

from my head? The tag was removed after [China] decided to resist America [in Korea] and came to [North] Korea's aid and when [we] dealt the US imperialists a blow.

The Wang Ming line³ was in fact Stalin's line. It ended up destroying ninety percent of our strength in our bases, and one hundred percent of [our strength] in the white areas.⁴ Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi⁵ pointed this out in his report to the Eighth [Party] Congress.⁶ Why, then, did he not openly attribute [the losses] to the [impact of] Stalin's line? There is an explanation. The Soviet Party itself could criticize Stalin; but it would be inappropriate for us to criticize him. We should maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union. Maybe [we] could make our criticism public sometime in the future. It has to be that way in today's world, because facts are facts. The Comintern made numerous mistakes in the past. Its early and late stages were not so bad, but its middle stage was not so good: it was all right when Lenin was alive and when [Georgii] Dimitrov was in charge.⁷ The first Wang Ming line dominated [our party] for four years, and the Chinese revolution suffered the biggest losses.⁸ Wang Ming is now in Moscow taking a sick leave, but still we are going to elect him to be a member of the party's Central Committee. He indeed is an instructor for our party; he is a professor, an invaluable one who could not be purchased by money. He has taught the whole party, so that it would not follow his line.

That was the first time when we got the worst of Stalin.

The second time was during the anti-

them, it would be a bewildering thing if socialism could be built in China! Look out, [they warn]. China might become an imperialist country—to follow America, Britain, and France to become the fourth imperialist country! At present China has little industry, thus is in no position [to be an imperialist country]; but [China] will become formidable in one hundred years! Chinggis Khan¹¹ might be brought to life; consequently Europe would suffer again, and Yugoslavia might be conquered! The “Yellow Peril” must be prevented!

There is absolutely no ground for this to happen! The CCP is a Marxist-Leninist Party. The Chinese people are peace-loving people. We believe that aggression is a crime, therefore, we will never seize an inch of territory or a piece of grass from others. We love peace and we are Marxists.

We oppose great power politics in international relations. Although our industry is small, all things considered, we can be regarded as a big power. Hence some people [in China] begin to be cocky. We then warn them: “Lower your heads and act with your tails tucked between your legs.” When I was little, my mother often taught me to behave “with tails tucked between legs.” This is a correct teaching and now I often mention it to my comrades.

Domestically, we oppose Pan-Hanism,¹² because this tendency is harmful to the unity of all ethnic groups. Hegemonism and Pan-Hanism both are sectarianism. Those who have hegemonious tendencies only care about their own interests but ignore others’, whereas those Pan-Hanists only care about the Han people and regard the Han people as superior to others, thus damaging [the interests of] all the minorities.

Some people have asserted in the past that China has no intention to be friends with other countries, but wants to split with the Soviet Union, thus becoming a troublemaker. Now, however, this kind of people shrinks to only a handful in the socialist countries; their number has been reduced since the War to Resist America and Assist Korea.¹³ It is, however, a totally different thing for the imperialists: the stronger China becomes, the more scared they will be. They also understand that China is not that terrifying as long as China has no advanced industry, and as long as China continues to rely on human power. The Soviet Union

remains the most fearsome [for the imperialists] whereas China is merely the second. What they are afraid of is our politics and that we may have an enormous impact in Asia. That is why they keep spreading the words that China will be out of control and will invade others, so on and so forth.

We have been very cautious and modest, trying to overcome arrogance but adhering to the “Five Principles.”¹⁴ We know we have been bullied in the past; we understand how it feels to be bullied. You would have had the same feeling, wouldn’t you?

China’s future hinges upon socialism. It will take fifty or even one hundred years to turn China into a wealthy and powerful country. Now no [formidable] blocking force stands in China’s way. China is a huge country with a population of one fourth of that of the world. Nevertheless, her contribution to the world is yet to be compatible with her population size, and this situation will have to change, although my generation and even my son’s generation may not see the change taking place. How it will change in the future depends on how [China] develops. China may make mistakes or become corrupt; the current good situation may take a bad turn and, then, the bad situation may take a good turn. There can be little doubt, though, that even if [China’s] situation takes a bad turn, it may not become as decadent a society as that of Jiang Jieshi’s. This anticipation is based on dialectics. Affirmation, negation, and, then, negation of negation. The path in the future is bound to be tortuous.

Corruption, bureaucracy, hegemonism, and arrogance all may take effect in China. However, the Chinese people are inclined to be modest and willing to learn from others. One explanation is that we have little “capital” at our disposal: first, we did not invent Marxism which we learned from others; second, we did not experience the October Revolution and our revolution did not achieve victory until 1949, some thirty-two years after the October Revolution; third, we were only a branch army, not a main force, during the Second World War; fourth, with little modern industry, we merely have agriculture and some shabby, tattered handicrafts. Although there are some people among us who appear to be cocky, they are in no position to be cocky; at most, [they can merely show] their tails one or two meters high. But we must prevent this from

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could this be? Taking the office of the first secretary can also become a source for being blinded by lust for gain, making it easy for one to be out of one's mind. Whenever one is out of his mind, there must be a way to bring him back to his senses. This time Comrade [Zhou] Enlai no longer maintained a modest attitude but quarreled with them and, of course, they argued back. This is a correct attitude, because it is always better to make every [controversial] issue clear face to face. As much as they intend to influence us, we want to influence them too. However, we did not unveil everything this time, be-

(2) About Sino-Soviet relations. Facing a [common] grave enemy, the Soviet comrades have ardent expectations about Sino-Soviet unity. However, in my opinion, the Soviet leaders have not been truly convinced by our argument; nor have the differences between us disappeared completely. For instance, many leaders of the Soviet Communist Party toasted and praised our article "Another Comment on the Historical Lessons of the Proletarian Dictatorship."²⁹ Their three top leaders (Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan), however, have never mentioned a word of it. Moreover, when we discussed with them the part of the article concerning criticism of Stalin, they said that this was what made them displeased (or put them in a difficult position, I can't remember the exact words). . . . Therefore, I believe that some of the Soviet leaders have revealed a utilitarian attitude toward Sino-Soviet relations. Consequently, at the last day's meeting, I decided not to raise our requests concerning the abolition of the long-term supply and purchase contracts for the Five-Year Plan, the [Soviet] experts, and [Soviet] aid and [Sino-Soviet] collaboration on nuclear energy and missile development. About these issues I didn't Khrushchev,

central leadership discusses it. This issue must be settled through an agreement between the two governments.

Peng [Dehuai] ought to pay attention to the section about the conversation where Mao has added some comments.

II

*China must shoulder the responsibility of capital investment for this radio station; China is duty-bound in this case. [We] may have to ask for Soviet comrades' help with regard to construction and equipment, but all the costs must be priced and paid in cash by us. [We] may share its use after it is constructed, which ought to be determined by an agreement between the two governments.*³³ This is China's position, not purely the position of mine.³⁴

6. Minutes, Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July 1958³⁵

Source: *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 322-333

After you left yesterday I could not fall asleep, nor did I have dinner. Today I invite you over to talk a bit more so that you can be [my] doctor: [after talking with you], I might be able to eat and sleep this afternoon. You are fortunate to have little difficulty in eating and sleeping.

Let us return to the main subject and chat about the issues we discussed yesterday. We will only talk about these issues here in this room! There exists no crisis situation between you and me. Our relationship can be described as: nine out of ten fingers of yours and ours are quite the same with only one finger differing. I have repeated this point two or three times. You haven't forgotten, have you?

I've thought over and again of the issues that were discussed yesterday. It is likely that I might have misunderstood you, but it is also possible that I was right. We may work out a solution after discussion or debate. It appears that [we] will have to withdraw [our] navy's request for [obtaining] nuclear-powered submarines [from the Soviet Union]. Barely remembering this matter, I have acquired some information about it only after asking others.³⁶ There are some warmhearted people at our navy's headquarters, namely, the Soviet advisers. They asserted that, now that the Soviet nuclear submarines have been developed, we can

obtain [them] simply by sending a cable [to Moscow].

Well, your navy's nuclear submarines are of a [top] secret advanced technology. The Chinese people are careless in handling things. If we are provided with them, we might put you to trouble.

The Soviet comrades have won victory for forty years, and are thus rich in experience. It has only been eight years since our victory and we have little experience. You therefore raised the question of joint ownership and operation. The issue of ownership has long before been dealt with: Lenin proposed the system of rent and lease which, however, was targeted at the capitalists.

China has some remnant capitalists, but the state is under the leadership of the Communist Party. You never trust the Chinese! You only trust the Russians! [To you] the Russians are the first-class [people] whereas the Chinese are among the inferior who are dumb and careless. Therefore [you] came up with the joint ownership and operation proposition. Well, if [you] want joint ownership and operation, how about have them all—let us turn into joint ownership and operation our army, navy, air force, industry, agriculture, culture, education. Can we do this? Or, [you] may have all of China's

ences. We will comply with the commonly accepted principles, especially the nine principles stated in the "Moscow Manifesto."⁴⁰ We ought to learn from all the experiences whether they are correct or erroneous. The erroneous lessons included Stalin's metaphysics and dogmatism. He was not totally metaphysical because he had acquired some dialectics in thinking; but a large part of his [thoughts] focused on metaphysics. What you termed as the cult of personality was one [example of his metaphysics]. Stalin loved to assume the greatest airs.

Although we support the Soviet Union, we won't endorse its mistakes. As for [the differences over] the issue of peaceful evolution, we have never openly discussed [these differences], nor have we published [them] in the newspapers. Cautious as we have been, we choose to exchange different opinions internally. I had discussed them with you before I went to Moscow. While in Moscow, [we assigned] Deng Xiaoping to raise five [controversial] issues. We won't openly talk about them even in the future, because our doing so would hurt Comrade Khrushchev's [political position]. In order to help consolidate his [Khrushchev's] leadership, we decided not to talk about these [controversies], although it does not mean that the justice is not on our side.

With regard to inter-governmental relations, we remain united and unified up to this date which even our adversaries have conceded. We are opposed to any [act] that is harmful to the Soviet Union. We have objected to all the major criticism that the revisionists and imperialists have massed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has so far done the same thing [for us].

When did the Soviets begin to trust us Chinese? At the time when [we] entered the Korean War. From then on, the two countries got closer to one another [than before] and as a result, the 156 aid projects came about. When Stalin was alive, the [Soviet] aid consisted of 141 projects. Comrade Khrushchev later added a few more.⁴¹

We have held no secrets from you. Because more than one thousand of your

mentioned to Comrade Yudin many times:
if not ten thousand times, at least one thousand times!

With some exceptions, though, most of the [Soviet] specialists are of a good quality. We have also made mistakes before: we did not take the initiative to pass on information to the Soviet comrades. Now we must correct it.

We have also made mistakes before: we did not take the initiative to pass on information to the Soviet comrades. Now we must correct it.

It was Comrade Khrushchev who had eliminated the four joint enterprises. Before his death, Stalin demanded the right to build a plant to manufacture canned food in our country. My response was that [we] would accept [the demand] as long as you provide us equipment, help us build it, and import all the products [from us]. Comrade Khrushchev praised me for giving [Stalin] a good answer. But why in the world do [you Russians] want to build a naval “cooperative” now? How would you explain to the rest of the world that you propose to build a naval “cooperative”? How would you explain to the Chinese people? For the sake of struggling against the imperialists, you may, as advisers, train the Chinese people. Otherwise, you would have to lease Lüshun and other [ports] for ninety-nine years; but your “cooperative” proposal involves the question of ownership, as you propose that each side will own fifty percent of it. Yesterday you made me so enraged that I could not sleep at all last night. They (pointing at other CCP leaders present) are not angry. Only me alone! If this is wrong, it will be my sole responsibility.

(Zhou Enlai: Our Politburo has unanimously agreed upon these points.)

If we fail to get our messages through this time, we may have to arrange another meeting; if not, we may have to meet every day. Still, I can go to Moscow to speak to Comrade Khrushchev; or we can invite Comrade Khrushchev to come to Beijing so as to clarify every issue.

(Peng Dehuai: This year Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky cabled me requesting to build a long-wave radio station along China’s coast to direct the [Soviet] submarine flotilla in the Pacific Ocean. As the project will cost a total of 110 million rubles, the Soviet Union will cover 70 million and China will pay 40 million.)⁴⁵

strength up to more than ninety percent. At the critical junctures [of our revolution], he wanted to hold us back and opposed our revolution. Even after [we] achieved victory, he remained doubtful about us. At the same time, he boasted that it was because of the direction of his theories that China's [revolution] succeeded. [We] must do away with any superstition about him. Before I die, I am prepared to write an article on what Stalin had done to China, which is to be published in one thousand years.

(Yudin: The Soviet central leadership's attitude toward the policies of the Chinese central leadership is: it is completely up to the Chinese comrades how to resolve the Chinese problems, because it is the Chinese comrades who understand the situation best. Moreover, we maintain that it is hasty and arrogant to judge and assess whether or not the CCP's policies are correct, for the CCP is a great party.)

Well, [we] can only say that we have been basically correct. I myself have committed errors before. Because of my mistakes, [we] had suffered setbacks, of which examples included Changsha, Tucheng, and two other campaigns.⁴⁷ I will be very content if I am refuted as being basically correct, because such an assessment is close to reality.

Whether a [joint] submarine flotilla will be built is a policy issue: only China is in a position to decide whether we should build it with your assistance or it should be "jointly owned." Comrade Khrushchev ought to come to China [to discuss this issue] because I have already visited him [in Moscow].

[We] should by no means have blind faith in [authorities]. For instance, one of your specialists asserted on the basis of a book written by one [of your] academy scholars that our coal from Shanxi [province] cannot be turned into coke. Well, such an assertion has despaired us: we therefore would have no coal which can be turned into coke, for Shanxi has the largest coal deposit!

Comrade Xining [transliteration], a Soviet specialist who helped us build the Yangtze River Bridge [in Wuhan], is a very good comrade. His bridge-building method has never been utilized in your country: [you] never allowed him to try his method, either to build a big or medium or even small sized bridge. When he came here, however, his explanation of his method sounded all right. Since we knew little about it, [we] let

him try his method! As a result, his trial achieved a remarkable success which has become a first-rate, world-class scientific invention.

I have never met with Comrade Xining, but I have talked to many cadres who participated in the construction of the Yangtze Bridge. They all told me that Comrade Xining was a very good comrade because he took part in every part of the work, adopted a very pleasant working style, and worked very closely with the Chinese comrades. When the bridge was built, the Chinese comrades had learned a great deal [from him]. Any of you who knows him personally please convey my regards to him.

Please do not create any tensions among the specialists regarding the relations between our two parties and two countries. I never advocate that. Our cooperation has covered a large ground and is by far very satisfactory. You ought to make this point clear to your embassy staff members and your experts so that they will not panic when they hear that Comrade Mao Zedong criticized [Soviet leaders].

I have long before wanted to talk about some of these issues. However, it has not been appropriate to talk about them because the incidents in Poland and Hungary put your [leadership] in political trouble. For instance, we then did not feel it right to talk about the problem concerning the experts [in China].

Even Stalin did improve himself: he let China and the Soviet Union sign the [alliance] treaty, supported [us] during the Korean War, and provided [us] with a total of 141 aid projects. Certainly these achievements did not belong to him but to the entire Soviet central leadership. Nevertheless, we do not want to exaggerate Stalin's mistakes.

Part III. China's Request for Soviet Military and Material Support⁴⁸

7. Memorandum, Chen Yun to N. A. Bulganin, 12 December 1956

Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50,8/J 12gT*(aboutc42randumTf 1201 /BDC 1.2 TL T*(China).)Tj E

jointly construct a high-power long-wave radio transmission center and a long-wave radio receiving station specially designed for long distance communication. In terms of the fund that is needed for the construction of the two stations, the Soviet Union will cover the larger portion (70%), and China will cover the smaller portion (30%).

The leaders in Beijing immediately considered this a matter related to China's sovereignty and integrity. Therefore, they wanted to pay all the expenses and to have exclusive ownership over the stations. (Source: Han Nianlong et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 112-113.)

31. Mao Zedong made these remarks on Peng Dehuai's report of 5 June 1958. See the previous document.

32. Lin Biao was then a newly elected vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and China's vice premier; Chen Yun was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, and China's vice premier in charge of financial and economic affairs; Peng Zhen was a member of the CCP Politburo and mayor of Beijing; Chen Yi was a member of the CCP Politburo, China's vice premier, and newly appointed foreign minister (starting

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MAO'S CONVERSATIONS

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with slogans “about a stable union with the Guomintang,” etc.

As a result of the serious ideological struggle and the great explanatory work following the 7th Congress of the Communist Party, especially in the last four years, the majority of Communists who made left or right errors acknowledged their guilt. Van Minh at the 7th Congress also wrote a letter with acknowledgement of his mistakes, however he then once again returned to his old positions. All of the former activity of Van Minh, Mao Zedong said, which was carried out under the direct leadership of the Comintern and Stalin, inflicted a serious loss to the Chinese revolution.

Characterizing the Comintern’s activity overall, Mao Zedong noted that while Lenin was alive he had played the most prominent role in bringing together the forces of the Communist movement, in the creation and consolidation of the Communist parties in various countries, in the fight with the opportunists from the Second International. But that had been a short period in the activity of the Comintern. Consequently, to the Comintern came “officials” like Zinoviev, Bukharin, Piatnitskii and others, who as far as China was concerned, trusted Van Minh more than the CC CPC. In the last period of the Comintern’s work, especially when Dimitrov worked there, certain movements were noticed, since Dimitrov depended on us and trusted the CC CPC, rather than Van Minh. However, in this period as well, not just a few mistakes were made by the Comintern, for example, the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party and others. In this way, said Mao Zedong, it is possible to discern three periods in the activity of the Comintern, of which the second, longest period, brought the biggest loss to the Chinese revolution. Moreover, unfortunately, precisely in this period the Comintern dealt most of all with the East. We can say directly, commented Mao Zedong, that the defeat of the Chinese revolution at that time was, right along with other reasons, also the result of the incorrect, mistaken actions of the Comintern. Therefore, speaking openly, noted Mao Zedong, we were satisfied when we found out about the dissolution of the Comintern.

In the last period, continued Mao Zedong, Stalin also incorrectly evaluated the situation in China and the possibilities for the development of the revolution. He

continued to believe more in the power of the Guomintang than of the Communist Party. In 1945 he insisted on peace with Jiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] supporters, on a united front with the Guomintang and the creation in China of a “democratic republic.” In particular, in 1945 the CC CPC received a secret telegram, for some reason in the name of the “RCP(b)” (in fact from Stalin), in which it was insisted that Mao Zedong travel to Chuntsin for negotiations with Jiang Jieshi. The CC CPC was against this journey, since a provocation from Jiang Jieshi’s side was expected. However, said Mao Zedong, I was required to go since Stalin had insisted on this. In 1947, when the armed struggle against the forces of Jiang Jieshi was at its height, when our forces were on the brink of victory, Stalin insisted that peace be made with Jiang Jieshi, since he doubted the forces of the Chinese revolution. This lack of belief remained in Stalin even during the first stages of the formation of the PRC, i.e. already after the victory of the revolution. It is possible that Stalin’s lack of trust and suspiciousness were caused by the Yugoslavian events, particularly since at that time, said Mao Zedong with a certain disappointment, many conversations took place to the effect that the Chinese Communist Party was going along the Yugoslav path, that Mao Zedong is a “Chinese Tito.” I told Mao Zedong that there were no such moods and conversations in our Party.

The bourgeois press around the world, continued Mao Zedong, particularly the right socialists, had taken up the version of “China’s third way,” and extolled it. At that time, noted Mao Zedong, Stalin, evidently, did not believe us, while the bourgeoisie and laborites sustained the illusion of the “Yugoslav path of China,” and only Jiang Jieshi alone “defended” Mao Zedong, shrieking that the capitalist powers should not in any circumstance believe Mao Zedong, that “he will not turn from his path,” etc. This behavior of Jiang Jieshi is understandable, since he knows us too well, he more than once had to stand in confrontation to us and to fight with us.

The distrust of Stalin to the CPC, Mao Zedong continued further, was apparent also during the time of Mao Zedong’s visit to the Soviet Union. One of our main goals for the trip to Moscow was the conclusion of a Chinese-Soviet treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. The Chinese

people asked us whether a treaty of the USSR with the new China will be signed, why until now legally there continues to exist a treaty with the supporters of the Guomintang, etc. The issue of the treaty was an extremely important matter for us, which determined the possibilities for the further development of the PRC. At the first conversation with Stalin, Mao Zedong said, I brought a proposal to conclude a treaty along government lines, but Stalin declined to answer. During the second conversation I returned once again to that issue, showing Stalin a telegram from the CC CPC with the same type of proposal about a treaty. I proposed to summon Zhou Enlai to Moscow to sign the treaty, since he is the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Stalin used this suggestion as a pretext for refusal and said that “it is inconvenient to act in this way, since the bourgeois press will cry that the whole Chinese government is located in Moscow.” Subsequently, Stalin refrained from any meetings with me. From my side there was an attempt to phone him in his apartment, but they responded to me that Stalin is not home, and recommended that I meet with [A.I.] Mikoyan. All this offended me, Mao Zedong said, and I decided to undertake nothing further and to wait it out at the dacha. Then an unpleasant conversation took place with [I.V.] Kovalev and [N.T.] Fedorenko, who proposed that I go on an excursion around the country. I sharply rejected this proposal and responded that I prefer “to sleep through it at the dacha.”

Some time later, continued Mao Zedong, they handed me a draft of my interview for publication which had been signed by Stalin. In this document it was reported that negotiations are being held in Moscow on concluding a Soviet-Chinese treaty. This already was a significant step forward. It is possible that in Stalin’s change of position, said Mao Zedong, we were helped by the Indians and the English, who had recognized the PRC in January 1950. Negotiations began right after this, in which Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Beria took part. During the negotiations, at Stalin’s initiative there was undertaken an attempt by the Soviet Union to assume sole ownership of the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway. Subsequently, however, a decision was made about the joint exploitation of the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway, besides

which the PRC gave the USSR the naval base in Port Arthur, and four joint stock companies were opened in China. At Stalin's

the creation of the PRC we undertook a further struggle with this ugly manifestation. It is entirely evident, continued Mao Zedong, that according to the logic of things during a beating the one who is being beaten begins to give false testimony, while the one who is conducting the interrogation accepts that testimony as truth. This and other vestiges which have come to us from the bourgeois past, will still for a long time be preserved in the consciousness of people. A striving for pomposity, for ostentatiousness, for broad anniversary celebrations, this is also a vestige of the psychology of bourgeois man, since such customs and such psychology objectively could not arise among the poorest peasantry and the working class. The presence of these and other circumstances, said Mao Zedong, creates the conditions for the arising of those or other mistakes with which the Communist parties will have to deal.

I observed that the main reason for Stalin's mistakes was the cult of personality, bordering on deification.

Mao Zedong, having agreed with me, noted that Stalin's mistakes accumulated gradually, from small ones growing to huge ones. To crown all this, he did not acknowledge his own mistakes, although it is well known that it is characteristic of a person to make mistakes. Mao Zedong told how, reviewing Lenin's manuscripts, he had become convinced of the fact that even Lenin crossed out and re-wrote some phrases or other in his own works. In conclusion to his characterization of Stalin, Mao Zedong once again stressed that Stalin had made mistakes not in everything, but on some certain issues.

Overall, he stressed that the materials from the Congress made a strong impression on him. The spirit of criticism and self-criticism and the atmosphere which was created after the Congress will help us, he said, to express our thoughts more freely on a range of issues. It is good that the CPSU has posed all these issues. For us, said Mao Zedong, it would be difficult to take the initiative on this matter.

Mao Zedong declared that he proposes to continue in the future the exchange of opinions on these issues during Comrade Mikoyan's visit, and also at a convenient time with Comrades Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Then Mao Zedong got distracted from

this topic and getting greatly carried away briefly touched on a few philosophical questions (about the struggle of materialism with idealism, etc.). In particular he stressed that it is incorrect to imagine to oneself Communist society as a society which is free from any sort of contradictions, from ideological struggle, from any sort of vestiges of the past. In a Communist society too, said Mao Zedong, there will be good and bad people. Further he said that the ideological work of China still to a significant extent suffers from a spirit of puffery [*nachetnichestva*] and cliches. The Chinese press, in particular, still cannot answer to the demands which are presented to it. On the pages of the newspapers the struggle of opinions is lacking, there are no serious theoretical discussions. Because of insufficient time Mao Zedong expressed a wish to meet with me again to talk a little specifically about issues of philosophy.

At the end of the discussion I inquired of Mao Zedong whether he had become acquainted with the *Pravda* editorial about the harm of the cult of personality, a translation of which was placed in [*Renmin Ribao*] on 30 March. He responded that he still had not managed to read through that article, but they had told him that it is a very good article. Now, said Mao Zedong, we are preparing for publication in *Renmin Ribao* a

ing much less than before. Though - Mao Zedong went on - I mostly work 8 hours a day (sometimes more), the productivity is not the same as it used to be. His comprehension of the material studied is less effective, and the necessity arose [for him] to read documents printed in large characters." He mentioned in this connection that "this must be a general rule that people of advanced age are in an unequal position to the young as regards the efficiency of their work."

Mao Zedong then emphasized that his resignation from the post of the Chairman of the PRC had lessened the load of state activities on him. Speaking about this he mentioned that at the time when he had submitted this proposal he had been supported only by the Politburo members, while many members of the CPC CC had objected. "There was even more disagreement among the rank and file communists." By now, he said, everybody was supporting this decision.

As he continued talking about his work and the activities of the leadership of the CPC CC, Mao Zedong said that for several years, practically from 1953-54 he was not chairing the Politbureau meetings any more. He said that from 1956 Liu Shaoqi is in charge of all the routine activities of the Politbureau, while he is taking part in some of the meetings from time to time. Mao Zedong mentioned that he personally is usually working and consulting mostly with the members of the Permanent Committee of the CPC CC Politbureau. Sometimes specially invited persons also take part in the meetings of the Permanent Committee.

Then Mao Zedong told that on some occasions he takes part in the enlarged Politbureau meetings. Leading party executives from the periphery are usually invited to these meetings, for instance the secretaries and deputy secretaries of the CPC CC bureaus from certain regions, the secretaries of the CPC Provincial Committees. Mao Zedong said that now he practically never speaks at the CPC CC Plenums, and even at the CPC Congress he just delivers a short introductory speech. His resignation from the post of the Chairman of the Republic gave him also an opportunity to refrain from participating in the work of the Supreme State Conference. However, he mentioned in this connection, I systematically study the documents and materials

(before they are adopted) of the most important party and state conferences and meetings.

Mao Zedong agreed with my statement, that in spite of a certain redistribution of authority between the CPC CC leaders he (Mao Zedong) still has great responsibilities in the leadership of the party and the country. He said that he still often has to work at night. "The principal workload is connected with the reading of numerous documents and materials." Twice a day, for instance, he said, "they bring me two big volumes of routine information on international affairs, which of course it is necessary to look through to keep updated, not to lose contact with life."

In the course of the conversation I mentioned that the rapidly developing international affairs demand constant attention and timely analysis. I stressed the outstanding significance of the Moscow Conference where the recent international developments were submitted to deep Marxist-Leninist analysis.

Mao Zedong agreed with this statement and quickly responded to the topic, saying: "The Moscow Conference was a success, it was thoroughly prepared, and the editing commission, which included the representatives of 26 parties, worked fruitfully." Foreign representatives, he went on, are often puzzled and ask why was the conference so long. Mao Zedong said that they apparently do not have a full understanding of the real situation when it took more than 10 days for each of the representatives of 81 parties to deliver his speech. Then there were repeated speeches, not to mention the work on the documents themselves. He stated: "It is very good that there were arguments and discussions at the conference. This is not bad."

Then, agreeing with my statement on the deep theoretical character of the documents of the Moscow Conference, Mao Zedong added that these documents caused a great confusion in the Western imperialist circles, among our common enemies.

During the conversation I gave a brief review of the work to popularize the results of the Moscow Conference in the Soviet Union, to study the Conference's documents within the political education network.

In his turn Mao Zedong told me that the Imperialist

cluding some branches of heavy industry;
capital investments into the construction of
public buildings will also be cut.

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**THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY'S
APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET
RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE
SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959**

by Mark Kramer

In early September 1959, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed the head of the Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to prepare a detailed background report on China for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of September and early October to take part in ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of the Communist victory in China. The

Beijing were present, at least in some fashion, as early as 1950-53.

Second, while giving due emphasis to problems that arose during the Stalin era, Zimyanin also underscored the detrimental impact of criticism unleashed by the 20th Soviet Party Congress and by the “Hundred Flowers” campaign in China. Zimyanin claimed that the Chinese leadership had “fully supported the CPSU’s measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences” after the 20th Party Congress, but he conceded that Beijing’s assessment of Stalin was considerably “different from our own” and that the Congress had prompted “the Chinese friends . . . to express critical

other East-bloc documents.¹⁶ The two transcripts also do not reveal anything about unpleasant incidents that may have occurred outside the formal talks. Although retrospective accounts by aides to Stalin and Mao who took part in the meetings can be helpful in filling in gaps, these memoirs must be used with extreme caution, especially when they are published long after the events they describe. Khrushchev's recollections were compiled more than 15 years after the Stalin-Mao talks; and Gromyko's, Fedorenko's, and Shi's accounts were written nearly 40 years after the talks. Even if one assumes (perhaps tenuously) that all the memoir-writers relied on notes and documents from the period they were discussing and depicted events as faithfully as they could, the passage of so many years is bound to cause certain failings of memory.¹⁷

Two important factors might lead one to ascribe greater credibility to Fedorenko's version of the Stalin-Mao relationship than to Khrushchev's. First, Fedorenko and Shi participated in all the private talks between Stalin and Mao, whereas Khrushchev and Gromyko were present at only the public meetings.¹⁸ Second, it is conceivable that Khrushchev was inclined to depict Stalin's behavior in an unduly negative light. (Khrushchev may have done this sub-consciously, or he may have been seeking to lay the "blame" on Stalin for the subsequent rupture with China.) By contrast, Fedorenko had no obvious reason by 1989 (the height of the Gorbachev era) to want to defend Stalin. One could therefore make a *prima facie* case on behalf of Fedorenko's account.

On the other hand, most of the latest evidence tends to support Khrushchev's and Gromyko's versions, rather than Fedorenko's. One of the most trusted aides to Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, who remained a staunch defender of the Soviet dictator even after being ousted by Khrushchev in June 1957, later recalled that when the Chinese delegation came to Moscow in December 1949, Mao had to wait many days or even weeks after his initial perfunctory meeting with Stalin until the Soviet leader finally agreed to receive him again.¹⁹ This corresponds precisely to what Khrushchev said, and it is confirmed by the sequence of the transcripts, as noted above. Khrushchev's account is further strengthened by the recollections of General Ivan

Kovalev, a distinguished Soviet military officer who served as Stalin's personal envoy to China from 1948 until the early 1950s. In a lengthy interview in 1992, Kovalev recounted the tribulations and rudeness that Mao had experienced during his visit:

Mao was met [on 16 December] by Bulganin and Molotov, who brusquely turned down his invitation to join him for a meal, saying that it would be contrary to protocol. For the same reason, they declined Mao's invitation to ride with him to his assigned dacha. . . . Mao was clearly upset by the cool reception. That same day, Stalin received Mao Zedong, but they held no confidential talks of the sort that Mao had wanted. After that, Mao spent numerous boring days at the dacha. Molotov, Bulganin, and Mikoyan stopped by to see him, but had only very brief official conversations. I was in touch with Mao and saw him every day, and I was aware that he was upset and apprehensive.²⁰

Kovalev also noted that in late December, Mao asked him to convey a formal request to Stalin for another private meeting, indicating that "the resolution of all matters, including the question of [Mao's] spare time and medical treatment, [would] be left entirely to your [i.e., Stalin's] discretion."²¹ According to Kovalev, this appeal went unheeded, and "as before, Mao remained practically in isolation." Even when Mao "retaliated by refusing to meet with Roshchin, our ambassador to China," it had no effect on Stalin. Kovalev emphasized that it was "not until Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow at the end of January 1950 that the talks finally proceeded more successfully." All this amply corroborates what Khrushchev wrote.

Khrushchev's depiction of the Stalin-Mao relationship is also borne out by newly declassified testimony from another key source, namely Mao himself. In a private meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China in late March 1956, Mao spoke bitterly about the "ugly atmosphere" he had confronted in Moscow in 1950 and about the "profound distrust and suspicion" that Stalin had shown toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. Mao also recalled the "insulting" treatment he had suffered after his prelimi-

nary discussions with Stalin:

From then on, Stalin sought to avoid me. I tried, for my part, to phone Stalin's apartment, but was told that he was not home and that I should meet with Mikoyan instead. I was offended by all this, and so I decided that I would not do anything more and would simply spend my time resting at the dacha. Then I had an unpleasant conversation with Kovalev and Fedorenko, who suggested that I go for a trip around the country. I flatly rejected this proposal and said that I might as well just "go on sleeping at my dacha."²²

Mao revealed these "problems and difficulties" to his Chinese colleagues as well, albeit somewhat more discreetly. In a secret speech at the CCP's Chengdu conference in March 1958, Mao averred that he had been forced into humiliating concessions by Stalin eight years earlier:

In 1950, Stalin and I argued with each other in Moscow for two months about our mutual defense treaty, about the Chungchang rail-

nists took power in Beijing, but the relationship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as a result of differences over Tibet and the disputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the Himalayas.⁶³ In the spring of 1959 China crushed a popular revolt in Tibet and deployed many thousands of extra troops on Tibetan soil—actions that were viewed with great apprehension in neighboring India. Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian border dispute heated up, leading to a serious incident in late August 1959, when Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a contested border post at Longju. Although each side blamed the other for the incident, the clash apparently was motivated in part by the Chinese authorities' desire to take a firm stand against India before Khrushchev arrived in Beijing.

As recriminations between India and China escalated, Chinese officials secretly urged "the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries to exploit all possible opportunities" to "conduct propaganda measures against India" and "expose the subversive role of imperialist and reactionary Tibetan forces" armed and supported by India.⁶⁴ These pleas were of no avail. Instead of rallying to China's defense, the Soviet Union scrupulously avoided taking sides during the skirmishes, and released a statement on 9 September 1959 expressing hope that China and India would soon resolve the matter "in the spirit of their traditional friendship."⁶⁵ Chinese officials were shown the TASS statement before it went out, and they did their best to persuade Moscow not to release it; but far from helping matters, Beijing's latest remonstrations merely induced Soviet leaders to issue the statement a day earlier than planned, without any amendments.⁶⁶ Mao and his colleagues were so dismayed by the Soviet Union's refusal to back its chief Communist ally in a dispute with a non-Communist state that they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow on September 13 claiming that "the TASS statement has revealed to the whole world the divergence of views between China and the Soviet Union regarding the incident on the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that has literally brought joy and jubilation to the Indian bourgeoisie and to American and British imperialism."⁶⁷ The irritation and sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two days later when Soviet and Indian leaders signed a much-publicized agreement that

provided for subsidized credits to India of some \$385 million over five years.

These events were still under way—and tensions along the Sino-Indian border were still acute—when Zimyanin was drafting his report, so it was probably too early for him to gauge the significance of Moscow's decision to remain neutral.⁶⁸ Even so, it is odd that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up having such a deleterious effect on Khrushchev's visit.⁶⁹

Zimyanin's Report and Soviet Policy-Making

The submission of Zimyanin's report to Khrushchev was one of several indicators of a small but intriguing change in Soviet policy-making vis-a-vis China. Throughout the 1950s the Soviet Union's dealings with the PRC, as with other Communist states, had been handled mainly along party-to-party lines. A special CPSU Central Committee department, known after February 1957 as the Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, was responsible for keeping track of developments in East-bloc countries and for managing relations with those countries on a day-to-day basis.⁷⁰ (Matters requiring high-level decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded from Soviet policy-making toward China. On some issues, such as the effort to gain a seat for Communist China in the United Nations, the MFA was the only important actor involved. Also, the foreign minister himself at times played a key role, notably in the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold secret negotiations with Mao about "issues of war and peace, the international situation, and the policy of American imperialism."⁷¹ Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign Ministry's input was limited. Apart from standard diplomatic support, the MFA had contributed relatively little during Khrushchev's two previous visits to China (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as well as his visits to most other Communist states. The bulk of the preparations had been handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Central Committee departments and by Khrushchev's own staff.

In that respect, the September 1959 trip

to China was quite different. The MFA ended up with a dominant role in the preparations for the trip, thanks in part to a deliberate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater say for the Foreign Ministry in policy toward China.⁷² When Gromyko first asked Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on China, the foreign minister knew that he would soon be accompanying Khrushchev on a two-week visit to the United States, a task that would enable him to bolster the Foreign Ministry's standing (as well as his own influence) on other issues, especially Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in between Khrushchev's two visits in late September was so limited, briefings for the China trip had to occur almost entirely on the plane. Gromyko was aware that the other senior members of the Soviet "party-government delegation," led by Mikhail Suslov, were scheduled to depart for China on September 26-27, while Khrushchev and Gromyko were still in the United States. Hence, the foreign minister knew he would be the only top official accompanying Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the 29th and 30th.⁷³ (Gromyko, of course, also intended to make good use of his privileged access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and flight back from, the United States.⁷⁴)

Under those circumstances, the Foreign Ministry's report on China, prepared by Zimyanin, became the main briefing material for Khrushchev, along with a short update (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent personnel changes in the Chinese military High Command.⁷⁵ What is more, Zimyanin (who was a member of the MFA Collegium as well as head of the ministry's Far Eastern department) and a number of other senior MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing to provide on-site advice and support, something that had not happened during Khrushchev's earlier visits to China.⁷⁶ Although the head of the CPSU CC department for intra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and a few other CC department heads also traveled to China as advisers, the Foreign Ministry's role during the visit was far more salient than in the past. (This was reflected in Gromyko's own role as well; among other things, he was the only Soviet official besides Suslov who took part in all of Khrushchev's talks with Mao and Zhou Enlai.⁷⁷) Hence, Zimyanin's report proved highly influential.

As things worked out, however, the

Soviet-Chinese Relations

The victory of the people's revolution in China and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic marked the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, based on a commonality of interests and a unity of goals in constructing a socialist and Communist society in both countries.

....

When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic, as reflected in bilateral agreements signed between the Soviet Union and PRC, including, for example, agreements to prohibit foreigners from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950), to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock companies, and to set the rate of exchange for the ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June 1950), as well as other such documents.⁸⁶

Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took measures to eliminate everything that, by keeping the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.⁸⁷ Over time, the above-mentioned agreements were annulled or revised if they did not accord with the spirit of fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a Soviet party and state delegation headed by C[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October 1954 played an important role in the establishment of closer and more trusting relations. As a result of this visit, joint declarations were signed on Soviet-Chinese relations and the international situation and on relations with Japan.⁸⁸ In addition, a communique and additional agreements were signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the Soviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies responsible for scientific-technical cooperation, the construction of a Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator railroad, and so forth.⁸⁹

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese rela-

tions. It created an atmosphere conducive to a more frequent and more amicable exchange of candid views. The Chinese friends began to speak more openly about their plans and difficulties and, at the same time, to express critical comments (from a friendly position) about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations. The CPC CC [Communist Party of China Central Committee] fully supported the CPSU's measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences.

Xinjiang had “become a mere zone of Soviet influence.” See “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.,” L. 93.

25. For a useful list of collections of Mao’s secret speeches, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward*, Harvard Contemporary China Series No. 6 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989), 78-81.

26. A good deal of valuable documentation has been emerging about Soviet policy toward China from the 1920s through the late 1940s, permitting a far more nuanced appraisal of Stalin’s policy. Among many items worth mentioning is the multi-volume collection of documents being compiled under the auspices of the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents from Recent History (RTsKhIDNI): *Kommunisticheskaya partiya (Bol’sheviki), Komintern, i Narodno-revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae*. The first volume, covering the years 1920-1925, was published in 1994. Important documents on this topic from the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) also have been published in several recent issues of the journal *Problemy Dal’nego vostoka*. Perhaps the most intriguing of these is the lengthy memorandum from Anastas Mikoyan to the CPSU Presidium after his trip to China in January-February 1949, which is presented along with supporting documentation by Andrei Ledovskii in issues No. 2 and 3 for 1995, pp. 70-94 and 74-90, respectively. Another set of crucial documents from early 1949, which are a splendid complement to Mikoyan’s report, were compiled by the prominent Russian scholar Sergei Tikhvinskii and published as “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Peregovory I. V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949 g.,” *Novaya i noveisha istoriya* (Moscow) 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-140. These include six telegrams exchanged by Stalin and Mao in January 1949, which are now stored in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, Ll. 95-118.

27. “Address on March 10,” 98. For Mao’s extended comments on this point during his March 1956 meeting, see “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.,” Ll. 88-92.

28. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part C (“O Vengrii”), pp. 17-19 and Part G, pp. 37-40. Khrushchev’s version of events is borne out by a close reading of the Chinese press in October-November 1956. The Chinese media spoke positively about the events in Hungary until November 2, the day after Nagy announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and two days after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade Hungary. On November 2, Chinese newspapers suddenly began condemning the “counterrevolution” in Hungary. This point was emphasized by the East German authorities in a secret memorandum on Chinese reactions to the Hungarian uprising: see “Bericht über die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Ungarn,” 30 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, IV 2/20, No. 212/02. Other evidence, including the memoir by the then-Yugoslav ambassador in the USSR, also tends to corroborate Khrushchev’s account. (Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, trans. by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 131-141.) Moreover, Khrushchev’s version is not inconsistent with the official Chinese statement of 6 September 1963 (cited in note 9 *supra*), despite the way that statement has often been interpreted. Khrushchev’s

account and the Chinese statement both indicate that the Soviet leadership hesitated about what to do vis-a-vis Hungary. The Chinese statement does not mention that Chinese officials, too, were initially hesitant, but that omission is hardly surprising and in no way contradicts Khrushchev’s account. The September 1963 statement goes on to claim that Chinese leaders “insisted on the adoption of all necessary measures to smash the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of socialist Hungary.” This assertion, too, is compatible with Khrushchev’s claim that Mao strongly supported the invasion *after* the Soviet Presidium had arrived at its final decision on October 31. (Because the Chinese statement omits any chronology, it creates the impression that Mao’s backing for an invasion *preceded* the Soviet decision, but the statement would hold up equally well if, as appears likely, Mao’s support for an invasion *followed* rather than preceded the Soviet decision.) In short, even if the Chinese statement is accurate in all respects, it does not necessarily contravene anything in Khrushchev’s account.

29. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/VI (STRICTLY SECRET), 31 October 1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41.

30. Of the myriad Western analyses of this topic, see in particular Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

31. Far too many Western analysts have overstated the supposed contrast between Soviet and Chinese approaches to the Third World in the 1950s, mistaking rhetorical flourishes for actual policy.

32. See Mark Kramer, “Soviet Arms Transfers and Military Aid to the Third World,” in S. Neil MacFarlane and Kurt M. Campbell, eds., *Gorbachev’s Third World Dilemmas* (London: Routledge, 1989), 66-110, esp. 68-70.

33. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi propagandy i kul’turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SECRET) of a speech by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of the PRC’s Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, 24 April 1959, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, L. 26.

34. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 6 (“Otnosheniya s kapitalisticheskimi i razvivayushchimisya stranami”), Part H (“Otnosheniya s arabskimi stranami”), pp. 57-58.

35. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze-duna,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 4 August 1958, 1-2. This point was confirmed in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, former Soviet ambassador in China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev during the 1958 trip.

36. In *Peking und Moskau* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), 388-392, Klaus Mehnert argues that Sino-Soviet differences during the Middle Eastern crisis were negligible, but his analysis applies only to the period after July 23 (i.e., some ten days after the crisis began). Mehnert’s comments have no bearing on the initial stage of the crisis, when, as the discussion here has shown, Soviet and Chinese leaders genuinely differed in their views about how to respond.

37. See Allen S. Whiting, “Quemoy 1958: Mao’s Miscalculations,” *The China Quarterly* 62 (June 1975), 263-270. The various post-hoc rationalizations that Mao offered (so that he could avoid admitting what a failure the whole venture had been) should not be

allowed to obscure the real purpose of the operation, as revealed in Mao’s secret speeches in September 1958.

38. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 72-73. The present author confirmed this point in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador to China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev who accompanied the Soviet leader during this trip to Beijing.

39. *Ibid.*, 73.

40. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 293-294, 691-693.

41. Richard M. Bueschel, *Communist Chinese Air Power* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 54-55.

42. See, e.g., Mao’s speech on 9 November 1958 at the First Zhengzhou Conference, translated in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, esp. 460-461.

43. For a cogent assessment of Sino-Soviet dynamics during the crisis, see Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, “The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,” in Morton H. Halperin, ed., *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 265-303. Halperin’s and Tsou’s conclusions differ markedly from standard Western interpretations of the crisis, which posited it as a case of Chinese aggressiveness and Soviet timidity. For a typical example of this view (which, unlike Halperin’s and Tsou’s analysis, does not fare well in light of new evidence), see John R. Thomas, “The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958,” *Orbis* 6:1 (Spring 1962), 38-64. John Lewis Gaddis has noted that U.S. officials at the time “interpreted [the bombardment of Quemoy] as a joint Sino-Soviet probe intended to test Western resolve.” See “Dividing Adversaries: The United States and International Communism, 1945-1958,” in *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into*

52. For a slightly different interpretation, see Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split," 499-500.

53. *Ibid.* and "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Pekine 2 oktyabrya 1959 g.," Osobaya papka

moved at this time: the chief of the Chinese General Staff, General Huang Kecheng (who was replaced by the public security minister, General Luo Ruiching); two other deputy defense ministers, General Xiao Ke and General Li Da; and a half dozen lower-ranking generals. These officers and two deputy foreign ministers were all removed because of their purported links with Peng Dehuai, who was accused in mid-1959 of "rightist opportunism" and forming an "anti-Party clique." These charges, approved by the CCP Central Committee at its plenum in Lushan in the first half of August, stemmed from a secret "letter of opinion" that Peng sent to Mao in mid-July, which strongly criticized the "confusion," "shortcomings," "extravagance," and "waste" of Mao's economic policies. The letter was disclosed to other senior officials at an expanded session of the CCP Politburo in Lushan in the latter half of July. Mao regarded the document as a grave threat to his authority, and he responded with a furious counter-attack, forcing members of the Politburo to side either with him or with Peng. Although several top officials undoubtedly shared Peng's misgivings about recent policies, they were unwilling to take a stand against Mao. By the time the enlarged Politburo session in Lushan adjourned at the end of July and the Central Committee plenum convened a few days later, Peng's fate was sealed. For solid analyses of the Peng Dehuai affair, see Jurgen Domes, *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), esp. 77-106; MacFarquhar, *The Great Leap Forward*, 187-237; J. D. Simmonds, "P'eng Teh-huai: A Chronological Re-Examination," *The China Quarterly* 37 (January-March 1969), 120-138; and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and Decline of Party Norms 1950-1965* (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979), ch. 9. Another invaluable source on the affair is the "memoir" by Peng Dehuai himself, which was compiled posthumously on the basis of autobiographical notes Peng wrote in response to interrogators during the Cultural Revolution. An English version is now available: *Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898-1974)*, trans. by Zheng Longpu (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984). The book includes a whole chapter on the Lushan plenum (pp. 485-509) and an appendix with the full text of the letter that Peng sent to Mao in July 1959. For additional documentation, see *The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-1968* (Kowloon: Union Research Institute, 1968). Contrary to much speculation in the West, there is no reason to believe that Peng's challenge to Mao revolved around military issues *per se* or had anything to do with the Soviet

attacks on the “cult of personality” could affect his own status as the supreme, all-wise leader of China; and (3) his belief that the chief features of Stalinism, especially the crash industrialization program of the 1930s, were still relevant, indeed essential, for China. Later on, after the Sino-Soviet split emerged, Chinese support for Stalin was largely rekindled, no doubt to retaliate against Khrushchev. For a lengthy Chinese statement from 1963 defending Stalin (while acknowledging that he made a few “mistakes”), see “On the Question of Stalin: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (2) by the Editorial Departments of People’s Daily and *Red Flag*,” 13 September 1963, in *Peking Review* 6:38 (20 September 1963), 8-15.

91. The reference here is to Mao’s trip in November 1957, his first visit to Moscow (and indeed his first trip outside China) since early 1950. On the point discussed in the next sentence, see Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, p. 105.

92. In May 1956 the Chinese authorities promulgated the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend”; and in the spring of 1957, after the CCP Central Committee published a directive inviting public criticism, many Chinese intellectuals took advantage of the opportunity to express remarkably bold and pointed critiques of the Communist regime, far exceeding what Mao had anticipated. After six weeks of growing ferment, the authorities launched a vehement crackdown under the new slogan “the extermination of poisonous weeds.” Hundreds of thousands of “rightists” and “counter-revolutionaries” were arrested, and more than 300,000 eventually were sentenced to forced labor or other punitive conditions. For a valuable overview of this episode, see Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* (New York: Praeger, 1960), which includes extensive documentation as well as a lengthy narrative and critical commentaries. For a perceptive analysis of the fundamental differences between the Hundred Flowers campaign in China and the post-Stalin “Thaw” in the Soviet Union, see S. H. Chen, “Artificial Flowers During a Natural ‘Thaw,’” in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), 220-254. Useful insights into Mao’s own goals for the Hundred Flowers campaign can be gained from 14 secret speeches he delivered between mid-February and late April 1957, collected in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 113-372.

93. These particular complaints were expressed by a high-ranking Chinese military officer, General Lung Yun, the vice chairman of the PRC National Defense Council, in the newspaper *Xinhua* on 18 June 1957, at the very end of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He declared that it was “totally unfair that the People’s Republic of China had to bear all the expenses of the Korean War,” noting (accurately) that China had been forced to pay for all the military equipment it received from the Soviet Union. Lung contrasted Moscow’s position with the “more suitable” policy of the United States during World War I and World War II, when Allied debts were written off. He also emphasized that China’s debt to the Soviet Union should be reduced in any case as compensation for the large amount of industry that the Soviet Union extracted from Manchuria in 1945-46. Lung’s appeals went unheeded, and the Chinese government continued to pay off the bills it had accumulated, equivalent to nearly \$2 billion. The

debt was not fully repaid until 1965. During the “anti-rightist” crackdown after the Hundred Flowers campaign, Lung was punished for his remarks, but he managed to regain his spot on the National Defense Council in December 1958. See MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals*, 50. See also Mineo Nakajima, “Foreign Relations: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line,” in MacFarquhar and Fairbank, eds., *The People’s Republic, Part I*, 270, 277.

94. See “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva mezhdru SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 31 October 1956, 1. For the CPSU Presidium decision to issue the declaration, see “Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/1 (STRICTLY SECRET), 30 October 1956, in APRF, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30. Zimyanin’s description of Chinese policy is accurate. The Chinese authorities immediately hailed the Soviet statement and cited it approvingly on many occasions later on. During a trip to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in January 1957, for example, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai repeatedly praised the October 30 statement as evidence of Moscow’s “determination to eliminate certain abnormal features of its relations with other socialist states.”

95. “Sovmestnoe Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe Zayavlenie,” 18 January 1957, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., *Sovetskoe i Kitaiskoe Zayavlenie*, 11-12.

information needed to build nuclear weapons. But unbeknownst to Chinese officials, Soviet leaders had decided in early 1958 not to transfer a prototype nuclear bomb to China, despite having made a pledge to that effect in the October 1957 agreement. Mao raised this matter during the talks with Khrushchev, but got a non-

level contacts. Concurrently, the situation on the borders worsened. In the spring, Beijing unilaterally announced stricter navigation regulations governing “foreign” (thus Soviet) vessels on the border rivers. Later that year small-scale skirmishes occurred along the Sino-Soviet and Chinese-Mongolian borders. Ever more aggressively, the

tic. Despite our overwhelming superiority in weaponry, it would not be easy for the USSR to cope with an assault of such magnitude.”¹⁷

Soviet concerns that the border conflict would spin out of control were central to the Soviet response to the Chinese challenge. Yet so was the specter of an even more radical shift in Chinese foreign policy evident in the offensive posture displayed in the ambush and atrocities. For Moscow, the March 2 incident also carried geostrategic meaning: it revealed “Beijing’s intention to activate its opportunistic political flirtation with the imperialist countries—above all with the United States and West Germany.”

The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership adopted a carrot-and-stick approach in response to the crisis: First, Moscow sought to isolate Beijing further and increase military pressure on the PRC. The March 2 clash had initially provoked a heated debate within the Soviet leadership. Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko reportedly advocated a “nuclear blockbuster” against China’s industrial centers, while others called for surgical strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities.¹⁸ Brezhnev eventually decided to opt for a more vigorous build-up of Soviet conventional forces in the East (including relocation of Soviet bomber fleets from the West), not necessarily precluding, however, the use of tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁹ Demonstrating their determination to retaliate with superior force, the Soviets, after a 12-day stand-off, attacked Chinese positions on the island with heavy artillery and overwhelming force, foregoing, however, the use of air or nuclear strikes.²⁰

To some extent, the Kremlin’s forceful but limited military response was influenced by heightened concern over the militarization of the crisis among Moscow’s European and Asian allies. Moscow, however, had no interest in escalating the crisis beyond control for other reasons as well. Added pressure on the PRC would not induce Mao to forego his “political flirtation” with the West—in fact, it might reinforce such a move, which would run counter to Soviet geostrategic interests. Thus, Brezhnev also sought to defuse the crisis by resuming negotiations with the Chinese. Within a week of the March 15 incident, Moscow sought to re-establish contact with Beijing.

Document No. 2, a telegram from the

East German Embassy in Beijing in early April 1969, documents one of the early Soviet peace feelers. The telegram reports information provided by the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Beijing according to which Kosygin, acting on behalf of the CPSU politburo, tried to contact Mao on March 21 through the existing hotline between Moscow and Beijing. The Chinese, however, refused to put Kosygin through. Reflecting Moscow’s concern over the crisis, Kosygin reportedly indicated that, “if necessary,” he would agree to meet even with Zhou Enlai. When the Soviet Embassy communicated the Soviet desire for talks to the Chinese Foreign Ministry the following day, the Soviets were informed that a direct line be-

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“contrived imperialist propaganda” that Moscow was “preparing a preventive strike” against the PRC. Preparatory to further negotiations on border issues in Beijing, both sides were reported to have agreed to three principles: (1) the observance of the existing border; (2) the inadmissibility of armed confrontations; and (3) military disengagement from disputed border areas. Kosygin also proposed the expansion of trade relations and economic cooperation as well as the normalizing of railroad and aviation connections. Significantly, the Soviet premier also acquiesced when Zhou declared that Beijing would not curtail its political and ideological criticism of the Soviet Union. Letting the Chinese save face, Kosygin conceded that, while Sino-Soviet disagreements “played into the hands of world imperialism,” Moscow considered polemics on controversial issues as “permissible” if conducted in a “fitting tone.”

Moscow was successful in forcing the Chinese to accept the *status quo* along the Sino-Soviet border. But this victory came at a price in ideological and geostrategic terms. Not only did the Soviets concede the validity of a direct challenge to its leadership within the Communist bloc in ideological terms, a development long evident but rarely formulated as explicitly as in the Beijing meeting. In the long run, Moscow’s coercive diplomacy worsened relations with the United States and helped drive China into a rapprochement with the West, thus altering the balance of power in Asia to Soviet disadvantage.²⁶

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**Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR
Leadership on 2 March 1969
Sino-Soviet Border Clashes**

5 Copies
3/8/69

On March 2, 1969, at 11 o’clock local time, the Chinese organized a provocation on the Island Damansky which is located on the river Ussuri south of Khabarovsk, be-

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accident that the ambush on the Soviet border unit was staged by the Chinese agencies at a time when Bonn started its provocation of holding the election of the Federal President in West Berlin.

The provocation in the area of the Island of Damansky is part of the Maoists' policy which aims at forcing a radical reversal in the foreign and domestic policies of the PR [People's Republic] of China and at transforming the country de facto into a power hostile toward the socialist countries.

The Mao Zedong group has prepared the organization of armed provocations along the Soviet-Chinese border for a long time. The Chinese authorities have been creating artificial tensions at the Soviet-Chinese border since 1960. Since this time the Chinese have undertaken several thousand border violations with provocative goals.

At the beginning of 1967, the number of border violations by Chinese authorities increased sharply. In some districts they tried to install demonstratively border patrols on the islands and those parts of the rivers belonging to the USSR. In December 1967 and in January 1968, the Chinese undertook large provocative actions on the island of Kirkinsi on the Ussuri [River] and in the area of the Kasakevich Canal. On January 23, 1969, the Chinese staged an armed attack on the Island of Damansky.

The border in the area of the Island of Damansky was established according to the Treaty of Beijing of 1860 and the enclosed map which the representatives of Russia and China signed in June 1863. According to the then drawn-up demarcation line the Island of Damansky is located on the territory of the USSR. This line has always been protected by Soviet border guards.

Confronted with the Chinese provocations at the border, the Soviet side, for years, has taken active steps towards a regulation of the situation.

The question of the borderline was discussed in the bilateral Soviet-Chinese Consultations on the Determination of the Borderline in Certain Controversial Areas of 1964. The Soviet side made a number of proposals regarding the examination of the controversial border question. The Chinese leadership, however, was determined to let these consultations fail. The Chinese delegation put up the completely untenable demand to recognize the unequal character of the treaties delineating the Soviet-Chi-

nese border and raised territorial claims against the Soviet Union about an area of altogether 1,575,000 square kilometer. On July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong declared in a conversation with Japanese members of parliament with regard to the Chinese territorial demands against the Soviet Union that "we have not yet presented the bill for this territory."

On August 22, 1964, the consultations were interrupted. Despite our repeated proposals the Chinese did not resume the conversations and did not react even when the question was mentioned in the Soviet foreign ministry note of August 31, 1967.

Meanwhile the Chinese authorities continued to violate grossly the Soviet-Chinese agreement of 1951 on the regulation of the navigation in the border rivers. In 1967 and 1968 they blew up the consultations of the mixed Soviet-Chinese navigation commission which had been established on the basis of the agreement of 1951.

In the Chinese border areas large military preparations set in (construction of airports, access routes, barracks and depots, training of militia, etc.).

The Chinese authorities consciously conjure up situations of conflict along the border and stage provocations there. On our part, all measures have been taken to avoid an escalation of the situation and to prevent incidents and conflicts. The Soviet border troops have been instructed not to use their arms and, if possible, to avoid armed collisions. The instruction on the non-use of arms was strictly enforced, although the Chinese acted extremely provocatively in many cases, employed the most deceitful tricks, picked fights, and attacked our border guards with stabbing weapons, with steel rod and other such things.

The armed provocation in the area of the Island of Damansky is a logical consequence of this course of the Chinese authorities and is part of a far-reaching plan by Beijing aiming at increasing the Maoists' anti-Soviet campaign.

Since March 3, 1969, the Soviet Embassy in Beijing has been exposed again to an organized siege by specially trained groups of Maoists. Brutal acts of force and rowdylike excesses against the representatives of Soviet institutions are occurring throughout China every day. All over the country, an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign has been kindled. It is characteristic that this whole

campaign assumed a military coloration, that an atmosphere of chauvinistic frenzy has been created throughout the country.

Faced with this situation the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government are undertaking the necessary steps to prevent further border violations. They will do everything necessary in order to frustrate the criminal intentions of the Mao Zedong group which are to create hostility between the Soviet people and the Chinese people.

The Soviet Government is led in its relations with the Chinese people by feelings of friendship and is intent on pursuing this policy in the future. Ill-considered provocative actions of the Chinese authorities will, however, be decisively repudiated on our part and brought to an end with determination.

[Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; translation from German by Christian F. Ostermann.]

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Document No. 2: Telegram to East German Foreign Ministry from GDR Ambassador to PRC, 2 April 1969

Council of Ministers of the
The Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mekher

of Communist and Workers' Parties the course of our policy in relation to China was clearly set forth. The CPSU and the Soviet government, proceeding from its unchanging policy oriented towards an improvement in relations between the USSR and the PRC, has repeatedly appealed to the Chinese leadership with concrete proposals about ways to normalize relations. The pronouncements of the government of the USSR of March 29 and June 13 of this year are very well known. The message of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the State Council of the PRC sent in July of this year, in which concrete proposals regarding the improvement of contacts between the Soviet Union and China along government lines were put forth, including the organization of a bilateral summit meeting, also served the aims of putting to rights Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations.

Undertaking these actions, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government proceeded from and proceeds from a principled course in Soviet-Chinese relations. According to our deep conviction, a softening of tensions in relations between the USSR and the PRC would correspond to the interests of our two countries, and also of the whole Socialist commonwealth overall, would facilitate the activation of the struggle against imperialism, would be an essential support to heroic Vietnam and to the peoples of other countries which are leading the struggle for social and national liberation.

Guided by these considerations, the CC CPSU decided to undertake one more initiative aimed at a softening of the situation in relations between the USSR and the PRC.

The Chinese side responded pretty quickly to our proposal to hold a meeting of A.N. Kosygin, who was present in Hanoi at Ho Chi Minh's funeral, with Zhou Enlai. However, the Chinese response arrived in Hanoi an hour after the departure of the Soviet Party-State delegation to Moscow via Calcutta, and therefore A.N. Kosygin set off for Beijing already from the territory of the Soviet Union.

The meeting of the Soviet delegation headed by Comrade A.N. Kosygin with Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi continued for about four hours. From the Soviet side efforts were applied to assure that the conversation took place in the spirit of a concrete consideration of the knotty issues of inter-governmental Soviet-Chi-

and the PRC. An initiative was revealed by us regarding an expansion of trade, the fulfillment of contracts which had been concluded, the signing of trade protocols for the current and next year, the working out of measures on trade and economic cooperation during the present five-year plan. Zhou Enlai promised to present these proposals to the Politburo of the CC CPC, and expressed his agreement to exchange supplemental lists of products for 1969.

We proposed to the Chinese side to normalize railroad and aviation connections between the two countries, and to reestablish the high-frequency link which had been interrupted by the Chinese authorities in March of this year.

From the Soviet side there also was raised the issue of mutually sending Ambassadors and the creation of conditions for the normal activity of diplomatic representatives.

Zhou Enlai stated that these proposals will be submitted to Mao Zedong.

During the consideration of issues of Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations Zhou Enlai stressed that the leadership of the CPC does not intend to curtail its political

We declared the provocative nature of the contrived imperialist propaganda to the effect that the Soviet Union allegedly is preparing a preventive strike on China. It was stressed that in the Soviet Union neither the Party nor the government has ever spoken about the unavailability of war and has not summoned the people to war. All of our documents, party decisions summon the people to peace. We never have said to the people that it is necessary to “pull the belt tighter,” that war is unavoidable. Zhou Enlai, in his turn, said that “China has no intentions to attack the Soviet Union.” He stressed that from the Chinese side measures will be undertaken not to allow armed confrontations with the USSR.

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**IN THE REGION AND
IN THE CENTER:
SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE
BORDER RIFT**

by Elizabeth Wishnick

How did Soviet Communist Party officials and activists in the regions bordering the People's Republic of China respond to the news of Aleksei Kosygin's 11 September 1969 meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing? The two documents below, from the State Archive of Khabarovskiy Kray (territory) in the Russian Far East,¹ show the reactions of several leading party members in the frontier region to Central Committee and Soviet government efforts to defuse the rupture with China.

One document is the stenographic record of a 22 September 1969 meeting of the regional and city party aktiv convened to discuss the Central Committee's account of Kosygin's discussion of the border conflict with Zhou. The second document is the Khabarovskiy Kray party committee's report of the same meeting to the CPSU CC in Moscow.

In comparing the two documents, it is particularly interesting to note their differences in emphasis. The Khabarovskiy Kray report to the CPSU CC accentuates the positive, stressing that Kosygin's meeting with Zhou represented a step toward resolving Soviet-Chinese differences through peaceful means. According to the stenographic record, however, many of the speakers described the problems in the border region in much greater detail than was reported to Moscow. Although they all applauded Kosygin's meeting with Zhou, some speakers noted that little change in the border situation had been observed since their encounter eleven days before. Comrade I.K. Bokan', for example, the head of the political department of a military district in the region, noting that there had been over 300 incidents of incursions by Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory in his district in 1969 alone, commented that no substantive changes were observed following the Kosygin-Zhou meeting. The Secretary of the Khabarovsk City committee of the CPSU, comrade V.S. Pasternak, made a similar remark, describing Sino-Soviet relations as "increasingly tense" and observing that the anti-Soviet hysteria and propa-

ganda in Beijing had not been abated. Bokan' urged his comrades to be prepared for any provocation on the border, while his colleague in the military district, comrade Popov, noted that Chinese ideological positions were dangerous for the internationaltions were dangerous for the desC14L T(urged his cw*

sue a principled and consistent course vis-a-vis China. We understand that the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples coincide and we support the policy of our government to resolve disputed issues at the negotiating table.

We view the meeting between comrade Kosygin and Zhou Enlai as just such an effort by our government to resolve these issues by peaceful means. We support those principles which were proposed as fundamental groundwork for negotiations. We are convinced that the resolution of the disputed issues will depend on the position of the Chinese side.

We are all the more vigilant since after the meeting the anti-Soviet propaganda, the anti-Soviet hysteria in Beijing has hardly decreased. We fully support the principled position of our party, directed against the anti-Leninist position of the Mao Zedong clique.

We will direct all efforts, to mobilize the work of the enterprises to fulfill the socialist obligations in honor of the 100th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comrade Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute.

Comr. SVERDLOV

Comrades, the information we have been listening to clearly and convincingly demonstrates that our party and its decision-making nucleus, in the form of the Leninist Central Committee, persistently and consistently, in the spirit of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, pursues a policy of consolidating the international communist movement, of surmounting of problems and disagreements, temporarily arising in the contemporary revolutionary movement.

It is natural and understandable that the slightest positive shift in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations would be met with satisfaction by the Soviet people, and all the more by us, China's immediate neighbors.

The information clearly outlined the Soviet Union's proposals for stabilizing Soviet-Chinese relations. These proposals, which result from the situation at hand, are timely, reasonable, and fair, and are capable of fostering the correct resolution of inter-governmental disputes, certainly, once the other sides expresses the desire to facilitate an improvement in relations. It is unlikely

we will be able to say that about the Chinese leadership.

From the information we learned that Zhou Enlai, arbitrarily promised, just as Mao himself would have, to continue the ideological struggle against our party, and consequently, against the policy of all communist parties of the socialist countries, for another 10 thousand years.

This is not accidental and is evoked as a reserve option for the long-term anti-Soviet campaign, and it is impossible to overlook this. Our party, proceeding from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, from the richest practice of its own and the international communist movement, considers a polemic about disputed issues to be fully achievable, but this polemic must lead to the interests of the peoples, the interests of the cohesion of the ranks of the communist parties, on the basis of deep scientific argumentation, without insults and abuse vis-a-vis another people and party.

We saw that on a number of occasions polemics were useful in the revolutionary movement. In its time the CC of our party honestly, openly noted a series of erroneous views by the late respected Palmiro Togliatti. There were polemics with other parties. But such polemics do not have anything in common with the unrestrained policy of the Chinese leaders.

Therefore it is necessary for us to all the more steadfastly and firmly turn the ideological struggle against the Chinese revisionists. Permit me to state in the name of the workers in higher education that we unanimously support the proposals and efforts to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations formulated by our party, and will not spare any effort to contribute to the consolidation of the strength and might of our great Motherland.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Kadochnikov, a milling cutter at the Khabarovsk heating equipment plant.

Comr. KADOCHNIKOV

Comrades, we, workers of the city of Khabarovsk, like the entire Soviet people, approve the initiative by the Central Committee of our party and the Soviet government, directed at the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

We were all witnesses to the fact that, as the leadership of the CPC [Communist Party of China] loosened its links to our party, the

Chinese leaders went so far as to stage military provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border. It is strange for us workers and all the Soviet people to hear such gibberish from people calling themselves communists.

It is fully understandable that we cannot passively watch the train of events in China. We approve the steadfast and principled line of our government for the settlement of disputed issues through negotiations and consider that our party and government will exert every effort so that normal relations with China can be achieved.

As far as we are concerned, we consider that it is necessary to strengthen the might of our Motherland through work. Our workers work calmly, confident in their strength and in the dur sp_L calmly, confident in their s go >> ofili-It

the leaders of China broke off relations between the Soviet Union and China. The results of this turned out to be deplorable. It began with [China's] isolation from absolutely the majority of the communist parties. The people of China, who were only

designed to ease the situation on the border and to consider this meeting to have been very useful.

II. The regional party aktiv completely and fully approves the policy of the party and government, aimed at normalizing relations between the Soviet Union and China.

What other proposals are there? There are proposals to accept such a resolution. No one is opposed? No.

After this the meeting of the aktiv was considered closed.

9/23/69

Stenographer Taran

[Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy Kray, f. p-35, op. 96, d. 234, ll. 1-12; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

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**Document II: Information Report Sent
by Khabarovskiy Kray (Territory)
Committee to CPSU CC, 22 September
1969**

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION

**KHABAROVSKIY KRAY
COMMITTEE**

City of Khabarovsk

(Sent 9/22/69)
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPSU
DEPARTMENT OF
ORGANIZATIONAL-PARTY WORK

INFORMATION

regarding the familiarization of the electoral aktiv of the Khabarovskiy Kray party organization with the Information from the CC CPSU about the trip by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to

Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin's discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969

On 22 September 1969 a regional meeting of the party electoral aktiv was held to acquaint them with the Information from the CC CPSU regarding the trip by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin's discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969.

The First Secretary of the regional party committee read the Information from the CC CPSU.

7 people spoke at the meeting. The participants noted with great satisfaction that our party, its Central Committee, persistently and consistently, in the spirit of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' parties [in June 1969 - translator's note], take a hard line on strengthening of the peace and security of peoples, consolidating the ranks of the international communist movement, and overcoming the difficulties and disagreements within it. They [the members of the *aktiv*] unanimously approved the initiative of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, directed at taking concrete measures to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations, settle disputed issues through negotiations and the organization of the meeting in Peking.

The Secretary of the Khabarovsk city committee of the CPSU V.S. Pasternak said in his remarks:

"The communists and all the workers of the city were particularly attentive to the news of the meeting in Beijing between the president of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A.N. Kosygin, and the president of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. Khabarovsk residents always steadfastly follow the development of Soviet-Chinese relations, [and] angrily judge the great power, adventurist course of the PRC leaders. The armed raids by the Maoists on the Soviet-Chinese border, the malicious slander against our Soviet people, our state, the Communist party, deeply trouble the workers of our city.

The initiative by the CC CPSU and the Soviet government to stabilize Soviet-Chinese relations and organize a meeting in Beijing in such a difficult current situation once again vividly affirms the wise policy of our party to resolve disputed issues by peaceful means.

The city party organization aims to improve the ideological work among the workers in every possible way, to mobilize the collectives of firms, construction compa-

nies, and institutions to fulfill socialist responsibilities in a manner worthy of the meeting in honor of the 100th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth."

I.P. Kadochnikov, member of the regional committee of the CPSU, a milling cutter at the Khabarovsk heating equipment plant, stated:

"We cannot passively observe the course of events in China, where the leaders increasingly aggravate relations with our country and the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border. We, Far Easterners, eagerly approve the practical steps by our party and government towards the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Our workers work calmly, confident in their own strength and in the durability of the Soviet borders. I feel this every day, every hour, working among with the collective of many thousands at the plant."

The rector of the Khabarovsk pedagogical institute, N.V. Sverdlov, noted:

"The Information concisely and clearly states all the proposals by the Soviet Union to settle the disputes and conflicts in Soviet-Chinese relations and to improve the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border and expand economic ties between our countries. These timely, reasonable, and fair proposals, which stem from our mutual interests, combine firmness and flexibility of policy, and, most importantly, are capable of fostering the correct resolution of intergovernmental disputes, of course, under circumstances when the other side expresses a similar understanding of the situation and the desire to find a way out of it."

E.A. Plotkin, member of the regional party committee of the CPSU, director of the construction bureau of the Khabarovsk Energomash plant, stated:

"The trip to Beijing by the president of the Council of Ministers, A.N. Kosygin, was very brief, but we understood how important this meeting was for the Soviet and Chinese peoples. The search for paths to stabilization, the reasonable resolution of foreign policy questions, which the Central Committee of the CPSU and our government put forth meet with approval at the plant."

The head of the political department of the Krasnoznamennyi border district, I.K. Bokan', expressed the thoughts and feelings of the border guards as follows:

"The troops of the Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern border district reacted to the

report of the meeting between the president of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, comrade A.N. Kosygin, with the premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, with feelings of deep understanding and satisfaction and consider that this discussion was useful for both sides. One of the central questions at this meeting was the question of the mitigation of the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border.

Relations along the border exemplify the relations between the states. The Maoists' provocative violations of the Soviet-Chinese border and their intervention in Soviet territory attest to the adventurist policy of the Chinese leadership, their aim to decide disputed questions through force.

The border forces in the district have at their disposal all that is necessary to fulfill their sacred duty before the Fatherland in an exemplary way. In these days of preparation for the 100th anniversary of the V.I. Lenin's birth, we will demonstrate our level of decisiveness by increasing the military preparedness of the troops in order to honor-

than a year ago. This is the main reason why, despite all the constructive efforts made by our delegation, the negotiations on border issues in essence haven't made any progress.

To move things forward, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government came out with an important initiative, and sent a letter from the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, comrade A.N. Kosygin, to the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, in July 1970. Proceeding from the principled line of Soviet foreign policy, we proposed in this letter to begin negotiations in Moscow, at the same time as the negotiations in Beijing, between special governmental delegations on a draft agreement between the USSR and the PRC on mutual non-use of force, including nuclear weapons, [and] the cessation of war propaganda and of preparations for war against the other side.

At the same time, to eliminate many controversial issues from the negotiations, a proposal was made to formulate an inter-governmental agreement on the demarcation of the eastern section of the Soviet-Chinese border (4300 km), consisting of more than half of its length, where most of the border incidents took place (from the point where the borders of the USSR, PRC, MPR [Mongolia] meet in the east and further to the south along the Amur and Ussuri rivers).

The letter expressed the view that, in the interests of the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, it would be expedient to hold another meeting of the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC, this time on the territory of the Soviet Union, and also restated a range of other constructive proposals. Meanwhile Beijing continues to speculate in the international arena and in domestic propaganda on the alleged existence of a "threat of force" from the USSR and to disseminate other anti-Soviet insinuations.

To deprive the Chinese government of a basis for such inventions and facilitate the shift to a constructive discussion of issues, the subject of the negotiations, on January 15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet another step - it made a proposal to the leadership of the PRC to conclude an agreement between the USSR and the PRC on the non-use of force in any form whatsoever, including missiles and nuclear weapons,

and forwarded a draft of such an agreement to Beijing through the ambassador of the USSR.

In sending this draft agreement for consideration by the government of the PRC, the Soviet side expressed its belief that the fulfillment of our proposal - the most rapid conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of force [—] would create a more favorable atmosphere for the normalization of relations between our two states and, in particular, would facilitate the restoration of neighborly relations and friendship between the USSR and the PRC.

A positive answer from the Chinese side to the Soviet initiative could lead to a decisive shift forward in the negotiations. However there is still no answer whatsoever from the Chinese side. There is a growing impression that Beijing, as before, is interested in maintaining the "border territorial issue" in relations with the Soviet Union and, in bad faith, at times in a provocative way, is aiming to use this for its anti-Soviet and chauvinistic goals.

Why have the Soviet steps towards the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations encountered such significant difficulties? The main reason, as was mentioned previously in our party documents, is that anti-Sovietism was and continues to be the main ingredient in the anti-Marxist, nationalistic line of the present Chinese leadership. This is confirmed, in particular, by the materials of the 11th plenum of the CC CPC (August-September 1970), the nature of the celebration of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the PRC [in October 1970], the continuing slanderous campaign against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, carried out both in the outside world and especially through domestic Chinese channels. The strengthening of the anti-Soviet campaign is taking place in the pages of the Chinese press. In the last half a year alone the Chinese central newspapers published hundreds of materials containing rude assaults against our party and our country. The walls of the houses in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities are covered with appeals to struggle against "So-

pects in the area of trade, economic, and scientific-technical cooperation. The Chinese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the effective political, economic, and other forms of cooperation among socialist states, as well as by their interaction, which facilitates the strengthening of the international situation of socialism and their interaction.

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SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS, 1980:

ist states], the Chinese leadership is trying to stratify the socialist countries into various groups. With such states as Romania, Yugoslavia, and the DPRK, China is developing extensive relations, supporting the nationalistic tendencies in their policies in every possible way with the aim of creating its own group on this basis, and using it to counter the socialist community. In relations with other socialist countries the hostile character of China's policy is strengthening even more, as the unceasing attacks and pressure on the SRV [Vietnam], Cuba, DPRL [Laos], and MPR [Mongolia], attest. China uses a double-dealing tactic including pressure and promises in its approach to the PRB [Bulgaria], HPR [Hungary], GDR, PNR [Poland], and ChSSR [Czechoslovakia]: on the one hand China is continuing its gross interference in their internal affairs, while clearly ignoring their interests; on the other hand, it is giving assurances about its readiness to develop relations with them on a mutually advantageous basis. Thanks to such a tactic, Beijing is counting on at least forcing these countries into positions of "neutrality" regarding China's course, if not to achieve more.

Within the Chinese leadership demagogic and deceptive practices are widely used. It is affirmed, as if China's struggle against the USSR need not worry the other socialist countries, that the development of relations between them and China could even facilitate the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, that the expansion of ties between these states and China meets their national interests, and, in particular, could bring them major advantages in the trade-economic sphere.

Beijing has noticeably strengthened its efforts to penetrate into various spheres of life and activities in the countries of the socialist community. Chinese representatives are trying to become more active in developing relations with official institutions and government agencies, social organizations, educational institutions, and the mass media; they are establishing contacts with various strata of the population, particularly with the intelligentsia and youth, and widely distributing invitations to various events at the PRC embassies. Information is being collected about the domestic life of their post country, the decisions of party and state organs, the economic situation and the military potential, the military forces and weapons. Under the guise of

"study tours," attempts are being made to send Chinese delegations to some socialist countries and receive their delegations in the PRC.

There are signs that the Chinese may reevaluate their relations with the ruling parties of some socialist countries, and establish party-to-party ties with them. Party-to-party ties are already developing with Yugoslavia and Romania; the first Chinese party delegation in recent years went to participate in the RKP [Romanian Communist Party] congress.

Denying in essence the general regularities of development of the revolutionary processes and socialist economic construction in various countries, the Chinese leadership has once again returned to the use of the conception of the "national model" of socialism, and especially rises to the defense of the Yugoslav "model".

Beijing's divisive activity shows its limited, but nevertheless negative, influence in certain socialist states. Some of the workers do not always grasp the meaning of the Chinese tactic and in certain cases do not provide their own effective rebuff to Beijing's hegemonic policy. Moreover, the facts show that responsible leaders of certain fraternal countries, counter to the official positions of their parties, are expressing an interest in excluding some important directions in their ties with China from the sphere of multilateral coordination, that in certain situations they are taking steps to expand ties with the PRC without considering the level of relations between China and other states.

Judging from all of this, China's tactical use of a differentiated approach [to socialist states], which plays on various nuances and changes in the domestic political and economic situation in certain socialist states, on any type of temporary difficulties, will not only continue, but may even be more widely used in the near future. It can be inferred that attempts by the Chinese to penetrate into various areas of the domestic life of the socialist countries will be further intensified.

Under these conditions an important question in the work of ambassadors is the effective and systematic opposition of Beijing's splitting activities in socialist countries, the neutralization of its plans to shake the unity of the socialist states, to influence their positions. It is necessary to obstruct the

intensifying attempts by the Chinese leaders to penetrate into various spheres of the domestic life of the socialist countries. With the participation of the leaders and representatives of the political and social circles of your post countries, direct the following:

1. Pay attention to the noticeable activization of Chinese policy towards socialist states. Using the example of Beijing's recent maneuvers, continuously carry out measures to clarify the danger of the Chinese differentiated approach 98.002of th1tf

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being held. As the leadership of the fraternal countries was informed, the results of the Moscow round of Soviet-Chinese negotiations showed that the Chinese side does not aim, in the near future in any case, to come to any agreements about the normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC; that China knowingly proposes unacceptable preconditions, and rejects the Soviet side's constructive proposals, directed at the elaboration of principles of relations between the two countries and the building of a political-juridical basis for them.

As far as the second round is concerned, now it is generally difficult to say anything about it, insofar as the Chinese press announced that it would be "inappropriate" to hold them at present. Recent events attest to the escalation of Beijing's hostility towards the Soviet Union.

3. Taking into account the hostile character of China's policy towards socialist states and the strengthening of its aggressiveness, note the necessity of a careful and deliberate approach to the development of economic ties and scientific-technical cooperation with the PRC, particularly in those areas which would facilitate the growth of its military-industrial potential. Beijing's efforts to exaggerate the brilliant perspectives of trade and economic cooperation with some socialist countries don't have any real basis and are only a tactical means of influencing these countries. Beijing now considers it advantageous to orient itself

will grow in international relations.

In accordance with the instructions you received previously and taking into account the specifics of your post country, continue your work to reveal the dangerous character of the developing rapprochement between aggressive circles in the West, above all the USA, and the Chinese leadership, calling attention to the following aspects.

1. In developing military cooperation with China, the ruling circles in the USA count on the possibility of influencing China to act in a “desirable” way, of channeling its policies in an acceptable direction. Frequently the foreign policy activity of the PRC is presented as a “stabilizing” factor in the international arena. The Chinese leaders themselves are not adverse to playing up to such a discussion and, to this end, without withdrawing the thesis of the “inevitability of war,” have begun to use a more flexible terminology. However, with the help of a sham “peaceful nature,” invoked to add greater “respectability” to the PRC’s foreign policy, Beijing is simply counting on gaining time to accomplish the forced arming of the country. Actually, more and more, the Chinese leadership is resorting to a policy of diktat and interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, and assumes on itself the improper functions of “teaching lessons” and “punishing” the unruly with the force of arms.

2. As before, the PRC government declines to make any international legal commitments to disarmament, tries to diminish the importance of results achieved in this area, and refuses to take part in measures to limit and stop the arms race. Beijing has set about to manufacture and experiment with intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and is work-

The experience of history attests to the fact that the extent of China's expansion will be proportional to the military might of the Chinese army. Even today China's neighbors, above all the countries of Southeast Asia which the Chinese leaders consider to be their traditional sphere of influence, experience an immediate threat. It would be easy to imagine how China will behave in relation to its neighbors once the USA and its neighbors assist China to acquire more modern weapons. Above all, China is trying to institute its control over Southeast Asia all the way to the coast of Malacca and the straits of Singapore.

Under these conditions, attempts to ignore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese policy and to remain neutral will only encourage Beijing to undertake new adventures and to extend its expansion. Collective efforts by Asian states could, on the contrary, impede China's path to increased military might, which is directed above all against countries of this region.

(For New Delhi only. The connivance and outright support of the USA for military preparations in China can only contradict India's interests. Although the Chinese leadership is holding talks about normalizing relations with India, there is an entire array of means of pressure against it in China's arsenal of strategies. In American-Chinese plans, the role which is allotted to Pakistan as a key factor in pressuring India and as a base of support for the aggressive actions of the USA and China in Southeast Asia is expanding more and more. In cooperation with the USA, Beijing is flooding India's neighbors with arms and, by creating an atmosphere of war psychosis, is attempting to maintain in power unpopular regimes such as the current one in Pakistan. Beijing is speeding up its military preparations along the Chinese-Indian border, constructing missile bases and strategic roads in Tibet, and activating its support for separatist movements in northeast India, where it is practically waging an "undeclared war" against this country.)

There is no doubt that as China strengthens its military-industrial potential, it will advance further along the path to the realization of Chinese leadership's openly declared territorial pretensions against neighboring countries in Southeast, South, and West Asia. This will not only lead to a serious destabilization of the situation in

Asia, but, at a certain stage, also could present a direct threat to other regions.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union can only draw the requisite conclusions. Not only do we carefully monitor the direction of American-Chinese cooperation in the military sphere, but also we must take the necessary steps to strengthen the security of our borders. We cannot tolerate change in the military-strategic balance in favor of forces hostile to the cause of peace.

(Only for Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kabul.

The post countries should inform MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that Soviet ambassadors were sent instructions about carrying out work to counter the negative consequences for the causes of socialism, peace, and detente, of the establishment of an American-Chinese military alliance. Familiarize the recipient with the content of the aforementioned instructions.

Carry out your work in coordination with the embassies (missions of) Cuba, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Laotian People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), the Polish People's Republic (PPR), and the Czechoslovak People's Republic (CPR).)

It is necessary to attentively follow all foreign policy steps taken to carry out plans for the expansion of American-Chinese military cooperation, to regularly and effectively inform the Center about them, and to take the measures required to neutralize the tendencies that are undesirable for our interests.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 34, Dok. 10; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.*]

Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with China: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy, 1969-95.

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Morning: Russians Abroad in the Far East

Maria Krotova (Herzen Institute, Petersburg): "Russo-Chinese Daily Relations in pre-1917 Harbin"

Lena Aurilena (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Youth Politics in Russian Emigre Organizations in Manchukuo, 1930s-40s"

Nadezhda Solov'eva (Khabarovsk Provincial Archive): "Khabarovsk's Archival Holdings on Russo-Chinese Relations"

David Wolff (Princeton U.): "Interlocking Diasporas: The Jews of Harbin, 1903-1914"

Shuxiao LI (Heilongjiang Trade Corporation): "The Chinese Eastern Railway and Harbin's Rise as an Economic Center"

Alexander Toropov (Central Archive of the Far East, Vladivostok): "Russia's Far Eastern Neighbors"

Iurii Tsipkin (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): "The Social Composition of the Harbin Emigration, 1920s-30s"

Afternoon: "Foreigners" in the Russian Far East (RFE): Settlement and Resettlement

Tatiana Ikonnikova (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): "German Intelligence in the RFE during WWI: Suspicions and Realities"

Vladimir Mukhachev (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Intervention and Civil War: New Documents and Approaches"

Teruyuki HARA (Slavic Research Center, Sapporo, Japan): "The Japanese in Vladivostok, 1906-1922"

Elena Chernolutskaia (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Forced Migrations in the Far East from the 1920s till mid-1950s"

Natsuko OKA (Institute of Developing Economies): "Koreans in the Russian Far East: Collectivization and Deportation"

Viktoriiia Romanova (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): "The Jewish Diaspora in the making of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast"

Chizuko TAKAO (Waseda U., Tokyo, Japan): "Reevaluating the 'Birobidzhan Project': The Regional Context"

