

More New Evidence On **THE COLD WAR IN ASIA**

Editor's Note: "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia" was not only the theme of the previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294 pages), but of a major international conference organized by CWIHP and hosted by the History Department of Hong Kong University (HKU) on 9-12 January 1996. Both the Bulletin and the conference presented and analyzed newly available archival materials and other primary sources from Russia, China, Eastern Europe and other locations in the former communist bloc on such topics as the Korean and Vietnam/Indochina Wars; the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split; Sino-American Relations and Crises; the Role of Key Figures such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Joseph Stalin, and Nikita Khrushchev; the Sino-Indian Conflict; and more. The new information presented via both activities attracted considerable media attention, including articles or citations in the New York Times, Washington Post, Time Magazine, Pravda, The Guardian, and Newsweek, as well as a report on the Cable News Network (CNN); garnering particular notice in both popular and scholarly circles were the first publication of conversations

MORE ON MAO IN MOSCOW, Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950

Editor's Note: The previous issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (no. 6-7, Winter 1995/96, pp. 4-9) contained translations of the Russian transcripts of two conversations (16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950) between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong during the latter's visit to Moscow in December 1949-February 1950. Mao's trip to the USSR, shortly after the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the establishment in October 1949 of the People's Republic of China, marked the only personal encounter between these two giants of 20th-century history, and led to the signing on 14 February 1950 of a Sino-Soviet treaty formally establishing an alliance between the two communist powers—a landmark in the history of the Cold War.

To provide further examples of the newly-available East-bloc evidence on this crucial event, the *Bulletin* presents below a selection of translated additional materials from Russian and Chinese sources. They include three records of conversations between Mao and senior Soviet officials, on 1, 6, and 17 January 1950, located in the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, formally known as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), and provided to the *Bulletin* by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute (Oslo), author of *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993); Westad's commentary precedes the documents.

In addition to immediate considerations relating to Mao's activities in Moscow, the conversations cover a range of subjects concerning Sino-Soviet ties—political, diplomatic, economic, and military. Especially notable for Cold War historians concentrating on international relations are the exchanges on joint strategy in the United Nations to unseat the Guomindang (Kuomintang) representative (foreshadowing a Soviet boycott that would enable the Security Council to approve U.N. participation in the Korean War) and a discussion of U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's National Press Club speech of 12 January 1950—particularly his efforts to foment discord between the USSR and China. These conversations, of course, should be read in the context of the two previously mentioned Stalin-Mao

vozhd personally.

What happened between the two sides in Moscow from December 17 to January 2 remains shrouded in mystery. Stalin obviously wanted to impress the Chinese, to show them Soviet power by arranging visits to memorials and symbols of the achievements of Communism. It is also obvious that he did not want anyone to engage in any further discussions of the main political issues beyond what had been said at the meeting between Mao and himself on December 16.

Beyond that, everything is still conjecture. Mao may have feigned illness to avoid accepting the Soviet agenda for "sightseeing" and to insist on an immediate continuation of the political talks. The Soviets then used Mao's "illness" to explain why substantive meetings with Stalin, or any Soviet leader, were impossible, thereby trying to force Mao to come up with suggestions for a specific agenda. Mao may indeed have been ill. We know that he was not in good health in October, and the strenuous journey to Moscow could hardly have helped.

Even more important is why Stalin decided to let his guest kill time over the New Year holidays holed up in a government *dacha* near Moscow. The most likely explanation is that the Soviet leader just could not make up his mind on what the outcome of the Chinese visit would be, and as long as the boss did not act, his subordinates could not take any initiatives on their own. The exertions of his own 70th birthday celebrations (on 21 December 1949) and the ensuing New Year functions may also have taken their toll on the *vozhd* and made it inopportune for him to seek out difficult negotiations just at that time.

We know that Stalin did meet with Mao on at least three occasions during this period, but existing sources indicate that those meetings were brief and dealt exclusively with specific practical issues, such as sending Soviet teachers to China and Soviet assistance in repairing the Xiaofengman hydroelectric station. In their book *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*, Sergei N. Goncharov, John W.

Lewis, and Xue Litai surmise that it was rumors among the foreign press corps in Moscow that Mao was being spurned or even put under house arrest by his Soviet hosts which compelled Stalin agree to let TASS publish an interview with the Chinese leader on January 2. In that interview, Mao referred to the 1945 treaty and trade issues as items being under consideration by the two sides.

Just what happened in the Kremlin during the day of January 2 we do not know. Oral history sources indicate that Molotov and Mikoyan together approached the boss and suggested holding talks with the Chinese at some point over the coming two weeks. Stalin agreed, and entrusted the two with seeking out Mao and informing him.⁷ After seeing Molotov and Mikoyan, Mao fired off a jubilant telegram to Beijing, telling of "an important breakthrough" in his work: The Soviets had agreed to signing a new treaty and would receive

protocols on Xinjiang and Manchuria which gave him a sense of strategic control of these areas. But Stalin and his associates paid a price for their concessions which was considerably higher than the price Mao paid for signing the agreements which provided him with protection, legitimacy, and aid. By his actions, Stalin undermined Chinese faith in the commonality of ideological

the Soviet withdrawal of troops [from Lushun] does not mean that the Soviet Union will stand by with folded arms [in a crisis]; rather, it is possible to find ways through which China will not become the first to bear the brunt. His opinion is that we may sign a statement, which will solve the Lushun problem in accordance with the above-mentioned ideas, and that by doing so, China will also gain political capital [*zhengzhi ziben*]. I said that it is necessary for us to maintain the legitimacy of the Yalta agreement. However, public opinion in China believes that since the old treaty was signed by the GMD [Guomindang; Kuomintang, KMT], it has lost its ground with the GMD's downfall. He replied that the old treaty needs to be revised and that the revision is necessarily substantial, but it will not come until two years from now. (4) Stalin said that it is unnecessary for the Foreign Minister [Zhou Enlai; Chou En-Lai] to fly here just for signing a statement. I told him that I will consider it. I hope that the commercial, loan, and aviation agreements will be signed at the same time, and the Premier [Zhou Enlai] should come. It is hoped that the Politburo will discuss how to solve the treaty problem and offer its opinions.

[Source: *Pei Jianzhang et al., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi [A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1994), 17-8; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996), 128.]*

Document 2: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, 19 December 1949 (excerpt)

(1) As to the question of the Burmese government's request to establish diplomatic relations with us, you should ask it in a return telegram if it is willing to cut off its diplomatic relations with the Guomindang, and at the same time invite that government to dispatch a responsible representative to Beijing for discussions about establishing diplomatic relations between China and Burma. Whether the diplomatic relations will be established or not will be determined by the result of the discussions. It is necessary that we should go through this proce-

dures of discussion, and we should act in the same way toward all capitalist countries. If a certain capitalist country openly announces the desire to establish diplomatic relations with us, our side should telegraph that country and request that it dispatch its representative to China for discussions about establishing diplomatic relations, and at the same time, we may openly publish the main contents of the telegram. By doing so, we will be able to control the initiative.²

[Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the founding of the People's Republic; hereafter JGYLMZDWG], vol. 1 (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), 193; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 129.]*

Document 3: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 22 December 1949

Central Committee:

(1) According to [Wang] Jiaxiang, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany all want to do business with us. If this is true, we are going to have trade relations with three more countries besides the Soviet Union. In addition, we have done business or are going to do business with Britain, Japan, the United States, India and other countries. Therefore, in preparing the trade agreement with the Soviet Union, you should have a comprehensive perspective. While we should naturally give top priority to the Soviet Union, we should at the same time prepare to do business with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Britain, Japan, the United States, and other countries, and you

Beijing Committee:

FROM THE DIARY OF Secret
ROSHCHIN N.V. Copy No.2

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
PEOPLE'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, COMRADE MAO ZEDONG
1 JANUARY 1950

Following the orders of the USSR Secretary of Foreign Affairs, comrade [Andrei] Vyshinskiy, on January 1 [I] visited the Chairman of the People's Central Government of the People's Republic of China, comrade Mao Zedong.

After an exchange of New Year greetings and other formalities, a friendly and warm conversation took place, during which comrade Mao Zedong related the following.

During the past few days he received a report from Beijing that the governments of Burma and India expressed their readiness to recognize the government of the People's Republic of China. The position of the Chinese government on this matter is as follows: to inform the governments of Burma and India that if they are sincere in their wishes to mend diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, first they must completely break all ties with Jiang Jieshi, unconditionally refuse any kind of support and assistance to this regime, making it into an official declaration. Under the condition that the governments of these countries accept the aforementioned proposals of the Chinese government, the Indian and Burmese governments may send their representatives to Beijing for negotiations.

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that there is also information, which states that in the very near future England and other countries of the British Commonwealth will evidently take steps toward recognizing the People's Republic of China.

Touching upon the military situation in China, comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that as of now all of the main Guomindang forces on the mainland of China have been crushed. In the Szechuan and Xinjiang [Sinkiang] provinces approximately 400 thousand Guomindang troops were taken prisoner and switched to the side of the People's Liberation army. For the remainder of the Khutzunan cluster, numbering 30-40 thousand persons, all the routes for

retreating to Tibet and to the south have been cut off. They will be destroyed in the very near future. In Yunnan there are also up to another 30 thousand persons scattered to the south-west from Kunming in separate groups of Guomindang followers, but their fate has been decided.

Mao Zedong requested to transmit the following information concerning his health condition and his plans for further stay in Moscow to the leaders of the Soviet government:

“My health condition — says Mao Zedong, — has improved after a two-year resting period. For the last four days I have been sleeping 8 hours a day with no problems, without taking special sleeping medication. I feel much more energetic, but when going for a walk, I cannot remain out in the fresh air for more than a quarter of an hour - I get dizzy. With regard to this, I intend to rest one more week in total peace and completely restore a normal sleeping pattern.”

Further he pointed out that following the week-long rest period he would like to visit comrades Shvernik, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov, Vasilevskiy, and Vyshinskiy. These visits will have to take the nature of ordinary conversations. He will not talk about any specific topics nor discuss any business matters. There must be one visit per day, they must not be very lengthy, and he thinks that the best time for them would be after 5-6 pm.

During the same time period he would like to meet with I.V. Stalin to discuss business matters.

After completing the discussion concerning business matters, during the remainder of the stay he intends to place a wreath at Lenin's mausoleum, see the subway system, visit a few collective farms, attend theaters, and with that finish his stay in Moscow.

Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized that he refrains from visiting factories, meeting2 Tc

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:215; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 133.]

**Document 8: Telegram, Mao Zedong to
CCP Central Committee, 5 January
1950**

Please pay attention to two matters: (1) When the question of replacing the [old] Sino-Soviet treaty with a new treaty has been reviewed by the Government Administrative Council and the [Central People's] Government Council, please urge all the participants to maintain secrecy. (2) Before Zhou [Enlai] departs with his more than ten [assistants], or on their way [travelling to Moscow], it is necessary for him to assemble all those people to declare discipline to them, telling them that undisciplined words and actions are prohibited, and that they must obey orders on every occasion.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:217; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 134.]

**Document 9: Conversation between
A. Vyshinsky and Mao Zedong,
Moscow, 6 January 1950**

FROM THE DIARY OF SECRET
A.Y. VYSHINSKY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Republic of China and the Soviet Union following the victory of the People's Revolution. A review of the existing treaty is especially necessary, since two important components of the treaty, Japan and the Guomindang, have suffered major changes: Japan has ceased to exist as an armed force and the Guomindang has been broken up. Besides, as is well known, a certain group of the Chinese people is expressing dissatisfaction with the existing treaty between China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the drafting of a new treaty of friendship and alliance between China and the USSR would be in the best interests of both sides.

While answering Mao Zedong, I said that the question of a new treaty, in my eyes, seems to be a complicated matter, since the signing of a new treaty or reviewing of the existing treaty and introduction of any kind of corrections may be used as an excuse by the Americans and the English for reviewing and altering parts of the treaty, changing which may cause damage to Soviet and Chinese interests. This is not desirable and must not be allowed to occur.

Mao noted that, without a doubt, this circumstance must be taken into consideration when creating a formula for solving the given problem.

Persons present during the conversation: comrades Kovalev I.V., Ea90K [Mo N.T., and also Wang Jiaxiang and Shi Zhe / Karskiy/.

The conversation lasted approximately 45 minutes.

A. Vyshinsky

[Source: AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 43, d. 43, papka 302, ll. 1-5; provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

**Document 10: Telegram, Mao Zedong
to Zhou Enlai and CCP CC, 6 a.m.,
7 January 1950**

[Zhou] Enlai and the Central Committee:

We have received the two telegrams on the management of the question of establishing diplomatic relations with Great Britain and India and the telegram on export-import trade, dated 8:00, 5 January. In regard with the question of export-import trade, you must pay special attention to making an overall plan on the total varieties and volume of exports to and imports from such countries as the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Hungary.

ies and volume of exports to and imports from such countries as the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Hungary.

Jy betwnd volume y betwsemmeddaterjo,ji 1[r8:00St 8:33aCWIH,ji wholeT* 0 Tc 0.04-8 Tc 0.f

(1) I fully agree to the plan to dispatch troops into Xizang [Tibet] contained in Liu [Bocheng]'s and Deng [Xiaoping]'s telegram of 7 January.⁶ Now Britain, India, and Pakistan have all recognized us, which is favorable to [our] dispatching troops into Xizang.

(2) According to Comrade Peng Dehuai, the four months needed for dispatching troops [to Xizang] will start in mid-May (in the previous telegram I mistakenly wrote "three months").⁷

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:226-7; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136.]

Document 14: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) I will depart for Leningrad today (the 13th) in the evening and will be back to Moscow in two days. (2) I have arranged for Liu Yalou, Soviet advisor Kotov and two other men to come here. Please inform Nie Rongzhen of this matter. (3) Xiao Jinguang can now be appointed as commander of the navy; please also inform Nie Rongzhen about this appointment.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:234; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136.]

Document 15: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950

(1) I agree with your telegram dated 13 January about implementing the order to requisition foreign military barracks and preparing to force the United States to evacuate all the former U.S. consulates from China.⁸ (2) I agree that the Shanghai Military Control Commission should confiscate or requisition immediately all the property left by the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration there. (3) As far as the problem of taking over the property left by the puppet regime in Hong Kong is concerned, please make a decision after the Foreign Ministry and the Central Finance and Economics Commission have provided their suggestions. I have no specific opinion on this matter. (4) Vyshinskii came to my quar-

first and foremost, to reinforce the country's internal situation, which is sufficiently clear and understandable to us.

2. Furthermore, I said that the declaration by the People's Republic of China, which states that maintaining the Guomintang representative in the Security Council is unlawful and that Jiang Tingfu must be removed from it, as well as simultaneous actions by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, caused a commotion and, to a certain extent, confused our enemies' camp. However, in order to bring the struggle begun in the UN to a conclusion, we would consider it expedient for the People's Republic of China to appoint its own representative to the Security Council. And it would be preferable for this appointment to take place as soon as possible.

Mao Zedong responded that he had a conversation with comrade Vyshinsky concerning this matter and completely agrees with such a proposal. However, for us, emphasized Mao Zedong, this matter presents a technical problem - selection of the candidate. The only suitable candidate is the present deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs comrade Zhang Hanfu, even though he is somewhat weak for the purpose. I would like to coordinate the question of appointing Zhang Hanfu with comrade Zhou Enlai upon his arrival in Moscow.

I said that if that is the only problem, he can talk to Zhou Enlai over the phone (VCh [a high frequency link]), while he is en route.

Mao Zedong willingly agreed to communicate with Zhou Enlai over VCh and to coordinate this question immediately.

3. After this I said that according to our information the head of the Guomintang delegation in the Union Council for Japan, General Zhu Shi-Min, wants to break with the Guomintang and switch to the side of the People's Republic of China. However, we have no confidence that this information is sufficiently reliable and, in addition, we do not know Zhu Shi-Min well and it is difficult for us to arrive at any definite conclusion about him. For this reason we would like to discuss the matter with Mao Zedong and find out whether we should wait until Zhu Shi-Min announces his switch or, without waiting for it, demand the removal of the Guomintang representative from the Union Council for Japan.

Mao Zedong said that from his point

of view it would be more expedient to act through the Secretary of the Guomintang delegation in the Union Council for Japan Chen Tin-Cho, who not long ago sent a letter through General Derevyanko concerning the work he is performing with regard to the switch of the aforementioned delegation in Tokyo to the side of the People's Republic of China. We, noted Mao Zedong, need to exert influence on Zhu Shi-Min and convince him to switch to our side. This would allow us to reach a smoother solution to the question of our representative's appointment to the Union Council for Japan.

Mao Zedong said that he will prepare a response to Chen Tin-Cho's letter and will send it to us for delivery to the addressee in Tokyo.

I said that this proposal is acceptable and we will be able to deliver comrade Mao Zedong's answer to Chen Tin-Cho through General Derevyanko.

The conversation lasted 1 hour 20 minutes.

Persons present during the conversation: comrade N.T. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe (Karsky).

V. MOLOTOV [signature]

18.1.50

[Source: AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 234, pap. 18, ll. 1-7; provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

Document 18: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 17 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) In response to the Vietnamese Government's request to establish diplomatic relations [with us], we should consent to it and give it our reply immediately. I have drafted a reply. Please broadcast it tomorrow (the 18th), while at the same time telegraphing it to Ho Chi Minh by internal radio transmitter.¹⁰ (2) Our foreign ministry should pass the Vietnamese Government's statement requesting establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries to the Soviet Union and the other new democratic countries.¹¹

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:238; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy

and the Cold War in Asia, 138.]

Document 19: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

The telegram of 17 January has been received. (1) That the United States is evacuating all its official personnel from China is extremely favorable for us. However, those democratic figures who have suffered from the fear of the United States may have some disagreement with such actions as the requisition of foreign military barracks. Please pay attention to making explanations to them. (2) When the British charge d'affairs [John C.] Hutchinson arrives in Beijing, what questions should we raise in discussions with him? The Central Committee should draft a written document on the basis of a discussion with members of the foreign ministry, which should define the guidelines, approach that we are to adopt and the concrete issues that we are to address. The document should be reported to me in advance.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:241; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138.]

Document 20: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5:30 p.m., 18 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) This afternoon, at 4:30, I had a telephone conversation with [Zhou] Enlai (he has arrived in Sverdlovsk and will, probably, arrive in Moscow on 20 January, at 5:00 p.m.), and we felt that as Zhang Hanfu does not have the necessary prestige and qualification, he should be assigned as a deputy. It is more appropriate to let Luo Fu become China's chief representative to the United Nations. A telegram to the United Nations has been drafted, and if the Central Committee agrees, please dispatch it and publish it tomorrow, on the 19th. (2) According to [Zhou] Enlai, both Gao Gang and [Li] Fuchun agree that Luo Fu is qualified to be [China's] diplomatic representative. But Luo Fu himself is yet to be informed. When you publish the telegram [to the United Nations], please send a telegram to Luo Fu at the same time, explaining that as we did not have

enough time, we were unable to get his consent in advance, and that we thus ask for his understanding. He will be notified in a separate telegram for the time of his departure for the United Nations. (3) The completion of the procedure on his nomination can be waited until the convening of the sixth session of the Government Council. If you feel necessary, you may summon the vice-chairpersons of the government and the leading members of the major parties for a discussion tomorrow, the 19th. (4) Since [Zhou] Enlai will soon come to Moscow, the statement can be issued in Li Kenong's name. (5) As what you did the last time, after the telegram is dispatched, copies of it should be sent to the diplomats of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and other countries in Beijing. (6) When the Xinhua News Agency publishes the news, it must be introduced that Zhang Wentian is a member of the CCP Central Committee, that he participated in the 25,000-li Long March, and that he has been responsible for various kinds of revolutionary work. (7) Please let me know of the progress of your arrangement on this matter.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:242; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138-9.]

Document 21: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 19 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and convey to [Hu] Qiaomu:

(1) I have written an article in the name of [Hu] Qiaomu. Please carefully scrutinize it and then publish it.¹² (2) The article, "Japanese People's Road (toward Liberation)," is very good.¹³ It is now being translated into Russian, and we are preparing to submit it to Stalin to read.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:245; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 139.]

Document 22: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 25 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) [Zhou] Enlai, Li [Fuchun], and oth-

ers arrived here on 20 [January]. On 21 [January], the twelve of us participated in a meeting in commemoration of Lenin. On 22 [January], six of us, including Shi Zhe, had a discussion with Comrade Stalin and others, in order to settle the questions concerning principles and the working procedures. On 23 [January], Zhou [Enlai], Wang [Jiayang] and Li [Fuchun] had a discussion with Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, and Roshchin about several concrete issues. On 24 [January], we handed to Vyshinskii a draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance worked out by us.¹⁴ We are now drafting a second document, that is, the agreement on Lushun, Dalian, and the Chinese Chanchun Railway, and, probably, the drafting can be finished today. We have also decided that we will make a third document, the Sino-Soviet barter agreement, ready in three days. All in all, our work is proceeding quite smoothly. (2) Attached here is the draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Please ask the Central Committee to discuss it and report its opinions to me by telegraph. Please pay attention to keeping it from the outsiders.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:251-2; English translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 140-1.]

Document 23: Remark, Mao Zedong, "About the Negotiations on Establishing Diplomatic Relations with Britain," 29 January 1950

Zhou [Enlai]: Please make the following response [to Beijing]: When [John C.] Hutchinson comes, only the problems concerning the relations between Britain and Jiang Jieshi and other problems related to establishing diplomatic relations [between Britain and the PRC] should be discussed. The question of the requisitioning of the military barracks should not be touched upon. While meeting the Dutch charge d'affairs, if he mentions the recognition of Indonesia in exchange for [Dutch recognition of the PRC], the matter should be reported to the superiors for consideration.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:253; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy

and the Cold War in Asia, 141.]

Document 24: Telegram, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Liu Shaoqi, 1 February 1950

Comrade Liu Shaoqi:

Please convey our greetings to Comrade Ho Chi Minh.¹⁵ He has played the role as the leader and organizer in the heroic struggle for Vietnam's national independence and the establishment of a people's democratic government in Vietnam. China and Vietnam have recognized each other, and will soon establish diplomatic relations. The Soviet Union has already recognized Vietnam, and it is hoped that the other new people's democratic countries will all give their recognition (our embassy in the Soviet Union has delivered Vietnam's memorandum asking for foreign recognition and establishing diplomatic relations to the embassies of all new democratic countries in the Soviet Union). We sincerely congratulate Vietnam's joining the anti-imperialist and democratic family headed by the Soviet Union. We wish that the unification of the entire Vietnam would be soon realized. We also wish Comrade Ho Chi Minh and his comrades-in-arms good health.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:254; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 141-2.]

Document 25: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 10 February 1950

Comrade Liu Shaoqi:

(1) It is approved that Su Yu may deploy four divisions in naval operation maneuver.¹⁶ (2) The first several phrases¹⁷ in the preface of the credit agreement, which mention China's compensation to the Soviet Union, should not be omitted. (3) The treaty and the agreements should be published by both sides on the same day, and you will be specially informed about the date. (4) [Chen] Boda has written an editorial for the Xinhua News Agency, which we will look over and send to you tomorrow. Please ask [Hu] Qiaomu to scrutinize it, and then publish it at the same time the treaty is published.¹⁸

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:257-8; transla-

tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, 142.]

Document 26: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 12 February 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

Here is an internal party telegram I have just drafted. Please give it some consideration as soon as you receive it and dispatch it quickly[:]

All central bureaus, bureau branches, and front-line committee:

A new Sino-Soviet treaty and a series of agreements will be signed and published in days. Then, when different regions hold mass rallies, conduct discussions, and offer opinions, it is essential to adhere to the position adopted by the Xinhua News Agency's editorial. No inappropriate opinions should be allowed.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:260-1; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, 142-3.]

¹ After leaving Beijing by train on 6 December 1949, Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow on 16 December and stayed in the Soviet Union until 17 February 1950. Liu Shaoqi was put in charge during Mao's absence. When Mao was in Moscow, he maintained daily telegraphic communications with his colleagues in Beijing, and all important affairs were reported to and decided by him.

² After the Burmese government had cut off all formal relations with the GMD government in Taiwan, the PRC and Burma established diplomatic relations on 8 June 1950.

³ During the first two to three weeks of Mao Zedong's visit in Moscow, little progress had been achieved in working out a new Sino-Soviet treaty that would replace the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. This telegram recorded the first major breakthrough during Mao's visit to the Soviet Union.

⁴ China's minister of trade at that time was Ye Jizhuang.

⁵ The full text of Zhou Enlai's telegram to the United Nations, which was dispatched on 8 January 1950, was as follows: "Lake Success, to Mr. Carlos Romulo, President of the United Nations General Assembly; to Mr. Trygve Li, Secretary General of the United Nations; also to the member states of the United Nations Security Council—

the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, Ecuador, India, Cuba, Egypt, and Norway: The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is of the opinion that it is illegal for the representatives of the remnants of the reactionary gang of the Chinese Nationalist Party to remain in the Security Council. It therefore holds that these representatives must be expelled from the Security Council immediately. I am specially calling your attention to this matter by this telegram, and I hope that you will act accordingly."

⁶ In this telegram, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping reported that they planned to dispatch the 18th Army to Tibet by the summer and fall of 1950.

⁷ On 24 January 1950, the CCP Central Committee formally issued the order to dispatch the 18th Army to enter Tibet.

⁸ On 6 January 1950, Beijing Municipal Military Control Commission ordered the requisition of former military barracks of the American diplomatic compound in Beijing, which had long been transformed into regular offices. Mao Zedong is here referring to this matter.

⁹ On 6 January 1950, the Cominform Bulletin published an article criticizing Nosaka Sanzo, a member of the Japanese Communist Party's Politburo, for his alleged "mistake" of putting too much emphasis on the peaceful path to power in Japan and his "wrong understandings" of the existence of U.S. influence in Japan. Although Nosaka had long been known as a faithful support of the CCP (he spent the war years in Yanan and attended the CCP's Seventh Congress), the CCP leadership still decided to maintain an identical stand with the Cominform in criticizing Nosaka. For a more detailed description of the

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**THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN
THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE
VERSIONS OF MAO'S
2 OCTOBER 1950 MESSAGE TO
STALIN ON CHINESE ENTRY
INTO THE KOREAN WAR:
A CHINESE SCHOLAR'S REPLY**

**by SHEN Zhihua
translated by CHEN Jian***

[Translator's Note: The Chinese Communist Party leadership made the decision to enter the Korean War in October 1950. For several years, scholars have relied upon Chinese documents available since the late 1980s to discuss the process by which Beijing made that decision. Among these documents, one of the most crucial was a telegram Mao Zedong purportedly sent to Stalin on 2 October 1950, in which the CCP chairman informed the Soviet leader that Beijing had decided "to send a portion of our troops, under the name of Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee."

With the opening of Russian archives in recent years, however, a sharply different version of Mao's 2 October 1950 message to Stalin has emerged, according to which Mao related that because dispatching Chinese troops to Korea "may entail extremely serious consequences," many CCP leaders believed China should "show caution" about entering the conflict, and consequently Beijing had tentatively decided against entering the war.

How did such a sharp discrepancy between the Chinese and Soviet versions of this communication occur?

on China. We must be prepared for the possible bombardments by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and for attacks by American naval forces on China's coastal areas.

(3) Of the two issues, the first one is whether the Chinese troops would be able to defeat American troops in Korea, thus effectively resolving the Korean problem. If our troops could annihilate American troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army (a competent veteran U.S. army), the whole situation would become favorable to the revolutionary front and China, even though the second question ([the possibility] that the United States would declare war on China) would still remain as a serious issue. In other words, the Korean problem will end in fact with the defeat of American troops (although the war might not end in name, because the United States would not recognize the victory of [North] Korea for a long period). If this occurs, even though the United States had declared war on China, the ongoing confrontation would not be on a large-scale, nor would it last very long. We consider that the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the same time, the United States openly declares war on China, which would be detrimental to China's economic reconstruction already under way, and would cause dissatisfaction among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people (who are absolutely afraid of war).

(4) Under the current situation, we have decided, starting on October 15, to move the twelve divisions, which have been earlier transferred to southern Manchuria, into suitable areas in North Korea (not necessarily close to the 38th parallel); these troops will only fight the enemy that venture to attack areas north of the 38th parallel; our troops

The obvious contradictions between these two versions of Mao Zedong's 2 October 1950 telegram to Stalin have inevitably raised serious questions concerning what really happened in Beijing and between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950. At a seminar held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. on 13 December 1995, and in his article in the Winter 1995/1996 issue of the



meeting failed to yield a unanimous decision to send troops to Korea. It thus decided that an enlarged Politburo meeting would be convened to discuss the issue on October 4.¹⁴ Evidently, before the Party leadership had reached a final decision, it would have been impossible for Mao to give an affirmative response to Stalin's October 1 request.¹⁵ In actuality, even at the October 4 enlarged Politburo meeting, which would last until October 5, the opinions of the CCP leaders were still deeply divided, with the majority, at one point, strongly opposing sending troops to Korea. The main tendency of the meeting was that "unless absolutely necessary, it was better not to fight the war."¹⁶

Within this context, with the majority of the Politburo members opposing the proposal, it is not surprising that Mao's initial response to Stalin's request was to abstain from a decision on October 1.

considerations before and after October 2, as well as by comparing the contents of the Chinese and Russian versions of the telegram.

First of all, it should be emphasized that Mao Zedong felt that he was forced to make the decision to send troops to Korea. He fully understood that China's involvement in the Korean War would entail great difficulties. On this point, his views basically coincided with those of his comrades who opposed or had strong reservations about sending troops to Korea. In actuality, those reasons that Mao listed in the Russian version, such as America's technological superiority, the danger of an open war with the United States, and the possible negative domestic reactions, were all reflected in the Chinese version, though from a different angle. When Mao mentioned in the Russian version that "many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution," this does not mean that he had changed his own determination. A careful comparison of the two versions leads to a different conclusion: Mao did not change his goals but rather the tactics he would use to achieve them. Instead of replying directly and positively to Stalin's request, Mao adopted a more indirect and ambiguous response, so that he would be able to reconcile his own determination to enter the war with the disagreements still existing among other CCP leaders, while at the same time keeping the door for further communication (and bargaining) with Stalin open. This interpretation would explain why the CCP chairman specifically informed Stalin in the Russian version that "A final decision has not been made on this question. This is our preliminary telegram." It also explains why he proposed to send Zhou Enlai to consult with Stalin.

That Mao had not altered his determination to enter the war was most clearly demonstrated by his attitude at the October 4-5 Politburo meeting. Although the majority of CCP leaders attending the meeting continued to express strong reservations about entering the Korean War, Mao told them that "all of what you have said is reasonable, but once another nation, one that is our neighbor, is in crisis, we'd feel

sad if we stood idly by."¹⁷ Mao finally convinced his comrades of the need to send troops to Korea at the October 5 meeting. Once the decision was made, the Chinese leaders acted immediately. (It is unclear whether this decision was taken before or after Mao received

KHRUSHCHEV VS. MAO:

Li Zhisui, the Chinese leader welcomed Khrushchev's assumption of leadership in the Kremlin. But the latter's speech denouncing Stalin soured Mao on Khrushchev for good. Despite his own personal and other grievances against Stalin, Mao now decided the new Soviet leader was "unreliable," and after that "never forgave Khrushchev for attacking Stalin."⁶ Moreover, Mao hardly bothered to conceal how he felt about Khrushchev, and later practically flaunted his contempt in Khrushchev's face.

For example, during his November 1957 visit to Moscow, Mao hardly hid his disdain for his Russian hosts, their hospitality, their food, and their culture. Khrushchev was "friendly and respectful," Dr. Li recalls, and went out of his way to treat Mao as a highly honored

guest. Yet, from the moment he arrived, "Mao was reserved and even a bit cool with Khrushchev," while in private conversations with his Chinese colleagues (which the KGB probably overheard and reported to Khrushchev), Mao overflowed with "private barbs against the Russian leader."⁷

During the first half of 1958, Mao's attitude toward the Soviets darkened even more drastically as he launched the "Great Leap Forward," and resolved to reduce Chinese dependence on Moscow. Ironically, it was just then that Khrushchev decided to propose still more military dependence to the Chinese in the form of a radio station on their territory to be used by Moscow for communicating with its new nuclear-powered, missile-toting submarines.

"We fully expected the Chinese to

cooperate with us when we asked for a radio station on their territory," Khrushchev recalls.⁸ When Mao abruptly refused to deal with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin on the issue and instead rudely demanded that Khrushchev himself come to China, the Soviet leader dropped everything and hurried off to Beijing, only to find himself the target of a new round of Maoist condescension and humiliation.

Talks on the radio stations and other military matters began politely. But when Khrushchev took too long repeating points Yudin had made, Mao openly displayed his contempt. Mao smoked throughout despite Khrushchev's well-known aversion to cigarettes. He also mocked his guest's equally familiar penchant for rambling on in disorganized fashion. Mao waved

**A New "Cult of Personality":
Suslov's Secret Report on Mao,
Khrushchev, and Sino-Soviet
Tensions, December 1959**

[Ed. note: Though still masked from public view, the simmering tensions in the Khrushchev-Mao relationship burst into the open between them when the Soviet and Chinese leaderships met in Beijing on 2 October 1959. Khrushchev, who had led a delegation to attend celebrations marking the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, was shocked when his criticisms of recent Chinese policies provoked a furious response—and the resulting argument turned so angry that officials on both sides sought to suppress the transcript. (A secret Chinese compilation of Mao's meetings with foreign communist leaders omits this encounter, and scholars have reported finding Soviet documents indicating that the record should be destroyed.)

*Nevertheless, the Soviet transcript of the meeting has survived—it was cited in Dmitrii Volkogonov's *Secrets of the Revolution* and the *Secrets of the Revolution**

(of the sort Khrushchev, and later Gorbachev, mounted) to reform it. But neither can they be separated from the personal deterioration that Khrushchev (and Gorbachev, too?) underwent as the world they tried so hard to improve unravelled around them. The fact that Khrushchev's Kremlin colleagues, who eventually ousted him, held his mishandling of relations with Mao against him, and that in part, they were correct to do so, underscores both Khrushchev's self-destructiveness, and its impact on overall Sino-Soviet relations.

In the beginning of his decade in power, Khrushchev attached a very high priority to consolidating the relations with Beijing that he believed Stalin had put at risk. Khrushchev condemned Stalin for condescending to Mao, for regarding the Chinese leader as a kind of "cave-man Marxist," and for manifesting "a kind of haughty arrogance" during the latter's visit to Moscow in 1949-50.¹⁷ Khrushchev launched his own relationship with Mao with the feeling that he could, should, and would do much better by the Chinese leader than Stalin had done. But instead of evoking Mao's gratitude and respect, the Chinese leader seemed to be condescending to him. Not only was such lack of fealty a problem in larger ideological and political terms, it grated irritatingly on Khrushchev's uneasy self of self. As a white European, Khrushchev felt a sense of superiority over the upstart Chinese. All the more devastating then that the upshot of Mao's treatment of him was to make Khrushchev himself feel inferior.

Both in 1954 and during their later meetings, Mao's negotiating methods suggested to Khrushchev that the Chinese leader was playing him for a fool. Yet that was precisely the sort of image which Khrushchev could not abide, particularly because he had been forced to trade on it for so long to survive Stalin's terrible suspiciousness toward his top lieutenants.

As one who prided himself on taking the measure of his interlocutors, Khrushchev was particularly annoyed that he couldn't figure Mao out. When Mao tried to convince him that the USSR should respond to an American

attack by retreating beyond the Urals

particularly vividly the role of Khrushchev's personality. Would any other Soviet leader have acted so rashly?

Several times Khrushchev described Mao and the environment around him as "Asiatic," referring especially to the Chinese leader's reliance on "flattery and insidiousness." Describing politics as "a game," Khrushchev confessed his continuing

SOVIET EXPERTS

continued from page 246

ment in June 1949 formalized the PRC's foreign policy framework, essentially establishing the "new China" as the Soviet Union's junior partner. Although never happy with such a relationship, Mao and his comrades believed that it had been necessary in order to promote China's economic reconstruction, safeguard the nation's security interests, and create momentum for the continuation of the Chinese revolution after its nationwide victory. The situation began to change, however, after Stalin's death in March 1953, and especially after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. Mao and his comrades increasingly believed that it was the CCP, not the CPSU, which should play the central role in the international communist movement. This growing sense of China's superiority, which, in a historical-cultural sense, had a profound origin in the age-old "Middle Kingdom" mentality, combined with many other more specific problems (of the sort usually present in any alliance relationship) to create a widening rift between the Chinese and Soviet leaders. During Khrushchev's visit to China in September-October 1959, the potential tension that had long accumulated between Beijing and Moscow exploded. Indeed, during a long meeting between Khrushchev and Mao and other Chinese leaders on 2 October 1959, the two sides emotionally criticized the other's domestic and international policies, demonstrating that the Sino-Soviet alliance was facing a real crisis.⁴

The Soviet note recalling all Soviet experts from China further intensified the crisis. Beijing could see in it nothing but Moscow's evil intention of imposing new "inequalities" upon them. This became particularly true when Moscow, according to Chinese sources, turned down Beijing's request that the Soviet experts, at least some of them, should stay in China until they had fulfilled their assigned tasks.⁵

These developments virtually destroyed the foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Mao would take the So-

viet withdrawal of experts from China as strong evidence to claim that Beijing's struggle against Moscow was not just one for true communism but also one for China's sovereignty and national integrity. Khrushchev and other leaders in Moscow seemed also determined to meet Beijing's challenge to the Soviet Union's position as the indisputable leader of the international movement.⁶ In retrospect, the Soviet decision of July 1960 can be interpreted as a crucial step toward the complete breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Note: The Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 18 July 1960

Strictly confidential

The Embassy of the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics in the People's Republic of China has been instructed to inform the Government of the People's Republic of China of the following:

In strict observation of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PR of China, the Soviet Government sends, in compliance with the request of the Chinese Government, a considerable number of experts to work in China. For this purpose, the Soviet organizations have selected the best and most experienced experts, often bringing disadvantages to the national economy of the PR of China. (Affairs of the)

ment presented to the PR of China and the other socialist countries the proposal to recall the Soviet experts, taking into consideration that these countries had by then trained their own cadres and were, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, well capable of solving by their own efforts the practical tasks they were encountering in the fields of economic and cultural developments. The majority of the people's democratic countries had at that time agreed to the proposal of the Soviet Government, and the Soviet experts were recalled from these countries to their motherland. After the Chinese leaders had expressed their critical attitude toward the Soviet experts in the year 1958, the Soviet Government once again presented to the Government of the PR of China the proposal to recall the Soviet experts. But this time, just as in the year of 1957, the Chinese side pronounced that it favored prolonging the stay of the Soviet experts by claiming that they were needed in the PR of China.

Recently, the Chinese side, when dealing with the Soviet experts working in the PR of China, began to pursue an apparently unfriendly line toward the Soviet Union, which was incompatible with the obligation of the treaty as well as with the norms prevailing between socialist countries. Following the instructions from their superiors, Chinese officials distribute specially compiled material in Russian language among the Soviet people propagating views directed against the position of the CPSU and of other brotherly parties. They make efforts to draw Soviet experts living in the PR of China into discussions on questions where certain differences of opinions exist between the CPSU on the one side and other brotherly parties on the other; they make efforts to impose their viewpoints upon the Soviet experts and try to lead them into opposition to the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

The leading officials at the Chinese institutions and enterprises where Soviet experts are working persistently try to draw them into discussions on the above-mentioned questions. So, for instance, on May 19, the office director of the Scientific Research Institute for Electric Industry of the PR of China in Guangzhou proposed to the Soviet experts working in the institute to discuss the questions raised in an anthology especially published in the Russian language under the title "Long Live Leninism," as well as to express their opinions on the articles included in this anthology. Among several groups of Soviet experts in Beijing and other cities of China, Chinese officials forced every Soviet expert to accept copies

of this anthology, which, as it was known, contained anti-Leninist theses to which the Soviet people cannot give their agreement. The deputy chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Yang Zhengwu, and the head of the Propaganda Department of the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Fu Zhong, both used a consultation meeting attended by a group of Soviet military experts to propagate their views on questions about war and peace, as well as an assessment of the current international situation, that are incorrect, faulty and in contradiction to the basic theses of the [November] 1957 Moscow Declaration of fraternal [communist] parties. There exist also a whole series of other cases in which leading officials of Chinese institutions and enterprises endeavor to draw Soviet specialists into discussions, to put them under pressure, and to influence them by suggesting to them viewpoints quite different from the positions of the CPSU.

The Soviet experts working in the PR of China consider such activities on the part of the Chinese authorities as open disrespect of themselves and of their work, as activities intolerable in relations between socialist countries, and, in fact, as an open agitation against the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

The Soviet experts, taking into their consideration a variety of facts, have been compelled to conclude that they no longer have the trust of the Chinese side they need in order to fulfill the tasks put before them, not to mention the respect these experts have earned by providing assistance to the Chinese people for [China's] economic and cultural development and military build-up. There exist several cases in which the opinions of the Soviet experts were grossly ignored, or in which there openly existed no wish [on the part of the Chinese] to take their recommendations into consideration, despite the fact that these recommendations were based upon the well-founded knowledge and rich experiences of these experts. This even went so far that the documents prepared by the Soviet experts, which included respective recommendations and technical rules, were demonstratively burned.

This information leads to the conclusion that the Soviet experts in the PR of China are being deprived of the opportunity to fulfill their useful functions and to contribute their knowledge and experiences to the fullest degree. They are practically put into such a situation that their selfless work is not being appreciated, and that they are encountering ingratitude from the Chinese

side.

In view of these facts it is difficult not to believe the information provided by some [of our] experts indicating that they are being spied on. The meaning of these measures is at a minimum incomprehensible to the Soviet people who came to the PR of China with the deeply felt desire to help the Chinese people in building socialism.

Of course, all of this hurts the feeling of the Soviet experts and, even more so, it has caused such a just indignation that they, due to the fact that they are being denied the trust they need, are forced to present to the Soviet Government the request that they be allowed to return to their motherland.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to declare that the afore-mentioned actions on the part of the Chinese side are unfriendly towards the Soviet Union. They are in contradiction with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PR of China, according to which both sides have committed themselves, in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual interests, to developing and consolidating the economic and cultural relations between them. Such activities on the part of the Chinese side make it practically impossible for the Soviet experts to continue to stay in the PR of China.

The Embassy is instructed to inform the Government of the PR of China that the Soviet experts and advisors, including the military, will be, in accordance with their own wishes, recalled to their motherland. While coming to this decision, the Soviet side has also taken into consideration the fact that the Government of the PR of China itself, in the past, has raised the question of ordering a number of Soviet experts working in the PR of China to return to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the PR of China will understand correctly the causes that have led to this decision.

[Source: *Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR" im Bundesarchiv J IV 2/202/280. Translation from Russian: Dieter Heintz and Anna Eckner. The copy of the Russian note is not dated but known from other sources.*]

* Dieter Heintz is deputy director of the Federal Institute for East European and International Studies in Cologne, Germany.

¹ See, e.g., John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963-1967* (London: Ox-

ford University Press, 1968).

² Khrushchev mentioned in the letter that as of August 1958, there were about 1,500 Soviet experts in China.

³ The Chinese Communist Party's mouthpiece, *Hongqi* (Red Flag) published this article in its April 1960 issue. It summarized the CCP's viewpoints on international issues and the correct orientation of the international communist movement.

⁴ For an internal Soviet account of Khrushchev's visit to Beijing, see M. A. Suslov's report to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 18 December 1959, contained in the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), and excerpted in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

⁵ See Han Nianlong et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy,] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 364-365.

⁶ In this regard, it is revealing that the Soviet note is found in the East German archives, a clear indication that Moscow was spreading its version of events to reassert its leadership role in the movement.

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CULTURAL REVOLUTION ARCHIVE ESTABLISHED

The following item appeared in the China News Digest of 26 November 1996; it was posted on H-Asia by Yi-Li Wu, a doctoral candidate in the History Department at Yale University, and brought to CWIHP's attention by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research at the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo:

Documents of Cultural Revolution Moved to Archive

After nearly 37,000 documents, tape recordings, and exhibits of the Cultural Revolution era from 47 government ministries were moved to a new central Cultural Revolution archive in east Beijing, archivists said Tuesday that scores of them are either incomplete or in poor condition, United Press International reports from Beijing. A worker at the Beijing Municipal Government Archive said: "One of the biggest problems is there are no indices for the information and there is no way of knowing what is and isn't there." Many of the documents were issued by the late Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The new archive will not be open to the public or academics, and government archivists will spend a year or so studying the materials and indexing them in the hope of finding what are missing. They will also attempt to search for more documents although some concede that many of the most sensitive documents will never resurface." (Vic CHIN, YIN De An)

emy of Sciences, P. Gafurov, to organize in Moscow a meeting with the participation of Chinese and Indian scholars on questions connected with the history and mutual influences of Chinese and Indian cultures.⁷

Third, the border conflict sharply worsened the position of the Communist Party of India (CPI): subjected to attacks from the bourgeois parties of India, the CPI also itself split between those who felt that only India was at fault in the conflict and those who suggested that responsibility could be divided between both countries. At the 6th CPI Congress in 1961, Soviet representative M. Suslov exerted considerable effort so that, on the one hand, militant pro-Beijing party members who felt the CPI must always align itself with the CCP would not prevail, and on the other hand, to block discussion at the Congress of a resolution proposed by a number of prominent Indian communists criticizing the PRC and backing Nehru. These Soviet actions could hardly pass unnoticed in Beijing; in a talk with Soviet ambassador S. Chervonenko, CC CCP secretary Deng Xiaoping made a point of referring indignantly to “some Indian communists, who are even praising Nehru.”⁸

Finally, another relevant aspect of the problem was the fact that Moscow clearly grasped that Beijing’s bellicose method of resolving border questions

per-level Chinese leadership: Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, et al.³⁵ The political campaign culminated with elaborately orchestrated³⁶ mass demonstrations of solidarity at the Cuban Embassy in Beijing, which took place non-stop from the 3rd to the 6th of November and in which, the Chinese media reported, more than five million people participated.³⁷

Soviet officials well understood the ulterior motive behind these mass demonstrations. While under the ostensible slogan of solidarity with Cuba, they sharply criticized those “who were frightened in the face of imperial aggression,” who “bartered with the freedom and independence of another people,” and so on.³⁸ However, at that moment Moscow was not up to a clarification of relations with China; rather,

the principal issues once again returned to the USSR's old viewpoint on that conflict, in which China did not at all appear to be the victimized side.⁴⁹ The new *Pravda* article, however, could scarcely seriously change anything, because by then the border situation had largely stabilized and, in the opinion of diplomats from the socialist countries, both combatants were searching for a means to withdraw from the conflict with as much dignity as possible.

In its main counterattack, Moscow turned to the congresses of the Communist parties of a number of countries which took place in late 1962 and early 1963, and also to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which took place in December 1962. Those who did not support Khrushchev were declared "babblers," "ultra-revolutionaries," and "reckless adventurists." In his indignation, the Soviet leader went to the point that he named as the main instigators of war not U.S. President Kennedy or West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (which at the time would have been entirely normal), but ... the Albanians! And although at these congresses there was still preserved the ritual, accepted in the last few years in the Communist world, when Moscow, cursing the Albanians, really had the Chinese in mind, and the PRC, cursing the Yugoslavs, meant the USSR, a new step on the path to a total split had been taken. Khrushchev, in particular, stressed that "someone taught the Albanians to pronounce vile words," and Wu Xiuquan, CC CPC member and former Chinese ambassador to Yugoslavia, speaking in his capacity as the permanent leader of the CPC delegation to the Communist party congresses which were taking place during that period, was subject to well-organized filibusters.⁵⁰ In its turn, the CPC responded in a series of articles in *Renmin Ribao* showing that the world had by no means been put on the brink of nuclear war by "babblers" and that "the juggling of nuclear weapons as the solution to international arguments" was in no way a true Marxist-Leninist position.⁵¹

Analyzing Soviet policy toward the PRC during this period, it makes sense to take into account the inconsistency

and well-known impulsiveness which marked Khrushchev's actions. Indignant at Beijing's position during the Caribbean crisis, Khrushchev, not thinking out very well the consequences of his actions, decided to activate all the levers of pressure in order to teach the Chinese a good lesson in the newly brought to light "classics of Marxism-Leninism."⁵² However, the Soviet leader still hoped to preserve a certain unity of the Communist world, viewing these disagreements with the PRC as an annoying misunderstanding which could be settled. The limits to the Soviet leadership's readiness to trumpet its fall-out with Beijing surfaced in December 1962 when the Indians decided to take advantage of the sharpening of Sino-Soviet contradictions and began

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cations between Nehru and Khrushchev. While these excerpts hint at how the Soviet archives can offer a fascinating and rich window into these and many other aspects of the still-murky Sino-Indian border dispute, much further research in Moscow is still necessary, particularly with key Chinese and Indian archives still closed. In any event, CWIHP would be pleased to assist scholars interested in examining the photocopies of these and other Russian documents obtained during research on Soviet-Indian relations, 1959 and 1962, or in commissioning English translations of more of them. The documents are on file as part of the Russian Archives Documents Database (RADD) at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at the George Washington University on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037, tel. (202) 994-7000; e-mail: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu; fax: (202) 994-7000.

The third section below is the transcript, found in the East German archives, of a 26 December 1962 conversation in Beijing between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Premier Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal (J. Zedenbal in German). Although the occasion of the talk was the signing of a Sino-Mongolian boundary treaty, the conversation soon turned to the recent clashes along the Sino-Indian border. According to the transcript—presumably kept by the Mongolians, though it is unclear from the document how it came to be translated into German and rest in the East German archives—Zedenbal took the opportunity to criticize Chinese policy in the border dispute with India as detrimental to the interests of the international socialist camp, producing a tense exchange with Zhou. Whether or not the transcript is accurate—no Chinese version is available—the Mongolians clearly wanted to show their Soviet-bloc patrons that they were standing up for Moscow's policy, and Ulan Bator may have circulated the transcript to Moscow and/or its allies precisely for that reason.

The document itself was located in the archives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in East Berlin by scholars collecting materials for a volume on relations between the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic: Werner Meissner, ed., *Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik und China, 1949-1990: Politik-Wirtschaft-Wissenschaft-Kultur. Eine Quellensammlung* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995). The document was not included in the published volume, but was recently obtained by David Wolff, who thanks Prof. Meissner (Hong Kong Baptist University) and his colleagues at the Free University in Berlin, Anja Feege, M. Leutner, and Tim Trampedach, for providing access to this and other documents on China from the former East German archives. The Zhou-Zedenbal record—which made its way into the East German archives and the German language in a manner that remains unclear—was translated into English by Wolff with assistance by Christian Ostermann, Oliver Corff, and James G. Hershberg.

truth and justice is on China's side. In this regard one must inform the Plenum that the letter we addressed to the CC of the Communist Party of China and the TASS announcement about the Indo-Chinese border conflict did not evoke a proper understanding among the Chinese leaders. In their answer to our letter the Chinese comrades claimed that the incident on the Sino-Indian border had been provoked by the Nehru government, which, as the letter of the Chinese friends reads, "has long been marching in its domestic and foreign policies in the reactionary direction." It follows: "We believe that if one carries out only the policy of unprincipled adjustment and concessions to Nehru and the Indian government, not only would it not make them change their position for the better, but, on the contrary, in the situation of the growing offensive on their side, if China still does not rebuff them and denounce them, such a policy would only encourage their atrocity. It would not be advantageous for the friendship between China and India, and also not be advantageous to make Nehru and the Indian government improve, instead of moving toward further rapprochement with the West."

The letter contains a reproach that "the TASS announcement displayed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union toward the incident on the Sino-Indian border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, who use this to drive a wedge into the relations between China and the Soviet Union. This cannot help evoking regrets."

The analysis of this letter of the CC of the Communist Party of China leads us to two conclusions of fundamental importance. They are the following: the Chinese comrades could neither correctly assess their own mistakes committed in their relations with India, nor the measures taken by the CC CPSU for regulation of the Sino-Indian conflict. The Chinese leadership's assessments of the situation in India and the behavior of Nehru with regard to the conflict are undoubtedly erroneous and arbitrary.

Let me refer to the opinion of our Indian friends expressed in their letters to the CC CPSU and the CC of the Communist Party of China. While registering the aggravation of the situation in India as a result of the conflict, the Indian comrades stated that "if the disputes continue, it would benefit

reactionary forces in India and would cause a negative influence on the masses of the Indian population." Indian comrades justifiably believe that further exacerbation of the Indo-Chinese relations could weaken the democratic movement in India, gravely undercut the position of the Indian commu-

the Nehru government is correct. At times the tone of our discussion became quite sharp. It came to the point when a member of the Politburo CC Communist Party of China, minister of foreign affairs Chen Yi, claimed that our line on Nehru is allegedly opportunistic [*prisposoblencheskaia*], and the policy of China is more firm and correct. Naturally, we gave a resolute rebuff to these pronouncements.

In connection with the remarks of the Chinese leaders one cannot help wondering how they understand the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, whether they see it as a general line of foreign policy of the socialist camp, whether they think it is necessary to struggle for relaxation of international tension and for securing general peace.

We are getting an impression that, while recognizing formally the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two global systems, the Chinese comrades tend to regard this principle just as a temporary tactical maneuver.

[ed. note: after additional critical remarks and recounting of discussion of other matters at the meeting, Suslov noted:]

One should say that at the end of the conversation on 2 October Mao Zedong and other Chinese comrades declared that they did not want war; that they would resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means and would settle the conflict with India through negotiations. They confirmed again that the Communist party of China has a common line and common goals with us. We expressed our satisfaction in this regard.

[noting that Khrushchev had pointed out the Chinese leadership's "nervousness and touchiness" at being criticised, Suslov harshly criticized the "atmosphere of the cult of personality" surrounding Mao, which he likened to that of Stalin; recalling that during a 1958 conversation with Khrushchev, Mao had compared Soviet-Chinese relations to two hands in which nine fingers were fully unified "and only in one, little finger we have disagreements," Suslov ended his report on an optimistic note, vowing that the Soviet leadership would do its utmost to promote strong ties and friendship between Moscow and Beijing—ed.]

[Source: Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 2, opis 1, delo 415, ll. 56-91; transla-

tion for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

II. Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on Soviet-Indian Relations and the Sino-Indian Border Conflict, 1962 (excerpts)

[The first excerpt is from a 17 January 1962 entry from the journal of Soviet ambassador to India I.A. Benediktov describing a conversation with the Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India (CPI), Bhupesh Gupta. During the conversation, Gupta urgently requests Soviet financial aid for the Indian party for use in an upcoming election campaign; the answer conveyed by Benediktov ten days later suggests that the Soviets responded positively to the request, although the amount is not indicated:]

Today I received Gupta at his request. Gupta communicated that on 16-17 January a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPI took place in Delhi, at which was discussed

today's meeting pointed out that the *Pravda* article, while in fact criticizing the position of the Indian communists and India's relation to this question as a whole, did not express any critical comments with regard to the PRC and the Chinese comrades.

Nambudiripad reported that the secretariat of the CPI after the discussion of the *Pravda* article today reached the conclusion that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India." The campaign that is going on everywhere against the PRC will, obviously, be extended to the Soviet Union, and then to all countries of the socialist system....He expressed the opinion of the secretariat that in connection with this statement of the Soviet press and in connection with the pressure on India from many neutral countries regarding a more rapid peaceful settlement of this conflict, the Indian government...can reach the conclusion that only western countries are our true friends...

"In this connection we very much would like to find out if Soviet leaders could help the CPI give an understanding to the Chinese comrades that it is extremely desirable to give the possibility to Nehru to move toward peace negotiations and cease military actions without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself, - Nambudiripad stated. The Secretariat has unanimously reached the conclusion that such a step by the PRC would have a huge significance for the cause of world peace, for all progressive forces, for the anti-imperialist struggle..."

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, ll. 134-139; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[This fourth excerpt is from a 2 November 1962 entry from Benediktov's diary, describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai—with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier—

opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."]

At a reception I met R.K. Nehru, who approached me and began a conversation. He set forth in great detail his views on the Indian-Chinese border conflict, noting that he had expressed them to the prime minister. R.K. Nehru said that the prime minister gave him a letter to N.S. Khrushchev and spoke about his conversation with the Soviet ambassador. In his words, the prime minister greatly appreciates the concern and anxiety of the government of the USSR and the general approach of N.S. Khrushchev to the problem of the Indian-Chinese conflict. "At another time, noted R.K. Nehru, it is possible that the prime minister himself would have spoken about this problem in detail, but now he is exceptionally busy, very tired and we must help him. Therefore I myself will tell you our views."

1. "After my return from China two years ago I personally did everything possible for the peaceful settlement of the border dispute. No one else has played a more important role in this matter than I. To some degree I have weakened my authority by having taken the hardest line on resolving the conflict by means of negotiations. The foreign policy leaders of India tried to the best of their abilities to solve this dispute and preserve friendly relations with the PRC. We did not cease to hope for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and did not make any military preparations, completely not supposing that military actions on the border were possible. The result is our present retreat."

2. "After many years in China, I know very well and am closely acquainted with all the leaders of China and with all the main party leaders. I [can] clearly present the

views of each of them. I am convinced, for example, that Zhou Enlai does not approve the policy of the PRC regarding India, while Liu Shaoqi can approve it."

3. "I am absolutely convinced that the given events are not simply a border conflict, but something more. This is part of a general strategy of Chinese leftist dogmatists - sectarians who obviously now have the upper hand in the leadership of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). This is the mainspring of the events. These sectarian elements in the CCP are trying to prove their thesis that India, as a capitalist country, will surely join the bloc of western countries, that it cannot conduct a policy of nonalignment for any length of time. They regard Nehru not as a nationalist leader but as a reactionary bourgeois. They are trying by their actions to force India to reject the policy of nonalignment, to draw it into the western bloc, to strike a blow at the entire policy of neutrality, nonalignment, peaceful coexistence. India, as the largest of the neutral countries of Asia, is their first and main target. Thus the issue is not this or that border or territory; the essence of the events is the attempts of the party sectarians of the CCP to prove in practice their theoretical position, an attempt to cross over to the offensive on the ideological front."

4. "I am convinced that their actions are an extension of the CCP's ideological disputes with the CPSU, and that the Chinese sectarians are directing the main blow against the Soviet Union and its foreign policy principles—against peaceful coexistence, the possibility of avoiding war in our atomic age, the possibility of the victory of communism not through war but through peaceful economic competition with the West. We value highly these principles of Soviet policy. I personally don't have anything against the establishment of commu-

West, but into two camps: one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against.”

6. “We are on the leading edge of the struggle against the realization in practice by these fanatics of their theoretical program, which is a threat to the entire world, to all peoples. Therefore, everyone must assist our struggle. Therefore we must not in any case retreat before them, not submit to their threats, not agree to conditions which they dictate on the basis of force and seizure of our territory. On the contrary, we must without fail defeat them, smash their first practical attempt to prove their thesis. Only their defeat and the preservation by India of its policy of nonalignment can teach them a lesson and force them to reconsider their theoretical convictions.”...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. 120-124; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[The fifth and final selection from Ambassador Benediktov's diary is from a 12 December 1962 entry recording a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Nehru. In the excerpt presented here, Nehru expressed a positive evaluation of Soviet-Indian relations, complimenting Khrushchev for his role in resolving the Cuban crisis, but in response to the Soviet envoy's emphasis that the border crisis with China be settled peacefully he firmly defended India's stand that PRC forces must withdraw from recently-occupied positions (e.g., return to the line held on September 8) before talks could start.]

In accordance with the commission of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev today I visited prime minister of India J. Nehru. I gave him warm greetings and best wishes from N.S. Khrushchev and other members of the Soviet government.

Nehru first of all inquired about the health of N.S. Khrushchev...

I further set forth the substance of the questions which I was commissioned by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to communicate to Nehru. I said to Nehru that the Soviet government appreciates the efforts of the Indian government and of Nehru personally which are aimed at preserving the policy of nonalignment, at preserving and further developing the friendly relations with the So-

viet Union. I set forth the opinion of N.S. Khrushchev on questions of the necessity of activating in every way the struggle for peace and general disarmament, for carrying out the policy of peaceful coexistence and resolution of disputed international questions through negotiations. I expressed the wish of N.S. Khrushchev that the border conflict between India and the PRC also will be resolved through peaceful means, through negotiations.

Nehru listened to all of this attentively and with great interest, taking notes in his notebook. He expressed great satisfaction with the friendly relations which exist between the USSR and India, between the governments of both countries and also between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and him personally. He expressed also the conviction that these relations will not only be preserved, but also will further develop in the future.

The prime minister stated further that he “fully agrees with Mr. Khrushchev in regard to the necessity of our general struggle for peace and disarmament.” He gave us to understand that the USSR can count on the support of India in these questions.

Concerning the question of the peace-

dertaking flexible measures towards settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict in a peaceful manner by negotiations.

In general, life confirms daily the need for flexible policies to solve international problems. We do not doubt that the Chinese-Indian border conflict can be settled peacefully.

By "speculating" on the Chinese-Indian border conflict, the reactionary forces in India have strengthened their activity and their offensive against the country's [India's] Communist Party and democratic forces.

We are convinced that the measures that your government has taken towards a ceasefire on the Indian-Chinese border, toward the withdrawal of border troops and towards the future settlement of this problem by negotiation will generate positive results. We are of the opinion that this would be, on the one hand a blow against reactionary forces in India itself, and on the other hand a blow against the forces of imperialism, with the USA at its head. We assume that such measures will strengthen India's neutral stance and will prevent India from abandoning this position. This will advance the battle for peace in the whole world. The American imperialists are making efforts to derive advantages from this conflict. The peaceful settlement would undoubtedly be a serious [line illegible—trans.] for imperialism.

After the signing of the border agreement between our countries, we will begin the demarcation of the borderline. As is well known, during the negotiations our delegation raised the question of the village of Hurimt in the Balgan-Ulgiisk district in western Mongolia. Our inhabitants have erected several buildings there and begun lumbering. Your delegation, however, replied that this place cannot be recognized as Mongolia, because this would meet with difficulties. At the same time, your delega-

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the Hungarian, Korean, and Chinese questions as well as on disarmament. In this way, India is getting ever further onto the side of the reactionary imperialists.

You, Comrade Zedenbal, will probably agree with some of what I'm saying and disagree with part. I am not forcing my opinion on you. Further development will show who is right. Our policy is a peace-loving foreign policy that is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

J. ZEDENBAL: Our main task is the signing of the Mongolian-Chinese border agreement. This work is on the verge of a successful conclusion.

Clearly, the Soviet Union, the PRC and the other countries of the socialist camp play a major role in keeping peace in the whole world. The socialist countries have taken on the goal to contribute to the fight for peace, each according to his strength. Naturally the socialist countries are interested in the peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict. It is my understanding that our discussion takes this standpoint, as a point of departure. We and you both know that Nehru is not a Communist, but a bourgeois politician. But we and you both understand how important it is, in the interests of the whole socialist camp, to exploit the positive sides of individual bourgeois politicians. We know that your party in its long history has garnered much experience in the exploitation of the deeds of individuals, who are on the enemy's side.

The exploitation of India's policy of neutrality is very important for the socialist camp. We assume that this is what the five principles of co-existence that you, Comrade Premier Zhou Enlai, together with Nehru, proclaimed. It will be very disadvantageous for our camp, if in place of Nehru, a man such as [Moraji] Desai comes to power. Then there will be a danger that India will join an aggressive bloc. In general, we attach the greatest meaning to the preservation and exploitation of India's neutrality. I think you will probably agree with this. The Chinese-Indian border conflict is now on all lips, since in contemporary international relations every event, even if of local character, becomes widely known.

We think that the ceasefire, the pulling back of troops and the readiness for a negotiated settlement of the border conflict through negotiations, a readiness that you decided on after appropriate evaluation of

the conflict and its connections to international problems and in consideration of all the complicated factors, correspond to the interests of the peoples of the socialist camp and all progressive mankind.

ZHOU ENLAI: The hitch is that the Nehru government represents the Grossbourgeoisie and is two-faced. It is correct that in the fight for peace one must also exploit the bourgeoisie. Nehru is however a representative of the Grossbourgeoisie. The reactionary tendency has the upper hand in the Nehru government's policies. We must lead a decisive struggle against him, we must unmask his treacherous machinations. In his pro-American policy, there is no difference between Nehru and Desai. Resumption of negotiations to strengthen peace will be useful. But the Communists see this question differently from other men. The Communist Party of England has differences of opinion with us on other matters, but on the Indian-Chinese border question, we are of the same opinion. It would be good, if in the future you kept this in mind.

J. ZEDENBAL: I understand that the Chinese side does not unconditionally insist on immediately incorporating a 90,000 square kilometer area on the eastern border, that this question will be decided in the future. Is that true or not?

ZHOU ENLAI: I already went to India with Comrade [Foreign Minister] Chen Yi in 1960 in order to settle the Chinese-Indian border question, but we returned with empty hands.

J. ZEDENBAL: The Chinese-Indian border question must not be solved only in the interests of China, but also in accordance with the interests of the whole international communist movement. Given this, I personally think that it would be somewhat better, if you didn't bring up the matter of the 90,000 square kilometers on the eastern sector of the border, but, on the contrary, support the development of class struggle within India in favor of socialism and communism, so that it can contribute to the strengthening of the Communist Party and the democratic forces whereby you would help to accelerate India's transition to communism. There can be no doubt that the border question will be resolved in the future. I repudiate the thought of your intending to weaken or undermine in any way the forces of the Communist Party of India. It would be absurd, if such an idea came into

the head of a Communist.

The kindling of conflict and noise over some 5-10 kilometers of land will, in the end, result in the strengthening of the domestic reactionary forces in India and the fanning of nationalistic passions. This would effect the Communists negatively and be disadvantageous for Socialism.

You Chinese Communists are much more experienced than us, and tempered in revolutionary battle. I am only saying what I think about this question and how I understand it.

ZHOU ENLAI: (Becoming nervous, with altered facial expression)

If you are interested in the Indian-Chinese border question, please examine again the literature that we have provided for the Asian and African countries. Our government is not fighting with India because of a few dozen kilometers of area. We have made absolutely no territorial claims, only the Indian side has. One must understand this correctly. The essence of the matter is that the Indian side is trying to annex an even larger area on the Western sector of the border. How quickly India treads the path of socialism depends, above all, on the revolutionary struggle of the Indian Communist Party and the Indian people. It is important to expose to the world public the evil machinations and dangers, that the reactionary forces of India represent. If we do not expose their reactionary activity, they will go over to the American side, and that is even more disadvantageous.

J. ZEDENBAL: The main thing is not to play into the hands of American imperialism.

It was agreed to continue the conversation the next day.

29 December 1962

[Source: Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen