary sources on Soviet atomic espionage, acted as surrogates for the scientists and attacked Sudoplatov. Holloway relies heavily on the point of view of surviving scientist Yuli Khariton, whose interest is not to give credit to the contributions of the hated Soviet intelligence apparatus. Sudoplatov, contrary to claims by Smirnov and Zubok, has been evenhanded in giving credit to both scientists and intelligence officers.

We helped Sudoplatov tell his story by organizing the chronology and translating his words into readable English. We did not alter accounts of poisoning, terrorism, espionage and perversions of ideology that made him an unwanted witness in Russia and an NKVD monster in the West. He remains a Stalinist with few regrets. We did not soften his tone nor did we enhance his account.

It was professionally irresponsible for the *Bulletin* to print Smirnov's and Zubok's

dismissal of the Bohr documents without an equal side-by-side explanation from physicists who have affirmed the intelligence value of the answers Bohr gave to the questions prepared by Soviet intelligence in November 1945. Holloway's contention that Bohr did not go beyond the Smythe report in his replies to Terletsky has been seriously contested by physicists who examined the documents (See *Sunday Times* [London], June 26, 1994). The claim that Bohr was only a theoretician and could not have commented on engineering problems is belied by Margaret Gowing, an author who wrote about the British bomb program and who is highly praised by Holloway.

Smirnov and Zubok can hardly be counted disinterested critics, since each is transmitting the position of his constituency.

A few of the recent affirmations of Sudoplatov's story are worthy of note:

# According to Yuri I. Drozdov, former chief of KGB Illegal Operations 1980 to 1991, and who served in the New York residency of the KGB from 1975 to 1979, "Sudoplatov's information on the cooperation of outstanding American physicists with Soviet intelligence is quite reliable."

Drozdov's statement was solicited and quoted by the editorial board of *Juridical Gazette*, a Moscow publication, in a footnote to a book review of "Special Tasks" in March, 1995.

The review, written by Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin, head of the First Chief Directorate (foreign operations) of the KGB from 1988 to 1991, reads in part:

"The book *SPECIAL TASKS* is very attractive and in its totality appears to be reliable. If there were legends in the intelligence service Pavel A. Sudoplatov would have been the hero, but the traditions of the intelligence service are not to reminisce. The more important the case the narrower the list of people who know about it, and these people are accustomed to keep silence.

"Now (fifty years later) the archives are stolen and the enemies of Russia exploit the secrets of the country in their interests. Here comes a remarkable and surprising event in the midst of these unjust judgments, where false witnesses dominate the scene and where



the judges pursue their own goals. Here comes a witness who is alive and tries to speak the truth about the events of many years ago.”

# The director of the Russian State Archives, Sergei Vladimirovich Mironenko, affirmed that Sudoplatov’s account of Soviet atomic espionage was “correct in essential points” according to documents of the NKVD from 1944 to 1953, which were released in June 1994. (See *Moscow News* #23, 1994). They include the documents on Terletsky’s mission to Niels Bohr and the formal establishment of the committee headed by Sudoplatov to coordinate atomic espionage. “The main sensation is not this but what we learned about the system. We therefore are confronted with the necessity of looking into other documents,” said Mironenko, who urged that the Presidential archives and the security ministry archives open their files.

# Former KGB officer Vladimir Barkovsky (who handled agents in England) has affirmed Sudoplatov’s account that Donald Maclean was the first to warn the Soviets that the British were seriously investigating the possibility of constructing an atomic weapon. British critics of Sudoplatov were in error in attributing the early report to John Cairncross.

# The presence of intelligence officer Kosoy, a TASS correspondent under cover in Sweden, confirmed a triangular link among Sweden, the U.S. and the Soviet Union as a path for espionage information.

# Soviet intelligence officer Arkady Rylov, who handled incoming espionage documents for Sudoplatov, stated on Russian TV that Semyon (Sam) Semyonov, a Soviet intelligence officer instrumental in acquiring atomic secrets in the United States, told him the sources of the material were Oppenheimer, Fermi and Szilard.

# Zoya Zarubin, who was a young translator working for Sudoplatov in the early 1940s, stated in a videotaped interview that she worked closely with Igor Kurchatov (director of the Soviet atomic bomb program) to translate the first espionage documents into workable Russian. She said that Soviet intelligence officer Zoya Rybkina, for whom she also worked, proudly told her that she was in contact with Niels Bohr on important information. Elizabeth Zarubin, the intelligence officer whom Sudoplatov said was successful in penetrating

Oppenheimer’s circle, was Zoya Zarubin’s stepmother.

In his own letter, which will appear in the forthcoming paperback edition of *SPECIAL TASKS*, Pavel Sudoplatov offers more details on Soviet atomic espionage operations. He has requested that the *Bulletin* publish his letter.

Sincerely yours,  
Jerrold L. Schecter  
Leona P. Schecter

*The following letter will appear in the paperback edition of SPECIAL TASKS to be published by Little, Brown and Company on June 1, 1995*

Writing memoirs, especially for the unwanted witness, is always risky. The events one describes have already been interpreted by interests in power whose version influences prominent historians

with former colleagues who worked with me and they reminded me that in 1949 top level American nuclear scientists turned down the approach of our illegals in the United States, led by Colonel Rudolf Abel, to resume cooperation “with the international anti-fascist scientific community.” By that time the Cold War was on and the Americans knew we had our own bomb.

Certainly, I do not pretend to know everything about Soviet intelligence operations during the period 1930 to 1953, but as chief of one of the main intelligence services I must stress that from 1941 atomic issues were discussed in my presence at the regular meetings of the four chiefs of Russian mili-

tific information provided by senior scientific personnel of the Manhattan Project we also channeled to our government reports about security rules in Los Alamos and code names used in internal U.S. government correspondence on the matter of atomic research. My colleagues recalled that in 1946, under direct orders from Beria and Vannikov, I transferred from Lefortovo and Lubyanka all technical intelligence information on the atomic problem to the administration of the Special Government Committee on Atomic Energy. The sources of that information were very closely held under Beria's direct personal control and when he was arrested in 1953 his files were moved to the Kremlin under Malenkov's orders. Beria's intelligence records, which contain the names of sources of secret atomic bomb information, have not been released and their location remains uncertain. Beria's atomic intelligence materials are not in the Enormous File of the Federal Intelligence Service. Perhaps the most secret parts of the Enormous file are in Beria's personal file in the Ministry of Security archives from that period. The Bohr documents were not found in the Enormous File, which contains the atomic espionage materials, but in the Russian State Archives files of the Interior Ministry.

My story is based on what I remember. I had no direct access to archives which in small details may be more or less correct than my memory. However, the thrust and important facts of my story are irrefutable and it was my duty to reveal the hidden motives of tragic events in Soviet history. I am glad that my explanation of the death of Raoul Wallenberg in *Special Tasks* will be included in the proceedings of the Russian-Swedish Commission on the Wallenberg Affair, which met in Moscow in 1994.

There are those in the former KGB and the scientific community who want to direct the public not to believe me because my story interferes with their book contracts or detracts from their scientific honors. Some would like to erase the record of combat and terrorist operations in the Stalin years. Today Russian and Western clandestine special operations continue in the Middle East against Syria, Iraq and Iran, described as criminal and terrorist governments, and against nationalities seeking their independence from Russia. These facts of international life still exist. Neither they nor the

*Special Tasks* I have described can be denied simply because they have never before been revealed. That something has not been told before does not mean it is not true.

signed/ Pavel A.Sudoplatov

\* \* \* \* \*

6 February 1995

To the Editor:

Your treatment of the Bohr document [in *CWIHP Bulletin* #4], highly interesting in many respects, nevertheless is peculiar in others. Most of your contributors are concerned to defend Niels Bohr's moral integrity. But this is not at issue, though his political attitudes may be. Whatever information he did or did not give was certainly in accord with his principles. The question is merely a factual one. Some of your contributors say he did not have any secrets, so could not give any to the Soviets; others that he had some, but would not have given them. And did he only say what was already in the Smythe Report? Yuri Smirnov puts it that "practically" everything he told was in the Report. Kurchatov's comment says that two points were of use. A British and an American physicist are lately on record to the effect that his replies were clearly helpful. A layman, while thus noting that professional opinion is by no means as one-sided as implied in your pages, is not in a position to judge. (Even a layman can indeed note remarks—for example on the vast number of spectrographs—which are not in the Report, though perhaps not of great use.) In any case, the NKVD feared it was being misled by the Smythe Report, as Feklisov (as quoted by Zubok) noted: so at least from an intelligence point of view, even mere confirmation was welcome. The question remains far less clear cut than your contributors imply.

The other concern of most of these contributors is to attack Sudoplatov. Sudoplatov certainly misunderstood, misremembered, or exaggerated, much of the significance of the Bohr interview. But some of the criticisms make no sense. David Holloway doubtless wrote in jest when he said that since Sudoplatov had co-authors it was impossible to know which wrote what. There are dozens of books of the same type. In any case, on the main point at issue,

Bohr's providing of information, Sudoplatov was already on record in July 1982. Again, one comment, by Smirnov, faults Sudoplatov for "shoddy research" in getting wrong a highly peripheral detail (on the dates and reasons for Bohr's trip to Russia). But "research" is not the point of such memoirs. Look at, for example, *Khrushchev Remembers*, where the "original material" (Strobe Talbott tells us in his Editor-Translator's note) was "quite disorganized" when it came into his hands; and which is full of misremembered (and uncorrected) detail—muddling up different plenums, confusing Lominadze's suicide with that of Ordzhonikidze three years later, etc., etc., while remaining, in Talbott's words "devastating and authoritative." (As to such discrepancies, we may note them in highly reputable or accepted sources: for example, the very venue of the wartime Bohr-Heisenberg meeting is disputed. And incidentally it seems odd that the Bohr-Terletsky meeting is not referred to all at in Abraham Pais' massive biography of Bohr.)

With all its errors it seems clear that on the substance of the Bohr incident—the fact of and the organization of the physicist's

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occasions.

The document is the record of the Politburo meeting of October 22, 1986, which

**COLD WAR  
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT**

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson Interna-