

International History Project Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995 pp. 1, 2-9), I described the collection of high-level documents on the Korean War that Russian President Boris Yeltsin presented to President Kim Young Sam of South Korea in June 1994. I also presented translations of six key documents from that collection that illuminate the decision-making behind the outbreak of full-scale war in Korea in June 1950. Since the publication of the Spring 1995 *Bulletin*, the base of documentary evidence on the Korean War has been enriched even more by the release of virtually the entire collection of high-level documents on the war declassified by the Presidential Archive in Moscow, which numbers approximately 1,200 pages. Through a joint project of the Center for Korean Research of Columbia University and the Cold War International History Project, these documents are now available to all interested researchers.

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The Presidential Archive (known offi-

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look at the Soviet role in Korea during the

KOREA MAP

This page

NOTE ON TRANSLATION: In translating these documents I have retained the style of the Russian texts, which in most cases is the cumbersome, indirect, bureaucratic prose characteristic of official Soviet documents. The telegrams from Mao Zedong to Stalin in 1951 and 1952 are written in particularly poor Russian; I have kept as much to the original text as possible while still rendering the prose intelligible. The numbers of the ciphered telegrams are given when they are legible, but in many cases the "DECLASSIFIED" stamp obscured the number of the telegram. Personal names and place names are given in the standard English spelling wherever possible; otherwise they are transliterated from the Russian. An index of abbreviations and identifications of the most important persons mentioned are provided after the documents. Dates are given in the Russian manner: day, month, year. Note on archival citations: Those documents that were provided by the Russian Government to South Korea have a citation to the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (AVPRF) as well as to the Russian Presidential Archive

Ciphered telegram Strictly secret

Copying prohibited

From Pyongyang

To Vyshinsky

At the request of Kim Il Sung, on May 12 I had a meeting with him and [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong. During the conversation Kim Il Sung reported to me that upon his return from Moscow he received a letter from Li Zhou-yuan (ambassador to China), in which he reported about a meeting that took place with Mao Zedong and [PRC Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai. During this meeting the question of the necessity of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong was discussed. Zhou Enlai proposed that the meeting have an official character. Mao, turning toward Li as if asking when you intend to begin the unification of the country, without waiting for an answer stated that if you intend to begin military operations against the south in the near future, then they should not meet officially. In such a case the trip should be unofficial.

Mao Zedong added further that the unification of Korea by peaceful means is not possible, solely military means are required to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, there is no need to be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third world war

CHINA'S ROAD TO THE KOREAN WAR

by Chen Jian

In October 1950, one year after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Beijing leadership sent "Chinese People's Volunteers" (CPV) to Korea to fight against United Nations forces moving rapidly toward the Chinese-Korean border. Although China's intervention saved Kim Il Sung's North Korean Communist regime from imminent collapse, it was unable to fulfill the Beijing leadership's hopes of overwhelming the UN forces. Therefore, when the Korean War ended in July 1953, Korea's political map remained virtually unchanged, while America's military intervention in Korea and China's rushing into a conflict with the United States finally buried any hope for a Sino-American accommodation, and the Cold War in Asia entered a new stage characterized by a total confrontation between the PRC and the United States that would last nearly twenty years.

The newly established Chinese Communist regime faced enormous problems during its first year, including achieving political consolidation, rebuilding a war-shattered economy, and finishing reunifica-
betw 753.5 reaypoatervfreu a

FYN-SI [Stalin].

No. 362/sh

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

1.7.50

*[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346,
List 104 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a,
Delo 3, Papka 11, l. 107]*

**16.1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov
to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re political mood on
North Korea**

Ciphered telegram No. 405809

VASILIEV we proposed the following structure:

1. To create two army groups headed byture:

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 826,
Listy 108-109]

**25. 25 July 1950, ciphered telegram,
Vyshinsky to Roshchin transmitting mes-
sage from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai**

MID USSR

Tenth Department Received 4 hours 30

sary then he can do it. KIM IL SUNG replied that he would convene the PolitSoviet tomorrow and read them the contents of this letter.

SHTYKOV

No. 1001
30.8.50

Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 159-160]

29. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) transmitting letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

FYN-SI [Stalin].

I transmit the letter I received.

According to the report of KIM IL SUNG's secretary, MUN IL, this text of the letter was confirmed by the PolitSoviet of the CC of the Labor Party.

SHTYKOV

No. 1011/sh

31.8.1950

Copies to Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of the 8th Department.

"DEAR comrade STALIN, I.V.

We are deeply touched by your attention.

We bring to you, our dear teacher, gratitude for the warm sympathy and advice. In the decisive period of the struggle of the Korean people we have received great moral support from you. We have firmly resolved to win the final victory in the struggle against the American interventionists, who are trying anew to enslave Korea.

In the noble struggle for independence and freedom we constantly feel your fatherly care and assistance.

We wish you many years of life and health.

Yours faithfully,

KIM IL SUNG

(upon commission of the PolitSoviet of the CC [Central Committee] of the Labor Party of Korea)

city of PYONGYANG

31.8.1950."

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 14-15 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 162]

30. 13 September 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600155/III.

From Pyongyang Sent 13.9.50 Received 13.9. 13:15

Sent to the 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 13.9 13:22.

By telegraph.

Extremely urgent.

Moscow—Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

In connection with the forthcoming session of the [UN] General Assembly, we consider it advisable to recommend to the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic to send a statement to the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which, on the basis of documents found in the archives of the Rhee Syngmann [South Korean] government, to show how the clique of RHEE SYNGMANN prepared an attack on the north, to set forth once again the position of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic on the question of the illegality of the American intervention in Korea, to illuminate the barbaric acts of the American armed forces in Korea and to demand the adoption of measures for the immediate cessation of the American intervention and the withdrawal from Korea of the troops of the foreign interventionists.

In addition to this statement [we advise] to send to the General Assembly and the Security Council photocopies of the documents to which reference will be made in the statement of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

In such case as you agree to this proposal, we ask you to communicate when it would be convenient to send such a statement.

We would consider it advisable also to inform the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic about the position which the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly will take on the Korean question.

We ask your orders.

SHTYKOV

No. 1154/sh.

13 September of this year

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,

Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 18-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 163-164]

[documents from 21 September 1950 through 14 October 1950 appear following the article in this issue by Alexandre Mansourov]

31. 25 October 1950, VKP(b) CC [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] Central Committee Politburo decision with approved directives to Foreign Minister Vyshinsky (at the United Nations in New York) and to Soviet Ambassador in Washington

All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik), CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P78/332 To Comrades Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko.

Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKPR(b).

Decision of 25 October 1950

332. - About the use by the United States of Japanese in the war against Korea.

To confirm the draft order of MID USSR to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern Commission (attachment 2).

SECRETARY CC

To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78

Attachment 1

NEW YORK

TO VYSHINSKY

353. Your proposal about the inadvisability of supporting in the General Assembly the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, which is using Japanese in the aggressive war against the Korean people, we consider incorrect. A statement by the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly with a declaration of support for the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, cannot weaken our position with regard to this question in the Far Eastern Commission. Therefore it is necessary for you to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the Americans of Japanese servicemen in the war in Korea. Use the facts brought forth in the statement of Pak Hon-Yong, in one of your next speeches in the

General Assembly at an appropriate moment, according to your discretion.

We are simultaneously giving an order to the Soviet representative in the DVK [Far Eastern Commission] to make a corresponding statement on this question and to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the United States of Japanese in military operations in Korea.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].

A. GROMYKO

To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78

TOP SECRET

Attachment 2

WASHINGTON

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

It is necessary for you to make the following statement at the next meeting of the Far Eastern Commission:

“As is known, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, Pak Hon-Yong, has sent to the chairman of the General Assembly and to the chairman of the Security Council a protest against the use of Japanese servicemen in military actions in Korea. In this protest it is shown that in the fundamental facts found in the decree of the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, it is established that Japanese servicemen participated in battles in the area of Seoul together with American troops, that one Japanese company participated in battles in the area of Chkholvon and that a significant number of Japanese are found in the 7th and 8th divisions of the Rhee Syngmann troops.

The use by the United States of Japanese servicemen in military operations in Korea is a gross violation of the Potsdam declaration, and also of section III of the resolution of the Far Eastern Commission “Basic Policy in Relation to Japan after Capitulation” of June 19, 1947, and the resolution adopted on the basis of this document “Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Use of Japanese Military Equipment” of February 12, 1948. The Potsdam declaration and aforementioned resolution of the Far Eastern Commission provide for the full disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, forbid the reestablishment or possession of any kind of Japanese military formations.

The Soviet delegation supports the protest of the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic against the use by the

USA of Japanese servicemen in the war against the Korean people. The Soviet delegation considers that the Far Eastern Commission must not disregard the aforementioned facts, which testify to the direct violation of the agreed-upon decision on the demilitarization of Japan.”

Give the statement to the press.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 827, Listy 141-143 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 155-157]

32. 28 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), via Roshchin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26239

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin
From Beijing Received 19 hours 50 minutes
28.10.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

27 October I received the following telegram from Mao Zedong addressed to you:

“Comrade Filippov!

In connection with the military situation that has developed in China at the present time, we urgently need to acquire from the Soviet Union the following armaments for the navy: high-speed torpedo boats, floating mines, armored ships, small patrol boats, minesweeping equipment, coastal fortress artillery and torpedo bomber planes.

I therefore intend to send immediately to Moscow by plane the commander of the navy Xiao Jinguang together with adviser Comrade Kuz’min in order to conduct negotiations with the responsible comrades of the Soviet Navy on the question of the request for the above mentioned arms and on the question of the construction of the Chinese navy in the future.

Along with Comrade Xiao Jinguang, two other comrades from the navy administration of China, Lue Shuchu and deputy chief of the rear administration of the navy Comrade Tsin I-tin, must also go [to Moscow].

I ask you to review the aforementioned and give me a corresponding reply.

MAO ZEDONG 27 October 1950.”

Note:

Comrade Zakharov has familiarized himself with this telegram and considers that the trip of the naval commander with adviser Kuz’min is necessary.

ROSHCHIN

No. 2623

28.10

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, Listy 62-63]

33. 29 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

BEIJING - to Comrade Zakharov

For MAO ZEDONG

To Comrade MAO ZEDONG

I received your telegram about naval matters. I agree to the trip to MOSCOW of XIAO, JINGUANG and the other comrades.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

29.10.50.

Copies: Stalin, Bulganin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 64]

34. 1 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5222

TO SHTYKOV

You request that our officers and advisers remain in the disposition of the [North] Koreans for the formation of Korean divisions. Such a point of view of yours is well known to us. But we do not know the points of view of the [North] Korean government, we do not know whether it wishes to have Soviet officers and advisers in the future or prefers to invite Chinese. You still have not communicated the point of view of the Korean government on this subject. We cannot impose our advisers and officers on the Korean government. Let KIM IL SUNG communicate his point of view regarding this.

FYN SI [STALIN]

1 November 1950

Copies: Stalin (2), 8th Department of the General Staff to Shtykov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347,

*List 84, and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a,
Delo 3, Papka 11, List 161]*

**35. 2 November 1950, ciphered telegram,
S.E. Zakharov, Soviet military represen-
tative in Beijing, to Fyn Si (Stalin)**

Second Main Administration of the General
Staff of the Soviet Army

CIPHERED TEL020 91u0L4 TDethe General

of the participation of China in the Security Council.

SECRETARY CC

To p.448(op) pr.PB No.78

BEIJING

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

For transmission to Zhou Enlai.

I have received your telegram with the request for a consultation on the question of the participation of China in the [UN] Security Council.

In our opinion two variants are possible.

The first variant [is] to refuse to accept the invitation in the manner in which it was formulated in the Security Council. Motives: the invitation deprives the Chinese people's republic of the right to discuss in the Security Council the most urgent questions of China, in particular the question of the military intervention in Korea and the question of the seizure of Taiwan by the United States of America, its right being limited only to the review of the report of MacArthur.

The second variant [is] to accept the invitation and to commission the Chinese delegation to make a statement in the Security Council on all the abovementioned questions, turning the discussion of the question into an indictment of the USA. If they do not allow the Chinese delegation fully to lay out its position, the Chinese delegation will walk out of the meeting and refuse to discuss even one report of MacArthur.

It seems to us that the first variant is more advisable.

You should not connect yourself to the conduct of the Soviet delegate in the Security Council, where he voted for the resolution of the English delegate [Gladwyn] Jebb, especially since, speaking between us, Soviet delegate [Jacob] Malik did not have an instruction to vote for the English resolution, but had a direct directive to put in a veto if the Soviet resolution was rejected. Malik apparently was carried away by the fact that he had nevertheless forced the Americans to vote in favor of inviting China, but he did not take into account that the form of the invitation adopted by the Security Council would place China in a disadvantageous position.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 371, Listy 4-5]

38. 15 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Zakharov

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26901.

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.

From Beijing Received 06 hours 10 minutes 16.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Comrade FILIPPOV:

I fully agree with your proposal to reinforce Belov's aviation force by an additional delivery of MIG-15 planes to China in two lots, numbering 120 (one hundred twenty) pieces and to create a command apparatus for the air corps.

As concerns questions regarding the airports in MANCHURIA and the strengthening of all PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] measures, we will resolve them together with comrade [S.E.] ZAKHAROV.

I express gratitude to the Soviet pilots for the heroism and effort they have displayed in battle, and for the fact that over the last 12 days they downed 23 invading American planes. I think that this is worth reporting to you.

I congratulate you on the successes!

MAO ZEDONG.

Nov 15, 1950.

NEW PARAGRAPH.

To Comrade FILIPPOV.

I report.

Your telegram was communicated at 20 hours 30 minutes local time 15.11.

ZAKHAROV

No. 2910

16.11

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 116 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 189]

39. 16 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26935

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev

From Beijing Received 20 hours 15 minutes 16.11.1950

EXTREMELY URGENT T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

At present the number of our troops operating in Korea has increased from 18 (eighteen) divisions of 6 (six) armies to 30 (thirty) divisions of 9 (nine) armies. Moreover we have another 9 divisions of 3 armies in reserve. In connection with this, transport is faced with very large tasks. With regard to automobiles, we have already received agreement from the Government of the Soviet Union about delivery of 3,000 automobiles before December 15.

It is necessary that we urgently resolve

Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26998

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin,
Khrushchev

From Beijing Received 20 hours 45 minutes
17.11.1950

EXTREMELY URGENT T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

According to a report from Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, we have an insufficient number of automobiles engaged in transport to the rear, enemy planes are inflicting losses on autotransport, and also it is not possible to ensure the supply of local human and material resources, food supply and winter clothing cannot be secured in time and the troops are experiencing hunger and cold.

A new operation will begin soon. Railroad bridges across the Yalu are subjected to bombardment by enemy planes every day.

The river is beginning to freeze, and it is not possible to build submerged bridges and pontoons. Therefore until such time as the river is frozen, so that automobiles can cross the ice, we must in the next 8-9 days transport at an extraordinary speed food stuffs, winter gear and ammunition. If we do not, it will

With regard to the preparation of pilots for one bomber regiment, it is more convenient to prepare them in the Korean school we have in the Far East Maritime Region. The materiel, TU-2 planes for the bomber regiment, will also be given.

3. We agree to accept an additional 120 men in the Korean pilot school that we have in the Far East Maritime Region, to train them as technicians and crew for attack planes.

4. It is better that the Korean pilots receive flight training in the place where they will study, i.e. in MANCHURIA or in

tions military activity cannot be ceased. In addition, we consider that you should not be too open and show all your cards too early before the representatives of the three states, who, frankly speaking, are spies of the USA. We think that the time has not arrived for China to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not liberated. Moreover, the USA could use China's five conditions to box us on the ear by [making] a UN resolution. It is not necessary to give this advantage to the USA.

We therefore think that it is possible at the present time to limit oneself to the following:

1. The Chinese Central People's Government along with you, gentlemen delegates of England, Sweden, India would welcome the soonest possible conclusion of the military actions in Korea. China is applying all its strength in order to conclude quickly the military activity forced on Korea and China.

2. Therefore, we would like to know the opinion of the UN and the USA with regard to conditions for an armistice. As far as we know, you have not been commissioned by the UN or the USA to discuss with anyone the conditions for an armistice. Moreover, the delegation from England together with the delegation from the USA, France, Norway, Ecuador and Cuba already introduced into the First Committee [of the General Assembly] of the UN a resolution condemning China, thereby hindering the matter of a settlement of the Korean question.

3. In view of this we will eagerly await the opinion of the UN and USA about the conditions for a cessation of military actions in Korea.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

Telegraph the fulfillment.

GROMYKO.

7/XII-50

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 20-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 196-197]

50. 8 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 4 January 1951 message from Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, and Pak Il U to Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 02 hours, 40 minutes 8.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T.
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin].

I send you a copy of the telegram to Comrade Kim Il Sung from Comrades Peng Dehuai, Kim Son and Pak Il U, sent 24:00 4.1 [January 4].

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it: "To Premier Comrade Kim Il Sung. We are simultaneously sending a copy to the commanders of the corps and army Comrades Hun Xianchu, Wu Ruilin, Chzhou Biao, Pan Khe-som and to the commander of the 1st Corps NRVS and to the staff of the Northeast.

1. Today (4 January) the 116th infantry division and a unit of troops from the 117th infantry division occupied the city of Seoul. Enemy troops defending Seoul withdrew to the south bank of the Kanko river. The city of Siumsen was also taken on 3 January by units of our 66th army.

The enemy withdrew to the area of Kosen and to areas further south.

It is supposed that the next attempt by enemy troops will be the defense of the river, which is beginning in the area of Chemul'po [Inchon], Kimpo, Iokhei, and is going on along the south bank of the Kanko river, through Gensiu, Seikheisio to Korio.

It is possible that the enemy, regrouping behind the natural barriers, like the Kanko river and the mountainous areas, will gather the remnants of its forces, gain time and make preparations for new military operations.

Another possibility is that, in case of further more powerful strikes by our troops, the enemy will withdraw to the south.

2. If we give the enemy the possibility to continue to occupy defensive positions along the south bank of the river Kanko, to control the airport at Kimpo and to use the port at Chemul'po for supply, then although Seoul will be in our hands, it will be under constant threat from enemy air force and artillery, which will be extremely disadvantageous for preparing our troops for a spring offensive.

If, in the presence of success, our troops make one more effort and destroy another unit of enemy troops and force the enemy to retreat from the south bank of the Kanko river, then we not only will be able to take the

Kimpo airport and control the port of Chemul'po, but this will create more advantageous conditions for the preparation of our troops for a spring offensive.

In order to achieve the aforementioned goals the following plan has been worked out:

a) To leave 1 division of 1st corps of the People's Army for garrison duty in the city of Seoul.

The main forces of the corps will be deployed in the area of Toto, Tok-heiri, Dzinsori, Mokudo.

After rest and regrouping, in three days they must prepare to make a forced crossing of the Kanko river and at the appropriate moment occupy the Kimpo airport, Chemul'po port and consolidate themselves there.

b) Troops of the left column as before are under the unified command of Khan' Sian'-chu.

The 50th army will continue to advance in the direction of Kosainairi, Kando, Kiriudo and the area to the northwest of these points. It will send out immediately a strong detachment to control the bridge across the Kanko river (by a counterattack attempt to occupy the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river). This detachment will find out what the situation is, make active preparations for a forced crossing of the Kanko river, attack the enemy on the south bank and continue to carry out the battle in cooperation with the main forces.

If the enemy continues to withdraw to the south, then it is necessary, while pursuing

c) The 42nd and 66th armies under the unified command of Wu Ruilin and Chzhou Biao, and also the 2nd and 5th corps of the People's Army under the unified command of Pan Kho-Son, in accordance with the joint forces plan established earlier, must destroy the enemy troops in the region of Kosen, Odzio, and afterwards await further orders.

All the aforementioned troops must send spies and outposts toward the enemy troops located in front of the frontline.

When the troops of the right column begin a new offensive these units must be ready to render assistance. Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, Pak Il U. 24:00 4.1.”

With bolshevik greetings.

MAO ZEDONG.

No. 103

7.1.51.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 88-90]

51. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram,

30 January 1951.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 44]

58. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Razuvaev with message for Kim Il Sung

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100269

To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

Discuss the following telegram with Comrade Kim Il Sung and his closest friends and communicate their opinion.

1. It is possible to consider it incontestable that the present [North] Korean divisions are less battle capable than the old divisions in the summer of last year. This is explained by the fact that the Koreans had 10 divisions, well fitted out with officer corps and more or less satisfactorily trained. And now the Koreans have 28 divisions, of which 19 divisions are at the front and 9 are in Manchuria. It is clear that the Koreans are not in a position to supply such a large number of divisions with officer corps. According to our norms, each division, having, let's say, 8,000 men must have at least 800 officers, not counting sergeants. I have in mind the genuine officers, capable of cementing a division, and not hastily commissioned officers. It is clear that the Koreans still don't have such a number of officers. Therefore the present Korean officers are understrength, unstable and little capable of battle. The Koreans increased the number of divisions and forgot about quality, but quality plays the decisive role here.

2. It would be advisable in the given situation to have not more than 23 divisions in the Korean army, so that the officer corps of the reduced 5 divisions can be used to fill out the officer corps of the remaining weak divisions, and the rank and file to use as reinforcement. This will strengthen the divisions, lessen the expenses and make for a gain in arms. The same needs to be said regarding the four Korean infantry brigades which are in poorly combat readiness and which also can be used to fill out the divisions with officers and rank and file.

3. At this stage the organization of corps administration is inadvisable, since there are no, or almost no, commanders capable of

leading the corps, but there are already army apparatuses. It would be better to organize the 5 army administrations with 4 divisions in each army, so that the army apparatus itself directly commands its divisions. In this case the Korean armed forces would have in its composition 5 armies (in all 20 divisions), and 3 divisions could be in the reserve of the main command for assisting the most needy armies according to the course of the operation. With time, when the commanders mature, when there will be enough of them and when they learn to command joint divisions, then it will be possible to transfer to a corps system.

Of course, this reform should not be carried out now, but during a time of rest after conducting the operation.

Discuss these proposals and communicate your opinion.

30 Jan 1951

FYN SI [Stalin]

No. 4/854

Copies: Stalin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 15-16]

59. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Razuvaev

- 27th and 31st pd, 5th army - 43rd pd, one pd by increasing 8th army

3. To temporarily keep naval brigades for the defense of bases and coastline.

To strengthen the naval brigades to significantly reduce VMU ["battle friction" that results from being understrength]; the sailor school and apparatus of naval command.

4. To carry out further reductions after the next operation, which will begin February 7-13, 1951.

5. To have the total number of army units and divisions be within the numerical limits that you recommended.

RAZUVAEV.

No. 375/sh

4.2.51

Copies: Stalin (2), Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, File of 8th Administration

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 25-26 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 199-200]

62. 16 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via Zakharov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 1078

Sent 22:03 16.2.51

Transmitted 22:55 16.2.51

BEIJING - To Comrade ZAKHAROV for Comrade ZHOU ENLAI

Your request about advisers for the Chinese Air Army will be satisfied. I consider

the fact that “serious rightist moods” have appeared among the Chinese troops. In my opinion this is explained by the fact that your local maneuvers with some forward advance but then a falling back, repeated several times, create among your troops the impression of weakness of Chinese and Koreans, but create among the Anglo-American troops the impression of their might. I fear that this situation can undermine the spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. I think that it will not be possible to crush these unhealthy moods unless you prepare and carry out a serious blow to the enemy with the defeat of three to four enemy divisions. This would lead to a serious turnaround in the moods of the Chinese-Koreans as well as among the Anglo-American troops. This, of course, will not be broad and far from being an offensive, will be only a serious short blow against the enemy, but this will be the kind of blow that will sober up the enemy and raise the fighting spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. Moreover this would give you the possibility of undertaking then wider and more successful local maneuvers needed to exhaust the enemy.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 297/sh
5 June 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 17-18]

66. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20448

Copies: Stalin (2)

From Beijing Received 18:30 5 June 1951

SERIES G T.

TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Comrade FILIPPOV!

In the course of conducting the war in KOREA we have run into such serious questions as the financial question, the question of the conduct of military operations directly at the front, the question of the danger of a possible enemy landing on the sea coast in our rear.

We intend to send Comrade GAOGANG to MOSCOW by plane in a few days to inform you regarding the aforementioned questions and to ask your directions in the

matter of the resolution of these important questions.

At the present time Comrade KIM IL SUNG is in BEIJING. He wishes to go with Comrade GAO GANG for discussion of these questions with you.

I ask you to communicate your opinion about the possibility of this trip.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 2787
5.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 23]

67. 7 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

BEIJING—TO KRASOVSKY

for Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegram about the trip to us of Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. We are ready to receive Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG and to discuss with them the questions indicated in your telegram.

On 8 June in the morning we will send a plane from Moscow to Peking to transport Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG to Moscow. The plane will arrive in Beijing on 9 June.

We ask you to give an order to your authorities about the unimpeded flight of the plane and its reception at the airport in Beijing.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 26 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 30]

68. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet military advisor in Beijing Krasovsky

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3559

BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

According to our information, our pilots are training the Koreans very slowly and in a slipshod manner. You and General Belov apparently intend to make professors rather than battle pilots out of the Chinese pilots. We consider this to be overcautiousness on the side of our aviation specialists. If Russian pilots were trained during the war in five

to six months, then why is it impossible to complete the training of Chinese pilots in seven to eight months? Isn't it time to throw away this harmful overcautiousness? The Chinese troops will not fight without air cover. Therefore it is necessary to create more quickly a group of eight Chinese air fighter divisions and send them to the front. This is now your main task.

Belov can send one division closer to the Chinese border in Manchuria, and two divisions can be held in the rear in North Korea, thus freeing up two airports for the Chinese fighter divisions closer to the front. This is absolutely necessary. It is necessary to arrange matters so that the Chinese rely only on their own aviation at the front.

Report the fulfillment.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 303/sh

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 47 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 33]

69. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong re meeting in Moscow with Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3557

BEIJING, TO ROSHCHIN

Deliver immediately to the addressee.

“To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

Today there was a conversation with your representatives from Manchuria and Korea [Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung]. Three questions were raised:

First—about an armistice. We recognized that an armistice is now advantageous.

Second—about military advisers. If they are very necessary to you, then we are ready to satisfy you.

Third—about the delivery of arms for sixteen divisions. There will not be objections from our side.

I won't write about the details, since your representatives will report to you about them.

We consider it absolutely necessary now to start moving at least eight fighter aviation divisions from the sixteen Chinese divisions. We think that besides two or three aviation divisions of MIG-15s, you could take to the front from central and southern China five or six divisions of MIG-9's, which operate very effectively against bombers. Eight fighter

does not send new reinforcements to Korea and does not make an amphibious landing, then in August we will be significantly stronger than now.

5. Right now we are planning the transfer of our aviation units to the front.

Mao Zedong
13.6.51"

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 57-60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 35-37]

72. 21 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21039

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 21:15

21.6.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!

1. Comrade Gao Gang has returned and transmitted your opinion on various questions.

I consider that they are all correct and we must do precisely thus.

As regards the question of planting rubber trees, we intend immediately to start the planning.

I hope that the Soviet government will send its representatives to assist us in formulating plans.

2. Our troops' eight months of experience in conducting war in Korea has clearly shown the great difference in the equipment of our troops and the troops of the enemy and the extreme necessity of improving the equipment of our troops. This is why we commissioned Comrade Gao Gang to appeal to you with a request about delivery to us of arms for sixteen divisions, to which you agreed. This is the minimal requirement of our troops in Korea for the present year.

Upon his return Gao Gang said that you consider our requirements in arms for each division insufficient and proposed to strengthen each division with tanks and artillery.

I consider this completely correct. This is necessary in war against imperialists.

I already sent a telegram to Comrade Siu Sian-tsian [with instructions] to conduct the

negotiations fully in accordance with your opinion.

3. According a telegram received from Comrade Siu Sian-tsian after his preliminary negotiations with representatives of the Soviet General Staff, of the total quantity of arms for sixty divisions according to the calculation of the Soviet General Staff, arms for only sixteen divisions will be delivered this year (including for three Korean [divisions]), and arms for the remaining forty-four divisions will be delivered in 1952-1953. This is in contradiction to the needs and time frame of the Korean theater of military operations.

4. For the goal of satisfying the urgent needs of the Korean theater of military operations, I ask you to study the applications transmitted by Comrade Gao Gang to Comrade Siu Sian-tsian, and explore the possibility of fulfilling all deliveries of rifles, artillery, tanks, airplanes, automobiles, spare parts for automobiles and GSM, medicines and other military equipment, at 1/6 [of the total] monthly, from July to the end of the year, so that the various military units in the Korean theater of military operations receive replenishment according to the presently existing organizational structure, what is advantageous for the conduct of military operations.

5. With the availability this year of deliveries of arms according to our applications, the missing quantity of arms needed for units in accordance with the new organizational structure proposed by the Soviet General Staff can be delivered in the next year. Simultaneously with this, in accordance with the delivery of arms, we will reorganize the selections for this division and in that way gradually convert the sixteen divisions to the new organization.

6. We have delayed our applications for three months and have thus brought great harm to ourselves. Today we suddenly have appealed to you with such large numbers and want all this to be delivered in six months. This places before you great difficulties, especially in the area of transport. I do not know if this can be done. I ask you to do as much as is possible.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 3107 21.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 64-65]

73. 24 June 1951, ciphered telegram,

Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

BEIJING - Comrade KRASOVSKY

For Comrade MAO ZEDONG

We received your telegram of June 21.

1. You must already know from [Soviet ambassador to the UN Jacob] Malik's speech that our promise about raising the question of an armistice has already been fulfilled by us. It is possible that the matter of an armistice will move forward.

2. As concerns arms for 60 divisions then I must say to you directly that to fulfill this application in the course of a single year is physically impossible and altogether unthinkable. Our production and military specialists consider it completely impossible to give arms for more than 10 divisions in the course of 1951. The fulfillment of the application for 60 divisions is possible, and at that with great difficulty, only in the course of 1951, '52, '53 and the first half of '54, i.e. in the course of three years. Such is the final opinion of our production and military specialists. I have tried in every way to shorten these periods even if by a half year, but unfortunately upon examination it has turned out that this is impossible.

I will communicate about all this in more detail in a separate telegram and also about the staff-organizational structure of the present Chinese divisions.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

24 June 1951

No. 635177

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 38]

74. 26 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Krasovsky in Beijing relaying telegram from Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

BEIJING - TO KRASOVSKY

We have received the following telegram from Mao Zedong:

"The government of the Chinese People's Republic intends to send fighter divisions armed with MIG-15s to Korea for participation in the military actions, which will be much better than sending divisions armed with MIG-9 planes. It is therefore necessary in the course of one and a half to two months to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th

fighter divisions, which are armed with MIG-9s, on MIG-15s, with a calculation of sending them to the front in September 1951.

The government of the Chinese People's Republic asks you to give an order to the Soviet comrades in China to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th fighter divisions on MIG-15s

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21334

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 11:20

30.6.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

1. I have received your two telegrams (of 24.6.51 and 28.6.51). I fully agree with your opinion.

a) As regards the time periods for the delivery of armaments for sixteen divisions, we should act only on the basis of the productive and transport possibilities of the Soviet Union, that is [we should] complete the deliveries of arms for sixteen divisions in the course of three years, and in 1951 complete the deliveries for ten divisions.

b) The staff-organizational structure you have proposed for the present Chinese infantry divisions is very good. We are implementing it. With sixteen divisions armed in accordance with this staff-organizational structure, the Chinese army will be far stronger than at present.

2. Malik's statement secured us the ini-

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 6-7]

84. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21405

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 13:55

3.7.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Comrade FILIPPOV!

During the meeting of military representatives of both sides we intend to advance the following 5 main points:

1. "Both sides must simultaneously issue an order for a ceasefire. Land, sea and air forces of both sides, after the issuing of the order on a ceasefire, must within all the borders of Korea cease fire and halt all other hostile actions."

This point will possibly be accepted by the enemy without qualifications.

2. "Land, sea and air forces of both sides must withdraw from the 38th parallel for a distance of 10 English miles and create a buffer zone in the region 10 English miles to the south and to the north of the 38th parallel. The civil administration of the buffer zone must be as it was before 25.6.1950, in other words to the north of the 38th parallel under the jurisdiction of the Korean People's government and to the south of the 38th parallel under the jurisdiction of the South-Korean government."

It is possible that there will be some divergences [from this proposal] among the enemy but we consider that our proposal is extremely just and it will be difficult for the enemy to refute it.

3. "Both sides must cease the transport of arms, troops and reinforcements (including land, sea and air transport) into Korea from outside the country and also the aforementioned transports to the front line on the territory of Korea."

We think that the enemy for his part will also advance a proposal on this question, and we therefore intend to take the initiative in this. But perhaps it is better to leave off the last part of our proposal?

4. "To create a control committee of

neutral states which would supervise the fulfillment of points 1, 2 and 3. In this committee there must be an equal number of representatives of neutral states that have not taken part in the Korean war and that have been selected by both sides."

We think that the enemy also will advance an analogous proposal, therefore we intend to show initiative in this. However, there will be numerous difficulties in the fulfillment of this point.

"Members" of the control committee proposed by the enemy will monitor our military transport on the Chinese-Korean border and at important communications points in Korea. Or should we not take the initiative ourselves, but wait for the enemy to advance his proposal, after which we will accept it?

I ask you to communicate your opinion about how to proceed expediently. To completely refuse to create a control committee seems also inadvisable.

5. "Both sides must carry out repatriation of prisoners of war. In the course of four months after the cessation of military operations to conduct a full mutual exchange of them, in separate batches."

The enemy will possibly propose to conduct a one for one exchange. We must demand repatriation of all prisoners of war. However, the enemy has taken prisoner a relatively larger number of North Koreans, who have already been included in the ranks of the South Korean troops, and therefore this situation will possibly elicit an argument.

In our opinion the 5 basic points indicated above must be accepted at the meeting of military representatives of both sides.

In addition there are some other points:

1. "All foreign troops including Chinese volunteer troops must completely leave North and South Korea within a specified period of time (for example within three-four months), in separate batches.

This is also a very important point. However, the representatives of the enemy possibly will think that this question belongs among political questions and should not be resolved at this meeting.

I ask you to study and communicate whether our side should advance this point.

2. "Within a specified period of time (for example in several months) refugees of North and South Korea must be returned to the areas where they lived previously."

Comrade KIM IL SUNG insists on advancing this point. However, to bring this about is very difficult. It is apparent that with regard to this question many differences of opinion and many arguments will arise between the representatives of North and South Korea, which can have an influence on the resolution of other important questions.

Or is it possible to advance this proposal?

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Comrade KIM IL SUNGow [othercComradis

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tions at the present front line and the designation of the present line contiguous to the troops of both sides as the demarcation line with the introduction of alterations in the line contiguous to troops of both sides in case of alterations of it in the period of the achievement of an agreement on all points of the agenda. At the present time the enemy is fighting with us precisely on this question, but we assume that this fight will not continue for long.

Our proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line and our agreement to set aside the question of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, and the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea before the convening of a political conference, was made not only because the present negotiations are negotiations about cessation of military operations and [because] the enemy will not in any case want to exchange eastern mountainous regions to the north of the 38th parallel for low-lying regions to the south of the 38th parallel, but also because in case the enemy refuses to leave the eastern mountainous regions we also have mountainous regions there [that are] advantageous for defense; as regards the western coastal plain to the south of the 38th parallel, it is advantageous for us because it has a much greater population than the eastern regions, and furthermore it is rich in agricultural products, plus the region of Kaesong is an advanced post for taking Seoul.

Korea, which was transmitted to the Center on 14 November through Krasovsky.

Zhou Enlai acquainted me with the telegram and added that while awaiting the reply of Comrade Filippov the Chinese side had already twice declined to meet with American representatives in Korea.

19.XI.51 ROSHCHIN

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 22 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 62]

95. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

Korea.

You communicated only on 18 November (your No. [number is illegible]) about the intention of the Korean friends to put forth an appeal to the General Assembly and the Security Council with demands: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops from the front line and creation of a 2-kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea—asking if such an appeal would contradict the statement of Comrade Vyshinsky.

Since we knew nothing about the proposed appeal of the Korean friends with a statement of the indicated demands, or at whose initiative arose the question of putting these demands before the UN, we asked you to elucidate (our No. 1059).

Without waiting for an answer to your telegram, in which were laid out the demands of the Korean friends mentioned above, you informed us (Your No. 1353 of 19 November), that on that same day, i.e. 19 November, the text of the statement by Pak Hon-Yong will be transmitted over the radio. Moreover, after receipt of our inquiry (our No. 1059), on the question of the indicated demands of the Korean friends you limited yourself only to a report that you had

Copies: Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, trying to bring an end to the war in Korea,

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, Listy 94-97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 76-77]

100. 31 January 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16008

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 23:00 31.1.1951
Series "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

For the past period of time, in view of the deliberate prolongation of the negotiations by the enemy in the course of the negotiations for an armistice in Korea, up to the present time a final agreement has not been achieved.

However, on the basic questions of the cessation of military operations, for example: on the question "Establishment of a military demarcation line between the two sides for the purpose of establishment of a demilitarized zone" an agreement has already been reached on three points.

On the question "working out practical measures for the implementation of a ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including the personnel, powers and functions of the apparatus for monitoring the implementation of the conditions of the ceasefire and armistice" an agreement has already been reached on six points (the texts are attached).

However, on the questions "Measures about prisoners of war" the enemy in principle cannot oppose the liberation of all prisoners of war. As a consequence of this, the negotiations cannot be dragged out for a long time. Nevertheless, the enemy is trying to drag out the negotiations under the pretext of a rash demand about limiting the rebuilding and construction of airports after the cessation of military operations and also a demand about liberation of prisoners on a voluntary basis. However, in view of the fact that our side decisively opposes these proposals and also in view of the fact that it is very difficult for the enemy to mobilize public opinion for continuation of the war in Korea, the satellites of the enemy and the USA itself are

all 15 points.

At each point a region of operation for the neutral state must be established within a radius of 30 miles from the center of the point.

We consider that the enemy has proposed too many points, the area of operation is too broad, and the number of open points is not equal. We intend to agree that both sides open 3-5 points each in North Korea: Singisiu, Seisin, Khanko, Manpkhodin and one airport. In South Korea: Pusan, Chemulpo, Suigei, Reisui, Khokodo. We also intend to propose that the radius of operations of the neutral group be established as 5 kilometers from the center of the point.

6. Neutral groups of observers will be attached to the monitoring organ of neutral states. The group must be organized as a minimum from four mid-level officers (lieutenant-major), two officers each from the representatives of neutral states invited by each side. In case of necessity subgroups can be created attached to the monitor groups, composed of two representatives, one person from each side.

The American side proposes to create 40 neutral groups of observers. We consider that this is too many. If an agreement is reached that both sides will each open 5 of their rear points, then it will be sufficient for fulfilling the obligations of the monitoring organ to have 16 neutral groups of observers, of which 10 groups will be permanently located at mutually agreed upon points of disembarkation and 6 groups can be used as reserves to send to the site of incidents.

7. The monitoring organ of neutral groups and the commission on the military armistice must be located in one place. The neutral groups of observation during the fulfillment of the tasks of inspection and observation do not have the right to study the "construction and characteristics" of all types of arms and ammunition.

As concerns the reports about results of the work of the neutral groups of observation, we consider that official reports must be adopted by the majority of the members of the given group, but reports not adopted by the majority of members or reports from individual persons cannot be official documents. They can be used as reference materials.

8. Material supply of the monitoring organ of neutral states and the groups subor-

dinate to it must be provided by both warring sides. Both sides must provide the monitoring organ with transport for trips of its members to points and to places where a violation of the agreement on armistice occurs.

All the 8 points set forth above concern questions of monitoring by neutral states in the rear regions of both sides outside the demilitarized zone.

I ask you to review whether our point of view is correct and whether anything needs to be added.

If you agree with our opinions, then do you consider it necessary to communicate about this in advance to the comrade leaders of the parties of Poland and Czechoslovakia[?]

I ask you to give your answer.

Note: The texts of the agreement reached on two agendas was sent to you by separate telegram.

With greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 326

31.1.52

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 73-77]

101. 3 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 709

TOP PRIORITY

SPECIAL

BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

Transmit the following answer to MAO ZEDONG.

"Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegrams of January 31 concerning the negotiations on questions of an armistice.

We agree with the plan outlined by you and the evaluation of the course of the negotiations which you give. The firm position taken by you has already given positive results and must force the enemy to make further concessions.

We consider that you must make an agreement with the leading comrades of Poland and Czechoslovakia about including their representatives in the commission of observers, and they, of course, will agree with this.

With greetings. FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

Confirm receipt.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

No. 72/III

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 80]

102. 8 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 22 January 1952 telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao and 4 February 1962 reply from Mao to Peng Dehuai

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16293

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 21:45

8.2.1952

SERIES "G" T

TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I send you for familiarization the abbreviated text of the telegram to me from Peng Dehuai of 22.1 of this year and my answer of 4.2 of this year.

The telegram of Comrade Peng Dehuai of 22.1 of this year.

"1. 16.1 of this year the Minister of Foreign Affairs of [North] Korea Pak Hon-Yong was at my place. In a conversation he said that the Korean people throughout the country demand peace and do not want to continue the war.

If the Soviet Union and China consider it advantageous to continue the war, then the Central Committee of the Labor Party will be able to overcome any difficulties and hold to their position.

I answered that a peaceful settlement on the basis of justice and rationality is advantageous for us. I also explained to him about the favorable conditions of our side in the present military situation and about the increase in the difficulties of America. Therefore an agreement on an armistice can be reached. However in military relations we will carry out active preparation of our forces for further conduct of military operations.

While departing, Minister Pak Hon Yong agreed with my point of view about the general situation and said that his visit had the goal of a simple meeting and his opinion is not the opinion of the Central Committee of the Labor party and the Korean government, but purely his personal opinion.

2. In 1951 the Korean government col-

Extremely urgent.

To Comrade SHTEMENKO

S.M.

I transmit the reply letter of KIM IL
SUNG to Comrade I.V. STALIN.

No. 1448 BABKIN

16.4.52

Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, File of 8th
Administration (2)

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!

The government of the DPRK is moved
by your fatherly concern about the urgent
needs of the Korencern he DsVB

correct.

Today we received a report from Pyongyang that Comrade KIM IL SUNG also agrees with your position.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

16 July 1952”

Telegraph the fulfillment.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 69 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 89]

108. 18 July 1952, ciphred telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 15 July 1952 telegram from Mao to Kim Il Sung and 16 July 1952 reply from Kim to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21646

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky

We have received your telegram of 17 December.

Your observations regarding the probability of an attack by the Americans in the spring of 1953 reflect the plans of the present American command in Korea, who are operating under the leadership of the Truman government. It is fully possible that these plans will be changed by the Eisenhower government in the direction of less tension on the front in Korea. Nevertheless, you are acting correctly when you count on the worst and proceed from the probability of an attack by the Americans.

We have reviewed your application for military goods for 1953 and the application for urgently needed military goods.

The quantity of arms, ammunition and other military goods which you requested oversteps the limits of our possibilities in 1953. Our calculations are based on the fact that we must deliver to you in 1953 arms, ammunition and other goods for 20 infantry divisions, this means that we must deliver for each of 20 divisions around 800,000 [units of] ammunition, 1320 artillery pieces of various types and other goods.

Taking into account the situation you speak of in your telegram, with great difficulty we can deliver to you in 1953, besides the arms and ammunition for 20 divisions [already] earmarked, with equal shipments until the end of the year, approximately one-fourth of the quantity you stated in your telegram of 17 December, specifically: 600,000 pieces of ammunition, 332 pieces of artillery of various types, tractor artillery, detonating fuses and other goods; the amounts of the deliveries of each will be determined by our War Ministry.

Thus, with a calculation of the arms and ammunition being delivered for 20 infantry divisions in 1953, there will be shipped to you: 1400 pieces of ammunition, as opposed to the 1,125,000 delivered in 1952, 1652 pieces of artillery of various types, as opposed to 1056 guns delivered in 1952.

As regards the applications for materials for military production mentioned in your telegram, transmitted to us by Minister of Foreign Trade Comrade E Tsz Chzhuanom—this application is now being studied by our Ministry of Foreign Trade.

SEMENOV [Stalin].

27 December 1952.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343,

Listy 115-116]

112. 19 March 1953, resolution, USSR Council of Ministers with draft letters from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet delegation at United Nations

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR
RESOLUTION

Of 19 March 1953 No. 858-372cc.
Moscow, Kremlin

Question of MID

The Council of Ministers of the USSR
RESOLVES:

1. To confirm the attached draft letters of the Government of the USSR to Comrades Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung (Attachment No. 1).

To transmit the present letter to Comrade Mao Zedong through Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Kuznetsov V.V., and [the letter] to Comrade Kim Il Sung through Comrade Malik, who will immediately be sent to Pyongyang.

2. To confirm the directive to the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly (Attachment No. 2).

Representative of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Malenkov

Business Manager of the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. Pomaznev

Attachment No. 1

The Soviet Government has thoroughly reviewed the question of the war in Korea under present conditions and with regard to the entire course of events of the preceding period. As a result of this, the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it would be incorrect to continue the line on this question which has been followed until now, without making those alterations in that line which correspond to the present political situation and which ensue from the deepest interests of our peoples, the peoples of the USSR, China and Korea, who are interested in a firm peace throughout the world and have always sought an acceptable path toward the soonest possible conclusion of the war in Korea.

It is not necessary to dwell in detail on all that the aggressor has done in the course

of the war in Korea. In the eyes of honest people of the whole world, the actions of the aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Korea more and more expose that bloc, and especially the aggressive forces of the USA, as an international factor that is pursuing a policy of preparing a new war and is ready to shift to a policy of broadening the war solely in order to dictate to people their aggressive

5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 54-65]

113. 29 March 1953, ciphered telegram from Kuznetsov and Fedorenko in Pyongyang [from notes taken at AVPRF; photocopy not available]

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

From PYONGYANG

Top Priority
Special File

In response to your communication No. 359.

During the second meeting on March 29, Kim Il Sung again declared that he fully agrees with the proposal of the Soviet government on the Korean question and considers that this proposal must be implemented as soon as possible.

Kim Il Sung further underscored that the time has come to show initiative from our side on the question of the conclusion of the war in Korea and achievement of peace. It is necessary, Kim said, either actively to carry out military operations or to end the war; a further dragging out of the existing situation is not in the interests of the DPRK and PRC, or of the entire democratic camp. In connection with this, Kim pointed out that the losses on the Korean side at the front and in the rear (daily nearly 300-400 persons) are very significant and it is hardly advisable to conduct further discussion with the Americans regarding repatriation of a disputed number of prisoners of war. In the present conditions, Kim said, the proposal of the Soviet government is the most advisable and correct.

Kim Il Sung is taking measures to prepare for the anticipated negotiations: the number of sick and wounded prisoners in the DPRK is being determined, materials for the negotiations in Panmunjom are being prepared, a statement from Pyongyang is being prepared, etc.

Following your instructions (Your Communication #242) we agreed with Kim Il Sung that the representative at the negotiations (if they resume) will be Nam Il, as before. In connection with this, the publication of a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly about naming Nam Il Minister of Foreign Affairs will be delayed. The post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK is temporarily being held by Li Don Gen. Kim Il Sung will inform the Chinese friends about this.

29.III.53 Kuznetsov, Fedorenko
SPRAVKA [Report]: No. 359 (bkh. #8265)
29.III.53

Comrades Kuznetsov, Razuvaev and Fedorenko have reported that on March 29 they were received by Kim Il Sung in the presence of General Nam Il, that Kim Il Sung was given the document which arrived from Moscow and that they agreed to meet again after Kim Il Sung has familiarized himself in detail with the document.

No. 242 (iskh. No. 6277) 24.III.53
Molotov gave an order to transmit to Kim Il Sung that Moscow advises that the decision of the question of naming Nam Il as Minister of Foreign Affairs be postponed until Malik's arrival and that it would be good at the present moment to be limited to the naming of a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would meanwhile serve as minister."

[Source: AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 120-122]

114. 29 July 1953, ciphered telegram, Kuznetsov to Soviet Foreign Ministry re meeting with Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

From BEIJING From Kuznetsov

To MID USSR URGENT

Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Zorin, Podtserob

[reporting a meeting of July 28]

After listening to the greetings of the CC CPSU, Mao asked me extend deep gratitude to the CC CPSU in the name of the CC CCP. Mao noted that the enemy was forced to reach an armistice not only by force of military reasons but also by force of political and economic reasons. In military matters the last year has shown that the enemy is not only not in a condition to advance on land but is also not able firmly to hold and defend the line of the front. The Chinese troops had begun not only to conduct a positional war but also to break through the front.

Among the political causes that forced the enemy to conclude an armistice, Mao noted the military contradictions in the camp of the imperialists and the significant activation of world social opinion, which is speaking out against the war in Korea.

Concerning economic causes, Mao stated that in the first two years of the war the

American monopolists amassed colossal profits in military orders and deliveries, but with the end of the negotiations for an armistice, and also as a result of the strengthening of the movement to end the war in Korea, their profits began to fall sharply.

Having returned to the military side of the matter, Mao noted that from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year in order to occupy more favorable borders along the Changan river. Further movement to the south would risk stretching out the flanks in the west and east shore of Korea. In this case the danger of landings in the rear of the Chinese-Korean troops would grow significantly.

Touching on further steps after the signing of an armistice, Mao Zedong said that the government of the PRC has a number of questions about which it would like to consult with the government of the USSR. By approximately 10 August, we will prepare a proposed plan of measures about which it is necessary to consult with the Soviet government.

Zhou Enlai was present at the meeting.
KUZNETSOV

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, Listy 187-189; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 156-158]

115. 20 April 1956, ciphered telegram, excerpt from cable from Soviet Ambassador to the PRC P. Yudin re meeting with Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Strictly Secret

From BEIJING

31 March I visited Comrade Mao Zedong.

...The important moments that apparently somewhat strengthened Stalin's trust in the CCP were your (my) information about the trip to China and the Korean war—the performance of the Chinese People's Volunteers, although in this question, said Mao Zedong, we were not sufficiently consulted. On the Korean question, when I (Mao Zedong) was in Moscow [in December 1949-January 1950] we came to an understanding about everything, the issue was not about the seizure of South Korea, but about the significant strengthening of North Korea. But subsequently Kim Il Sung was in Moscow,

where some kind of agreement was reached, about which no one considered it necessary to consult with us beforehand. It should be noted, said Mao Zedong, that there was a serious miscalculation in the Korean war about the supposed impossibility of intervention of international forces on the side of South Korea...

P. YUDIN

[Source: APRF, List 157, Fond, Opis and Delo not given]

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

APRF Archive of the President, Russian Federation
 AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation
 CC Central Committee (of a communist party)
 CCP Chinese Communist Party
 CPV Chinese People's Volunteers (the designation given PLA units sent to fight in Korea)
 DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
 KPA Korean People's Army (the army of North Korea)
 MID Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
 PLA People's Liberation Army (Army of the PRC)
 PRC People's Republic of China
 VKP(b) All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)
 VVS Voennye Vozdushnye Sily Air Force

INDEX OF NAMES

Beria, L.A., Minister of State Security, USSR
 Belov, General M. Chief of Staff for Soviet First Air Army, Commander of 64th Fighter Air Corps
 Bulganin, N.A., Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, USSR
 Deng Hua, Commander of the 13th Army Corps of the People's Liberation Army, in June 1951 became Acting CPV Commander and Political Commissar
 Fedorenko, N.T., diplomat and interpreter at the Soviet embassy in Beijing
 Filippov, pseudonym used by Stalin for ciphered telegrams
 Fyn Si, pseudonym used by Stalin for ciphered telegrams

Gao Gang, Head of the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party
 Gromyko, A.A., First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR
 Jiang Jieshi, (Chiang Kai-shek in Wade-Giles spelling) leader of Chinese Nationalist Party who established a rival government in Taiwan in after being driven out of mainland China by the PLA in 1949
 Kaganovich, L.M., Deputy Premier of USSR
 Kim Ch'aek, Deputy Commander of Korean People's Army
 Kim Tu-bong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party
 Li Kenong, Director of Military Intelligence and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, PRC, head of Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations
 Liu Yalou, Commander of the Air Force, PRC
 Malenkov, G.M., Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR
 Malik, Ia., Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations
 Mao Zedong, (Mao Tse-tung in Wade-Giles spelling), supreme leader of Chinese Communist Party
 Matveev, pseudonym used by M.V. Zakharov
 Mikoyan, A.I., Minister of Foreign Trade, USSR
 Molotov, V.M., replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs 1949, remained deputy chairman of Council of Ministers, USSR, until restored to Foreign Minister's post following Stalin's death in March 1953
 Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of General Staff of People's Liberation Army
 Pak Hon-Yong, Foreign Minister of Korean People's Democratic Republic
 Pak Il U, Minister of Internal Affairs, DPRK, named by Mao Zedong as deputy commander and deputy political commissar of Chinese People's Volunteers
 Peng Dehuai, Commander of Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea
 Qiao Guanhua, Director of the Press Bureau, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations
 Razuvaev, V.N., USSR Ambassador to DPRK following Shtykov's dismissal in December 1950
 Ridgway, Gen. Matthew, April 1951 appointed Commander of U.S. Eighth Army in Korea
 Roshchin, N.V., Soviet Ambassador to the People's Republic of China
 Shabshin, A.I., former Soviet Vice-Consul

in Seoul, 1940-46, became deputy to Political Adviser in North Korea
 Shtemenko, S.M., Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces
 Shtykov, T.F., Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK until December 1950
 Tsarapkin, S.K., Member of Soviet delegation to United Nations, had served as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Korea 1946-48
 Vasiliev, Major General, Head of Soviet Military Advisory Group in DPRK
 Vasilevsky, A.M., Minister of War, USSR
 Vyshinsky, A.Ia., Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR
 Wu, General Xiu-quan, Head of special delegation to the United Nations from the People's Republic of China in December 1950
 Xiao, Jinguang, Commander of the Navy of the People's Republic of China
 Xie, Fang, Chief of Staff, Chinese People's Volunteers
 Zakharov, General Matvei Vasilievich, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Head of Special Military Mission to North Korea (pseud. Matveev)
 Zakharov, Semen Egorovich, Corps Commissar sent to Beijing during Korean War as Stalin's personal military envoy
 Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister of People's Republic of China

Kathryn Weathersby, Assistant Professor of History, Florida State University (Tallahassee), is working on a book on the Soviet Union and the Korean War. She contributed articles on new Russian archival evidence on the Korean War to CWIHP Bulletins 3 (Fall 1993) and 5 (Spring 1995) and authored CWIHP Working Paper No. 8 on "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives."

While it is apparent that these sources have created new opportunities for fresh studies, it is also clear that they were released on a selective basis and, sometimes, for purposes other than a desire to have the truth known. Indeed, unless scholars, both Chinese and non-Chinese, are offered free and equal access to the original historical documentation, there is always the possibility that a

South

China was involved in the process of working out communist strategy in Korea in the late 1940s. Basically Mao supported Kim's desire "to liberate" the South and

cesses in the struggle against American troops.”³⁴ On December 4, Soviet deputy

into an awkward position.”⁴⁸ Stalin rejected the idea, saying: “In your cable you proposed that we, from Moscow, should direct the armistice talks. This is, of course, unthinkable and not necessary. It’s you, comrade Mao Zedong, who’ll have to direct negotiations. We can at best give advice on some questions. We are not able to be in direct communication with Kim Il Sung. You must have direct communication with him.”⁴⁹


To raise the stakes at the forthcoming negotiations the communists decided to be more active on the front, to put additional pressure on the adversary as well as to improve their own defenses in case the other side would try to gain a military advantage.

Measures were also taken to upgrade the overall military potential of North Korea, making it ready for a prolonged war. Stalin satisfied the requests of his allies as much as he was able, except for the advisers. Periodically Stalin lashed at the Chinese for extravagant requests for weapons and unwillingness to share them with the North Koreans.

My analysis concludes here, leaving for other contributions a reexamination of the strategy and tactics of the communist side at the armistice talks and in the final stage of the war. In conclusion, I would stress that further archival research is needed to get definite answers to the following aspects of communist politics in the Korean war:

1. The exact reasons for the reversal of Stalin’s position on “the liberation” of South Korea.
2. The real motives behind China’s initial refusal to enter the Korea War, and the total picture of Soviet-Chinese interactions on Korea in 1949-1950.
3. The detailed process of communist preparations for the war.
4. The events of the first days of the war and reaction to these events in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang.
5. What further strategy Stalin had in mind when he ordered North Korean communists to evacuate the country in the autumn of 1950.

1. See, e.g., coded message N 121973, 2 May 1947, The 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, pp. 4-6, Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF); cable from Ambassador Shtykov to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 19



SHTYKOV

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umes remain: Vol. 1, 149 pages (from Sept. 5-Nov. 16, 1946); Vol. 2, 141 pages (from Dec. 1, 1946-Feb. 5, 1947); Vol. 3, 193 pages (from July 7-Aug. 29, 1947); Vol. 4, 72 pages (from July 26-Sept. 6, 1948). The periods of Aug. 1945-Sept. 1946, Feb.-July 1947, Sept. 1947-July 1948, and Sept. 1948 to 1951 have been lost.

In the diaries, of course, Shtykov wrote

the Soviet Army in the north. The Soviet leaders in the north, through Kim Il Sung, tried to persuade or even threaten leftist leaders in the south, who were against the merger, into accepting Pak Hon-yong's line and the merger. For instance, when Kang Jin, a leftist leader in the south who was against the merger, visited North Korea, Kim Il Sung, apparently under the direction of Shtykov, met with Kang and reported the details of the meeting to Shtykov on 22 October 1946.¹⁰

I met with Kang Jin. I told him that he had to take full responsibility for the failure of the merger. I also told him, "Although I don't know whether you are a running-dog of American Imperialism, you are helping Americans enormously. ... Comrade Pak Hon-yong's decision is not only his but also 400,000 North Korean Party members'. ... You have to admit that you made a mistake if you truly want to be a real revolutionary which you have not been."

After the success of the merger, Shtykov ordered General Romanenko, the Director of the Soviet Military Administration in the north, to telegraph Pak Hon-yong as follows: "Congratulations on the hard-earned but successful merger."¹¹ Even after the merger, Shtykov and the Soviet leaders closely worked with Pak and even supported him financially from time to time.¹²

It has been a widely accepted view that the September General Strike and the October Taegu Riot (or Uprising) in the south had nothing to do with the Soviets. However, the Shtykov Diaries shed new light on this issue. The strike and the riot broke out to a certain extent spontaneously under KCP leadership. But the incidents themselves provoked the intervention of Soviet leaders in the north. On the other hand, Communist leaders in the south had to consult with the Soviets when the General Strike transformed into an armed riot. In their wholehearted support for the strike and riot, Shtykov and the Soviet leaders did not refrain from giving advice: Shtykov gave specific instructions to Communist leaders in the south, and these leaders often asked for the instructions of the Soviet leaders in the north.¹³ For example, Shtykov wrote in his diary on 28 September 1946:

As regard to the strike, I instructed as follows:

Continue the struggle until the demands of various economic claims, wage increase for workers, the release of the leftist leaders from prison, the cancellation of the warrant of arrests of Communist leaders, and revived publication of banned leftist newspapers are met.

Stop the strike when the demands are met.

Declare that [the strikers] will continue to talk with the American Occupation Government on the issue of transition of power to People's Committee [in the south].

Demand that the American Occupation Government not oppress the organizers and supporters of the strike.

Probably the most striking evidence of intervention was that Shtykov funneled 2 million yen to support the General Strike and later 3 million yen for the October Riot.¹⁴

There are some problems in analyzing the diaries. First, the information in the diaries is so fragmentary that it is nearly impossible for us to understand completely how certain situations evolved. They also contain many abbreviations which can be understood only by the author himself and grammatical errors which are open to a variety of interpretations. Above all, Shtykov wrote as if he were giving orders to Korean leftist leaders: according to the diaries, the Korean leaders were simply automatons. Therefore we must interpret historical events very carefully, comparing information from the diaries and that from other sources.

Still, the Shtykov diaries are undoubtedly among the most important documents to emerge on Soviet policy toward Korea from 1945 to 1951 and the emergence of the Cold War in East Asia. From the diaries, it is evident that Shtykov and the Soviet Army in North Korea played a major role in the decision-making: Soviet policies in Korea were planned at Shtykov's desk and approved by the higher ranking Soviet army leaders and later by Moscow. After he received approval from Moscow, the diaries suggest, Shtykov and his lieutenants carefully choreographed and directed the political drama of North Korean (and sometimes South Korean) politics. Although not all of

Zhou Enlai as an intermediary between Stalin and Mao in managing (mismanaging?) the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the role of the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang in the initial stages of the war, T.F. Shtykov, as an intermediary between Stalin and Kim Il Sung in the ill-fated handling of the USSR-DPRK alliance.

Shortly before the 40th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, the Russian government released a new batch of previously classified documents related to the events on the Korean peninsula from 1949 to 1953, including some correspondence between Stalin and Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong, internal correspondence between the Kremlin and various Soviet government ministries involved in the prosecution of the war in Korea, and ciphered telegrams between Soviet representatives in North Korea (known officially as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and their respective superiors in Moscow. In total, these new primary source materials amount to well over a thousand pages and come from the Archive of the President of

trial for disinformation and panicking. In their correspondence with Stalin, they doubted the need to redeploy KPA troops from the Naktong River front to the defense of Seoul, instead favoring a strategy of exerting additional pressure on the southeast-

fall of Seoul nothing would stop the UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel; that if they did cross the parallel, the remaining KPA units would not be able to render any serious resistance, and, consequently, the war would be over in a very short period of time, with the North Korean state being eliminated by the aggressive American imperialists. Unanimously, the North Korean leadership agreed to ask both allies, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, for direct military assistance. The Political Council thus discussed and approved two official letters [Document #6] addressed to Stalin and Mao Zedong, begging them to intervene directly and without delay to save the North Korean regime.

It is noteworthy that the next day, before dispatching the letter to Stalin, Kim solicited Shtykov's advice regarding its content and advisability. On the evening of September 29, following the mandate of the WPK CC Politburo, Kim for the first time officially raised to his Soviet military advisers the question of the UN forces' crossing the 38th parallel. At his meeting with Shtykov and Zakharov [Document #5], with Pak Hon-Yong present, he asked Shtykov whether the latter thought the enemy would dare to cross the 38th parallel. Once Shtykov replied that he was not sure, Kim concurred by saying that "it was not clear to me either." Kim added, however, that "if the enemy did cross the parallel, the People's Army would not be able to form new troops and, therefore, would not be able to render any serious resistance to the enemy forces." Kim told Shtykov he wanted his advice as to how they should approach Stalin concerning their letter requesting direct Soviet military assistance. But Shtykov dodged the question, obviously to ensure that the final decision to invite Soviet troops to the defense of North Korea—and subsequent responsibility, should things go wrong—would rest with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong themselves.²³ Kim and Pak were visibly dissatisfied and upset but at the same time so "confused, lost, hopeless, and desperate," and had so much at stake at the moment, that they went ahead and asked Stalin for a total commitment, including Soviet ground troops, even without Shtykov's blessing.²⁴

It was on October 1, at 2:50 a.m., that Stalin received ciphered telegram #1351 from Shtykov, containing an official text of the letter of Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong

pleading for help [Document #6]. Actually, the letter was dated September 29. The next day, Pak Hon-Yong personally delivered it to Shtykov with an emotional plea that "at the moment of the enemy's troops crossing of the 38th parallel, we will desperately need ground troops from the Soviet Union." The letter arrived at the Eighth Department of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces on September 30, at 23:30 p.m., by wire as "very urgent," was deciphered on October 1, at 0:35 a.m., typed up at 1:45 a.m., and forwarded to Stalin to his dacha in the South at 2:50 a.m. The timing is important in this case because only after having received Kim Il Sung's plea for help did Stalin dispatch a cable to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on October 1, at 3:00 a.m., requesting China's direct intervention in the Korean conflict.

In their letter, Kim and Pak informed Stalin about the severe consequences for the KPA of the Inch'on landing. Although still loathe to admit that Seoul had fallen, they indicated that the enemy "had the real possibility of taking over Seoul." They were certain that "with the complete occupation of Seoul, the enemy would launch a further offensive into North Korea." Kim and Pak admitted that "if the enemy were to take advantage of the situation and step up its offensive in North Korea, then we would be unable to stop the enemy by our own forces... and the U.S. aggression would succeed in the end." Nonetheless, they emphasized that they were still determined to fight on, to mobilize new troops and to prepare "for a protracted war." They argued that it was "in the USSR's national interest to prevent the U.S. advance into North Korea and the latter's transformation into a colony and military springboard of U.S. imperialism."

Finally, they begged Stalin for a "special kind of assistance," admitting that "at the moment when the enemy troops begin to cross the 38th parallel, we would desperately need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union." Afraid of their plea being rejected outright and fearful that Stalin held them personally responsible for the war's disastrous turn, Kim and Pak inserted a face-saving proposition for Stalin, i.e., "if for any reason, this [direct military assistance - AM] proves to be impossible, please, assist us in lining up international volunteers' units in China and other countries of people's democracies to be used in providing military assistance to our struggle." Kim and Pak

could not be more explicit than that. Recognizing that they could not survive on their own, they were crying out for help to Stalin, their "fatherly leader," for, preferably, the Soviet cavalry to rescue the day, or, if not, to broker Mao's consent to enter the war.

In the meantime, on September 29, General MacArthur restored the Government of the Republic of Korea headed by Syngman Rhee in an emotional ceremony in the capital in Seoul. The last hope that the war could be contained at the *status quo ante belli* was dashed when later that day the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved MacArthur's plan for the conquest of North Korea, envisioning the Eighth Army advancing to Pyongyang and the Tenth Corps being withdrawn from the Inch'on-Seoul area for another amphibious landing at Wonsan. The same day, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gen. George C. Marshall sent an encouraging message to MacArthur: "We want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel."²⁵

On September 30, the Soviet Politburo conferred again on the Korean situation, in particular Zakharov's latest report on the dire military situation [Document #4]. The discussion focused on the need to avoid a direct military confrontation between the USSR and the United States and the options still available to salvage the situation in Korea, including soliciting Chinese help and opening a last-ditch diplomatic maneuvering at the United Nations. The Politburo directed that the Foreign Ministry draft a new ceasefire resolution to be submitted to the UN. Also, they decided to approve Kim Il Sung's proposals to reorganize the KPA high military command, form six new divisions, and withdraw remaining North Korean troops from the South [Document #8]. At the same time, the Politburo decided that armaments, munition, and other materials for the new divisions would be supplied to the KPA between October 5 and 20.²⁶ Finally, the Politburo recommended that Kim ask the Chinese to dispatch truck drivers to North Korea.

It is worth noting that Stalin specifically mentioned in his instructions to Shtykov that their last recommendation should be passed to Kim Il Sung without any reference to Moscow, as if it were coming from the Soviet military advisers in the field. The probable cause for such reticence may have

by Soviet organizations in Korea [Politburo Decision No. P78/168, Document #14]. He was notified of this policy change by wire the same day. Ironically, the permission arrived just as Shtykov, sensing a policy shift in Moscow, losing all his faith in Kim Il Sung's ability to defend his regime on his own, and unsure if any help was coming from Moscow or Beijing, requested even more extended evacuation powers, now including the families of the Soviet citizens of Korean nationality,³² the personnel of the Soviet Air Force units stationed in Korea,³³ and all other Soviet citizens in Korea [Document #16]. It took less than a day for Vasilevsky and Gromyko to get Stalin's approval and immediately wire the affirmative response.

After the conference with his Politburo associates sometime during the day of October 5, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Mao

Soviet Union and PRC provide sanctuary for Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA if they could no longer fight on their own; the main forces, arms, equipment, and some cadres of the KPA would be redeployed to northeast China, while the disabled and wounded men, as well as Koreans of Soviet origin, could be moved to the Maritime Province of the Soviet Far East. In their new bases in northeast China they would train new troops, master new weaponry, and prepare themselves for the day of their reentry into Korea. Stalin reiterated that since the Chinese did not intend to send troops, the Soviet Union and China should work out concrete plans to provide shelter for their Korean comrades and their forces, and make sure that one day they would be able to return to Korea.

Reportedly, Zhou was stunned at what he heard. He backed away from his initial tough stance, and asked Stalin whether China could count on Soviet air cover should it decide to fight in Korea. Without a pause, Stalin responded positively: "We can send a certain number of aircraft to offer cover [for the CPV in Korea-AM]." Stalin also reassured Zhou that the Soviet Union would take care of weapons and equipment supplies for the CPV, including their replacements, immediately after the Chinese side ascertained its needs in actual combat.

The Stalin-Zhou talks lasted for two days, and yet no mutually agreed upon decisions were reached at the end. Zhou simply said that he needed to communicate with Beijing in order to ask for new instructions.

9. [Ed. note: In addition, some high-level declassified Russian documents bearing on the period examined by this article were published in English translation in Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-458; see also Col. Gen. D.A. Volkogonov, "Should We Be Frightened by This?—Behind the Scenes of the Korean War," *Ogonok* (Moscow) 25-26 (June 1993), English translation in Vladimir Petrov, "Soviet Role in the Korean War Confirmed: Secret Documents Declassified," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 13:3 (Fall 1994), 42-67, esp. 48-57.]

10. Although this document has still not been declassified, it is alluded to in a detailed chronology of events prepared by officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry who had access to still-classified materials. In particular, the chronology entry dated 20 September 1950, describing the content of Stalin's reply to Zhou Enlai's inquiry about the military situation in Korea after the Inch'on landing (an inquiry which Zhou had conveyed to Amb. Roshchin and Soviet military advisers Kotov and Konnov on September 18), states: "These Soviet recommendations [regarding what the KPA should do following the Inch'on landing] were transmitted to Kim Il Sung on 18 September 1950." See *Chronology of Major Developments on the Eve of and During the Korean War (January 1949-October 1950)* [hereafter *Chronology*]. Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), Moscow, Fond 5, opis 58, delo 266, list 55.

It appears that this is the same telegram which Stalin referred to in his message to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on 1 October 1950 [Document 10], in which he stated that on September 16 "Moscow warned our Korean friends that the landing of the USA troops at Chemulp'o [Inch'on] had great significance...." Perhaps the discrepancy can be explained by the fact that although the telegram may have been drafted in or sent from Moscow on September 16, given the time difference and the chaos of the military situation it might have been handed to Kim only on September 18. Further declassification is required to resolve the question conclusively, however.

11. At this point, it is worth clarifying a bit of confusion that has emerged over the fact that there were two senior Soviet military officials with the surname Zakharov at this juncture of the Korean War. Army Gen. *Matvey Vasilievich Zakharov* (1898-1972), the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, was dispatched to Pyongyang in late September 1950 to inspect and report back to Stalin on the military situation. He signed and received messages using the pseudonym, "*Matveyev*." In October 1950, shortly after M.V. Zakharov was sent to Korea, Corps Commisar *Semyon Egorovich Zakharov* (1906-1969) was sent to Beijing as Stalin's personal military envoy to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and remained in the Chinese capital until the end of the war in July 1953, and documents involving him bear his actual name.

12. See *Chronology*, AVPRF, Fond 5, Opis 58, Delo 266, listy 52-53.

13. In *Uncertain Partners* (p. 174), Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue refer to a five-man team which was dispatched from China to Korea on September 17 "to survey local topography." This must be the same team of senior military officers to which Zhou referred.

14. *Chronology*, listy 54-55.

15. See *Chronology*, listy 55-56.

16. Rees, *Korea*, 91.

17. These charges are not completely fair because the Soviet military advisers were severely restricted in their

mobility by Stalin's early order that under no circumstances they cross the 38th parallel, even when the KPA was on the offensive at the Naktong River front. Hence, their own knowledge of the military situation and ability to influence it were very much limited.

18. See Shabshin's conversation with Pak Hon-Yong, recorded in Document #5. A.I. Shabshin had been the Soviet Deputy Consul in Seoul before the end of the Second World War; as Adviser on Political Affairs; in 1946, he was appointed as a Political Adviser to the Soviet 25th Army responsible for the occupation of North Korea; when the Korean War started, he was assigned to Gen. Matveyev's team.

19. Kim was reported to be very upset that Ch'oe failed to report to him regularly about the development of the military situation in Seoul, despite his access to radio.

20. Kim Il Sung commanded his troops from inside an underground bunker located in the vicinity of Pyongyang. According to Yu Song-ch'ol's memoirs, during the entire war Kim Il Sung made only one visit to the Front Line Command. That was when it was located at the Seoul Capitol Building. Others disagree and insist that he came down as far as Suanbo to inspect the front lines and allegedly even bathed in hot springs there. [See Yu Song-ch'ol, "Recollections," *Choong-ang Ilbo* (Seoul), 14 November 1990.] Consequently, the only more or less reliable source of updates on the military situation for Kim Il Sung at that time was his Soviet advisers. But as the predicament of the KPA deepened, they seemed to begin to dodge his inquiries, citing insufficient knowledge, and to avoid giving recommendations on strategy and tactics.

21. See Document #5.

22. One should note that two days earlier Zakharov had told Kim that it was wishful thinking on his part to count on manning those nine divisions from among "the southerners" because the UN offensive would most likely cut off and rout them. See Document #4.

23. Such "shyness" was quite unusual for Shtykov, who in the past had pushed Kim Il Sung around as he pleased and often used Kim's name to promote his own ideas in Moscow.

24. The origins of this request were not without controversy even within the DPRK government. In his conversation with A.I. Shabshin on September 28 [Document #5], Pak Honyong mentioned that originally the WPK CC PC intended to ask only for Soviet air support because some nationalistic North Korean leaders advocated only limited direct Soviet participation in the war. As of September 29, Kim Il Sung still insisted, perhaps pro forma, that "we should continue to fight on and eventually unite Korea by our own forces." However, as the military situation continued to deteriorate, increasing the perception in Pyongyang that only an all-out intervention by the USSR could bail out the North Korean regime, which was on the brink of complete disaster, Kim felt compelled to seek full Soviet military intervention.

25. Quoted in Rees, *Korea*, 103.

26. This timetable may have reflected Stalin's hope that the remnants of Kim's troops would be able to resist the UN troops on their own at least for the next few days while he would be busy seeking Chinese support.

27. His justification for this measure was that most of these enterprises were destroyed by American air raids and out of operation anyhow.

28. I have not located any evidence in the Russian archives as to whether Stalin was informed on October 1 that MacArthur had just made an unconditional surrender demand to the North Koreans to "forthwith lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct." Nor could I find any

records indicating whether Stalin knew of U.S. delegate to the UN Warren Austin's famous statement to the UN Political Committee made the day before: "Today the forces of the United Nations stand on the threshold of military victory... The aggressor's forces should not be permitted to have refuge behind an imaginary line because that would recreate the threat to the peace of Korea and of the world."

29. See *Chronology*, list 61.

30. The purported Mao to Stalin cable of 2 October 1950 appeared in an official Chinese compilation of Mao's writings published by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao Diyi Ce (1949.9-1950.12)* [The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Since the Founding of the Nation, vol. 1 (Sept. 1949-Dec. 1952)] (Beijing: Central Documents Publishing House, 1987), pp. 539-541; an English translation appears in Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, 275-76, reading as follows:

1. We have decided to send some of our troops to Korea under the name of [Chinese People's] Volunteers to fight the United States and its lackey Syngman Rhee and to aid our Korean Comrades. From the following considerations, we think it necessary to do so: the Korean revolutionary force will meet with a fundamental defeat, and the American aggressors will rampage unchecked once they occupy the whole of Korea. This will be unfavorable to the entire East.

2. Since we have decided to send Chinese troops to fight the Americans in Korea, we hold that, first, we should be able to solve the problem; that is, [we are] ready to annihilate and drive out the invading armies of the United States and other countries. Second, since Chinese troops are to fight American troops in Korea (although we will use the name Volunteers), we must be prepared for a declaration of war by the United States and for the subsequent use of the U.S. air force to bomb many of China's cities and industrial bases, as well as an attack by the U.S. navy on [our] coastal areas.

3. Of these two problems, the primary problem is whether or not the Chinese troops can annihilate the American troops in Korea and effectively resolve the Korean issue. Only when it is possible for our troops to annihilate the American troops in Korea, principally the Eighth Army (an old army with combat effectiveness), can the situation become favorable to the revolutionary camp and to China, although the second problem (a declaration of war by the United States) is still a serious one. This means that the Korean issue will be solved in reality along with the defeat of the American troops (in name it will probably remain unsolved because the United States will most likely not admit Korea's victory for a considerable period of time). Consequently, even if the United States declares war on China, the war will probably not be of great scope or last long. The most unfavorable situation, we hold, would result from the inability of the Chinese troops to annihilate American troops in Korea and the involvement of the two countries' troops in a stalemate while the United States publicly declares war on China, undermines the plans for China's economic reconstruction, which has already begun, and sparks the dissatisfaction of [China's] national

Document 1: Soviet Defense Minister

VKP(b) CC

P78/73

27 September 1950

[To:] Cmrds Malenkov, Bulganin,
Vasilevsky

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the
Meeting of the Politburo of the CC
VKP(b) Decision dated September 27,
1950

#73. - Questions of Korea.

Approve of the attached directive
to Comrades Matveyev and Shtykov.

Secretary of the C[entral] C[ommittee]

* * * * *

**Attachment to
#73 (op) of the Politburo Protocol #78**

Top Secret

Pyongyang

TO MATml5o7u1Lqz/J 1 >> [2</B 574 /J 13uLine3</B 682.0001 /J 1 >> BDC -0.001 Tw 1.2 T TdSHTYKOVJ 1 >> [2</B 574 /J 13uLin

advisers will be captured by the enemy, as was directed earlier.

Report on the implementation of this directive.

F Y N SI. [STALIN]

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 90-93]

Document 4: Ciphred telegram from Matveyev (Zakharov) to Fyn Si (Stalin), 26 [27] September 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600262/sh

From Pyongyang Sent on
26.9.50 at 8:10¹ a.m., by wire
Received in Moscow on 27.9.50 at 20:55
p.m.
Arrived in the 8th MDGS² on 27.9.50 at
21:10 p.m.
Deciphered by Morozov on 27.9.50 at
23:50 p.m.

Number of copies made - 10

Distribution List:

Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1,
Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1,
Bulganin - 1, Vasilevsky - 1, 8th MDGS
file - 1.

TO COMRADE FYN SI [STALIN]

From: PYONGYANG

Sent on 09/29/50 at 20:23 p.m.

Received in Moscow on 09/30/50 at 14:45 p.m.

Received at the 8D/GS on 09/30/50 at 14:50 p.m.

Deciphered by Vakushin on 09/30/50 at 15:50 p.m

Distribution list - 12 copies:

Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1,

Beria - 1, Mikoyan -1, Kaganovich - 1,

Bulganin - 1, Gromyko - 1, 8 MDGS - 1,

MFA - 1, on file - 1.

To: MOSCOW

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

To Comrade GROMYKO

Instantsia [Highest Authority]

On 29 September 29 I met KIM IL SUNG upon his request.

PAK HÓN-YÓNG was present at the meeting. In the beginning of the conversation KIM IL SUNG asked me whether I was aware of the military situation at the front.

I replied that I did not know the latest one.

Then KIM IL SUNG briefly explained to me the predicament of his troops on the basis of the report of the Front Commander and asked my advice as to what one could do in order to improve the situation at the front. KIM IL SUNG believes that in the wake of the enemy's having occupied the Syarye mountain range and moving into the rear of the Second Army Group the front situation is becoming particularly troublesome. Earlier they hoped that they would be able to withdraw troops in an organized manner. But because of their poor discipline

that

Ieves

that

inreitaruchd

for Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 3172

Coded, only by wire

Submitted at 23:45 p.m. on 07/05/50

Distribution List - 3 copies: Stalin - 2,

Molotov -1

To BEIJING, [SOVIET] AMBASSA-
DOR

Re Your ciphered telegrams ## 1112-
1126

Tell Zhou Enlai the following:

1. We agree with the opinion of Chinese comrades regarding the Indian intermediation in the matter of admitting the People's [Republic of] China into the UN membership.

2. We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteers' actions in North Korea in the event of the enemy's crossing the 38th parallel. We will do our best to provide the air cover for these units.

3. Your report about the flights of the Soviet aircraft over the Manchurian territory has not been confirmed. But we have issued an order not to permit such overflights.

F I L I P P O V [STALIN]

_ 373/sh

5.7.50 [5 July 1950]

Typed by Stepanova at 0:55 a.m. on 07/
06/50

*[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 331,
list 79]*

**Document 8: Draft Telegram, Chan Fu
(Stalin) to Matveyev (Zakharov), 30
September 1950**

VKP(b) CC

P78/118

09/30/50

To: Cmrds. Malenkov, Bulganin, list 79]09/30/50list 79]09/30/50Decon th d ChdEMC er 1950STd T*(DodTj E8. ET 56 561 38 Ju06B761 23

Korea may take place only when the initiative for the return of any such specialists comes from the government of the DPRK. You should not display any initiative of your own in raising the issue of the evacuation of Soviet specialist before the Koreans do.

The return of the personnel of the Soviet organizations working in the DPRK to the Soviet Union should be done in the previously-established order, that is, via the MFA of the USSR upon consultations with appropriate ministries and organizations of the USSR.

You should inform the MFA of the USSR about each case of pending return of the Soviet specialists from Korea well in advance.

A. G r o m y k o

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 123, 125]

Document 10: Ciphred Telegram,

In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large [*kraine bol'shim*].

Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send out troops to

in conversations of MAO ZEDONG with

USSR into the pilot training program.

I will keep you informed about further talks with the Chinese comrades. 8 October 1950.

F Y N S I [STALIN]

Comrade Shtykov, I ask You to read this letter to Kim Il Sung. He may copy it by hand in your presence, but You may not hand over this letter to Kim Il Sung because of its extreme confidentiality.

F Y N S I [STALIN]

concerning the temporary evacuation of some Soviet specialists upon consultations with the Korean government, as well as of the personnel of Soviet organizations in Korea.

G R O M Y K O

5-nb

[APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 121-122]

~~# 204-90880 / Ministry of Defense~~

h-8nb

[Handwritten: This letter was delivered to Comrade Bulganin on October 7, 1950 at 22:15 pm.]

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 65-67]

Document 14: Telegram from Gromyko to Shtykov Approved by Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Politburo, 5 October 1950

VKP(b) CC

P78/168

05/10/50

To: Cmrds Bulganin, Gromyko

**Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC
VKP(b)**

Decision dated October 5, 1950

168. The Question of Shtykov.

The attached draft of a telegram addressed to the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Com. Shtykov, regarding the question of the evacuation of Soviet specialists and personnel of Soviet organizations from Korea to the USSR, has been approved.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

4ak

[Attachment to the Decision of the Politburo #78 regarding #168]

PYONGYANG

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

1304/sh. We agree with your proposals

the complete takeover of all of Korea, and its

months.

Furthermore, Comrade Mao Zedong noted that at present the government of the People's Republic of China cannot pay in cash for the armaments delivered. They hope to receive arms on credit.

Thus, the 1951 budget will not be affected, and it will be easier for them to explain it to the democrats.

In conclusion, Mao Zedong stated that the leading comrades in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party believe that the Chinese must come to the assistance of the Korean comrades in their difficult struggle. To discuss this matter, Zhou Enlai will have to meet comrade Filippov again.

Zhou Enlai is being sent new instructions.

R O S H C H I N

No. 2408

13.10 [13 October]

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, listy 1-2]

Document 20: Ciphred Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 13 October 1950

**Ciphred Telegram # 75525/4/6759
(incoming #3735/shs)
(Stalin's hand-written note)**

PYONGYANG

To SHTYKOV for Comrade Kim Il Sung

I have just received a telegram from Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] discussed the situation [in Korea - AM] again and decided after all to render military assistance to the Korean comrades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao Zedong. In connection with this new decision of the Chinese comrades, I ask You to postpone temporarily the implementation of the telegram sent to You yesterday about the evacuation of North Korea and the retreat of the Korean troops to the north.

F Y N S I [STALIN]

13 Oct 1950

[typed:] Sent on 13.X.50

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 74-75]

Document 21: Ciphred Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung, 14 October 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 4829

To PYONGYANG—SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Transmit to KIM IL SUNG the following message:

“After vacillations [*kolebaniy*] and a series of temporary [provisional] decisions the Chinese comrades at last made a final decision to render assistance to Korea with troops.

I am glad [*rad*] that the final and favorable decision for Korea has been made at last.

In this connection, you should consider the recommendations of the meeting of the Chinese-Soviet leading comrades, which You were told of earlier, annulled. You will have to resolve concrete questions regarding the entry of the Chinese troops jointly with the Chinese comrades.

The armaments required for the Chinese troops will be delivered from the USSR. I wish You success.”

F Y N S I [STALIN]

14.10.50

Typed by Doronchenkova #8865

Made 2 copies: Stalin - 1, 8MDGS - 1.

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, list 77]

1. Although on the front page of the telegram it says that it was sent from Pyongyang at 8:10 a.m. on September 26, I believe that the date was indicated incorrectly because of a typo. It should be dated as of September 27 because at the end of the telegram it says that it was dispatched from Pyongyang at 12:35 p.m. on 27 September 1950 (local time) which is 6:35 a.m. of the same date Moscow time.

2. 8th MDGS stands for the Eighth Main Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

**CWIHP ACTIVITIES
AT V WORLD CONGRESS
OF CENTRAL AND
EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES,
POLAND, AUGUST 1995**

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) organized several activities in connection with the V World Congress of Central and East European Studies, held at Warsaw University on 6-11 August 1995.

CWIHP, in cooperation with the National Security Archive (a non-governmental repository for declassified documents and research institute located at George Washington University), co-organized three panels at the Warsaw meeting. Two were chaired by CWIHP Director Jim Hershberg: “New Evidence on the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981,” with presentations by Mark Kramer (Russian Research Center, Harvard University), Michael Kubina (Free University, Berlin), and Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive); and “Cold War Flashpoints,” with Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive), Johanna Granville (Carnegie-Mellon University), Byrne, and Kramer. Malcolm Byrne chaired a session on “New Opportunities for Research and the Issue of Openness in Cold War Studies,” with presentations by Hope Harrison (Lafayette College), Sven Holtsmark (Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies), Hershberg, and Zubok.

During the conference, CWIHP, the National Security Archive, and the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, conducted a day-long workshop on current scholarship and research on the 1980-81 Polish Crisis. CWIHP presented a collection of newly-released Soviet documents on the crisis, included Politburo minutes, selected, translated, annotated, and introduced by Mark Kramer, while the Archive assembled declassified U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Plans were discussed to hold an oral history conference on the 1980-81 Polish Crisis, gathering key Polish, Russian, and Americans involved in the events, in the spring of 1997 in Poland. Meetings were also held with German and Hungarian colleagues regarding, respectively, meetings for scholars to present new East-bloc evidence on the 1953 East German uprising and the 1956 Hungarian crisis which are planned in connection with the National Security Archive's “Cold War Flashpoints” project and will be co-sponsored by CWIHP.

In conjunction with the Warsaw gathering, Hershberg and Byrne gave presentations regarding CWIHP's and the Archive's activities at the International Librarians' Conference on Libraries in Europe's Post-Communist Countries, held near Krakow, Poland, at Jagellonian University's Polonia Institute (Przegorzaly) on 3-5 August 1995.

11 July 1995

To the Editor:

Since Kathryn Weathersby chose once again to stigmatize my work (as “revisionist”) in the spring 1995 issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*, perhaps I might be permitted a comment. The documents that she reproduced, selectively culled from a vastly larger archive and handcarried to Seoul by a Boris Yeltsin beseeching South Korea to aid the faltering Russian economy, are quite interesting but in ways that she does not seem to understand.

Document #1, a standard transcript of Kim Il Sung’s meeting with Stalin on 5 March 1949 widely circulated for use inside the Soviet government, is impressive primarily for how bland it is, adding very little to the existing record. If anything it illustrates how distant Stalin was from the Korean situation, probing Kim on what kind of an army he had, what kind South Korea had, and whether he had utilized the “national bourgeoisie” to organize trade (which Kim indeed had done). This transcript adds virtually nothing to what has been known of this meeting, a relatively full record of which can be found in an archive of captured North Korean materials in Washington. But it does appear to show that no secret military alliance or agreement issued forth from this meeting, as the South long claimed.

This document certainly does not provide evidence for Dr. Weathersby’s assertion that the meeting was “revealing in a most intimate way [of] the nature of the relationship” between the USSR and the DPRK or that North Korea was “utterly dependent” on the USSR. The captured archive has large numbers of documents on Korean-Soviet trade, negotiations over various exchanges, and proof that some precious Korean minerals, like gold and monazite (when refined, useful for a thorium atomic bomb) were indeed transferred in large quantities to Russia. (I covered this briefly in my *Origins of the Korean War*, volume 2 [Princeton University Press, 1990], pp. 151-2, 340-45.) These voluminous materials still do not prove North Korea’s utter dependency on the USSR, especially when contrasted to South Korea, which had half its annual budget and five-sixths of its imports in the 1950s provided virtually gratis by the United States. (Stalin, to the con-

trary, charged Kim two percent—about what mortgages cost in the U.S. then.)

Document #7, Stalin’s telegram to Russian ambassador to P’yongyang Shtykov on

30 January 1950 #7 of 40009 pg 042 <IBZ 202.001> (by Jth2 UniBDE -0.07

by late 1949, namely, that both sides understood that their big power guarantors would not help them if they launched an unprovoked general attack—or even an assault on Ongjin or Ch'orwon. Document #6, a telegram from the Russian ambassador to Moscow in January 1950, shows Kim Il Sung impatient that *the South* “is still not instigating an attack,” thus to justify his own, and the Russians in P'yôngyang tell him once again that he cannot attack Ongjin without risking general civil war. Meanwhile Rhee and his advisors (some of whom were Americans with cabinet-level portfolios in the ROK government) had gotten the message (especially through OSS and CIA operative Preston Goodfellow) that the US would only back Seoul in the case of an unprovoked and unequivocal attack from the North. Thus the 1950 logic for both sides was to see who would be stupid enough to move first, with Kim itching to invade and hoping for a clear southern provocation, and hotheads in the South hoping to provoke an “unprovoked” assault, thus to get American help—for that was the only way the South could hope to win. What better way for both sides to begin than to do it in isolated, remote Ongjin, with no foreign observers present along the parallel?

Other items in these documents also bear comment. They make clear that well before the war Kim already had begun playing Moscow off against Beijing, for example letting Shtykov overhear him say, at an apparently drunken luncheon on 19 January 1950, that if the Russians wouldn't help him unify the country, “Mao Zedong is his friend and will always help Korea.” In general this document underscores my point that the victory of the Chinese revolution had an enormous refractory effect on North Korea (*Origins*, 1990, pp. 369-71), and that North Korea's China connection was a trump card Kim could play to create some breathing room for his regime between the two communist giants. The documents also show that Kim's timing for an invasion was deeply influenced by his desire to get large numbers of Korean soldiers back from China, where they had been fighting for years with Mao's forces (*Origins*, 1990, pp. 451-53).

These documents put to rest forever, in my view, P'yôngyang's canard that it was Pak Hon-yong, the southern communist leader, who argued for war in 1950 and foolishly thought the southern people would

“rise up” to greet northern troops (*Origins*

COLD

SOVIET INTERROGATION OF U.S. POWs IN THE KOREAN WAR

by Laurence Jolidon

The extensive, covert involvement of Soviet intelligence in the interrogation of American prisoners throughout the Korean War has been laid bare thanks to a trove of long-secret military documents unearthed by the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on missing Americans in the former Soviet Union.

Despite accounts in the debriefings of repatriated U.S. POWs—and even brief mentions in the Western press during and immediately following the war—that Russians had questioned U.S. POWs, Soviet officials steadfastly maintained for decades that it never happened.

The Kremlin's obvious interest in the details of American weapons, strategy and morale in the Far East—as early-Cold War indicators of what to expect once the battle for world supremacy that most assumed would eventually occur in Europe was joined—had never gone that far, Stalin and his successors argued.

Moscow's leaders hid behind the fiction that the Soviet Union, while lending moral and logistical support to the troops of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and air protection along the Manchurian border for the sanctuary it had recently ceded to the new Chinese ruler, Mao Zedong, had primarily been a neutral, disinterested party in Korea.

But just as Soviet Communist Party archival documents made public in the past few years have drawn a clear, intentional and decision-making connection between Stalin's hand and the North Korean invasion, documents from Soviet military files have deepened our knowledge of what became in effect an extensive, bold, yet largely covert intelligence war conducted by the Soviets north of the 38th parallel.

One key document, obtained in April 1994 by investigators from the Pentagon's POW/MIA Affairs Office working under the aegis of the Joint Commission, came from files at the Soviet military archives in Podolsk.

The two-paragraph message, dated 26 November 1952, from S. Ignatyev, the chief Soviet military advisor in North Korea, to G.M. Malenkov, one of Stalin's principal

ministers, stated:

Representatives of the MGB of the USSR and China came from Peking to conduct further prisoner interrogations, in order to gain more precise information on spy centers, landing strips and flights over the territory of the Soviet Union.

The interrogations will continue in Pekton [Pyoktong].

While seemingly cursory and matter-of-fact, this document had several important implications.

First, it contradicted previous Russian assurances that Soviet officials had not been involved in the interrogation of American POWs.

Even after veterans of the Soviet military intelligence service had told the Joint Commission of their personal involvement in numerous interrogations, the Russian side had insisted that the rules under which Soviet forces operated in the Korean War theater forbade such acts.

As proof, they cited message traffic to Soviet posts in the war theater dating from January 1951, and repeated as a standing order throughout the war, that “our translators are categorically forbidden to interrogate American and British POWs, or prisoners of any other nationality.”

The Ignatyev-Malenkov message, on its face, was either a reversal of that policy or—as some American analysts believed—a clue that the “categorically forbidden” order was only for public consumption.

(In the course of the Russian-American dialog on this subject through the meetings of the Joint Commission, the Russian position shifted several times. Some Russian members of the commission admitted reluctantly that one favored method of interrogating American POWs was to have the Russians' questions put to the prisoners by Chinese interrogators while the Soviets sat, un-First, it cocommission admitby

The statement that “interrogations will continue in Pekton (Pyoktong),” a city on the North Korean side of the Yalu near the border with China, could be read as a sign that the Soviets wished to make it clear that the prisoners—and the intelligence gained from their interrogations—should be shared.

A later Soviet document, acquired by the American side of the commission in early 1995, also appears to lift any previous prohibition against Soviet involvement with American POWs—if the prohibition ever existed. Sent on 29 January 1953, and addressed to three top Soviet leaders including Lavrenti Beria, then head of the MGB, the message read:

“The minister of public security of China, having reported on 27 January 1953 to our advisor on this decision of the TSK KPK [the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party], requested that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war and oversee their work. The MGB advisor was ordered by us to render such help.”

A second document that illustrates the involvement of Soviet military intelligence in the interrogation of American POWs in Korea deals with the 4 December 1950 shootdown of a USAF RB-45 reconnaissance plane.

None of the four men aboard the plane—the pilot, Capt. Charles McDonough, two other crewmen, and Col. John R. Lovell, a top-ranking Air Force intelligence officer believed to be on a mission from the Pentagon—made it back to the U.S.

Thus, like the Cold War spy flights, the RB-45 case was wrapped not only in the difficulties of unraveling any MIA case from the tangles of the Korean War but also in the sensitivity that attaches to intelligence missions and personnel.

The key document discovered so far in the RB-45 case revealed not only that at least one of those aboard was captured alive, but also that Soviet interest and involvement in the case was high.

A cable dated 17 December 1950, stated in part:

An aircraft shot down on 12-4-50 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km to the east of Andun (Manchuria). The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to the earth burned up completely. The crew bailed out on parachutes. The pilot

Captain Charles McDonough was taken prisoner.

Under interrogation he said:

The aircraft was shot down at an altitude of 30,000 feet.

The crew numbering 3 persons bailed out on parachutes. The navigator having landed ran off, where the radio operator disappeared to he did not see. The captive himself was burned and is in a critical condition.

A second cable, dated the following day, added this:

I am informing you that the pilot from the shot down B-45 aircraft died en route and the interrogation was not finished.

These two cables—both sent to Marshal Stepan Krasovskiy, chief of the Soviet general staff in Moscow—were found in the Soviet military archives in Podolsk by civilian Russian researchers working under the direction of Dr. Paul Cole, then with the Rand Corp. Cole’s project was authorized under a Pentagon contract with Rand to search for information in Soviet archives dealing with Americans missing after World War II, the Korean War and Cold War.

The cables in the McDonough-Lovell RB-45 case were made available to the American side of the Joint Commission within a short time after Cole learned of them in the fall of 1992 and ultimately became a part of the large repository of Joint Commission documents that comprises the results of the commission’s efforts.

After being translated, documents received from the Russian side of the commission, along with transcribed minutes of the Joint Commission’s regular meetings (usually three times a year), are placed on file at the Library of Congress.

Besides filling gaps in the world’s expanding knowledge of Soviet behavior and policies, the still-growing collection of documents, summaries of papers, lists and translations now available to scholars and the general public may ultimately help resolve a significant number of American MIA cases.

To date, the Joint Commission’s record on that score has been modest. Only one actual Cold War MIA case—a U.S. fighter pilot whose remains were retrieved from an uninhabited coastal island in the Russian Far East after a Russian man who took part in the original burial came forward with details of

the incident—has been resolved through the Joint Commission’s efforts.

But investigations into other cases, particularly those related to the testimony of live Russian witnesses, are continuing; and together, the Senate committee and the Joint Commission did become a catalyst for bringing to light some of the Soviet Union’s most closely-held secrets regarding the treatment of Americans in Russian hands.

One clear lesson was that the main targets of the Soviet’s intelligence war during Korea were American POWs—and that the most prized among them were the pilots and crews of the innovative units of the U.S. Far East Air Force. Of men flying the F-86, the most advanced U.S. fighter of the Korean War era, a disproportionate several dozen failed to appear among the ranks of the repatriated U.S. POWs when prisoners were exchanged in 1953.

The documents on American POWs from Soviet military archives, taken together with the testimony of Soviet veterans of Korea and now-declassified papers from U.S. archives, clearly point to Soviet complicity in the disappearance and probable death of dozens, if not hundreds, of those POWs who were not repatriated.

Soviet military data dealing with American prisoners in Korea began making its way to U.S. authorities and private researchers in the winter of 1991-92, as the administration of Mikhail Gorbachev was giving way to his rival, Boris Yeltsin.

During what many would later characterize as a brief “window of opportunity,” when a mood of genuine reform and openness about past misdeeds seemed to emanate from Moscow, government and private researchers seeking answers about U.S. POWs and MIAs attempted to turn the moment to their advantage.

A number of interested parties in the U.S. government—the State Department, Pentagon, National Archives, Library of Congress—decided on a unified approach to gaining access to files related to missing Americans, and supported the creation of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission. Each agency or department appointed a representative to the commission, whose co-chairmen were former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon for the U.S. and the late Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, a historian and military adviser to Yeltsin, for the Russians.

The commission began its work in rela-

tive obscurity. But in a move whose motivation and meaning to this day remains somewhat of a mystery, Yeltsin in June 1992 suddenly announced that a number of American military prisoners had indeed been held on Soviet territory. And he vowed an investigation that would determine whether any remained alive.

His statement revived the hopes not only of thousands of families seeking infor-

