

Research in the history of the USSR (and Britain) documents projects, see the list of Soviet and Cuban sites in the (preliminary) findings of

The *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* has previously reported on various new findings regarding the crisis—known to Russians as the “Caribbean Crisis” and Cubans as the “October Crisis”—particularly in issue no. 5 (Spring 1995), which featured an extensive compilation of translated documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow.<sup>2</sup>

In this issue, the *Bulletin* presents more translated materials from that repository—the Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF)—documenting various aspects of Soviet policy during the events of the fall of 1962. Most were declassified by Soviet/Russian authorities in 1991-1992 and provided to NHK Japanese television in connection with a documentary on the Cuban Missile Crisis aired to mark the 30th anniversary of the event in October 1992; Prof. Philip Brenner (American University), one of the consultants to the show, in turn, subsequently gave copies of the documents to CWIHP and the National Security Archive—a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University—where they are now deposited and available for research. That collection is available at [www.mtg.org](http://www.mtg.org)

\* the *Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.*, including reports from the USSR's newly-arrived ambassador to the United States, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, on the situation in Washington and his meetings with leading personages, and from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on his conversation with Kennedy on October 18;

\* the *United Nations in New York*, from which USSR ambassador Valerian Zorin reported on debates in the Security Council, and on contacts with other delegates and U.N. officials, and then more senior Soviet officials sent to handle the diplomacy of the settlement, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov and Mikoyan, reported on their negotiations with U.S. negotiators John J. McCloy and Adlai Stevenson as well as conversations with U Thant;

\* and the *Soviet Embassy in Havana*, from which USSR Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseev reported on Cuban developments, including the fervor gripping the country when it seemed war might be imminent, the leadership's angry reaction when Khrushchev accepted Kennedy's request to withdraw the missiles without advance consultation with Castro, and the difficult conversations which ensued as Soviet officials, in particular Mikoyan, tried to mollify the upset Cubans and at the same time secure Havana's acquiescence to the measures Moscow had accepted in order to resolve the crisis.

The fact that almost all of the documents below came from the Foreign Ministry archive should induce some caution among readers seeking an understanding of Soviet policy regarding the crisis. Not surprisingly, for instance, they illuminate diplomatic aspects of the events far more than, for instance, either military or intelligence aspects. In fact, the Russian Defense Ministry has declassified a substantial amount of material on "Operation Anadyr"—the code-name for the Soviet missile deployment to Cuba—and other military actions related to the crisis, and the *Bulletin* plans to present some of those materials, with translation, annotation, and commentary by Mark Kramer (Harvard University), in a future issue.<sup>5</sup> As for Soviet intelligence archives, these have not been opened to researchers except on a highly selective basis; however, a book scheduled for publication in 1997 by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali is expected to draw on these sources. Finally, as noted above, documentation on decision-making at the highest level of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) remains classified, presumably in the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF).

It is not possible to provide a comprehensive commentary on the significance of the documents, both because of space limitations and also because they may be used by researchers for so many different purposes—not only historians of the Cold War but political scientists, specialists in bureaucratic politics, nuclear theory, and "crisis management," psychologists, specialists in U.S., Soviet, and Cuban foreign policy, biographers of key figures, and many others have looked to the Cuban Missile Crisis for answers and illumination. Best read in conjunction with the other Russian documents published in *Bulletin 5* and elsewhere, as well as American materials, the documents below are offered merely as useful raw primary source material rather than as evidence for any particular interpretation. Nevertheless, some preliminary reactions can be offered on a few issues.

### Pre-Crisis U.S. Military and Covert Policies Toward Cuba

One issue of vital importance during the run-up to the crisis on which the documents here (and in *Bulletin 5*) provide some evidence is the question of how the Soviets perceived the Kennedy Administration's policies and actions toward Cuba, particularly Washington's covert operations against the Castro regime and the likelihood that it would take more direct military action. They clearly show that Moscow's representatives noted, and blamed the United States government in general and the Central Intelligence Agency in particular for, what it called the "piratical raids" by anti-Castro Cuban exile groups being carried out with U.S. support against the island. Although one does not find specific references to "Operation Mongoose"—the code-name for the massive CIA covert operation undertaken with the aim of toppling Castro after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961—the reports of Ambassador Alekseev in Havana and Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington in September and early October 1962 show that Moscow had no doubt as to who was responsible for what the former called the "landing of counter-revolutionary bands of spies and arms" and "constant acts of provocation."<sup>6</sup> Dobrynin's cable of 15 October, for instance, lays out the role of the CIA in supporting actions of the exile group "Alpha 66."

However, the documents suggest that the Soviets had only a general knowledge of "Operation Mongoose"—although Soviet military intelligence (GRU) archives might well contain more detailed reports—and Moscow remained uncertain as to the significance of the American support of the harassment operations—i.e., whether they presaged a direct U.S. military intervention to overthrow Castro—right up to the eve of the crisis. As the crisis approached, however, Soviet officials appeared to feel more assured that U.S. military action against Cuba was not imminent (which to those in the know in Moscow signified that the secret deployment of missiles could proceed safely). In a document published in *Bulletin 5*, Foreign Minister Gromyko, in fact, cabled Moscow after meeting Kennedy on October 18 in the Oval Office—unaware that the American already knew about the Soviet missile bases in Cuba—that "Everything we know about the position of the USA government on the Cuban question allows us to conclude that the overall situation is completely satisfactory... There is reason to believe that the USA is not preparing an intervention and has put its money" on economic sanctions.<sup>7</sup>

The actual Soviet record of the Gromyko-Kennedy conversation, excerpted here, offers readers a chance to follow in detail this duplicity-filled conversation, in which neither man told the other the most important fact in the situation under discussion. Gromyko dutifully criticized Washington for its actions against Cuba, and acknowledged only that Moscow was providing Cuba with "exclusively defensive armaments" which could not "represent a threat to anybody." Kennedy, for his part, with the U-2 photographs of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba under construction lying in his desk drawer, told Gromyko that the United States "take[s] on trust" Soviet statements about the defensive character of the weapons it was shipping to Castro but reiterated his public warnings that "were it otherwise,

the gravest issues would arise.” While stressing that the situation had taken a turn for the worse since July as a result of Moscow’s stepping-up of military aid to Cuba—calling the situation “perhaps the most dangerous since the end of the Second World War”—Kennedy made no mention of the missiles.

After reading the account of the conversation, it is hard to explain Gromyko’s smug assessment that the situation was “completely satisfactory,” other than as a spectacular case of wishful thinking (or a blase memo to mask a more candid assessment relayed through other channels). It is clear, from his repeated statements of concern, that Kennedy was trying to caution Moscow to rethink its adventure without tipping his cards—and perhaps even signalling a possible way out of the crisis that had (so far as Moscow knew) not even begun. Repeatedly assuring Gromyko that the United States had “no intentions to launch an aggression against Cuba,” Kennedy noted pointedly that, “If Mr. Khrushchev addressed me on this issue, we could give him corresponding assurances on that score,” and repeated the offer twice later in the conversation. A little more than a week later, of course, after the world had been brought to the brink, precisely such a declaration from Kennedy would give Khrushchev the fig leaf he needed to swallow his pride and accept the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

The Russian documents reveal nothing new on the issue of whether, in fact, the Kennedy Administration had been moving toward taking military action against Cuba even before it discovered the existence of the Soviet nuclear-capable missiles on the island in mid-October. In a previous publication, the current author presented evidence that the U.S. government and military undertook serious contingency planning, and even some preliminary redeployments, in September and the first two weeks of October 1962 toward the objective of achieving, by October 20, “maximum readiness” for either an air strike against or invasion of Cuba, or both, although the article remained agnostic on the issue of whether Kennedy had actually made a decision to attack Cuba or simply wanted the option available.<sup>8</sup> Recently, a potentially crucial, yet still problematic, piece of evidence from American archives has surfaced to suggest that, literally on the eve of the crisis, the Kennedy Administration was *not* on the verge of imminent military action against Cuba.

At issue is a recently declassified purported fragment of notes of a conversation on the afternoon of Monday, 15 October 1962, between Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. (At that point, the U-2 photographs taken over Cuba the previous day had not yet been identified as revealing Soviet missile sites under construction, a development that would take place only later that afternoon and evening and be reported to the president the following morning, October 16.) During a discussion of contingency plans concerning Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) minutes—obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act—paraphrase McNamara as saying: “President wants no military action within the next three months, but he can’t be sure as he does not control events. For instance, aerial photos made available this morning show 68 boxes on ships that are not believed to be Il-28s and cannot be identified. However, the probabilities are strongly against military action in the next 30 days.”<sup>9</sup> Similarly, a recently-declassified JCS historical report prepared in 1981 evidently relies on those notes in stating (without citation) that in their meeting on October 15, “the Secretary [McNamara] said that President Kennedy wanted, if possible, to avoid military measures against Cuba during the next three months.”<sup>10</sup>

If accurate, the notes would certainly constitute a strong piece of evidence against the hypothesis that the Kennedy Administration believed it was headed toward, let alone desired, a military confrontation with Cuba in the immediate future, just before news of the missiles. The evidence is problematic, however, due to an unfortunate case of destruction of historical evidence by the JCS that apparently makes it impossible to evaluate the context or provenance of McNamara’s reported remarks (see footnote for details).<sup>11</sup>

### **Berlin and Cuba**

One issue which has long intrigued students of the crisis is the nature of its connection, if any, to the simmering U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Berlin—which had quieted somewhat since the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the Checkpoint Charlie

early October 1962, deliberately floated the idea of an imminent intensive diplomatic effort (or possibly a renewed superpower showdown) on Berlin, to take place in late November after the U.S. Congressional mid-term elections, in order to distract American attention from Cuba long enough to allow Moscow to complete its secret missile deployment. Such is, at any rate, the strategy that Anastas Mikoyan privately described to Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership on 4 November 1962 (published in *Bulletin* 5) as the one the Kremlin had followed in the weeks and months preceding the crisis: “We let the Americans know that we wanted to solve the question of Berlin in the nearest future. This was done in order to distract their attention away from Cuba. So, we used a diversionary maneuver. In reality, we had no intention of resolving the Berlin question at that time.”<sup>15</sup> In the memorandum of the Gromyko-Kennedy conversation on October 18, one can see the Soviet Foreign Minister dangling the Berlin bait, suggesting that a summit meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev take place in the United States “in the second half of November”—when Khrushchev would attend a session of the U.N. General Assembly—in order to discuss the issues that separate [the USA and USSR] and first of all the questions of the German peace treaty and West Berlin.”





*Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: New Press, 1992); Robert Smith Thompson, *The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis*





**RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS  
ON THE  
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS**

**I. BEFORE THE CRISIS:  
14 SEPTEMBER-21 OCTOBER 1962**

**M. Zakharov and S. P. Ivanov to  
N.S. Khrushchev, 14 September 1962**

Personal memorandum to N. S. Khrushchev

The USA is conducting intensive air and naval patrols around Cuba, giving special attention to the reconnaissance of Soviet vessels.

The head of the Cuban counterrevolutionaries, Juan Manuel Salvat, announced

places. The USA is determined not to let this happen. It cannot be allowed to occur. The West's presence in Berlin and its access to the city represent, as before, vitally important interests, and no concessions with regard to them can or will be made to Soviet pressure, whatever form that pressure may take. The problem now consists of the fact that we both have locked horns [in confrontation—ed.].

Nuclear war may be an irrational phenomenon, but there is more to it than this, since recognizing it as irrational does not necessarily signify being saved from it. If both sides come to the negotiating table with an absolute certainty that the other side will in no circumstances have recourse to nuclear war, then that would be one of the surest paths toward such a war, because one side or the other could go one step further and apply a pressure beyond what the other side is able to put up with, and for all intents and purposes we would be heading for catastrophe.

In government circles there is a feeling that we quite possibly have some difficult weeks and months ahead of us due to Berlin, and that a crisis of the first order may arise before Christmas.

With Cuba the situation is different. Berlin is a vitally important issue for both sides, and the fundamental positions of both sides with regard to it remain inflexible. Latin America is another vitally important region. Berlin and Latin America are two dangerous regions. No [U.S.] military actions concerning Cuba could be or should be undertaken until there are signs of overt Cuban aggression against the countries of the Western hemisphere. Cuba should be and is now under close observation, and the USA has been kept informed of what is happening there. The USA's policy consists, as before, in ensuring that the maintenance of Cuba be as expensive as possible both for the USSR and for Castro's regime. It appears unlikely that the USSR could afford to invest funds in Cuba that would be sufficient to meet Cuba's actual and long-term needs. Only the USA alone had a billion-dollar trade with Cuba before the Castro revolution.

According to the American government's calculations, there are d n8sothw [ire,n5. su 04 Tn C--1.33

represent, any threat to the countries of Latin America. It is strange to think as if small Cuba can encroach on the independence of either this or that country of Latin America. Cuban leaders and personally Fidel Castro have declared more than once in front of the whole world and in a most solemn manner that Cuba does not intend to impose their system, that they firmly favor the non-interference of states into the internal affairs of each other.

The people who call for an aggression against Cuba allege that, they say, it is not sufficient to have those statements of the Cuban government, though those statements are supported by deeds. But by that whatever aggressive action or adventure can be justified. Solutions of almost all the international issues are results, you know, of statements, dictums, or negotiations between states, in the course of which corresponding governments give an account of their positions on either these or those questions, as for example takes place now during the conversations that we have with the USA administration. But does the USA administration not believe the statements of the Cuban government? Really, is it not convincing when the Cuban government officially declares its aspiration to settle all disputed questions with the USA administration by means of negotiations? In this regard may be quoted the well-known statement made by Mr. [Oswaldo] Dorticos, President of the Republic of Cuba, during the current session of the UN General Assembly, a statement of which the USA President is undoubtedly aware.<sup>1</sup>

The Cubans want to make secure their own home, their independence. They appeal for reason, for conscience. They call on the USA to renounce encroachments upon the independence of Cuba, to establish normal relations with the Cuban state.

The question is: Is it worthwhile to whip up a campaign and organize different sorts of hostile activity around Cuba and at the same time inimical actions against those states which maintain good relations with Cuba, respect its independence, and lend Cuba a helping hand at a difficult moment? Is it not a destruction of international law, of the UN principles and purposes?

Is it possible, Mr. President, for the Soviet Union, taking into account all of this, to sit cross-handed and to be a detached onlooker? You say that you like frankness.

Giving an account of the Soviet government position frankly as well, I would like to stress that nowadays is not the middle of the XIX century, is not the time of colonial partition and not the times when a victim of aggression could raise its voice only weeks and months after an assault. American statesmen frequently declare that the USA is a great power. This is correct, the USA is a great power, a rich and strong power. And what kind of power is the Soviet Union?

You know that N.S. Khrushchev was positively impressed by your realistic statement during the Vienna meeting about the equality of forces of the two powers—the USSR and USA. But insofar as it is so, inasmuch as the USSR is also a great and strong power it cannot be a mere spectator while there is appearing a threat of unleashing a large war either in connection with the Cuban issue or [with a] situation in whatever other region of the world.

You are very well aware of the Soviet government attitude toward such an action of the USA, as the decision about the draft of 150 thousand reservists.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet government is convinced that if both of our countries favor a lessening of international tension and a solution of unsettled international problems, then such steps should be avoided because they are intended for sharpening the international situation.

If it came to the worst, if a war began, certainly, a mobilization of an additional 150 thousand reservists to the USA armed forces would not have significance. And undoubtedly you are very well aware of this. For the present is not the year 1812 when Napoleon was setting all his hopes upon the number of soldiers, of sabres and cannons. Neither is it 1941, when Hitler was relying upon his mass armies, automatic rifles, and tanks. Today life and and military equipment have made a large step forward. Nowadays the situation is quite different and it would be better not to rely on armaments while solving disputed problems.

So far as the aid of the Soviet Union to Cuba is concerned, the Soviet government has declared and I have been instructed to reaffirm it once more, our aid pursues exclusively the object of rendering Cuba assistance to its defensive capacity and development of its peaceful economy. Neither industry nor agriculture in Cuba, neither land-improvement works nor training of the Cuban personnel carried out by the Soviet

specialists to teach them to use some defensive types of armaments, can represent a threat to anybody. Had it been otherwise, the Soviet government would never be involved in such aid. And such an approach applies to any country.

The example of Laos convincingly illustrates this. If the Soviet Union were conducting another policy.

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corresponding assurances on that score. The build-up of the Cuban military might has badly impressed the American people and the USA congress. As President I was trying to calm public opinion and I have declared that, taking into account the kind of aid rendered by the Soviet Union to Cuba, we must keep cool and self-controlled. But I was not able to find a satisfactory explanation for those actions of the Soviet Union.

Kennedy said later, that the Soviet Union is aware of the American opinion regarding the present regime in Cuba. We consider that it would be better if there were another government. But we do not have any intentions to attack Cuba.

You are saying that we have established a blockade around Cuba, but that is not the case. We have only taken the decision that the ships, after bringing cargo to Cuba, will be barred entry to the American ports to pick up freight.

The actions of the Soviet Union create a very complicated situation and I don't know where the whole thing can bring us. The present situation is, perhaps, the most dangerous since the end of the Second World War. We, certainly, take on trust statements of the Soviet Union about the sort of armaments supplied by you to Cuba. As President I am trying to restrain those people in the USA who are favoring an invasion of Cuba. For example, last Sunday in one of my speeches I declared against one of the American senators, who had previously supported such an invasion.<sup>3</sup>

I repeat, a very dangerous situation has nevertheless arisen regarding this issue and I don't know what can be the outcome.

I answered Kennedy that once there was an attempt to organize an invasion of Cuba and it is known what was the end of the affair.<sup>4</sup> From different official statements and your own statements, Mr. President, everybody know what were the circumstances and how that invasion was arranged. Everybody knows also that the USA administration needs only to move a finger and no Cuban exiles, nor those who support them in the USA and some countries of the Caribbean, would dare launch any adventure against Cuba.

At this moment Kennedy put in a remark that he had already had an exchange of opinions with N.S. Khrushchev on the issue of the invasion of Cuba in 1961 and had said that it was a mistake.

I should be glad, Kennedy stressed, to give assurances that an invasion would not be repeated neither on the part of Cuban refugees, nor on the part of the USA armed forces.

But the issue is, Kennedy said, that as a result of the USSR government's action a rescurm difyearUnion dangeroussud-in 1961 andnas, ric

received before departure, the question of a possible meeting of the heads of the two powers has been touched upon.

The Soviet government, as before, is building its foreign policy on the recognition of that indisputable concept that difference in ideologies, to which our states adhere, need not be a barrier to their peaceful coexistence and cooperation in the interests of strengthening the peace. You and we, as it was underlined more than once by N.S. Khrushchev, are human beings and you have your own ideology, and you are well aware of our attitude towards it. The USSR is a socialist state, and is building communism. We are guided by communist ideology. Who will gain the victory in the end—this question must be solved not by the force of armaments, but by the way of peaceful competition and we, the communists, have urged this since the days of Lenin.

We resolutely condemn the calls to solve ideological disputes by the force of armaments. A competition in economics, in satisfying the material and spiritual requirements of the people—that is the field where in a historic, peaceful “battle,” without use of armaments, must be solved the question of which ideology would prevail and which one would quit the stage of his-

speech. Appended to the letter was the draft of a resolution which in its main strategic part runs as follows:

“The Security Council...

1. Demands, as a temporary measure, in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter, the immediate dismantling and removal from Cuba of all ballistic missiles and other armaments used for offensive purposes.

2. Authorizes and requests the acting secretary general to dispatch to Cuba a corps of UN observers to ensure fulfillment of this resolution and to deliver a report.

3. Demands the cessation of quarantine measures directed against military deliveries to Cuba after the UN has been assured of the fulfillment of Point 1.

4. Strongly recommends that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics immediately discuss the issue of measures to be taken to eliminate the currently existing threat to the security of the Western hemisphere and to peace throughout the world, and to deliver a report on this to the Security Council.”

We will forward the text of Stevenson’s letter and the draft of the resolution to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by teletype.

The United States’ formulation of the imaginary threat posed by Cuba and the USSR is clearly aimed at concealing and



peace.

3. To call upon the interested parties  
to carry out this resolution immediately, and



place on the same level a party on one hand that has taken provocative actions and imposed a naval blockade, and on the other hand parties that have been engaging in normal shipping activity and taking lawful measures for safeguarding their countries' defense. We emphasized that the acting Secretary General's most urgent obligation is to exert necessary pressure on the government of the USA to make them lift the ille-

leaders and people. At meetings and gatherings there is almost no trace of the ostentation and verbosity that are characteristic of Cubans. The awareness of an immediate threat has brought the Cuban people even closer, and has strengthened their hatred of American imperialism.

The Soviet Union's authority has climbed to unprecedented heights. The actions of the USSR government in its defense of Cuba are completely convincing the people of the failure of the American provocations. The whole country is preparing to rebuff the aggressors. Committees for the defense of the revolution are establishing, in every city neighborhood, in factories, on the national estates and institutions, first-aid brigades offering immediate help to the wounded. Volunteer brigades are on the alert for profiteers, and are prohibiting the purchase of excessive quantities of goods in stores.

Militia observation posts have been placed on all streets. There are no signs of panic, and no false alarmist rumors are being spread.

The domestic counterrevolution has fallen completely silent, and has not yet shown any signs of activity.

The nation is anxiously awaiting the first clashes between Soviet steamers and the American ships constituting the blockade.

The arrival yesterday and today of two Soviet steamers in Cuban ports without serious complications was met with great relief.

Secretary General U Thant's appeal, and Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's response to it and to Bertrand Russell, were commented upon here as events of the greatest importance.

Meanwhile the radio and newspapers attribute great significance to [Soviet Defense Minister] Marshal R.Ya. Malinsky's speech.

Moreover, Fidel Castro finds great significance in the emergence of a movement for solidarity with Cuba, especially in the countries of Latin America.

It is his view that the USA's current insane actions against Cuba provide firm ground for the further expansion of this movement, which will be able to force the Americans to rethink their plans.

He approves of our policy of not giving in to provocations, and of the possible

avoidance of unnecessary conflicts. Castro, for example, approves of the fact that several of our vessels have turned back from their courses, and thus have not given occasion for any major conflicts.

At the same time Castro, in the course of conversations with our military experts, has expressed a belief in the necessity of shooting down one or two piratic American planes over Cuban territory.

Unverifiable information has been received by us and the Czechs from unverifiable sources on the possibility of an interventionist landing or a bombing of Cuban military targets on 26-27 October. The leadership has taken this information into consideration, but is not taking it very seriously.

The situation in the Soviet colony is normal. All necessary measures have been taken for a possible exacerbation of the situation.

25.X.62 ALEKSEEV

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Cable from Soviet Ambassador to the USA A. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962**

The situation in Washington remains tense and complicated. At the same time, today in political and diplomatic circles and in the comments of American press, radio, and television, began appearing rays of hope for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban issue and they are related to the quiet, restrained behavior of the Soviet government and its readiness for negotiations with the USA (it is necessary to mention that the Embassy is receiving quite a number of cables and letters from ordinary Americans in which they express their gratitude to the Soviet government and N.S. Khrushchev for their position in the current situation).

Nevertheless, prevailing here are the expectations for further mounting of crisis in the relations between the USA and the USSR over Cuba. In addition to our previous considerations currently we would like to say the following:

1. It is becoming daily stronger the

opinion that steps undertaken by the Kennedy administration regarding Cuba had been dictated by the desire to stop the generally unfavorable for the USA developments in the world and to try to reestablish the status-quo which had existed at the moment of the meeting between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy in Vienna last year. Risk, entailed with these steps made by Kennedy's administration, is outweighed, in his view, by those unfavorable consequences for the USA military-strategic situation, which would appear in the case of the placing in Cuba of Soviet medium and long-range missiles.

2. Regarding how far the Kennedy administration is ready to go against Cuba, the following impression has been forming.

Judging from available data, the administration sets itself, as a minimal aim, the object of not allowing the emplacement in Cuba the aforementioned missile launchers. Meanwhile, according to some sources, whose reports still need additional checking, the possibility is discussed—in case of not achieving that aim by other means—to destroy the missile launchers in Cuba under construction by a massive air-raid of American aviation. It is necessary to mention that, according to all reports, the Americans are not aware of exact numbers and kinds of our missile weapons in Cuba. This circumstance makes them rather nervous.

3. The most militant line in the USA administration still is held by [Attorney General] R. Kennedy, [Secretary of Defense Robert S.] McNamara, [National Security Adviser McGeorge] Bundy and military men, who insist on a firm approach with the purpose of destroying the missile bases in Cuba, not even stopping at invasion of the island. [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and [Secretary of the Treasury Douglas] Dillon are now holding a somewhat restrained and more cautious position, though they also favor continued pressure upon us.

In this regard the course of the discussion inside the administration of the President's response to U Thant's appeal [of October 24; see above] seems significant. According to our information, the first group was insisting on a categorical rejection of that appeal. Such an answer had been already elaborated and it was even supposed to be transmitted to the largest information agencies. But at the last moment (around 12 o'clock midnight) the President inclined

to the current, more flexible, [version] prepared by Rusk.

The President is vacillating right now, but, judging from everything, especially the principal direction of USA policy, he is heeding the first group, particularly, his brother. A certain danger of the situation is

sels bound for Cuba keep away from the interception area for a certain period of time, and that the USA for the duration of that same period avoid immediate encounters between their ships and Soviet vessels. In this event we will declare that U Thant's proposal, which is the basis on which all the interested parties have agreed to conduct negotiations, goes above and beyond the "primary measures" that he put forth in his second message.

Since the forthcoming meeting with U Thant is a preliminary one and raises the issue of further negotiations, including a conclusive normalization of the whole situation in the Caribbean region, we ask to be briefed on your decision as to the level, form, and direction of further negotiations.

If there are supplementary instructions for the first meeting with U Thant, we ask you to take into consideration the meeting time proposed by U Thant.

25.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962**

26 October 1962

The Cuban delegate, Garcia-Inchaustegui, met with U Thant on 26 October, at which time U Thant entrusted him to deliver to Havana a message from him to Fidel Castro (we are sending this as a separate telegram).

In the conversation with Garcia-Inchaustegui, U Thant, who had informed him of the correspondence between U Thant and Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, and President Kennedy as well, expressed his ideas for using Dorticos's proposal of 8 October in the General Assembly as a way to achieve a lasting normalization of the Caribbean basin situation. The Cuban reminded U Thant that Dorticos in his speech had emphasized the extenuating circumstance that the USA had already declared that it did not

intend to attack Cuba, but that now it had broken their promise.

To this U Thant responded that for this reason it is necessary to specify what guarantees should be made by the USA to assure that it will not take any antagonistic actions against Cuba, and asked Garcia-Inchaustegui to explain the views of the Cuban government on this matter.

2. The head of the Brazilian delegation, [Alfonso] Arinos [de Melo Franco], has worked out a draft resolution on the denuclearization of Latin America and Africa under the observation of a monitoring committee (we will send this as a separate telegram). In a conversation with Garcia-Inchaustegui, Arinos expressed his view that approving this resolution would allow Cuba to "avoid humiliation" if it is forced to renounce the construction of missile bases.

According to Garcia-Inchaustegui, this draft resolution has received great currency among the Latin American countries, and the delegates from the Latin American contingents who met with U Thant this evening should discuss the draft with the acting Secretary General.

Garcia-Inchaustegui told the Brazilian himself that, in his personal opinion, it would be better that the issue of the elimination of all foreign military bases in Latin America be brought up, since then such a formulation would include the base at Guantanamo as well.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962**

26 October 1962

I delivered N.S. Khrushchev's response to U Thant's second message (at 13:00 local time).

U Thant expressed satisfaction with the

fact that once again his proposal had been approved. After this, U Thant told us that tonight he had received a response to his second message from Kennedy as well, and at our insistence he provided us with the text of that response (after he had submitted this disclosure to the approval of the USA legation, and after receiving our consent to his disclosing to the USA legation the content of our own response).

We are communicating the text of Kennedy's response as a separate telegram.

U Thant presented us with the possibility of his immediate publication of both his messages to N.S. Khrushchev and to Kennedy, and of both responses given to those messagees by the USSR and the USA. He led us to understand that a comparison of both responses would show the world community that the Soviet Union, unlike the USA, was continuing to aim for support of peace and the prevention of war.

We responded to the effect that we were not yet authorized to agree to the publication of N.S. Khrushchev's response, and would give him an answer later.

We believe it would be expedient to give our consent to the publication of the documents mentioned.

Today at 16:00 there will be a meeting between Stevenson and U Thant. At 18:00 Eastern Standard Time we are once again meeting with U Thant, and if we do not receive other instructions by that time, we will give our consent to the publication of N. S. Khrushchev's second response.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962**

26 October 1962

On the evening of 26 October we ([Platon] Morozov and I) met with U Thant, in the presence of [UN Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs Chakravanthi V.]











Castro and to the latest message to Kennedy about the dismantling of special weaponry it became clear that confusion and bewilderment are reigning inside the Cuban leadership.

Dorticos said that, unfortunately, Cuban and Latin American peoples would perceive the decision to dismantle the special weaponry, relying only upon Kennedy's assurances, as a defeat for the Soviet government.

He said that whatever assertions Kennedy made, the Cuban government could not weaken its vigilance.

We understand, declared Dorticos, that this decision of the Soviet government is directed to the preserving of peace and in the end it will be advantageous for the whole socialist camp, including Cuba, but under the present conditions of great patriotic enthusiasm of our people this report would be perceived by infinitely electrified masses as a cold shower.

He said that for the Cuban leaders the most important thing right now is to preserve the Soviet Union's prestige, which had been raised so high in Cuba.

According to him, the counterrevolution will immediately seize this opportunity and direct all its work to revive distrust toward the Soviet Union.

Here, said Dorticos, we must rise to the occasion in order to explain correctly to our people the meaning of the adopted decisions.

He declared that under the created circumstances the Cubans were obliged to publish a statement, differing in tone from N.S. Khrushchev's letter, and there was suggested a preliminary acceptance by the Americans of the five [Cuban] conditions, including evacuation of the Guantanamo base. (transmitted to TASS)

Besides, Dorticos explained, we found ourselves in a difficult situation insofar as we had officially declared that we would not allow any UN observers on our territory.

Until a certain time we will have to stick to this "maximum program" and seek ways of achieving an honorable agreement which could be reached only if we receive from the USA absolute guarantees of our security.

According to Dorticos, no Kennedy statements could be trusted inasmuch as even now the piratical flights over Cuban territory were occurring and this was done not without Kennedy's knowledge.

Dorticos considers that the Americans,

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ibbean. As a result of the efforts undertaken by the Soviet and Cuban sides there have been received guarantees on the part of the USA administration of non-aggression

provide a good and fair foundation for resolving the whole problem. The Soviet government, bearing in mind U Thant's recommendation, has undertaken to suspend temporarily the traffic of its ships bound for Cuba, and to keep them away for a short period of time from the region declared by the United States as being under quarantine.

The government of the USSR has also declared that on board these ships there are not, and will not be, any arms that President Kennedy and the USA government see as "offensive."

Later the government of the USSR agreed to dismantle and send back to the Soviet Union the launchers now in Cuba that are seen by the United States as "offensive."

In brief, said V.V. Kuznetsov, the government of the USSR has undertaken to approve and accept U Thant's proposal; at the same time it has declared and still declares that for its part it will take any and all measures to prevent an exacerbation of the situation, which could lead to a worsening of the conflict and an unleashing of thermonuclear war. In its actions the government of the USSR is bearing in mind the sincere desire of nations to safeguard peace and calm throughout the globe.

The Soviet government has stressed and continues to stress that the actions of the United States, manifested by the imposition of the blockade, as well as the whole USA policy towards Cuba, are aggressive, and aimed at an exacerbation of the situation rather than a normalization of it. There is no need at present to provide a detailed description of American actions during the past week. That has lucidly been done by the Soviet government's statement, as well as by N.S. Khrushchev's messages to the USA President Kennedy and to U Thant.

If it were to assess the situation as it exists today, V.V. Kuznetsov continued, the Soviet government would note with satisfaction, as has already been noted in N.S. Khrushchev's message, that the USA at the present moment has taken a position which makes it possible to settle the whole Cuban problem on the basis of the Soviet proposals. All this has been the result of the efforts made by the Soviet government, as well as by the United Nations Organization and by U Thant himself. The Soviet Union acknowledges the great efforts that were displayed by U Thant.

President Kennedy's latest response to

N.S. Khrushchev's message testifies to the fact that the American government believes it possible to reach an agreement on the basis of the USSR's proposals. This we consider to be a positive factor. With regard to this it seems to us that the moment has arrived for making a transition from general statements to concrete matters. The government of the USSR is ready to do so.

U Thant has expressed his hope that the exchange of opinions will be fruitful and positive, and that it will help eliminate the threat now present in the Caribbean region. He has also expressed his thanks to N.S. Khrushchev for his greetings and his appreciation of his (U Thant's) efforts to maintain peace. U Thant has asked V.V. Kuznetsov to convey his sincere gratitude for all the understanding and cooperation he has received.

After this U Thant said that he recognizes the danger of the existing situation. That danger intensified late Saturday night and early Sunday morning. At that time there were indications that the point of no return had arrived. U Thant did not sleep that night, conducting endless consultations with Narasimhan and Rikhye. Fortunately nothing tragic occurred.

Khrushchev's response yesterday to Kennedy's message represents a very great commitment to the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis. U Thant emphasized that this was not just his personal opinion, but also the opinion of all his colleagues and the overwhelming majority of the permanent UN delegates with whom he has met. For this fruitful and positive gesture, said U Thant, the whole world expressed its gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev and to the government of the Soviet Union.

U Thant said that he too was concerned about the continuing blockade of Cuba on the part of the United States. He recalled his own proposals for a voluntary suspension by the Soviet Union of arms stockpiling in Cuba for a short period of time in return for the United States' voluntary suspension of the blockade. After three-day talks on this issue with the Soviet delegate to the UN, V.A. Zorin, and the USA delegate to the UN Stevenson, U Thant put all his efforts, he said, into finding the fastest resolution of this issue.

At the present time, U Thant said, after his trip to Cuba had been decided, and after the conversation taking place between

V.A. Zorin and U Thant on 28 October, he again addressed a request to the United States to suspend its blockade. In doing so he emphasized that the Soviet Union had undertaken to give orders to its ships to temporarily suspend traffic to Cuba, which signals the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the preliminary settlement proposed by U Thant. U Thant said that he had also declared to the Americans that a continuation of the blockade is especially undesirable during his visit to Cuba. U Thant has still not received a response from the Americans, but hopes to have one in the near future, possibly even today.

V.V. Kuznetsov thanked U Thant for the warm words addressed to the USSR government and personally to N.S. Khrushchev, and said that he would immediately convey them to their destination.

V.V. Kuznetsov agreed that the time has come for turning to concrete problems and ranking them on the basis of their urgency and importance. He was happy to note that, in his outlines as in U Thant's plans, the quarantine issue occupies first place. This suggests that our thoughts and desires are heading in the same direction.

In connection with this, V.V. Kuznetsov recalled that the Soviet government, as N.S. Khrushchev informed U Thant on 25 October, had accepted the first proposal of U Thant, which stipulated in particular a voluntary suspension of all arms transfers to Cuba for a period of two to three weeks, and the simultaneous temporary cessation of the quarantine activity on the part of the United States.

The most recent declarations of the USSR government have created even more favorable conditions for carrying out the proposal to end the quarantine. Nevertheless the quarantine activity still continues. However, as U Thant knows, ship captains have received instructions to remain on the open sea, outside the boundaries of the quarantine activity, for a certain period of time. Such a situation cannot continue for long, since it is depriving Cuba of peaceful goods that are necessary to it, it is creating difficulties for the fueling of the ships remaining on the open sea, and it is incurring losses because of their enforced inactivity. With regard to this, we welcomed U Thant's thoughts on the necessity of resolving this whole issue in the next one or two days. But the imposed quarantine has already been

going on for more than five days, and now there are no longer any reasons for not suspending the quarantine activity.

The declaration of the quarantine by the United States is illegal, and is recognized as such by the whole world. Nevertheless, proceeding from the situation at hand and guided by the interests of peace, the government of the USSR at the present moment is set on the issue of suspending the practical operations of the quarantine. It is quite natural that we would like these operations to cease immediately. In any case we have

the United States and other Latin American countries, and for Cuba. For this reason, U Thant intends to propose that United Nations observers be placed not only on Cuban territory, but also on the territory of the United States and several Latin American countries neighboring Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov said that we now have a clearer idea of the task that U Thant is setting for himself during his trip to Cuba. In connection with this he expressed some of the Soviet views on this matter. First and foremost, Kuznetsov stressed, as is already known from N. S. Khrushchev's messages, the missile installations in Cuba are in the hands of Soviet specialists. The Soviet government has stated that it is dismantling and removing these launchers from Cuba.

It is evident from the message sent by N. S. Khrushchev to Kennedy on 27 October and from the later message with which the American government generally agreed, that the Soviet government has agreed to the imposition of on-site checks after the above-mentioned dismantlings, of course with the consent of the government of the Republic of Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov asked whether the Americans are not moving away from the position laid out in Kennedy's message.

V. V. Kuznetsov expressed his agreement with the Soviet Union's granting of guarantees on arms provisioning and the dismantling of missile installations, and so too the United States should make guarantees to the effect that it will not infringe upon the security and sovereignty of Cuba either with its own armed forces, or through support for other countries, and that it will not permit or aid the activity on its own territory of subversive sabotage groups. These pledges must be firm.

We have made note of Kennedy's statement that the USA will guarantee that no aggression against Cuba will take place. However, on one hand Kennedy declares that the Soviet Union's statements are reassuring, while on the other hand the USA is making new demands that place the two parties in unfairly different positions.

V. V. Kuznetsov concluded that his idea comes down to the point that the statements existing at the present time are sufficient to lift the quarantine without having to take any measures related to the speedy establishment of checks on the dismantling of missile sites in Cuba.

With regard to this he recalled N. S. Khrushchev's message to Kennedy of 28 October, which said that the Soviet Union was prepared to reach an agreement with the United States on the possibility of UN representatives monitoring this dismantling process. In doing so, Khrushchev referred to his earlier message of 27 October, which said that agents of the UN Security Council could conduct on-site inspections on the fulfillment of the obligations that have been taken on. Of course it will be necessary to receive the permission of the government of the Republic of Cuba to allow these authorized officials to enter the country.

U Thant declared that he now understands better the problem connected with establishing on-site inspections on the dismantling and removal of the missile launchers from Cuba. Now, after N. S. Khrushchev's messages of 27 and 28 October, and the explanations offered by V. V. Kuznetsov, he has a clear idea of the Soviet government's position.

During his stay in Cuba he, U Thant, intends to raise the issue of the dismantling and removal of missile materials from Cuba in his talks with Prime Minister Fidel Castro, and it is possible that the latter will have something to say on this matter.

Returning to the question of guarantees, U Thant said that such guarantees should be bilateral. On his own initiative he decided to raise the issue of the presence of UN representatives in all the countries of this region. If the government of Cuba agrees to some UN presence, said U Thant, then he intends to propose to the Organization of American States and the United States to admit UN representatives onto the territory of the USA and the Latin American countries, in the interests of removing the threat to peace in this area. In its general outlines, U Thant has informed the Americans of this idea.

V. V. Kuznetsov declared that the Soviet Union has formulated its duties clearly and concisely, and that there should be no doubt in anyone's mind about the fulfillment of these duties. As far as the USA guarantees to Cuba are concerned, they have already been generally laid out in outline form. With regard to this, V. V. Kuznetsov has directed U Thant's attention to the passage from N. S. Khrushchev's message of 27 October which refers to what the USA should do about making guarantees to Cuba,

and especially: the USA government will declare in the Security Council that the USA will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders, its sovereignty, and that it pledges not to interfere in its domestic affairs, not to invade it or let its territory serve as a base for any invasion of Cuba, and that it will also restrain those who wish to take aggressive action against Cuba either from within USA territory, or from the territory of the countries that neighbor Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov remarked that, as can be inferred from the Soviet Union's proposals, the duties of all parties should be formulated and represented in the form of joint or individual declarations to the Security of guaran-

governments have officially declared.

V. V. Kuznetsov noted that if the USA wanted an agreement, they would have quickly resolved this matter. If they have no such desire, they can find a million pretexts and ask a million questions. V. A. Zorin said that such an agreement could indeed be reached today, since the positions of all the interested parties have in general been clearly presented.

At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that during U Thant's stay in Cuba, contact with him would be sustained through Narasimhan.

The conversation was recorded by V. Zhrebtsov.

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign  
Minister Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign  
Ministry, 29 October 1962**

29 October 1962

On 29 October we met with U Thant.

We conveyed greetings to U Thant from Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, as well as the latter's wishes for U Thant's success in averting a war, strengthening the peace, and safeguarding the security of all nations. U Thant was told that I had been entrusted by the Soviet government to aid him, U Thant, in his efforts to eliminate the current dangerous situation. We then laid out the basic points of the USSR's position in the Cuban affair, as they were defined in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's messages to Kennedy of 26, 27, and 28 October 1962. We noted that the USA had declared the Soviet proposals to be generally practicable, which allows the

only, or also on vessels chartered by the Soviet Union. We said that we cannot speak of any vessels other than Soviet ones, but that it would be absurd if the Americans started suspecting the Soviet Union of conveying arms that it calls "offensive" on chartered vessels belonging, for example, to Sweden or Lebanon. U Thant agreed that this would be an absurdity.

We asked U Thant what his intentions were with regard to the forthcoming negotiations in Cuba. U Thant said that he wanted to exchange views with Fidel Castro primarily on how the dismantling of war sites, which is referred to in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message of 28 October, would be carried out.

We told U Thant that the military sites mentioned there were in the hands of Soviet officers. U Thant answered that he knew this, and of course would consult with the Soviet Union on this matter.

With regard to this, we reminded U Thant that, as noted in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's letter of 27 October, the checks should be carried out after the arms

30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Deputy Foreign  
Minister V. VV**



the International Red Cross, and prefers that such checks be carried out not on the open sea, but in Cuban ports.

Stevenson said furthermore that now the USA attributes primary importance to reaching an agreement on the inspection of the dismantling of the Soviet military emplacements in Cuba, insisting that such inspection be carried out during the dismantling process. The Americans imagine inspections, as Stevenson said, in the form of planes flying over Cuba with inspection groups on board.

2. The Irish delegate [Frederick H.] Boland voiced a proposal, clearly not without American consent, for convening the Security Council immediately after U Thant's return from Cuba, and, without discussing in detail any other matters at this meeting, to hear U Thant's report and make a decision about authorizing U Thant to create an inspection mechanism for the dismantlings in Cuba. As far as the other matters in the Cuban settlement are concerned, including the matter of guarantees for Cuban security, Boland believes that those matters can be raised in speeches at the above-mentioned meeting of the Security Council, but that approving resolutions

Cuban government's input on this issue, and the Council's resolution approving all these declarations and entrusting the acting Secretary General of the UN, under the supervision of the Security Council, to carry out the necessary measures according to the procedures of the UN apparatus.

We will propose in the framework of these declarations to stipulate, as a guarantee of Cuban security, the final end to all blockade activity against Cuba, and the duties of the USA in the capacity proposed by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message to Kennedy of 27 October, and taking into account Fidel Castro's statement of 28 October.

If the Americans insist, we will consider the possibility of approving the explicit mention in the declaration of the Soviet government's obligation to dismantle the Soviet military sites in Cuba which the Americans call offensive, and of the Soviet government's approval of the inspection system that has been worked out.

The Americans will obviously demand a declaration from the Cuban government that contains an expression of consent to the elaborated guarantees of security and of the inspection system, as well as a formulation of Cuba's non-attack obligations with regard to its neighbors, in accordance with the goals of the UN Charter. We will consult with the Cuban delegation on this issue.

As far as the inspection system on the dismantling is concerned, we propose that our primary position should be to agree to the implementation of the inspections after the completion of the dismantling process. If the Americans insist on carrying out inspections during the dismantling process, it might be possible to agree to this as long as we had guarantees for a monitoring procedure that would of course keep hidden from the inspectors anything we did not want to reveal. The monitoring process should take only a short time to be carried out—only a period necessary for ascertaining that the dismantling has been completed.

With regard to the composition of the inspection apparatus, there are now several variants being advanced in UN circles.

According to facts released by the UN secretariat, U Thant wants to create a monitoring apparatus composed of representatives from a selection of neutral countries belonging to the UN—Sweden, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Brazil,

[and] Yugoslavia, and also Switzerland. There is also an idea about delegating the monitoring process to eight neutral countries represented in the Committee on Disarmament (India, Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico, Brazil, Sweden), possibly, with the goal of setting a precedent for resolving questions involving inspections on full and general disarmament. The Americans, U Thant has informed us, are putting forth a variant in which the monitoring groups consist of representatives from the USA, the USSR, and Cuba.

We propose that it would be appropriate to stipulate that the monitoring groups include representatives from countries like Indonesia, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana. In the course of negotiations it would be possible to agree on a variant in which the groups are composed of representatives from eight neutral countries belonging to the 18th Committee on Disarmament.

Furthermore a question arises about future UN measures on strengthening peace in the Caribbean region after the completion of the inspections of dismantling, and also on the inspection (by International Red Cross forces) of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba.

In our opinion, it would be possible to agree to the presence in Havana (or in several Cuban commercial ports) of small groups of UN representatives (of the same composition as the groups verifying military-site dismantling) with the right to carry out selective inspections on the vessels of various countries arriving in Cuba, with the purpose of determining whether or not they are carrying so-called "offensive" sorts of armaments. [One could] make this conditional upon the requirement that the same groups of UN representatives be placed in the USA and the Latin-American countries for periodic inspections of certain regions of these countries with the purpose of determining whether preparations are being made for the invasion of Cuba, either by these countries themselves or by Cuban emigres.

It would be possible to propose that this system of observation operate for the duration, for example, of one year, after which

Cuba.







31/X/62 ALEKSEEV

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-*















spections, and that now it was necessary to find new methods of monitoring that would confirm that the dismantling and removal of the missiles had begun (in McCloy's opinion, the best solution would be aerial photos along with a check on the ships removing the cargoes from Cuba on the open sea. McCloy underscored that this monitoring should be formal— without inquiring into the details of the missiles, which are secret).

3. McCloy spoke a lot about the future

foreseen in the message to N.S. Khrushchev and was ready to look for some new methods that would in essence give the Americans the possibility to be certain of the implementation of our commitment to withdraw the weapons.

To our specific question what new methods was he referring to, McCloy said: the USA could limit [itself] to the continuation of their flights which give them confidence that there has not resumed in Cuba an installation of the dangerous for them types of armaments.

If Castro is against a ground verification, continued McCloy, another thing could be done - a transfer of the lists of armaments withdrawn from Cuba, when they would be removed, and of the corresponding information, which however would not disclose Soviet technological secrets. We do know roughly how many missiles currently are situated in Cuba. In this case we could manage without ground verification. We are glad, - said McCloy, - that today our plane had not come under fire when it had been flying over Cuba. As far as we know the anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba are in the hands of your people, not the Cubans, although it's possible that there are some Cuban personnel.

McCloy received a very firm response that the USA [has] no right to overfly Cuba and nobody can guarantee the security of such illegal flights.

4. We raised the question of normalizing relations between the USA [and] their Latin American allies, and Cuba. We also asked what is their attitude to U Thant's plan for a UN presence in the Caribbean. The Americans flatly rejected any inspection of their territory whatsoever and declared: "You will have to trust our word."

At the same time, Stevenson said that the USA aspires to normalize the situation in the Caribbean, but under the condition of Castro's cooperation. We could in some form elaborate mutual guarantees, acceptable to Castro and his neighbors. If Castro is afraid of them, they are afraid of him, too. I consider, said Stevenson, that after the Cuban crisis is settled the tension in this region would be lessened.

In this regard we put the question in this way:

"Castro may ask me if the USA [is] going to re-establish diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba? Maybe you in-

tend to do so not immediately, but some time later?"

Stevenson said that he was not able to give an answer to that question insofar as it is part of the competence of the OAS [Organization of American States]. But perhaps we can consider the possibility of organizing corresponding regional arrangements, giving the necessary confidence to the countries of the Caribbean. I hope that steadily we will succeed in eliminating antagonism between Cuba and its neighbors.

At the same time Stevenson made the observation that currently the "antagonism" between Cuba and its neighbors is instigated by "subversive actions in this region, perhaps undertaken mutually." McCloy noted that "Cuba is the breeding ground of infection and Venezuela an example."

It was clear that in the immediate future the USA [is] not going to re-establish diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba.

5. Stevenson and McCloy stated that the USA refuse[s] point-blank to discuss the question of liquidating the American base at Guantanamo.

6. In the course of the conversation McCloy attempted to broach the subject of an eventual evacuation from Cuba of the Soviet "ground-air" anti-aircraft missiles. We have resolutely warded off this probing, declaring that such a question could not be raised and that we had sold these weapons to a number of countries, including the United Arab Republic and Indonesia. McCloy made the observation that "they are good machines against attacks from air-space."

7. McCloy and Stevenson agreed that it would be good for Soviet and American delegations to try to reach preliminary agreements over the issues to be discussed by the Security Council.

8. McCloy and Stevenson expressed satisfaction over the exchange of opinions and Stevenson underlined that the USSR and USA positions "are not so far from each other." Both of them were inquiring whether I would stop on my way back [from Cuba].

I said in response that for the moment I had no plans to do so but if necessary I assumed it would be possible.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

[Source: AVPRF; trans. V. Zaemsky; copy on file at National Security Archive.]

**Soviet Record of 1 November 1962  
Dinner Conversation between CPSU  
CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan  
and White House envoy John McCloy  
and U.S. Ambassador to the United  
Nations Adlai Stevenson**

Secret. Copy no. 24

RECORD OF CONVERSATION OF  
com. A.I. MIKOYAN

Stevenson says that in fact the issue about immediate suspension of the “quarantine” is purely academic. Soviet ships will

Stevenson. In our opinion, the sole problem that confronts us - it is to work out conditions for inspection that should be carried out by representatives of the Red Circle. This is relatively easy task. One could set up two check-points at the approaches to Cuba's ports, in the South and in the North, where two ships of the Red Cross could be located. These might be ships of neutral countries or any other ships, perhaps even sailing hospitals. On board there could be Red Cross inspectors who could check on ships going for Cuba, so that the character of this check-up would be via radio - inquiring on the ship's origins, where it goes and with what cargo. Inspectors would not board ships. I think that such [a form of] inspection should not create problems. We would be glad to hear from you which ships, in your opinion, must be utilized for these aims. I would like to repeat that one could easily reach understanding on this issue.

There is, however, one problem: measures to check the fulfillment of obligations on dismantling and withdrawal of missile equipment from Cuba. As I understood from U Thant, Castro did not agree to UN inspections stipulated in the exchange of letters between J. Kennedy and N.S. Khrushchev. We hope that you will discuss this issue once again in Havana.

McCloy. I must emphasize that we do not accept the 5 conditions of Castro as the conditions for fulfillment of what had been said in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.

Stevenson. The problem that concerns us most is that an inspection should be carried out before you report to the Security Council about the completion of withdrawal of missile equipment. Naturally, there should be a check-up of how this undertaking is implemented. I think that such a check-up need not be difficult to carry out.

In addition to that, of course, there is the issue of the form of USA assurance that Cuba will not be subjected to invasion. This also need not present any difficulties.

McCloy. And to a certain extent this is an answer to the question previously posed by Mr. Mikoyan.

A.I. Mikoyan. You keep focusing all attention only on the issue of withdrawal of armaments from Cuba and on inspection. However, the first-order question is to grant to Cuba guarantees of non-intervention against it on the part of other countries of the Western hemisphere, recognition of the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Cuban Republic, observation of its territorial inviolability, non-interference into its domestic affairs. Castro demands it, and you apparently do not want to give such assurances.

Castro puts forward also a demand to liquidate the U.S. base in Guantanamo. Why are you refusing to discuss this issue? While pressing your demands, you do not want to hear the legitimate demands of the other side. Of course, this is an issue of American-Cuban relations, but in any case this issue must be discussed with Castro.

The exchange of letters between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy - this is in essence already an agreement. But by itself the exchange of letters cannot be considered as a final document. One must carry out negotiations to work out such a final document on the basis of the exchange of letters, since this issue has acquired a bilateral international character.

We suggest to conduct negotiations on this basis and believe that the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba should sign a protocol, with participation of U Thant. Such a protocol might fix all the basic premises contained in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy.

I repeat, we think that you should consider the proposals advanced by Castro. They are legitimate ones. You should also consider the issue of the base in Guantanamo. I i fulfillment o13ntries ofMcCloy. the Sovit ohoudissue one pene Tj sto Cub adsibletk o to





A.I.Mikoyan. Normalization would be complete if the Soviet Union, the USA and Cuba signed a joint document together with the UN Secretary General on the basis of the exchange of letters between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. In any case, this issue cannot be resolved without Cuba. A decision in which Cuba is not a party will not be binding for her. Cuba must have guarantees of non-intervention.

I would like to know: do you have any ideas about forms of control? If you have them - discuss them in the next few days with V.V. Kuznetsov.

Stevenson. As to the territorial integrity of Cuba, the formulas in the letter of Kennedy are simple and clear: after certain types of weapons will be removed from Cuba, the USA will make an announcement about the guarantee against any kind of invasion of Cuba.

McCloy. As to the forms of verification, the ideal form in my mind would be regular overflights by planes doing aerial photo-reconnaissance, and ground inspection. I hope that the Soviet Union would bear on Castro so that he will agree to the conduct of such inspection as was stipulated in the letter of N.S.Khrushchev. However, if Castro refuses to accept such inspection, we should look for another form. The USA might continue overflights by its planes giving us confidence that one does not resume in Cuba assembly of types of weapons that represent danger for us. But in this case we would like to have assurances that our plans will not be downed. One could also consider yet another possibility. Could you pass to us the lists of armament that is being withdrawn from Cuba? We know approximately how many missiles you now have in Cuba. If you could pass to us the lists of what you will transport on your ships (of course, I understand that these documents will not contain specifications of these armaments), then through comparison of this data with the data about the presence of armaments in Cuba, that is in our disposal, we would follow the process of evacuation of armaments that are of danger for us. I believe that this would be enough. In this case we would get on along ground inspection.

The system of passing of the lists of cargo removed from Cuba would not touch on your security interests. As to overflights, you, as we understand, cannot guarantee that the Cubans would not shoot at our planes.

But we are glad that when today our plane flew over Cuba, it was not shot at. As far as we know, the anti-aircraft missiles deployed in Cuba are not in the hands of the Cubans, but in the hands of your people. Today we intercepted radio-commands and conversations of the anti-aircraft units deployed in Cuba and that confirmed us again in our conclusion. I must say that we are glad that these anti-aircraft missiles are in the hands of the Russians whose hands are not itching like the hands of the Cubans.

In passing, I would like to say that although we do not include anti-aircraft missiles into the category of offensive weapons, we would very much like that you withdraw these missiles as well.

A.I.Mikoyan. As I see, your sense of humor has completely disappeared.

Stevenson. In your conversations in Havana you could cite good arguments in favor of ground inspection: on one side, it would assure us that you are fulfilling your obligations, on the other hand, Castro would obtain confidence that no invasion of Cuba would take place: since U.N. observers would be around.

A.I.Mikoyan. I believe that in the course of today's conversation we laid the ground for upcoming negotiations. I think that we should not now go into detail. You

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We will inform Fidel Castro of the content of the documents [not further identified-ed.]. He has entrusted me to convey a translation of the draft to President Dorticos, and to reach an agreement with him on all points.

Dorticos, having read through the document, said that in principle the document serves the interests of Cuba, and that it would be approved.

Separate remarks will be introduced after the discussion of our proposals with Fidel Castro and the other leaders, and also after their talks with Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, which are slated for today.

2.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan in New York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962**

2 November 1962

From the following telegram you will learn the details of the important statement made by McCloy in the talks on monitoring the dismantling of the "offensive weaponry." He declared that in view of Castro's refusal to agree to a ground-based monitoring, the Americans were willing not to insist [on that], knowing the forms and methods of monitoring put forth in Khrushchev's message, [but] that it was necessary to find other methods for convincing the Americans that the dismantling process had been completed and that everything had been removed.

In response to my question about whether there was some concrete proposal as to how this should be done, he said the following: to allow them the possibility of flights over Cuba for inspections from the air, without ground-based monitoring; this was the first point. The second was that the Soviets provide the Americans with information about how much of the weaponry has been dismantled and removed, and when. The important part of this is not to impart secret military information that reveals the nature and capacities of this weaponry.

I rejected here the possibility of flights over Cuba, since that would affect the sovereignty of Cuba itself. The proposal about

information from our side, I said, should be discussed with our military specialists, who arrived with me to aid Kuznetsov.

McCloy reported with great satisfaction that on 1 November their plane had flown over Cuba without being fired at, and had made photos. He attributed this to the presence of Soviet specialists at the anti-aircraft missile installations.

I conclude that if our agreement with Castro not to shoot down American planes retains its force, then when they fly one or two more times it will mean that inspections on the dismantling have been carried out. There remains the issue of inspections on the removal of the dismantled weaponry, which could be resolved through means suggested by McCloy.

In view of this, Castro's position, which rejects the possibility of on-site inspections, will cease to be an obstacle to settling with the Americans the issue of monitoring the dismantling and removal of the weaponry.

I consider all this to be expedient.

In my talks with Castro I will fully explain our position on the issue of monitoring in accordance with Khrushchev's message, I will show him its correctness and acceptability, from our point of view, for Cuba.

In connection with the Americans' proposal laid out earlier, and taking into account the Cubans' arrogance, I consider it expedient not to insist or ensure that they reject their position on not allowing observers onto their territory to check on the dismantling and removal process, the position which they have made clear to U Thant and have published several times in the press.

In truth, in Castro's speech yesterday this position was made to seem somewhat more flexible.

I await instructions concerning this matter in Havana.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan in New York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962**

2 November 1962

Yesterday in the hour-long discussion with McCloy and Stevenson, the positions of the parties on all issues connected with the Cuban conflict were explained, as well as the American position in the form in which the Americans consider it necessary to define it.

We will be sending to you a short exposition of the most important points of the discussion within 2 or 3 hours, and today, 2 November and 1:00 in the afternoon I will be flying to Cuba. Our comrades will compose a detailed record of the conversation, and will send it after I am gone. The conversation was important, and you should become familiarized with that detailed record of it.

McCloy has declared that with the aim of speeding up the removal of the missiles, before the fine-tuning of the observation system by the Red Cross has been reached, they agree to and are interested in allowing Soviet vessels bound for Cuba entry into Cuban ports without inspection, by way of a hail like the one that was given to the tanker "Bucharest."

We are introducing a proposal to give instructions to all our vessels bound for Cuba to proceed to their destinations.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A. Gromyko to unidentified recipient, 2 November 1962**

2 November 1962

The head of the American delegation at the negotiations in New York, McCloy, has informed Comrade Kuznetsov on 31 October that Washington has decided that until the Red Cross has begun its monitoring of the vessels bound for Cuba, it would not carry out inspections on these vessels, but to apply to them the same procedure that was applied to the tanker "Bucharest." During this time the "quarantine" will be officially continued.

As is well known, the tanker "Bucharest" passed through a region under American "quarantine" without hindrance.

Six Soviet vessels now on the open sea beyond the announced limits of the "quarantine" have received orders to proceed into the Cuban ports, and at present they are now on their way toward Cuba.

A. G.

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

**Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 3 November 1962**

3 November 1962

On 3 November Morozov, Mendelievich, and Timerbaev had a meeting with Narasimhan and Loutfi (replacing U Thant) for the examination of technical issues connected with the sending of observers from the International Red Cross Committee to ascertain that on the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba there is no weaponry considered offensive by the USA.

Narasimhan said that the the secretariat of the UN in New York had not yet received the definitive consent of the International Red Cross to its participation in the organization of the monitoring. An answer from the Red Cross could be received today, 3 November.

Narasimhan also laid out the thoughts of the Americans, as he understood them, regarding the Red Cross's monitoring procedure.

The USA considers it expedient to deploy two vessels with observers from the International Red Cross on the open sea near the Cuban coast—one 8 to 10 miles off Havana, and another in the strait between Cuba and Haiti. The vessels should have radio contact with the UN. On each vessel there should be two groups of International Red Cross observers. Each group should contain eight observers. In this way, 32 observers will be needed in all.

In response to our question about how to manage such a large number of observers, especially when bearing in mind that Stevenson in his talks with us on 1 November of this year had expressed his view that the International Red Cross inspections

could be reduced to radio interrogations of passing ships, Narasimhan answered that in many cases it will be precisely that, but that the International Red Cross observers should have the right to carry out inspections (to check documents, to inspect ship holds, and so on), if such a necessity should arise.

Our representatives remarked that such a proposal from Narasimhan concerning the conferral to the International Red Cross groups of inspection rights contradicts the views expressed earlier by Stevenson. We will continue to insist that the inspections be limited to interrogations by radio.

The USA, Narasimhan continued, is prepared to provide its own transportation for the International Red Cross inspectors. This may be ordinary transportation for the conveyance of troops, even though they would be unarmed and would contain on board civilian passengers.

We told Narasimhan that the Soviet Union, as had already been declared to U Thant, had given its consent to the conveyance of the International Red Cross observers either by Soviet or by neutral vessels. Narasimhan responded that he knew about this, but all the same considered it possible to inform the Soviet e184 Twf th(a propothe)Tj T\* -0.008 Tc -00.02 Twe by the ,lyichUSA, Narasimhan s,II sbjnspection to tusance So-rs.

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*provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 4 November 1962<sup>18</sup>**

4 November 1962

Today talks were conducted between A.I. Mikoyan and Comrades Fidel Castro, O. Dorticos, R. Castro, E. Guevara, E. Aragonez, and C.R. Rodriguez, as well as myself.

Comrade Mikoyan conveyed warm, fraternal greetings from the Presidium of the CC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev to the Cuban leaders. He expressed a lofty appreciation of the Cuban revolution, and support for the rebuff to the interventionists; he spoke about our support for Cuba; and he remarked that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was delighted by the courage and fearlessness displayed by the leaders of Cuba's revolution in these perilous days, and the readiness of the Cuban people to hold firm. Then Comrade Mikoyan said that when the Central Committee learned of the misunderstanding arising in Cuba of several issues and decisions made by us, they came to the conclusion that it would be impossible to clarify these issues by way of mere correspondence. The Central Committee made the decision to send Comrade Mikoyan to Cuba to clarify to our friends our position, and to inform them of issues that are of interest to them. Comrade Mikoyan remarked that he naturally did not have any intention of exerting pressure; his task was simply to explain our position.

Knowing our Cuban friends, A.I. Mikoyan said, I am sure that they too will agree with this. It could of course turn out such that even after the explanations there will be certain points on which our points of view will remain different.

Fidel Castro declared that he has already informed the Cuban comrades present at the talks of the issues raised by him yesterday before Comrade Mikoyan, and made a short resume of these issues.

A.I. Mikoyan remarked that Fidel Castro spoke yesterday in detail and with sincerity, and asked whether the other com-

rades wanted to add anything to this, whether they had other remarks to make.

O. Dorticos asked for an explanation of why N.S. Khrushchev approved the proposal made by Kennedy to declare that there would be no attack on Cuba on the condition of the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, even though the Cuban government had not yet at this time expressed its own opinion on this proposal.

C.R. Rodriguez put a question to Comrade Mikoyan—where does the Soviet leadership see the essence of victory, does it consist in military success or in diplomatic success? We believed, Rodriguez noted, that we could not yet talk about victory, since the guarantees from the USA were ephemeral.

Then A.I. Mikoyan, developing arguments made in N.S. Khrushchev's letters to Fidel Castro, and also from the discussion of the issue in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, offered additional arguments with the aim of driving away any doubts from the minds of our Cuban comrades. He spoke moreover of the main points of his talks with U Thant, McCloy, and Stevenson.

**Telegram (No.4448) from the Minister  
of the USSR Merchant Fleet to Captain  
of Ship “Amata” via Soviet ambassador  
in Havana (Alekseev), 5 November 1962**

5 November 1962

I ask that you transmit information on the location of the ship “Amata.” Your ship has been selected for use by the Organization of the United Nations for the conveyance of a group of representatives from the International Red Cross consisting of 16 people. Your location, after you take this





5 November 1962

Today the "Washington Post" published an article by [columnist Joseph] Alsop under the title "The Soviet Plan for Deception." The article talks about Robert Kennedy's connection with [Georgi] Bolshakov<sup>19</sup> (the latter was not named directly), and also declared in dramatic tones how that connection was used "for the deception" of the President in the issue of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. It mentions in particular Bolshakov's reception by N. S. Khrushchev in the summer of this year, and the oral message for the President conveyed through him.

This and several other details are known in Washington only by Robert Kennedy, whom Bolshakov met with after his return from vacation (the article also mentions this meeting). For this reason it is clearly obvious that the article was prepared with the knowledge of, or even by orders from, Robert Kennedy, who is a close friend, as is the President, of Alsop.

After his first meeting with Robert Kennedy, immediately after his return from vacation, Bolshakov no longer met with

representatives to U Thant's proposal for a "UN presence" in the area of the Caribbean Sea, including on USA territory, as a measure seeking to guarantee a lasting peace in this region. We emphasized that the stubborn refusal of the USA to lift the "quarantine" does not at all contribute to the creation of a positive atmosphere for the resolution of the Cuban problem.

Second. U Thant asked a fine-tuning question with regard to our information on the USA attempts to broaden their demands for the removal of our weaponry from Cuba. He asked in whose hands—ours or the Cubans'—the IL-28 bombers can presently be found, as well as the torpedo cutters of the "Mosquito" class and the missiles on board them, missiles of the "air-surface" class, and missiles of the "surface-surface" class, of a small operational radius.

We answered U Thant that we cannot now provide information on this issue. U Thant asked us to make inquiries to Moscow, and to give him an answer "for his own personal information."

We ask that you provide us with information on this issue.

We assume that in examining this issue it would be appropriate to bear in mind that Fidel Castro, in his speech of 1 November, declared not only that Cuba possessed the "strategic weaponry" which now "the Soviet Union had decided to seize," but also that all other weaponry "is our property."

Third. U Thant asked whether there could be a disclosure, through first-hand observation, of the missiles on the vessels that will remove them from Cuba, or whether instead they would be kept in containers. General Rikhye, who was present at the talks, said, not waiting for our answer, that he had proposed that they be packed in a way appropriate for long-distance overseas shipping, with a view for the prevention of corrosion, but that they could be viewed in their outline forms from beneath the packing.

U Thant was also interested in whether all the missiles would be removed by one trip of each of the ships used for this purpose, or whether the ships would instead remove only a part of the missiles at once, returning them to Soviet ports and then sailing back to retrieve the rest. We said that all the missiles would be loaded onto the ships and ready for shipping no later than 10 November, and that consequently the issue of

a gradual removal through several trips would not arise.

Fourth. U Thant, emphasizing that he was speaking for himself personally and would not contact the Americans with regard to this issue, asked whether it would not be possible—unless, after we approve the American proposal for monitoring communicated yesterday by McCloy, the Americans accept the agreement—to entrust the monitoring to representatives of the International Red Cross, the same ones who will be conducting inspections, as is now proposed, on the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba.

We told U Thant that we would provide information on his proposal to Moscow, but that we supposed that the Soviet government had already introduced to the Americans such liberal proposals on the inspection process that they are offering the full possibility for settling the whole issue, if the other side earnestly wants such a settlement.

It appears to us that it is expedient to seek an agreement on the basis of the consent we have already given to the American proposals on the inspection process. If it is not possible to reach an agreement on this basis, examine U Thant's proposal. In such a case it may be possible, in our opinion, to agree that the International Red Cross representatives carry out inspections on vessels leaving Cuba with missiles in the same way that it has been proposed that they conduct inspections on the vessels bound for Cuba.

Fifth. U Thant stated that at each meeting with the Americans (his last meeting with them took place on 2 November) he has asked them questions about guarantees for Cuba's security and about the lifting of the "quarantine," and that he intends to continue to do so.

U Thant reacted with great interest to our information on the exchange of views with the Americans on the subject of the "UN presence" in the Caribbean Sea area. It was clear that this issue is important to him, and that he wants to reach a positive settlement of it. He asked us in particular whether we considered McCloy's negative response with regard to UN posts on USA territory to be "conclusive," or whether it was just an "initial reaction." We said that it was difficult for us to make judgments on this, but that it seemed that it was only an "initial reaction."

U Thant informed us that on 2 Novem-

ber he discussed the issue of the "UN presence" with delegates from Venezuela and Chile, as well as with representatives from the United Arab Republic, and that their reaction was generally positive.

Sixth. U Thant told us, evidently having in mind information published in today's American newspapers on a seemingly imminent meeting of the Security Council, that he considered it necessary and possible to convene the Council only after all issues have been resolved at the negotiations be-

warheads and bombs. At the same time the Americans kept shying away from a discussion of the issues concerning the Americans' fulfillment of their own obligations. The discussion at times became pointed, and this was an effect created largely by Stevenson and McCloy.

1. More than half the discussion was devoted to an exchange of opinions on the issue of the IL-28 planes located in Cuba. Stevenson and McCloy stated that the agreement between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy stipulated the removal of all these planes from Cuba, and their return to the Soviet Union. The essence of Stevenson's and McCloy's argument on this issue can be reduced to the following:

Kennedy's statement of 22 October and his proclamation of 23 October placed jet bombers in the category of the so-called "offensive" Soviet weaponry in Cuba. Kennedy's message of 27 October referred to the "offensive missile bases," as well as to "all armament systems that can be used for offensive purposes," apparently including jet bombers in this category. Comrade N.S. Khrushchev indicated in his message of 28 October that the Soviet government had issued instructions to dismantle and return to the Soviet Union the arms that "you call offensive." The Americans call both



In order to be convinced that it is precisely missiles that are being shipped out, rather than something else, the Americans are requesting that the covers or casings be removed from certain missiles during the observation. The desire was expressed that the missiles be shipped on the decks of the ships. Gilpatrick emphasized that they did not have in mind the sort of unveiling of the missiles that would allow a disclosure of their technical characteristics.

The Americans emphasized that they considered it important to become convinced that the entire quantity of missiles that they had been informed of was being removed from Cuba.

The question was raised as to how and where a meeting could be arranged between the American ships with the Soviet vessels carrying the missiles. The Americans proposed that we inform them of the ship's numbers of all our vessels which are headed out of Cuba bearing missiles, so that the captains of the American ships from which the observations will be conducted can be able to make contact with the captains of our ships, and arrange a meeting-place with them without disturbing the itineraries of the Soviet vessels. We said that in that case it would be necessary for the captains of our vessels to have the ship's numbers of the American ships as well, in order to find out whether they should get in contact with those particular ships. Gilpatrick agreed, and proposed that the ship's numbers of the Soviet and American vessels be exchanged.

The Americans also requested to be informed of the departure schedules of the other ships carrying missiles out of Cuba after 7 November.

We believe that the American proposals for carrying out an observation of the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba are acceptable. In the event that they are approved, we ask to be immediately informed of the ship's numbers of the Soviet vessels, and of the departure schedules of the ships carrying missiles out of Cuba after 7 November, unless all the missiles will have been removed by 6 or 7 November.

7.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**From the Journal of V.V. Kuznetsov:  
Record of Conversation with the Cuban  
Representative to the UN, C. Lechuga,  
7 November 1962**

On 7 November 1962 a meeting took place with the permanent Cuban representative to the UN, Lechuga.

V. V. Kuznetsov informed him that in recent days we had been discussing with the Americans a series of problems deriving from the exchange of letters between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, and President Kennedy, including the issue of assurances and guarantees that Cuba would not be attacked by the USA or by the other countries neighboring Cuba.

At the present stage of the discussion, we have not yet gone so far as to work out any documents or the details of the agreement. The Americans are now trying to find pretexts for avoiding definite and concrete statements. All in all, they have not been displaying any spirit of cooperation at the negotiating table.

In the American press there are frequent statements about how the USA has apparently won a triumph in the Cuban crisis. But it is clear to anyone who is able soberly to assess the events that, thanks to the firm and peaceful policies of the Soviet Union and the peace-loving actions it has taken in the crisis period, what has really triumphed is the cause of peace, what has triumphed is reason.

Now that the first stage is over and the missiles are being shipped out of Cuba, we consider it necessary to take the following steps in the negotiations with the Americans, steps that should show whether or not the Americans really want to put an end to the crisis and to prevent a repetition of this dangerous military situation. We intend to put before the Americans the issue of how they will fulfill their obligations regarding the guarantee against an attack on Cuba.

Lechuga said that Cuba supports the Soviet Union's peace-loving policies, and that the misunderstanding which had arisen in Cuba after the first steps taken by the Soviet Union had now been completely eradicated. We knew, Lechuga said, that the Soviet government was defending the interests of peace, we were in full agreement with the goals it was pursuing, but we were not

in agreement on the formulations that had been used to do so. It must be borne in mind that the Cubans are a young nation, passionate in character. When the crisis began, the Cubans were full of determination to fight, and for this reason when the events took a different turn, the feeling arose in them that they had experienced a failure. At the same time that this crisis represented a global problem, for Cuba it was also her own problem, one which roused the whole nation, and from that communal feeling came the famous five points appearing in Fidel Castro's statement. Now, however, the Soviet government can be sure that the uncertainty which arose in the first moments of the crisis has been dispelled, and that the Cuban nation is delighted by the firmness and peace-loving actions of the Soviet Union.

Lechuga also said that he had radic28tary situation. i20





troupe, he delivered a welcome speech in which he said that the President was preparing to attend their premier the following evening. At the end, he kissed Maya Plisetskaya when he found out that he and she had been born in the same year, month, and day, and said they would celebrate their birthdays in a week. None of this needs to be mentioned especially, but all in all the behavior of Robert Kennedy, who is ordinarily quite a reserved and glum man, reflects to some degree the calmer and more normal mood in the White House after the tense days that shook Washington, even though this fact is concealed in various ways by American propaganda.





not to open fire on American planes.

A. GROMYKO

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Memorandum from the Head of the  
USSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU,  
20 November 1962**

I am reporting on the situation on the USSR-Cuban sea lanes.

At the present time, there are 20 dry-cargo ships and 4 oil-carriers on their way to Cuba from Soviet ports on the Baltic, the Black Sea, and in the Far East, carrying industrial and agricultural equipment, automobiles, metal, grain, flour, conserves, sulfates, oil, gas, ammonia, and other loads. Besides this, the tanker the "Tukmus" is nearing Cuba, sailing out of the Canadian port of Montreal with a cargo of animal fat. Four of the vessels mentioned are passing through the zone of the blockade imposed by the USA. The others will reach this zone between 20 and 30 November.

There are 13 dry-cargo vessels and 7 tankers en route from Cuba to Soviet ports. They have all successfully passed through the blockade zone.

The Soviet vessels bound for Cuba are being subjected to overhead flights by USA Navy airplanes during their whole passage across the Atlantic Ocean. Within the blockade zone these flights occur more frequently, aerial photos are taken, American ships come up close to them, inquiring what cargo is being carried and where, and then they

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ticed the positive role you, the president's brother, played during the confidential negotiations between the president and the head of the Soviet state. Of course, we understand, that you did this, as did we, in the interests of one's own country, one's own people. It was important, however, that you understood correctly, in the critical moment, what those interests were. Let us now complete the outlined resolution to the Cuban question, without complicating it with trivial formal cavils [*melochnaia pridirka*], or even worse, some deviation from the agreement on the final settlement of this question. Indeed, if one speaks the truth, there's not much left to do; it is only necessary to put in writing or to finalize, without excessive procrastination that which the American side obligated itself to do during the exchange of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and the president.

R. Kennedy noted that he agreed that little of essence remained to be done - indeed, "it's 90 percent done," although there are still difficulties that must be overcome. But he, R. Kennedy, did not intend to analyze these difficulties. They were the subject of detailed discussion in New York. He only wanted to emphasize briefly that with which he began: the importance of further developing mutual understanding between the president and N.S. Khrushchev. This will determine to a large extent the success and solution of other questions that still await settlement.

A.I. Mikoyan agreed with this. Returning to his conversation with the president, A.I. Mikoyan said, that although in its course there were a few sharp [*ostryi*] moments, on the whole he agrees with R. Kennedy's evaluation of the conversation with the president.

To all appearances, this was reflected in the ensuing conversation with Rusk, which took place in a business-like and friendly atmosphere, clearly, not without the influence of the president. R. Kennedy smiled, but he didn't say anything.

In concluding the conversation, R. Kennedy asked [Mikoyan] to give greetings to N.S. Khrushchev. In his turn A.I. Mikoyan sent greetings to the president.

Robert Kennedy showed interest in visiting the Soviet Union and expressed this desire.

A.I. Mikoyan said that this was a good idea and completely realizable. If the de-

crease in tension between [our] countries continues further and the political atmosphere warms up, then this trip would not only be interesting but useful for him.

After our return to the other room, Udall made the first toast to the leaders of the two great nations - N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy - "people of strength and peace." One theme of the toasts and remarks of the American representatives during the meal was to express satisfaction over the fact that our two countries have succeeded in avoiding a clash in the Cuban crisis and [to support] the need to search for ways of avoiding the repetition of similar crises in the future. Note the following pronouncements.

Udall emphasized the pleasant impressions from his trip to the Soviet Union and from his meeting with N.S. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. He said that his feelings of sympathy for the Soviet people grew stronger, and he said so despite criticism of these statements in the USA, still in September. He asked [me] to transmit his invitation to visit the United States to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Novikov, and to the Energy and Electrification Minister, Comrade Neporozhnyi, noting in jest that he was ready to show "some secrets," as was done during his visit to the Soviet side.

A.I. Mikoyan pronounced a toast to the host, Secretary Udall, his wife and children, who were presented to A.I. Mikoyan by their parents. Udall has 6 children.

A.I. Mikoyan joked that although Khrushchev's acquaintance with Udall was brief, and Mikoyan's acquaintance with Udall at the time even briefer, Udall immediately won over Khrushchev and then Mikoyan. Khrushchev said to Mikoyan: What a simpatico [*simpaticnyi*] and good man is Mr. Udall!

When I met him at dinner, said Mikoyan, he made such an impression on me. There are some people, whom you know for years, but actually don't know, and suddenly after decades you see the real face of the man. And there are also those, who after several hours, you can tell what kind of man they are. Udall belongs to this category. When he returned to his homeland after visiting the Soviet Union he landed in an atmosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria. The agents of monopolies, the press and radio tried to get anti-Soviet statements out of him, counter to those he had made in the Soviet

Union. Udall's conscientiousness [*dobrosovestnost'*] was confirmed and he did not give in to this pressure and said what he thought, that is, he repeated in the USA what he had said in the Soviet Union.

A.I. Mikoyan transmitted greetings from N.S. Khrushchev and offered a toast to [Khrushchev's] health.

Ball underlined that the necessary condition for greater trust between the USSR and USA was our renunciation of "the practices [of] a closed society," stating, in particular, that this should be demonstrated concretely by the broadening of exchanges and in our agreement to the sale of bourgeois newspapers on the streets of Moscow.

Replying to Ball, A.I. Mikoyan that so long as the arms do not have an open society. You have no advertising [*reklam*], but society is closed but in its own way. When the arms race is eliminated and disarmament takes place, will then open many places in which the presence today of foreigners is forbidden. Then we will have open exchanges and contacts.

Wishing to draw Heller, the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, into the conversation (he appeared pleasant, a relatively young professor, the most part silent),

A.I. Mikoyan asked Heller how he would explain the fact that, in particular, the USA has more steel producing potential than the USSR, but the USSR in the third quarter of this year produced more steel than the USA. "If you did not need so much steel, why build so many factories and remove huge amounts of capital from circulation, including the living work force [that has become] unemployed. In general, what measures are you taking to remove such disproportions and are they removable at all in a free enterprise system?"

Heller avoided answering by changing the topic of conversation, not wishing to enter an argument where he felt himself weak. A.I. Mikoyan in the context of the dinner did not insist on an answer.

Heller promptly supported Mikoyan's statement on the appropriateness of transferring power and means freed up by the end of the arms race toward raising the standard of living of the people from underdeveloped countries and of the people of the states participating in the arms race.



vana, for Castro's message to Khrushchev on 26 October 1962—in which he called on the Soviet leader to authorize a “harsh and terrible” attack on the United States should it invade Cuba—clearly reflected the Cuban's belief that Moscow was (or should be) willing to go to war on Cuba's behalf. For an English translation of Castro's letter, which first appeared in the Cuban newspaper *Granma* in November 1990, see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 481-482.

<sup>9</sup> Presumably a reference to Khrushchev's letters on that day to both Kennedy (accepting his proposal to resolve the crisis) and Castro (explaining his decision); for the texts of both letters, see Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: The New Press, 1993), 226-229, 239.

<sup>10</sup> A secessionist rebel leader from Katanga (later Shaba) Province in the Congo (later Zaire) against whom the UN was considering the use of military force, which it later used to quash the resistance.

<sup>11</sup> For an English translation of the letter, which emerged publicly only three decades later when it was released by Soviet officials, see *Problems of Communism—Special Edition* (Spring 1992), 60-62; also U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 189-90.

<sup>12</sup> A reference to Kennedy's agreement to withdraw the approximately 5,000 U.S. troops sent to Thailand in May 1962 in response to an attack by the pro-communist Pathet Lao in Laos. Kennedy's decision followed a private appeal in Khrushchev's name conveyed through Robert Kennedy in mid-June by Bolshakov. See Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 11 July 1962 (regarding meetings apparently held on 18 and 19 June 1962), in U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XXIII: Southeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), 950.

<sup>13</sup> Igor D. Statsenko was the commander of a Soviet missile division deployed to western Cuba.

<sup>14</sup> Alekseev evidently refers to Khrushchev's letter to Castro dated 30 October 1962; an English translation can be found in an appendix to Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 485-488.

<sup>15</sup> Castro here refers to his message to Khrushchev dated 26 October 1962, an English

translation of which appears in an appendix to Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 481-482.

<sup>16</sup> A reference to anti-U.S. protests held outside the embassy in Moscow during the crisis.

<sup>17</sup> Evidently a reference to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which Kennedy created.

<sup>18</sup> For English translations of the Russian records of conversations in Havana between Mikoyan and Castro and the Cuban leadership on 3-5 November 1962, see Vladislav Zubok, “‘Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan's talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962” (plus accompanying documents), *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 59, 89-92 and 109, 159.

<sup>19</sup> Until the missile crisis, Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet official based at the USSR Embassy in Washington, had been used as a back-channel go-between to deliver messages between Khrushchev and the Kennedys, meeting frequently with Robert Kennedy. As the document indicates, this channel ended after the Kennedys concluded that Bolshakov had been used to mislead them by transmitting false reassurances in the summer and early autumn of 1962 that Khrushchev would not send offensive weapons to Cuba or take any disruptive action prior to the Congressional elections in November. Instead, beginning with the missile crisis, a new channel was set up between Robert Kennedy and Ambassador Dobrynin.

<sup>20</sup> For Khrushchev's 4 November 1962 letter to Kennedy, see Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 264.

<sup>21</sup> Nixon had been defeated by his Democratic rival in the California gubernatorial elections, upon which he announced his retirement from politics. The relevant passage in Khrushchev's 12 November 1962 message read: “Now the elections in your country, Mr. President, are over. You made a statement that you were very pleased with the results of these elections. They, the elections, indeed, were in your favor. The success does not upset us either—though that is of course your internal affair. You managed to pin your political rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat. This did not draw tears from our eyes either....” See James A. Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisted* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 290.

## STATE DEPARTMENT, RUSSIAN ARCHIVES COOPERATE ON KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDY FRUS VOLUME

In an unprecedented example of cooperation between the State Department Historian's Office and the Russian Foreign Ministry archives, a volume of *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the official published record of U.S. foreign policy, has appeared with Russian archival documents.

*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), contains several Russian documents among the correspondence, oral messages, back-channel exchanges, and other records concerning direct communications between U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, including exchanges between the two concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis in Oct.-Nov. 1962 that were declassified by Russian authorities five years ago and published in Spring 1992 in *Problems of Communism*.

One newly-available document from the Russian archives contained in the volume is a translation of a long (approximately 25 type-written pages) 1 April 1963 “talking paper” from Khrushchev to Kennedy. Upon reading through the message when it was presented to him by Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the president's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, handed it back on the grounds that it was “so insulting and rude to the President and to the United States that I would neither accept it nor transmit its message.” Robert Kennedy told his brother that he had informed an “obviously

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**MIKOYAN-CASTRO TALKS***continued from page 320*

*by the Russian and transcribes the meaning of the phrase into the simple past tense. Both documents are evidently transcriptions of memo notes taken during a speech and do not seem to have been corrected. Their overall tone is colloquial. When the meaning was clear enough, I changed the punctuation and divided very long sentences into shorter ones. I did not shorten the phrases whose meaning was unclear. In this latter case, I tried to be as literal as possible; translating word by word. Editor's and translator's insertions appear in brackets, as opposed to parenthetical phrases in the original document. The translation preserves some apparent errors in the originals regarding parentheses and quotation marks, where the punctuation marks are not closed. In general, however, the sense of both documents is understandable even to a reader who is unfamiliar with the events.—Carlos Osorio (National Security Archive).]*

**Document I:  
Cuban Record of Conversation,  
Mikoyan and Cuban Leadership,  
Havana, 4 November 1962**

MEETING OF THE SECRETARIAT OF  
THE CRI WITH MIKOYAN AT THE  
NATIONAL PALACE,  
SUNDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1962.

Preamble by Mikoyan:

He says he has come to Cuba to discuss their differences with the Cuban Compañeros [comrades] and not to [discuss] what has been stated by the imperialists. They trust us as much as they trust themselves. He is willing to discuss for as long as it takes to solve the differences. The interests of the Soviet Union are common to ours in the defense of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and in all the other interests.

**FIDEL:** Summarizes our differences in terms of the procedures used to deal with this crisis.

**DORTICOS:** Asks whether Mikoyan considers that they have obtained the guarantees that president Kennedy offered.

**CARLOS:** Asks whether the victory mentioned by the Soviets has been attained.

**MIKOYAN:** Says he will respond to the questions, and asks to be excused for he will speak for a long time. He says he will start with the doubts expressed by Fidel in order to explain them.

He thinks that the main problem consists in explaining why they have sent troops and strategic weapons. If this is not understood, it is very difficult to understand the whole situation. He did not think we had doubts about this. He said that “the fate of the Cuban revolution is a permanent preoccupation of ours, especially since its socialist character was declared. When the imperialists were defeated in Giron [Beach at the Bay of Pigs—ed.], we congratulated ourselves, but we also worried. The *yanquis* [Yankees, i.e., North Americans—ed.] did a stupid thing but we knew they would continue harassing because Cuba is an example that they could not tolerate. Our assessment was that they had two parallel plans; the first one consisted of the economic strangulation of Cuba in order to bring down the regime without a military intervention. The second one consisted of an intervention organized by Latin American governments and their support, as an alternative to the other plan.

We consider the victory of the Cuban revolution as an enormous contribution to Marxism-Leninism. Its defeat would be an irreparable damage to Marxism and to other revolutionary movements in other countries. Such a defeat would mean the preponderance of imperialism over socialism in the world. Such a defeat would mean a terrible blow against the world revolution. It would break the correlation of forces. It is our duty to do everything possible to defend Cuba.

“Our comrades told us that the economic situation in Cuba had worsened due to the *yanquis*' pressure and the enormous military expenses. This worried us for it coincided with the plans of the *yanquis*. We had a discussion about the economic decline and we have helped without you requesting it. You are very modest in your requests and we try to help you. We decided to give you weapons for free and donated equipment for 100,000 men. In addition, in our commercial negotiations, we have looked at all the possibilities and we have tried to provide everything you needed without payments in

kind. We have given you 180 million roubles in order to help you. This is a second phase of help because before that there were commercial and credit agreements but these last deliveries have been in aid.

When Khrushchev visited Bulgaria [on 14-20 May 1962—ed.] he expressed many things to us, he said “although I was in Bulgaria, I was always thinking of Cuba. I fear the *yanquis* will attack Cuba, directly or indirectly, and imagine of the effect on us of the defeat of the Cuban revolution. We cannot allow this to happen. Although the plan is very risky for us, it is a big responsibility for it exposes us to a war. Cuba must be saved[.] “They thought it over for three days and later all the members of the Central Committee expressed their opinions. We have to think a lot about this action in order to save Cuba and not to provoke a nuclear war. He ordered the military to develop the Plan and to consult with the Cubans. He told us that the main condition was to carry out the Plan secretly. Our military told us that four months were needed for the preparations. We thought the enemy would learn about it right in the middle of the plan and we anticipated what to do. We thought the plan would not be carried out to the end, but this was an advantage, for the troops would already be in the Island. We foresaw that, in order not to provoke a war, we could use the UNO [United Nations Organization] and the public opinion. We thought the Plan would not provoke a war but a blockade against weapons and fuel instead. How to solve this - your lack of fuel? Considering the geographic situation of the Island, it has been very difficult to avoid the blockade. If you were closer we could have used our Air Force and our Fleet, but we could not. The *yanquis* do have bases surrounding us in Turkey and blocking the Black Sea. Given the situation, we cannot strike back. Okinawa is too far away too. The only possibility was to cut the communications with West Berlin. In Berlin this is possible.

We have not thought of building a Soviet Base on the Island to operate against the North Americans. In general, we consider that the policy of bases is not a correct one. We only have bases in [East] Germany, first because of the right we have as an invading country, and after that due to the Warsaw Treaty. (Stalin did have bases abroad). In the past, we have had them in Finland and in China too (Port Arthur) -

those bases we have abandoned. We only have troops in Hungary and Poland, to protect the troops in Germany and the communications with Austria.

We do not need bases to destroy the United States because we can attack with the missiles deployed in our territory. We do not have a plan to conquer North America. The only thing we need to do is to launch a counter strike, but that will serve to destroy them without having to send in our troops.

the documents. We have had discussions about your question whether the dismantling of the base at Guantanamo is better. That would be better for Cuba, but from a military point of view of the interest of Cuba, it is not possible. If we decided to withdraw all the weapons from Cuba, then we could demand the withdrawal from Guantanamo, Guantanamo has no importance in military terms. That would be more dangerous, and that is important from a political perspective. Concerning the inspection: if we said we reject any inspection, the enemy could interpret that as an attempt to trick them. All it is about is seeing the sites, where the weapons were and their shipping for a few days. Cuba is in the hands of the Cubans. But because we were the owners of those weapons... (paragraph missing). [notation in original-ed.] We thought that you, after the consultations, you would accept the inspection. But we never thought of deciding anything for you. Why did we think that we could accept a verification of the dismantling by neutrals, without infringement of the Cuban sovereignty? It was understood that no State would accept an infringement of your sovereignty. In very particular cases, a State can... [ellipsis in document—ed.] its acts, by agreement and not due to pressures from abroad - the territory of the Embassy





then request the inspection of other sites in Cuba - the forests for instance. They can claim that the missiles could have been diverted from their route between the base and the ships.

FIDEL: How would the inspection they propose take place?

Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos)

FIDEL: Couldn't they do the same on the high seas? What is the difference?

Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos)

FIDEL: Tell companero Mikoyan that I understand very well the interest of keeping U Thant on our side, but for us, that is a critical issue. It would have a disastrous effect on our people. The North Americans say that the inspection is inferred from the letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on the 28 (Fidel is making reference to the letter of Khrushchev on the 27 where he accepts the inspection of the Missiles Bases by officials of the UNO Security Council, but making reference to Cuba and Turkey agreeing to it). [note in original—ed.]

Just because of this phrase of Khrushchev, they cannot take this as a concession of the Soviet Union. Companero Mikoyan says to hell with imperialists if they demand more. But on the 23 we received a letter [from Khrushchev] saying, to hell with the imperialists...(he reads paragraphs from the letter). Besides, on one occasion we heard of the proposal of U Thant about the inspection in Cuba, the United States, Guatemala, etc., we understand, that concessions should be made, but we have already made too many. The [U.S.] airplanes are taking pictures because the Soviet Union asked so. We have to find a way to provide evidence without inspection. WE DO NOT THINK OF ALLOWING THE INSPECTION, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO ENDANGER WORLD PEACE, NOR THE SOVIET FORCES THAT ARE IN CUBA. WE WOULD RATHER FREE THE SOVIET UNION OF THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS [MADE] WITH US AND RESIST WITH OUR OWN FORCES WHATEVER THE FUTURE BRINGS. WE HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENDANGER THE PEACE OF THE WORLD, BUT WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO RESIST AGGRESSION. [capi-

tals in original-ed.]

DORTICOS: What has been expressed by companero Fidel does not require a later discussion among us, for we all agree on this criteria (the companeros respond affirmatively)

MIKOYAN (Transcribed by Dorticos)

FIDEL: From our conversation yesterday, we had concluded that the Soviet Government understood the reasons we had to reject the inspection. That was a fundamental issue. That should have been the common ground to talk about common actions. If we do not agree on this, it is difficult to talk about future plans. That is the fundamental political issue. The North Americans persist in obtaining a political victory. The issue of the inspection is to affront the Cuban Revolution. They know there are no missiles. The verification on the high seas has the same effect as in the harbors. The only difference is the humiliating imposition that the U.S. Government wants to carry out for political reasons.

MIKOYAN: (transcribed by Dorticos)

[Source: *Institute of History, Cuba, obtained and provided by Philip Brenner (American University); translation from Spanish by Carlos Osorio (National Security Archive).*]

#### EDITOR'S NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See Vladislav M. Zubok, "Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union": Mikoyan's talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 59, 89-92, and "Mikoyan's Mission to Havana: Cuban-Soviet Negotiations, November 1962," *ibid.*, 93-109, 159; for the November 4 conversation, see 94-101, and for the November 5 (afternoon) conversation, see 101-4.

<sup>2</sup> Cuban officials took part in several oral history conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis which also involved former U.S. and Soviet policymakers, including a conference in Moscow in January 1989 and a gathering in Havana exactly three years later in which Fidel Castro played an active role. The principal organizer of the conferences was James G. Blight, Thomas J. Watson Institute of International Studies, Brown University. For more on Cuban participation in such gatherings, see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn,

and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), *passim*. Blight and the Watson Institute, in cooperation with the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., are also involved in organizing oral history conferences on the Bay of Pigs events of 1961, as well as efforts to obtain Cuban sources on such events as the U.S.-Cuban negotiations on normalization of 1975 and Cuban interventions in Africa in the 1970s.

<sup>3</sup> The reference to the West German role in revealing the existence of the missiles to the U.S. administration is obscure, as no such link is present in most historical accounts of the American discovery. Soviet officials may have been inferring a West German role from the presence in Washington on October 16-17 of the Federal Republic of Germany's foreign minister, Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, for meetings with senior American officials, though there is no indication that he brought any intelligence data concerning Soviet missiles in Cuba. See, e.g., Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, rev. ed. [1992?]), 206, 252.

<sup>4</sup> A reference to U.S. Marine exercises, code-named PHIBRIGLEX-62, scheduled to begin on 15 October 1962, practicing amphibious landings of 7,500 Marines on the Caribbean island of Viecques to overthrow a mythical dictator known as "Ortsac"—a fact which was leaked to the press in an obvious psychological warfare tactic. The exercises themselves were also planned to mask preparations for a possible U.S. Navy blockade of Cuba. See citations in James G. Hershberg, "Before 'The Missiles of October': Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?" in James A. Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 254-5, 275-6 (fns 87, 88).

<sup>5</sup> For the text of the draft agreement, translated from a copy in the Russian archives, see Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: edition q, inc., 1994), 185-8.

**FOR IMPORTANT  
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INFORMATION,  
SEE PAGE 421**





CPSU Central Committee, at a dinner party at the home of Interior Secretary Stewart Udall on the evening of November 30—an occasion one American present described as a “strange, seemingly unreal evening” as enemies who had nearly engaged in thermonuclear war only weeks war wiled away the hours in drinking, toasts, and (sometimes forced) convivial conversation.<sup>13</sup> A wily diplomatic trouble-shooter since the Stalin era, Mikoyan was passing through Washington after three weeks of difficult negotiations in Cuba with Fidel Castro over the outcome of the crisis and a day before the Udall affair had met with President Kennedy at the White House.

Before the meal was served (as Mikoyan related in a cable printed in this *Bulletin*), Robert Kennedy invited Mikoyan into a separate room for a tete-a-tete in which he underlined the importance above all (“even more important than the fates of my children and your grandchildren”) of restoring personal trust between his brother and Khrushchev. Mikoyan not only agreed and assured Robert Kennedy that Khrushchev felt the same way, but said that the Soviet government applauded the president’s “self-possession” and willingness to compromise at “the most dangerous moment, when the world stood at the edge of thermonuclear war.”

Moscow, moreover, Mikoyan added, had “noticed the positive role that you, the president’s brother, played during the confidential negotiations” between the U.S. and Soviet leaderships during the crisis. Robert Kennedy expressed an interest in visiting the USSR, an idea which Mikoyan warmly endorsed, especially should relations between the two rivals improve after surviving (and resolving) the rough Cuban passage.

Those relations did in fact improve somewhat in the succeeding months, leading to, among other events, John F. Kennedy’s conciliatory American University speech in April 1963 and the signing of U.S.-Soviet pacts on a limited nuclear test ban and a hot line between Washington and Moscow. But the post-Cuban Missile Crisis opening for a continued rapprochement between

both Kennedy brothers and Khrushchev—a prospect the Americans thought would last through a second Kennedy Administration—ended with the U.S. president’s assassination in Dallas in November 1963 and Khrushchev’s toppling less than a year later.

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**Robert F. Kennedy, Memorandum  
for Dean Rusk on Meeting with  
Anatoly F. Dobrynin on  
27 October 1962**

TOP SECRET

Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D.C.  
October 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE FROM  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

At the request of Secretary Rusk, I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at approximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 27th. I asked him if he would come to the Justice Department at a quarter of eight.

We met in my office. I told him first that we understood that the work was continuing on the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to him that in the last two hours we had found that our planes flying over Cuba

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Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately.

I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.

RFK: amn

[Source: John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; provided to CWIHP by Prof. Peter Roman, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA.]

<sup>1</sup> Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1969; citations from Mentor/New American Library paperback edition, 1969). Questions about the book's reliability deepened after another former Kennedy aide, speechwriter Theodore Sorensen, acknowledged that, as an uncredited editor of the manuscript, he taken it upon himself to delete "explicit" references to the arrangement he and Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin reached on the evening of 27 October 1962 regarding the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the settlement of the crisis. Also problematic is the fact that Robert Kennedy's original diary, on which the book is based, has not been opened to researchers. Sorensen made his confession upon being challenged by

*The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St.

126 fn 183.

<sup>2</sup> The most detailed account of Robert F. Kennedy's part in the missile crisis (at least on his life) is by Arthur M. Schleser er, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1978; citations from Futura Publications paperback edition, 1979).

<sup>3</sup> w DoJim Hershberg,ngBenAnatomy of a Controversy:

Anatoly F. Dobrynin's Meeter .

Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962," *CWIHP*



vana later that fall, would have left the “military units of the two states under the command of their respective governments.”<sup>12</sup> Even so, the Cuban leader’s message on 26 October still struck a raw nerve in Moscow.<sup>13</sup> It was a vivid reminder of the dangers that might have resulted if the Soviet Union had delegated any responsibility for nuclear operations.

A related lesson about the dangers posed by local actors pertained to the role of the commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, Army-General Issa Pliev, who was chosen for the post because of his long-standing and very close friendship with both Khrushchev and the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii.<sup>14</sup> At no time during the crisis did Pliev have authority to order the use of either medium-range or tactical nuclear missiles, but it is now known that several weeks before the crisis—in the late summer of 1962—Malinovskii had considered the possibility of giving Pliev pre-delegated authority to order the use of tactical missiles against invading U.S. troops if Pliev’s lines of communication with Moscow were severed and all other means of defense against an invasion had proven insufficient. A written order to this effect was prepared on 8 September 1962, but in the end Malinovskii declined to sign it.<sup>15</sup> Thus, at the time of the crisis Pliev had no independent authority to order the use of nuclear weapons or even to order that nuclear warheads, which were stored separately from the missiles, be released for possible employment. The limitations on Pliev’s scope of action during the crisis were reinforced by two cables transmitted by Malinovskii on 22 and 25 October, which “categorically” prohibited any use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances without explicit authorization from Moscow.<sup>16</sup>

The strictures imposed by the Soviet leadership held up well during the crisis, as the procedural safeguards for nuclear operations proved sufficient to forestall any untoward incidents.<sup>17</sup> For the most part, Khrushchev’s and Malinovskii’s faith in Pliev was well-founded. Nevertheless, it is clear that Pliev wanted to ease some of the pro-

cedural restrictions—at least for tactical missiles—even after he received the two telegrams that “categorically” forbade him to order the issuance or use of nuclear weapons without express authorization. On 26 October he sent a cable to Moscow in which he apparently mentioned that Castro wanted him to prepare for a nuclear strike and that, as a result, he had decided it was time to move nuclear warheads closer to the missiles (though without actually issuing them to the missile units). Pliev then requested that his decision be approved and that he be given due authority to order the preparation of tactical missiles for launch if, as appeared imminent, U.S. troops invaded the island.<sup>18</sup> Soviet leaders immediately turned down both of his requests and reemphasized that no actions involving nuclear weapons were to be undertaken without direct authorization from Moscow.<sup>19</sup>

Still, the very fact that Pliev sought to have the restrictions lifted, and his seeming willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons if necessary, provided a sobering indication of the risks entailed in giving discretion to local commanders. The risks would have been especially acute in this instance because there were no technical safeguards on the nuclear weapons in Cuba to serve as a fallback in case Pliev (or someone else) attempted to circumvent the procedural safeguards.<sup>20</sup> This is not to say that it would have been easy for Pliev to evade the procedural limits—to do so he would have had to obtain cooperation from troops all along the chain of command—but there was no technical barrier *per se* to unauthorized actions.

Thus, one of the clear lessons of the crisis was the need not only to maintain stringent procedural safeguards for all Soviet nuclear forces, but also to equip those forces with elaborate technical devices that would prevent unauthorized or accidental launches. This applied above all to nuclear weapons deployed abroad, where the lines of communication were more vulnerable to being severed or disrupted.<sup>21</sup>

One further lesson from the Cuban missile crisis, which reinforced the pro-



when, allegedly in response to deployments by NATO, Khrushchev warned that the Pact would be “compelled by force of circumstance to consider stationing [tactical nuclear] missiles in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.”<sup>25</sup> Shortly thereafter, the Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish armed forces began receiving nuclear-capable aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles from the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup> The Bulgarian and Hungarian armies also soon obtained nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles from Moscow; and even the Romanian military was eventually supplied with nuclear-capable Frog-7 and Scud-B missiles. In





(Moscow), 22 November 1962, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> See the account by the Hungarian charge d'affaires in Washington, D.C. in October 1962 (who later defected), Janos Radvanyi, *Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 137. China, too, was not informed in advance about either the placement or the withdrawal of the missiles in Cuba. This point was noted by Chinese leaders during the bitter Sino-Soviet polemics in 1963. See, for example, the exchanges in "On the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA," *Peking Review* (Beijing), 15 March 1963, pp. 11-13; "Otkrytoe pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza partiinym organizatsiyam i vsem kommunistam Sovetskogo Soyuza," *Pravda* (Moscow), 14 July 1963, p.1; and "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," *Peking Review* (Beijing), 6 September 1963, pp. 7-11. See also the article by M.Y. Prozumenschikov in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

<sup>5</sup> "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," Report No. 24762s (TOP SECRET) from Col.-General P. Ivashutin, chief of the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, to Marshal M. V. Zakharov, head of the General Staff Military Academy, 28 August 1964, in Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony (TsAMO), Delo (D.) 158, esp. Listy (L.) 352-3, 411-2, 423, and 400. I am grateful to Matthew Evangelista for providing me with a copy of this document.

<sup>6</sup> This point is stressed in the top-secret cables adduced in note 2 *supra*.

<sup>7</sup> On the state of the Russian archives, see Mark Kramer, "Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls," *Cold War International History Bulletin*, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 1, 14-37.

<sup>8</sup> "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," pp. 332-3.

<sup>9</sup> "Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda," *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR* (Moscow), No. 24 (31 December 1990), pp. 67-80, esp. pp. 71-73. This correspondence was first released in November 1990 by the Cuban, not Soviet, government. Fidel Castro was seeking to rebut a claim made in a portion of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs that appeared in English for the first time in 1990. Khrushchev had recalled that Castro was urging him to launch a *preemptive* nuclear attack against the United States, whereas Castro insisted (correctly) that he had called for an all-out Soviet nuclear attack against the United States only if U.S. troops invaded Cuba. Soon after this correspondence was published in Spanish in the 23 November 1990 issue of the Havana daily *Granma* (and in English in the weekly edition of *Granma*), the Soviet government realized it had nothing to gain by keeping the Russian version secret any longer. Hence, the full correspondence was published in the Soviet Foreign Ministry's in-house journal, as cited here. [Ed. note: For Khrushchev's version, see *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, trans. and ed. by Jerrold

L. Schechter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), pp. 170-83, esp. pp. 177, 183; for an English translation of the correspondence and an accompanying commentary in *Granma*, see Appendix 2 of James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch (with the assistance of David Lewis), *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), pp. 474-91; the key letter, of Castro to Khrushchev on 26 October 1962, is on pp. 481-2.]

<sup>10</sup> "Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda," pp. 73-5. This point was re-emphasized to Castro by Prime Minister Mikoyan during their conversations in November 1962. See "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s prem'er-ministrom revolyutsionnogo pravitel'stva Kuby F. Kastro," 12 November 1962 (Top Secret) and "O besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro," 20 November 1962 (Top Secret), both published in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), Nos. 11-12 (November-December 1992), pp. 143-7 and 147-50, respectively. See esp. p. 149.

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted, however, that a decision to send 901-A4 nuclear warheads and 407-N6 bombs to Cuba for the Frogs and II-28s was not finalized until 8 September 1962, by which time Khrushchev may already have changed his mind about the command-and-control arrangements.

