

Editor's Note: U.S.-Soviet relations following the inauguration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter in January 1977 misfired by March, when Secretary of State Vance carried the new president's arms control initiative to Moscow, only to receive a harsh public lashing from the Soviet leadership. (For translations of Russian archival documents on this early period, including correspondence between Carter and Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 140-154, 160.) But ties seemed to be mending by the late summer of that year—as reflected by progress on talks toward signing a SALT II arms treaty, quiet cooperation in heading off a South African nuclear test, and (on 1 October 1977) the issuance of an unprecedented joint statement calling on Israel and its Arab enemies to return to the Geneva Conference co-chaired by Washington and Moscow to seek a “comprehensive peace” in the Middle East.

Yet, the fall of 1977 and the first half of 1978 witnessed another downturn in relations, caused by, among other disputes, the negation of the October 1 joint communique on the Middle East as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat startled the world by visiting Jerusalem in November 1977 and pursuing a separate peace with Israel; a massive Soviet-Cuban military airlift to Ethiopia that fall turned the tide of the Somali-Ethiopia conflict and irked Washington, which the following spring retaliated by accelerating ties with Beijing; talks on SALT II slowed to a crawl; Soviet human rights abuses (including the highly-publicized arrests and trials of well-known dissidents such as Anatoly Shcharansky and Yuri Orlov) fanned public anger in the United States; and within the Carter Administration, the faction (led by

release, and translation of important new documents from the Russian archives, in particular from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (known officially as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, or AVPRF), and the former CPSU CC archives (the Center for the Study of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD); additional East-bloc sources were obtained from the East German archives by Christian Ostermann of the National Security Archive. In addition, the Project and the National Security Archive sought the declassification of U.S. documents through the Freedom of Information Act.

All documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project and the CWIHP are available for research at the National Security Archive, which together with CWIHP has created (and houses) a Russian and East-bloc Archival Documents Database (READD) which is planned eventually to produce an internet-accessible listing of documents; in addition, beyond what is published in the Bulletin, CWIHP hopes to make additional translated materials available to scholars through the internet via the National Security Archive's home page on the World Wide Web (<http://www.nsarchive.com>). For further information, contact the National Security Archive, Gelman Library, 7th fl., 2130 H St. NW 20037, tel.: (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005; and nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu (e-mail).—James G. Hershberg

**Document 1: Record of Conversation
between Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko and President Carter, 23
September 1977**

RECORD OF THE MAIN CONTENT
OF A.A. GROMYKO'S
CONVERSATION
WITH USA PRESIDENT J. CARTER

23 September 1977, Washington

J. CARTER. I am very happy to greet you here in the White House. It is an honor to meet you.

A.A. GROMYKO. I am very happy to meet you, Mr. President, and to discuss the questions which are of interest to both sides. I want to use this opportunity to tell you that L.I. Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership send their greetings and best wishes to you.

J. CAR

Vladivostok negotiations. If so, one has to recognize the disagreements between us on this question, the disagreements in interpretations.

Secretary of State Vance told me about your conversation with him on these matters yesterday and I intend to give you an account of our concrete proposals a little bit later.

So, I set forth my views on the questions of developing the relations with the Soviet Union and I would like to emphasize once again the great importance that I attach to our mutual relations with the Soviet Union. I would like to assure you that personally as well as as President of the USA that I will sincerely strive to overcome all existing disagreements between us. I hope that in the course of a few months we will be able to achieve such progress in our mutual relations, which would justify a meeting between myself and L.I. Brezhnev. I would very much like him to visit the USA where we would be able to discuss with him for two-three days here, in Washington, or, even better, in Camp David, all the questions which interest both of us.

Before that, however, I would like us together to have made such progress in solving the problems of particular importance to us, that would demonstrate to the whole world our mutual aspiration consistently to improve our relations. I spoke about it publicly and I use this opportunity to express my appreciation to L.I. Brezhnev for his public reaction to my speech in Charleston.

The American people sincerely strives for cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union. I hope that I, as the political leader of our country, and L.I. Brezhnev, as the political leader of the Soviet Union, will not create obstacles on the path which our peoples so sincerely strive to follow. And I hope that our meeting today will be useful and constructive in this respect.

A.A. GROMYKO. I attentively listened to your statement in which a whole spectrum of questions between our countries has been touched upon. On my part I would like to express my opinion on the questions you have touched upon and maybe on some others.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the entire Soviet leadership, L.I. Brezhnev personally, and all our people sincerely aspire to maintain good friendly relations with the USA, not just normal busi-

ness relations but precisely good friendly ones. I think, you, yourself, made such a conclusion from L.I. Brezhnev's speeches, in particular after your speech in Charleston.

Incidentally, I would like to linger a bit on some of your speeches, bearing in mind the importance of this question. You made some statements where you touched upon mutual relations with the Soviet Union. In some of these speeches you emphasized the importance of mutual understanding and cooperation with the Soviet Union. In some others you just mentioned the Soviet Union without definite statements. And yet in some others you criticized the Soviet Union, in your own way, but I repeat, criticized it. Sometimes you did it indirectly but it was not difficult to guess to whom you addressed these criticisms, whom you had in mind.

And so we ponder which of these statements reflect your true policy as the President of the USA, the policy of the USA as a state. We would like to think that it is those statements, in which the need of cooperation was emphasized, the necessity of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union for the interests of both of our countries, for the interests of the whole world.

But this is our desire too[;] however, only you can interpret your own statements. And that is why we would like you to do it now. I would like to bring to Moscow a definite answer on the question of how you, yourself, imagine the prospects for development of relations with the Soviet Union.

There is hardly a need for a lengthy discussion about the significance of these relations for the peoples of our countries as well as for the whole world. It is self-evident that these relations have a great significance. If there are good relations and mutual understanding between us or, even better, friendly relations, then there will be peace in the world, there won't be another world war. If, however, these relations will go awry, if somebody will ruin these relations, then a world tragedy will occur.

The basic thing in this matter is the question of what will be the policy of the USA government toward the Soviet Union and, consequently, what will be the policy of the Soviet Union toward the USA. For ourselves, for the Soviet Union we have been giving and can give a clear answer right now. I am authorized to declare on behalf of all our leadership, on behalf of L.I.

Brezhnev, that our policy is directed to maintaining good and, even more than that, - as we already mentioned - friendly relations with the USA.

In your statement you touched upon some concrete problems. You pointed at the need to take into account the differences in social and economic systems of our countries. Actually, these differences exist, and they will exist. It is important, however, that despite the existing differences between us we should continue to develop our mutual relations. We again emphasize that it would be in the interests of both our peoples and of the whole world. Precisely all that we call the policy of peaceful co-existence, the policy of resolving controversial issues by peaceful means, regardless the differences in economic and social systems and the differences in ideology.

You correctly pointed out the importance of trade-economic relations. It is also true that they are essential for the development of political relations. It would be very good if all the obstacles on the path of the development trade-economic relations between our countries were removed. But it were not we who created these obstacles. They have been created on this side of the Atlantic ocean. All this is well known.

We, certainly, have noted some optimistic signals that appeared in the statements of some American politicians that the situation can change for the better in the near future. We would like for this to happen. We believe that it would be in the interests of both countries to establish normal trade-economic links, to remove all the obstacles on this path, especially because from the very beginning they were artificial. But in general, such relations are for our mutual benefits. We are convinced that it is both countries that will benefit from trade and the development of economic links between them.

You touched upon the issue of "human rights." We must say that when you or other American politicians begin to talk about "human rights," we, in the Soviet Union, in the Soviet leadership, have a kind of automatic conditional reflex: we expect that some shots will be made towards the Soviet Union, of course without any grounds. Why is it being done? We do not believe that one person in the world or even a group of people can claim the unique right to make judgments about "human rights." Each state

has to decide these questions independently. And so it is being done.

If we would like to make a list of all violations of human rights in the USA or, say in England, Italy, the FRG, and in many other countries, it would be a long and impressive list. We are not doing it, however, because we do not want to interfere in other people's affairs. But we will never allow others to interfere in our affairs.

You mentioned someone called Shcharansky. Nobody knows him at all except, maybe, doctors and some representatives of authorities who oversee the order in our country. Such questions have an infinitesimal significance. Certainly, you, Mr. President, have a right to act as you believe is needed, but speaking impartially such position of yours on this question can only harm the climate of our relations. Besides, we think that the gain you get, acting in a such a way, is enormously disproportionate to your political loss.

You touched upon the so-called Jewish question. The Soviet Union during the war saved millions of Jews. These are known facts. This is an open book. Right after the war we together, or to be more precise, at the same time as the USA we introduced in the UN the proposal on the creation of an independent Jewish state. Since then we have always supported the right of Israel to independent state existence. We are trying to convince the Arabs, including the most extremist groups, to recognize Israel as an independent state, i.e. to recognize the reality. But at the same time we are blamed that we act wrongly in regard to Jewish question. In general, the question of emigration from the Soviet Union of any nationality, whether the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Armenians, the Georgians, the Jews or others, is our domestic problem, which is to be resolved in accordance with the laws of our country. If you use the facts then you probably know that dozens of thousands of Jews have left the Soviet Union over the past several years.

With satisfaction I have heard your words that you expect positive results from the Belgrade Conference, the results in the spirit of the Helsinki agreement. It would be good if Belgrade would become a constructive forum instead of a place of mutual accusations, some kind of a box of complaints. The Soviet Union is ready to play in Belgrade its own constructive role and

hopes that other participants will do the same.

Now, about the situation in the South of Africa. Our policy for this region is simple. We do not have any military bases, and no military personnel in this region. If one feels the influence of our ideology there then who in the world can build the barriers against the dissemination of any ideology? The only thing we want there is that all the problems should be solved by the majority of population, by the peoples themselves. The majority of population there are Blacks, so the power belongs to them, not to the White racists. We are against any delays in the transition of power. Such is, in short, our position in regard to Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa. Incidentally, to the question of the SAR I will come back in connection with the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Now about Angola. We hailed the birth of this new independent African state. Not so long ago we met A[gostinho]. Neto in Moscow, on the highest level, with the participation of L.I. Brezhnev. We did not find that Angola took a hostile position in regard to the USA. As for the Cuban troops in Angola, it is the business of Angola and Cuba and I am not authorized to discuss this question. It would be right, however, to ask in this regard: whose personnel supports the anti-Angolan movement, the troops that are based in Zaire and invade Angola? Whose foreign troops acted in Angola even before the arrival there of the Cuban troops. The answers to these questions are clear.

Now about the Middle East. This is a large topic. I do not think we should spend

course, the Soviet Union, we believe it is correct to emphasize that it would have been a great mistake if a dirty game had been played here, the open or secret collusion against the Soviet Union, against its interests. Because sooner or later it would have become known and the appropriate consequences would follow, including those in the area of the US-Soviet relations. We would like to hope that the USA does not intend to play the Chinese card against the Soviet Union. In the past under other American administrations we have been assured many times that the USA does not have such intentions. We will see what the reality turn out to be.

Presently relations between China and the USA are normal and, possibly, even friendly, whereas our relations with China are tense. We do not object to the existence of normal relations between China and the USA. But be on guard so that they do not pull you into games dirty and dangerous for our both countries. We too once had good relations with China. If the Chinese would be able to embroil the USA with the Soviet Union they would gladly use it for their own advantage. Would this be good for the USA? We do not have a crystal ball so that we could see the future, however, the history teaches historians a lot. It have taught us, in any case, and the USA, too, should have already learned.

You have mentioned the Indian Ocean. Certainly it would have been very good if an agreement would be reached between us on this question. Objectively, there are grounds for this. But it is strikingly evident, however, that you stubbornly cling to one rock in the Indian Ocean which is called Diego Garcia. In our view the USA has no real need for this, but at the same time this is being done with the intention of stepping on our toes. This is being done against the interests of our security. The American side should see this problem in a broader context. On our part we are ready to continue the exchange of opinions on this question that has already begun.

We conduct negotiations with the USA on a range of other questions, including the arms limitations at the expert level, working groups. We are ready to continue these negotiations and would like to believe that they reach positive results.

About the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our interests in this issue are es-

entially identical. We both should expect a great danger if this problem will not be effectively resolved. This is a fact that the SAR [South African Republic] step by step is moving forward to the creation of its own nuclear weapon. There are also other states who are close to the creation of nuclear weapons. It would be good if the USA and the Soviet Union would work more vigorously in the direction of reliable prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. We are ready for it.

You touched in general upon the question of arms sales to other countries. This question is certainly connected to the general climate that exists in the world, to the existence of hotbeds of tension. If the conditions for stopping the arms sales had been created, we would have been ready to make an appropriate agreement. We stated it many times. But first the hotbeds should be removed. One of these hotbeds is the Middle East.

I think that it was not accidental that you lingered on the question of stopping nuclear tests. We would like to hope that the Soviet-American agreement on some partial steps in this sphere, which have been concluded between us and which are being considered by the USA Congress, will be ratified as soon as possible. And we hope that the negotiations, that are being conducted between us on the broad treaty, will have also be successfully concluded.

You also touched upon the problem of problems, the signing of an agreement on strategic arms limitation. I would like to state our position on two major questions which are still unresolved. First, on the

informed you. We are talking, in part, about the total number of land-based ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missiles] equipped with MIRV. Yesterday during my conversation with Vance I announced that we would be ready to limit the number of such missiles to 820 units under the condition that in the agreement our proposed limitation would be stipulated for the missiles [of] "air-land" class. I would like to get a definite reaction of the American side to our proposal before my departure from the USA.

Now, there is another thing. We would like you, here, in the USA, to stop scaring the people by the statements about an ability of making a first strike at America by the Soviet Union. Why is it being done? As we understand it, it is being done only to excite the atmosphere so that one could easily build up the military budget of the USA.

What first strike you are talking about? We are not going to make a first strike at anybody. Moreover, together with the other states of the Warsaw Pact we proposed to all countries signatory of the Final Act on Security and Cooperation in Europe to sign an agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapon against each other. So stop scaring the American people by this nonexistent Soviet threat. The Soviet Union did not have, does not have, and will not have such an intent.

And now I would like to read what L.I. Brezhnev, whom I met before my departure to the USA, asked me to tell you in person. Besides the greetings I extended to you in the beginning of our conversation, he asked me to tell you the following: "I and the whole Soviet people are struggling for peace and struggling for it conscientiously. But I am firmly convinced as well as all our leadership that this issue must be resolved not arithmetically but politically. We do not have any other alternative. No calculations will lead to anything good. I ask the President to think about it. Such an approach would only elevate the authority of our states. And the peoples of the world would take a sigh of relief."

Now a few words about your meeting with L.I. Brezhnev, which you have mentioned. L.I. Brezhnev, personally, and the Soviet leadership are not at all against such a meeting, in general. We believe that such a meeting would be an important threshold if it had been thoroughly prepared and concluded with a major political outcome. The

USA, we think, should also be interested in this. In addition, a meeting would not be in anyone's interests if it were a meeting just for the sake of meeting, or if such a meeting would push our relationship backwards.

This seems to coincide with what you said.

J. CARTER: Let me briefly comment on your statements. My attitude toward the Soviet Union is consistent. On my part, there were no words of criticism as such toward the Soviet Union or Brezhnev personally. At the same time, in the Soviet press there had been critical statements toward me personally. Recently such criticism significantly subsided, which I appreciate. The point is that such criticism gives concern to our people. And I hope that in the future there will be no more.

I would like to emphasize that I am deeply devoted to maintaining constructive friendly relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of solving all contentious questions in a peaceful atmosphere and without public polemics. I hope that in the future Soviet-American relations will constantly improve. I would suffer a complete political

mentioned in Vladivostok. I certainly understand why the current different interpretations arose. We do not intend to use for our advantage the fact that the question of the cruise missiles was not discussed in Vladivostok. And we do not want to use our current technological superiority in this regard. And in general, we do not want any advantages for ourselves in the area of strategic arms, since attempts to get such an advantage could upset the general balance and create disharmony.

In our country, however, even a unanimous agreement of the whole government is not enough for securing the ratification by the Congress of any signed agreement.

The Soviet side, apparently, does not give any significance to a question of its own heavy missiles, which are three times more destructive than any of our missiles. In this respect I am very worried by your statement that "there is no land behind the Volga" for you, i.e. that you are against any further discussion and concessions on the questions which interest us. I would like to hope that the Soviet side will display more flexibility.

The question of Soviet heavy missiles is a subject of concern for us as a question of our cruise missiles is a subject of concern for you. You said that you intend to strive for the achievement of the mutually acceptable agreement, however, my first impression is that the Soviet side does not display enough flexibility.

We already put forward many proposals directed to achieving an agreement, but the Soviet Union turned them down. We are ready, however, to show further flexibility - although there are limits to it - in the hope that the Soviet side will act the same way.

In the end, I hope, we will be able to totally eliminate nuclear weapons. If in the course of the third round of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms we would be able to cut back the upper limits on this types of weapons by 50 percent then we would be ready in the course of the following round to go even further, under the condition, of course, that China and France will not start to build up their nuclear weapons on a large scale.

You said that you made concessions to us when you agreed on some decrease of the upper limit of the means of delivering the strategic nuclear weapons. But we do

not see it as a concession to us. We would find ourselves in the same situation. It would have been a mutual step leading to a conclusion of a better agreement than the one which we talked about earlier. And still we have the issue of the Soviet heavy missiles.

You said that you made concessions to us on the question of counting ICBMs with MIRV but this too is not unilateral concession, because otherwise it would be needed to check every single missile whether it is equipped with a MIRV device or not.

The consent of the Soviet Union in regard to the structure of the future agreement also is not just a concession since the achieved agreement does benefit both sides.

There are two important question right now, as you have said, which create many difficulties. But before I touch on them I would like to mention those less significant disagreements which exist on a number of other questions.

One of these concerns the overall total level of delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons which under the original agreement must be equal to 2,400 units. You proposed that in 5 years after the signing a new agreement this level would be cut back to 2,250 units. But we would like to lower the mentioned original number by 10 per cent, i.e. to 2,160 units which, in our opinion, would fully satisfy the needs of each side. Thus, the difference between our positions is only

90 units. This issue needs to be solved.

We agree to include into the protocol for a three year term a resolution on non-deployment of the land-based and submarine-based cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km.

In regard to the Soviet aircraft "Backfire." The Soviet side, as I understand it, is ready to guarantee that its range will not exceed 2,200 km and that its current rate of production will not increase. It would be useful for us, however, to know what is its current rate of production.

A.A. GROMYKO: American experts have at their disposal the appropriate information.

J. CARTER: On the question of mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles we have some disagreements inside our own government whether we should develop them or reject its production altogether. We are ready to ban its production and deployment for the period of the protocol term. The Soviet side, as we understand, would like this ban to be in effect until 1985. It also proposes to ban testing of these missiles. I think, our positions are close and the only thing is to find a mutually accepted wording.

There are some disagreements on the question of new types of the inter-continental ballistic missiles. We would like agree on a ban on testing and deployment of all new types of the ICBM. But you prefer to ban testing and deployment of only new types of ICBM equipped with MIRV. I do not quite understand what is the essence of this disagreement.

A.A. GROMYKO: Speaking about our concessions I had in mind concessions to the American side. There should not be any misunderstanding here. This is related to the question of the methods of counting ICBMs equipped with MIRV which was appreciated at the time by the USA government.

Yesterday I informed Mr. Vance about our consent to the establishment of a separate level for ICBMs equipped with MIRV to the total of 820 units. This is almost the same number as was proposed by the USA (800).

We agreed to cut back during the term of the agreement the overall level for the number of delivery vehicles of strategic nuclear weapons from 2,400 to 2,250. You mentioned the figure 2,160. What we have

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proposed is a compromise figure leaning toward the American side.

As for the land-based and submarine-based cruise missiles for some reason you speak not about a full ban but actually about permitting them to be tested on an air platform. It attracted my attention even yesterday while listening to Mr. Vance's statements. It is clear that if a cruise missile intended for submarine or land basing is tested on the air platform then it is possible to produce them by the hundreds and thousands, like pancakes.

There are also other questions to which I can draw the attention of the USA Government. We will have another opportunity to talk about them with the State Secretary. However, those two questions which I have mentioned are the main obstacle to the agreement. These, I repeat, are the question of our heavy missiles and the issue of cruise missiles on heavy bombers. I would like to hear your opinion about how we can settle these issues.

(In order to exert pressure on Carter we specifically emphasized that if the American side wishes to stick to their previous unacceptable positions, then the concessions in other issues made by us to the USA become invalid.)

J. CARTER: I have spent many hours studying the history of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the USA on the question of strategic arms limitation, and analyzing the fundamental interests of the Soviet Union and the USA in this area. We hope that you understand what and why is our concern.

On the basis of my understanding of what the main concerns of the Soviet Union are, we now are ready to leave aside the question of modern heavy Soviet ICBMs. In other words, their number could reach 308 units as it was stipulated by the interim agreement.

We also are ready to agree on the sublevel of 820 ICBMs equipped with MIRV (which also includes our heavy missiles).

We are ready to leave at the level established in Vladivostok the total level of carriers with MIRV in the amount of 1,320 units, including ICBMs with MIRV, submarine-based ballistic missiles with MIRV, and also heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles with a range exceeding 600 km.

We propose, however, that in the limits of this level (1,320 units) a sublevel of

1,200 units for ICBM and submarine-based ballistic missiles with MIRV would be established.

This combination almost fully accords with the Soviet side's position except for the sublevel of ICBMs and submarine-based ballistic missiles with MIRV (1,200 units).

Under such a settlement the difference of 120 units between the total number of carriers with MIRV (1,320 units) and the number of ICBMs and submarine-based ballistic missiles with MIRV (1,200 units) could be used by both sides for heavy bombers equipped with "air-land" class cruise missiles. In the limits of the sublevel of 1,200 units both sides will have the freedom to arrange the composition of the carriers with MIRV taking into account, of course, the sublevel of 820 units for the land-based ICBMs and MIRV.

Then, the sublevel of 820 ICBMs with MIRV, as I understand, will have to include the Soviet launchers, deployed in the area of Derazhnia and Pervomaisk.

There are some other disagreements between us. For instance, you propose that the agreement on the maximum range of 2,500 km for the "air-land" cruise missiles on heavy bombers remain valid for the term of the basic agreement, until 1985. But we suggest to include this question into the protocol for the term of 3 years in order to discuss this question again.

I did not quite understand what you said regarding the rate of production of the "Backfire" aircraft. According to our information you produce 30 such aircraft a year.

A.A. GROMYKO: I did not mention any numbers and have no intention to do so since you know the facts. Yesterday I read a relevant text to Secretary Vance. Incidentally, I want also to recall that part of this text which deals with the range of this aircraft. What we are saying is that the range of this aircraft now is 2,200 km and we are not going to increase it to such an extent so it could hit targets on USA territory. We are not saying that the range of the "Backfire" will not exceed 2,200 km. This is what we said to Vance yesterday.

J. CARTER: We, certainly, would like to have more clarity in this regard. If, for example, you intend to increase the range of this aircraft up to 2,400 - 2,500 km we would like to get precise information about it so that not only you but also we could judge if that aircraft can reach the continen-

tal USA or not. I certainly trust L.I. Brezhnev and you but we would like to have more certainty.

A.A. GROMYKO: It is well known that the distance between the Soviet Union and the USA is at least 5,500 km and that was taken as a criterion for the definition of the ICBM.

J. CARTER: But the range is not the only criterion. An aircraft could fly the maximum distance only in one direction. That is why I would prefer that its maximum range were precisely expressed in kilometers so to avoid any misunderstanding in the future, especially because your statement which you were ready to make, in principle, is a very good one.

A.A. GROMYKO: This question has already been discussed between us. Just read more carefully our possible statement and you will see that it resolves all these issues.

As for your last proposals, we, certainly, will be ready to discuss them but judging from our first impression they are aimed at giving one-sided advantages to the USA. And this is not the way of resolving the problems we are facing.

J. CARTER: But any agreed upon limitation has an identical impact on the USA and the Soviet Union with the exception that the Soviet Union gets a possibility to deploy 308 modern heavy missiles, which the US cannot do. We are to agree on that since it was previously stipulated by the interim agreement.

A.A. GROMYKO: The solution to this

position on the heavy missiles?

J. CARTER: Perhaps you did not understand me correctly. We do not demand anymore that you change your position on the heavy missiles. We accept your position. I only said that this is the only aspect where there is some inequality to the Soviet Union's advantage. In the rest the obligations of both sides are identical: what is permitted to the Soviet Union is permitted to us. And only in the question on heavy missiles the Soviet Union has some advantages. I hope, however, that you do not take me for a fool who would put forward proposals damaging to the interests of the USA.

The Soviet side wanted to preserve the upper limit of carriers with MIRV to 1,320 units. We agreed to it.

You proposed to include the heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles in that upper limit. And we agreed.

However, this is not at all a sign of USA weakness. I think such solutions should satisfy your strategic and political needs and that they are in accordance with the Vladivostok agreement reached by my predecessor President Ford and L.I. Brezhnev.

You will be able in the last part of the day to continue the discussion of these questions with Vance. If further difficulties should arise I will be ready directly or via Vance to make every effort possible to resolve them. In general, I think that solutions proposed by us should satisfy all your wishes as well as to satisfy modestly our special interests.

A.A. GROMYKO: We will be ready to discuss in more detail all these questions with Vance.

Let me thank you for this conversation. I would like to emphasize once more that the Soviet side would like to achieve, in the end, the conclusion of a new agreement on limitation of strategic arms. This would be a great success, but it depends, of course, on both sides.

The following people were present at the meeting: On the Soviet side: A.F. Dobrynin, G.M. Kornienko, N.N. Detinov, V.G. Makarov, B.G. Komplektov, V.M. Sukhodrev;

On the American side: Vice-President W. Mondale, Secretary of State C. Vance, the Special assistant to the President for National Security Z. Brzezinski, the USA Ambassador in the USSR [M.] Toon, the deputy assistant to the President [D.] Aaron, the

Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency P. Warnke, an official of the National Security Council W. Hyland, an interpreter Kramer.

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[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; obtained and translated by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

**Document 2: CPSU CC Politburo
Transcript, 27 April 1978 (excerpt)**

Top Secret

Only copy

Working Transcript

MEETING OF THE
CC CPSU POLITBURO
27 April 1978

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.
Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu. V., Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P., Kosygin, A.N., Kulakov, F.D., Mazurov, K.T., Pel'she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A., Ustinov, D.F., Demichev, P.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Chernenko, K.Y., Kapitonov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Riabov, Ia.P., Rusakov, K.V.

I. About the results of the negotiations with the Secretary of State of the USA, C. Vance

BREZHNEV. My conversation with Vance took place after his two-day negotiations with Comrades Gromyko, Ogarkov, and others had concluded. He, evidently, had picked out in advance several issues which he had not brought up in the course of the general negotiations. We can assume that he had an agreement with Carter on this. It is characteristic, that Vance did not take any of the members of his delegation in to the meeting with me. Only the ambassador came with him. But I, from my side, also did not presume to broaden the circle of our participants. Comrades Gromyko, Dobrynin, and Aleksandrov participated in the conversation.

Thinking over the plan of the conversation, we set ourselves some tasks:

1. Set forth our understanding of the main results of the negotiations which Vance

this time had conducted in Moscow, and from him receive confirmation of that understanding.

2. To openly express to him our evaluation of the contradictions of Carter's inconsistent foreign policy line, his constant swings between assurance that he is for an improvement of relations with the USSR and calls for a cranking up [*nakruchivanie*] of of the arms race; to remind Vance (and through him, Carter) that there are things which are more important than the foreign policy maneuvers of the moment, particularly: issues of war and peace.

3. To once again express our attitude about a possible meeting with Carter, about which he, as you know, continues to hint through all possible channels.

4. To make known to the USA administration in advance our steps in response to Carter's decision to defer the production of the neutron bomb.

5. To give a rebuff to several political maneuvers which, as we assumed and as was confirmed, Vance could take. We are talking, primarily, about the attempt to put forth an accusation to the address of the USSR and Cuba in regard to events in Africa.

I will not dwell in detail on the course of the conversation. A transcript of it was just distributed. All the comrades, probably, have familiarized themselves with it. I will say only that the mentioned program was entirely fulfilled. Vance agreed with our evaluation of the negotiations on strategic weapons. He accepted with due attention the criticism of the foreign policy zigzags of the Carter government, and will, of course, pass them on to the President.

The attempt to deliver a reproach for Africa and African affairs which are linked with the development of relations between the USA and the USSR, received such a strong rebuff that Vance, excuse me, was not glad that he had raised that issue. He found it necessary to take a defensive position, and to justify himself.

Overall, I think, the conversation was useful. It will help Carter to see several things in a more realistic light. The tone of the conversation was correct and friendly. Vance behaved well, and even cordially.

SUSLOV. Carter has a great desire to meet with Leonid Il'ich.

Members of the Politburo, Candidate members of the Politburo, and Secretaries of the CC say that they have read the tran-

script of the conversation. The conversation was very good, substantive, sharp in its tone, as was appropriate. It has an aggressive character.

KOSYGIN. The conversation really forced Vance to think over many issues, and he will of course pass all the content on to Carter.

USTINOV. Leonid Il'ich spoke very well about offensive strategic weapons. They should know our position on that issue.

SUSLOV. Leonid Il'ich did very well in conducting the conversation with Vance.

KOSYGIN. The main thing is that they now know perfectly our position on all the issues.

SUSLOV. We have to take a decision to approve Leonid Il'ich's conversation with Vance and the negotiations of Comrades Gromyko, Ogarkov, and others on issues related to the limitation of strategic weapons.

ALL. Correct.

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), f. 3, op. 120, d. 39, ll. 187-189; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

Document 3: Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Vance, 31 May 1978 (excerpts)

Secret, Copy No. 1

ever, in answering your question, I want to set forth the evaluation of the actions of the Soviet Union in Africa which is being formed in the USA and many other countries (not only European). Many people now presume that the Soviet Union sets fires in various regions of Africa instead of preventing those fires in a peaceful way.

The third issue which provokes serious concern is connected with the question of human rights, which has become particu-

tive attitude to our proposals. They met them with raised bayonets, every time rejecting them at once. We proposed to freeze mili-

between the Soviet Union and the USA. Maybe it makes sense for the sides to meet more often both on our level and on the level of those who negotiate concrete questions, in order to clarify the positions of both sides? Maybe it follows that we should think of other methods? One thing is clear: something must be done to change the tendency, which has lately appeared in the relations between our two countries.

A.A. Gromyko. This is a very important question.

C. Vance. Let me now respond to your remarks regarding our information about the participation of Cubans in the events in Zaire. According to our intelligence data, Cubans took part in planning and preparation of the intrusion there. As for the sources of our information, it was the Commander of Katang armed forces, General Mbumba, and Cuban sources in East Germany. We considered these sources reliable.

A.A. Gromyko. Oh, then you are simply victims of disinformation. If we were not sure that our information was authentic, we would not have told you about it. We take great responsibility for what we are saying.

C. V

First. We should come forward in our press (simultaneously in all of the main newspapers) with a large and serious declaration, calling it, let's say, "Concerning the policy of the Carter government." We should publish this declaration without any sort of signature—this will even attract more attention to it. In it we should say directly, that in the policy of the USA changes are taking place which are dangerous for the affairs of peace. Under the curtain of lies and slander on the USSR and other socialist countries, concrete matters are being perpetrated, directed against peace and detente. The course of negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitations of strategic arms is intentionally being retarded. Attempts at clumsy interference in our internal affairs are being perpetrated, in fact, the ties between both countries are being curtailed. New extensive plans for the arms race are being made, and for decades in advance, at the very time when the peoples hoped for disarmament. The current creators of American policy, it seems, have already found a common language with the aggressive anti-Soviet rulers of China, who, as it is known, declare peace and detente to be a fraud, and war to be the single realistic prospect.

The government of the USA has become the inspiration for a new colonialism in Africa — the policy of armed intervention and open interference in the affairs of African governments, the merciless suppression of revolutionary liberation processes.

It is all of these current tendencies in the foreign policy of the Carter government which have lent the central color to the work of the last session of the Council of NATO in Washington. Encouraging its adherents, dragging after itself those who waver and doubt, putting pressure on the dissenting participants of this bloc, the USA is attempting once again to push it onto the road of the "cold war" and of active preparation for a hot war.

So all of these dangerous sides of the current policies of Carter should be [described], without excessive dramatization, but clearly shown in such a document. It is necessary to show both to other countries and to communities in the USA itself, just how dangerous a game Carter, Brzezinski, and their likes are starting.

We should conclude this text with a calm and clear confirmation of our course

towards detente and towards the development of good, mutually beneficial relations with the United States.

Second. We should come forward with a collective declaration of governments—participants in the Warsaw Pact regarding the results of the session of the Council of NATO. This document, taking into consideration the necessity of its approval, among others by the Romanians, should be made less sharp, with emphasis on the constructive elements of our policy.

We should note with regret, that the work of the session of the Council of NATO and its resolutions do not serve detente or the consolidation of peace, but the exacerbation of the international situation and the intensification of military preparations, the arms race. Urgent calls for the increase of allotments, the agitation of the NATO representatives for neutron, chemical, bacteriological arms, the forcing through of long-term programs for the production of arms of all types—this is the real meaning of this session and of that which follows after it.

The countries of the Warsaw Pact condemn this policy and are certain that the peoples of other countries will condemn it. There is an attempt to impose on us a continually broader competition in arms. But we decisively come forward for keeping in check the arms race, for concrete agreements on these questions in all forums. The Soviet Union is doing all that is dependent on it for the successful completion of negotiations with the USA concerning SALT. The socialist countries occupy a flexible position and are developing concrete constructive initiatives at the Vienna talks. The countries of the Warsaw Pact are coming forward for the strict observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence, against interference in the internal affairs of other countries — whether in the form of armed intervention or subversive activities of another sort.

And we should conclude this document with a persistent call to return to the path of detente, to the path of mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation, which is clearly indicated in the document of the Helsinki Summit, in Soviet-American and other bilateral documents, and in numerous resolutions of the UN.

Third. We should come forward with a special Declaration of the Soviet government on African affairs. In this document we should categorically refute and expose

the imperialist intentions with regard to the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Africa, among them the region of the Horn of Africa, in Zaire, etc. Briefly and in calm tones we should say how it is in reality. At the same time with all sharpness we should condemn the policy of armed intervention, subversive activity and other forms of interference in African affairs by the governments of NATO headed by the USA. We should show how the contemporary colonizers, operating with the hypocritical slogan, "African solidarity," enlist accomplices for themselves in Africa from the numbers of reactionary, anti-popular regimes, for carrying out their own policy. We should express our conviction that genuine African solidarity will take hold—the single will of independent countries and the free peoples of Africa, their resoluteness to assert the independence of their countries and the freedom of their internal development.

These are the three documents, it seems to me, that it would be possible to prepare in the immediate future and come forth with them. Of course, this is not to be done in one day, but somehow intelligently distributed over time.

Simultaneously it would be possible to prepare instructions for our ambassadors in progressive and other more or less independent governments in Africa for carrying out the corresponding work with their guidance.

In the spirit of the documents, about which I just spoke, it would be necessary, of course, to develop work through other channels as well—along the lines of connections with fraternal parties, in the framework of international social organizations, etc.

As far as the work of the special session of the General Assembly of the UN for disarmament is concerned, evidently, it is necessary to continue to illuminate this theme in our media of mass information from the point of view of the proposal of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we should likewise support all that is healthy and constructive, which has appeared and should appear in the work of the Assembly, and should expose the maneuvers of the opponents to disarmament.

If the comrades are in agreement, then, probably, we could charge the preparation of the material, to which I referred, to the MFA and to the corresponding departments

of the CC (International Department, Department of the CC and the Department of Propaganda for Foreign Affairs).

[Source: *Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 89, per. 34, dok. 1; obtained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.*]

**Document 5: Transcript of CPSU CC
Politburo Meeting, 8 June 1978
(excerpt)**

Top secret
Only copy
Working draft

SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF
THE CC CPSU
8 June 1978

Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I.
In attendance: Comrades Andropov Yu.V.; Grishin V.V.; Gromyko A.A.; Kulakov F.D.; Pelshe A.Y.; Suslov M.A.; Ustinov D.F.; Demichev P.N.; Kuznetsov V.V.; Ponomarev B. N.; Solomentsev M.S.; Chernenko K.Yu.; Dolgikh V.I.; Ryabov Y.P.; Rusakov K.V.

[. . .]II. About Sakharov.

BREZHNEV. The other day comrade Andropov Yu. V. informed me that Sakharov has really let himself go and is behaving like a mere hooligan. The situation deteriorated to the point where he and his wife started a fight with a militiaman near the court building while the Orlov case was being tried.

The reasons of our superpatient attitude to Sakharov are familiar to you. But there is a limit to everything. We must not leave his escapades without reaction.

There was a suggestion to discuss Sakharov's behavior at the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. Perhaps, we should do this.

The members of the Politburo, candidates members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee support this proposal.

[Source: *TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 71; obtained by D. Wolff; trans. by M. Doctoroff.*]

Document 6: Transcript of CPSU CC

**Politburo Meeting, 22 June 1978
(excerpt)**

Top secret
only copy
Working paper

SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF
THE CC CPSU
22 June 1978

Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I.
In attendance: Comrades Andropov, Yu. V.; Grishin, V.V.; Gromyko, A.A.; Kulakov, F.D.; Pelshe, A.Y.; Suslov, M.A.; Ustinov, D.F.; Demichev, P.N.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; Ponomarev, B.N.; Solomentsev, M.S.; Chernenko, K.U.; Dolgikh, V.I.; Ryabov, Y.P.; Rusakov, K.V.

[...] 2. Information of comrade Andropov, Yu. V. on the Shcharansky matter

BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov would like to inform the Politburo about the Shcharansky matter. Let's give him the floor.

ANDROPOV. I want to inform the Politburo that at the present time in the USSR 520 people are kept in prison, of these 110 people are held on charges that have political coloring. We will have to decide the question of Shcharansky's trial, the preparation of which is completed now. As is known, Carter made a speech to the effect that Shcharansky should not be brought to responsibility. But we can not satisfy such a request. Shcharansky committed crimes and has to take full responsibility for them. He will be put on trial. But what is the best time for the trial? Perhaps it should be started on July 10, this seems to be better. The USSR Ambassador to the United States comrade Dobrynin also recommends this time.

We discussed all questions of organization of Shcharansky's trial together with comrades Rudenko and Smirnov. Shcharansky admits his guilt, we uncovered his spy activity and can provide appropriate materials. He is charged under two articles: under article 64 for espionage and under article 70 of the Criminal Code for betrayal of the Motherland. His trial will

the Embassy, in which are reviewed the basic elements of contemporary Soviet-American relations.

Attachment: the letter mentioned above, Secret, on 8 pages, to the addressee and to the file.

USSR AMBASSADOR IN THE USA

/s/ A. DOBRYNIN

[attachment]

USSR EMBASSY in the USA

Washington

SECRET, Copy No. 2

11 July 1978

Attachment to Issue No. 667

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA
(Political Letter)

Almost eighteen months ago—20 January 1977—the new, 39th President of the USA, J. Carter, stepped across the threshold of the White House. Since that time, a definite policy has been conducted by his administration, the basic elements of which are the subject of the review in the present political letter.

I. As has already been noted by the Embassy, Soviet-American relations during the Carter Administration have been characterized by instability, major swings, which to a great extent are due to its calculations of the state of affairs in both its internal and external dimensions. In the middle of April of this year, Carter, as is well known, conducted in his country residence, Camp David, a meeting of the members of his cabinet and closest advisors, at which was taken a decision to carry out a regular reevaluation of Soviet-American relations. The initiative for this affair came from Brzezinski and several Presidential advisors on domestic affairs, who convinced Carter that he would succeed in stopping the process of worsening of his position in the country if he would openly initiate a harsher course vis a vis the Soviet Union.

Africa (events on the Horn of Africa,

for our propaganda in the USA.

- Regarding a Middle East settlement: As the Americans try, with the assistance of "artificial respiration," to extend the life of the Sadat "initiative," it is expedient, along with the indisputable continuation of our principled course, which has demonstrated its correctness, to once again, at the proper moment, publicly raise the issue of a resumption of preparations for the Geneva Conference, and in the presence of the Americans as co-chairmen, of fulfilling the joint Soviet-American communique of 1 October 1977. By doing this we will soundly throw a wrench into the Administration's current game. We should continue to reveal the hypocrisy of the USA in trying to show that it is equally close to the interests of the Arabs and Israel. At the same time we must more actively use the contradiction between the American imperialistic interests in the Middle East (oil, investment in Saudi Arabia, etc.) and Israeli-Zionist interests (open territorial expansion at the Arabs' expense).

- On the Chinese issue, we should continue to actively, publicly advance to the USA our thesis, that the Carter Administration's formation of a bloc with Beijing on an anti-Soviet basis would preclude to it opportunities for cooperation with the Soviet Union in the matter of a decrease in the threat of nuclear war and of arms limitation, particularly as regards SALT. We should support the growing feeling among Americans of anxiety regarding the possible consequences of the current course of the Administration vis a vis China. This became, according to our observations, especially noticeable here after Com. L.I. Brezhnev's warning in Minsk, since it has begun to occur to many Americans that the Administration's playing of the "Chinese card" carries with it potentially dangerous elements of confrontation with the Soviet Union which, which are detrimental to the USA, but in China's interests. Without the constant support and nurturing among Americans of these feelings of anxiety and preoccupation, as is now taking place in the USA in relation to SALT, the Administration's current covert move toward a deal with China may assume an even more open and dangerous character.

The immediate future, in any case the next month or month and a half, will be an extremely complex period in Soviet-Ameri-

can relations, and it will be difficult to count on any sort of noticeable positive shifts. More possibly, we can expect regular anti-Soviet outbursts about Shcharansky, [Aleksandr] Ginsburg, and others.

Later, however, with the achievement of a SALT agreement, which in itself will be a significant event, and when the Administration will have to more actively try to justify that agreement in Congress and before the public, it is possible to expect an improvement in the political climate in our relations. About that time an election campaign will be going on here, with its usual outburst of chauvinistic demagoguery and anti-Soviet propaganda.

On this issue it is indicative that our expression of firmness in relation to the prosecution of renegades like Shcharansky played its own role. The Carter Administration, despite all its rhetoric, was forced to retreat and to announce its intention to continue the Soviet-American negotiations on SALT aimed at the achievement of concrete results, and to declare that that agreement meets the interests not only of the Soviet Union, but also the national interests of the USA. "The Russians won this mini-confrontation;" such is the conclusion of the local political observers.

Finally, a Soviet-American summit may become the most important landmark from the point of view of a turn in our relations with the USA, taking into account the great political charge which such meetings carry.

Overall, it is important, as always, to consistently adhere to our principled line on the development of relations with the USA, to the achievement of concrete decisions and agreements wherever it coincides with our interests, and at the same time to give a decisive rebuff to unacceptable manifestations in the policy of the Carter Administration.

[A. DOBRYNIN]

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 76, dok. 28, ll. 1-9; document obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Project; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]

Document 8: Transcript, Meeting of East German leader Erich Honecker and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev,

the worse in our relations. I am speaking above all of the arms race heightened by Washington which is at the same time delaying the negotiations on arms control, and the continuing campaign for the so-called "human rights."

At the center of attention at the meeting which recently took place between A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance were questions relating to a new agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, especially the question of new types of ballistic missiles. Should there be any [agreement on limitations] or not, and if so, to which [weapons] should they apply? The Americans tried this time again to handle the matter in a way that would assure them the possibility of developing missiles in which they have an interest without regard for our interests. We, by contrast, were willing to renounce on a mutual basis the creation of new intercontinen-

tions with the USA. The negotiations were, frankly speaking, very difficult and this not only because of their intensity. The largest difficulties were connected with the nature of the questions with which we dealt, with the differences, yes, even with direct contrasts between our views.

As you know, it is not our habit to avoid difficult questions. The Middle East, South-east Asia, the situation in Southern Africa, the relationship between the USA and China - on all these questions I explained our basic point of view. With great determination I conveyed to Carter our opinion on the wrong theses of American propaganda with respect to the "Soviet threat" as well as with respect to the "violation of human rights" in the Socialist countries. Carter's situation, as the recent rearrangement in Washington proved, is not easy. A bitter battle over the coming into force [ratification] of the SALT II-Treaty is now being waged. If the treaty failed in the Senate, this would be, I think, a political catastrophe for Carter. But it would also be an extremely severe blow to the international prestige of the USA.

You will of course understand that, by and large, the prospect of the failure of the treaty is not desirable for us. But even in such a case, we will probably not lose politically because then the entire world will recognize who is consistently seeking disarmament and who is working in the opposite direction. But we all should try - in the framework of our means - to make sure this important matter will have a different end.

And now to the European matters. Here obviously much depends on proceeding with our initiatives in the field of disarmament which we have taken at the meeting of the [Warsaw Pact] Political Consultative Committee in Moscow and later at the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers in Budapest.

The reaction to our proposal has been a bit vague. The NATO countries seem to have acknowledged the positive direction of the efforts of the Warsaw Pact countries but an audible "yes" was not to be heard. It is good that currently the necessary link is being established at the level of foreign ministries between the European conference on military detente as proposed by us and the European meeting [of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)] in Madrid in 1980.

If our proposal on the conclusion of a

treaty on the non-first use of nuclear weapons as well as other kinds of arms is accepted, it would, I must say, constitute a tremendous advantage for the cause of detente. By the way, I have also talked about this with Carter. We have proposed to him a declaration to the effect that both sides would forego the first use of either nuclear or conventional arms against the other side or its allies. Initially Carter declared that he would agree and said that one could try to arrange for an agreeable formula. But later the Americans put on the reverse gear. But one has to understand that after all we wrestled six years over the conclusion of SALT II.

The Chinese problem still demands greatest attention.

The nature of Chinese foreign policy revealed itself in China's aggression against Vietnam. The Chinese are now negotiating with the Vietnamese comrades but they are conducting the negotiations in a way that it becomes obvious that they do not want a normalization of relations but Vietnam's capitulation. Moreover, there is a real danger of new Chinese provocations against Vietnam. One has to take that seriously. This obliges all of us, of course, not to weaken in the slightest manner our support and our help for the Vietnamese people as well as for the peoples of Laos and Cambodia. There are more than enough problems and extremely difficult problems. Let's take the "refugee" matter. The enemies of Vietnam have undertaken everything in order to make use of this problem to create a bad image of Vietnamese policy. To be sure, they did not manage to turn the Geneva conference into a trial of Vietnam. But obviously the matter cannot be put to rest. The Vietnamese friends are facing a great political and propagandistic job. We all have to support them in this task.

Now briefly on our imminent negotiations with the Chinese about which you have learned from the newspapers. One cannot expect quick progress in the Soviet-Chinese dialogue. The negotiations with China will require great patience, circumspection, and exact calculation of each of our steps.

That having been said, I think it is important for all of us not to relent in our opposition against China's policy which runs counter to the cause of peace and international security.

A few words on the Middle East. The fact that the question of prolonging the terms

for the presence of UN special forces on the Sinai Peninsula does not appear any more on the agenda of the Security Council undoubtedly constitutes a success for our common line. Hence the attempts to bless Israel's separate agreement with Egypt directly with the authority of the UN failed. And that was exactly what Cairo, Tel Aviv and Washington persistently tried to achieve. But now the UN special troops have to be withdrawn.

With respect to international questions, Erich, I would like to briefly touch upon the situation in Africa.

Recently we have had quite active contacts with representatives of the progressive African states. To generalize these talks and the observations made by our comrades, and our CC comrades as well, the task of politically strengthening the independent African countries is still in the forefront. But the problem of our economic relations with these states is already posed in its fullest extent. It is important and valuable that we vigorously oppose colonialism and racism. But the task which we have to meet together has larger dimensions. It is necessary to involve the African countries to a larger degree in cooperation with us in the economic field. This will be of advantage to us as well as the Africans. Your trip through a number of African countries, Erich, proved very useful. We highly appreciate your efforts in support of the progressive forces in Africa.

[concluding remarks]

Honecker: [report on domestic Issues]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 JIV 2/201/1313; document obtained and translated by C.F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security Archive); copy on file at the Archive.]

Document 10: CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 1 February 1980, with telegrams to Soviet Ambassador to West Germany (for Willy Brandt) and Finnish Social Democratic leader K. Sorsa (not printed)

Proletariats of all countries, unite!
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRALCOMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P182/2

To Comrades Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Pel'she, Ponomarev,

Zimianin, Zamiatin, Rusakov

Extract from protocol No. 182 of the
session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU
of 1 February 1980

Re: Information for the Chairman of the
Sotzintern [Socialist International] W.
Brandt and the Chairman of the Social-
Democratic Party of Finland, K. Sorsa.

1. Confirm the text of a telegram to the
Soviet Ambassador to the FRG (Attachment
1).

2. Confirm the text of information for
transmittal to K. Sorsa (Attachment 2).

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE

Attachments to No. 300s

[attachment 1]

Re: Item 2, Protocol No.182

SECRET

Attachment 1

BONN

TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Meet personally with W. Brandt, tell
him that you are authorized to communi-
cate certain views on the international situ-
ation that has developed, and expound on
the following text.

Recently, especially in connection with
decisions of the December session of the
NATO Council, events have transpired that
have sharply complicated the international
situation.

It is possible that we do not share the
same views on everything. One way or an-
other, under present circumstances, precise
and first hand information about assess-
ments and intentions becomes especially
necessary. The important thing is to find a
common language on the issue that has al-
ready been the topic of our mutual preoccu-
pation for many years - how to supportigoly
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flame international tensions. We are talking about efforts to resurrect the doctrines from the days of the Cold War - "containment" and "rolling back" of Socialism, and "brinkmanship."

During meetings with the working group of the Sozintern [Socialist International] in Moscow, the issue was discussed as to where the policy of President Carter is leading. Now, that is fully apparent. We are literally talking about the destruction of that which was achieved in the last ten years, accomplished by men of good will, including the Social Democrats.

Under these circumstances it is mandatory to reaffirm the policy of detente in international tensions. Great significance adheres in pronouncements to the effect that it is now important to "preserve cool heads and continue the process of negotiations," that "hysteria must not substitute for rational policy," and that "it is necessary to beware of ill-conceived and hypertrophied [sic] reactions which do not conform to the reality of events and which, in their entirety, could lead to an even worse situation."

Our position is to seriously, responsibly, and adamantly adhere to the principles of peaceful co-existence, and to everything positive in the development of normalized, mutually advantageous relations between governments that was achieved in the process of detente.

Events in Afghanistan. We would request you to examine them without the prejudice and hysteria characteristic of the Carter Administration.

We think it would be useful to bring the following information to your attention.

The facts establish that only a short time after the April revolution of 1978, an intense "undeclared war" was instigated against Afghanistan. Bands of mercenaries, financed with money from the CIA and Beijing, have literally terrorized the civilian population of that country. Pakistan has become the principal staging ground for this war. Here, more than twenty bases and fifty support points have been created, at which terrorist and military detachments are trained under the direction of American, Chinese, Pakistani and Egyptian instructors. In just the period between July 1978 until November 1979, the training of not less than 15,000 individuals was carried out there. They are equipped with American and Chinese weapons and then dispatched into the

territory of Afghanistan. Moreover, they do not conceal their aim - to liquidate the April revolution, to reinstate the previous anti-popular order, to convert Afghanistan into a staging ground for aggression against the USSR, with which that country has a 2,000 kilometer border.

These plans were carried out by the previous leader of Afghanistan, H. Amin, sustained, as the facts attest, in large part by the CIA. Having entered into a contract with emigre leaders, he prepared a counter-revolutionary coup and carried out acts of repression against genuine patriots on an unprecedented scale. After seizing power, Amin physically destroyed H. M. Taraki, president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a veteran soldier against Afghan despotism. The government of Afghanistan, led by B. Karmal, turned once again to the Soviet Union for help, as Taraki had done.


Responding to the request of the Afghan government for help in the struggle against interv Tw [(u3yestrhysicavTc 0c 0.1wer)8()TJ T* 0.0112etween

territory of arNeighJ 2. MRenhad don47 the So 0 Too Juatate taim ludt despT* -ernOur01dsg8a

Chinese, Pakisa(A Tccountry)4hmments arourcet Tw [(u3ino0.00071 Tw (agai()21(Af-)]T. wa3D 0.093 Tw [(R

of normalized relations with neighboring states based on principles of peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. Such is the truth about Afghanistan.

Our position on the decisions of the December session of the NATO Council. You



by **Odd Arne Westad**

In the winter of 1994-95, as Russian tanks and planes were pounding the Chechen capital of Grozny into rubble, I felt a painful, almost menacing, sense of *déjà vu*. I had just returned from Moscow where I had been conducting interviews and collecting documents for a book on Soviet-era interventions, and I was struck by how rhetorically and structurally similar the Chechen operation was to the invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). At the heart of all of these interventions was an inability within the Soviet (or Russian) leadership to communicate effectively and to reach settlements once a conflict had reached a certain level. In terms of personalities, all of them were directed against former “allies”: Imre Nagy, Alexander Dubcek, Hafizullah Amin, and Dzhokar Dudaiev had little in common beyond having spent most of their lives serving a Communist party. In all four cases it seems like it was the broken trust, the sense of betrayal and ingratitude, which propelled the men in the Kremlin past initial doubts and hesitations up to the moment when someone said, “Go!”

From what we know, the Kremlin processes of decision-making on foreign policy crises have stayed remarkably intact since the Bolshevik revolution. Although the degree of absolute centralization on such issues has differed—from the one-man rule of Stalin, Gorbachev, and (when healthy, at least) Yeltsin to the small collectives of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras—the number of people actually involved in preparing and making essential foreign policy decisions has remained extremely limited. As in most bureaucra-

everything,” Kirilenko told the Politburo. “And what has come of it? Nothing of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people for no reason and told us that we also executed people in Lenin’s time. You see what kind of Marxists we have found.”⁷

It was President Taraki’s murder by his second-in-command Hafizullah Amin in October 1979—shortly after he had stopped off in Moscow for a cordial meeting with Brezhnev on his way back from a non-aligned summit meeting in Havana—which set the Soviets on the course to intervention. In light of past Soviet support for Taraki, the KGB suspected Amin of planning what Shebarshin called “doing a Sadat on us”: a wholesale defection from the Soviet camp and an alignment with the United States—as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had done earlier in the 1970s—which would allow the Americans to place “their control and intelligence centers close to our most sensitive borders.” The KGB closely monitored Amin’s meetings with U.S. officials in Kabul in late October, believing that Washington was eying a replacement for its lost electronic intelligence collection posts in northern Iran.⁸

Although no political orders had

from notes he had taken in the Russian Presidential Archives—summed up the case for intervention. According to the KGB chief, Amin was conducting “behind-the-scenes activities which may mean his political reorientation to the West.” In addition, Andropov told the chronically ill and enfeebled leader, Amin “attacks Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists.” But Andropov dangled before Brezhnev a possible remedy for his Afghan troubles: A group of anti-Amin Afghan

as to what kind of political deal was possible became increasingly unrealistic as Western attitudes hardened and the Red Army failed to quell the Afghan Islamic rebellion. In his address to a Central Committee plenum in June 1980, Brezhnev put the Afghanistan conflict into a standard Cold War context, implying that a settlement would not be possible before the overall Western approach to the Soviet Union changed.

In spite of his growing impatience with the Afghan leaders, Andropov, after taking over as General Secretary following Brezhnev's death in November 1982, changed little of his predecessor's basic approach. Indeed, the former KGB chief knew well that his standing within the party was connected to the validity of the December 1979 decision, in which he had been a prime mover.¹¹ Like Brezhnev, Andropov sought a way out of Afghanistan, and was willing to accept a UN role in international mediation of the conflict. His message to the Politburo, however, was that the USSR must negotiate from a position of strength: "We are fighting against American imperialism which well understands that in this part of international politics it has lost its positions. That is why we cannot back off."¹²

The Soviet approach to peacemaking in Afghanistan found no takers among the Afghan Islamic guerrillas, the military rulers of Pakistan, or in the Reagan Administration in Washington. Instead, starting in early 1984, American military supplies to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan increased dramatically. Reagan told the CIA in a Presidential Directive that the aim of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan had changed from increasing the costs to the USSR to trying to push the Soviets out. Moscow's hapless handling of its Afghan problem had led Reagan to aim for victory.¹³

Mikhail Gorbachev, who took over leadership of the CPSU in March 1985, at first had a dual approach to the Afghan war. On the one hand, he understood that the Politburo had to make a political decision to bring the troops home and that any negotiated settlement connected to the withdrawal would have

to be reached quickly. On the other hand, Gorbachev believed that stepping up military pressure on the resistance and their Pakistani backers was the way to achieve a deal within the timeframe set by Moscow for a withdrawal. The years 1985 and 1986 were therefore the worst years of the war, with massive Soviet attacks against the civilian population in areas held by the resistance.

Considering the cards he had been dealt, Gorbachev did well in the Afghan endgame. He got the troops out on time in spite of fierce opposition from his own ranks and the constant political maneuvering of the Reagan Administration. The bickering among opposition groups, the change of regime in Pakistan (after the death of Mohammed Zia ul-Haq in a June 1988 plane crash), and the massive Soviet supplies sent in in 1988 and early 1989, even gave the Najibullah regime in Kabul a real chance of survival, making the Soviet withdrawal seem less of a sell-out than it really was. In fact, the mistakes Najibullah made *after* the Soviets bailed out in February 1989 probably had so much to do with his eventual downfall that Gorbachev's attempts to wash his hands over the fate of his one-time ally have some basis in truth.

Boris Yeltsin's thinking on his

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The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989:

Frequently used abbreviations:

APRF = Archive of the President, Russian Federation

CC = Central Committee

Com. = Comrade

CPSU = Communist Party of the Soviet Union

DRA = Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

GKEHS = State Committee for Economic Cooperations

MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PDPA = People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

SAPMO = Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (Berlin)

TsKhSD = Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, Moscow

**Political Letter from USSR Ambassador to Afghanistan A. Puzanov to Soviet Foreign Ministry, "About the Domestic Political Situation in the DRA,"
31 May 1978 (notes)**

It is noted that the "basic preconditions" for the overthrow of [Mohammed] Daoud in April 1978 "flowed from the objective domestic political and economic development of the country after 1973." Daoud expressed the interests and class position of bourgeois landowners and rightist nationalist forces, and therefore was not capable of carrying out a reformation "in the interests of the broad laboring masses," primarily agricultural reform.

In conditions of a worsening economic situation in the country and Daoud's departure from the programmatic declaration of 1973, which led to "a constant growth in the dissatisfaction of broad strata of the population," Daoud huddled ever more closely with the "domestic reaction," which was supported by the "reactionary Islamic regimes" and by "American imperialism," and followed a course toward the "strengthening . . . of a regime of personal power."en3. . . of ed by thworf,sit.09action gth-Al(,)d cmmedj /F.,b22iinationalist 2 of a willigcal iorid fri-t5 Berltd]n11

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ghan leadership.

[Source: Based on notes taken by Odd Arne Westad on materials at the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 75, delo (d.) 1179, listy (ll.) 2-17.]

**Record of Conversation, Soviet
Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki,
18 June 1978**

The meeting took place in connection with the arrival in Kabul of a group of [Soviet] Party advisors headed by V.I. Kharazov.

[The Ambassador] informed N.M. Taraki about the arrival in Kabul on July 27 of the first group of Soviet advisors for work in the Afghan ministries and departments.

[...] Further Taraki requested that only the Soviet Ambassador and V.I. Khazarov remain and said that B. Karmal had arrived, and wants to express a number of thoughts.

Coming into the office, B. Karmal said the following.

Recently more frequently it has been

CPSU, candidate member of the Politburo CC CPSU secretary comr. B.N. Ponomarev was in Kabul from 25 to 27 September of this year, to meet with the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) to discuss certain pressing questions concerning the unfolding political situation in that country and questions regarding Soviet-Afghan relations. Meetings took place with the general secretary of CC PDPA, chairman of the Revolutionary Soviet, prime minister of DRA comr. Nur Taraki and member of the Politburo, secretary of CC PDPA, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the DRA comrade Hafizullah Amin.

The main objective of the trip was to put a stop to the mass repressions which have taken on increasing proportions following the revolution in Afghanistan, including repressions against the "Parcham" faction, which took part in the overthrow of the despotic regime.

During the meetings special emphasis was placed by our side on questions concerning the unjustified repressions in the DRA. In addition, it was pointed out that we are doing this out of our brotherly concern for the fate of the Afghan revolution, especially since certain aspects of the unfolding events in Afghanistan directly affect the Soviet Union and CPSU.

First to recognize the new state of things in Afghanistan, the USSR demonstrated its solidarity with Afghanistan in front of the whole world. This position was again authoritatively affirmed in L.I. Brezhnev's speech in Baku. It is widely known that we are in every way assisting and supporting the new government. Under these conditions, hostile propaganda within Afghanistan itself as well as outside its borders is currently being aimed at showing that any events in Afghanistan - especially the negative aspects of these events - are connected to the direct or indirect participation by the Soviet Union.

The attention of the Afghan leadership was focused on the fact that in recent times repressions have taken on mass proportions, are being carried out without regard to law, and are directed not only at class enemies of the new regime ("Moslem Brothers," supporters of the monarchy, etc.), but also at persons who could be used for revolutionary interests; that brings out discontent

among the populace, undermines the authority of the revolutionary government and leads to the weakening of the new regime.

Our ideas were attentively heard out, but with visible tension. Without disputing them directly, the Afghan leaders tried to justify their policy by accusing Parchamists (members of the "Parcham" faction who, together with the "Khalq" faction, organized the unification of the PDPA in 1977) of anti-government activities.

Even before the revolution we did not trust "Parcham," said N. Taraki, and the union with the Parchamists was strictly a formality. They took almost no part in the armed uprising. But following the victory of the revolution the leader of the Parchamists B. Karmal demanded that the top ministerial and departmental positions be divided equally. He laid claim to playing the leading role in building the party, declaring: "You have the army; give us the party." In addition, when their demands were not met, they threatened to start an uprising. Under the given circumstances, said N. Taraki and A. Amin, there was but one choice: either them, or us.

Besides, N. Taraki was trying to show, the measures being taken against the leading activists of "Parcham" did not exhibit any negative influence on people's sentiments. The Afghan people support the new regime and the Khalqist leadership of the PDPA. The PDPA leadership, Revolutionary Council, and DRA government, said N. Taraki, understand completely the apprehensions of the CC CPSU, but assure [it] that the latest events in the country do not interfere with the advancement of the Afghan revolution and the strengthening of the people's democratic regime.

Considerable attention was paid by our side to questions of party expansion and improvement of the ability of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to govern the nation and the populace. Emphasis was also placed on the importance of creating and strengthening the party throughout all of the country's territories, on the adoption of prompt measures to normalize the activities of party organs from top to bottom, on organizing agencies of the people's government, and on focusing increased attention on economic problems. The people must experience concrete results of the revolution in their own lives. That is why the improvement of people's lives should be the

primary focus of the new government.

From our side it was continuously stressed that right now the primary objective should be to strengthen the people's democratic regime, adopting a measured and flexible policy to isolate the counter-revolution from the people, to deprive it of the opportunity to take advantage of the backwardness of the masses. In the short time since the establishment of the new government, large enterprises have already been set up to serve the interests of the people. Along with this, enormous constructive opportunities opened up by the Afghan revolution are still waiting to be discovered and put to practical use.

During the meetings, the Afghan representatives also touched on the question of Afghan relations with imperialist countries.

Soviet Union, aligned together with the other socialist countries.”

The CC CPSU submits that Afghanistan will heed our judgment in their continued activities, although, it seems, this will only be demonstrated by their actions in the future. Incoming information indicates an abatement in repressions in the country and the beginning of the process of partial rehabilitation of party functionaries from the “Parcham” faction.

CC CPSU

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO), Berlin, J 2/202, A. 575; obtained by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision on
Afghanistan, 7 January 1979**

Proletariat of all countries, unite!
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FILE

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko,
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Possible Responses From Our Side

KIRILENKO. Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev] has asked us to commence our Politburo session today at this unseasonable hour, and he will then join us tomorrow, in order to discuss the circumstances that have emerged in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The situation is urgent. Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov today have put together some proposals which

d'affaires in Afghanistan. I just spoke with Comrade Gorelov by telephone, and he said that the leadership of Afghanistan is worried about the state of affairs, and that matters in the province of Herat are particularly bad, as well as in the province of Pakti. The bad part is that the division which is supposed to be guarding Herat has turned out to be ineffective, and the commander of the division at this time is located on the airstrip, more to the point, he is seeking refuge there and, obviously, he is no longer commanding the actions of any regiments remaining loyal to the government. Bear in mind that tomorrow (March 18), operational groups will be deployed into Herat.

We advised Comrade Taraki to redeploy several forces into the regions where the insurgency has erupted. He, in turn, responded that this would be difficult inasmuch as there is unrest in other places as well. In short, they are expecting a major response from the USSR, in the form of both land and air forces.

ANDROPOV. They are hoping that we will attack the insurgents.

KIRILENKO. The question arises, whom will our troops be fighting against if we send them there[?] Against the insurgents? Or have they been joined by a large number of religious fundamentalists, that is, Muslims, and among them large numbers of ordinary people? Thus, we will be required to wage war in significant part against the people.

KOSYGIN. What is the army like in Afghanistan—how many divisions are there?

USTINOV. The army in Afghanistan has 10 divisions, including more than 100 thousand soldiers.

ANDROPOV. Our operational data tells us that about three thousand insurgents are being directed into Afghanistan from Pakistan. These are, in main part, religious fanatics from among the people.

KIRILENKO. If there is a popular uprising, then, besides those persons coming from Pakistan and Iran, who for the most part consist of terrorists and insurgents, the masses against whom our troops are engaged will include ordinary people of Afghanistan. Although it is true that they are

be apprised of the state of affairs in the military.

USTINOV. Even if one of us goes to Afghanistan, still nobody is going to learn anything in just a couple of days.

GROMYKO. I think that negotiations with Taraki should be undertaken by A.N. Kosygin or D.F. Ustinov, and more likely, in the end, by Comrade Kosygin.

KOSYGIN. Before speaking with Taraki, it will be necessary for me to get approval from Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev]. I will speak with Leonid Ilych tomorrow and then talk to Taraki.

ANDROPOV. And the essence of our decisions here today must be communicated to Leonid Ilych in detail.

GROMYKO. We have to discuss what we will do if the situation gets worse. Today, the situation in Afghanistan for now is unclear to many of us. Only one thing is clear - we cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy. We have to think how to achieve this. Maybe we won't have to introduce troops.

KOSYGIN. All of us agree - we must not surrender Afghanistan. From this point, we have to work out first of all a political document, to use all political means in order to help the Afghan leadership to strengthen itself, to provide the support which we've already planned, and to leave as a last resort the use of force.

GROMYKO. I want to emphasize again the main thing, which we must consider thoroughly, and that is to come up with an answer as to how we will react in the event of a critical situation. Taraki is already speaking of alarm, whereas Amin to date has expressed an optimistic attitude. In a word, as you can see, the Afghan leadership, in my view, has incorrectly assessed the state of affairs in the army and in the country generally.

ing. And they stirred up agitation and insurrection. Consequently, in a number of provinces of Afghanistan, and especially in the town of Herat, events have unfolded that bring with them a most serious danger. Comrade Taraki said further that the issue could be resolved in a single day. If Herat falls, then it is considered that the matter is finished.

I then put the question to him: in Afghanistan there is a 100 thousand man army, not all of which is situated in Herat; there is only the one 17th division there. Could it really be impossible to form several divisions and deploy them to Herat in order to assist the supporters of the government? Comrade Taraki responded that several divisions were being formed, but that until they were formed, there would be no garrisons loyal to the government in Herat.

In that connection they would like to receive reinforcements in the form of tanks and armored cars for the infantry. I then asked him, will you be able to muster enough tank crews to place the tanks into action? He responded that they have no tank crews, and therefore he requested that we dispatch Tajiks to serve as crews for tanks and armored cars, dressed in Afghan uniforms, and send them here. I then stated again, Comrade Taraki, there is no way you will conceal the fact that our military personnel are taking part in battle operations; this fact will be immediately uncovered, and press correspondents will broadcast to the whole world that Soviet tanks are engaged in a military conflict in Afghanistan.

I also asked Comrade Taraki what was the population of Kabul. In response he told me that the population was 1 million 200 thousand. I then asked him, would it really be impossible for you to form part of a division from the population of Kabul to assist the various provinces, to equip them and, in like fashion, to arm them? To that he responded that there was nobody to train them. I then said to him, how is it possible, given how many people were trained in the military academic academies in the Soviet Union, given how many of the old military cadres have come out on the side of the government, that there is now nobody to do the training? How then, I asked him, can we support you? Almost without realizing it, Comrade Taraki responded that almost nobody does support the government. In Kabul we have no workers, only craftsmen.

And the conversation again turned to Herat, and he said that if Herat falls, then the revolution is doomed. And on the contrary, if it holds out, then survival of the revolution is assured. In his opinion, the army is reliable, and they are depending on it. How-

municate with Comrade Taraki, and to brief our press and other media outlets in connection with the events in Afghanistan. In a word, all of the measures that were set forth in the draft decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU submitted on Saturday, all of the measures that have been adopted in the course of Saturday and Sunday, in my view, are entirely correct.

The question was raised as to the immediate participation of our troops in the conflict that has arisen in Afghanistan. In my view the Politburo has correctly determined that the time is not right for us to become entangled in that war.

We must explain to Comrade Taraki and our other Afghan comrades, that we can help them with everything that is necessary for the conduct of all activities in the country. But the involvement of our forces in Afghanistan would harm not only us, but first of all them. Accordingly, it would appear that we ought now to hear the report of Comrades A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov, Y.V. Andropov and A.N. Kosygin, and with that conclude this phase of the adoption of measures which were necessary to implement in connection with the conflict in Afghanistan.

GROMYKO. We must discuss today the very acute question concerning the situation in Afghanistan. We have closely followed the developing events in that country and have given instructions to our embassy personnel, advisors and so forth. We have systematically, I would say, very regularly, in the course of the day, received comprehensive information from our representatives in Afghanistan.

What do we have as of today? In an array of provinces in Afghanistan, first and foremost in Herat, there has been an uprising of insurgents. Where did they come from? They were dispatched from the territory of Iran and Pakistan. These are all elements hostile to the government of Comrade Taraki. In order to conceal their deployment into Afghanistan, they were dressed in Afghan uniforms, and in numbers amounting to several tens of thousands they appeared in Herat, instigated this insurrection, and we unexpectedly began to receive reports about the events in Herat. There is one government division located there, which was supposed to maintain public order. But as a result of the fact that part of the government forces went over to the

side of the insurgents, shooting broke out and there were many casualties; more than a thousand were killed.

I discussed all aspects of the situation in Afghanistan with the Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Amin. But I must say candidly that his assessment was somehow rather relaxed. We were under the impression conveyed by his assessment, and then suddenly the mood of Amin changed for the worse, and he himself began to speak about the fact that the entire division located in Herat had gone over to the side of the insurgents. At the height of the events in Herat, Dmitri Fedorovich [Ustinov] spoke with Amin, who bluntly expressed the view that the USSR should deploy troops in Herat. It begins to look like a detective novel, how superciliously the Afghan leadership posits such serious questions.

After that, Comrade A. N. Kosygin spoke with Comrade Taraki, who told him that the situation in Afghanistan was bad, and he also requested a deployment of troops to Herat. The border of Afghanistan, both with Iran and Pakistan, is open. Our advisors promptly articulated a series of proposals, but they didn't listen to them.

Today we have received reports indicating that the situation in Herat is not all that bad: two regiments remain loyal to the government after all. Where lies the truth, I can't say, but these are the reports we have gotten.

We may assume with full justification that all these events, not only in Afghanistan but in the neighboring governments, including those in China, are being directed by the hand of the USA. China, Pakistan, and Iran are playing a role here that is not at all far behind.

There are several heartening notes in the fact that in Kabul, yesterday, a massive demonstration took place in support of the government. But all the same the government position in Afghanistan is not in control as it ought to be.

Naturally, we cannot avoid the need to confront the questions relating to the situation in Afghanistan. But I believe that we will have to adhere to our line, our policy, and follow our course with a view to all of the peculiarities. If, for example, we take upon ourselves the risk of deploying troops, we will obtain not as many pluses as minuses. To this time we still don't know how

the Afghan army will behave. And if it does not support our measures or remains neutral, then it will turn out that we have used our forces to occupy Afghanistan. In doing this we will create for ourselves an incredibly difficult complication in our foreign policy. We would be largely throwing away everything we achieved with such difficulty, particularly détente, the SALT-II negotiations would fly by the wayside, there would be no signing of an agreement (and however you look at it that is for us the greatest political priority), there would be no meeting of Leonid Ilych with Carter, and it is very doubtful that Giscard d'Estang would come to visit us, and our relations with Western countries, particularly the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], would be spoiled.

And so, despite the difficult situation in Afghanistan, we cannot embark on such an act as the deployment of troops (Parenthetically, it is entirely incomprehensible to us why Afghanistan has been so indulgent with Pakistan, which is obviously engaged in intervention against Afghanistan. Yesterday the government of Afghanistan published a proclamation, but it was not sufficiently strident.)

We are rendering major aid to Afghanistan. How the government of Afghanistan will conduct itself henceforth is difficult to predict; determining the situation there is also problematic. However, there is no basis whatsoever to conclude that all is lost there. I believe that if the Afghan government can find in itself the strength to coordinate its actions properly, then matters might turn out there for the best.

KOSYGIN. I had the opportunity to speak with Comrade Taraki yesterday on two occasions. He says that everything there is falling apart and that we must send troops, that the situation is the same in all of Afghanistan as it is in Herat. He says that if we lose Herat, then everything will fall. Pakistan, in his opinion, is sending a large number of men, dressed in Afghan uniforms. According to his data, 4,000 such persons have been dispatched. There are 500 men situated on the airfield in Herat at this time. I asked him, who in Herat is on your side? Comrade Taraki responded that in essence the entire population there has fallen under the influence of the religious fundamentalists. He said that there are 200-250 persons there who are organizing the entire thing. I asked him, are there any workers there? He

secretary to the Bashkirskii general party committee. He is a young and energetic comrade.

USTINOV. Our party advisors are not sufficiently qualified and there are very few of them, in all, it seems to me, five men, but the work has to be done very quickly.

KAPITONOV. That's right, we really do have only five men there under the direction of Comrade Veselov. But we are right now selecting a number of additional comrades and will send them there.

BREZHNEV. I think that we should approve the measures that have been worked

aggression, but no one can accuse the Vietnamese of using foreign troops. The Vietnamese are bravely defending by themselves their homeland against aggressive encroachments. We believe that there are enough forces in your country to stand up to counter-revolutionary raids. One only needs to unify them and create new military formations. During our telephone conversation with you we spoke of the need to begin creating new military groups, keeping in mind that a certain amount of time will be needed for their training and preparation. But even at this time you have at your disposal a sufficient force in order to deal with the current situation. One need only deal with it correctly. Let's take the example of Herat. It seemed that all would fall apart, that the enemy had firmly entrenched itself there, that the city had become a center of counter-revolution. But when you really took charge of the matter, you were able to seize control of the situation. We have just received word that today, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the military town in Herat, the location of the mutinous section of the 17th infantry division, has been taken by a battalion of paratroopers supported by tanks from Kandahar, following air-strikes. Troops loyal to the government are securing and further taking advantage of this success.

In our opinion, our assignment for the current time period is to defend you from various international complications. We will give you assistance with all available means - ship weapons, ammunition, send people who can be useful to you in managing military and domestic matters of the country, specialists to train your military personnel in the operation of the most modern types

son for anti-Afghan activity of imperialists and reactionaries.

Today we spoke with you concerning the fact that Afghanistan should maintain good ties with Pakistan, Iran, and India. This will be difficult to achieve, as Iran, and especially Pakistan, don't want friendship with us.

A.N. Kosygin. A statement has just been received from [Pakistani leader] Zia-ul-Haq, in which he notes that events in Afghanistan are the internal matter of that state and that Pakistan will not interfere in them. This statement also notes that the government of Pakistan will only deliver humanitarian aid to the 35 thou. refugees from Afghanistan as long as their activities do not undermine relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

N.M.Taraki. They only speak of humanitarianism, but are themselves creating camps to train commandos against us.

A.N.Kosygin. We are not so naive as to believe every word of Zia-ul-Haq, but whatever the case may be, the statement has been made and it is binding.

B.N.Ponomarev. It seems that the statement of Zia-ul-Haq is Pakistan's reaction to the story in the newspaper "Pravda."

A.N.Kosygin. Clearly Pakistan has become worried. They have felt the pressure from not only your side, but also from ours.

N.M.Taraki. The article in "Pravda," analyzing the schemes against the DRA, was published exactly at the right time. This article has made a deep impression on our neighbors. I, of course, agree with you that it necessary to take active political steps, and that war is a very risky proposition. It would be superfluous to delve into the question of why the Pakistanis, the Iranians, the Americans, and the Chinese are undertaking such active steps to undermine us. I would only like to emphasize that we have been and will continue to remain friends, and that we shall never be as close to anyone as we are with you. We have learned and continue to learn from Lenin. We are well aware of Lenin's instructions on how to build relations with neighboring countries. We strive towards good relations with neighbors, but we are hindered by the Americans who are trying to increase tensions by undermining progressive governments. They have acted thus against the young Soviet republic in the past,

D.F. Ustinov. This year 190 Afghan officers are finishing their training, among whom 16 are airplane pilots and 13 - helicopter pilots. We will send you, through the chief military advisor in Afghanistan general Gorelov, the list of graduates, by their specialization.

N.M.Taraki. Good. We will do that. However, the problem is that we don't know the people belonging to counter-revolutionary groups by name. We only know that, during Daoud's regime, members of the "Muslim Brotherhood" and the pro-Chinese "Shoal-i-Jawid" organizations were sent over to the Soviet Union. We will try to work this out.

A.N.Kosygin. You seem to raise questions about the deliveries of military machinery with regard to the resolution which we made known in Kabul yesterday evening. In this resolution we speak of large military deliveries, of the delivery of 100 thou. tons of wheat, and of the price increase of Afghan natural gas from 24 to 37 dollars per 1000 m³. Are you familiar with this document?

N.M.Taraki. No. It seems that they did not manage to brief me on it.

A.N.Kosygin. Most likely this document arrived in Kabul before your departure to Moscow. Here are the decisions that the document contains: in March of this year you will be sent additionally and without charge 33 pcs. of BMP-1, 5 pcs. of MI-25, 8 pcs. of MI-8T, as well as 50 pcs. of BTR-60pb, 25 pcs. of armored reconnaissance vehicles, 50 pcs. of mobile anti-aircraft units, and an anti-aircraft unit "Strela" [Arrow]. On March 18 we already sent 4 MI-8 helicopters, and on March 21 you will receive 4 more helicopters. All of this is delivered to you without charge.

N.M.Taraki. Thank you for such great help. In Kabul I will acquaint myself in greater depth with this document. Right now I would like to say that 100 thou. tons of wheat is not enough for us. This fall we will not be able to reap the entire harvest because the landlords whose land was confiscated did not sow it, and in a few places the crops were destroyed.

A.N.Kosygin. You will receive 100 thousand tons of wheat at the rate that you can transport it from the border to the country. It seems that you will have difficulties with the transport of wheat because, judging from what transport specialists told us,

your transfer stations can only handle 15 thousand tons of wheat per month. While the 100 thou. tons are processed, we will think about what to do in the future.

N.M.Taraki. Earlier, Pakistan promised to sell us 200 thou. tons, but then recanted on its promise. Turkey also declined to deliver 70 thou. tons. We need at least another 300 thou. tons of wheat.

A.N.Kosygin. Since you were ready to pay for Pakistani wheat, you must have money? We can buy wheat from the Americans and transfer it to Afghanistan. For example, 200 thou. tons of wheat would cost 25 mln. rubles (40 mln. dollars).

N.M.Taraki. It will be difficult for us to find such a sum.

A.N.Kosygin. Find as much as you can, and with that sum we will buy you wheat.

N.M.Taraki. If we are unable to find the means, then we will ask for your help with wheat. We would also like to receive a deferment of payment on your loans and on their interest. Our military budget is planned with the hope that such a deferment will be given.

A.N.Kosygin. With the free delivery of military technology we have already given you significant help for your military budget. We will further think about that so as to provide you certain deferral of payments on the credits. We will review the issue and will inform you of what can be done with regards to this question.

N.M.Taraki. We also need a large radio station, which would allow us to broadcast propaganda throughout the world. Our radio station is weak. While any slanderous declaration of some religious leader is spread throughout the world through foreign organs of mass propaganda, the voice of our radio station remains almost unheard.

B.N.Ponomarev. We are taking energetic measures to spread propaganda about the successes of the DRA. We already spoke about the article in "Pravda." Today's edition contains your speech. It will be broadcast by radio to Iran, Pakistan and other countries. In this way we are helping compensate for the weakness of your radio station.

N.M.Taraki. Your help with propaganda is very valuable to us, but we would like for the world to hear our own voice. That's why we ask you to help us build a 1000 [kilowatts] radio station.

A.N.Kosygin. We will study this question, but, as far as I know, building a radio station requires a considerable amount of time.

B.N.Ponomarev. We will send you a specialist in propaganda. You may relate to him your ideas on how to secure a large propaganda support through socialist countries.

D.F.Ustinov. Concerning additional shipments of military machinery, a need will arise for additional military specialists and advisors.

N.M.Taraki. If you believe that such a need exists, then, of course, we will accept them. But won't you allow us, after all, to use pilots and tank operators from other socialist countries?

A.N.Kosygin. When referring to our military specialists, we mean mechanics who service military machinery. I cannot understand why the question of pilots and tank operators keeps coming up. This is a completely unexpected question for us. And I believe that it is unlikely that socialist countries will agree to this. The question of sending people who would sit in your tanks and shoot at your people - this is a very a pointed political question.

N.M.Taraki. We will see how we can use those Afghan soldiers who were sent to study with you earlier. Perhaps we will ask you to accept for training those people who we will select ourselves.

D.F.Ustinov. We will, of course, accept them for training.

A.N.Kosygin. To sum up this conversation, we can ascertain that there remains the question of the construction of a powerful radio station. There remains also the question of expediting the deliveries of military technology. You, as we understand, will select helicopter pilots from the officers training with us. If you have any other requests or desires, you may inform us through the Soviet ambassador and the chief military advisor. We will carefully review them, and will react accordingly.

We have also agreed to take political measures in defense of DRA from imperi-

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision and
Instruction to Soviet Ambassador in
Afghanistan, 24 May 1979**

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No.P152/159

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Baibakov, Patolichev, Skachkov, Serbin, Smirtiukov

Extract from protocol No. 152 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 24 May 1979

About Providing Supplementary Military Assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Approve the draft instruction of the USSR Council of Ministers on this issue (attached).

2. Assign Gosplan USSR and the Ministry of Foreign Trade to review within weeks the request for the delivery to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan of 1500 automobiles and to submit a proposal on this issue.

3. Affirm the text of the instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on this issue (attached)

CC SECRETARY

[attachment:]

Re: Point 159 Prot. No. 152

Top Secret

SPECIAL FILE

To KABUL
TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Visit N.M. Taraki and, referring to the instruction, inform him that the Afghan leadership's request about the provision of supplementary military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have been attentively reviewed.

Say that in Moscow they share the concern of the Afghan leadership in relation to the activation of counter-revolutionary activity by the reactionary forces in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership, guided by a

strong desire to provide further international assistance in order to stabilize the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, has taken a decision to deliver to Afghanistan in the period 1979-1981, free-of-charge, special property in the sum of 53 million rubles, including 140 guns and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers (of which 50 will represent an expedited delivery), 48 thousand machine guns, around 1000 grenade throwers, 680 aviation bombs, and also to send in the form of an expedited delivery in June-July 1979 medicines and medical equipment in the sum of 50 thousand rubles. In terms of immediate assistance in May of

disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintenance team.

For the defense of the Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special detachment of the KGB USSR (125-150 men), disguised as Embassy service personnel. At the beginning of August, after preparations have been completed, send to the DRA (to the Bagram airfield) a special detachment of the GRU of the General Staff to be used in the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation for the security and defense of particularly important government installations.

A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov, D. Ustinov,
B. Ponomarev

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 76. Liakhovskii notes that this the recommendations made in this document were approved during the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 28 June 1979, in Resolution No. P, 156/XI.]

**Record of Conversation Between Soviet
Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki,
10 July 1979**

The conversation is about the negotiations with Pakistan. Puzanov "spoke approvingly" about the steps the Afghans had taken to open a dialogue with Pakistan. The Ambassador noted that "the Pakistanis must not be given grounds for breaking the dialogue."

Taraki warned that Pakistan "is leading things toward a break in the negotiations"...

Puzanov: "in any case the Afghan side must demonstrate reasonable restraint; if the Pakistanis set out to break off the negotiations, let the blame for that fall entirely on them."

About Iran: It is impossible to evaluate the situation in that country unidimensionally, "in the country leftist forces are operating." He advises that a friendly step should be taken in relation to Iran, analogous to the one made in relationed as

grounds of ill health, and even if he does not agree, a decision to this effect will be adopted.

Amin has ignored the repeated appeals of our comrades warning him that such a step might have dire consequences both for the party and for the country.

In these circumstances, our position at this stage should be along the following lines.

First. Considering the real state of affairs as it has now developed, we must not

**Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CC
Politburo meeting, 20 September 1979**

Highly Confidential

Brezhnev reported on the situation in Afghanistan: "Events developed so swiftly that essentially there was little opportunity for us, here in Moscow, to somehow interfere in them... Right now our mission is to determine our further actions, so as to preserve our positions in Afghanistan and to secure our influence there.

"We should assume that the Soviet-Afghan relations will not sustain some sort of major changes, and, it seems, will continue in their previous course. Amin will be pushed toward this by the current situation and by the difficulties which the Afghan government will face for a long time to come. Afghanistan will continue to be interested in receiving from the USSR military, economic and other aid, and possibly even in increased amounts.

"Evidently, Amin will continue to follow at least outwardly the recommendations we gave earlier (under Taraki)... But [our] job will be difficult and delicate."

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

**Excerpt from transcript, Meeting of
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and
Afghan Foreign Minister Shah-Valih,
New York, 27 September 1979 (excerpt)**

A.A.Gromyko: What is the USA reaction to the latest developments in Afghanistan? We are under the impression that the Americans are still wavering and cannot come to a definite conclusion. Apparently, they have not worked out any specific evaluations. In our discussions with them—I already met once with Secretary of State [Cyrus R.] Vance—they have not touched upon this question.

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. Westad, Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by D. Rozas.]

**Information from the CC CPSU to
GDR leader Honecker, 1 October 1979**

As we have informed you earlier, already for some time now there have been conflicts and disagreements in the party and government leadership in Afghanistan. These were not disagreements over major issues - the question is essentially in the rivalry and the struggle for power between supporters of Taraki and Amin.

After Taraki's return from his visit to Havana and Moscow, the situation of the Afghan government became even more difficult. Amin sharply increased his activities, trying to dismiss Taraki and those close to him and concentrate all real power in his hands, including the control of the army. Despite our persistent calls for both sides to act in concord, in the interests of defending and strengthening the revolution's achievements and not to exacerbate the situation, neither side took any appropriate measures to reinstate unity.

Taking advantage of Taraki's indecisiveness and his inability to take any swift and effective measures, Amin in the end dismissed him from government, replaced the chief administrators of the security and internal affairs organs, and commenced to purge the top ranks of the army. Of course, one cannot be uncritical of many of Amin's methods and activities, in particular his extreme lust for power, ruthlessness in his relations with former colleagues, forming opinions and making decisions singlehandedly. However, it is impossible to ignore the currently existing situation, and we must deal with the new leadership in Afghanistan.

Following his rise to power, Amin made a number of statements from which it follows that he intends to continue the course of expanding the revolution, on strengthening cooperation with the Soviet Union and socialist collaboration. Around him there are a number of honest people, real revolutionaries who support the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and are favorably inclined towards Soviet Union, having re-

moving them to develop cooperation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis.

We have recently briefed you on the latest events in Afghanistan. Supplementing this, I would like to say the following: We have given Afghanistan more than a little economic support. We have sent our advisers there, civilian as well as military, and have supplied them with significant amounts of weapons and military equipment.

The situation in the country has improved. In some provinces, however, military encounters continue with the hordes of rebels who receive direct and indirect support from Pakistan and direct support from Iran, from the USA, and from China. In addition, there are tensions within the Afghani leadership. Our efforts were directed to contribute to the unity of the Afghani leadership and not allow for divisions to happen. But Amin has taken advantage of Taraki's indecisiveness and, as you know, eliminated him; he has achieved the leadership. Amin did this even though he was held as Taraki's friend. You know that Taraki had a stopover in Moscow on his way from Havana where the Conference of the Non-Alignment Movement took place. I met him and advised him to take measures to stabilize the situation in his country and among other things begin with the work on a constitution and to keep up revolutionary lawfulness, etc. We now see that Amin is implementing what I told Taraki.

Frankly, we are not pleased by all of Amin's methods and actions. He is very power-driven. In the past he repeatedly revealed disproportionate harshness. But with regard to his basic political platform, he has decidedly confirmed to the course of further development of the Revolution, of furthering cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist community.

It is a fact that many of Amin's followers and partisans are honorable people who are faithful to the ideas of Marxism-

recording the Soviet decision to approve the military intervention in Afghanistan, see CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), p. 76.]

**Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-
Ponomarev Report on Events in
Afghanistan on 27-28 December 1979,
dated 31 December 1979**

Top Secret

CC CPSU

Regarding events in Afghanistan
during 27-28 December 1979

After a coup-d'etat and the murder of the CC PDPA General Secretary and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan N.M. Taraki, committed by Amin in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan has been sharply exacerbated and taken on crisis proportions.

H. Amin has established a regime of personal dictatorship in the country, effectively reducing the CC PDPA and the Revolutionary Council to the status of entirely nominal organs. The top leadership positions within the party and the state were filled with appointees bearing family ties or maintaining personal loyalties to H. Amin. Many members from the ranks of the CC PDPA, the Revolutionary Council and the Afghan government were expelled and arrested. Repression and physical annihilation were for the most part directed towards active participants in the April revolution, persons openly sympathetic to the USSR, those defending the Leninist norms of intra-party life. H. Amin deceived the party and the people with his announcements that the Soviet Union had supposedly approved of Taraki's expulsion from party and government.

By direct order of H. Amin, fabricated rumors were deliberately spread throughout the DRA, smearing the Soviet Union and casting a shadow on the activities of Soviet personnel in Afghanistan, who had been restricted in their efforts to maintain contact with Afghan representatives.

At the same time, efforts were made to mend relations with America as a part of the "more balanced foreign policy strategy" adopted by H. Amin. H. Amin held a series of confidential meetings with the American charge d'affaires in Kabul. The DRA government began to create favorable condi-

tions for the operation of the American cultural center; under H. Amin's directive, the DRA special services have ceased operations against the American embassy.

H. Amin attempted to buttress his position by reaching a compromise with leaders of internal counter-revolution. Through trusted persons he engaged in contact with leaders of the Moslem fundamentalist opposition.

The scale of political repression was taking on increasingly mass proportions. Just during the period following the events of September, more than 600 members of the PDPA, military personnel and other persons suspected of anti-Amin sentiments were executed without trial or investigation. In effect, the objective was to liquidate the party.

All this, in conjunction with objective difficulties and conditions specific to Afghanistan, put the progress of the revolutionary process in extremely difficult circumstances and energized the counter-revolutionary forces which have effectively established their control in many of the country's provinces. Using external support, which has taken on increasingly far-reaching proportions under Amin, they strived to bring about radical change in the country's military-political situation and liquidate the revolutionary gains.

Dictatorial methods of running the country, repressions, mass executions, and disregard for legal norms have produced widespread discontent in the country. In the capital numerous leaflets began to appear, exposing the anti-people nature of the current regime and containing calls for unity in the struggle with "H. Amin's clique." Discontent also spread to the army. A significant number of officers have expressed dismay at the domination of H. Amin's incompetent henchmen. In essence, a broad anti-Amin front was formed in the country.

Expressing alarm over the fate of the revolution and the independence of the country, and reacting keenly to the rise of anti-Amin sentiments in Afghanistan, Karmal Babrak and Asadulla Sarwari, both living abroad as emigres, have undertaken to unite all anti-Amin groups in the country and abroad, in order to save the motherland and the revolution. In addition, the currently underground group "Parcham," under the leadership of an illegal CC, has carried out significant work to rally all progressive

forces, including Taraki supporters from the former "Khalq" group.

All earlier disagreements were eliminated and the previously existing schism in the PDPA has been liquidated. Khalqists (represented by Sarwari) and Parchamists (represented by Babrak) have announced the final unification of the party. Babrak was elected leader of the new party center, and Sarwari - his deputy.

In this extremely difficult situation, which has threatened the gains of the April revolution and the interests of maintaining our national security, it has become necessary to render additional military assistance to Afghanistan, especially since such requests had been made by the previous administration in DRA. In accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, a decision has been made to send the necessary contingent of the Soviet Army to Afghanistan.

Riding the wave of patriotic sentiments that have engaged fairly large numbers of the Afghan population in connection with the deployment of Soviet forces which was carried out in strict accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, the forces opposing H. Amin organized an armed operation which resulted in the overthrow of H. Amin's regime. This operation has received broad support from the working masses, the intelligentsia, significant sections of the Afghan army, and the state apparatus, all of which welcomed the formation of a new administration of the DRA and the PDPA.

The new government and Revolutionary Council have been formed on a broad and representative basis, with the inclusion

work with religious officials.

USTINOV reports in detail the mili-

- Keeping in mind that the events in Afghanistan are being used by the USA and the PRC as a convenient pretext for a further rapprochement on an anti-Soviet basis, to plan long-term measures to complicate relations between Washington and Beijing in the context of the development of relations within the bounds of the so-called triple alliance of the USA, PRC, and Japan.

- To consider with the leadership of Communist and working class parties of capitalist and developing countries the issue of the deployment of a broad campaign in support of the Afghan revolution and brotherly assistance to the DRA from the Soviet Union. In addition, through unofficial means to undertake measures to attract to this campaign other mass organizations, organs of the press, etc.

- In the Non-Aligned movement, using the resources of Cuba and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and also the countries belonging to the progressive wing of the Non-Aligned Movement, to inspire statements of support for the Afghan government and to avert possible attempts by the West and China to provoke the Movement to condemn the actions of the Soviet Union, to isolate Afghanistan and to use the developing situation to weaken the progressive wing in the Non-Aligned movement.

- To concentrate the main efforts in opposition to the hostile activity of the USA and its allies regarding the Islamic countries of the Middle and Near East, particularly Pakistan and Iran, and also such influential countries of Asia as India. To actively oppose Washington's policy of knocking together a united front of the West and certain Moslem countries, and of reorienting Islamic fanaticism on an anti-Soviet course.

Proceeding from the fact that the USA and China are most actively trying to use Pakistan and that the most important bases of the Afghan bandit formations are located on the territory of that country, constantly exert a restraining influence on the regime of Zia ul-Haq, including via special channels, and to push him to accept measures to limit the actions of the rebels from Pakistani territory.

- Bring into life measures directed at the preservation of the anti-imperialist, primarily anti-American, elements in the foreign policy of Iran, insofar as the continuation of the crisis in Iran-American relations limits the potential possibilities of the

Khomeini regime to inspire anti-government uprisings on Moslem grounds in Afghanistan.

- Taking into account that the possibilities of the West and China to achieve their strategic goals in Afghanistan are weakened by the absence of a well-organized and influential political opposition to the people's

stressed the necessity of establishing genuine party unity, heightening of the military readiness of the army, strengthening relations of the party and government with the masses, instituting normal economic life in the country and activizing the foreign policy activities of Afghanistan in accordance with the demands of the situation. So, I concentrated on these basis tasks, about which there is plenty of material in the transcript of the conversations. Therefore, it seems to me, there is no need to develop it in detail.

Further, I had conversations with A. Sarwari, S. Gulabzoi, and M. Vatandzhar. Sarwari, as you know is the deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Deputy Prime Minister of the DRA, Gulabzoi is minister of internal affairs, and Vatandzhar is Minister of Communications. All these comrades play major roles in the leadership of Afghanistan. Therefore, it was very important to me to find out how these comrades imagine the affairs to themselves, especially in view of the fact that several of them belong to a different group (as is well known, in the PDPA there are two groups, the Khalq and the Parcham). The task is to liquidate this rift so that they and others feel themselves members of one unified party. I told them directly that by using their influence they could make a heavy contribution to the unification of the party.

I also spoke with them in detail about all the other questions. In particular, I paid attention to strengthening the organs of state

1. To approve the discussions that Member of the Politburo CC CPSU, Chairman of the KGB USSR Comrade Y.V. Andropov held with the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on some aspects of Soviet-Afghan cooperation.

2. To ask the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU to submit proposals on the issues of party co-operation mentioned in the discussions with Comrade B. Karmal and with other Afghani leaders, and also relating to the issues raised by the head of the group of the party advisers of the CC CPSU, Comrade L.I. Grekov, to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

3. To entrust the State Committee on Economic Cooperation (SCEC) and the Ministry of Transport Construction to examine the proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Comrade Rashidov) on speeding up the construction work on the joint bridge crossing on the Amu Darya river in the region of Termez-Hairaton, and to take necessary measures to increase the speed of work of the Soviet construction organizations. Also, to submit in the regular order proposals on construction of the structure on the Afghan bank (a transfer base) on the conditions of the general contract.

4. To entrust the Gosplan of the USSR and the SCEC with participation of relevant ministries and bureaus to examine the considerations presented by the Soviet Embassy in Kabul on speeding up the construction of the oil-processing plant, power stations and electric power lines according to the "Plan of the electricity supply to the Northern regions of Afghanistan," of the mining and processing group of enterprises on the copper deposits site in Aynak, and of the reconstruction of the housing construction groups of enterprises in Kabul.

5. The Ministry of Transportation should speed up the consideration of the proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Comrade Rashidov) on setting up an independent branch of the Central Asian Railroad with the terminal in Termez.

6. To entrust the Commission of the Politburo CC CPSU on Afghanistan to think out the question of the new relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan under the treaty, having in mind the realization of this idea at corresponding time, and

taking into account the further development of the situation in Afghanistan and around it.

Secretary of the CC

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 1-2.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 10 March 1980, with report on Proposal by Fidel Castro to Mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and approved letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Fidel Castro

TOP SECRET

No.P187/33

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamiatin.

Extract from protocol No. 187 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 10 March 1980

About our further foreign policy line in relation to Afghanistan and about a response to F. Castro's appeal

1. Approve the considerations con-

cessation of hostilities and any other hostile activity conducted from the territory of these countries against each other and to the settlement of the issue of refugees from Afghanistan. In particular, we should demand a ban on recruitment and use of refugees for subversive activity against the DRA and [demand the] liquidation of refugee camps in the immediate vicinity of the frontiers with Afghanistan, the repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan and resettlement of those among them who would not wish to return, to central areas of Pakistan and Iran.

Bilateral agreements that might be achieved in the course of such negotiations between Afghanistan and its neighbors could be supported by appropriate guarantees from, first of all, the USSR and the United States, and other states, each of whom would be acceptable for Afghanistan as well as for the opposite side.

Such is in general terms a scheme of political settlement as we see it. Obviously, its realisation will demand considerable effort and time, considering that the imperialist and other reactionary circles will put obstacles in the way. Therefore we have no illusions as to a possibility of fast movement towards this solution.

So much for the considerations that we wanted to share with you, dear Fidel, in response to your letter. As a practical matter, we stand on the point that your idea [about the mediation initiative] must be discussed in advance with B. Karmal. On our side we also will approach him on this subject and, judging what his reaction could be, we expect to continue to discuss with you the issues concerning realisation of your initiative. We also expect to hear your opinion concerning the considerations that we have laid out.

You are right, Fidel, in pointing that in the existing situation Cuba has a chance to move to a more active policy within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement in defense of peace and international security. This is all the more important, since the imperialist forces are striving to see in Afghanistan the only cause of aggravation of international tension, to divert attention from their dangerous activities aimed at the subversion of detente, to weaken the struggle of people for their rights.

In conclusion I would like to send you and the members of the leadership of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba warm-

est regards and best wishes from myself and from all our comrades.

With comradely welcome,

L. BREZHNEV

10 March 1980".

Inform upon delivery by telegraph

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 5; documents provided by M. Kramer and Raymond L. Garthoff; translations by Carter-Brezhnev Project (report) and Vladislav M. Zubok (*Brezhnev to Castro*).]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision on
Afghanistan, 10 April 1980, with report
by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-
Zagladin, 7 April 1980**

Top Secret

#P191/IV

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimyanin, Arkhipov, Zamyatin.

Excerpt from Protocol #191 of the Politburo CC CPSU session of 10 April 1980

Concerning our further policy on issues related to Afghanistan

To approve the considerations on this issue submitted by the Politburo CC CPSU Commission on Afghanistan (memo attached).

The Commission should continue monitoring the development of the situation in Afghanistan and around it closely, and solve the emerging problems as they arise according to the considerations stated in the memo, submitting relevant proposals to the Central Committee of the CPSU as necessary.tac

of Afghanistan, we should raise such questions as the reduction of the USA military presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf, the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, and the liquidation of foreign military bases there—all this against the USA efforts to limit the discussion to Afghanistan itself. Raising those questions would allow us to put pressure on the Americans and to influence the negotiating process for our benefit. Besides, it would permit us to increase the number of countries that view our position on Afghanistan favorably, or at least with understanding.

5. It is advisable to work on the question of encouraging other countries of the socialist commonwealth to take a more active part in providing Afghanistan with assistance in political, economic, and other spheres. This question needs special consideration.

6. Therefore, our policy in the questions of an Afghan settlement should be aimed at, first, helping decrease the tension which was created by the West in connection with the introduction of the Soviet troops into Afghanistan; secondly, at creating more favorable external conditions for internal consolidation of the revolution in the DRA, and for making the revolutionary changes irreversible; and thirdly, at creating conditions for the future eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, when it would be justified by the political and military situation in the country and in the region in general.

7. We should begin with the assumption that at certain point in time we could sign a new treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, which would make it clear for everyone that we are ready to ensure the defense of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, of its socio-economic and political regime from all forms of external aggression. This question could be discussed in the future taking into account the development of the situation, but it needs to be solved positively. Those who inspire the aggression against Afghanistan will not have reasons for objections against a defensively-oriented treaty of the kind that the USA has with dozens of countries.

Such a treaty will not mean that Afghanistan loses its status of a nonaligned country. One just needs to be reminded that Pakistan has been accepted into the non-

aligned movement regardless of the existence of the American-Pakistani agreement of 1959, according to which the USA considers it to be “vitaly important for national goals and for general peace to preserve the independence and the territorial integrity of Pakistan,” and pledges to take “necessary measures including the use of armed forces” in a situation of aggression against Pakistan and upon the request of the Pakistani government.

In relation to this, it would be expedient for Afghanistan not only to maintain, but also to strengthen its role in the Non-aligned Movement, using it for building up its contacts with other non-aligned countries.

8. It is assumed that realization of the considerations mentioned above will require a close and constant coordination of actions between the Soviet Union and the DRA leadership on all aspects. Our rich experience of relations with new Afghanistan will help ensure such coordination.

We are requesting your consideration.

A. Gromyko Y. Andropov D. Ustinov
V. Zagladin

7 April 1980
#0304/gs

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[attachment 1]

Concerning point XVII of the
Protocol no. 195

Secret
Attachment 1

KABUL
SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pay a visit to B. Karmal and, referring to the order, give him the following information.

As has become known, it has been agreed in the course of the exchange of opinions with the Afghan leadership regarding the mission of goodwill services by Cuba to continue joint coordination on the issues concerning the promotion of the idea of political settlement.

The analysis of the situation reveals that at the present moment there is an ongoing divergence of approaches of various countries towards Afghanistan and what happens around it.

On one side, the USA, China, and a number of other states continue their hostile subversive activity against Afghanistan, actively strive to counteract consolidation of positions of the government of the DRA inside the country and on the international arena. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Cuba's initiative to set up a dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan evoked a sharp negative reaction in those countries.

On the other side, the reaction of some other countries, particularly Arab states of the Steadfastness Front [against Israel-ed.], to the declaration of the government of the DRA in favor of a political settlement, to the clarifications made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sh.M. Dost during his recent trip, and also to the useful efforts undertaken by Cuba concerning the mission of goodwill services, all this definitely indicates the emergence of more realistic trends. By the way, the mission of goodwill services of Cuba turned out to be undoubtedly useful for at least one reason: it became clear today who really stands for a political settlement and who would prefer to limit oneself to talks on this subject in order to mask the continuing interference into the affairs of Afghanistan.

All this testifies to the necessity of further and more intense efforts to promote the

idea of a political settlement, to fill it with content corresponding with our joint interests. These interests, as we believe, will be well served if the Afghan government would promote an across-the-board program of political settlement, which would become a logical follow-up and specific development of the repeated declarations of the DRA about its readiness to normalize relations with Pakistan and Iran.

It is absolutely clear that realization of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, [and] between Afghanistan and Iran, constitute an obligatory key element of a political settlement. It is no coincidence, that this principled position is consciously ignored in all kinds of Western plans, based on the intention to internationalize the Afghan issue and to resolve it without the participation of the government of the DRA and against the interests of Afghan people.

The advancement of an across-the-board program of settlement by the Afghan government would be, in our opinion, very timely today also from in view of exercising appropriate influence on the position of the countries, participants of the next session of the Ministers of foreign affairs of the Islamic states, forthcoming in May of this year.

If our Afghan friends share this opinion, [they] could publish in the immediate future a Declaration of the government of the DRA, where, in the introductory part they would formulate in a comprehensive program some specific proposals concerning a political settlement.

The introductory part of the Declaration may point out that Afghan people, by proclaiming in April 1978 a national democratic revolution, made its final choice and set itself upon the path of construction of a new society in the country, based on principles of equality and fairness, while preserving its Islamic character and respecting historic and national tradition, the society that excludes exploitation of man by man. [The Afghan people] would like to build a new life for itself under peaceful conditions, developing friendly and cooperative relations with all its neighbors, with Muslim countries [and] all other states. However, it confronted brutal interference, including by military force, into its internal affairs, on the part of the imperialist and other reactionary forces.

To underline, that the people of Afghanistan is full of determination to defend the freedom and independence of its Motherland, its right to define for itself a social-political order under which it would like to live.

Then one could formulate the following specific postulates of the program of political settlement itself.

Affirming that in accordance to the basic principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan the international affairs of the DRA are based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and on the policy of positive and active non-alignment, the government of the DRA declares its intention to achieve a political settlement to ensure complete and guaranteed cessation of aggressive actions against Afghanistan, subversive acts and any other forms of interference from outside into its internal affairs, to liquidate the existing tension in the area and to overcome the differences through peaceful means, by means of negotiations. To this end:

1) The government of the DRA proposes to the governments of Pakistan and Iran to hold Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian negotiations, having in mind the development of bilateral agreements about normalization of relations. Such agreements might contain commonly accepted articles concerning mutual respect for sovereignty, readiness to develop relations on the basis of principles of good neighborliness and non-interference into internal affairs, and might include specific commitments to suppress military and any other hostile activity from their territory against each other.

2) The government of the DRA appeals again to the Afghans who temporarily stay, for different reasons, on the territory of Pakistan and Iran, to return to the Motherland. It confirms that they would be respected and their liberties and personal protection would be guaranteed, and they would be able to choose freely their place of residence and type of occupation. The government of the DRA appeals to the authorities in Pakistan and Iran to assist the free return of the aforementioned persons to Afghanistan. However, if any part of those Afghans prefers to stay [abroad], then the questions concerning their presence must also be discussed during bilateral negotiations with a view to achieving appropriate agreements.

3) Upon achieving mutually satisfac-

time will be able to strengthen our contingent, so as to reliably work together to provide for the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

The possibility of reaching at an appropriate time a Treaty of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which would clearly demonstrate the resolve of both countries not to allow any encroachment from without on the independence and integrity of the Afghan state, deserves serious attention.

. . . We have proposed and propose that Washington be led in our mutual relations by the principles of equality, equal security, mutual advantage, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. In a single word, we have built and are ready in the future to build our relations with the USA on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Declaring our readiness to maintain normal relations with the USA, we proceed from the fact that hostility between the two powers is not only unwise, but also dangerous. At the same time we more than once have warned the Americans, that they should take into account the lawful interests of the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union will not permit anyone to trample on those interests. Many of you, evidently, have in your memory how during the terms of office of various Presidents throughout the post-war period, American policy rocked from side to side. It cost the Soviet Union considerable effort to lead the USA to an acknowledgement of the single reliable basis of our relations—a policy of peaceful coexistence.

Now the American administration has once again begun to veer wildly. The underlying cause of the current break in Soviet-American relations is Washington's attempt to do whatever it takes to achieve military superiority over us.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 40; provided by M. Kramer.]

**Information from the CC CPSU to
Erich Honecker, 18 July 1980**

18/7/80
Confidential

DISPATCH

The other day, the President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq addressed us with a proposal on holding talks with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran under the mediation of the Soviet Union. The goal of these talks should be, in his words, the normalization of bilateral relations, the preservation of Afghanistan's status as independent and friendly to the Soviet Union and the assur-

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and border forces, and also through the national transport corporation.

The Carter administration is seeking to unite the Afghan counterrevolution, promising its leaders that if they unite, they will receive unlimited help in the form of weapons and money. The USA chief of mission in Pakistan, B. King, said this during a meeting this past March with the secretary of Pakistan's defense ministry, Lieutenant-General D. Khan. The USA consulates in Peshawar and Karachi are working to unite the scattered groups of the Afghan counterrevolution. An "Afghan section" that has been created in the USA consulate in Karachi is supervising rebel operations and providing them with weapons and equipment.

The American authorities are also instigating actions by anti-Afghan emigre groups in the United States itself. With the direct participation of the CIA, the "Association of American Aid to Afghan Refugees," the "National Liberation Front of Afghanistan," the "Unity Council," and the "Committee for Solidarity in Organizing the Liberation of Afghanistan" have been set up in the USA. These organizations have been given the task of coordinating the actions of anti-Afghan forces abroad and of providing financial aid to armed detachments of the Afghan counterrevolution.

The American CIA has devised special recommendations "for the use of religious movements and groups in the struggle against the spread of Communist influence." In accordance with these recommendations, agents from the American special services in Pakistan are carrying out vigorous work among the Pushtun and Beluga tribes, provoking them to carry out anti-government acts in Afghanistan.

Foreign interference in the DRA's internal affairs, above all by the USA, is thwarting efforts to normalize the situation in Afghanistan.

Reported for informational purposes.

D. Ustinov

2 October 1980

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 177, ll. 84-86; translated by Mark Kramer; first publication in Russian in Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriia 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (document on 98-99), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.]

(excerpt), 10 March 1983

SESSION OF THE CC
CPSU POLITBURO

and Iran. Experience has shown that we were unable to do this in view of the difficult terrain of the area and the existence of hundreds of passes in the mountains. Today it is necessary to precisely say that the strategic assignment concludes with the carrying of the problem towards ending the war.

GORBACHEV. It is necessary to include in the resolution the importance of ending the war in the course of one year - at maximum two years.

GROMYKO. It should be concluded so Afghanistan becomes a neutral country. Apparently, on our part there was an underestimation of difficulties, when we agreed with the Afghan government to give them our military support. The social conditions in Afghanistan made the resolution of the problem in a short amount of time impossible. We did not receive domestic support there. In the Afghan army the number of conscripts equals the number of deserters.

From the point of view of evaluating the domestic situation in Afghanistan, we can sign under practically everything that Najib suggests. But we should not sharply cut off Karmal, as he serves as a symbol to his people. A meeting of our representatives with him should be held. It is also necessary to try keep him on the general track; to cut him off would not be the best scenario. It is more expedient to preserve [his relations] with us.

Najib recommends a rather wide spectrum of steps. They deserve attention. One path is to draw in the peasant masses on the way of supporting the government power; another - negotiations with Islamic parties and organizations inside Afghanistan and beyond its borders, which are ready to compromise; third path - relations with the former king. I think that we should not spurn them. This should be done possibly in a combination other than proposed by Najib. Right now a more concrete stage of discussion with him concerning these questions is needed. A certain plan of actions is necessary. Here, it seems, our participation is needed, in particular, through the course of our contacts with Pakistan.

Concerning the Americans, they are not interested in the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. On the contrary, it is to their advantage for the war to drag out.

GORBACHEV. That's right.

GROMYKO. It should be considered how to link India into the settlement. A de-

lay in the resolution of these problems does not increase our opportunities for settlement. Right now the situation is worse than half a year ago. In one word, it is necessary to more actively pursue a political settlement. Our people will breathe a deep sigh if we undertake steps in that direction.

Our strategic goal is to make Afghanistan neutral, not to allow it to go over to the enemy camp. Of course it is important to also preserve that which is possible in the

GORBACHEV. We can give corresponding instructions to comr. Kryuchkov.

SHEVARDNADZE. Both comr. Kryuchkov and comr. Vorontsov are good people, but their discussions cannot replace meeting with the General Secretary.

GORBACHEV. Here, probably, Akhrome'ev S.F. hears about the organization of a headquarters for the military command of DRA and smiles. Would these headquarters really command our troops?

DOBRYNIN. We must give liberty to Najib. Two questions arise here. First—the idea of national reconciliation, and second—the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.

Karmal must be removed. But we must remember that through national reconciliation, not a single member of the CC PDPA Politburo supports Najib. There is no concept of such reconciliation.

GORBACHEV. The concept of settlement exists—we have established that—but in practice the problem is being resolved. Sergei Fedorovich, perhaps you will solve it?

AKHROME'EV [USSR dep. minister of defense]. No, it will not be possible to solve it.

DOBRYNIN. The question of the concept has not become the most important for the Afghan government. I come out in favor of receiving Najib in Moscow. Right now a message could be given to comr. Kryuchkov about the meeting with Najib. Let him tell Najib that he himself should make the decision concerning Dost, Karmal, but that this must be done without stirring up factionalism.

AKHROME'EV. Military actions in Afghanistan will soon be seven years old. There is no single piece of land in this country which has not been occupied by a Soviet soldier. Nevertheless, the majority of the territory remains in the hands of rebels. The government of Afghanistan has at its disposal a significant military force: 160 thousand people in the army, 115 thousand - in Tsarando and 20 thousand - in state security organs. There is no single military problem that has arisen and that has not been solved, and yet there is still no result. The whole problem is in the fact that military results are not followed up by political [ac-

two questions. First of all, in the course of two years effect the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan. In 1987 withdraw 50 percent of our troops, and in the following [year] - another 50 percent. Second of all, we must pursue a widening of the social base of the regime, taking into account the realistic arrangement of political forces. In connection with this, it is necessary to meet with comr. Najib, and, possibly, even with other members of the CC PDPa Politburo.

We must start talks with Pakistan. Most importantly, [we must make sure] that the Americans don't get into Afghanistan. But I think that Americans will not go into Afghanistan militarily.

AKHROME'EV. They are not going to go into Afghanistan with armed forces.

DOBRYNIN. One can agree with USA on this question.

GORBACHEV. We must give instruc-

forces, after which the situation may gradually begin to shift to their advantage. Such an opinion is borne out by some remarks made by representatives of the opposition, in the course of contacts with Soviet representatives in Islamabad. By these remarks it was implied that if the government of Najibullah holds out, they will re-examine their current position of not recognizing it in the capacity of a negotiating partner.

In the given situation there arise for us a number of difficult elements. On the one hand, our departure from decisions, which have been made and announced, to complete the withdrawal of our forces on 15 February may cause us extremely undesirable complications in the international arena. On the other hand, there is no assurance that shortly after our departure there will not arise a very serious danger to the regime that, throughout the world, is associated with us. Especially since the opposition, during the decisive period, may well manage to coordinate its actions for a given time, which is what the American and Pakistani military circles have been persistently urging them to do. Certain apprehensions also arise due to the fact that there is still no real unity within the PDPA, and factional, tribal, and other disagreements remain. Impulsiveness and memories of past "injustices" are transparent in the thinking of some Afghan leaders. Feeble, to say the least, are the actions of prime minister M.H. Sharq and many ministers in his cabinet.

A most serious factor remains the fact that violations of the Geneva accords by Islamabad have acquired not just an open, but a flagrant character. Pakistani borderguards are directly participating in military operations on Afghan territory. Bombardments of bordering regions of Afghanistan are taking place, arms flow continuously, and armed bands are crossing over from Pakistan. As before, the headquarters of the Afghan opposition parties, their training centers and bases continue to function unimpeded in Peshawar and other cities. All of this is done by inertia [concerning policies] established under Zia-ul-Haq. It is unlikely that B[enazir]. Bhutto is in a position to change the situation in the near future.

Both we and Afghanistan have been continuously, in a decisive manner, and citing concrete facts, condemning and continue to condemn such actions of the Pakistani government. Such a line is meant to be con-

tinued also in the future, including in the UN Security Council as well as in contacts with the Pakistani government itself.

1. The chief question on which depends the continuing evolution of the situation boils down to this: will the government be able to maintain Kabul and other large cities in the country, though above all the capital? The situation in Kabul is difficult; indeed, the main problems are not even military, but economic. It is very clear that the opposition plans to organize an economic blockade of Kabul, close off its supply of foodstuffs and petroleum products, and provoke discontent and even direct insurgence of the populace. Already, such a blockade is virtually being carried out by the forces of the opposition in the form of highway robberies and intimidation and bribery of drivers of Afghan ground-based freight vehicles destined towards Kabul. It should be pointed out that the present complications with flour and foodstuffs in general in Kabul are to a significant degree related to the fact that the directive to inflict defeat on Ahmad Shah, whose detachments present the greatest threat to the road between Kabul and Hairaton, was not carried out when the time was ripe.

At the present time, just the monthly requirement of flour in Kabul is around 15 thou. tons. Recently, several thousand tons of flour were delivered by Soviet motor and air transport. However, it is imperative to have stored provisions for at least 2-3 months, which would be controlled by the President and which would give the Afghan friends the possibility of feeling secure in this matter.

Since such large stores can be created only with the help of motor transport, we are talking about getting flour and other foodstuffs through the Hairaton-Kabul highway. In the words of comr. Najibullah, if the road remains functionally secured until May, the survival of the regime is guaranteed. Evidently, the Afghan friends will not be able to secure the normal functioning of the road without our help. We must proceed from the fact that a break in the functioning of the Hairaton-Kabul highway cannot be allowed. In addition, special attention will have to be paid to the most vulnerable section of the highway, which is the Salang pass with its more than three kilometer-long tunnel.

In preparation for the delivery of such

assistance it is necessary, during the remaining time, to intensify through all channels the condemnation of the actions of the opposition, which is obstructing the delivery of foodstuffs to Kabul and other large Afghan cities; moreover, one should lay stress not on the fate of the present government, but on the situation of the population of these cities, which is seriously suffering as a result of such barbarous actions.

In principle, it is possible to consider the following scenarios:

troops. Prior to this time, create a widespread general opinion with condemnations of the actions of the opposition, which is sentencing the population of Afghan cities to death from starvation. With the backdrop of such general opinion the escort of convoys by our units would appear to be a naturally humanitarian step. In addition, under this scenario, a number of sections of the road would have to be surmounted with a fight each time.

Fourth scenario. Withdraw almost all Soviet troops by February 15. Officially affirm the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent in a corresponding statement. But, under the pretext of transferring some posts on the Afghan Side of the Hairaton-Kabul highway, leave Soviet units in some

flict in Afghanistan.

Special attention should be paid towards supporting contacts with the Pakistani Side, using the upcoming talks involving the USSR minister of foreign affairs in Islamabad.

8. It is essential to carry on even more goal-oriented propaganda work concerning Afghanistan, for which all scenarios of developments in the Afghan situation must be thoroughly analyzed ahead of time. Of particular importance will be the securing of propaganda concerning the decision to introduce martial law in Afghanistan, if such is taken by President Najibullah.

E. Shevardnadze V. Chebrikov

A. Yakovlev D. Yazov V. Murakhovskii
V. Kryuchkov

23 January 1989

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[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 4; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision,
13 May 1989, with report by Zaikov-
Shevardnadze-Yazov-Kryuchkov**

Proletarians of the World, Unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No P158/6

To com. Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Zaikov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yazov, Baklanov, Belousov, Kryuchkov, Belyakov, Pavlov A., Falin

Excerpt from the protocol no. 158 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU on 13 May 1989

On additional measures to influence the Afghan situation

1. To agree with considerations of com. Zaikov L.N., Shevardnadze Ed. Y., Yazov D.T., Kryuchkov V.A., reported in the memorandum of 12 May 1989 (attached)

2. For the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the Committee on State Security [KGB] of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to take necessary measures for realization of the proposals in

the memorandum.

3. For the State commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the military-industrial questions, the Ministry of Defense of the USSR together with corresponding ministries and agencies to decide urgently on the possibility of an increase of delivery of R-17 missiles and their combat divisions to Afghanistan [in the amount of]