

STALIN'S CONVERSATIONS

Talks With Mao Zedong, December 1949-January 1950, And With Zhou Enlai, August-September 1952

with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok

This issue of the Cold War International History Project *Bulletin* leads off with translations of five meetings between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and top leaders (Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai) of the newly-created People's Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and 1952. The originals of the documents, which constitute some of the most intimate glimpses of the personal interaction between Soviet and Chinese leaders yet to emerge from the formerly closed archives of the communist world, are kept in the Russian Presidential Archives (officially known as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) in Moscow. They were recently declassified by Russian authorities in connection with efforts to gather materials related to the Korean War for presentation by the Russian Government to South Korea. CWIHP obtained copies of these documents, as well as many other Russian archival records concerning the Korean War which appear later in this issue of the *Bulletin*, as a consequence of its cooperation with a research project involving the Center for Korean Research, Columbia University, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

(Photocopies of all the Russian documents obtained by CWIHP are available to researchers through the National Security Archive, a non-governmental documents repository, library, and research institute located on the seventh floor of The Gelman Library at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and will also be made available through Columbia University.)

The documents that follow begin with transcripts of two conversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, which took place in Moscow on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950, during the Chinese leader's two-month visit to the USSR shortly after the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. Those conversations came as the two countries negotiated the terms of the incipient Sino-Soviet alliance following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and also constituted the first and only personal encoun-

ter between these two communist titans and major figures of 20th-century world history.

Next come three transcripts of conversations in Moscow between Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in August-September 1952, where issues on the table for discussion included the ongoing Korean War, Sino-Soviet ties, and the relationship of both to the broader Cold War. The transcripts yield insights into these issues, and also into the state of mind of Stalin himself in his final months (he died in March 1953), one of the murkiest periods in his nearly-three decade reign over the USSR.

To assess the significance of these documents, the *CWIHP Bulletin* has assembled four specialists familiar with Sino-Soviet relations, and the personalities of Stalin and Mao, from various perspectives: **Prof. Chen Jian** (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale), author of *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); **Prof. Vojtech Mastny** (Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, currently at the University of Hokkaido, Japan), author of *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, 1947-1953* (Oxford University Press, 1996), a forthcoming sequel to his *Russia's Road to the Cold War, 1941-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); **Dr. Odd Arne Westad** (Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute), author of *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and **Dr. Vladislav M. Zubok** (National Security Archive), co-author (with Constantine Pleshakov) of *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, March 1996).

Translations of the documents were performed for CWIHP by Danny Rozas, with additional assistance from Kathryn Weathersby and Chen Jian.

—Jim Hershberg, Editor, *CWIHP Bulletin*

**Rivals and Allies:
Stalin, Mao, and the Chinese Civil War,
January 1949**

Introduction by Odd Arne Westad

could be translated into Russian.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I am currently reviewing my works which were published in various local publishing houses and which contain a mass of errors and misrepresentations. I plan to complete this review by spring of 1950. However, I would like to receive help from Soviet comrades: first of all, to work on the texts with Russian translators and, secondly, to receive help in editing the Chinese original.

Comrade Stalin: This can be done. However, do you need your works edited?

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, and I ask you to select a comrade suitable for such a task, say, for example, someone from CC VKP/b/ [All-Union Communist Party of bolsheviks].

Comrade Stalin: It can be arranged, if indeed there is such a need.

Also present at the meeting: comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinskii, [Soviet translator N.T.] Fedorenko and [Chinese translator] Shi Zhe /Karskii/.

Recorded by comr. Fedorenko.

[signature illegible 31/XII]

[Source: *Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis (op.)*

1, delo (d.) 329, listy (ll.) 9-17; translation by Danny Rozas.]

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II. Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow, 22 January 1950

RECORD OF CONVERSATION
BETWEEN COMRADE I.V. STALIN
AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MAO ZEDONG

22 January 1950

After an exchange of greetings and a short discussion of general topics, the following conversation took place.

Stalin: There are two groups of questions which must be discussed: the first group of questions concerns the existing agreements between the USSR and China; the second group of questions concerns the current events in Manchuria, Xinjiang, etc.

I think that it would be better to begin not with the current events, but rather with a discussion of the existing agreements. We believe that these agreements need to be changed, though earlier we had thought that

they could be left intact. The existing agreements, including the treaty, should be changed because war against Japan figures at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war is over and Japan has been crushed, the situation has been altered, and now the treaty has become an anachronism.

I ask to hear your opinion regarding the treaty of friendship and alliance.

Mao Zedong: So far we have not worked out a concrete draft of the treaty, only a few outlines.

Stalin: We can exchange opinions, and then prepare an appropriate draft.

Mao Zedong: Judging from the current situation, we believe that we should strengthen our existing friendship using the help of treaties and agreements. This would resonate well both in China and in the international arena. Everything that guarantees the future prosperity of our countries must be stated in the treaty of alliance and friendship, including the necessity of avoiding a repetition of Japanese aggression. So long as we show interest in the prosperity of our countries, one cannot rule out the possibility that the imperialist countries will attempt to hinder us.

Stalin: True. Japan still has cadres remaining, and it will certainly lift itself up again, especially if Americans continue their current policy.

Mao Zedong: Two points that I made

earlier are cardinal in changing our future treaty from the existing one. Previously, the Guomindang spoke of friendship in words only. Now the situation has changed, with all the conditions for real friendship and cooperation in place.

In addition, whereas before there was talk of cooperation in the war against Japan, now attention must turn to preventing Japanese aggression. The new treaty must include the questions of political, economic, cultural and military cooperation. Of most importance will be the question of economic cooperation.

Stalin: Is it necessary to keep the provision, stated in article 3 of the current Treaty of friendship: "...This article shall remain in force up until that time when, by request of both High Participants in the Treaty, the United Nations is given the

offices of the commission chairman and of the director should be replaced by Chinese cadres. However, given comrade Molotov's proposals, this question requires more thought.

Stalin: If we are talking about joint administration, then it is important that the replacements for the managing position be alternated. That would be more logical. As for the duration of the agreement, we would not be against shortening it.

Zhou Enlai: Should we not change the ratio of capital investment by each side, by increasing the level of Chinese investment to 51%, instead of the current requirement for parity?

Molotov: This would go against the existing provision for parity.

Stalin: We do indeed have agreements with the Czechs and the Bulgarians which provide for parity and equal-footing for both sides. Since we already have joint administration, then we might as well have equal participation.

Mao Zedong: The question needs to be further examined, keeping in mind the interests of both sides.

Stalin: Let us discuss the credit agreement. We need to officially formalize that which has already been agreed to earlier. Do you have any observations to make?

Mao Zedong: Is the shipment of military arms considered a part of the monetary loan?

Stalin: This you can decide yourself: we can bill that towards the loan, or we can formalize it through trade agreements.

Mao Zedong: If the military shipments are billed towards the loan, then we will have little means left for industry. It appears that part of the military shipments will have to be billed towards the loan, while the other part will have to be paid with Chinese goods. Can't the period of delivery of industrial equipment and military arms be shortened from 5 to 3-4 years?

Stalin: We must examine our options. The matter rests in the requisition list for our industry. Nevertheless, we can move the date that the credit agreement goes into effect to 1 January 1950, since the shipments should begin just about now. If the agreement specified July 1949 as the time for the commencement of the loan, the international community would not be able to understand how an agreement could have been reached between the Soviet Union and China, which

at the time did not even have its own government. It seems that you should hasten somewhat to present the requisition list for industrial equipment. It should be kept in mind that the sooner such a list is presented, the better for the matter at hand.

Mao Zedong: We believe that the conditions of the credit agreement are generally favorable to China. Under its terms we pay only one percent interest.

Stalin: Our credit agreements with people's democracies provide for two percent interest. We could, says comr. Stalin jokingly, increase this interest for you as well, if you would like. Of course, we acted under the premise that the Chinese economy was practically in ruin.

As is clear from the telegrams that we have received, the Chinese government intends to use its army in the reconstruction of its economy. That is very good. In our time we also made use of the army in our economic development and had very good results.

Mao Zedong: That's right. We are drawing on the experience of our Soviet comrades.

Stalin: You raised the question of China receiving a certain amount of grain for Xinjiang?

Mao Zedong: Wheat and textile.

Stalin: For this you need to come up with the necessary requests that include numbers.

Mao Zedong: Very well, we shall prepare these.

How shall we proceed with the trade agreement?

Stalin: What is your opinion? Up until now we have only had a trade agreement with Manchuria. We would like to know what sort of a situation we should look forward to in the future: will we be signing separate agreements with Xinjiang, Manchuria and other provinces, or a single agreement with the central government?

Mao Zedong: We would like to have a single, central agreement. But in time Xinjiang may have a separate agreement.

Stalin: Just Xinjiang; what about Manchuria?

Zhou Enlai: A separate agreement with Manchuria can be ruled out, since in the agreement with the central government China's obligations would in essence be fulfilled by shipments made from Manchuria.

Stalin: We would like the central government to sanction and take the responsibility for the agreements with Xinjiang or Manchuria.

Mao Zedong: The agreement with Xinjiang must be signed in the name of the central government.

Stalin: Right, since [a] provincial government might not take many things into account, whereas things are always clearer to the central government.

What other questions do you have?

Mao Zedong: At the present time the main question is economic cooperation - the reconstruction and development of the Manchurian economy.

Stalin: I think that we will entrust the preparation of this question to comrs. Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, Zhou Enlai, and [CCP CC member and Vice Chairman of Finance and Economics Commission] Li Fuchun.

Any other questions?

Mao Zedong: I would like to note that the air regiment that you sent to China was very helpful. They transported 10 thousand people. Let me thank you, comrade Stalin, for the help and ask you to allow it to stay a little longer, so it could help transport provisions to [CCP CC member and commander of the PLA's Second Field Army] Liu Bocheng's troops, currently preparing for an attack on Tibet.

Stalin: It's good that you are preparing to attack. The Tibetans need to be subdued. As for the air regiment, we shall talk this over with the military personnel and give you an answer.

The meeting took two hours.

Present at the meeting were comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, Roshchin, Fedorenko and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, [PRC Ambassador to the USSR] Wang Jiaxiang, [CCP CC member] Chen Boda, and Shi Zhe /Karskii/.

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 29-38; translation by Danny Rozas.]

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III. Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952

[Classification level blacked out: "NOT SECRET" stamped]

RECORD OF CONVERSATION
BETWEEN COMRADE
I.V. STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI

20 August 1952

Present:

On the Soviet side
comrs. Molotov, Vyshinskii,
Fedorenko.

strong on its own feet.

Zhou Enlai informs that they would like to receive an additional 800 specialists from Soviet Union.

Stalin says that this request will be examined and that we will try to send as many as we can.

Zhou Enlai asks also for assistance with technical documentation (blueprints, etc.).

Stalin answers that this is, indeed, necessary.

Zhou Enlai asks if it will be possible to continue to educate students in the USSR and to send interns to Soviet enterprises.

Stalin expresses agreement.

Zhou Enlai touches on the question of the military five year plan. Informs that materials are under preparation and that a written report will be presented. Also wishes to receive military equipment.

Stalin asks what Zhou Enlai has in mind: shipments of weapons or equipment for military factories.

Zhou Enlai says that he meant shipments of weapons. Noting that since agreement has already been expressed with regard

observation and notes that the Chinese government is addressing this matter. They have maintenance factories and are currently working to organize assembly plants; these plants will open next year.

Stalin inquires whether China has worker education schools in their factories. Adds that we have such a school in every factory.

Zhou Enlai admits that this is one of the weaker spots. They are taking measures to rectify the situation. There are courses given in factories. They are trying to attract students and are selecting party members to teach.

Stalin points out that we have a special ministry, the Ministry of Labor Resources. There are vocational schools. It would be good for China to establish something of the sort. Every year these schools graduate around 1 mln. young workers.

Zhou Enlai asks, what sort of institutions does Soviet Union have to train middle management cadres[?]

Stalin explains that there are special technical schools for this purpose.

Zhou Enlai says that he would like to discuss the question of radar.

Stalin promises to assist in this matter. Radio and radar are very important.

Zhou Enlai says that they were m 54[his purpose.

unsure of what Kim Il Sung thinks. Perhaps it would be good to speak to them about this.

Stalin agrees.

Zhou Enlai repeats that the Chinese government believes that it is wise to continue the negotiations in Panmunjom. But China is preparing for the possibility of another 2-3 years of war. Again asks for assistance with aviation, artillery, and ammunition, as China cannot deal with these matters on its own.

Stalin announces that everything we can give you, we will.

Asks how is the Korean morale. Is there confusion?

Zhou Enlai explains that, indeed, there has been much destruction in Korea, especially after the bombing of the electric power station on the Yalu river. This has had an impact on Korean morale and on their efforts to accelerate the struggle to achieve peace.

Stalin says that the American strategy is fright. But they have not frightened China. Could it be said that they have also failed to frighten Korea?

Zhou Enlai affirms that one could essentially say that.

Stalin. If that is true, then it's not too bad.

Zhou Enlai adds that Korea is wavering somewhat. They are in a slightly unsteady state. Among certain elements of the Korean leadership one can detect a state of panic, even.

Stalin reminds that he has been already informed of these feelings through Kim Il Sung's telegram to Mao Zedong.

Zhou Enlai confirms this.

Asks how should the Chinese delegation proceed further.

KChZhD, caoutchouc, and the construction of the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan railroad.

Zhou Enlai referring to the hevea question, says that they will take all measures in order to provide USSR with 15-20 thousand tons a year, but they are apprehensive that the blockade and other measures directed against China by its enemies may prevent it from fulfilling this commitment in full. The

147, excluding military arsenals (aero-manufacturing enterprises, tank enterprises, ship-building enterprises). Explains that these 147 enterprises are not military, though they serve military needs.

Stalin. We usually build few new enterprises; we try to expand existing ones. It's more economical. However, China will have to build new ones, since there aren't enough existing ones. During the war we converted aero-maintenance shops into aero-manufacturing plants, and automobile factories into tank factories. We frequently resorted to inter-enterprise cooperation, producing parts in various enterprises and then assembling them. China ought to try this method. It is simpler than building special factories.

Zhou Enlai says that during the civil war years they also made use of cooperation among enterprises in the manufacture of light weapons, but now they are embarking upon the manufacture of heavy weapons, and that requires creating a base.

Shifts to the question of how to cover the cost of the trade imbalance between the Soviet Union and China. Says that there are 3 ways to cover this cost: 1) increase Chinese exports to the USSR; 2) receive payments in foreign currency - dollars, pound sterling, Hong Kong dollars, Swiss francs; 3) credit. Asks which of the three options is most acceptable.

Stalin. Perhaps it will be necessary to make use of all three.

Zhou Enlai says that they are planning to increase exports to the USSR to 13 bln. rubles. We can supply cattle, leather, fur, wool, silk, mineral resources, and food-stuffs: beans, fats, tea.

Notes that over five years they could collect up to 200 mln. American dollars, as well as 1.6 bln. British pound sterling, Hong Kong dollars, and Swiss francs.

Stalin. American dollars are preferable. British pound sterling have limited circulation. As for Hong Kong dollars, you should consult our Ministry of Finance.

The Soviet Union needs lead, wolfram [tungsten], tin, and antimony. We would like you to increase the deliveries of these.

Notes that we would also accept lemons, oranges, and pineapples which the Soviet Union buys from other countries.

Zhou Enlai says that the loan of 4 billion rubles that they would like to receive from the USSR consists of the following:

985 mln. rbls. - weapons shipments for 60 divisions; 2,126 mln. rbls. - military-naval shipments; 100 mln. rbls. - caoutchouc; 800 mln. rbls. - industrial equipment.

Stalin. We will have to give something, though the exact amount must be calculated. We cannot give four billion.

Zhou Enlai says that this amount does not include aviation. They intend to pay cash for aviation.

Stalin. The question here is not in the monetary amount, but in whether we will be able to produce this much equipment. All that will have to be determined, which will take some two months.

Zhou Enlai shifts to the question of specialists. Says that beginning with 1953, China will need new specialists in the following fields: financial and economic matters - 190 people, military - 417, medical school instructors and others - 140. In addition, they will also need specialists for the military industry, though this matter is still being studied.

Stalin. This will have to be examined: what specialists, in which fields and with what profiles. We will send some, though it's difficult to say how many.

Have you found the Soviet specialists currently working in China useful?

Zhou Enlai responds that they are very useful.

Asks whether comrade Stalin has any remarks to make on the recently submitted report.

Stalin. The impression is a positive one. China is growing. China must become the flagship of Asia. It must in its turn supply other countries with specialists.

Zhou Enlai notes that the report contains a footnote, specifying that in the event the war ends, we would like to create an army of 3,200 thousand people, with 102 divisions.

Stalin. That's good. But that's the minimum. China must be well armed, especially with air and naval forces.

Zhou Enlai. We project on having 150 air regiments with 13,000 flight personnel.

Stalin. That's too few. You'll have to add some. You should have 200 air regiments.

Zhou Enlai. Then we will have to increase the number of flight personnel.

Stalin. That's right. You will probably have to shift to three-regiment divisions. That's more economical - less division staff.

Zhou Enlai asks whether there needs to

be a certain ratio maintained between fighter jets and reciprocating engine planes.

Stalin says that reciprocating engine fighter-planes should be gradually retired and replaced by jets. Fighter jets have a speed of 800 kilometers. Pilots should be trained on reciprocating engine planes and then transferred to jet planes. Reciprocating engine planes should be completely retired over the next two years. We will give you new fighters with speeds of 1000-1100 km/h. You must not fall behind in this matter.

Zhou Enlai raises the question of providing China with technical documentation for the manufacture of the following weapons: 122mm howitzers, 37mm guns and 67.2mm field guns.

Stalin says that the blueprints can be provided.

Zhou Enlai asks whether they should immediately begin the construction of tank factories or build automobile and tractor factories first, and then convert them to tank production.

Stalin responds that some sort of a tank manufacturing plant should be built. Such a plant could be gradually expanded. As for automobile factories, you definitely need more of them.

Zhou Enlai says that they will redraft their five year plan and will seek our advice; the redrafted materials will be submitted to comrade Molotov.

Stalin advises to fix the overall growth [rate] at 15%, and at 20% for yearly plans. Notes that that would be a plan with a reserve margin. Points out the importance of giving the workers a slogan for overfulfilling the plan. Such a plan can be overfulfilled. Says that this is exactly how we draft our plans, with a certain reserve margin, since there is a possibility of having unfavorable circumstances. You can't plan for everything.

Stalin expresses interest in the production of naval mines in the PRC.

Zhou Enlai responds that plans for a naval mine factory are being drafted.

Stalin points out the importance of defending Chinese sea ports.

Inquires about the situation in Macao.

Zhou Enlai replies that Macao continues, as before, to be in Portugal's hands.

Stalin says that this scum that has situated itself on the very entrance to China must be driven out.

Zhou Enlai says that in their relations with Southeast Asian countries they are

maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma, where PRC has been trying to influence its government through peaceful means. The same in Tibet. Asks whether this is a good strategy.

Stalin. Tibet is a part of China. There must be Chinese troops deployed in Tibet. As for Burma, you should proceed carefully.

Zhou Enlai says that the Burmese government is concealing its true position with regard to China, but is actually maintaining an anti-China policy, orienting itself with

pay for the maintenance of Chinese and Korean POWs.

STALIN says that this proposal can be acceptable, but we must keep in mind that the Americans will not want to deliver all the POWs, that they will keep some captives, with the intention to recruit them. This was the case with our POWs. Now we are capturing several of our POWs a day, who are being sent over by America. They are withholding POWs not because, as they say, the POWs don't want to return - America often refers to this - but so that they could use them for spying.

ZHOU ENLAI concedes that this is

and a group of CC members was directed to take care of the excesses. In general discontent was eliminated, and cases of defection, including those to USSR territory, have been halted.

STALIN says, that the excesses resulted from the desire to obtain land and domestic animals faster, confiscating both from the rich.

ZHOU ENLAI notes that as soon as the rumors about reforms had spread, the hostile elements began to slaughter domestic animals.

STALIN notes that similar incidents took place at a certain time in our experience as well. It is necessary to hurry up with the reform. If the agricultural reform is not instituted, such looting will continue to occur.

ZHOU ENLAI explains that the agricultural reform is being instituted in crop farming regions, and redistribution and excesses connected with it [are occurring] in the animal farming regions. Since animal herders participated in the redistribution, the Chinese government has decided to improve their condition, which should improve the general condition as well.

STALIN says: of course, it is up to you.

ZHOU ENLAI says that according to the Liu Shaoqi report, two representatives from the Indonesian communist party should arrive at the XIX [Party] Congress, and he asks whether it would be timely to discuss party issues in Moscow with them.

STALIN says that it is difficult to tell yet. It depends on whether they will address the CC. He points out, that when the representatives from the Indian communist party arrived, they asked us to help in determining the party policy, and we had to do it, even though we were busy.

ZHOU ENLAI reports that the Japanese comrades should arrive as well, and it is likely they will also want to discuss party issues.

STALIN answers that older brothers cannot refuse their younger brothers in such a matter. He says that this should be discussed with Liu Shaoqi, who has substantial experience, and clarified how the Chinese comrades perceive it.

ZHOU ENLAI points out that Liu Shaoqi intends to bring with him appropriate material, in order to discuss a number of questions.

STALIN notes that if the Chinese com-

rades want to discuss these issues, then of course we will have no contradictions, but if they do not want it, then we will not have to discuss anything.

ZHOU ENLAI answers that the Chinese comrades will definitely want to talk.

STALIN answers that, in this case, we shall find the time.

ZHOU ENLAI says that it is possible that the comrades from Vietnam will also arrive.

STALIN notes that the Vietnamese comrades are our friends and will be our welcome guests.

ZHOU ENLAI, ending the conversation, says they would like to receive instructions concerning all these issues.

STALIN asks - instructions or suggestions?

ZHOU ENLAI answers that from comrade Stalin's perspective perhaps this would be advice, but in their perception these would be instructions.

STALIN notes that we give only advice, convey our opinion, and the Chinese comrades may accept it or not; instructions, on the other hand, are mandatory.

ZHOU ENLAI repeats that from the Chinese perspective these are instructions, most valuable instructions. He notes that they do not accept these instructions blindly, but consider it necessary to understand and accept them deliberately.

STALIN emphasizes that we know China too little, and that is why we are cautious in giving instructions.

ZHOU ENLAI says that comrade Stalin certainly is well familiar with the particular issues they are addressing, and asks again whether there will be any instructions.

Comrade STALIN answers that our advice is this: we should remember, that England and America will try to place their people into the apparatus of the Chinese government. It does not matter if they are American or French. They will work to undermine, try to cause decay from within, could even commit such crimes as poisonings. That is why we must be alert. He says we should keep this in mind. Here - these are all the instructions.

ZHOU ENLAI says that these are very valuable instructions. He agrees that not only Americans, English and French can commit such treacheries, but they also push the Chinese into it.

STALIN adds - their agents from the

[Chinese] national bourgeoisie.

MOLOTOV, returning to the question of military credit, the payment for weapons for 60 Chinese divisions, asks whether he understood Zhou Enlai correctly the last time, that the cost of deliveries for 60 divisions is not related to the military credit, granted by the Soviet government to China from 1 February 1951, according to the agreement. The deliveries of weaponry for 60 Chinese infantry divisions will be paid in full amount according to the credit, granted in a special agreement between China and the Soviet Union.

ZHOU ENLAI answers that comrade Molotov understood him absolutely correctly, and again asserts, that the weapon supplies for 60 Chinese divisions have to be paid in full, according to the rates established for countries other than China, and not in half.

STALIN says that in this case we should sign a special agreement.

He mentions the gifts presented to Soviet representatives by the Chinese government, and notes that there have been very many gifts.

ZHOU ENLAI explains that they could not present gifts to comrade Stalin for the 70th anniversary [of Stalin's birth]. They attended the museum of gifts, saw the gifts sent by other countries, and they feel they must make up for what they were not able to do before.

STALIN says that we also would like to present the Chinese delegation automobiles made in USSR. He says that we have automobiles "ZIS", smaller than "ZIM", but very beautiful, and we would like to present you with these "ZIMs."

Then he mentions the question concerning Song Qingling [also Soong Chingling; widow of Chinese nationalist Sun Yat-sen and then Vice Chairperson of the Central People's Government of the PRC].

ZHOU ENLAI says that he is working on getting her closer to him, that she is gradually shifting from bourgeoisie ideology to our side, that she comes out with good articles based on our ideology. She says that Song Qingling is very proud of being the winner of the International Stalin Peace Award.

The conversation started at 10:30, ended at 12:30.

Recorded by: [signature] /A. Vyshinskii/
[signature] /N. Fedorenko/

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 343, ll. 97-103; translated by Danny Rozas with Kathryn Weathersby.]

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COMMENTARIES

Comparing Russian and Chinese Sources: A New Point of Departure for Cold War History

By Chen Jian

These documents from the Russian Presidential Archives provide significant new insights into the making and development of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1949-1950. They usefully complement the account contained in the memoirs of Shi Zhe, Mao Zedong's Russian language interpreter, who has been one of the main sources of our knowledge about the relationship between Beijing and Moscow during the early Cold War period. (See Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu* [Together with Historical Giants: Shi Zhe's Memoirs] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1992).) As the translator of Shi Zhe's memoirs, I am deeply impressed by the richness of the information in these documents. I am also surprised, in spite of some discrepancies, by the extent to which Russian and Chinese materials (including Shi Zhe's memoirs and other sources) are in accord. I will therefore focus my comments on comparing Chinese and Russian sources on the same events as reflected in these documents.

Let me start with the meeting between Mao and Stalin on 16 December 1949. The Russian minutes of the meeting are highly compatible with, but more detailed than, Mao Zedong's own summary of the meeting in his telegram to Liu Shaoqi on 18 December. Mao's telegram reads as follows:

(1) [I] arrived in Moscow on the 16th, and met with Stalin for two hours at 10 p.m. (Beijing time). His attitude was really sincere. The questions involved include the prospect of peace,

the treaty, loans, Taiwan, and the publication of my selected works.

(2) Stalin said that the Americans are afraid of war. The Americans ask other countries to fight the war [for them], but other countries are also afraid of fighting a war. According to him, it is unlikely that a war will break out, and we agree with his opinions.

(3) With regard to the question of the treaty, Stalin said that because of the Yalta agreement, it is improper for us to overturn the legitimacy of the old Chinese-Soviet treaty. If we are to abolish the old treaty and to sign a new treaty, the status of the Kurile Islands will be changed, and the United States will have an excuse to take away the Kurile Is-

particular. The two leaders also discussed the agenda of Zhou's visit, which included the issues of Luda, Soviet support of China's first Five-year Plan, Soviet technological support to China in establishing rubber tree plantations in southern China, and the construction of a railway from Ji'nin, a city on the Sino-Mongolian border, to Ulan-Bator. The two leaders then had a long discussion on the Korean armistice issue. Zhou Enlai told Stalin that China would be willing to end the war on acceptable conditions but would not yield to unreasonable American terms. In Mao's view, Zhou informed Stalin, if the Communists could demonstrate a more enduring patience than the Americans, the enemy would sooner or later make additional concessions. Zhou particularly emphasized that it was Mao's belief that a firm Communist stand in the armistice negotiations might prolong the war in Korea but would not trigger a third world war. Rather, in Mao's opinion, the conflict in Korea had exposed the weakness of the United States, and delayed the coming of a new world war. Zhou also mentioned that the Chinese did have difficulties in continuing war operations under the current conditions, especially as the Americans held a 9 to 1 superiority in artillery pieces over the Communist forces. Stalin expressed his full agreement with Mao Zedong's assessment of the situation, offering to increase Soviet military equipment delivery to China so that the Chinese troops would hold a 20 to 9 superiority in artillery fire power against the Americans. Stalin also advised that the Chinese-North Korean side should take three steps in dealing with the Americans on the prisoner issue. First, if the enemy insisted on holding

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A Palpable Deterioration

by **Vojtech Mastny**

The two sets of documents about high-level Sino-Soviet conversations, separated in time by less than three years, illustrate the palpable deterioration of relations between the two communist powers under the strain of the Korean war. Yet the nature of the deterioration, as well as its extent—not to mention the personalities of the principles—appear quite different from these contemporary Russian records than they do from the retrospective Chinese accounts which have so far been the main source of information on the subject and which project the later Sino-Soviet rift into a period when a fundamental conflict of interest was neither present nor anticipated.

Even with the allowance made for a tendency of the Russian note taker to embellish the atmosphere prevailing at the meetings, there cannot be a doubt that Mao Zedong on his first visit to Moscow treated Stalin as the supreme authority of world communism, with a reverence that was not merely pretended but rooted in a perception of common interests, to which the Chinese leader repeatedly and cogently alluded. The same perception determined Stalin's uncharacteristically considerate, even generous, attitude toward his junior partner, so much in contrast with the condescension he usually displayed in dealing with his eastern European lieutenants. The Russian documents hardly bear out the self-serving Chinese descriptions of his stinginess and boorishness, an image that Mao himself—no doubt retrospectively embarrassed by the extent of subordination he had once been willing to accept in regard to Moscow—later tried to disseminate.

Of course not everything was sweet and smooth between the two ruthless and devious dictators; still, their ability to dispose of potentially contentious issues was remarkable. Of these, none was more important than the question of whether the treaty Moscow had concluded with China's previous government should remain in effect or be replaced by a new one. During the month that elapsed between his two meetings with Mao, Stalin reversed himself, and on both occasions Mao readily followed suit. Whereas in mid-December Stalin considered the treaty an outgrowth of the Yalta

agreement indispensable to safeguard Soviet territorial acquisitions in the Far East, by January 22 he was ready to send Yalta "to hell" and dispense with the treaty on the ostensible grounds that it had merely been a temporary expedient required by the war against Japan. He proved amenable to Mao's insistence that the new pact must be stronger, including the obligation for the two signatories to consult with each other on all important international matters.

This proposed provision is one of the few possible hints in the record at the impending communist aggression in Korea, whose preparation also provides the most compelling reason for Stalin's reversal on the Sino-Soviet treaty. During their December meeting, the two chieftains still gave no inkling of plotting the Korean adventure, despite North Korea's Kim Il Sung's persistent entreaties to obtain Moscow's support for his plan for a forcible reunification of the country. If in December they knew of the plan but did not yet consider it topical, the thrust of their January conversation suggests that by then they had begun changing their minds. Their assessment, in view of recent U.S. public statements and behavior implying a diminished likelihood of effective American opposition, offers the most plausible explanation of the change.

Besides the decision to proceed toward a tighter Sino-Soviet alliance, the subject of the January conversation most relevant to the prospective North Korean action was the presence of Soviet forces at the naval base of Port Arthur on the Chinese mainland. Unanimous in their view that the forces should remain there as a deterrent to any possible American military move against China, Stalin and Mao anticipate keeping the place under Soviet control until the conclusion of what they look forward to as a satisfactory peace settlement with Japan; in the final agreement signed three weeks later, the transfer to Chinese sovereignty was to be fixed to take place in two years' time. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the only reason why they could possibly expect to achieve a Japanese peace treaty to their liking was the crushing effect that a successful unification of Korea by the communists, presumably within that particular time span, would have on the United States.

* * * * *

By the time Zhou Enlai came to Moscow in August 1952, the Korean gamble had

failed, Mao had learned the bitter lesson of Stalin's renegeing on his promise to provide Soviet air cover for the Chinese intervention force, and the botched war had reached a stalemate. Its burden was weighing ever more heavily on the Chinese and North Koreans, though not on Stalin, who could relish the sight of the United States being pinned down on the Far Eastern battlefield—unless, to be sure, Washington would decide to expand hostilities in trying to force a decision.

The kind of underlying consensus permeating Stalin's conversations with Mao is no longer evident in the record of his talks with Zhou. These are businesslike talks, where bargaining takes place, though within the limits of propriety, and conflict of interest matters, even if it is not allowed to come into the open. Considering Stalin's rapidly deteriorating physical and mental condition, he still shows an impressive command of economic and military facts; only in the later sessions does his reasoning get muddled when he tackles the larger questions of diplomacy and war. For his part, Zhou lives up to his reputation of a cool and deft negotiator, never losing sight of what he wants to accomplish, his deliberate obfuscations notwithstanding.

Zhou's dual aim was the achievement of an armistice in Korea as quickly as possible while maximizing Soviet economic and military assistance to his ravaged country. Yet he never states these goals so clearly and sometimes even seems to be contradicting them. He affirms China's refusal to entertain any concessions to the Americans. Indeed, the two conversation partners outdo each other in their professions of intransigence toward the "imperialists" although not all that they say is to be taken at face value.

Stalin lectures the Chinese visitor—as if both did not know better—about the supposed military flabbiness of the Americans and their inability to subdue even little Korea. He expresses his expectation that eventually the United States would be compelled to end the war on terms agreeable to the communists; accordingly, as a deterrent to any American attempt to expand the war, he complies with the Chinese request to keep Soviet forces in Port Arthur beyond the previously agreed time limit. It is difficult to tell whether Stalin's expectation was another example of his frequent wishful think-

ing, rooted in the ideologically motivated belief that sooner or later “objective” forces would compel the capitalist enemies to behave that way he wanted them to behave. It is also possible, and not mutually exclusive, that he was making a disingenuous argument to persuade the Chinese to go on fighting, thus perpetuating their dependence on him while keeping the United States engaged. He is certainly not helpful in advancing any practical proposals to induce an armistice, insisting instead on demands that he knew were unacceptable to the U.S. side.

Playing a weak hand as a *demandeur*, Zhou has the difficult task of convincing the Soviet ruler to provide enough material assistance for both the prosecution of the war and China’s economic development while dissuading him from blocking a compromise that alone could lead to the termination of hostilities. By dwelling on China’s determination to fight on for several more years, if necessary, rather than to make any concessions, Zhou secures Stalin’s promises of huge military and economic assistance. He makes good use of the Soviet leader’s fascination with turning China into the “arsenal of Asia” and his support for the Chinese conquest of Tibet, though he sidetracks Stalin’s unsolicited advice to expel the Portuguese “scum” from the enclave of Macau.

leagues were Soviet references to Xinjiang, Mongolia, and (to a lesser extent) Manchuria: in Mao's image six years later these areas were "turned into spheres of influence of the USSR." (See Mao's conversation with Yudin, 31 March 1956, reprinted elsewhere in this issue of the *Bulletin*.)

The centerpiece of Stalin's conversations with Zhou Enlai in Moscow in the summer of 1952 is the search for an armistice in Korea, a solution which at this stage both allies wanted, but which was held up by Stalin's ceaseless maneuvering on the issue. The Soviet leader most likely wanted the Chinese to go firmly on record in requesting a ceasefire (possibly to be arranged by Moscow) and to back away from their position from the previous summer, when Stalin had wanted an end to the war and Mao had turned him down. In his conversations with Zhou, Stalin paid lip-service to Mao's previous position, while underlining that the Chinese and the North Koreans should not undertake further offensives and could postpone the contentious POW issues until after an armistice had been signed. But neither Stalin nor Zhou would admit to the other that they were looking for a way out of the war against the United States and its allies.

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**"To hell with Yalta!"—
Stalin Opts for a New Status Quo**

by Vladislav Zubok

The two transcripts of conversations during the Stalin-Mao talks in December 1949-February 1950 provide a unique insight into Stalin's doubts and second thoughts about the creation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Although the groundwork for holding the summit meeting had been laid during an exchange of secret high-level missions over the previous year (Anastas

from previous months of contacts and correspondence that it would be hard for the Chinese, and Mao in particular, to retain the old treaty which Stalin had concluded with the Guomindang (GMD). Therefore, he tried to sweeten the bitter pill by telling Mao that it would be possible to preserve the existing treaty only “formally,” while changing it “in effect,” that is, “formally maintaining the Soviet Union’s right to station its troops in Port Arthur while, at the request of the Chinese government, actually withdrawing the Soviet Armed forces currently stationed there.” (He quickly added, however, that if the Chinese desired the Soviet troops to remain, they could do so “by request of the Chinese government” for the next 2, 5, 10, or even 20 years.) Stalin also expressed willingness to alter some points concerning the ownership and exploitation of the Chinese-Changchun railroad.

Stalin’s new position must have struck Mao like a bolt of lightning (the final proof, though, will come only in the Chinese leader’s correspondence surrounding the meeting). But Mao did not explicitly object. Instead, he humbly admitted that during the discussions in Beijing of a future Sino-Soviet treaty the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership had “not taken into account the American and English positions regarding the Yalta agreement. We must act in a way that is best for the common cause,” Mao said, according to the Soviet record. “This question merits further consideration. However, it is already becoming clear that the treaty should not be modified at the present time.” Mao also admitted that Soviet control over Port Arthur (Lushun) and the Chinese-Changchun railroad “corresponds to the interests of China.”

No language, however, could conceal the divergent priorities of the two leaders. When Mao indirectly asked the Soviet leader “to send volunteer pilots or secret military detachments to speed up the conquest of Formosa [Taiwan],” Stalin promised only “to consider” such assistance and advised Mao to “organize an uprising” on the GMD-controlled island as a possible alternative to a military assault. Stalin was careful not to indicate that he wished to curb the nationalist ambitions of the Chinese revolutionaries, yet in essence that was what his words implied. Again and again, Stalin repeated that the “most important” thing was to avoid giving the Americans a “pretext to inter-

vene.” At the same time, Stalin encouraged the Chinese to “frighten the imperialists a bit” by probing the positions of the British and French in Hong Kong, Burma, and Indochina, i.e. in the South and far from the Soviet security perimeter.

Eventually, in their initial conversation, both leaders decided to drop the issue of the treaty, and moved to discuss other issues. When Mao inquired whether Zhou Enlai should travel to Moscow concerning the treaty, Stalin replied benignly and cryptically that this was a question that “you should decide for yourselves. Zhou may be needed in regard to other matters.” The ambiguity of this response, perhaps aggravated by translation, may well have contributed to Mao’s impression that Stalin did not want to discuss a new treaty. The meeting ended without any specific proposals from either side, and in the coming weeks Stalin and Mao engaged in a tacit war of nerves. Some other factors intervened as well, particularly a report from Soviet advisor I.V. Kovalev (who had been a Stalin emissary to Mao) stating that Mao was neither a real “Marxist” nor strong enough to resist pressure from “the right-wing of the [Chinese] national bourgeoisie, which has pro-American inclinations.”⁵

For whatever reason, Stalin decided to let Mao cool down (and cool his heels), and to gain more time himself to gauge the international response to their meeting, and suggested resuming talks only on 2 January 1950, more than two weeks later. Before calling Mao, however, Stalin sent Molotov and Mikoyan for a reconnaissance to his Blizhnita dacha where Mao was quartered. Molotov recalled that “Stalin hadn’t received him [Mao] for some days after he arrived. Stalin told me, ‘Go and see what sort of fellow he is.’” Molotov returned and allegedly reported that it would be a good idea to receive Mao for another meeting. “He was a clever man, a peasant leader, a kind of Chinese Pugachev [a Russian peasant revolutionary]. He was far from a Marxist, of course....”⁶ The concerns about Mao’s political and ideological face played, however, a secondary role in Stalin’s change of mind—the international situation was far more important. Finally, as Molotov informed Mao on January 2, Stalin decided to jettison the old Sino-Soviet treaty and with it his commitment to the Yalta arrangements in the Far East. Mao jubilantly reported the news to

Beijing: “Comrade Stalin has agreed to Comrade Zhou Enlai’s arrival here and to the signing of a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, as well as agreements on credit, trade, civil aviation, and others.”⁷

In Mao’s estimate, the crucial factor was that Great Britain and India recognized the PRC in January. In fact, a more important development was the conclusion of the Truman Administration’s reassessment of its Far Eastern strategy. Washington decided to keep a hands-off policy toward Taiwan and to focus instead on the defense of its essential interests in other Pacific areas it deemed critical, particularly Japan and Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia. The new American policy was enshrined secretly on 30 December 1949 in a classified document, NSC-48/2, announced by Truman in a press conference on 5 January 1950, and spelled out publicly a week later by Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson in his “defense perimeter” speech at the National Press Club.⁸ One may speculate that Stalin learned about the essence of this new policy before these official pronouncements, from various leaks and intelligence sources in Washington and London. It is even possible that, as with his reversal of the initial Soviet response to the Marshall Plan in the spring of 1947,⁹ an intelligence coup might have been a pivotal factor in prompting Stalin to reassess his Far Eastern strategy.

From Stalin’s perspective, all this appeared as a new American doctrine for the Far East, a crucial change in the international situation which seemed to signify a U.S. retreat from the Asian mainland and implicit acceptance of the Sino-Soviet alliance as a new geopolitical *fait accompli*. Stalin might also have suspected that he no longer had anything to lose if he openly rejected a now-outmoded “spirit of Yalta.” On the other hand, Stalin knew from many sources (Kovalev among them) that other members of the CCP leadership, such as Zhou Enlai, had been enthusiastic about the prospect of balancing Soviet influence in China with an American presence. By sticking to the old treaty, Stalin could only play into the hands of the British and of Acheson, who eagerly sought to discover an opening through which to drive a wedge between Stalin and his most promising and significant potential ally in the Far East.

7. See the text of Mao's cable to Beijing of 2 January 1950, as reprinted in Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, *Uncertain Partners*, 242.
8. Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, *Uncertain Partners*, 98, 101; Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 336-337.
9. On the importance of espionage data in the reversal of Soviet policy toward the Marshall Plan, see Mikhail M. Narinsky, "The Soviet Union and the Marshall Plan," in Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1994), 45-46.
10. See record of meeting in f. 0100, op. 43, d. 8, papka

Chinese people.

We are deeply concerned by the fact that this deception will have a large influence on the people and make us start another political detour, i.e. to refrain from rejecting peace negotiations with the Guomindang. We are delaying the creation of the coalition government. Our principal objective is to make the Americans and the Guomindang put all their aces on the table, while we keep our aces until the last moment.

We have recently published a list of war criminals, 43 persons, unofficially (a statement by a person of authority). The PLA has not yet issued an order to arrest these war criminals.

On January 1 Jiang Jieshi delivered his peace proposal. We gave an unofficial answer to this, too (an editorial article by a journalist). To sum up, we have left some room for a volte face, to see how the Chinese people and international opinion would react to the Guomindang's deceptive negotiations.

But now we are inclined towards rejecting the peace deception by the Guomindang with full righteousness, because now, as the balance of class forces in China has already changed irreversibly and the international opinion is also unfavourable to the Nanjing government, the PLA will be able to cross the Yangzi this summer and start the offensive towards Nanjing.

It looks like we do not have to make one more political detour. In the present situation this maneuver would be damaging rather than beneficial.

4. Thank you for asking for our opinion on such an important issue. If you do not agree with my opinion as expressed here or would introduce corrections, please let me know.

Mao Zedong

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Stalin to Mao Zedong, 14 January 1949

To Comrade Mao Zedong.

We received your long telegram on the Nanjing peace proposal.

1. Certainly it would be better if the Nanjing government's peace proposal did not exist at all, if this whole peace maneuver by the USA was nonexistent. Clearly, this maneuver is disagreeable, because it can bring some trouble to our common cause. But, unfortunately, this maneuver does exist, it is a fact and we cannot close our eyes on this fact, we have to accept it.

2. Undoubtedly, the peace proposal by Nanjing and the USA is a manifestation of a policy of deception. First, because Nanjing does not really want peace with the Communist party, as the peace with the Communist party would mean the rejection by the Guomindang of its principal policy of liquidation of the Communist

party and its troops, and that would lead to the political death of the Guomindang leaders and the total disintegration of the Guomindang army. Second, because they know that the Communist party will not make peace with the Guomindang, as it cannot abandon its principal policy of liquidation of the Guomindang and its troops.

So what does Nanjing want after all? It wants not peace with the Communist party, but an armistice, a temporary termination of hostilities to use the armistice as a respite to restore order among Guomindang troops, to fortify the south bank of the Yangzi, to ship armaments from the USA, to reinforce and then to break the truce and deliver a blow on the People's Liberation forces, blaming the Communist party for the breakdown of negotiations. Their minimal wish is to prevent the total defeat of the Guomindang forces by the Communist party.

This is the basis of the current deception policy of Nanjing and the USA.

3. How can one respond to this maneuver by Nanjing and the USA? Two replies are possible. First reply: to reject the Nanjing peace proposals openly and directly, thus declaring the necessity of the continuation of civil war. But what would that mean? That means, first, that you had put

will not accept these conditions, the people will realize, that the Guomindang and not the Communist party is to blame for the continuation of civil war. The banner of peace in this case rests in the hands of the Communist party. This issue is especially important now, when a lot of people in China are tired of the civil war and are ready to support the advocates of peace.

But let us assume the impossible and imagine that the Guomindang had accepted these terms. What should the Communist Party's plans of actions be like?

First, it would be necessary to refrain from terminating the hostilities and then to create the central coalition government organs in such a way that approximately three fifths of seats in the Consultative Council and two thirds of the posts in the government would be retained by the Communists, and the other seats and posts would be distributed between other democratic parties and the Guomindang.

Second, it is necessary that the posts of the prime minister, Commander in Chief, and, if possible, that of the president, be occupied by Communists.

Third, the Consultative Council should declare this coalition government the only government of China, and any other government, pretending to be the government of China, should be declared a rebel group, subject to be disbanded.

And, finally, the coalition government should order both your troops and the Guomindang troops to swear allegiance to the coalition government and that hostilities against the troops which had given the oath would be terminated immediately, while they would be continued against the troops which had refused to give the oath.

It seems unlikely that the Guomindang would agree to these measures, but if they would not, it would be also detrimental for them, because they would be totally isolated, and these measures would be carried out without them.

4. This is our understanding of the issue and our advice to you. Maybe we were not able to present our advice clearly enough in our previous telegram.

We ask you to regard our advice as advice only, which does not impose any obligations on you and which you can accept or turn down. You can be sure that your rejection of our advice will not influence our relations and we will remain your friends as we have ever been.

5. As for our answer to the Nanjing mediation proposal, it will be in the spirit of your proposals.

6. We still insist that you postpone temporarily your visit to Moscow, as your presence in China is essential now. If you want we can immediately send an authoritative member of the Politbureau to Harbin or some other place to negotiate on issues of interest to you.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 110-113.]

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Mao Zedong to Stalin, 14 January 1949

Comrade Filippov,

1. I was glad to receive your supplementary telegram of January 11. On the principal line (the breakdown of large scale negotiations with the Guomindang [GMD], the continuation of the revolutionary war to the end) we agree with you completely.

Today we published eight conditions under which we [would] agree to enter into peace negotiations with the Guomindang. These conditions are put forward against the five reactionary conditions which Jiang Jieshi mentioned in his peace proposal of January 1.

Several days ago already the Americans sounded out our opinion—whether we would wish to conduct peace negotiations with the Guomindang without the 43 war criminals. So this sole condition—negotiating without war criminals—is no longer sufficient to undermine the intrigue of the Guomindang peace negotiations.

2. [This point dealt with the work of the CCP radio station.]

3. Since the publication of the Guomindang's peace proposals there has been much fuss in the GMD-controlled areas and the population is en masse demanding peace from the Guomindang, reproaching the Guomindang that its peace conditions are too severe.

The agitation and propaganda organs of the Guomindang are hastily explaining why the Guomindang needs to preserve its legal status and its army. We think that this disorder in the Guomindang-controlled regions will be increasing further.

Mao Zedong

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 104-105.]

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Stalin to Mao Zedong, 15 January 1949

To Comrade Mao Zedong.

We have just received your last short telegram, which shows that we now have unanimous opinions on the issue of the Nanjing peace proposal and that the Communist party of China has

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