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# **Exploiting and Securing the Open Border in Berlin: The Western Secret Services, the Stasi, and the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961**

**Paul Maddrell**

**Aberystwyth University, Great Britain**

On 13 August 1961, the East German Communist regime closed its last remaining open border with the West, sealing the border between the Soviet and Western Sectors in Berlin. The fence it put up quickly turned into the Berlin Wall. Berlin had been at the forefront of international politics since the Soviet government, on 27 November 1958, had sent the United States, Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany a diplomatic note demanding that the occupation regime in the city be ended and West Berlin become a “free city.” The Western governments had feared since that time that West Berlin would be blockaded, as had happened between 1948 and 1949. The literature on the East Germans’ and Soviets’ decision to close the border presents it as a means of maintaining the stability of the GDR regime by stopping the flow of refugees to the West.<sup>1</sup> While this was the primary purpose behind the action, it was not the only one. The open border in Berlin exposed the GDR to massive espionage and subversion and, as the two documents in the appendices show, its closure gave the Communist state greater security. Not only was this the official Socialist Unity Party<sup>2</sup> line, it expressed a reality as well. Indeed, state security officers called the border closure “die Sicherung der Staatsgrenze” (the securing of the state border).

The two documents printed in translation below are records of Main Department IX (*Hauptabteilung IX*) of the East German Ministry of State Security (MfS, better known as Stasi). This was the MfS’ so-called *Untersuchungsorgan* (investigation branch) which, among other responsibilities, had the job of interrogating arrested spies and pre-paring assessments of trends in Western espionage. Its job therefore required it to examine evidence of Western spying very carefully and critically.

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Hope Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003)

The documents shed new light on the history of the contest between the Western intelligence agencies and Communist security services. They show that the closure of the sectoral border in Berlin was the key moment in the history of the MfS' counter-espionage and counter-subversion services. Western intelligence saw when Khrushchev issued his ultimatum of November 1958 on the Berlin and German questions that he meant to put a stop to their successful espionage and subversion, which they had chiefly carried out from bases in West Berlin. The Western secret services had to develop new methods to infiltrate the Communist police state. Their task became even more difficult after August 1961 when the wall went up. Their operations had largely depended on freedom of movement over the border between the Western and Soviet sectors.

The open border in West Berlin had four benefits in particular for the Western secret services. It meant that East Germans could leave the GDR via West Berlin. Some were refugees, leaving it for good; others were only leaving for a day or two, either visiting relatives or friends in the Western sectors or just shopping. All these people were vulnerable to Western influence. Most important were the refugees. Once in West Berlin they were interrogated and asked to name people still in East Germany, usually colleagues at work or friends, who would be willing to cooperate with Western intelligence. Contact could then be made with those named, again exploiting the open border in Berlin, either via a letter, often posted in the GDR itself by a courier who crossed over into it from West Berlin, or by a courier who would visit the target. The target would be invited to visit West Berlin; where he or she would be asked to cooperate in espionage activities. This was the principal way of recruiting spies, yet there were others too. East Germans who were merely visiting West Berlin were also approached, using a variety of means and excuses, and successfully recruited. They would return home and spy for the West.

The second benefit of an open border was that the informant, once recruited, could travel regularly to West Berlin to hand over information to his controller. These personal meetings, which were the primary way of communication between agent and controller in all Western services, allowed for quick, safe, and full method of communication, superior to other forms. The informant could also be trained at these meetings and supplied with spying equipment.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See P. Maddrell, *Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 56-8 & 119-29.





services would lose the military cover they had long exploited. Second, if Khrushchev carried out his threat to transfer control of the Allies' access routes to

The documents below show the way in which they adjusted. To ensure continued communication, they distributed either radio sets capable of receiving shortwave transmissions or shortwave converters. These would enable spies to receive instructions by radio. The Americans originally set a deadline of 28 May 1959 (when the ultimatum expired) for the distribution of radios. Secret writing equipment (invisible ink, prepared writing paper, and codebooks) was also distributed. The spy would communicate with the West by these means if communication by personal meeting became impossible but communication by post remained possible. This would be the case if the sectoral border in Berlin were closed. Radio transmitters were distributed and “dead letter boxes”<sup>8</sup> (DLBs) created to prepare for the eventuality of war. Either the transmitter was a fast one (the BND’s practice) or radio agents were also supplied with tape recorders, on to which they recorded the messages they intended to broadcast (a practice



people with special permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs; only people with special permission from the frontier troops could enter the border strip.<sup>11</sup>

Securing the border significantly enhanced the GDR's security, as Document 2 states: The protection measures taken by the government of the GDR on 13.8.1961 on the state border with West Berlin gave rise to a considerable obstruction to the subversive work of the secret services, particularly owing to the substantial elimination of West Berlin as a base for spying on the German Democratic Republic.

From the MfS' perspective, the security crisis which had lasted since the late 1940s became less intense in August 1961, though it remained grave. The SED still needed furious repression to remain in power. However, the MfS' superiority in the fields of espionage and counter-espionage over the Western secret services operating against it, and particularly those of the Federal Republic, dates from 1961. From that time, the MfS' foreign intelligence service, the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA), became ever more successful at penetrating its West German targets, while the Stasi's counter-espionage divisions consistently frustrated the efforts of Western intelligence services to spy successfully in the GDR.<sup>12</sup> Western - and particularly West German - subversion of the GDR continued, but its forms changed. Moreover, the sealed border contributed to the GDR developing politically in ways very different from the Federal Republic. Opposition to the Communist regime ceased to be total. Rather than seeking the regime's overthrow and the re-introduction of parliamentary democracy and a free-market economy, it evolved into more subtle forms of resistance.<sup>13</sup> Accordingly, Jens Gieseke has called 13 August 1961 "the GDR's secret foundation day."<sup>14</sup> The Berlin Wall made a greater contribution to the GDR's security than the sealing of its Western border four decades earlier had made to that of Russia because the Western secret services, at this highpoint of the Cold War, were far more active against the GDR and the rest



was brought about by war or by the introduction of border controls in Berlin. Without hyperbole, the border closure was one of most prepared-for events in twentieth-century European history. Though an effort to seal the border was not seen as the most likely outcome of the crisis by the CIA, all the main Western secret services saw it as a distinct possibility.

In early 1959, the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence took the view that it would be impossible to close the sectoral border throughout the whole of Berlin completely. It advised the US Government that "police, border guards, and workers' militiamen could be posted at strategic points, but it would be impossible to seal the dividing line effectively. Instead, the Communists are likely to continue their tactics of intimidation, infiltration, and harassment."<sup>15</sup> By contrast, it considered that a successful blockade of West Berlin was possible because the access routes by air, land, and water could be cut. All the routes were crucial for the population of West Berlin because by the late 1950s the Americans thought that it could no longer be sustained by an airlift alone. The "Three Essentials" of President John F. Kennedy's Berlin policy, announced on 25 July, did not explicitly preclude the construction of a wall; however, the President did insist that the Allies retain unhindered access to West Berlin. In the period leading up to the border closure, CIA analysts expected Khrushchev to repeat what he had done between November 1958 and January 1959: demand a peace treaty which would end the Allied rights of access to West Berlin and give the GDR control over these routes. The access routes would then be cut and refugees thus prevented from leaving West Berlin. It would therefore make little sense for them to make their way there. The CIA's reports stress the importance of preparing to break a blockade; they do not mention a wall.<sup>16</sup>

The report considers the operations of the principal Western services and makes several interesting comments. The MfS recorded that the "American secret service" had a policy of mass recruitment of spies. Since the CIA at the start of the 1960s had only about a hundred spies in the GDR, this must have been chiefly the policy of the USA's military intelligence agencies, which

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<sup>15</sup> CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 5 February 1959, in Steury (ed.), *On the Front Lines of the Cold War*, p. 452.

<sup>16</sup> B. Stöver, "Mauerbau und Nachrichtendienste: Die CIA und der Wandel der US-Politik in Ostmitteleuropa," in Hertle, Jarausch & Kleßmann (eds.), *Mauerbau und Mauerfall*, pp. 139-41; M. Uhl & A. Wagner (eds.), *Ulbricht, Chruschtschow und die Mauer* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), pp. 195-7; SNIE 2-61, "Soviet and Other

were very active in East Germany.<sup>17</sup> The same claim of mass recruitment is made by the MfS veterans Klaus Eichner and Andreas Dobbert in their book *Headquarters Germany: Die USA-Geheimdienste in Deutschland* (Berlin: edition ost, 1997). It is supported by Main Department IX's own monthly reports of its investigations into suspected cases of espionage.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, similar claims have been made by American intelligence officers as well. Richard M. Bissell Jr., the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans under Allen Dulles, commented in 1968 that spying was conducted with "special intensity" in Berlin before the Wall was built.<sup>19</sup> Harry Rositzke, a CIA officer in West Germany in the 1950s, has stated that American "agents ... penetrated high circles of the ruling party, the government's economic ministries, the railway and postal administrations, the police and the militia. Thousands of reports, from freight car loadings to





SIS's policy was very different from that of the USA's military intelligence agencies. It was one of highly selective recruitment. It sought to infiltrate the government apparatus, recruiting well-placed agents able to provide high-grade political, economic, and scientific intelligence over a long period. They were therefore very security-minded and careful. Blake's memoirs make clear that SIS considered itself to be highly professional – more professional than many of its rivals. Unlike the Americans and West Germans, who met their agents in public spaces in West Berlin, the British only met them in cars and safehouses. By making the spy report orally and recording what he or she said, the British were able to obtain the maximum amount of information from him and cross-check it (one benefit of the personal meeting). They could also carefully examine the spy to gauge whether he might be working for the MfS or KGB. SIS was slower to prepare for a change in the conditions for spying than the Americans or West Germans.<sup>25</sup>

Document 2 is entitled “Brief assessment of the investigation results achieved in 1961 in work on crimes of espionage” (*Kürze Einschätzung der im Jahre 1961 erzielten Untersuchungsergebnisse in der Bearbeitung von Spionageverbrechen*) and dated 9 January 1962. In it, Main Department IX reviews its counter-espionage successes of the previous year and draws conclusions as to the policy of the Western secret services. The records of Main Department IX show that it took care to support its conclusions with evidence, such as the one shown in Document 1. However, Document 2 demonstrates that the assessments it prepared also reflected the SED line, even if this meant disregarding a lack of evidence. So, as both documents show, it had obtained plenty of evidence that the Western secret services were preparing for war – that is to say, preparing to fight one rather than start one. Consistent with the Party line, the assessment maintains that the Western secret services were “preparing an attack on the German Democratic Republic.” The claim is also made that, before the border in Berlin was closed, new

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<sup>25</sup> This was not the first time that British Intelligence had had to overcome a fence in order to obtain intelligence. During the First World War, the Germans had used two electrified fences to seal occupied Belgium off from neutral Holland. The fences extended the whole length of the border between the two countries. Both SIS and the intelligence service of the British Army in France managed to smuggle through the fences intelligence on German troop movements obtained by train-watcher networks in Belgium. Belgian spies also sent their intelligence directly to the army in Northern France by carrier pigeon (the First World War forerunner of radio transmission). The British experimented (unsuccessfully) with radio transmission of military intelligence during the Great War. Radio was also used to send instructions to spies. The British also sent Belgian refugees as spies back into their country via Holland, which anticipated their exploitation of East German refugees thirty to forty years later. On this, see C. Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Heinemann, 1985), pp. 139-46 & 156-65.

agents were recruited in the Western part of the city “by means of threats and blackmail.” In actual fact, as the Department knew full well, the principal motive for East Germans to agree to act as spies was anti-Communism.<sup>26</sup> The remark reflects its Party spirit and hostility towards “the class enemy.”

This assessment also confirms that the Western secret services were very successful in recruiting agents in GDR ministries. The report refers to the arrest of “a series of agents of the American and English secret service as well as the BND, who had managed [...] to infiltrate state and social institutions and gather information on the defence preparedness, foreign policy measures of the government of the GDR, and other political tasks, as well as on key political-economic elements of the Seven Year Plan.” At the time the report was written, however, four months after the border closure, much of their espionage was directed towards obtaining military intelligence. The Western governments continued to fear that war might break out over West Berlin, particularly since Khrushchev had not yet succeeded in his aim of incorporating it into the Soviet sphere of influence. Spies were told by their controllers to look for signs of a popular uprising which would overthrow the SED regime. It was the fact that there was no such uprising which was the surprise of 1961.

As MfS records, both documents translated here are held by Central Archive (*Zentral-archiv*) of the *Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*<sup>27</sup> (BStU). They were therefore made available pursuant to the provisions of the Law on the State Security Records (*Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz*) of 1991, which requires the names of people who neither worked for the MfS nor fell into other specific categories of exception to be blacked out. Consequently, names have been redacted out of each document. However, their meaning and significance remain clear.

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<sup>26</sup> See Maddrell, *Spying on Science*, pp. 120, 130.

<sup>27</sup> In English: Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic.

## **DOCUMENT APPENDIX**

### **DOCUMENT 1: ASSESSMENT BY MAIN DEPARTMENT IX OF CHANGES TO THEIR OPERATIONS MADE BY THE MAIN WESTERN SECRET SERVICES IN RESPONSE TO KHRUSHCHEV'S ULTIMATUM ON BERLIN**

[Source: BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX Nr. 4350, pp. 341-360. Translated by Paul Maddrell.]

Main Department IX/1

New methods of operation of Western secret services

I. The following material is based on experience of investigative work of the last few months as well as information obtained from the exchange of information with other responsible departments.

Applies to all secret services: [they] react to the political situation in each case – party and government.

For example:

- chemistry conference
- proposals USSR and GDR for the resolution of the West Berlin question

Characteristic:

Immediate reaction on the part of all intelligence services to proposals – particularly Americans and Federal Intelligence Service –

Officers worried, confused – however, unlike politicians of the Western Powers they assessed the situation relatively realistically; that is to say: comprehensive re-ordering of their work.

(a) foreigners ally; that is to

- (c) use of the most modern technology;
- (d) covert addresses [in] West Germany, dead drop boxes, and smuggling routes on the Western state border and the sectoral borders.

[handwritten note: name blacked out – Visa. Border region - DLB store for documents and technical aids]

Cooperation:

Personal meetings are no longer carried out in bars, only in cars and safehouses which are mostly unknown to the agents.

Permanent change (*wechsel*) of safehouses – personal meetings are limited as much as possible – for example: Brehmer – one year

Meetings in West Berlin with “PM 12”<sup>29</sup> or plane from West Berlin to West Germany

Tasks: transmitted by radio [handwritten note: no radio traffic [illegible word] Brehmer]

For example: Brehmer

Courier connection via DLB.

Communication of intelligence:

West German covert addresses have been given out to almost all agents.

Addresses do not exist, post office workers take them out, spy reports written with invisible ink (tablets – almost all tablets suited to making invisible ink) are also encoded. [handwritten note: and typewritten]

To a greater degree agents are equipped with radio sets – deadline 28 May 1959<sup>30</sup>, replacement sets stored in DLBs.

With the radio sets – tape recorders, radio signals are transmitted on to these, tape plays at ten times normal speed over the transmitter – therefore hard to locate.

Along the sectoral borders and Western state border smuggling routes for people and DLBs

Resident agents are equipped with radio-telephones – for example: [name of agent blacked out]

[handwritten note: Schneeberg [illegible word] Aue]

Regional radio headquarters: Frankfurt/Main, Fulda, Offenbach.

[Handwritten note: radio with tape and pencil – then illegible]

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<sup>29</sup> This was a visa issued by the East German People’s Police (the *Volkspolizei*), permitting East Germans to visit West Germany or West Berlin.

<sup>30</sup> This was when Khrushchev’s ultimatum expired.

Technical aids:

Beyond those already stated:

(a) Cameras:

built into glasses case, into wristwatch, cigarette lighter, and fountain pen.

Chiefly the Minox is used – automatic camera with telephoto lens for railway junction – for example: [name of agent blacked out]

(b) Bugging equipment: BASA/microphone – e.g. [name of agent blacked out]

Tapping of telephone cables on roads and in telephone exchange, bugging devices are attached to tape recorders which run for 24 hours. Bugging devices which are equipped with a transmitter have been installed in chandeliers and pocket torches. For example: [name of spy blacked out].

(c) Devices which record radioactive emissions fixed to railway tracks so as to detect uranium transports – for example: [name of spy blacked out]

(d) Transport of technical devices, codes, and instructions takes places in packaging materials which are in common use in the GDR, e.g. cans of beef, tins of paint, bars of chocolate, accordions, vacuum cleaners.

III. British secret service:

is divided in West Berlin into:

12 Berlin Intelligence Staff (BIS)<sup>31</sup>

Fundamentally rejects the creation of espionage groups.

Base of both departments of the British secret service on the premises of the Reich sports ground (Olympic Stadium Prohibited Zone).

They are directly responsible to the Prime Minister.<sup>33</sup>

#### Recruitment methods:

Utterly rejects mass recruitment, chiefly makes use of refugees who write to their circle of acquaintances and relatives. [handwritten note: compare with [name blacked out] – direct work on the person in the GDR – summoned<sup>34</sup> by means of letters.

In making recruitments the officers speak openly of the British secret service and as evidence that cooperation will be secure state that no British agents have yet been sentenced on the territory of the GDR, otherwise there would have been articles in the democratic<sup>35</sup> press.

[They] eagerly recruit GM [Geheime Mitarbeiter: secret co-workers], GI [Geheime Informatoren: secret informants] or contacts of the MfS, tell agents to join the SED. [handwritten note: strongly working for “P-sources”<sup>36</sup>]

#### Maintaining the connection:

The agents are mainly given telephone numbers 93 51 40 or 45.

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<sup>32</sup> For the MfS, economic espionage included scientific espionage, since scientific institutions (the research departments of the big nationalized enterprises and research laboratories and institutes) formed part of the economic complex. Scientific espionage was a key part of the tasking of SIS and the other major Western services.

<sup>33</sup> Translator’s note: The Berlin Intelligence Staff, as a military staff, was under the control of the Secretary of State for Defence. Thta33





Strict separation of responsibility.

Main base in Germany: Baden-Baden.

West Berlin Quartier Napoleon – Reinickendorf, Kurt-Schumacher-Damm –

Use German employees for recruitment and introduction

Cooperation chiefly with French officers.

Since [Soviet] Note on Berlin<sup>40</sup> use of German employees on a greater scale.

French are making preparations for withdrawal.

Equipping agents with radio sets.

Recruitment methods:

Zoo Station<sup>41</sup> - black market dealer in optical goods – [handwritten note: House of the East  
German Homeland] – refugee camps about refugees (*Fluchtlingslager über Republikfluchtige*) –  
[two words blacked out] – [handwritten note: exploitation of “Heimatverbände” – revanche<sup>42</sup>].

Aids:

Characteristic features:

French secret service is currently generous with financial resources – pays in advance monthly salary for one year, makes agents buy motorbikes and radio sets.

V. Federal Intelligence Service (BND):

1. Structure:

Change in the structure (1. Intelligence collection, 2. Sabotage – Subversion and 3. Counter-espionage)

Now: 1. Spying [handwritten note: Near intelligence collection: GDR; Deep intelligence collection: People's Democracies; Far intelligence collection: USSR]; 2. War; 3. Intelligence collection and work on hostile intelligence services.

[handwritten note: that is a more prominent feature of the BND's character]

That is to say: concentration now on war and hostile intelligence services.

Structure of offices (organization) remained as known up to now Headquarters (GD – *Geheimdienst*), general agencies (GV – *Generalvertretungen*), district agencies (BV – *Bezirksvertretungen*), sub-agencies (UV – *Unterververtretungen*), local branches (FL – *Filialen*), and agent controllers (VMF - *Vertrauensmannführer*).

Cover: as up to now (firms, trade representatives, and suchlike.)

[handwritten note: without (official) guard – only porters]

The BND's methods of activity:

(a) research<sup>43</sup> and recruitment: main territory of research: West Germany, returnees, visitors to West Germany

Post and foreign offices – surveillance – collecting addresses

partly West Berlin – exploitation of offices which GDR citizens call at, e.g. Federal Support Offices (131-type pensions<sup>44</sup>) etc.

Selection of recruitment candidates:

Up to now – chiefly Fascists, Wehrmacht and police officers

Today – still the case – but Federal Intelligence Service seeks so-called “party faithful” – people who outwardly support the policy of the Party and state.

[handwritten note: compare [name blacked out] – exploitation of grievance and compromising material]

Recruitment:

Known up to now – German theme – reunification of Germany among other phrases – activity in Nazi Germany revealed

New line: activity in Nazi Germany not revealed – if it is, then flag<sup>45</sup> not revealed.

[handwritten note: general testing by means of 08 tasks, then P-sources (Weinderlich [name])]

(b) Working methods with agent networks:

1953-1956 offices (FI<sup>46</sup>) in West Berlin – severe blows by MfS

Transfer of all official offices to West Germany “to the secure hinterland.”

Officers of the Federal Intelligence Service only now come to West Berlin for meetings.<sup>47</sup>

Constant changing of meeting places (hotels), e.g. [name blacked out]

Instruction:

meetings also in West Germany

reduce number of meetings.

That is to say: the work from West Germany of the Federal Intelligence Service will increase in future.

(c) Methods of communicating intelligence:

Secret text [(ST)] process – covert addresses – [handwritten note: ST – Blue]

receive instructions, whereby each operator receives: key, date, time of day, and time when headquarters will repeat [message].

(speech traffic – not machine)

Types of radio sets: “Eisenach,” “Rema/800,” “Dominante,” “Stradivari/E9” and all sets with 2 loudspeakers.

#### Transports and hiding places:

Transport concealed in tins of preserved food from HO [*Handelsorganisation*: a state-owned network of shops and hotels], even unopened, has been maintained up to recent instructions.

Children’s toy – like cars and toy railway sets etc.

Utensils (pocket mirror) and cigarettes etc.

[Handwritten note: petrol cans – paint tins and some use with set  
parcel with pieces of clothing  
pieces of clothing in general]

#### Couriers:

There are specific instructions for selection and collaboration

For example: people who travel a lot (professionally), long-distance drivers, sailors, and suchlike, sales representatives, courier material not to be concealed on body, concealment during transport must offer the chance of abandoning the material easily.

#### (e) Other technical aids:

MINOX cameras

- Robot Star and Robot Junior with cable release and powerful telephoto lens. Particularly during observation of MfS offices and officers.

### 3. Particular installations under attack:

Economic espionage against key parts of the people's economy (for example: chemistry, coal, energy, or big construction sites – Rostock harbour)

[handwritten note: see in connection with returnees]

Military espionage – all installations of the Soviet army and NVA [*Nationale Volksarmee*: the East German army.]

Stepped-up activity against the MfS and the organs subordinate to it.

Aim: to penetrate, study, spy, “play games,” smash existing IM [*Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*: informants] groups.

Also spying on officers of MfS by means of observations, investigations, conversations, bar visits, drinking bouts, and suchlike.

Introduction of compromised MfS employees to secret service.

#### Conclusions:

1. consistent political instruction of officers; each officer – each department must [form] from this corresponding conclusions for investigative work.

2. increases sharing of experience – give more attention to operational evaluation.

3. evaluation of investigation cases – more attention to presentation of evidence.

Counter-espionage uses too little operational technology to obtain official evidence.

for example: photographing meetings by means of an observer.

Case [name blacked out] – operational combination tank -

Case [name blacked out] – [handwritten: (photographed handing over spying equipment)]

therefore important: as the intelligence service now instructs its agents in interrogations to require evidence to be presented [handwritten: e.g. arrest order e.g. [name blacked out]] – no basis for arrest without confession.

[handwritten: informants' information: show evidence – otherwise no confession]

previously: MfS would make use of beatings and other physical means – agents thereby intimidated – the interrogator impressed by correct behaviour – confession.







Thus it should be recognized that the agents of the most active imperialist secret services – the American services and the BND – are being prepared to a particularly large degree for their employment in war.

This finds expression in the increased tasking to gather information of a military-strategic nature, such as determining the load-bearing capacity of bridges, the significance of railway junctions, the flow capacity of streets, railways, and waterways, as well as the extent and employment of transport space.

Without exception, the agents of the American, English, and French secret service, as well as the BND, have been employed to inquire thoroughly into the military potential and the defence measures taken by the government of the GDR. The focus of the military spying in the activity of the American secret service and the Federal Intelligence Service lies above all in the collection of intelligence about the units of the Soviet army temporarily stationed on the territory of the GDR. In this their agents predominantly concentrate on spying on missile units and on the construction of air defence bases and storage depots.

For example, the agent of the American secret service [name blacked out] and the BND spy [name blacked out] tried to find out such information in a large number of towns on the territory of the GDR.

The concentration of the secret services, particularly the American services and the BND, on creating agent groups must also be evaluated in connection with the preparations for war against the GDR of the West German militarists, in combination with NATO, were intensified in 1961.

In accordance with the instructions and general orders which were obtained, these groups, predominantly equipped with radio-technical aids, were, among other things, to report on the mood and condition of the population, signs of discontent, starting fires as well as other acts of sabotage and subversion, imbalances in the people's economy, particularly shortages in the provision of goods, and on the situation in agriculture.

The main task of the agent groups created consists of collecting and transmitting intelligence about troop movements and other military operations to increase the defence preparedness and striking power of the armed forces of the GDR. Closely connected with that are orders to ascertain the situation among the civilian population, the provision of goods, and the readiness of the population to support the armed forces.

Thus it was possible to liquidate a large number of groups, above all of the BND, in whose possession were, altogether, 22 high-performance radio sets and converters suitable for war conditions, which would serve to transmit information in case of war. Most of the radio-technical devices seized in the course of investigative actions were smuggled into the territory of the GDR from West Berlin by couriers like the arrested BND spies [name blacked out] and [name blacked out]. Some were deposited in so-called far and near hiding places. Some of the radio sets meant for use in war were transported into the GDR by the agent radio operators using means of transport made specifically for this purpose. Musical instruments, liquid containers, and tools were chosen as hiding places for transporting the radio sets. Until 13.8.1961 these agent groups transmitted the information they gathered to their controllers almost exclusively at personal meetings as well as using invisible ink and prepared paper via covert addresses in West Germany.

The fact that people who have left the GDR illegally are recruited for spying in West Berlin and West Germany and sent back to their hometowns to gather information on defence preparedness is also to be evaluated in connection with the concentration of the secret services on preparing an attack on the German Democratic



In the course of last year it was possible to prove that the Iranian secret service, exploiting Iran's diplomatic representations in West Germany, is engaging in intensive agitation and subversion

trade relations between the foreign trade organs of the GDR and trading companies of capitalist and socialist countries.

The aim of this extensive spying is the preparation of an economic blockade of the GDR in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The protection measures taken by the government of the GDR on 13.8.1961 on the state border with West Berlin gave rise to a considerable

have been sent into Democratic Berlin to observe troop movements, gatherings of people, and unrest expected by the American secret service in Democratic Berlin.

Over and above that, for example, the instruction and training of the arrested agent of the American secret service [name blacked out] was broken off prematurely and precipitately after the security measures came into force. [Name blacked out] was smuggled illegally into the GDR and received instructions to inquire into the military situation on the territory of the GDR.

It is to be concluded that the number of spies of the American secret service smuggled over the state border (West) increased.

According to investigative results of cases of spies of the American and West German secret service, the main method of maintaining the connection is radio activity.

Basically, tasks and spying instructions are transmitted by radio, whereby the American secret service uses the "Ilmenau 210" radio sets which are available for purchase [in the GDR] and the BND uses shortwave converters which are specifically meant for radio reception.

Some of the arrested radio agents of the BND were already reporting by radio the observations they had made to the regional radio headquarters of the Federal Intelligence Service.



Thus the agents are supplied with money and spyi