

Translators' Note: On 23 August 1958, Chinese Communist forces in the Fujian area along the People's Republic of China's Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled Jinmen Island. In the following two months, several hundred thousand artillery shells exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around it. At one point, a Chinese Communist invasion of the Nationalist-controlled offshore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In response to the rapidly escalating Communist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the Eisenhower Administration, in accordance with its obligations under the 1954 American-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. naval vessels to help the Nationalists protect Jinmen's supply lines. Even the leaders of the Soviet Union, then Beijing's close ally, feared the possible consequences of Beijing's actions, and sent Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to inquire about China's reasons for shelling Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed on October 6, when Beijing issued a "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it was speculated by many at that time, and later confirmed, that this message was drafted by Mao Zedong). The message called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem, arguing that all Chinese should unite to confront the "American plot" to divide China permanently. From this day on, the Communist forces dramatically relaxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the Taiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war between China and the United States.

In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in Cold War history, it is particularly important to understand Beijing's motives. Why did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the shelling relate to China's overall domestic and international policies? Why did the Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis

as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, scholars have been forced to resort to "educated guesses" to answer these questions.

The materials in the following pages, translated from Chinese, provide new insights for understanding Beijing's handling of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu Lengxi, then the director of the New China News Agency and editor-in-chief of *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily). Wu was personally involved in the decision-making process in Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and attended several Politburo Standing Committee meetings discussing the events. His memoir provides both a chronology and an insider's narrative of how Beijing's leaders, Mao Zedong in particular, handled the crisis. The second part comprises 18 documents, including two internal speeches delivered by Mao explaining the Party's external policies in general and its Taiwan policy in particular. The two parts together provide a foundation to build a scholarly understanding of some of the key calculations underlying the Beijing leadership's management of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly interesting is the revelation that Mao decided to shell Jinmen to distract American attention from, and counter American moves in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his extensive explanation of how China should use a "noose strategy" to fight the "U.S. imperialists." Equally important is his emphasis on the connection between the tense situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass mobilization in China leading to the Great Leap Forward. It should also be noted that

however, the General Office of the Central Committee called, urging me to go to Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21

lounge hall of the swimming area at Beidaihe's beach. Mao chaired the meeting in his bathrobe right after swimming in the ocean. Among the participants were Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Dehuai.⁶ Wang Shangrong, Ye Fei, Hu Qiaomu, and I also attended the meeting.⁷

Chairman Mao started the meeting by saying that while we had had a good time at this summer resort, the Americans had extremely hectic and nervous days. According to their responses during the past days, Mao said that Americans were worried not only by our possible landing at Jinmen and Mazu, but also our preparation to liberate Taiwan. In fact, our bombardment of Jinmen with 30,000-50,000 shells was a probe. We did not say if we were or were not going to land. We were acting as circumstances dictated. We had to be doubly cautious, Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen was not a small matter because it had a bearing on much more important international issues. The problem was not the 95,000 Nationalist troops stationed there—this was easy to handle. The problem was how to assess the attitude of the American government. Washington had signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty, however, did not clearly indicate whether the U.S. defense perimeter included Jinmen and Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if the Americans wanted to carry these two burdens on their backs. The main purpose of our bombardment was not to reconnoiter Jiang's defenses on these islands, but to probe the attitude of the Americans in Washington, testing their determination. The Chinese people had never been afraid of provoking someone far superior in power and strength, and they certainly had the courage to challenge [the Americans] on such offshore islands as Taiwan, Jinmen, and Mazu, which had always been China's territories.

Mao said that we needed to grasp an opportunity. The bombardment of Jinmen was an opportunity we seized when American armed forces landed in Lebanon [on 15 July 1958]. Our action therefore not only allowed us to test the Americans, but also to support the Arab people. On the horns of a dilemma, the Americans seemed unable to cope with both the East and the West at the same time. For our propaganda, however, we should not directly connect the bom-

bardment of Jinmen [to the America's landing in Lebanon]. Our major propaganda target was America's aggressions all over the world, condemning its invasion of the Middle East and its occupation of our territory, Taiwan, Mao said. The *People's Daily* could begin our propaganda campaign by criticizing an anti-China memorandum recently published by the U.S. State Department, enumerating the crimes of America's invasion of China in the past and refuting the memorandum's calumny and slander against us. We could also organize articles and commentaries on the resolution passed by the UN General Assembly, requesting American and British troops to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan. Then we could request the withdrawal of American armed forces from their military bases in many countries across the world, including Taiwan. Our media should now conduct an outer-ring propaganda campaign. After we learned the responses and moves of America, of Jiang Jieshi, and of other countries, we could then issue announcements and publish commentaries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu. Mao said that at the present our media should build up strength and store up energy—draw the bow but not discharge the arrow.

Peng Dehuai suggested that the media should write some reports and articles about the heroic fighting of our commanders and soldiers on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The participants at the meeting agreed that our reporters on the front could prepare articles, and we would decide later when they could publish their reports.

That evening I informed the editors of the *People's Daily* in Beijing, through a secured telephone line, of the Politburo's instructions on how to organize our propaganda campaign. But I did not say anything about the Politburo's decisions, intentions, and purpose for bombing Jinmen-Mazu, which were a top military secret at that time.

For the next two days, the Politburo's Standing Committee meeting at Beidaihe focused its discussions upon how to double steel and iron production and upon issues of establishing the people's commune. Chairman Mao, however, still paid close attention to the responses from all directions to our bombardment of Jinmen, especially to America's response. Mao's secretary called me several times checking on follow-up information after the NCNA's *Cangao ziliao* [Restricted Reference Material]⁸ printed

America's responses. During these days, I asked NCNA to report to me every morning by telephone about headline news from foreign news agencies. I reported the important news to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou.

The Central Committee's working conference at Beidaihe ended on 30 August. Then Chairman Mao returned to Beijing to chair the Supreme State Conference. On 4 September, one day before the conference, Mao called for another Politburo Standing Committee meeting, which mainly discussed the international situation after the bombardment of Jinmen. The meeting analyzed the American responses. Both [Dwight] Eisenhower and [John Foster] Dulles made public speeches. They ordered half of their warships in the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Meanwhile, the American government also suggested resuming Chinese-American ambassadorial talks at Warsaw.⁹ Seemingly, the American leaders believed that we were going to attack Taiwan. They wanted to keep Taiwan. However, they seemed not to have made up their mind whether or not to defend Jinmen and Mazu. Both Eisenhower and Dulles slurred over this matter without giving a straight answer. The participants at the meeting agreed that the Americans feared a war with us. They might not dare to fight us over Jinmen and Mazu. The bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu had already accomplished our goal. We made the Americans very nervous and mobilized the people of the world to join our struggle.

At the Politburo's Standing Committee meeting, however, the participants decided that our next plan was not an immediate landing on Jinmen, but pulling the noose [around America's neck] tighter and tighter—putting more pressure on America—and then looking for an opportunity to act. All participants agreed with Premier Zhou's suggestion of announcing a twelve-mile zone as our territorial waters so as to prevent America's warships from reaching Jinmen and Mazu.¹⁰ Chairman Mao considered it righteous for us to defend our territory if American ships entered our territorial water. Our batteries, however, might not fire on them immediately. Our troops could send a warning signal first, and then act accordingly.

Chairman Mao also said that we were preparing another approach as well. Through the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks, which would be resumed soon in Warsaw,

a war with us. After we announced a twelve-mile zone of territorial waters, American warships at first refused to accept it. They invaded the boundary line of our territorial waters many times, though they did not sail into the eight-mile territorial waters which they recognized. Later, after our warnings, American ships did not dare to invade our twelve-mile territorial waters. Once some American gunships escorted a Nationalist transportation flotilla shipping munitions and supplies to Jinmen. When this joint flotilla reached Jinmen's harbor, I ordered heavy shelling. As soon as our batteries opened fire, the American ships turned around and quickly escaped. The Nationalist ships suffered heavy losses. Apparently, America was a paper tiger.

America, however, was also a real tiger, Mao continued. At present, America concentrated a large force in the Taiwan Straits, including six out of its twelve aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, forty destroyers, and two air force divisions. Its strength was so strong that one could not underestimate it, but must consider it seriously. Thus, our current policy [toward Jinmen] was shelling without landing, and cutting-off without killing (meaning that without a landing, we would continue bombing Jinmen to blockade its communication and transportation and to cut off its rear support and supplies, but not to bottle up the enemy [on the island]).

Chairman Mao also told me that the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks had resumed at Warsaw. After several rounds of talks, we could tell that the Americans were certain about defending Taiwan but not sure about Jinmen. Some indications suggested that the Americans intended to exchange their abstaining from defending Jinmen-Mazu for our recognition of their forcible occupation of Taiwan, Mao said. We needed to work out a policy concerning this situation. It was not adequate for us to accept General Zhang Zhizhong's advice at that point. Mao asked the *People's Daily* and NCNA to suspend the ongoing propaganda campaign and wait for the Central Committee's further decision.

Chairman Mao asked for my comments on his news draft after it was typed out. I noted that the article particularly mentioned at its end that General Zhang had joined Mao's inspection trip. I agreed with Mao's manuscript except the last paragraph about

Zhang Zhizhong, which might mislead public thinking about relations with the Nationalists. According to Chairman Mao's instruction, the article was published as the headline news on the front page of the *People's Daily* on that National Day (1 Oc-

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Jieshi would ask for American help; it would make Americans anxious, worrying that Jiang might bring them into trouble. For us, not taking Jinmen-Mazu would have little impact on our construction of a socialist country. Jiang's troops on Jinmen-Mazu alone could not cause too much damage. On the contrary, if we took over Jinmen-Mazu, or if we allow the Americans to force Jiang to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we would lose a reliable means by which we can deal with the Americans and Jiang.

All the participants at the meeting agreed with Chairman Mao's proposal to allow Jiang's troops to stay at Jinmen-Mazu and force the American government to continue with this burden. The latter would be always on tenterhooks since we could kick it from time to time.

Premier Zhou expected the Americans to propose three resolutions during the Chinese-American talks. Their first proposition might ask us to stop shelling; in return, Jiang would reduce his troops on Jinmen-Mazu and America would announce that Jinmen-Mazu was included in the American-Jiang mutual defense perimeter. The second proposal might suggest our cease-fire if Jiang reduced troops on Jinmen-Mazu, while America would declare that their mutual defense did not include Jinmen-Mazu. The last plan might ask for our cease-fire, Jiang's withdrawal from Jinmen-Mazu, and a commitment by both sides not to use force against each other. All three propositions were unacceptable, Zhou emphasized, because they were essentially aimed at creating two Chinas and legalizing America's forcible occupation of Taiwan. Zhou, however, considered it favorable for us to continue the Chinese-American talks, which could occupy the Americans and prevent America and the European countries from bringing the question of the Taiwan Straits to the UN. We also needed to explain clearly the situation to our friends in Asia and Africa so as to give them the truth and prevent [the crisis] from doing us a disservice. All the participants agreed with Premier Zhou's suggestions.

Chairman Mao concluded at the meeting that our decision had been made—continuation of shelling but not landing, blockading without bottling up and allowing Jiang's forces to stay at Jinmen-Mazu. Our shelling would no longer be daily, with no more 30,000 or 50,000 shells each time.

Later on, our shelling could be at some intervals; sometimes heavy shelling, sometimes light; and several hundred shells fired randomly in one day. However, Mao said that we should continue to give wide publicity to our propaganda campaign. We insisted in our propaganda that the question of Taiwan was China's internal affair, that bombing Jinmen-Mazu was a continuation of the Chinese civil war, and that no foreign country or international organization should be allowed to interfere in China's affairs. America's stationing of its land and air forces on Taiwan was an invasion of China's territory and sovereignty; concentrating a large number of naval ships in the Taiwan Straits revealed American attempts to cause tensions. All U.S. vessels must be withdrawn from that area. We must oppose America's attempts to create two Chinas and to legalize its forcible occupation of Taiwan. We would solve the problem of Jinmen-Mazu, or even the problem of Taiwan and Penghu, with Jiang Jieshi through negotiations. Chairman Mao emphasized that our media propaganda should explicitly address the above principles. Our delegation at the Warsaw talks should also follow these principles while using some diplomatic rhetoric. All these points would not be publicly propagated until we had issued a formal government statement. At the present, the *People's Daily* could have a "cease-fire" for a couple of days to prep

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vention in China's internal affairs, and withdrawing all American armed forces from Taiwan and Penghu). Chairman Mao asked me to finish my writing that evening. He was going to wait to read and check the article that night. Mao told me that I could leave right now to write the article without waiting for the end of the meeting.

Leaving Zhongnanhai, I rushed back to the *People's Daily's* building. After ordering a dish of fried noodles as my dinner from a restaurant across the street, I began to draft the editorial hurriedly in my office. With Chairman Mao's instruction, my writing was very smooth and fast. A little bit after the midnight, I finished my draft. It was two or three o'clock in the early morning of the 9th when the final proof of the article was sent to Chairman Mao for checking and approval. Mao read the editorial early the same morning and made important changes in its last paragraph. He re-wrote the paragraph as follows: "Seemingly, the problem still needs to have more tests and observations. We are still very far away from the time of solving the problem. After all, the imperialists are the imperialists, and the reactionaries are the reactionaries. Let us wait and see how they will make their moves!" Chairman Mao noted his approval on the final proof: "Not very good, barely publishable." The time written down below his signature was six o'clock of 9 October.

I received my manuscript sent back by Chairman Mao on the morning of 9 October. Meanwhile, I received a telephone call from Mao's secretary, Lin Ke. Lin told me that Chairman Mao wanted to include Dulles's 8 October announcement of American ships stopping their escorts in the editorial. Mao also suggested postponing its publication for one day. After reading Mao's revision and corrections, I felt that the editorial's title was not a very bold headline. So, according to the changes he made in the last paragraph, I changed the title to "Let's See How They Make Their Moves." After the editorial was published on 11 October, it was thought to be Chairman Mao's writing because of its striking title and special style close to that of the "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan."

Two days later, the *People's Daily* published another editorial, "Stop Talking about Cease-fire; To Leave Is the Best," on 13 October. This editorial was based upon Premier Zhou's opinion at the Politburo

Standing Committee meeting on 4 October. Zhou gave the editorial his final check and approval. Its main content was our critiques and refusal of an American request for a cease-fire on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The editorial clearly stated that there was no war between China and America, so where did the cease-fire come from? It asked America to withdraw all of its naval and air forces from Taiwan and surrounding areas around the Taiwan Straits. It was a perfect timing for this editorial, corresponding to the "Defense Ministry's Order," which was issued on 13 October and drafted by Chairman Mao. In that order, the Defense Ministry announced a continuation of the suspension of our bombardment for two more weeks. The suspension, however, still contained the precondition that no American ships could be escorts. We would resume shelling immediately if there were any American escort vessels.

Two days later, Eisenhower ordered all the warships from the Sixth Fleet which had been sent as reinforcements to the Pacific to return to the Mediterranean. He also sent Dulles to Taiwan to confer with Jiang Jieshi. The Editorial Department of the *People's Daily*, without really knowing what was going on, wrote an editorial entitled "Having Only Themselves to Blame," saying that Dulles and Jiang played a "two-man show." After the editorial was published on 21 October, Premier Zhou called us during the same morning and gave a pungent criticism that we were neither consistent with the facts nor with the policy made by the Central Committee. When Chairman Mao chaired a Politburo Standing Committee meeting that afternoon, he also criticized our editorial as bookish and naive, reeling and swaggering, which had a one-sided understanding of the Central Committee's policy and gave an inappropriate emphasis to the American-Jiang solidarity. Chairman Mao believed that Dulles's mission to Taiwan was to persuade Jiang Jieshi to withdraw his troops from Jinmen-Mazu in exchange for our commitment not to liberate Taiwan so that America could gain a total control of Taiwan's future. Disagreeing with Dulles, however, Jiang demanded that America commit to a "mutual defense" of Jinmen-Mazu. Jiang and Dulles had a big argument in which nobody gave in to the other. As a result, the meeting ended in discord and was not a "two-men show" of solidarity. After the Politburo meeting, Chairman Mao asked Premier Zhou to talk to me

one more time about this particular matter. Then we wrote another editorial to re-criticize the Dulles-Jiang meeting.

Chairman Mao also said at the Politburo Standing Committee meeting that there were many problems in the relationship between America and Jiang. The Americans wanted to make Jiang's "Republic of China" one of their dependencies or even a mandated territory. But Jiang desperately sought to maintain his semi-independence. Thus came conflicts between Jiang and America. Jiang Jieshi and his son Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Ching-kuo] still had a little bit of anti-American initiative. They would resist America if it drove them too hard. Among such cases in the past were Jiang's condemnation of Hu Shi [Hu Shih]¹⁷ and his dismissal of General Sun Liren¹⁸—actions taken because Jiang believed that the troublemakers against him were supported by the Americans. Another good example of Jiang's independence was the recent smashing and looting of the American Embassy in Taipei by Taiwanese masses.¹⁹ Jiang permitted American armed forces stationed in Taiwan only at the regimental level, while rejecting larger units at the divisional level which America had planned to send to Taiwan. After our shelling of Jinmen began, Jiang allowed only 3,000 more American marines to reinforce Taiwan and they were stationed in Tainan [a city in southern Taiwan]. As Chairman Mao had pointed out two days earlier, we and Jiang Jieshi had some common points. The conflict at the Dulles-Jiang meeting suggested that we might be able to ally with Jiang to resist America in a certain way. Our policy of not liberating Taiwan in the near future might help Jiang relax and concentrate on his fight against America's control. We neither landed on Jinmen nor agreed with the American proposal for a "cease-fire." This clearly caused problems between Americans and Jiang. In the past months, our policy had been one of shelling without landing and blockading without driving Jiang's troops to the wall. While continuing the same policy, we should from now on implement it more flexibly in favor of supporting Jiang Jieshi to resist America's control.

All the participants at the meeting agreed with Chairman Mao's ideas. Premier Zhou added that "shelling" was coordinated with "blockading." Since we relaxed our "blockading," we might also need to relax our

“shelling.” Mao agreed with him by suggesting that we should announce an odd-numbered-day shelling, with no shelling on even-numbered days. For the odd-numbered-day shelling, our targets might be limited only to the harbors and airport, not the defense works and residential buildings on the island. From now on, our shelling would be limited in scope, and, moreover, the light shelling might not be on a regular basis. Militarily it sounded like a joke, since such policy was unknown in the history of Chinese or world warfare. However, we were engaged in a political battle, which was supposed to be fought this way. Chairman Mao said that we only had “hand grenades” right now, but no atomic bombs. “Hand grenades” could be successful for us to use in beating Jiang’s troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu], but not a good idea to use in fighting against Americans, who had nuclear weapons. Later, when everybody had nuclear weapons, very likely nobody would use them.

Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping wondered at the end of the meeting whether we should issue a formal statement announcing future shelling on odd days only but not on even days. Chairman Mao believed it necessary. He also required me to understand that the editorial mentioned early in the meeting should not be published until our formal statement was issued.

On 25 October, the “Second Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” drafted by Chairman Mao was issued in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. A result of the analysis of Dulles’s speech published by the U.S. State Department on 23 October, the message pointed out that on the one hand Dulles finally saw a “Communist China” and was willing to make contact with it. On the other hand, however, this American bureaucrat still considered the so-called “Republic of China” in Taiwan as a “political unit which was factually existing.” The American plan was first to separate Taiwan from the mainland, and second to mandate Taiwan’s special status. The message read, “China’s affairs must be handled by the Chinese themselves. For any problem unable to be solved at once, we can give it further thought and discuss it later between us. . . . We are not advising you to break up with Americans right now. These sort of ideas are not practical. We simply hope that you should not yield to the pressure from Americans. If you

live under somebody’s thumb and lose your sovereignty, you will eventually have no place to call your home and be thrown out into the sea.” The message announced that we had already ordered PLA batteries on the Fujian front not to fire on the airport, harbors, ships, and beaches of Jinmen on even days. On odd days, we might not bomb either, as long as there were no ships or airplanes coming to Jinmen.

The same day the statement was issued, Chairman Mao sent for Tian Jiaying²⁰ and me for a conversation. Besides asking us to make a survey of the current condition of people’s communes in Henan Province, Mao talked about the bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu. He said that during this event [ut

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the above points be accounted as working out splendid plans here to defeat the enemy in battles a thousand miles away, and having some certainty of success that we will be ever-victorious? We must persist in the principle of fighting no battle we are not sure of winning. If you agree [with the above points], telegraph this letter to Ye Fei and ask him to think about it very carefully. Let me know his opinion.

Have a peaceful morning!

Mao Zedong
10 A.M., 27 July²⁴

3. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, 18 August 1958, 1:00 a.m.²⁵

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:348

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

[We are] preparing to shell Jinmen, dealing with Jiang [Jieshi] directly and the Americans indirectly. Therefore, do not conduct military maneuvers in Guangdong and Shengzhen, so that the British would not be scared.

Mao Zedong
1 A.M., 18 August

P.S.: Please call air force headquarters attention to the possibility that the Taiwan side might counterattack us by dispatching large groups of air force (such as dozens, or even over one hundred, airplanes) to try to take back air control over Jin[men] and Ma[zu]. If this happens, we should prepare to use large groups of air force to defeat them immediately. However, *in chasing them*, [our planes] *should not cross the space line over Jinmen and Mazu.*²⁶

4. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng, 3 September 1958²⁷

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:376

Part I

Comrade [Huang] Kecheng:

Both the instruction and the appendix²⁸ are well written. Please send them to Comrade Peng Dehuai EMC /Touch-gforc 0.05buch-Upsyao Tw 1.2 TL T*(rade Peng Dehs1d MazDC -0.078 Tw 1 (indirecnstaseyppens, wbon anra

tionalism? It seems to me that they are currently attacking the nationalist countries, such as Egypt, Lebanon, and the other weak countries in the Middle East. But they will attack the socialist countries until, say, when Hungary completely has failed, Poland has collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Germany have fallen down, and even the Soviet Union and us have encountered troubles. They will attack us when we are shaking and crumbling. Why should they fail to attack you when you are falling down? Stable and strong, we are not falling down now, and they are unable to bite the hard bone. So they turn to those more biteable countries, gnawing at Indonesia, India, Burma, and Ceylon. They have attempted to overthrow [Gamal Abdul] Nasser,³¹ undermine Iraq, and subjugate Algeria. By now Latin America has made a significant progress. As [U.S.] vice president, [Richard] Nixon was not welcomed in eight countries, where people spat and stoned him. When the political representative of America was treated with saliva and rocks there, it means contempt for America's "dignity," and an unwillingness to treat it "politely." Because you are our enemy, we therefore treat you with saliva and rocks. Thus, we should not take the three military organizations too seriously. [We] need to analyze them. Even though aggressive, they are not steady.

The third point is about the tension in the international situation. We are calling every day for relaxing international tensions because it will benefit the people of the world. So, can we say that it must be harmful for us whenever there is a tense situation? I do not think it necessarily so. A tense situation is not necessarily harmful for us in every circumstance; it has an advantageous side. Why do I think this way? It is because besides its disadvantageous side, a tense situation can mobilize the population, can particularly mobilize the backward people, can mobilize the people in the middle, and can therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in economic construction. Afraid of fighting a nuclear war? You have to think it over. Look, we have fired a few shells on Jinmen and Mazu, and I did not expect that the entire world would be so deeply shocked, and the smoke and mist is shading the sky. This is because people are afraid of war. They are afraid that the Americans will make trouble everywhere in the world. Except for Syngman Rhee, no second country

supports America among so many countries in the world. Probably the Philippines can be added to the list, but it offers only "conditional support." It is a tense situation, for example, that caused the Iraqi revolution, is it not? The current tense situation is caused by the imperialists themselves, not by us. In the final analysis, however, the tense situation is more harmful for the imperialists. Lenin once introduced this point in his discussions about war. Lenin said that a war could motivate people's spiritual condition, making it tense. Although there is no war right now, a tense situation caused by the current military confrontation can also bring every positive factor into play, while at the same time stimulating groups of backward people to think.

The fourth point is about the issue of withdrawing armed forces from the Middle East. American and British troops of aggression must withdraw. The imperialists now refuse to withdraw and intend to stay there. This is disadvantageous for the people, but it will at the same time educate the people. In order to fight against aggressors, you need to have a target; without a target, it is difficult for you to fight against the aggressors. The imperialists now come up there themselves to become the target, and refuse to leave. This arouses the people of the entire world to fight against the American aggressors. After all, it seems to me that it is not so harmful for the people when the aggressors put off their withdrawal. Thereby the people will yell at the aggressors everyday: why do you not leave [our country]?

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initiated the Great Leap Forward, throwing away dependence and breaking down blind faith. The result is good.

The seventh is the non-recognition issue. Is [imperialist countries'] recognition [of the PRC] or non-recognition relatively

with which America has signed a treaty. The situation in Lebanon is more flexible as no treaty is involved there. It is said that one issued the invitation, and the other came, and [the noose] is hitched up. As far as Taiwan is concerned, this is an encased knot since a treaty was signed. There is no difference between the Democrats and Republicans in this case. Eisenhower agreed on the treaty and [Harry] Truman sent the Seventh Fleet there. Truman could come and go at will since there was no treaty during his time. Eisenhower signed the treaty. America is tied up [in Taiwan] because of the Guomintang's panic and request, and also because America was willing [to be tied up there].

Is it [America] tied up at Jinmen and Mazu? I think that it has also been tied up at Jinmen and Mazu. Why do I think so? Did not the Americans say that they had not

made any decision yet, and that they would make the decision in accordance with the situation after the Communists landed there? The problem lies in the 110,000 Guomintang troops, 95,000 men on Jinmen and 15,000 on Mazu. America has to pay attention to them as long as these two large garrisons are on the islands. This concerns the interest and feelings of their class. Why do the British and Americans treat the governments in some countries so nicely? They cannot fold their hands and see these governments collapse. Today the Americans and Jiang are having a joint military exercise under the command of [Vice Admiral Wallace M.] Beale, commander of the Seventh Fleet.

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lytic copper, the combination will be dissolved when it is electrolyzed. Jiang Jieshi is [for us] a domestic issue, and you [Americans] are [for us] a diplomatic issue. [The two] cannot be mixed up.

America now attempts to dominate four out of the five continents, except for Australia. First of all, in North America, this is mainly America's own place, and its armed forces are there. The next is Central and South America where it intends to provide "protection," although it does not have garrisons there. Then, there are Europe, Africa, and Asia, to which [America] has given its main attention, and deployed its main force in Europe and Asia. I do not know how it [America] can fight a war with a few soldiers scattered everywhere. Thus, I believe that it focuses on occupying the intermediate zone. As far as the territories of our [socialist countries] are concerned, I believe that the Americans do not dare to come, unless the socialist camp encounters big trouble and they are convinced that the Soviet Union and China will totally collapse as soon as they come. Except for [the countries belonging to] our camp, America is seeking hegemony everywhere in the world, including Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and, also, Australia. Australia has linked itself with America through a military alliance and follows its orders. Is it better for America to try to control these places by utilizing the banner of "anti-communism" or by fighting a real war against communism? To fight [a real war] against communism means to dispatch its troops to fight us and fight the Soviet Union. I would say that the Americans are not so stupid. They only have a few soldiers to be transferred here and there. After the incident in Lebanon, American troops were transferred there from the Pacific. After they arrived in the Red Sea area, the situation changed unfavorably [in the Pacific], and they turned around quickly and landed at Malaya. They announced that [the troops] were taking a vacation there, and kept quiet for seventeen days. Later, after one of their reporters claimed that [America] was taking charge of the Indian Ocean, everyone in the India Ocean [area] expressed opposition. When we began our artillery bombardment, America came here since there were not enough [of its] troops here. IOJ ItTRMC /Touch-Up_Line<</Brge

The Right to Health Support Fund (then) served as a host for the 2001-2002 conference in Beijing. CC5 IJ2 TL da K6x057 all vt >I2/TIL, T01 big trouble and every

geous to hundreds of millions of Chinese people who oppose imperialism, to peace-loving peoples all over the world, and to all social classes, all social ranks, and the governments [in various countries]. They now have to believe that America, always arrogant and aggressive, is no good after all. [The U.S. government] moved six of its thirteen aircraft carriers [to the Taiwan Straits]. Among these carriers, there are some big ones with the size reaching 65,000 tons. It is said that with 120 ships, it forms the strongest fleet in the world. It does not matter if you want to make it even stronger. It does not matter if you want to concentrate all of your four fleets here. I welcome you all. After all, what you have is useless here. Even though you move every ship you have here, you cannot land. Ships have to be in the water, and cannot come to the land. You can do nothing but make some threatening gesture here. The more you play, the more the people in the world will understand how unreasonable you are.

7. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh, 10 September 1958

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:413

Comrade President:

Your letter of 8 September³⁷ has been received. Thank you.

I believe that (1) the Americans are afraid of fighting a war. As far as the current situation is concerned, it is highly unlikely that a big war will break out; and (2) it seems to me that the business in your country should go on as usual.

8. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and Huang Kecheng, 13 September 1958³⁸

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 7:416-417

Part One

Premier Zhou and Comrade Huang Kecheng:

[I] have received [the documents] you sent to me, including two intelligence reports on Jinmen's situation and the order of our military.³⁹ In addition to carrying out [the operations] in accordance with the lines set up by the order, it is also necessary to fire some scattered shells day and night around the clock, especially at night, shelling especially the area within the three-mile radius of Liaoluowan. The sporadic shelling (200 to

300 shells a day) will make the enemy panic[ky] and restless day and night. It seems to me that [doing this] is a big, or at least moderate, advantage [to us]. What is your opinion about it? On the days of heavy shelling we will not fire scattered shells. On the days of light shelling we will use this method. For the sake of shelling Liaoluowan at night, [we] should accurately calibrate battery emplacements during daytime, which will make the shelling at night more accurate. Please seek opinions from [the people at] the front, to see if this method is workable or not.

As far as the Warsaw talks are concerned, in the next three to four days, or one week, [we] should not lay all of our cards on the table, but should test [the Americans]. It seems that it is unlikely for the other side to lay all of their cards out, and that they will also test us. What is your opinion, Zhou [Enlai], Peng [Dehuai], Zhang [Wentian],⁴⁰ and Qiao [Guanhua]⁴¹?

Congratulations for the success from the very start.

9. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 19 September 1958

Source: *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, 353

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

Your letter dated the night of the 18th has been received. It is indeed very good.⁴² [I am] very happy after reading it since [we] have gained the initiative. Please take due actions immediately. Please also pass your letter and my reply here at once to Comrades Wang Bingnan⁴³ and Ye Fei. Make sure that they understand [the key to] our new policy and new tactics is holding the initiative, keeping the offensive, and remaining reasonable. We must conduct our diplomatic struggle from a far-sighted perspective so that it will develop without any difficulty.

Mao Zedong

4:00 A.M., 19 September, Hefei

10. Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Conversation with S.F. Antonov⁴⁴ on the Taiwan Issue, 5 October 1958 (Excerpt)⁴⁵

Source: *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan*, 262-267

The entire situation has already changed at this point. Dulles's press conference published on 30 September reveals some

changes in America's position. Although Dulles's talks with reporters do not clearly indicate [America's new position], he expressed ambiguously that if China commits to a cease-fire, America can persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw from the offshore islands [under his control]. Apparently America intends to carry out basically a policy to help Jiang slip away from Jinmen.

After Dulles made this suggestion, Jiang Jieshi became very upset. Jiang knew the content of Dulles's talks in advance. Thus, he gave a speech on 29 September, and another on 1 October, stating that the Americans had done a disservice to him. Two days later, when he talked to British reporters from *The Times* [of London], Jiang asked Britain to advise America not to be fooled [by the communists]. This is really funny.

Last night the Indian ambassador [to Beijing] hurriedly informed me of V. K. Krishna Menon's plan [at the United Nations].⁴⁶ Menon believes that current changes in the situation have already become a tendency. Thus, he is planning to make a general speech at the UN meeting, including a suggestion that Jiang's troops withdraw from the offshore islands and a request to us to stop fighting against Jiang. Britain attempted to mediate this affair in the past, but we refused it. Dag Hammarskjöld⁴⁷ of the UN intended to talk to us through Norway, [but] we also turned it down. Even though America was not willing to invite India [to mediate] before, it had no choice but to invite Menon this time. Menon was unwilling to come himself, if America did not send an invitation to him, or if he was unsure about the situation. At the present, since Menon feels certain about the situation because America has asked for his help, he is planning to deliver this proposition. Our assumption is as follows: after Menon makes his proposition, it will be accepted by UN members, and then by most countries in the world. Through this approach, the UN can put pressure on Jiang Jieshi and meanwhile ask us to make compromises. Thereby, America can maneuver between Jiang and us to make a bargain.

We calculate that America has three cards to play:

First, to defend Jin[men]-Ma[zu]. America's proposition on 18 September requested our cease-fire on Jinmen, we rejected it immediately. We have been ever since condemning America's occupation of

Taiwan. America now attempts to expand its occupation to Jinmen-Mazu, we must oppose it firmly. America dares not engage in a war merely for the sake of Jinmen, because the American people and its allied countries oppose it. Moreover, if America wants a war for Jinmen, we are prepared to fight against it. In addition, the Soviet Union supports us. After our rejection, America took back its first card, that is, defending Jinmen and Mazu.

Its second card is about "two Chinas." America's proposition on 30 September had a central point of lining up China with the Soviet Union on the one side, and Jiang Jieshi with the United States on the other side. It puts forth a "two Chinas" scheme and pushes us to accept the status quo. We firmly oppose it now, and will continue to oppose it.

The third is to freeze the Taiwan Straits. America intends to persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw from the offshore islands as an exchange to freeze the situation in the Taiwan Straits, requesting our renouncing the use of force on Taiwan, or our accepting America's occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and "two Chinas" as "an existing fact." America may not play its third card at once. As soon as Dulles's meeting with press caused Jiang Jieshi's big complaints, Dulles wrote to Jiang for explanation and comfort. At the same time, Eisenhower informed the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that America could not yield to force. He, however, also said that if Communist China ceased fire, [America] could reconsider [the situation there]. It shows that America is still wavering, though it wants to get away from Jinmen-Mazu.

According to the above calculations, I told the Indian ambassador yesterday that we did not want Menon to deliver his proposition to the UN. We cannot trade a settlement of Jinmen-Mazu for a recognition of America's occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and acceptance of the existence of so-called "two Chinas."

Meanwhile, some Asian and African countries are suggesting that the Eight-nation Committee⁴⁸ can draft a statement about the Taiwan situation. I also told the Indian ambassador yesterday that we believed that the Asian and African countries could hardly issue such a joint statement since there existed two different positions among them-

selves. I said to him it was better not to have

we can possibly fight for thirty more years, it is better [for both sides] to talk for solutions.

To be sure, [on the one hand,] Jiang Jieshi will likely hold a press conference [as soon as we publish our message], accusing us of attempting to cast a bone between him and America, saying that he will never sit down with the Chinese Communists for negotiations, and so forth. In his mind, however, Jiang can figure out himself that there is a lot behind this, and that he can make a further bargain with America. This is his old trick. On the other hand, Americans will also criticize the Chinese Communist attempt to drive a wedge between them and Jiang. But, meanwhile, they will suspect in their minds that we suddenly let up pressure on Jinmen, almost blockaded to the death, because there might be a tacit agreement between us and Jiang. The louder Jiang yells, the more suspicious the Americans will become.

Therefore, we cause a new dilemma for America, and it does not know how to cope with it. America is facing a very difficult situation right now. It originally planned to persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw [from Jinmen]. If it again suggests withdrawal, Jiang Jieshi will say that America abandons him. If America stops persuading Jiang to withdraw, we will achieve our goal.

11. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai, 5 October 1958

Source: *Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:437

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] Kecheng:

Our batteries should not fire a single shell on 6 and 7 October, even if there are American airplanes and ships escorts. If the enemy bombs us, our forces should still not return fire. [We should] cease our activities, lie low, and wait and see for two days. Then, we will know what to do. Although the air force must carry on our defense, the airplanes should not fly off the coast. One more thing: do not issue any public statement during these two days because we need to wait and see clearly how the situation will develop. Please carry out the above order immediately. Or [you can] pass this letter [as an order] to Ye Fei and Han Xianchu.⁵¹

Mao Zedong

8:00 A.M., 5 October

P.S.: After you have handled this letter, please convey it to the Premier.⁵²

12. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai, 6 October 1958

Source: *Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:437

Peng [Dehuai] and Huang [Kecheng]:
Please pass on to Han [Xianchu] and Ye [Fei]:

Yesterday I said not to issue any public statement, and to wait and see for two days. Later [I] thought about this again, and considered it more appropriate to issue a statement first. This is the reason for [me to write] the "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan."⁵³ This statement is about to be issued, please instruct the Fujian Front radio station to broadcast it repeatedly.

Mao Zedong

2:00 A.M., 6 October

Send this to [Huang] Kecheng for handling immediately.⁵⁴

13. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 11 October 1958

Source: *Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:449-450

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

No hurry to reply to the letters from the Soviets.⁵⁵ Need to discuss them first.

Cao Juren⁵⁶ has arrived. Ignore him for a few days, do not talk to him too soon. [I] will think about whether I need to meet him or not.

Tell [Huang] Kecheng to double-check accurate numbers of how many enemy airplanes we shot down, and how many of our planes were shot down in more than fifty days of air engagements since the Shantou air battle on 19 August. Prepare the statistics for the Soviets' information. They believed the enemy's false information and do not know the true story. [The Soviets] should sell ground-to-air missiles to us, and let us control the employment of them. The Soviets may send a few people to teach us how to use them. I intend to adopt this policy. [We can] discuss Sovi-

**MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES'S
"PEACEFUL EVOLUTION"
STRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROM
BO YIBO'S MEMOIRS**

**Introduction, translation, and
annotation by Qiang Zhai**

Born in 1905, Bo Yibo joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925. During the Anti-Japanese War, he was a leading member of the CCP-led resistance force in Shanxi Province. In 1945, he was elected a member of the CCP Central Committee at the Party's Seventh Congress. During the Chinese Civil War in 1946-1949, he was First Secretary of the CCP North China Bureau and Vice Chairman of the CCP-led North China People's Government. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, he became Finance Minister. As a revolutionary veteran who survived the Cultural Revolution, Bo Yibo is considered one of the most powerful figures in China today.

Between 1991 and 1993, Bo published two volumes of his memoirs, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* [Recollections of Certain Major Decisions and Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1993). The first volume covers the period 1949-1956 and the second volume 1957-1966. In the preface and postscript of his volumes, Bo notes that in preparing his memoirs he has consulted documents in the CCP Central Archives and received the cooperation of Party history researchers. Bo's reminiscences represent the most important memoirs of a high-ranking CCP leader for the 1949-1966 period.

As a still active senior leader, Bo is not a disinterested writer. His arguments and conclusions are completely in line with the 1981 Resolution on Party History.¹ Memoirs in China usually have a didactic purpose that encourages the creation of edifying stereotypes. Bo's memoirs conform to a tradition in the writing of memoirs in the PRC: didacticism. Arranged topically, Bo's memoirs are dry and wooden. There is little description of the character and personalities of his colleagues. In this respect, Bo's volumes follow another memoirs-writing tradition in the PRC, which tends to emphasize the role of groups and societal forces at

the expense of individuals. Despite these drawbacks, Bo's memoirs contain many valuable new facts, anecdotes, and insights. Especially notable are Bo's references to Mao's statements unavailable elsewhere. Since Bo played a major role in Chinese economic decision-making during the period, his memoirs are especially strong on this topic. He sheds new light on such domestic events as the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Affair, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposition to Rush Advance, the Great Leap Forward, the Lushan Conference of 1959, economic rectification in 1961-1962, and the Socialist Education Campaign. Although international relations in general does not receive much attention, the volumes do include illuminating chapters on some key foreign policy decisions.²

The translation below is taken from Chapter 39 of the second volume (pp. 1138-1146). This section is very revealing about Mao's perception of and reaction to John Foster Dulles's policy toward China in 1958-1959. The CCP leader took seriously statements by the U.S. Secretary of State about encouraging a peaceful change of the Communist system. In November 1959, according to Bo, Lin Ke, Mao's secretary, prepared for Mao translations of three speeches by Dulles concerning the promotion of peaceful evolution within the Communist world. After reading the documents, Mao commented on them before having them circulated among a small group of Party leaders for discussion. Thus Bo's memoirs not only provide fresh texts of what Mao said, but also an important window into what he read. As a result, the interactive nature of Mao's activities—with his top colleagues and his secretary—is open to examination. A sense of the policy-making process, as well as Mao's opinions, emerges from Bo's memoirs.

The years 1958-1959 were a crucial period in Mao's psychological evolution. He began to show increasing concern with the problem of succession and worried about his impending death. He feared that the political system that he had spent his life creating would betray his beliefs and values and slip out of his control. His apprehension about the future development of China was closely related to his analysis of the degeneration of the Soviet system. Mao believed that Dulles's idea of inducing peaceful evolution within the socialist world was already

taking effect in the Soviet Union, given Khrushchev's fascination with peaceful co-existence with the capitalist West. Mao wanted to prevent that from happening in China. Here lie the roots of China's subsequent exchange of polemics with the Soviet Union and Mao's decision to restructure the Chinese state and society in order to prevent a revisionist "change of color" of China, culminating in the launching of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Mao's frantic response to Dulles's speeches constitutes a clear case of how international events contributed to China's domestic developments. It also demonstrates the effects of Dulles's strategy of driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union.

* * * * *

**To Prevent "Peaceful Evolution" and
Train Successors to the Revolutionary
Cause**

by Bo Yibo

According to the general law of socialist revolution, only through the leadership of a proletarian political party directed by Marxism, reliance on the working class and other laboring masses, and waging of an armed struggle in this or that form can a revolution obtain state power. International hostile forces to the newly born people's government would always attempt to strangle it in the cradle through armed aggression, intervention, and economic blockade. After the victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet Union experienced an armed intervention by fourteen countries. In the wake of World War II, imperialism launched a protracted "Cold War" and economic containment of socialist countries. Immediately after the triumph of the revolution in China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.S. imperialists invaded Korea, blockaded the Taiwan Strait, and implemented an all-out embargo against China. All of this shows that it will take a sharp struggle with external hostile forces through an armed conflict or other forms of contest before a newly born socialist country can consolidate its power.

History suggests that although the armed aggression, intervention, and economic blockade launched by Western imperialists against socialist countries can create enor-

with the commentaries, to the members attending the meeting.

The three speeches by Dulles all contained the theme of promoting a “peaceful evolution” inside socialist countries. The three commentaries based on Chairman Mao’s talks highlighted the key points in Dulles’s remarks and warned of the danger of the American “peaceful evolution” strategy. The first commentary pointed out: “The United States not only has no intention to give up its policy of force, but also wants, as an addition to its policy of force, to pursue a ‘peaceful conquest strategy’ of infiltration and subversion in order to avoid the prospect of its ‘being surrounded.’ The U.S. desires to achieve the ambition of preserving itself (capitalism) and gradually defeating the enemy (socialism).” After noting the main theme of Dulles’s testimony, the second commentary contended: Dulles’s words “demonstrate that U.S. imperialists are attempting to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union by the method of corrupting it so as to realize their aggressive goal, which they have failed to achieve through war.” The third commentary first took note of Dulles’s insistence on “the substitution of justice and law for force” and his contention that the abandonment of force did not mean the “maintenance of the status quo,” but meant a peaceful “change.” Then it went on to argue that “Dulles’s words showed that because of the growing strength of the socialist force throughout the world and because of the increasing isolation and difficulties of the international imperialist force, the United States does not dare to start a world war at the moment. Therefore, the United States has adopted a more deceptive tactic to pursue its aggression and expansion. While advocating peace, the United States is at the same time the aggressor. The United States is at the same time the aggressor and

subvert

**THE VIETNAM WAR AND SOVIET-
AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1964-1973:
NEW RUSSIAN EVIDENCE**

by Ilya V. Gaiduk

The Vietnam War stands out among Cold War crises for its scale, length, intensity, and global repercussions. The literature on the war and the American role in it encompasses thousands of volumes, from political memoirs to soldiers' eyewitness accounts to historical and journalistic studies, to novels and political science treatises.¹ With the passage of time, ever more documents have been declassified, enabling more thorough and comprehensive analyses. Now that there is substantial access to archives in the former USSR, researchers have at their disposal a whole set of previously unavailable materials which shed new light on unresolved issues as well as on problems which have either escaped the attention of Western scholars or have not yet been analyzed in detail.

One of those problems relates to the Soviet Union's participation in the Vietnam conflict, particularly the nature of Soviet-American relations during the war and Moscow's role as a potential mediator. Although many U.S. researchers have studied these problems and, on the basis of the

This section of the Bulletin presents new evidence from Russian, Chinese, and Polish sources on one of the Cold War's most costly conflicts: the Vietnam War, which consumed more than 58,000 American lives and, according to recent estimates, more than 3.2 million Vietnamese lives. Presented here are articles by Ilya V. Gaiduk (Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow), who employs documents from the CPSU Central Committee archives to illuminate Soviet policy toward the Vietnam conflict (in a foretaste of his soon-to-be published book on the subject), and by Zhai Qiang (Auburn University at Montgomery), who uses newly released Chinese sources to explore Beijing's handling of the escalation of the war in 1964-65; and a precis of a secretly-prepared memoir by Jerzy Michalowski, a Polish diplomat who was deeply involved in secret mediation efforts between the United States and North Vietnam in the mid-1960s.

However, recognizing that the most important "other side" for Americans during the Vietnam War was, of course, the Vietnamese themselves, the Cold War International History Project has launched an

**BEIJING AND THE VIETNAM
CONFLICT, 1964-1965:
NEW CHINESE EVIDENCE**

by **Qiang Zhai**

The years 1964-1965 marked a crucial period in the Vietnam War. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and subsequent U.S. escalation of war against North Vietnam represented a major turning point in the American approach to Indochina, as the Johnson Administration shifted its focus from Saigon to Hanoi as the best way to reverse the deterior-

effort to organize collaborative research with Vietnamese scholars and to collect Vietnamese sources on the international history of the Vietnam and Indochina conflicts. To this end, CWIHP has begun contacts with the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in Hanoi on the possibility of organizing an international scholarly conference on the history of U.S.-Vietnam relations since World War II. CWIHP, along with the National Security Archive at George Washington University, is also collecting declassified archival evidence from Vietnamese, American, and other sources in connection with an oral history conference of senior former Vietnamese and American decision-makers (including Kennedy and Johnson Administration Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara), to be organized by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Foreign Policy at Brown University, and the IIR. (Agreement in principle to hold the conference was reached during discussions in Hanoi in November 1995.)

CWIHP also plans to devote a special issue of the Bulletin to new evidence on the war, primarily from Vietnamese sources.

--Jim Hershberg, Editor

rating trend in South Vietnam and to persuade the North Vietnamese leadership to desist from their increasing involvement in the South. How did Beijing react to Washington's escalation of the conflict in Vietnam? How did Mao Zedong perceive U.S. intentions? Was there a "strategic debate" within the Chinese leadership over the American threat and over strategies that China should adopt in dealing with the United States? What was in Mao's mind when he decided to commit China's resources to

Hanoi? How and why did a close relationship between Beijing and Hanoi turn sour during the fight against a common foe? Drawing upon recently available Chinese materials, this paper will address these questions.¹ The first half of the article is primarily narrative, while the second half provides an analysis of the factors that contributed to China's decision to commit itself to Hanoi, placing Chinese actions in their domestic and international context.

China's Role in Vietnam, 1954-1963

China played an important role in helping Ho Chi Minh win the Anti-French War and in concluding the Geneva Accords in 1954.² In the decade after the Geneva Conference, Beijing continued to exert influence over developments in Vietnam. At the time of the Geneva Conference, the Vietnamese Communists asked the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to help them consolidate peace in the North, build the army, conduct land reform, rectify the Party, strengthen diplomatic work, administer cities, and restore the economy.³ Accordingly, Beijing sent Fang Yi to head a team of Chinese economic experts to North Vietnam.⁴

According to the official history of the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG), on 27 June 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap headed a Vietnamese military delegation on a secret visit to Beijing accompanied by Wei Guoqing, head of the CMAG in Vietnam. The Vietnamese visitors held discussions with Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, and General Petroshevskii, a senior Soviet military advisor in China, regarding the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's reconstruction of the army and the war plan for the future. The DRV delegation visited the Chinese North Sea Fleet before returning to Hanoi in mid-July. That fall, on 15 October 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap led another secret military delegation to China, where he talked with Peng Dehuai and Soviet General Gushev again about the DRV's military development and war planning. The Vietnamese inspected Chinese military facilities and academies and watched a Chinese military exercise before traveling back to North Vietnam on December 11.⁵

The official CMAG history states that during both of Giap's journeys to Beijing, he "reached agreement" with the Chinese and the Russians "on principal issues." But it

does not explain why Giap had to make a second visit to China shortly after his first tour and why the Soviet participants at the talks changed. Perhaps disagreement emerged during the discussions of Giap's first trip, leaving some issues unresolved. In fact, according to the study by the researchers at the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, the Chinese and the Russians differed over strategies to reunify Vietnam. The Soviet advisors favored peaceful coexistence between North and South Vietnam, urging Hanoi to "reunify the country through peaceful means on the basis of independence and democracy." The Chinese Communists, conversely, contended that because of imperialist sabotage it was impossible to reunify Vietnam through a general election in accordance with the Geneva Accords, and that consequently North Vietnam should prepare for a protracted struggle.⁶

On 24 December 1955, the Chinese government decided to withdraw the CMAG from Vietnam; Peng Dehuai notified Vo Nguyen Giap of this decision. By mid-March 1956, the last members of the CMAG had left the DRV. To replace the formal CMAG, Beijing appointed a smaller team of military experts headed by Wang Yanquan to assist the Vietnamese.⁷

These developments coincided with a major debate within the Vietnamese Communist leadership in 1956 over who should bear responsibility for mistakes committed during a land reform campaign which had been instituted since 1953 in an imitation of the Chinese model. Truong Chinh, General Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers' Party (VWP), who was in charge of the land reform program, was removed from his position at a Central Committee Plenum held in September. Le Duan, who became General Secretary later in the year, accused Truong Chinh of applying China's land reform experience in Vietnam without considering the Vietnamese reality.⁸

The failure of the land-reform program in the DRV dovetailed with a growing realization that the reunification of the whole of Vietnam, as promised by the Geneva Accords, would not materialize, primarily as a result of U.S. support for the anti-Communist South Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, who refused to hold elections in 1956. As hopes for an early reunification dimmed, the DRV had to face its own economic difficulties. The rice supply became a major

building new airfields there, Beijing intended to deter further U.S. expansion of war in South Vietnam and bombardment against the DRV. Between August and September 1964, the PLA also sent an inspection team to the DRV to investigate the situation in case China later needed to dispatch support troops to Vietnam.³¹

The first months of 1965 witnessed a significant escalation of the American war in Vietnam. On February 7, 9 and 11, U.S. aircraft struck North Vietnamese military installations just across the 17th Parallel, ostensibly in retaliation for Vietcong attacks on American barracks near Pleiku and in Qui Nhon. On March 1, the Johnson Administration stopped claiming that its air attacks on North Vietnam were reprisals for specific Communist assaults in South Vietnam and began a continuous air bombing campaign against the DRV. On March 8, two battalions of Marines armed with tanks and 8-inch howitzers landed at Danang.³²

Worried about the increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Zhou Enlai on April 2 asked Pakistani President Ayub Khan to convey to President Johnson a four-point message:

(1) China will not take the initiative to provoke a war with the United States. (2) The Chinese mean what they say. In other words, if any country in Asia, Africa, or elsewhere meets with aggression by the imperialists headed by the United States, the Chinese government and people will definitely give it support and assistance. Should such just action bring on American aggression against China, we will unhesitatingly rise in resistance and fight to the end. (3) China is prepared. Should the United States impose a war on China, it can be said with certainty that, once in China, the United States will not be able to pull out, however many men it may send over and whatever weapons it may use, nuclear weapons included. (4) Once the war breaks out, it will have no boundaries. If the American madmen bombard China without constraints, China will not sit there waiting to die. If they come from the sky, we will fight back on the ground. Bombing

means war. The war can not have boundaries. It is impossible for the United States to finish the war simply by relying on a policy of bombing.³³

This was the most serious warning issued by the Chinese government to the United States, and given the caution exercised by President Johnson in carrying out the "Rolling Thunder" operations against the DRV, it was one that Washington did not overlook. Clearly, U.S. leaders had drawn a lesson from the Korean War, when the Truman Administration's failure to heed Beijing warning against crossing the 38th parallel led to a bloody confrontation between the United States and China.

The U.S. escalation in early 1965 made the DRV desperate for help. Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap rushed to Beijing in early April to ask China to increase its aid and send troops to Vietnam/Touc to inne<</B 94.0009 /J 1 >> BDC 0 T TL T0on 466.0005 /J 1 >> BDC

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troops to prepare for a North Vietnamese counter offensive or launch an offensive themselves to disrupt the enemy's deployment and win the strategic initiative.⁴⁰

But despite Liu Shaoqi's April promise to Le Duan and Luo Ruiqing's agreement with Van Tien Dung, China in the end failed to provide pilots to Hanoi. According to the

clear that “the problems mentioned above are directly related to the whole armed forces, to the whole people, and to the process of a national defense war.” It asked the State Council “to organize a special committee to study and adopt, in accordance with the possible conditions of the national economy, practical and effective measures to guard against an enemy surprise attack.”⁵¹

Yang Chengwu presented the report to Mao, who returned it to Luo Ruiqing and Yang on August 12 with the following comment: “It is an excellent report. It should be carefully studied and gradually implemented.” Mao urged the newly established State Council Special Committee in charge of the Third Front to begin its work immediately.⁵² Mao’s approval of the report marked the beginning of the Third Front project to relocate China’s industrial resources to the interior. It is important to note the timing of Mao’s reaction to the report—right after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The U.S. expansion of the war to North Vietnam had confirmed Mao’s worst suspicions about American intentions.

Deputy Prime Minister Li Fuchun became Director, Deputy Prime Minister Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing became Vice Directors of the Special Committee. On August 19, they submitted to Mao a detailed proposal on how to implement the Third Front ideas.⁵³ In the meantime, the CCP Secretariat met to discuss the issue. Mao made two speeches at the meetings on August 17 and 20. He asserted that China should be on guard against an aggressive war launched by imperialism. At present, factories were concentrated around big cities and coastal regions, a situation deleterious to war preparation. Factories should be broken into two parts. One part should be relocated to interior areas as early as possible. Every province should establish its own strategic rear base. Departments of industry and transportation should move, so should schools, science academies, and Beijing University. The three railroad lines between Chengdu and Kunming, Sichuan and Yunnan, and Yunnan and Guizhou should be completed as quickly as possible. If there were a shortage of rails, the chairman insisted, rails on other lines could be dismantled. To implement Mao’s instructions, the meetings decided to concentrate China’s financial, material, and human resources on the construction of the Third Front.⁵⁴

While emphasizing the “big Third Front” plan on the national level, Mao also ordered provinces to proceed with their “small Third parts. One p9deU.S. aircraftiflewTi32oenan-

nology to attack aircraft and warships so that we can knock out one enemy ship with a single missile. The enemy's strength is in its navy, air force, atomic bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy and air force has its limits. If the enemy sends ground troops to invade China, we are not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we should be prepared for the enemy to come from all directions, including a joint invasion against China by many countries. On the other, we should realize that the enemy lacks justification in sending troops.... This will decide the difference between a just and an unjust war.⁶²

Zhu De remarked at the same meeting that "so long as we have made good preparations on every front, the enemy may not dare to come. We must defend our offshore islands. With these islands in our hands, the enemy will find it difficult to land and

perience was relevant to the struggle of liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. By firmly backing the Vietnamese struggle against the United States, he wanted to demonstrate to Third World countries and movements that China was their true friend. Victory for North Vietnam's war of national unification with China's support would show the political correctness of Mao's more militant strategy for coping with U.S. imperialism and the incorrectness of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence.

fundamentally from those of Hanoi. Whereas the Chinese now regarded the United States as a potential counterbalance against the Soviet Union, their Vietnamese comrades continued to see Washington as the most dangerous enemy. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and the unification of the country, Hanoi's bilateral disputes with Beijing over Cambodia, a territorial disagreement in the South China Sea, and the treatment of Chinese nationals in Vietnam came to the fore, culminating in a direct clash in 1979.

Was China Bluffing During the War?

The fact that Beijing did not openly acknowledge its sizable presence in North Vietnam raised questions about the justification for Washington's restraint in U.S. conduct of war, both at the time and in later years. Harry G. Summers, the most prominent of revisionist critics of President Johnson's Vietnam policy, asserts that the United States drew a wrong lesson from the Korean War: "Instead of seeing that it was possible to fight and win a limited war in Asia regardless of Chinese intervention, we...took counsel of our fears and accepted as an article of faith the proposition that we should never again become involved in a land war in Asia. In so doing we allowed our fears to become a kind of self-imposed deterrent and surrendered the initiative to our enemies." Summers contends that "whether the Soviets or the Chinese ever intended intervention is a matter of conjecture," and that the United States allowed itself "to be bluffed by China throughout most of the war." He cites Mao's rejection of the Soviet 1965 proposal for a joint action to support Vietnam and Mao's suspicions of Moscow's plot to draw China into a war with the United States as evidence for the conclusion that Mao was more fearful of Moscow than Washington and, by implication, he was not serious about China's threats to intervene to help Hanoi.⁹⁵

Was China not serious in its threats to go to war with the United States in Indochina? As the preceding discussion has shown, Beijing perceived substantial security and ideological interests in Vietnam. From the

mittee on this question. Has it started its work?

Mao Zedong
August 12.

[Source: *Ibid.*, 33.]

Document 3: “Report on How Our Country’s Economic Construction Should Prepare Itself Against an Enemy Surprise Attack” by Li Fuchun¹⁰⁰, Bo Yibo¹⁰¹, and Luo Ruiqing¹⁰², 19 August 1964.

Chairman¹⁰³ and the Central Committee:

In accordance with Chairman’s comments on the General Staff War Department’s report of how our country’s economic construction should prepare itself for a surprise attack by the enemy, we have gathered comrades with responsibility in these areas for a meeting. All of us agree that Chairman’s comments and the War Department’s report are extremely important. We must pay serious attention to and do our best on such an important issue concerning our country’s strategic defense. The meeting has decided:

(1) To establish a special committee on this case within the State Council. We suggest that the committee consist of thirteen people including Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Bo Yibo, Luo Ruiqing, Xie Fuzhi, Yang Chengwu, Zhang Jichun, Zhao Erlu, Cheng Zihua, Gu Mu, Han Guang, and Zhou Rongxin. Li Fuchun serves as Director, and Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing Deputy Directors.

(2) In addition to the four areas mentioned by the War Department, our preparation measures also need to include universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutions, warehouses, government departments and institutions as well as civil shelters in cities and mines. We must follow Chairman’s principle of “careful study and gradual implementation” in conducting our investigation into various areas as early as possible and pay attention to the following issues.

(a) All new construction projects will not be placed in the First Front, especially not in the fifteen big cities with over a

million population.

(b) For those currently on-going construction projects in the First Front and particularly in the fifteen big cities, except those that can be completed and put into effective operation next year or the year after, all the rest must be reduced in size, undergo no expansion, and be concluded as soon as possible.

(c) For existing old enterprises, especially those in cities with high industrial concentration, we must remove them or some of their workshops. Particularly for military and machinery enterprises, we must break them in two parts if possible, and shift one part to the Third and Second Fronts. If we can remove them as a whole, we must do that with careful planning and in steps.

(d) Beginning in next year, no new large and medium-size reservoirs will be built.

(e) For key national universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes in the First Front, if they can be removed, we must relocate them to the Third and Second Fronts with careful planning. If they can not be removed, we must break them into two parts.

(f) From now on, all new projects, in whatever Front they will be located, must comply with the principle of dispersion, closeness to mountains, and concealment. They must not be concentrated in certain cities or areas.

We have divided labor to deal with the above work:

(a) The State Economic Commission and the State Planning Commission will be responsible for the arrangement of the industrial and transportation systems.

(b) The Ministry of Railway will be responsible for preparation measures concerning railroad junctions.

(c) The Office of National Defense Industry will be responsible for the arrangement of national defense industry.

(d) The General Staff will be responsible for the division of the First, Second, and Third Fronts on the national level and for the arrangement of national defense fortifications and war preparation mobilizations.

(e) Comrade Tan Zhenlin will be responsible for preparation measures concerning reservoirs.

(f) Comrades Zhang Jichun and Han Guang will be responsible for the arrangement of universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes.

(g) Comrade Zhou Rongxin will be responsible for the protection of city buildings and government departments and institutions.

We will spend the months of September and October investigating the various aspects and produce detailed plans that can be implemented gradually. The special committee will synthesize the plans before submitting them to the Central Committee for inclusion in the general plan for the next year and in the Third Five-Year Plan.

(3) We propose to revive the People’s Anti-Air Committee. Premier¹⁰⁴ should still serve as Director and Comrade Xie Fuzhi as Secretary General (Comrade Luo Ruiqing was Secretary General originally). We will

tions with China. But we stick to one point: the United States must withdraw from Taiwan, and after that all other problems can be easily resolved. The United States does not accept this point. China and the United States have been negotiating for ten years and we are still repeating the same old words. We will not give up that point. The United States once wanted to exchange press delegations with us. They argued that when we began with minor issues, we could better settle major problems later. We contended that only by starting from major issues could minor problems be easily resolved.

You withdrew your armed forces from the South in accordance with the Geneva Accords. As a result, the enemy began to kill people in the South, and you revived armed struggle. At first you adopted political struggle as a priority supplemented by armed struggle. We supported you. In the second stage when you were carrying out political and armed struggles simultaneously, we again supported you. In the third stage when you are pursuing armed struggle as a priority supplemented by political struggle, we still support you. In my view, the enemy is gradually escalating the war; so are you. In the next two and three years you may encounter difficulties. But it is hard to say, and it may not be so. We need to take this possibility into consideration. So long as you have made all kinds of preparations, even if the most difficult situation emerges, you will not find it too far from your initial considerations. Isn't this a good argument? Therefore there are two essential points: the first is to strive for the most favorable situation, and the second to prepare for the worst.

The Algerian experience can serve as a reference for you. Possibly in the fourth or fifth year of their war, some Algerian leaders became worried. At that time, their Prime Minister Arbas came to talk with us. They said that Algeria had a very small population of ten million. A million had already died. While the enemy had an army of 800,000, their own regular forces possessed only about 30,000 to 40,000 troops. To add the guerrillas, their total forces were less than 100,000. I told them at the time that the enemy was bound to defeat and that their population would increase. Later, after negotiations France began to withdraw its troops. Now it has completed the withdrawal, only leaving behind a few small

naval bases. The Algerian revolution is a national democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie. Our two parties are Communist. In terms of mobilizing the masses and carrying out people's war, our two parties are different from Algeria.

I talked about people's war in my article. Some of the statements refer to specific problems of ten to twenty years ago. Now you have encountered some new conditions. Many of your methods are different from our methods in the past. We should have differences. We also learn about war gradually. At the beginning we lost battles. We have not done as smoothly as you have.

I have not noticed what issues you have negotiated with the United States. I only pay attention to how you fight the Americans and how you drive the Americans out. You can have negotiations at certain time[s], but you should not lower your tones. You should raise your tones a little higher. Be prepared that the enemy may deceive you.

We will support you until your final victory. The confidence in victory comes from the fighting you have done and from the struggle you have made. For instance, one experience we have is that the Americans can be fought. We obtained this experience only after fighting the Americans. The Americans can be fought and can be defeated. We should demolish the myth that the Americans cannot be fought and cannot be defeated. Both of our two parties have many experiences. Both of us have fought the Japanese. You have also fought the French. At the moment you are fighting the Americans.

The Americans have trained and educated the Vietnamese people. They have educated us and the people of the whole world. In my opinion it is not good without the Americans. Such an educator is indispensable. In order to defeat the Americans, we must learn from the Americans. Marx's works do not teach us how to fight the Americans. Nor do Lenin's books write about how to fight the Americans. We primarily learn from the Americans.

The Chinese people and the people of the whole world support you. The more friends you have, the better you are.

[Source: The People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Communist Party Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Mao Zedong Waijiao wenxuan*

(Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Central Documentary Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994), 570-573.]

Document 7: Mao's Conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968.

Because there has been no battle to fight recently, you want to negotiate with the United States. It is all right to negotiate, but it is difficult to get the United States to withdraw through negotiations. The United States also wants to negotiate with you because it is in a dilemma. It has to deal with problems of three regions: the first is the Americas—the United States, the second is Europe, and the third is Asia. In the last few years the United States has stationed its major forces in Asia and has created an imbalance. In this regard American capitalists who have investments in Europe are dissatisfied. Also throughout its history the United States has always let other countries fight first before it jumps in at halfway. It is only after World War Two that the United States has begun to take the lead in fighting, first in the Korean War and then in the Vietnam War. In Vietnam the United States is taking the lead, but it is followed by only a small number of other countries. Whether the war is a special war or a limited war, the United States is totally devoted to it. Now it cannot afford to pay attention to other countries. Its troops in Europe, for example, are complaining, saying that there is a shortage of manpower and that experienced soldiers and commanders have been removed and better equipment has been relocated. The United States has also redeployed its troops from Japan, Korea and other areas of Asia. Did not the United States claim that it has a population of two hundred million? But it cannot endure the war. It has dispatched only several hundred thousand troops. There is a limit to its troops.

After fighting for over a dozen years you should not think about only your own difficulties. You should look at the enemy's difficulties. It has been twenty-three years since Japan's surrender in 1945, but your country still exists. Three imperialist countries have committed aggression against you: Japan, France, and the United States. But your country has not only survived but also developed.

Of course imperialism wants to fight.

sory Group in the Struggle to Aid Vietnam and Resist

Clarendon Press, 1994), 506-523.

46. John W. Garver, "The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War," *Parameters* 22 (Spring 1992), 73-85, quotation on 75.

47. Sun Dongsheng, "The Great Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction," *Dangde wenxian* [Party Documents] 3 (1995), 42-48. Sun's indirect quotation of Mao's remarks is on p. 44. *Dangde wenxian* is a bi-monthly journal published by the CCP Central Documentary Research Office and the Central Archives. It often contains important party documents. Sun Dongsheng is a researcher at the Central Documentary Research Office.

48. Mao's conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* [Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994), 582.

49. Yuan Dejin, "The Evolution of Mao Zedong's Theory of War and Peace since the Founding of New China," *Junshi lishi* [Military History] 4 (1994), 36.

50. For an excellent discussion of the origins, development and consequences of the Third Front, see Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," *The China Quarterly* 115 (September 1988), 351-386.

51. For the complete text of the report, see *Dangde wenxian* 3 (1995), 34-35.

52. Mao to Luo and Yang, 12 August 1964, in *ibid.*, 33.

53. For the text of the Special Committee report of 19 August 1964, see *ibid.*, 33-34.

54. Mao's remarks are quoted in Sun, "The Great Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction," 45.

55. Sun, "The Great Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction," 44.

56. Naughton, "The Third Front," 368.

57. Mao's conversation with He Long, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu, 28 April 1965, in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* [Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Writings] 6 vols. (Beijing: Military Science Press and Central Document Press, 1993), 6:404.

58. For Snow's version of his conversation with Mao, see Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1971), 215-216. For the Chinese version, see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, 544-562.

59. Li and Hao, *Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun*, 341.

60. *Ibid.*, 341-342; *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, 6:403.

61. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., *Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975*, 455.

62. Liu Shaoqi's speech at the war planning meeting of the Central Military Commission, 19 May 1965, in *Dangde wenxian* 3 (1995), 40.

63. The CCP Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Zhu De nianpu* [Chronicle of Zhu De] (Beijing: People's Press, 1986), 537-538.

64. Harry Harding, "The Making of Chinese Military Power," in William Whitson, ed., *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 361-385; Uri Ra'an, "Peking's For-

see

facilitated by Johnson's escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

From late 1964 on, Soviet policy with respect to Vietnam pursued several goals. First and foremost, the USSR emphasized moral and political support to what it described as the Vietnamese people's war against American aggression. The Soviet mass media now promptly and frequently carried official statements by Soviet leaders denouncing U.S. aggressive actions in Southeast Asia, no longer delaying as it had with TASS's statement on the Tonkin Gulf incident. Steps were taken to expand contacts both with Hanoi and representatives of the South Vietnamese patriotic forces, and, accordingly, the CPSU CC now approved the opening in Moscow (at the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee), on 24 December 1964, of a permanent mission of the NFLSV.

Second, Soviet material assistance (economic and, primarily, military) to the DRV and NLF expanded. Soviet military supplies in the period from 1963 to 1967 (particularly after 1965) exceeded one billion rubles, according to the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi.¹⁰ Prior to 1965, German models of arms were sent to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union, but from then on the Kremlin provided only Soviet-made arms to the "Vietnamese friends," including the latest designs of surface-to-air missiles, jet planes, rockets, and field artillery, as well as a large array of especially sophisticated arms and combat hardware for the DRV air defense system.¹¹ And Soviet economic and military assistance to Vietnam kept on increasing. According to estimates of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, by 1968 Soviet material assistance accounted for 50 percent of all aid to the DRV, and as of 1 January 1968 the total value of Soviet assistance over that period was in excess of 1.8 billion rubles, with military supplies accounting for 60 percent.¹²

Such a turnabout in Soviet policy with respect to cooperation with Vietnam was received with satisfaction by the Hanoi leaders, who increasingly stressed the importance of Soviet moral, political, and material assistance in their conversations with the officials of the Soviet Embassy and those of other socialist countries. However, the North Vietnamese leaders' appreciation for this largesse by no means signified that they would now take the USSR's side in the Sino-

Soviet dispute, or otherwise rely exclusively on only one communist patron. Rather, after Moscow changed its attitude to the DRV, Hanoi took steps to secure maximum profit by exploiting its friendship with *both* of its mighty allies—the PRC and the USSR—as they competed for influence in Southeast Asia. Precisely this policy was pursued by the WPV Central Committee grouping which was formed in late 1964-early 1965 and included Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap.¹³ This group sought to rid North Vietnam of China's excessive wardship, on the one hand, and, on the other, to avoid any kind of dependence on the Soviet Union. As a result, in that period reports by Soviet representatives in Vietnam, the USSR Defense Ministry, and the KGB regarding reduced Chinese influence in the DRV were accompanied by complaints of insincerity, egoism and unmanageability on the part of "the Vietnamese friends."

For instance, back in 1966, in his analysis of the prospects of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi Ilya Shcherbakov pointed out: "Just as before, the Embassy believes that the process of promotion of our relations with the WPV and the DRV will hardly be steady or rapid in view of the policy pursued by the Vietnamese comrades. This was, regrettably, confirmed in the past few years. Even the manifestation of a more serious discord between the WPV and the Communist Party of China will not probably mean automatic or proportionate Soviet-Vietnamese rapprochement. The year 1966 showed once more that we are obliged constantly to display initiative and unilaterally, as it were, drag the Vietnamese comrades to greater friendship and independence." The ambassador then stressed the "general positive nature" of the WPV's tendency for independence but pointed to its negative aspects, primarily to indications that the Vietnamese conducted its foreign policy, including its relations with Moscow, from a narrow, nationalistic viewpoint. Soviet aid was regarded by Hanoi exclusively from the standpoint of their benefit to Vietnam, rather than for the good of the international socialist cause.¹⁴

This undercurrent of tension in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations, produced by what Moscow viewed as Hanoi's parochial perspective, cropped up repeatedly. In 1966, for example, the North Vietnamese expressed indignation at the partial reduction of Soviet

and U.S. military contingents in Germany. Why? Because, they explained, the Soviet troops had allegedly been transferred to the Soviet-Chinese border, which provia lae<<uch-Uraprap
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other signs of distrust and suspiciousness toward Soviet Defense Ministry representatives. The Soviet leadership was informed about violations of storage rules for Soviet military hardware, wasteful use of missiles and ammunition, and neglect of Soviet experts' advice on the rules of exploitation of military hardware, which led to its spoilage. All this coincided with Hanoi's requests for more assistance, but the DRV leaders evidently saw no contradiction in this: It was pointed out in the 1970 political report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi that, while "attaching great importance to the Soviet military assistance, the command of the People's Army of Vietnam at the same time regarded it exclusively as the obligatory discharge of its internationalist duty by the Soviet Union."¹⁷

All the above-mentioned facts suggest how complicated and contradictory Soviet-Vietnamese relations were, and demonstrate the great discrepancy between the scale of

cially.

Regrettably, we do not yet have access to all the documents, including the still-classified “special dossiers” (*osobaya papki*) at SCCD, as well as KGB, Foreign and Defense Ministry, and Presidential Archive materials, that are necessary to reconstruct fully from Soviet sources all of the many conversations and probes connected to various diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the Vietnam conflict in 1965-67, including, perhaps most importantly, the so-called MARI-GOLD and SUNFLOWER initiatives (to use the secret U.S. government code names), in both of which the Soviet Union played an important role.³⁰ An initial survey of the SCCD archives disclosed only cryptic traces of Soviet contacts with potential intermediaries. For instance, documents failed to clarify what was discussed in conversations with L. Mulkern (vice-president for international relations of the Bank of America), who asked for assistance in establishing unofficial contacts between U.S. President Johnson and the Soviet government, or with Marshall D. Shulman (then an associate of Harvard University’s Russian Research Center), both of which were recorded by the KGB (the latter with the recommendation that Shulman be advised that his information had to be confirmed by the U.S. President). While the documents encountered during this early stage of research left these and many other questions unresolved, they certainly pointed at the high intensity of unofficial Soviet-U.S. contacts apparently related to the war (either directly or through mediators, as, for instance, through the services of Austrian Ambassador in the USSR Vodak) in the summer-autumn of 1965.³¹

Moscow’s seeming reluctance to meet Washington half-way in its diplomatic efforts was probably at least partly attributable to the fact that the Kremlin was acutely aware of its limited ability to exert influence on Hanoi’s policy—an awareness due in large measure to the complete and objective information sent to Moscow by the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, led by Ambassador Shcherbakov. Perusing the great number of minutes of conversations between Soviet Embassy officials and Vietnamese leaders, WPV members, and Vietnamese citizens, as well as informational letters and reports sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the CPSU CC, one gets the impression that decision-making on the Vietnamese issue

was largely produced in accordance with recommendations and draft decisions sent by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi—not by the Politburo, the CC Secretariat, nor the Foreign Ministry—and only later were those recommendations and draft decisions rubber-stamped by the top Soviet leaders. This conclusion, albeit preliminary, is based on ample documentary evidence, when, for instance, the Soviet Ambassador sets out a number of ideas in his political letter to Moscow about what should be done, and later the same considerations were put forward as the official views of the CPSU and Soviet government in conversations with Pham Van Dong or Nguyen Duy Trinh.³² So Moscow obviously deemed it advisable to consult the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi before adopting decisions.

Take the following two examples. The political letter³³ of the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, entitled “Soviet-Vietnamese Relations After the Talks Held in April 1968,” prepared for Moscow Center on 1 September 1968, assessed the results and significance of the opening of the Paris peace talks. Regarding the situation as favorable for achieving a settlement in the best interests of the Vietnamese people, the Ambassador, who signed the letter, believed that the prime task at the moment was “to help the Vietnamese comrades to put an end to the hostilities this year and switch over to a political settlement of the Vietnamese issue.” With this aim in view, Shcherbakov believed, it would be advisable to invite a higher-level DRV government delegation to Moscow in October and “try once more to analyze jointly the situation and convince the DRV government to express its opinion on the whole package of the Vietnamese settlement.”

Soon afterward, V. Chivilev, the Soviet charge d’affaires in the DRV, presented Pham Van Dong with a letter of invitation from Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin for a DRV party and government delegation to visit the Soviet Union. The date of the visit was later settled and a decision was adopted on a visit to the USSR by a Vietnamese government delegation led by Le Duan in November 1968. Though the materials on the visit remain inaccessible, it seems highly likely that Soviet leaders followed the recommendations of their man in Hanoi.³⁴

Another example of the importance of the Soviet ambassador’s advice in decision-making dates to early 1974. CC Secretary

Boris Ponomarev, who was in charge of the Party’s international relations, submitted to the CPSU CC Secretariat a memorandum, entitled “On a Proposal to the Vietnamese Friends,” in which he raised the issue of establishing and promoting relations between the CPSU and the communist parties of several Southeast Asian countries by making use of the authority wielded by the WPV in the communist movement in the region. In other words, he suggested possible Soviet penetration of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. After inconclusive discussion of the proposal, Ponomarev, along with CC secretaries Suslov, Kirilenko, Demichev, Katushev, and Rakhmanin, decided to consult the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi on the matter.³⁵

The new importance attached to the role of ambassadors and embassies in the process of decision-making on foreign-policy issues reflected a general trend, typical of the Brezhnev era: the growing influence of the bureaucratic apparatus, especially medium-level officials, on policy-making. Since top Soviet leaders had little idea of the reality in Vietnam, they willingly entrusted decision-making in the sphere of current policy to experts, signing ready-made decisions or intervening only in extraordinary situations.³⁶

Thus, indirect evidence suggests that in defining its stand on the Vietnam War, Moscow largely drew on the opinion of its diplomatic representatives in the DRV. And in 1965-1966 the Soviet Embassy was far from optimistic about the prospects for a peaceful settlement. Meetings and conversations between the Soviet Embassy officials and members of the diplomatic corps and journalists accredited in Hanoi revealed that North Vietnam’s leaders were fully committed to continuing the hostilities against the USA. Indicative in this respect was a conversation at the WPV CC on 23 August 1966 between Soviet charge d’affaires P. Privalov and Nguyen Van Vinh, Chairman of the Committee for the Unification of the Country. Gen. Vinh firmly believed that the situation was hardly favorable for opening North Vietnamese-U.S. talks. “Had we been defeated by the Americans,” Vinh said, “we would have had no other choice than to agree to hold talks, but we are confidently dealing blows at the enemy and winning decisive victories. What would it mean for us to hold talks now? That would mean losing every-

thing....”³⁷ This viewpoint was shared by the entire WPV top leadership.

That is why the Soviet Embassy’s report for 1966 included very cautious forecasts about possible changes in the DRV stand. The embassy, in the belief that it was necessary to “exert and broaden, with the support of all peace-loving forces and the socialist countries, strong political and diplomatic efforts in order to bring the matter to the settlement of the conflict in the current year,” suggested that the USSR might eventually have to elaborate and present its own peace plan to the Vietnamese comrades. That supposition was made on the basis of what the embassy viewed as a certain coincidence of the CPSU and WPV “assessment of the situation and active promotion of politico-diplomatic struggle for Vietnam.”³⁸

In that contest, the USSR sought to evade the issue of acting as a formal mediator at the U.S.-DRV talks (which was what the USA sought). The only role the Soviet Union was then prepared to play was that of a “postman,” who would carry both sides’ messages, and that of “a night watchman” by offering an opportunity for unofficial meetings between U.S. and North Vietnamese embassy officials in Moscow.³⁹ At the same time, Moscow spared no effort to convince its “Vietnamese friends” of the need to switch from military to political-diplomatic methods to attain a settlement.

The USSR undertook the mission of “a postman” and “a night watchman” very reluctantly, probably for fear of being turned into an official mediator. At least it did not wish to perform those functions on a permanent basis. So the United States had to use the services of other countries, in particular, Poland, Canada, India, etc. However, early in 1967 a new flurry of activity was observed in Moscow. In Jan.-Feb., DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh received

amount of work with the French.” The main factor behind Hanoi’s choice of the French capital, Le Duan told Chivilev, was “the opportunity to maintain contacts with Moscow from it.”⁴⁵

The same factor was taken into account by Moscow, which faced the task of keeping the sides at the negotiating table. With this aim in mind, the Kremlin exerted constant pressure on North Vietnam not to disrupt the process. On 13 June 1968, the CPSU CC and Soviet government sent a letter to the WPV CC and DRV government stressing that the Paris talks were vitally important for achieving a settlement of the Vietnam issue. The Soviet leaders also emphasized that they were living through an important period was “the

stood the importance of this new development, and flew to Bulgaria to brief Leonid Brezhnev, who encouraged them to proceed. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duan went to Beijing at about the same time, where he received contradictory advice from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.

Phan Van Dong's reply to Lewandowski generated considerable excitement since it contained a request to arrange an unprecedented face-to-face meeting, in Warsaw, between the Americans and the North Vietnamese. Rapacki and Michalowski began a series of consultations with John Gronouski, to set the stage for these critical talks. From the beginning, however, difficulties emerged. First, the American side began to express doubts about certain unspecified details of the 10-point plan as it had been recorded by Lewandowski. Secondly, the Chinese government, opposed to any talks, increased its pressure on the Vietnamese. Worst of all, the tempo and brutality of American bombing raids in the Hanoi area were stepped up. On December 13 and 14, the center of the city was hit for the first time. Stunned by these attacks, the North Vietnamese withdrew their offer to meet. In a dramatic confrontation on December 19, when Gronouski accused the Poles of acting in bad faith, Rapacki's frustration overflowed: he smashed his glasses down on the table, and they flew into the American ambassador's face. Operation *Marigold* appeared to be dead.

The Poles continued to hope that a basis for face-to-face talks still existed, however. They briefed UN General Secretary U Thant, who promised to do whatever he could. They also contacted Pope Paul VI (using Italian Premier Fanfani as an intermediary). The pontiff sent a letter to Hanoi and to Washington, begging both sides to save the peace process. Gronouski left Warsaw to consult with President Johnson, while Rapacki drafted an urgent appeal from members of the Polish Politburo to their counterparts in Hanoi, calling for a reconsideration of the American proposals. As snowstorms closed down airports all over Europe, Gronouski returned to Warsaw unexpectedly, and requested a meeting with Rapacki on Christmas Eve. He announced that all bombing within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi had been suspended, and that he was ready to meet with a Vietnamese representative in Warsaw. This message was promptly

conveyed to Phan Van Dong by Poland's ambassador Siedlecki. The Vietnamese, still smarting from the bombing raids of early December, and under intense pressure from China, refused to discuss the matter any further. Operation *Marigold* had failed.

The great hopes that were raised by *Marigold*, and its dramatic collapse, gave rise to many commentaries, explanations, and to some finger-pointing. In his report, Jerzy Michalowski provides a detailed rebuttal of certain claims made by Henry Cabot Lodge in his memoirs. Michalowski had the opportunity to discuss *Marigold* with President Johnson in September of 1967. LBJ did not accept Michalowski's interpretation of the events, nor would he acknowledge the continuing determination of the North Vietnamese to keep fighting. In time, he would change his views.

After personally witnessing some of the unsuccessful attempts to end America's entanglement in Vietnam, after discussing the events with many of the participants, and after studying many of the relevant documents, Michalowski closes his report with a strong indictment of U.S. policy. He is convinced that Lyndon Johnson and his circle of hawkish advisors never understood how

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THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES

by **Kenton J. Clymer**

On a graceful boulevard radiating out from Wat Phnom in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, stands the elegant, newly renovated National Library of Cambodia. Built by the French in the 1920s (it opened on 24 December 1924), the library also housed the country's archives. A separate archives building, located directly behind the National Library (and thus not visible from the street) was built in 1930. Unlike the library, it still awaits renovation. Designed with high ceilings, large windows, and electric ceiling fans, both buildings incorporated the best available technology for preserving books and manuscripts in tropical climates.

During the French colonial period and after, until the end of the Khmer Republic in 1975, the library and archives were administered jointly. In 1986, however, following the Vietnamese model, they were separated. The library is controlled by the Ministry of Information and Culture, while the archives reports to the Council of Ministries.¹

During the terrible period of the Khmer Rouge (1975-78), the library and archives were home to pig keepers, who served the Chinese advisers living in the hotel next door. The pigs rooted in the beautiful gardens. All of the staff from the library and archives, about forty people, fled. Only a handful survived the Khmer Rouge regime, and only two or three returned to work in the library once the Khmer Rouge were driven out in 1979.

The library's holdings today are only a fraction of what they were in 1975. But contrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rouge may not have systematically destroyed books and documents.² To be sure many books were ruined, some simply pushed off the shelves to make room for cooking pots, others used for cooking fires or for cigarette papers.³ Subsequent neglect and mismanagement made matters worse, arguably much worse. Many books that did survive the Khmer Rouge years were improperly stored and soon succumbed to insects and the elements. Two Australians archivists, Helen

SOURCES ON THE KHMER ROUGE YEARS: THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE PROGRAM

[Ed. note: Following is the First Progress Report (dated 15 September 1995) of the Cambodian Genocide Program, based at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies, Council of Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Law School, Orvill H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale University.]

Executive Summary

The Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) has made rapid progress in assembling the documentation, legal expertise and historical evidence necessary to prosecute the crimes of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime. This is consistent with the CGP mandate to help implement "the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979." [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.] Nearing the halfway mark of its two year mandate, the program has the following major achievements to its credit:

1. Identifying Legal Options for Redress

Until now, the international impetus has not existed to motivate the Cambodians to organize an effective process to seek legal remedies for the Pol Pot regime's crimes. The Royal Cambodian Government is now considering several options for legal redress of the genocide, based on the findings of an international conference hosted by the Cambodian Genocide Program in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State. This conference, chaired by CGP Director Ben Kiernan, of Yale University, was held in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995. It was addressed by two international legal scholars commissioned by the Department of State to review the legal possibilities for cases involving criminal violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal human rights law in Cambodia. Cambodia's two Co-Prime Ministers also addressed the conference; both praised Yale University and its CGP. The conference was attended by nearly 100 others, including six Members of the National Assembly, senior officials from the Council of Ministers and various ministries such as Justice and Interior, and legal officers.

2. Documenting the Cambodian Genocide

Until now, no detailed picture has existed of specific atrocities, victims and perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made major strides in assembling the documentation necessary to prosecute the authors of the Cambodian genocide. A series of databases, now information, will be made accessible through the Internet by 1997: a) computerized maps of Khmer Rouge prisons and victim grave sites across Cambodia; b) a biographic database on the Cambodian elite, many of whom comprised victims of the Khmer Rouge; c) a second biographic database on the Khmer Rouge political and military leadership, including many alleged perpetrators of criminal acts; d) an electronic database of photographs, including rare images taken during Pol Pot's 1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime and 4,000 photographs taken by the Khmer Rouge of their victims before execution; e) an imaging database of thousands of rare documents from the Pol Pot period, many of which are being made publicly available for the first time; and f) a bibliographic database of literature and documents in various languages on the Pol Pot regime. Yale's CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of Yale's singular combination of Cambodia area and archive studies, genocide research, legal resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute this complex research undertaking.

3. Recreating Lost Histories

Until now, no detailed history of events in each region and zone of the Khmer Rouge

regime had been contemplated. The Cambodian Genocide Program has nine new histories already underway, comprising detailed and original research on the fates of various regions and population groups into which Pol Pot's regime divided Cambodia. In the process, Cambodian scholars are being trained in both social science methods and computer documentation. In addition to these nine separate studies in preparation, others are in the planning stage. The first volume of these studies is to be published in 1997.

4. Training Cambodian Lawyers

Until now, the legal expertise did not exist in Cambodia to support a trial of Khmer Rouge leaders utilizing due process guarantees and unimpeachable evidentiary standards. The Cambodian Genocide Program has just graduated the first class of seventeen Cambodian legal professionals, government officials, and human rights workers from CGP's nine-week intensive summer school on international criminal law and international human rights law. The school was held in Phnom Penh from June to August 1995, with the participation of the Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights at the Yale Law School. A second summer school will be held in Cambodia in mid-1996. The individuals trained in the CGP program will be able to staff a domestic or international tribunal.

5. Creating a Permanent Cambodian Documentation Center

Until now, no "center of gravity" existed in Cambodia to provide a spark for the serious study of what happened to Cambodian society during the Khmer Rouge regime. The Cambodian Genocide Program has established an international non-governmental organization in Phnom Penh, known as the Documentation Center of Cambodia. The Documentation Center is facilitating the field operations of the CGP, training Cambodians in research and investigative techniques, and will enable an indigenous organization to continue the work of the program after the conclusion of the CGP mandate in January 1997.

Introduction

In Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, the world witnessed one of the worst cases of

genocide and crimes against humanity ever perpetrated. While those responsible for the Nazi Holocaust in the first half of the 20th century were punished, there has been little effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice for the atrocities they committed. In 1994, the U.S. Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. A team of world-class Cambodia scholars based at Yale was chosen to receive funding from the U.S. Department of State, and subsequently, by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. That team has now, in three quarters of a year, made tremendous progress in remedying this omission of justice and accountability. Four major problems face any effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice:

- 1) a paucity of specific documentary evidence linking high-level policymakers and military personnel to acts of genocide and crimes against humanity;
- 2) insufficient training of Cambodian officials and lawyers with the political will and legal skills to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice;
- 3) insufficient awareness among Cambodian policymakers of the options available for legal redress of genocide and crimes against humanity.

just in the 1990s. Evidence from the trial of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Up_Line<</B 346.0027/J 1 >

port from the worldwide Cambodia studies community (see "Scholars Speak out on Cambodia Holocaust," letter to the *Wall Street Journal*, signed by 29 Cambodia scholars and specialists, 13 July 1995). These scholars represent virtually the entire field of Cambodian studies. Leading Cambodian scholars David P. Chandler, Milton E. Osborne, and Michael Vickery have already provided help in various ways. Others who have responded positively to requests for information on their personal archival holdings include Justin Corfield, Mark Dodd, Stephen Heder, Henri Locard, and Judy Ledgerwood. Additional Cambodia scholars like David Ashley and Jason Roberts have generously offered to work with the CGP on a volunteer basis.

An Australian professional working with the CGP has also initiated a project to begin the computer mapping of Khmer Rouge prison and mass grave sites. This project has now been funded by the Australian government at the level of A\$24,300. Additional funding is being sought. This is the first time anyone has attempted to construct a comprehensive inventory of the terror apparatus used by the Khmer Rouge regime to murder up to two million people.

In June, July, and August 1995, CGP Director Ben Kiernan presented the Program's work-in-progress at the U.S. Forum on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (in New York), at Monash University and the University of New South Wales (in Australia), and at the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Phnom Penh. These occasions all produced new collaboration from foreign scholars and specialists, ranging from an offer of a large biographic database to a promise of rare photographs of the Pol Pot leadership. The ability of the CGP to attract the cooperation of Cambodia scholars, along with legal and technical experts worldwide, is a key factor in explaining the success of the Program to date.

Cambodian Reception of the CGP. Cambodian leaders have complained for years that the outside world had not recognized the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and the tragedy of the Cambodian people. The initiation of the Cambodian Genocide Program helped answer this complaint on an international scale. This measure of recognition sparked a new willingness among the Cambodian political elite to squarely face the darkest chapter of Cambodian history.

Cambodians have become full partners in the CGP's work. His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk wrote to CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson on 21 July 1995, "I infinitely thank the distinguished promoters of this research program, especially Dr. Ben Kiernan and yourself, for the care that you have manifested, thanks to the 'Cambodian Genocide Program,' in nourishing truth and promoting and assuring respect for human rights in my country."

Since the earliest days of the CGP in January 1995, the Royal Cambodian Government has been unreservedly supportive of the mandate given to Yale University by the U.S. government. The Co-Prime Ministers, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Co-Ministers of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Co-Ministers of Defense, and the President of the National Assembly have all pledged their personal and institutional cooperation with the CGP. Enthusiasm about the goals of the program transcends political affiliation, with support coming from the leadership of all three parties represented in the government. But the cooperation of the Royal Government has gone far beyond pledges. The Royal Government is providing the CGP with a wide range of resources to facilitate our work in Cambodia and in the region at large.

At the Striving for Justice Conference in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995, First Prime Minister Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen publicly committed the Royal Cambodian Government to bring the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice for their crimes against humanity. In his opening address to the conference, the First Prime Minister complimented the CGP, saying, "On behalf of the Royal Government, on behalf of Samdech Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister, and on my own behalf, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and warmest congratulations to the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigation and Yale University for embarking on the two years programme of documentation, research and training on the Cambodian genocide. I would also like to express my sincere thanks equally to the United States to create the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act and its appointment of Yale University to carry out the two year programme."

Substantively, the First Prime Minister argued, "The international crimes of the

Khmer Rouge violated the most central norms of international law and this clearly affected the interests of all states in general and Cambodia in particular." His Royal Highness the First Prime Minister added, "The Royal Government is determined to bring those responsible for the perpetration of these heinous crimes against the Cambodian people to face justice." In his closing address to the conference, His Excellency Samdech Hun Sen summed up the view of many participants by saying of the conference, "This is not about politics, it is about justice. If we do not bring the Khmer Rouge to justice for killing millions of people, then there is no point in speaking about human rights in Cambodia."

Large numbers of ordinary Cambodian citizens seem to concur with the Co-Prime Ministers. Many Cambodians in Cambodia, the U.S., and other countries have volunteered their assistance. Since June 1995, a team of Cambodian volunteers in New Haven, CT, has been preparing a biographical index of Khmer Rouge political leaders and military commanders. As of September 1995, Cambodian-American citizens' groups in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, California, and Texas have offered to compile witness testimony on behalf of the CGP. The thirst for justice is powerful among the survivors of Pol Pot's genocide.

Consistent with these feelings of ordinary Cambodians and the policy of the government, the CGP has received from the Royal Cambodian Government significant assistance to our research program. One of the most useful forms of this aid is the unprecedented assistance from the Royal Government in retrieving documentation from Vietnam unavailable to researchers up until now. In combination with previously unexamined archives from the Cambodian People's Party, Royal Government ministries, and private archives now being opened to the CGP in Cambodia, a wealth of new data pertaining to criminal culpability during the Khmer Rouge regime seems destined to come to light. It is the expressed policy of the Royal Government to assist the CGP in uncovering such important information.

Evaluation. To ensure objectivity and quality control, the CGP has instituted a rigorous two-tier system of program evaluation. In the first tier, the Steering Group of the Department of State's Office of Cambo-

dian Genocide Investigations conducts periodic external reviews of CGP operations. As a basis for these evaluations, in May 1995 CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson produced a 209-page Implementation Plan outlining the Program's strategy for achieving its objectives. The first external evaluation, held in June 1995, termed the progress of CGP operations "excellent" (*Time Magazine*, 26 June 1995).

CGP also carries out an internal review process, staffed by distinguished experts in international law and genocide investigation, such as Professor Cherif Bassiouni, former Chair of the United Nations Commission of Experts for the inquiry on violations of international humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia (predecessor to the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal). The first round of internal evaluation of CGP operations began in June 1995. This evaluation has already produced numerous useful ideas for improving various aspects of our operations, and yielded an overall positive appraisal of CGP progress. According to one evaluator, "Your thoughtful and methodical explanations for the preparation of such a project should serve as a model for the documentation and analysis of crimes against humanity in other countries.... The training program designed to support the project is outstanding."

Summary. In 1994 the prospect of a trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders seemed remote. Now, through the work of the Cambodian Genocide Program, it has become a strong probability. In 1994, the information resources and legal evidence necessary for a judicial accounting of the genocide had yet to be identified or assembled, and the required legal skills did not yet exist. These prerequisites are now well on the way toward fulfillment. By the end of 1996, when the CGP's mandate will expire, an international Cambodian genocide tribunal may have already commenced functioning. By then, the CGP will certainly have provided the scholarly and legal resources for Cambodians to pursue their own justice for the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. In short, the Cambodian Genocide Program has taken major steps to fulfill its own three-part mandate: to expose and document the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, and to hold the perpetrators accountable.