

*Leadership Transition  
in a Fractured Bloc*

*Featuring:*

CPSU Plenums; Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the Crisis in East Germany; Stalin and the Soviet-Yugoslav Split; Deng Xiaoping and Sino-Soviet Relations; The End of the Cold War: A Preview

# *The Cold War International History Project*

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and receives major support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation. The Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak. The Director of the Cold

### Leadership Transition in a Fractured Bloc : Editor's Note

On 1 March 1953, I.V. Stalin retired from a late night feast with Comrades Beria, Bulganin, Khrushchev and Malenkov to read some top secret files.<sup>2</sup> The first told him that the Soviet gold reserve had reached 2049 tons. The second was bad news: despite imaginative efforts, Soviet organs had failed to “rub out” (*skovyrmut*) Tito.<sup>3</sup> In the course of the following few hours, Stalin himself was laid low by a stroke. On 5 March 1953, with Stalin in a terminal coma, an emergency plenary session (*plenum*) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) was called. The mood was somber and the final resolution focused on one point.<sup>4</sup>

In connection with Comrade Stalin's serious illness, which means his longer or shorter non-participation in leadership [duties], to consider the most important party and government task during Comrade Stalin's absence to be the unbroken, correct leadership of the country, which in turn requires complete leadership unity and the impermissibility of any kind of division or panic.

Stalin did not tarry long, dying that very night at 9:50, but the succession crises, against which the plenum had warned, dragged on for years.

This period of “collective leadership,” as it was known, also defined a new era of the Cold War. Whether for reasons of state, matters of principle or simply convenient pretext, decisions on current foreign policy and interpretations of past decisions became linked to the personal political fortunes of a series of top leaders. The falls of Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Zhukov, and finally Khrushchev himself are linked to such key Cold War topics as the German question, nuclear strategy, Yugoslavia, “Open Skies” and the Cuban Missile Crisis, respectively. With the West, hesitancy gave way to renewed hostility.<sup>5</sup> Insecure and changing leadership in the Kremlin was a poor base on which to try and build détente. Stalin was gone, but the nature of the succession to his autocratic regime guaranteed long life to the Cold War.

Several sections of this *Cold War International History Project Bulletin 10* cover the immediate post-Stalin period from a variety of angles. The **Plenums** section presents excerpted transcripts from three gatherings of the CC CPSU at which bitter words of leadership disagreement were spoken in the interstices of foreign policy debate. In addition, new materials on Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in a “secret speech” to the 20<sup>th</sup>

Party Congress on 25 February 1956 show the exclusively domestic concerns driving a decision that would have fateful consequences for the international Communist movement and, in particular, the Sino-Soviet relationship. The origins of the speech are documented with such important Russian sources as Malin notes<sup>6</sup> and the Mikoian diary, while the Polish archives provide an impromptu “second secret speech” by Khrushchev to the Polish sixth party plenum in March 1956. Here Khrushchev describes in some detail Stalin's “persecution complex” and its dark consequences.<sup>7</sup>

The **Berlin 1953** section presents multiple perspectives from German, Russian and Hungarian archives on this earliest East-bloc uprising against Communist rule, quashed in a day by Soviet occupation forces stationed in Germany. Unlike 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia, no invasion was necessary. To broaden perspective even further, materials come from party, military and state sources. On the actual day of maximum unrest, June 17, coverage becomes almost hourly thanks to the frequent reporting schedule of the Russian military authorities repressing the “disorders.” Other highlights are Beria's groveling, unheeded pleas from prison to old associates in the Presidium, following his arrest in late June (he was shot in December 1953) and the remarkable meeting,

aging dictator to help salvage the deteriorating Grand Alliance: 10

President Truman had sent him [Hopkins] to have the kind of frank talk with Marshal Stalin that we all know Marshal Stalin liked to have.

The two Stalin conversations in this *Bulletin* show the dictator in two moods, in two roles. Other talks show other facets. Scholars in possession of transcripts, memcons, reports and memoir materials in any language on Stalin's meetings with top leaders in the period 1939-1953 are invited to contribute and send them to CWIHP by mail or FAX. The 3-4 October 1997 Stalin Workshop in Budapest and the 19-20 March 1998 Moscow Workshop will be followed by other Stalin events.

The section on the **End of the Cold War** is also the overture to a larger project, jointly planned with the National Security Archive at George Washington University and leading to commemorative activities and publications in 1999-2001. The nearness of the events to be covered will almost certainly inspire controversy.<sup>11</sup> This issue of the *Bulletin* aims only to raise the thorny question of dating the Cold War's demise by publishing two sets of documents that offer divergent perspectives from different regions of the world, Southeast Europe and Northeast Asia. The Soviet Foreign Ministry's presentation to the American Ambassador of the "Brezhnev doctrine" as a gift on Christmas Eve, 24 December 1989, bears note as a key symbolic turning point. The Cherniaev excerpt, previously available to Japanese readers only, reveals the long and laborious process by which Gorbachev tried to change the insular nature of Soviet-Japanese relations, but he ran out of time.

The **Deng** section invokes the memory of the late paramount leader of the PRC by shedding light on his role in Sino-Soviet affairs between 1956 and 1963, the very years when fraternal relations were breaking down. Was renewed entente possible even as late as 1962? Did a group within the CCP leadership favor this option, even counter to Mao Zedong's views? These are crucial questions for understanding the ultimate end of Sino-Soviet cooperation, the origins of the Cultural Revolution and the prehistory of the Strategic Triangle. Just as *Bulletins 6-9* and the CWIHP conference at the University of Hong Kong in January 1996 focused attention on Sino-Soviet disagreements regarding the Korean War, even at the height of the two regimes' intimacy, *Bulletin 10* and the October 1997 Beijing conference co-sponsored by CWIHP (See pp.6-7) highlight documents on persistent themes and practices of unity, where the powers of hindsight would emphasize ineluctable discord. Once again, access to East-bloc documents shows that these historical processes were much more complex and multi-sided than previous analysts have portrayed them (or indeed, *could* portray them in the absence of archival access). Of course, many aspects are still unclear and the

documentation is far from complete.

**Research Notes** on Soviet intelligence and documents on nuclear weapons in Cuba and China, among others, conclude *Bulletin 10*. Andropov's 1967 report, his first as KGB Chairman, gives us an inside overview of the world's largest intelligence agency charged with both domestic and foreign responsibilities. For millions, the Cold War is synonymous with nuclear terror. In this *Bulletin* the moment of purest dread (at least for Americans) comes on page 225, when the Soviet rocket forces on Cuba are ordered to "be prepared, following a signal from Moscow,

to helping all those who want to read our electronic publications up onto the web.

It is traditional at this point to make acknowledgements, although I know I do not have enough space to name all those who have contributed to this *Bulletin* and *Electronic Bulletin*. First of all, I want to thank Dean Anderson, George Bowen, Joe Brinley, Sam Crivello, Rob Litwak, John Martinez, Michael O'Brien, and the Smithsonian Institution, without whom the website would have never happened. Christian Ostermann was the best Co-editor and Associate Director one could wish for. Christa Sheehan Matthew deserves full credit for the greatly improved appearance, layout, and French translations. I am grateful to Andrew Grauer for putting up with some unusual scheduling. Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie is the name that appears most often in this *Bulletin*, because he translated much more than his share. Without Tom Blanton, CHEN Jian, Leo Gluchowski, Mark Kramer, Odd Arne Westad, and Vlad Zubok, I might have despaired of finally getting the *Bulletin* out. Without Jim and Annie Hershberg, I certainly would have.

Wishing everybody happy archival hunting in 1998.

David Wolff, Editor  
*CWIHP Bulletin* and *CWIHP Electronic Bulletin*.

<sup>1</sup> A. I. Mikoian, the longest serving member of the Presidium/ Politburo (1926-1966), wrote these words in reaction to the presentation to the Presidium of the (P.N.) Pospelov report, the first detailed, documented study of Stalin's mass slaughter of Party cadres. For more on this, see Naumov and Gluchowski articles below. Mikoian's *Memoirs* are cited as Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation (AP RF), f. 39, op.3, d.120, although it appears that the file has actually already been transferred to the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Contemporary Documentation (RTsKhIDNI) in preparation for declassification.

<sup>2</sup> Stalin was a night owl and, therefore, so were his minions. On the abolition of nocturnal summonses under Khrushchev, see John Gaddis, *We Now Know* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1997), p. 206.

<sup>3</sup> On the assassination plans, see p.137 below.

<sup>4</sup> The materials of the March 1953 plenums can be found in TsKhSD (Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation), f.2, op.1, dd.23-26; Additional materials are available on Reel 7 of the Volkogonov papers in an article draft entitled "Smert' Stalina" (Library of Congress, Manuscript Collection); Qualified medical personnel had become scarce after Stalin took to torturing his doctors, an ultimately effective, though indirect, way for one of history's greater tyrants to hasten his own end.

<sup>5</sup> Vojtech Mastny has recently argued in his Beer-prize winning book (see p. 74 below) that only "irresistible Western pressure" coinciding with internal crisis might have caused significant change in the Kremlin's policies. See Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1996), p. 190.

<sup>6</sup> V. N. Malin was head of the General Department of the CC CPSU under Khrushchev and kept detailed notes of Presidium discussions and decisions. For his notes on the crises of 1956 in

Poland and Hungary, see Mark Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises" *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9, pp. 358-410. This is also the longest *CWIHP Bulletin* article of all time.

<sup>7</sup> Of course, we should not forget that if Khrushchev, in attacking Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov can allow himself to mock the whole Soviet diplomatic corps by saying, "that is what it means to be a diplomat—he sees, and I don't see anything. (laughter in the hall)," any bickering over foreign policy issues may actually mask a personal attack on the Foreign Minister or his institutional stronghold, the "MID." For quote, see p. 42 below.

<sup>8</sup> To a certain extent, it appears that the Soviet Presidium was trying to replicate its own "collective" nature in other East-bloc countries by removing the Stalinist party chieftains, who had ruled the fraternal parties in a dictatorial manner. In the Hungarian document, Matyas Rakosi, Hungary's mini-Stalin, was forced to humble himself with such comments as: "Regarding hubris, that's an illness that one can not detect, just like one can not smell one's own odor." On the scope of change, Molotov was most direct: "The comrades had a chance to become convinced that even though we are talking about Hungary, this issue is not only Hungary, but all the peoples' democracies." (See pp. 85, 83 below.)

<sup>9</sup> This is not to say that Stalin was loquacious. It is unimaginable that Stalin would speak for hours impromptu like Khrushchev (pp. 44ff. below) or Gorbachev (pp. 196 ff.).

<sup>10</sup> On the Hopkins mission, see William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War* (New York, 1982), pp. 101, 103-7. The Harriman quote comes from a memorandum of conversation for the 26 May 1945 meeting between Hopkins and Stalin held in Box 179 of the Harriman Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The editor is grateful to Jim Hershberg for locating and providing this document.

<sup>11</sup> Examples of such discussions are: "The Kramer-Blight et al. Debate on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Cuba" (*Bulletin* 3), "The Sudoplatov Controversy on Atomic Espionage" (*Bulletins* 4, 5), and "The Cumings-Weathersby Exchange on Korean War Origins" (*Bulletin* 6-7).

<sup>12</sup> See p. 43 below.

<sup>13</sup> In Summer 1997, a CWIHP delegation consisting of Jim Hershberg, Mark Kramer, David Wolff and Vladislav Zubok visited the archives of Chisinau (Kishinev), Kyiv, Riga, and Vilnius, where over 8000 pages of materials (often unavailable in Moscow) were gathered. These will be an important resource in the preparation of planned *CWIHP Bulletins* on "Intelligence and the Cold War," "Nationalism and the Cold War," and "The End of the Cold War," as well as for additional publications on Cold War crises in Central and Eastern Europe.

# Table of Contents

Editor's Note: Leadership Transition in a Fractured Bloc .....	1
The Drama of the Plenums : A Call to Arms by <i>David Wolff</i> .....	5
Declassified Materials from CPSU Central Committee Plenums:	
Sources, Context, Highlights by <i>Mark Kramer</i> .....	7
Central Committee Plenums, 1941-1966: Contents and Implications by <i>Gael Moullec</i> .....	26
CPSU Plenums, Leadership Struggles, and Soviet Cold War Politics by <i>Vladislav Zubok</i> .....	28
Plenum Transcript Excerpts (January 1955, July 1955, March 1956, June 1957) .....	34
Khrushchev's Second Secret Speech by <i>Leo Gluchowski</i> .....	44
“This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse”: The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet <i>Deutschlandpolitik</i> and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives by <i>Christian Ostermann</i> .....	61
Yugoslavia and the Cold War by <i>Christian Ostermann</i> .....	111
The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948 by <i>Leonid Gibianskii</i> .....	112
Soviet Plans to Establish the COMINFORM in Early 1946:	
New Evidence from the Hungarian Archives by <i>Csaba Békés</i> .....	135
Stalin's Plan to Assassinate Tito .....	137
The Turn in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 1953-55 by <i>Andrei Edemskii</i> .....	138
Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 by <i>Leonid Gibianskii</i> .....	139
In Memoriam: Deng Xiaoping and the Cold War by <i>David Wolff</i> .....	149
“Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!”	
Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1963 by <i>Vladislav Zubok</i> .....	152
Deng Xiaoping, Mao's “Continuous Revolution,”	
and the Path toward the Sino-Soviet Split by <i>CHEN Jian</i> .....	162
Deng Xiaoping's Talks with the Soviet Ambassador and Leadership, 1957-1963 .....	165
Cold War Endpoints?: Beginning the Debate by <i>David Wolff</i> .....	183
When did the Cold War End? by <i>Thomas Blanton</i> .....	184
Stalemate in an Era of Change: New Sources and Questions on Gorbachev, Yeltsin,	
and Soviet/Russian-Japanese Relations by <i>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa</i> .....	192
The Last Official Foreign Visit by M.S. Gorbachev as President of the USSR:	
The Road to Tokyo by <i>A.S. Cherniaev</i> .....	196
Research Notes on Soviet Intelligence; Cuban Missile Crisis; Chinese Nuclear Testing; Poland, 1980-82; Ukraine and the Prague Spring; and, Sarajevo Archives .....	211

# The Drama of the Plenums : A Call to Arms

**Khrushchev.** You want to turn everything back in order then to take up the axe yourself.  
**Molotov.** No, this is not so, com. Khrushchev. I hope that that is not what you want, and moreover,  
 that is not what I want.  
 CC CPSU Plenum, Kremlin, 24 June 1957

by *David Wolff*

In the third week of June 1957, a series of meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) found N.S. Khrushchev, the First Secretary, in the minority. With a Kremlin coup in the offing, Khrushchev managed to convoke a CC plenary session, whose outcome was not at all certain prior to the meeting's opening. But by the third day, when the epigraph above was spoken, it was clear that the Army and security organs, together with the CC, would support Khrushchev. Thus, Molotov had no axe at hand and Khrushchev's concern was purely rhetorical, a reminder of the true correlation of forces on the plenum floor.<sup>1</sup> This kind of showmanship is illustrative of the theatrical qualities of the plenum transcripts, excerpts from which are presented here for the first time in English translation. Additional materials can be found on the CWIHP website.

For the most part, the CC CPSU Presidium/Politburo members staged and took leading roles in the drama.<sup>2</sup> Under Stalin, and later under Brezhnev, autocratic rule produced unanimously-approved speeches and decisions to be rubber-stamped by the plenum. But during the Khrushchev years, especially between 1953 and 1957, "collective leadership" produced multiple Presidium scripts to compete on the plenum floor, with the winning narrative to be determined by the audience. With this in mind, the selection of cadres for the plenum (to paraphrase Stalin) would decide all.<sup>3</sup> Of course, the structure of CPSU work and promotion was such that all Presidium members had chaired innumerable meetings of the *aktiv* and knew all the organizational tricks. But Khrushchev was best of all, both at garnering loyalty and placing the trustworthy onto the CC. This is not to say, as Mark Kramer points out in his essay, that the plenum decisions were made in the course of the session. Nonetheless, the plenum discussions provide us with a window into the Presidium-level discussions that did lead to the key decisions, just prior to the plenums themselves.

Aside from the sharp dialogue generated by clashing scripts, another theatrical plenum element is the role of the "voices" rising up from the plenum floor to interrupt the speaker. Although one can not tell from the transcripts, one suspects that these are generated by loyalists hand-picked for their eloquence to play a role somewhere between *claque* and Greek chorus. Their functions are

multiple, serving sometimes as echo (**Mikoian**: That is why Nikita Sergeevich [Khrushchev] blew up. I also almost blew up. **Voices**: Blew up.), sometimes as a prompt (**Pospelov**: The July 1955 plenum recorded this. **Voice**: On Yugoslavia.), and sometimes for emphasis (**Khrushchev**: How much gold did we spend then, com. Malenkov, 200-250 tons? **Voice**. If not more.). Heckling was also part of the job, as was laughing at the right jokes and myriad other planned impromptus.<sup>4</sup>

The three essays that begin this section each cover different ground. Vladislav Zubok's piece most closely captures the core problematic of this *Bulletin* issue. As each of Khrushchev's competitors is expelled from the inner circles of power, Zubok chronicles the key foreign policy decisions linked to the demotion. Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, and Zhukov followed each other down in dizzying succession. Gael Moullec reminds us that foreign policy and leadership struggle were just a small part of the issues touched on by the plenums. The social and cultural history of the Cold War can also draw from this invaluable source. Mark Kramer's article will be essential reading on this topic and for all those planning work in *fond 2* at the former Central Committee archives in Moscow (now known as the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD) for many years to come.

The plenum excerpts themselves help tie together the various sections of this *Bulletin*. (Excerpts from the July 1953 plenum, at which Beria was denounced, have already appeared in English and are summarized in CWIHP *Bulletin* 1, and are therefore omitted here.) In January 1955, the role of Malenkov and Beria during the 1953 German events took center stage, complementing Christian Ostermann's essay and accompanying documents. By July 1955 Molotov and Khrushchev clashed over the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. These discussions supplement the Yugoslavia section. Khrushchev's "second secret speech" at the Sixth Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party in March 1956 adds context to Stalin's conversations with Yugoslav leaders. In the part of the *Bulletin* devoted to Deng Xiaoping and Sino-Soviet relations, we often see Deng eager for information about plenum results. Chinese matters, as well as wide-ranging foreign policy disagreements, appear in the June 1957 transcripts.<sup>5</sup> Mark Kramer's essay also makes clear how extensively the plenum sessions treated







The different versions of the proceedings were preserved for most, but not all, of the 51 plenums. The status of each version is specified clearly both in the *opis'* and on the cover of each *dela*. The *dela* for a particular version are grouped consecutively, which makes it relatively easy to distinguish them from other versions.

In addition to the transcripts of plenum proceedings, Opis' 1 includes many files of documents that were used or distributed at the plenums. These documents in some cases were publicly available after the plenums, but in other cases they were classified "secret" or "top secret" and issued on a highly restricted basis. For certain plenums, a separate *dela* contains the resolutions and theses (or drafts) approved by the Central Committee as well as any final comments by senior party officials.

Although Opis' 1, like all the other *opisi* of Fond 2, is officially described as "declassified," selected materials in Opis' 1 (and in the other four *opisi* of Fond 2) are in fact still classified and are marked as such (*ne rasssekrecheno*) in the *opis'*. The fact that some materials in Fond 2 have not yet been declassified is one of the reasons that TsKhSD has been allowing researchers to use the original, bound transcripts and documents, rather than microfilms of them. The listing of sequential numbers for microfilm reels in the *opisi* leaves no doubt that all the *dela* in Fond 2 have been filmed, but the reels mix classified with declassified materials. Hence, only the hard copies are being loaned out.<sup>9</sup> Although the continued classification of some materials in Fond 2 is vexing and unwarranted, the opportunity for scholars to use the original documents (rather than the more cumbersome and, in certain cases, barely legible microfilms) is a welcome, if perverse, benefit of this obsessive secretiveness.

### The Context of the Plenum Materials

Through almost the whole of the Soviet era, very little information about CPSU Central Committee plenums was released to the public. During the long reign of Josif Stalin (1929-1953), virtually nothing about Central Committee plenums was disclosed. That pattern continued for several years after Stalin's death. Transcripts of key plenums during Nikita Khrushchev's consolidation of power (e.g., the sessions in July 1953, January 1955, July 1955, February 1956, June 1957, and October 1957) were not publicly disseminated at all. This policy of strict secrecy was eased during the final years of Khrushchev's tenure, when edited "stenographic accounts" of some plenums were published. Although the appearance of these transcripts was a major step forward, the accounts did not always enable readers to determine precisely what went on at the plenums. Moreover, the publication of stenographic accounts ceased in March 1965, five months after Leonid Brezhnev displaced Khrushchev; and from that point until the end of the 1980s information about Central Committee plenums was as exiguous as it had been in Stalin's time. The only materials released during the two decades under Brezhnev and his immediate

successors, Yurii Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko (and even during the first few years of the Gorbachev era), were brief announcements (*informatsionnye soobshcheniya*) that Central Committee plenums had been held, lists of those who had spoken, and the resolutions (*postanovleniya*) and theses (*tezisy*) adopted by the plenums, which revealed nothing about the tenor of the meetings.<sup>10</sup> The opening of Fond 2 thus fills an important gap in the historical record.

Nevertheless, scholars who use the newly declassified plenum materials should bear in mind a number of caveats. First, it is important to recognize that the Central Committee was not a decision-making body.<sup>11</sup> The list of plenums in Opis' 1, provided in Note 5 below, underscores just how limited the Central Committee's role was in Soviet policy-making, especially during the Stalin era, when the Central Committee almost never met. During the final twelve years of Stalin's life, the Central Committee convened only six times, for a total of ten days. The extremely infrequent and perfunctory nature of Central Committee plenums was part of Stalin's general policy of weakening subordinate structures that might in some way infringe on his immense personal power. Under Khrushchev, the frequency of plenums increased, but the Central Committee still convened no more than a total of fifteen days in a given year, and usually far less. Moreover, the timing of plenums did not settle into a particular pattern. All members of the Central Committee had full-time jobs elsewhere, which consumed the vast bulk of their energies and attention.

Even on the rare occasions when the Central Committee met, it usually functioned as little more than a rubber stamp for the Presidium/Politburo's decisions. As interesting and valuable as the plenum documents are, they clearly show that, with the exception of the June 1957 plenum, all key decisions had been arranged in advance by the Presidium/Politburo, which met shortly before the plenums to iron out any differences and approve the plenum agenda and resolutions. It is telling that in some instances the drafts of resolutions, prepared several days before the Central Committee convened, would already say that the resolutions had been "adopted unanimously"—a result that clearly was not in doubt.<sup>12</sup>

The June 1957 plenum was a special case because Khrushchev had been outvoted on the Presidium by what became known as the "Anti-Party Group." During a session of the Presidium from 18 to 21 June 1957, only three of the ten other full Presidium members—Anastas Mikoyan, Mikhail Suslov, and Aleksei Kirichenko—had supported Khrushchev. Through last-ditch maneuvers, Khrushchev was able to stave off his dismissal by forcing the convocation on June 22 of a Central Committee plenum, which he knew would take his side in the dispute. That session marked the only time from the mid-1920s onward when the top leaders had failed to reach a consensus beforehand about the results they hoped to achieve at the plenum.

The fact that the general outcomes of the plenums were arranged in advance does not mean that the discussions were dull and lacking in substance. On the contrary, in many cases the debates were very lively and the top leaders provided important information to the rank-and-file Central Committee members about salient issues and controversies. Even so, it is clear from the transcripts and other materials that the Presidium/Politburo carefully stage-managed and orchestrated the plenums to produce a desired result. The plenums were extremely useful for the top leaders in many ways—by giving ordinary Central Committee members a sense of involvement in the policy-making process, by ensuring wide support within the party for the top leaders' policies and objectives, and by conferring a formal stamp of legitimacy on the Presidium/Politburo's actions—but this does not change the basic fact that key decisions were actually made by the Presidium/Politburo, not by the Central Committee.

The highly circumscribed nature of the Central Committee's role was broadly understood even before any of the plenum materials were declassified. It is not at all surprising that the plenum transcripts would confirm that the Central Committee routinely complied with the Presidium/Politburo's wishes. The notion of a "circular flow of power"—whereby the top party leader and his allies chose (and had the power to dismiss) lower-ranking personnel, who in turn were empowered to vote for delegates to the party congress, who in turn elected the members of the Central Committee, who in turn were responsible for electing the highest party organs—had long enabled Western scholars to understand why the Central Committee, despite nominally being empowered to countermand the Presidium/Politburo, instead was staunchly supportive of the top leaders' preferences.<sup>13</sup> The members of the Central Committee had an in-built incentive to be loyal, resting on self-interest.

The thing that researchers need to bear in mind, then, is that the sudden availability of the plenum materials should not lead to an exaggeration of the Central Committee's role. The documents must be seen in context. Some of the plenum transcripts and supplementary materials contain valuable information that is not readily available from other declassified documents, and this will be of great benefit. But unless the plenums are evaluated against the wider backdrop of Soviet politics (in which the Presidium/Politburo was the dominant organ), there is a danger that some scholars will end up "looking for their keys where the streetlight is."<sup>14</sup>

This temptation may be particularly strong because the vast majority of records of Presidium/Politburo meetings from the post-Stalin era have not yet been released. Detailed notes from Presidium meetings during the Khrushchev era, compiled by the head of the CPSU CC General Department, Vladimir Malin, exist in Fond 3 at TsKhSD, but only a tiny fraction of these had been released as of late 1997, despite earlier promises that the full collection would be declassified by the end of 1996.<sup>15</sup>

Verbatim transcripts were kept for Politburo meetings during the Brezhnev era and afterwards, but only a minuscule portion of these have been released so far. In late 1991 and 1992, some Politburo transcripts (or portions of transcripts) were declassified for a short-lived trial of the Soviet Communist Party at the Russian Constitutional Court.<sup>16</sup> The bulk of the selected transcripts were from the Gorbachev era (mainly because Russian president Boris Yeltsin hoped they would embarrass Gorbachev), but even these materials represented only a small fraction of the sessions held between 1985 and 1991. Although a few additional Politburo transcripts from the Gorbachev era have been published since the early 1990s—some were put out by the Gorbachev Foundation to offset the impact of the materials released by the Yeltsin administration, and others were featured in the Russian archival service's journal *Istochnik*—these scattered documents are no substitute for access to the full collection.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, only a handful of transcripts have been released for Politburo meetings from the Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko periods (though a few well-placed Russian officials have been given access to the full collection of transcripts). The unavailability of most of the Politburo notes and transcripts may create at least some temptation to ascribe too large a role to the Central Committee and other agencies whose records are now available.

The dominance of the CPSU Presidium/Politburo in the Soviet policymaking process was necessarily reflected in the Central Committee plenums. The context of each plenum can be understood only by answering several questions: What was the Presidium/Politburo hoping to derive from the plenum? Why did the Presidium/Politburo decide to convene the Central Committee? What steps were taken to ensure that the plenum bolstered the Presidium/Politburo's aims? So long as the Politburo's records remain largely sealed, definitive answers to these questions may not always be possible; but the transcripts of the plenums and other documents often permit well-founded conclusions. For example, it is now clear that the plenum in early July 1953 which denounced the "criminal anti-party and anti-state activities of [Lavrentii] Beria" was

e2criminal

were told by the highest party authorities, went along obediently this time as well.

The stenographic account of the July 1953 plenum was declassified and published in early 1991, and it has been cited by many Western and Russian scholars since then.<sup>19</sup> Unfortunately, most of these scholars have failed to take due account of the context of the plenum. Rather than seeing the plenum for what it was—namely, an attempt by Beria’s rivals to rationalize their actions by blaming the ousted security chief for a host of purported “crimes”—many researchers have taken at face value the allegations made against Beria. This has been especially true of the claims about Beria’s supposed effort to “destroy the people’s democratic regime in [East Germany].” Beria’s real views about Germany in the spring of 1953 bore little resemblance to the accusations lodged against him. It was Molotov, not Beria, who had taken the lead in forging the new Soviet policy toward Germany after Stalin’s death, and all the other top Soviet officials, including Beria, had supported him.<sup>20</sup> The views attributed to Beria were contrived by Molotov to gloss over his own responsibility for having drastically reshaped Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* just before the June 1953 uprising in East Germany. Numerous Western and Russian scholars who have used the published stenographic account of the July 1953 plenum have been far too accepting of Molotov’s tendentious portrayal of Beria and Germany.<sup>21</sup>

The misunderstandings that have arisen from the declassified account of the July 1953 Central Committee plenum underscore the need for circumspection when drawing on the materials in Fond 2. Unless scholars constantly bear in mind the purpose and context of each plenum, they risk going astray in their interpretations of substantive issues as well as of the dynamics of Soviet policy-making.

One additional problem that researchers may encounter when using the new plenum materials is the distortions that sometimes crept in during the editing of the Central Committee transcripts. As noted above, Fond 2 contains two or more versions of most of the plenums. For research

esting ofyplenum 83(schT\* (wimicb demT\* loreshaad ced fohe plenumrollly 1953 ple24.9 67sing thfourseecMosria ple5. -0.3 TD [22 ]50



advanced by Com. Molotov as inimical to our party and a non-Leninist and sectarian position”), it was clear that Molotov had experienced a major setback. But what is perhaps most striking, in view of the intense criticism Molotov encountered, is that he was able to hold onto his position for another two years and that he very nearly won out over Khrushchev in June 1957. The transcript of the July 1955 plenum thus provides crucial evidence that Khrushchev, despite having consolidated his position a good deal, had by no means overcome his most formidable challenger. Anyone who could withstand and recover from the attacks that Molotov endured during the July 1955

realized.<sup>36</sup>

The plenum documents also reveal that Yugoslavia was not the only East European country that complicated Moscow's efforts in the late 1950s to unite the world Communist movement under explicit Soviet leadership. The standoff with Poland in October 1956 had induced Khrushchev to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, which provided for Poland's continued status as a loyal member of the Soviet political and military bloc.<sup>37</sup> This arrangement was briefly strained in late October and early November 1956 when Gomulka insisted on the withdrawal of Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, the Soviet officer who had been serving as Polish defense minister for the previous seven years; but Khrushchev eventually acceded to Gomulka's demand. Despite this breakthrough, the plenum materials confirm that Soviet-Polish relations were still marred by occasional frictions. Suslov's report at the December 1957 plenum indicated that the Polish representatives at the world conference of Communist parties in Moscow had been at odds with the Soviet Union on several key issues:

During the preparation of the documents—the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto—the Polish comrades tried to introduce their own slant by ensuring there was no reference to the leading role of the Soviet Union and by avoiding harsh attacks against imperialism, especially against American imperialism. They steadfastly objected to the passage in the Declaration that said American imperialism has become the center of international reaction. The Polish comrades argued that the peculiar circumstances they face in Poland do not yet enable them to embrace the formula “under the leadership of the Soviet Union.” They claimed that the Declaration is supposedly too bellicose a document and that it could damage relations with the imperialists.<sup>38</sup>

Suslov also complained that the Polish delegation's draft of the so-called Peace Manifesto, the document that was due to be approved by the 64 Communist parties attending the second phase of the conference (on 16-19 November), was “seriously deficient” because “it made no mention of where the threat of war originated.” He emphasized that the “document prepared by the Polish comrades had to be drastically revised” because “the representatives of the other fraternal parties [including the CPSU] did not support the Polish comrades on even a single point that they raised.”

Suslov did not directly impugn the motives of the Polish authorities, but he maintained that “these allusions to some sort of special circumstances in their country don't seem particularly convincing.” Khrushchev, for his part, implied that the main reason Polish officials did not want to antagonize the United States is that they were uncertain whether U.S. banks would “still give credits” to Poland if relations deteriorated.<sup>39</sup> Despite these skeptical com-

ments, both Suslov and Khrushchev acknowledged that “the important thing is that the Polish comrades in the end signed the Declaration, which undoubtedly will have an enormous impact in Poland.”

In subsequent years, especially after the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, Gomulka came more closely into line with the Soviet point of view. Even so, the plenum materials indicate that Khrushchev remained concerned that the defiance Gomulka displayed in 1956 and the unorthodox positions he adopted in 1957 might someday resurface.

#### *Fissures in the Communist World (II): China and Albania*

As important as the ideological challenge posed by Yugoslavia may have been, it was nothing compared to the rift that emerged with China at the end of the 1950s. From December 1959 on, an inordinately large number of Central Committee plenums were devoted to the subject of China and the world Communist movement. At a plenum on 22-26 December 1959, Suslov presented a detailed report on “the trip by a Soviet party-state delegation to the People's Republic of China” in October 1959.<sup>40</sup> This report, which had been commissioned by the CPSU Presidium on 15 October (shortly after Khrushchev and the other members of the delegation had returned to Moscow) and was approved in a draft version by the Presidium on 18 December, gave many Central Committee members the first direct inkling they had received of how serious the incipient problems with China were. Although Suslov's report did not feature the strident rhetoric and harsh polemics that would soon characterize Sino-Soviet relations, he spoke at length about the “dangerously foolish ideas of the Chinese comrades,” the “egregious economic and intra-party mistakes committed by the Chinese comrades,” and the “acute disagreements” between Moscow and Beijing on “basic matters of socialist construction.”

In addition to highlighting ideological differences, Suslov enumerated many “foreign policy issues on which major disagreements have surfaced between us and the Chinese comrades,” including Mao Zedong's rhetorical dismissal of nuclear weapons as “a paper tiger” (a claim that, in Suslov's view, was “leading the Chinese people to believe that a nuclear war would be an easy matter and that no preparations were needed”); China's aversion to peaceful coexistence with the United States (a policy that, according to Suslov, Chinese leaders “regard as merely a convenient tactical maneuver” rather than a “profound Leninist principle”); China's clumsy handling of negotiations with Japan; the recent exacerbation of tensions between China and India despite Moscow's efforts to mediate (efforts which, Suslov complained, had “not been matched by the requisite understanding on the part of Chinese leaders” because “the Chinese comrades cannot properly evaluate their own mistakes”); and the deterioration of China's relations with Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and other East Asian countries (a trend that, in Suslov's

view, had left China “isolated in the international arena”). Of particular interest were Suslov’s comments about Mao’s “completely incomprehensible” retreat during the Sino-American crisis that erupted in August 1958 when China began bombarding the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits:

We [in Moscow] regarded it as our internationalist duty to come out decisively in support of the fraternal Chinese people, with whom our country is bound by alliance obligations. According to secret documents that we had intercepted, it had become clear that the ruling circles in America were already psychologically prepared to relinquish the offshore islands to the PRC. However, after precipitating an extreme situation in the vicinity of the offshore islands and making far-reaching statements, the Chinese comrades backed down at the critical moment. . . . It is obvious that in backing down, the Chinese comrades squandered things. The perception abroad was that they had caved in.<sup>41</sup>

In all these respects, Suslov argued, “the Chinese comrades are at odds with the common foreign policy line of the socialist camp. The lack of needed coordination between the two most powerful Communist parties on questions of foreign policy is abnormal.”<sup>42</sup>

After recounting this litany of “serious disagreements,” Suslov emphasized that long-standing efforts to increase the appearance and reality of unity within the socialist camp made it imperative to curtail China’s deviations in foreign policy:

The incorrect actions of one of the socialist countries affects the international situation of the entire socialist camp. We must bear in mind that imperialist propaganda directly links the actions of the Chinese comrades with the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries. And indeed, our Communist parties, too, always emphasize that the socialist camp has only one foreign policy course.<sup>43</sup>

Suslov declared that the Soviet Union would try to restore “complete unity” by continuing “to express our candid opinions about the most important questions affecting our common interests when our views do not coincide.” Although the aim would be to bring China back into line with the USSR, Suslov argued that if these efforts failed, the CPSU Presidium would “stick by the positions that our party believes are correct.”

Throughout the report, Suslov insisted that the disagreements were not yet irreparable. He noted several measures that could rapidly improve Sino-Soviet ties, and he pledged that the CPSU Presidium would do all it could to “strengthen and develop Soviet-Chinese friendship and unity” on the basis of “Leninist principles of equality and mutual cooperation.” Nevertheless, a key passage in his

report may have left some Central Committee members wondering whether relations with China could really be mended, at least while Mao Zedong remained in power:

It has to be said that all the mistakes and shortcomings in the internal and foreign policies of the Chinese Communist Party can be explained in large part by the cult of personality surrounding Com. Mao Zedong. Formally, the CC of the Chinese Communist Party abides by the norms of collective leadership, but in reality the most important decisions are made by one man and therefore are often plagued by subjectivism and, in some instances, are simply ill-conceived. By all appearances, the glorification of Mao Zedong in China has been growing inexorably. More and more often, statements appear in the party press that “we Chinese live in the great era of Mao Zedong.” Comrade Mao Zedong is depicted as a great leader and a genius. They call him the beacon, who is shining the way to Communism and is the embodiment of the ideas of Communism. The name of Mao Zedong is equated with the party, and vice versa. The works of Com. Mao Zedong are presented in China as the final word of creative Marxism and are placed on a par with the classic works of Marxism-Leninism.... All of this, unfortunately, impresses Com. Mao Zedong, who, judging from everything, is himself convinced of his own infallibility. This is reminiscent of the situation that existed in our country during the final years of J. V. Stalin. We, of course, weren’t able to speak with the Chinese comrades about this, but the [CPSU] plenum must be aware of these aspects of life in the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>44</sup>

This part of Suslov’s report went well beyond any previous statements that Soviet leaders had made in forums larger than the CPSU Presidium. Up to this point, Soviet officials had said nothing in public about the problems with China, and even in private Moscow’s criticism of Mao had been subdued. Despite Suslov’s willingness to voice much stronger complaints at the Central Committee plenum, he indicated that a low-key policy should be maintained in public. Although he acknowledged that the Soviet Union would not praise or overlook what it believed to be “profound mistakes,” he averred that “we shouldn’t engage in direct criticism, since this would lead to an unnecessary public discussion which might be construed as interference in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party and would induce our enemies to gloat over the discord between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party.” Suslov argued that, at least for the time being, the CPSU must “avoid public discussions and rely instead on private meetings and other contacts between the two parties to explain our position to the Chinese comrades.”

Despite Suslov’s hopes that the situation could be rectified and that public polemics could be avoided, the



Sino-Soviet split continued to widen. Tensions increased rapidly in the first few months of 1960, culminating in the publication of a lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birthday.<sup>45</sup> The statement, entitled "Long Live Leninism," removed any doubts that Soviet officials and diplomats still had about the magnitude of the rift between the two countries.<sup>46</sup> Soon thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East European governments became aware of the conflict when Chinese officials voiced strong criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in Beijing of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a few weeks later at the Third Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, where Khrushchev sought to rebut the comments expressed at the WFTU meeting and to retaliate for China's decision to provide other delegates with copies of a confidential letter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP leadership. The top Chinese official in Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.<sup>47</sup>

This confrontation was the main topic of discussion at the next CPSU Central Committee plenum, on 14-16 July 1960. Khrushchev designated one of his closest aides on the Presidium, Frol Kozlov, to present a lengthy report to the plenum outlining "the mistaken positions of the CCP CC on fundamental questions of Marxist-Leninist theory and current international relations."<sup>48</sup> Kozlov reiterated all the complaints voiced by Suslov seven months earlier, but the tone of his speech was much more pessimistic. Kozlov accused the Chinese leadership of "acting surreptitiously, behind the backs of the CPSU and the other fraternal parties, to create fissures and rifts in the international Communist movement and to spread its own special views, [which] contravene sacred Leninist principles." His speech prefigured the harsh rhetoric that would soon pervade Sino-Soviet exchanges.

At the next CPSU Central Committee plenum, on 10-18 January 1961, the growing acrimony in the world Communist movement was again the main topic of discussion. By this point, the Soviet Union had withdrawn all its military technicians and advisers from China, and had begun recalling its thousands of non-military personnel, causing disarray in many of China's largest economic and technical projects and scientific research programs.<sup>49</sup> At the plenum, Suslov presented a lengthy and—on the surface—surprisingly upbeat assessment of the "world conference" of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960. He claimed that the meeting had "successfully resolved all these problems [of disunity in the Communist world] and had marked a new, spectacular triumph of Marxism-Leninism in the international Communist movement."<sup>50</sup> The Soviet Union, he declared, could now "tirelessly work to strengthen the unity, cohesion, and friendship" among socialist countries.

Despite this optimistic gloss, much of Suslov's speech at the plenum actually gave grounds for deep pessimism. Although Soviet and Chinese officials had been able to

achieve a last-minute compromise that temporarily papered over their differences, this fragile "solution" had been preceded by venomous exchanges. Suslov acknowledged that, from the outset of the conference, "the Chinese Communist leaders not only had declined to reassess their mistaken views, but had grown even more adamant in espousing anti-Leninist and anti-Marxist" policies. Suslov maintained that the CPSU Presidium had "done its best to overcome its disagreements with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" through a series of preliminary meetings and contacts, but had failed to persuade the Chinese delegates to alter "their mistaken views on crucial matters."<sup>51</sup> All the preparatory work for the conference, according to Suslov, had been turned by the Chinese into "a source of discord." The proceedings of the conference itself had not been made public, but Suslov informed the Central Committee that the head of the Chinese delegation, Deng Xiaoping, had delivered two speeches that were sharply at odds with the CPSU's positions, demonstrating "a complete unwillingness to find some way of overcoming the two parties' disagreements." Suslov also noted that the Albanian delegation, led by Enver Hoxha, had sided with the Chinese participants and had expressed "bizarre, malevolent, and dogmatic views aimed solely at causing tension and dividing the conference."<sup>52</sup> Although Soviet leaders had been aware since mid-1960 that Albania was aligning itself with China, Hoxha's speech at the November 1960 conference, according to Suslov, had shown for the first time what a "monstrous" form this realignment was taking.

The speeches of the Chinese and Albanian delegations, Suslov told the Central Committee, had been greeted by a torrent of angry criticism. "Everyone at the conference," he claimed, "understood that the Chinese delegation's opposition to certain points," especially to a proposed statement regarding the need to overcome the "pernicious consequences of [Stalin's] personality cult," was motivated by "an awareness that this statement could be directed against all forms of personality cults, including the one in the Chinese Communist Party."<sup>53</sup> Suslov argued that the "mistaken views of the Chinese comrades" would persist so long as Mao Zedong demanded "endless glorification" and "aspired to claim a special role in the development of Marxist-Leninist theory" and the policies of the socialist bloc:

With the obvious guidance of the CCP leadership, the Chinese press is fanning the personality cult of Com. Mao Zedong and proclaiming him "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time" (*Renmin Ribao*, 7 October 1960), in the hope of staking out a special role for Mao Zedong in the international Communist movement. It is hardly accidental that CCP leaders have geared their actions over the past year toward the assumption of a dominant place among the fraternal Communist parties.<sup>54</sup>

Suslov acknowledged to the Central Committee that the impasse resulting from the “obduracy” of the Chinese leadership had nearly caused the conference to collapse. Although Khrushchev was able to reach a compromise with the Chinese delegation in last-ditch talks on 30 November, the bulk of the conference had given little

These efforts by the CCP leaders, far from being limited to the ideological sphere, extend into the sphere of practical politics among socialist countries and Communist parties. In seeking to enervate the unity and cohesion of the socialist commonwealth, the CCP leadership resorts to all manner of tricks and maneuvers to disrupt economic and political relations among the socialist countries and to sow discord in their activities on the international arena. Recently, the fissiparous and subversive actions of the Chinese leaders in the world Communist movement have drastically increased. There is no longer any doubt that Beijing is seeking to achieve a schism among the Communist parties and the creation of factions and groups that are hostile to Marxism-Leninism.<sup>60</sup>

Zhukov had sided with Khrushchev against the “Anti-Party Group” and had been rewarded for his efforts by being promoted to full membership on the CPSU Presidium. Khrushchev’s abrupt shift against Zhukov in October 1957 came as a shock both inside and outside the Soviet Union. The decisive maneuvers to remove Zhukov occurred while the defense minister was on an extended trip to Yugoslavia and Albania in the last few weeks of October, a trip that had been authorized by the CPSU Presidium. When Zhukov began his travels he had no inkling that he was about to be dismissed, as he acknowledged at the plenum:

Some three weeks ago, when I was instructed to set off for Yugoslavia and Albania, I said goodbye to all the members of the CC [Presidium], or at least to most of them, and we spoke as though we were the closest of friends. No one said a word to me about any problem. . . . I was not given the slightest hint that my behavior was somehow deemed improper. Only now are they saying this to me. . . . We all parted in such good spirits and warm friendship three weeks ago that it’s still hard to believe all this has suddenly happened.<sup>65</sup>

In a remarkably short period of time after Zhukov’s departure, Khrushchev arranged with the other Presidium members (and with senior military officers) to deprive the defense minister of all his top posts. The CPSU Presidium formally endorsed the ouster of Zhukov and the appointment of a successor, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, at a meeting on 26 October, which Zhukov was hastily summoned to attend while he was still in Albania. The announcement of his dismissal and the appointment of Malinovskii as defense minister was carried by the TASS news agency later that day. Only after Zhukov’s fate was sealed did Khrushchev convene the Central Committee.

Because the notes from Khrushchev’s earlier discussions and from the relevant Presidium meetings (especially the meetings on 19 and 26 October) have not yet been released, key information about Khrushchev’s motives in the affair is still unavailable.<sup>66</sup> The plenum documents show only what Khrushchev wanted the Central Committee to hear, not necessarily what he really believed. Nevertheless, the plenum materials do add some intriguing details to previous accounts and, if used circumspectly, shed considerable light on the reasons for Khrushchev’s move against his erstwhile ally.

One of the most valuable aspects of the declassified documents, repetitive and turgid though they may be, is that they clarify the allegations against Zhukov. The general case against Zhukov had been known since a few days after the plenum, when summary materials were published in the CPSU daily *Pravda*.<sup>67</sup> Official histories of the Soviet Army’s political organs, published in 1964 and 1968, had provided some additional information.<sup>68</sup> Even so, a few of the allegations were at best unclear, and in some cases it was not known precisely what Zhukov

had been accused of. Nor was it known whether Zhukov had tried to defend himself against the charges. The vast quantity of declassified testimony and supporting documentation introduced at the plenum, beginning with Suslov’s opening speech (which outlined all of Zhukov’s alleged transgressions), gives a much better sense of what the charges entailed.

For example, it had long been known that Zhukov was denounced for having proposed certain changes in high-level military organs, but it was not known precisely what his alleged intentions were. The plenum materials indicate that Zhukov was accused of having wanted to abolish the Higher Military Council, a body consisting of all the members and candidate members of the CPSU Presidium as well as all the commanders of military districts, groups of forces, and naval fleets. The Higher Military Council was under the direct jurisdiction of the Defense Council, the supreme command organingyf thethe direct jurisd.The t hadg p7romma7











February 1956 (Dela 181-184); 27 February 1956 (Dela 185-187); 22 June 1956 (Dela 188); 20-24 December 1956 (Dela 189-208); 13-14 February 1957 (Dela 209-221); 22-29 June 1957 (Dela 222-259); 28-29 October 1957 (Dela 260-272); 16-17 December 1957 (Dela 273-284); 25-26 February 1958 (Dela 285-298); 26 March 1958 (Dela 319-327); 6-7 May 1958 (Dela 304-318); 17-18 June 1958 (Dela 319-327); 5 September 1958 (Dela 328-332); 12 November 1958 (Dela 333-338); 15-19 December 1958 (Dela 339-360); 24-29 June 1959 (Dela 361-397); 22-26 December 1959 (Dela 398-448); 4 May 1960 (Dela 449-452); 13-16 July 1960 (Dela 453-485); 10-18 January 1961 (Dela 486-536); 19 June 1961 (Dela 537-543); 14 October 1961 (Dela 544-548); 31 October 1961 (Dela 549-553); 5-9 March 1962 (Dela 554-582); 23 April 1962 (Dela 583-587); 19-23 November 1962 (Dela 588-623); 18-21 June 1963 (Dela 624-658); 9-13 December 1963 (Dela 659-696); 10-15 February 1964 (Dela 697-743); 11 July 1964 (Dela 744-747); 10 October 1964 (Dela 748-753); 16 November 1964 (Dela 754-764); 24-26 March 1965 (Dela 765-786); 27-29 September 1965 (Dela 787-805); 6 December 1965 (Dela 806-812); 19 February 1966 (Dela 813-817); and 26 March 1966 (Dela 818-822).

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, the standardized form (classified “sekretno”) that was circulated along with appropriate transcript pages to each speaker, in TsKhSD, Fond (F.) 2, Opis’ (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 268, List (L.) 15.

<sup>7</sup> The name of the CPSU CC Politburo was changed to the “CPSU CC Presidium” at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952. The name was changed back to the Politburo just before the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, “Tov. Sukovoi E. N.,” 18 March 1958, memorandum on materials to include in the final stenographic account of the plenum held on 28-29 October 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 269, L. 79, as well as the attachment on Ll. 80-145.

<sup>9</sup> This is in contrast to the plenum documents in Opis’ 2 of Fond 17 at RTsKhIDNI. RTsKhIDNI gives out only the microfilms of these documents.

<sup>10</sup> Useful compilations of the materials published after Central Committee plenums from 1953 through the late 1980s are available in two sources: *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s’ezdov, konferentsii, i plenumov TsK*, various editions (Moscow: Politizdat, various years); and the 29 volumes of the CPSU yearbook published between 1957 and 1989, *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika* (Moscow: Politizdat, published biennially until the mid-1960s and annually thereafter). From 1989 to 1991, the new Central Committee journal *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* featured stenographic accounts of selected plenums, including some from the pre-Gorbachev era.

<sup>11</sup> The term “Central Committee” refers here exclusively to the body comprising 200-300 people who convened for plenums. Even when plenums were not in session, many resolutions and directives were issued in the name of the Central Committee, but these were actually drafted and approved by the Politburo or Secretariat, not by the Central Committee itself. Soviet officials also frequently used the term “Central Committee” to refer to the whole central party apparatus, but this, too, gives a misleading impression of the Central Committee’s role. The term is used here only in its narrowest sense.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, the marked-up draft “Postanovlenie plenuma TsK KPSS: Ob uluchshenii partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoi Armii i Flote,” October 1957 (Secret), in “Materialy k Protokolu No. 5 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS 28-29. 10. 1957 g.,” in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 261, Ll. 69-74.

<sup>13</sup> The term “circular flow of power” was coined by Robert V. Daniels in “Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev,” in John W. Strong, ed., *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin* (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1971), p. 20. Daniels had developed the basic interpretation at some length more than a decade earlier in his *The Conscience of the Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), and similar views had been elaborated by numerous

scholars such as Merle Fainsod and Leonard Schapiro.

<sup>14</sup> On this general problem, see Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” *Cold War International History Bulletin*, Issue No. 3 (Fall 1993), p. 34.

<sup>15</sup> For an analysis and translation of these notes and supplementary materials, see Mark Kramer, “Special Feature: New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises,” *Cold War International History Bulletin*, Issue No. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 358-410.

<sup>16</sup> Almost all of the transcripts that were released in the early 1990s are now accessible in Fond 89 of TsKhSD. For a convenient, cross-indexed, and chronological list of these transcripts compiled by I. I. Kudryavtsev and edited by V. P. Kozlov, see *Arkhivy Kremlya i Staroi Ploshchadi: Dokumenty po “Delu KPSS”*—Annotirovannyyi spravochnik dokumentov, predstavlenykh v Konstitutsionnyi Sud RF po “Delu KPSS”, (Novosibirsk: Siberskii Khronograf, 1995).

<sup>17</sup> The two most valuable collections put out by the Gorbachev Foundation are Mikhail Gorbachev, ed., *Gody trudnykh reshenii* (Moscow: Alfa-Print, 1993); and A. V. Veber et al., eds., *Soyuz možno bylo sokhranit’—Belaya kniga: Dokumenty i fakty o politike M. S. Gorbacheva po reformirovaniyu i sokhraneniyu mnogonatsional’nogo gosudarstva* (Moscow: Aprel’-85, 1995). Some relevant items also have appeared in the Foundation’s journal *Svobodnaya mysl’*. The items published in *Istochnik* (e.g., about the Politburo’s immediate reaction to the Chernobyl accident) seem to have been released for the same reason that materials were turned over earlier to the Constitutional Court.

<sup>18</sup> In a typical case, Khrushchev attributed to Beria “dangerous and counterrevolutionary” policies that Khrushchev himself had devised only a few weeks earlier for Latvia, Estonia, and Moldavia. See “Voprosy Latviiskoi SSR (Proekt),” 7 June 1953 (Top Secret), “Voprosy Estonskoi SSR (Proekt),” 8 June 1953 (Top Secret), and “Voprosy Moldavskoi SSR (Proekt),” 8 June 1953, all from N. S. Khrushchev to the CPSU Presidium, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 6, Ll. 20-29; F. 5, Op. 15, D. 445, Ll. 46, 267-277; and F. 5, Op. 15, D. 443, Ll. 29-59, respectively.

<sup>19</sup> For the published version, see “Delo Beria,” two parts, in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* (Moscow), No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 139-214, and No. 2 (February 1991), pp. 141-208. As discussed below, the published stenographic account differs substantially from the verbatim transcript, though the comments here apply just as much to the verbatim transcript.

<sup>20</sup> For extensive evidence of this, see my forthcoming article on “The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy-Making.”

<sup>21</sup> Even a prominent scholar like Amy Knight, who is deservedly skeptical of many of the charges lodged against Beria, uncritically accepts the statements made about East Germany. See her *Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 193-200.

<sup>22</sup> “Plenum Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS, 2-7 iyulya 1953 g.,” July 1953 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, Fond (F.) 2, Opis’ (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 29, List (L.) 51.

<sup>23</sup> This was the case, for example, with the plenum on 24-26 March 1965. A new, 22-page text was inserted by Mikhail Suslov in place of his original report to the plenum, “Soobshchenie ob itogakh Konsul’tativnoi vstrechi kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii,” in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 766, Ll. 81-102. Suslov indicated at the bottom of the new version that “[t]his text should be used in place of the stenogram.”

<sup>24</sup> Sometimes, the changes that turn up can be both amusing and revealing about events and individual leaders. For example, at the plenum in late October 1957, a few weeks after the Soviet “Sputnik” had been launched into orbit, Khrushchev boasted that “we now have European missiles, which can strike targets all over Europe without leaving our territory.” In the left-hand margin of the verbatim transcript, the first editor wrote a large question mark next to this



was assured as of 25 October, the day before the CPSU Presidium formally approved the measure. See "V Prezidium TsK KPSS," 25 October 1957 (Secret), from N. Mikhailov, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 261, Ll. 45-51. No doubt, other documents, not yet released, will shed greater light on the timing and motives of Khrushchev's actions.

<sup>67</sup> "Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o plenumе Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS" and "Postanovlenie plenuma TsK KPSS ob uluchshenii partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoii Armii i Flote," *Pravda* (Moscow), 3 November 1957, pp. 1-3.

<sup>68</sup> Yu. P. Petrov, *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo v Sovetskoii Armii i Flote (1918-1961)*

Since the collapse of the USSR, the doors of the Soviet archives are partially open to Russian and foreign researchers and we can say that the balance sheet is, for today, “on the whole, positive.” At the same time, however, faced with the multiplicity and diversity of meticulous scientific publications,<sup>1</sup> the historian has the right to ask: Is Soviet history hiding collections of unedited documents, worthy of publication in full?

In order to better grasp the importance of this question, we must keep in mind the fact that we are studying a system that made a veritable religion of secrecy. Currently, we are only in possession of very weak documentation on Soviet decision-making and on the exact terms of the decrees adopted at the top of the State-Party pyramid. In contrast to historians of France, we have neither an official journal nor a complete anthology of laws. Thus, after five years of a democratic regime, the collection of the joint decisions of the Soviet Central Committee and Council of Ministers is still stamped “for official use” and doesn’t include any secret decisions, clearly the most important ones.<sup>2</sup> Still more serious, the titles, (let alone the texts) of Politburo resolutions made after 1953 have not yet been declassified and the preparatory materials for these resolutions (notes, reports, etc.) remain inaccessible in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation

the Soviet Union, the circuitous route that a non-conformist manuscript had to follow to be published, and the resistance of certain sectors to all forms of change.

**Khrushchev:** A number of you have most certainly read the novel by Solzhenitsyn, *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, published in the last issue of *Novyi Mir*<sup>8</sup> ...

[A few months ago] Comrade Tvardovskii, the editor in chief of *Novyi Mir*, sent me a letter and the manuscript of this new author, and asked me to read it. I read it, and it seemed to me that it was worth publishing the manuscript. I gave the manuscript to other comrades and asked them to read it. A little while later, I met these comrades and asked them their opinion: they were quiet [movement in the room].

They didn't say that they were against it—no, nobody said anything openly—they simply said nothing. But me, the First Secretary, I realized what this really means and I convened them to review the situation.

One discussant said to me, “We should be able to publish it, but there are certain passages ...”

I said to him: “We ban books precisely because they have this type of passage. And if it didn't have such passages, the editor in chief wouldn't have asked our opinion. Which passages bother you?”

-Yes, he said, the [security] organ officials are presented in a bad light.

-What do you want, it was exactly these people who were the executors of the orders and the wishes of Stalin. Ivan Denisovich dealt with them and why would you want him not to talk about it? Moreover, Ivan Denisovich does not have the same sentiment towards all of these people. In this novel, there is also the moment where the captain of the ship, the second rank captain, this Soviet sailor, who finds himself in a camp just because an English admiral sent him a watch as a souvenir, says to the head of the camp, Beria's henchman: “You don't have the right, you're not a real Soviet, you are not a communist.”

Buinovskii, this communist sailor, speaks on behalf of the prisoners, to a soulless being and calls for justice in calling to mind the high standards of communism. What has to be softened here? If we have to make it milder, and take this away, then nothing will remain of this novel.

Following that, I asked the members of the Presidium to read *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and we reached a consensus: we had the same positive opinion of this work as Comrade Tvardovskii ... Why did certain of our comrades fail to understand the positive contribution of Solzhenitsyn's book? Because once more we have before us some people branded by the period of the personality cult, and they haven't yet freed themselves from it, and that's all ...<sup>9</sup>

This brief overview of the broad range of questions raised by these transcripts testifies to their importance for a better understanding of the last four decades of the Soviet Union. Publication and a complete study of this body of

documents would permit us, to borrow the apt expression that Nicolas Werth applied to the 1930s, “to scrape off the many layers of vagueness, of factual error, and of hypotheses based on second-hand accounts, [the very source] on which the history of the USSR had been founded.”<sup>10</sup>

*Gael Moullec is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Studies of Paris (IEP-Paris) and Associate Researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History (IHTP-CNRS)*

[Translated from French by Christa Sheehan Matthew]

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., *Stalin's Letters to Molotov* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1995); *Stalinskoe Politbiuro v 30-e gody* [Stalin's Politburo During the 1930s] (Moscow, AJRO-XX, 1995); *The “Special Files” for I.V. Stalin*, (Moscow, Blagovest, 1994); N. Werth, G. Moullec, *Rapports secrets soviétiques (1921-1991)* [Secret Soviet Reports], *La société russe dans les documents confidentiels* [Russian Society Revealed in Confidential Documents] (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); *Neizvestnaia Rossiia XX vek, Arkhivi, Pis'ma, Memuary, Istoricheskoe nasledie*, [The Unknown Russia in the 20th Century: Archives, Letters, Memoirs, Historical Heritage] (Moscow, vol. 1: 1992, vol. 2: 1992, vol. 3: 1993); also the reviews of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* [Historical Archives] and *Istochnik* [Sources].

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., *Postanovleniia Soveta Ministrov SSSR za oktiabr' 1981*, No. 957-1051. *Dlia sluzhebnogo pol'zovaniia* [The Decisions of the Soviet Council of Ministers in October 1981] [for official use]. Also decisions No. 961 (On Obligatory Insurance) and No. 964 (Nomination of the Vice-Minister of Energy) are in this collection; decisions 962 and 963 are not included.

<sup>3</sup> We review here the definitions given by Soviet works: “The Central Committee of the CPSU: supreme organ of the Party in the interval between two congresses. It is elected by the congress. It elects the Politburo of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the Secretary General of the Central Committee.” [*Sovetskii Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar'*, p. 1483] “Plenum of the Central Committee: plenary meeting of the Central Committee. It meets at least once a semester to resolve the political questions that are of the utmost importance for the Party” [*Sovetskii Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar*, p. 1025].

<sup>4</sup> See essay by Mark Kramer in this issue for full list of plenums and fond numbers.

<sup>5</sup> “Poslednaia antipartiinaia grupa” [The Last Antiparty Group], *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 2-3-4-5-6 (1993).

<sup>6</sup> TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 180, ll. 132-202. A Soviet delegation led by Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoian went to Yugoslavia from 26 May to 3 June 1955. This was the first visit of Soviet leaders since the 1948 rupture of relations between the two countries. On the rupture, see, *The Cominform, Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994).

<sup>7</sup> TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469.

<sup>8</sup> The novel was published in the journal *Novyi mir* 11 (November 1962).

<sup>9</sup> CC Plenum 19-23 November 1962, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 623, l. 990b.

<sup>10</sup> See the preface of N. Werth in O. Khlevniuk, *The Kremlin's Circle, Stalin and the Politburo in the 1930s*.

**T**he transcripts of plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is perhaps the most valuable collection released during the second (after 1991-92) declassification campaign in the Russian archives. Pressure from central media and his approaching re-election campaign made Russian President Boris Yeltsin deliver on his promise to transfer documents of “historical” value from the closed Kremlin archive (now the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation) to the open state archives for public scrutiny and publication. In fulfillment of Yeltsin’s decree of September 1994, no less than 20,000 files arrived at the Russian Center for the Study and Preservation of Documents of Contemporary History (RTsKhIDNI) and the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD). Among them are the files of CPSU plenary meetings for the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union (ArchivpoTj5, organized for the first time and made available in the fall of 1995).

available for researchers, including the following:

- 1. The documents of the Bolshevik program

- 2. The documents of the division of the party

- 3. The documents of the purges.



socialism” for the Soviet empire in the past and the future. He made it clear that Stalin’s reaction against Tito was not a costly mistake, as Khrushchev maintained, but an absolutely rational preemptive measure against the growing threat of nationalist deviations in the communist camp, led by the Soviet Union. “NhRG 0 J [acilleviatiist



Molotov, “this formula of com. Khrushchev ignores all other socialist countries, besides the USSR. However, one should not ignore the People’s Republic of China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and other communist countries.”<sup>15</sup>

In one instance Molotov was right on the mark: radical de-Stalinization and the new doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” did annoy the Chinese leadership and the pressure from within the communist camp forced

Khrushchev on a number of occasions to make drastic, if only momentary, detours from his preferred policies. One was during the Hungarian crisis on 19-30 October 1956, when Khrushchev had to cave in, at first, to Beijing’s insistence that Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Hungary and the practice of “great power chauvinism” with regard to Eastern Europe in general should be renounced in words, if not in deeds. Molotov reminded the plenum of another episode, when Khrushchev had to

## **Eisenhower, “Open Skies” and Khrushchev’s Global “Peace Offensive” : New Evidence from the 6<sup>th</sup> Polish Party Plenum (20 March 1956)**

*[Ed.Note: Although Khrushchev’s speech to the 6<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party was, in largest part, devoted to Stalin, the First Secretary of the CC CPSU also found time to discuss the international situation in a frank manner with the Polish comrades. A longer excerpt regarding Stalin is elsewhere in this section. One can only speculate about the relationship between Eisenhower’s request to “Ask Zhukov” and the role of “Open Skies” in Zhukov’s dismissal 19 months later. On this, see next page.]*

“Concerning the propositions of Mr. [US President Dwight D.] Eisenhower and “open skies,” among us I tell you, that we tell the Americans that this proposition deserves some attention. But [strictly] among us, I tell you, it deserves attention so that it can be thrown into the garbage. What does it mean to fly? What do you think—nothing else better to do.....this is nonsense. Its only advantage is to avoid concrete propositions about the reduction of arms. They gave us nonsense and they are trying to confuse us.

I’m not letting you in on a secret. I said it to Eisenhower as soon as he finished his presentation, when we met at the buffet which he organized for the meeting. We had a glass of cognac and he asks me: “So?” And I told him: “In my opinion, your proposition is no good.” “Why?” “Because it does nothing good. All you are proposing is nonsense.” He replied: “Well, maybe the military judge it differently. Let’s ask Marshal [and Minister of Defense Georgii] Zhukov. What will he say?” And I said: “Ask Zhukov, let him judge. If such things were done during the war, right before the attack.....Comrade [Marshal Konstantin] Rokossowski.....then you have to know where.....during the war and for sometime since.....then we already cannot imagine, because the enemy can always re-group his troops or use camouflage and then totally confuse us. But, what do you think, if we want to show you a factory then we can show you some kind of dummy; different lighting and you’ll photograph it all, and what will you get? It will be an empty place. But, we can do it, and you can do it, so why should we do such nonsense. Someone can ask, then why did we write that this proposition deserves attention? Because this capitalist language is such that you cannot just say, to hell with it. You have to say that this problem demands deep investigation, and will be discussed.....follow the rule, and it was written like this.....

I think we have very good prospects on this matter [dealing with the capitalists] and we will, with pleasure, conduct the discussion with [Nikolai] Bulganin in London, with [British Prime Minister Anthony] Eden, and other friends. We are placing great hopes on the arrival of [French President Guy] Mollet and [Foreign Minister Christian] Pineau, and the delegation from the [French] Socialist Party, which shows that we have achieved so many contacts.

Of course, comrades, I have to tell you that we correctly understand our position and our responsibility. We have to smartly lead this policy and move toward disarmament. But, we should never cross the line, which would endanger the survival of our conquests. We have to do everything to strengthen defense, to strengthen the army. Without these things, nobody will talk to us. They are not hiding the fact that they have the hydrogen bomb, nuclear arms, and jet-propulsion technology. They know that we have all these things, and therefore, they have to talk to us, fight with us; but not be afraid.....this is a game, in which nobody will be a winner. If Lenin would arise he would have been pleased to see his cause become so strong, that the capitalistic world admits being unable to win the war against the socialist countries.

Comrades, this is the power of Marxist-Leninist teaching. We did not work for nothing; not for nothing used the strength of this form of government. Therefore, we must continue working. We must work, work, work to reduce the troops and increase defense, Comrade Rokossowski. It is difficult to agree with marshals on this matter, they’re rather hot-tempered.

Right now, we have to work on the demoralization of their camp. The demoralization of NATO, the Baghdad pact, SEATO. I think we have a great opportunity to carry it out. And the stop of Comrade [Anastas] Mikoian stirred up everybody, his trip to Karachi. Yesterday morning, he flew out to Pakistan.”

*[Source: AAN (Archiwum Akt Nowych, Archive of Modern Records), PZPR 2631 Materiały do stosunków partyjnych polsko-radzieckich z lat 1956-1958, “Przemówienie tow. Chruszczowa na VI P TD [(thi But,k wen s7pG, Tf not b6d..343Tj 0 e,)Tb of(mits)Tj nie 106, anrb*











selves into admitting that some kind of war allegedly would lead to the end of capitalism and the end of civilization, it means that we do not have our head on our shoulders, but on the totally opposite part of the body (laughter). Therefore, no science, no political considerations can justify [such a statement of Malenkov]. It merely proves how harmful is carelessness in the questions of theory and the lack of principles in politics.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 2, op. 1, d. 127. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]

<sup>1</sup> Khrushchev is probably referring to the discussion of Beria's role in the debate on the future of Soviet policy in Germany at the July 1953 Plenum [see the publication in *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 1-2, (1991)]. In the following paragraph Khrushchev criticizes Malenkov's position on the "construction of socialism in the GDR" during the meeting of the Soviet leadership on 28 May 1953, when Lavrentii Beria and Viacheslav Molotov presented two rival proposals. Beria suggested renouncing the goal of constructing socialism altogether and, according to some sources, even contemplated a neutral, democratic, bourgeois Germany. The rest of the leadership, however, opposed this proposal and agreed with Molotov who only suggested rejecting the course of "forced" construction of socialism that had been earlier sanctioned by Joseph Stalin for the GDR communist leadership. The debate resulted in the behind-the-scenes negotiations that led to the "New Course" proposals of the Soviet leadership. The following excerpts from Khrushchev's speech at the plenum highlight Malenkov's role in the debate. Khrushchev, clearly for the purpose of undermining Malenkov's authority, "reveals" that he had been supportive of Beria's proposal. On historians' debate about the significance of this episode see: Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 160-162; James Richter, "Re-examining Soviet Policy Towards Germany in 1953," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 45, no. 4 (1993), pp. 671-691. On Beria contemplating a "neutral reunified" Germany, see Pavel Sudoplatov et al., *Special Tasks*. pp. 363-364.

<sup>2</sup> Khrushchev makes an important distinction between the two bodies that ruled the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Malenkov as a chairman of the Council of Ministers presided over the meeting of May 28, while Khrushchev was there only by invitation as a Secretary of the CC. Voroshilov who did not get any important government job in the post-Stalin setup was not apparently invited to the meeting, although he was a member of the CC Presidium (Politburo). Khrushchev's statement generally corroborates the view that immediately after Stalin's death Beria and Malenkov sought to continue Stalin's tradition in putting the state government above the party "collective" decision-making body.

<sup>3</sup> "They" meaning Beria and Malenkov. On the details of these behind-the-scenes negotiations and threats, see "Memuary Nikiti Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," *Voprosy Istorii*, no. 2-3 (1992), pp. 93-94; Feliks Chuev, *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym*, (Moscow: Terra, 1990), pp. 332-335.

<sup>4</sup> In this speech Malenkov proposed substantial measures to improve living standards of Soviet people, particularly the collectivized peasantry, by reducing taxes, increasing the size of private plots of land for peasants' households. He also proposed, for the first time since 1928, to increase investments into "light"

industries' production of consumer goods at the expense of "heavy" industries, producing armaments.

<sup>5</sup> I.F. Tevosian was a minister of "black" metallurgy and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. He made his career as one of Stalin's favored "captains" of "industrialization." Khrushchev in this episode poses as a defender of the interests of heavy industry against Malenkov.

<sup>6</sup> This discussion of yet another "political error" by Malenkov reveals, incidentally, the negligence of the "collective leadership" to peruse carefully routine speeches delivered by all members of the top Soviet leadership who, by the Constitution, had to run for elections for the Supreme Soviet—nominally the highest power of the land. Malenkov said that "a new world war...with modern weapons means the end of world civilization." On the background of Malenkov's remarkable initiative, see David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 337-339; Zubok and Pleshakov, pp. 166-167.

<sup>7</sup> The sentence is unclear in the Russian original, but Khrushchev talks here about Beria's attempt to make Ignat'ev, minister of the MVD or Internal Security a scape goat for the Kremlin doctors' affair in 1952. In his proposal to the Council of Ministers on 3 April 1953 to free the arrested doctors and close the affair, Beria specifically blamed Ignat'ev and the leadership of the "old" MVD. Later, when he was arrested, this gesture came to be regarded as a clever ruse to earn popularity in the country and to restore Beria's personal control over the secret police machinery. For the text of Beria's proposal and the comments, see G.Kostyrchenko, . *For the turiiKestno*







which went to London as an instruction from com. Molotov, the following clarification was made: if necessary, if you are asked, what the term “agreed levels” means, you must say that we have in mind a reduction of arms and armed forces by one third. Com. Molotov then excused himself, saying that he had made an oversight, that it was a mistake, but I consider it necessary to speak about this.

[Source: *TsKhSD f.2, op. 1, d. 173, ll. 76 ff.* Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

<sup>1</sup> Ed. Note: In February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met in the Palace of Livadia at Yalta in the Crimea to discuss and agree on the postwar order.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. Note: In October 1944, Churchill and Stalin met in the Kremlin and divided up spheres of influence in Europe, allegedly on the back of an envelope. For details, see Albert Resis, “The Churchill-Stalin Secret ‘Percentages’ Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944,” *American Historical Review* 83 (1977-78) pp. 368-87.

.....

### Evening, 9 July 1955

**Bulganin.** (Chairman) Com. Molotov has the floor.

**Molotov.** [Ed. note: Molotov presents the development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations since World War Two for about twenty minutes.] Comrades, the issue of Yugoslavia has great political significance. Obviously, the complex nature of the Yugoslav issue is clear to us all...

If one were to judge by this statement, it would appear that the main reason for the rupture in relations between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in 1948 was some “materials” which were fabricated by the enemies of the people Beria and Abakumov, and the rest is not worthy of attention.

From what I have said and from a real acquaintance with the materials, one can, however, establish that this statement, which tries to explain the reason for the rupture in relations with the CPY in large part by the hostile intrigues of Beria and Abakumov, does not fit with the factual situation. Beria and Abakumov’s intrigues, without a doubt, played a certain role here, but this was not of chief importance.

The groundlessness of that explanation, it seems to me, is visible from the following:

First, it was incorrect to place the blame for the rupture in relations between the CPSU and the CPY only on our party, while keeping silent about the responsibility of the CPY. This falsely exonerates [*obeliaet*] the leadership of the CPY, for which there are no grounds.

Secondly—and this is the important point—it should not be ignored that as the basis of the disagreement

between our party and the leadership of the CPY, there was the fact that the Yugoslav leaders distanced themselves from the principled international positions for which they had stood in the previous period.

In a discussion of this issue in the CC Presidium, some doubt was expressed in relation to the awkwardness and incorrectness of the given explanation. However, the following arguments followed in defense of the given explanation of the reasons for the rupture: that if we did not say that the main reason was Beria’s and Abakumov’s intrigues, then the responsibility for the rupture would fall on Stalin, and that was impermissible.

These arguments should not be accepted.

**Khrushchev.** On Stalin and Molotov.

**Molotov.** That’s new.

**Khrushchev.** Why is it new?

**Molotov.** We signed the letter on behalf of the party CC.

**Khrushchev.** Without asking the CC.

**Molotov.** That is not true.

**Khrushchev.** That is exactly true [*tochno*].

**Molotov.** Now you can say whatever comes into your head.

**Khrushchev.** Without even asking the members of the Politburo. I am a member of the Politburo, but no one asked my opinion.

**Molotov.** Com. Khrushchev is speaking imprecisely [*netochno*].


**Khrushchev.** I want once again to repeat: I was not asked, although I [was] a member of the Politburo.

**Molotov.** You must not forget that the basic and real reason for the rupture was the move of the leadership of the CPY from a position of communism to a position of nationalism, and not just someone’s intrigues which, of course, also played their role.

Did such a departure by the Yugoslav leaders from the Pouce in th8

its ties with countries like the USA, England and others, and together with this, its dependence on these countries, have become stronger and stronger. It [Yugoslavia] is between two camps, tilting towards the capitalist countries. In view of this, it is completely clear that it is our task to weaken Yugoslavia's ties with the capitalist countries which are pulling it into the imperialist camp, be they commercial, economic, or military-political ties, which are putting Yugoslavia in a position of dependence on imperialism. For this, it is necessary to increase and strengthen Yugoslavia's ties with the USSR and the people's democratic countries, showing all possible vigilance in relation to the remaining ties that Yugoslavia has with the capitalist countries. Such a policy will strengthen our socialist camp and at the same time will weaken the camp of the imperialist countries. Such a policy is correct, let's say, in relation to India (or Finland), and is all the more correct in relation to Yugoslavia, where the revolutionary traditions of partisan struggle against fascist occupiers are alive and sympathies for the USSR are great in the people, and where such post-war revolutionary victories as the nationalization of large industry and others, which were accomplished when Yugoslavia marched in the same ranks as the people's democratic states which had arisen at that time, have been preserved. However, it should not be forgotten that in recent years (1949-1955), Yugoslavia has made a series of steps backward both in the city (the weakening of state planning authority in relation to nationalized industry), as well as especially in the countryside, where in recent years a line of renouncing the collectivization of agriculture has been followed.

We must make sure that Yugoslavia does not enter the





correct to stay in Austria. It is a beach-head [*platsdarm*], and only a fool would give up such a beach-head if he planned to make war now. If [you are] not for war, then we have to leave. In our country, communists do not understand you; the Austrian communists do not understand, and Austrian workers begin to see our troops as occupiers. Communists abroad also do not understand us. Why are we sitting in Austria; what are we waiting for there?

Com. Molotov was commissioned to prepare a draft. He presented the draft, but it said that if an *anschluss* were to be prepared of Austria with Germany, we would reserve the right to lead our troops into Austria. There was a lot of all sorts of nonsense in the draft presented by the MID.

I said to com. Molotov:

- Listen, we have to look at things realistically and concretely. Let's assume that we manage to conclude a treaty in which this is said. Imagine that they prepare an *anschluss*. After all, after we find out about it, everything will be ready for an *anschluss*—artillery will be deployed where they should be, and troops will be assembled. After all, they are not fools, and know that if there is an *anschluss*, we can oppose an *anschluss* and, probably, repulse it. So, in such a situation, would you start a war?

You have to keep in mind, after all, that the Austrians and Germans are nations [*natsii*] close to one another. If someone set us such conditions: to separate the Russians from the Ukrainians or Belorussians, what would we say? We would say, without pausing for thought:

- You take your proposals to God's mother [*k bozh'ei materi*]!

Why should we stick our noses into that matter?

Remember what has already happened. After the First World War, France reserved rights for itself as to the Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland zones. But Hitler came to power in Germany. He squeezed France, seizing the Saar district [and] the Ruhr [and] Rhineland zones, and what became of it? An embarrassment. The French disgraced themselves (trhemelfvs, aingc it. ecame oceadrthat mrance ras aot fn GaTj T\* [(bo arm. out. o t n aperopi(-Undoubtedy)47(, ai ifstomrect )Sch a sproposalstprimt?s s. oe ]TJ T\* [(possibilityof itkeng the )fntioaiove[We

**The Speech by Comrade Khrushchev  
at the 6th PUWP CC Plenum (Excerpt)  
20 March 1956, Warsaw**

**[Head of State Council]**

**Comrade Aleksander Zawadzki [in Polish]**

Comrades, the [PUWP] Politburo has taken advantage of the occasion afforded by Comrade Khrushchev's visit with us, and has invited Comrade Khrushchev to meet with the Central Committee plenum. As a result we should treat this as the beginning of the plenum—the actual

acquaintance, we worked together in the Donbass. I was in charge of the orgotdel [Organization Department] of Stalin's regional committee, he was in charge of

asked: "Do we procure more meat now or less?" "More." I said: "I'm saying more too." "More milk?" "More." "Well, the population has increased too." Wages have risen. The purchasing ability has increased too. Then, if that's so, talk like this. We couldn't tell him these things. Well, what kind of socialism is it when a person can't drink an extra cup of milk. I, at the time of capitalism, drank as much milk as I wanted, being a miner during capitalism. And now, I have to, I should be thankful, that now, I can buy a cup of milk for my child. But, such is the situation. This means that this is our fault; we're discrediting socialism. The workers and employees, and all the people—a socialist system, capitalist system, he doesn't choose by himself. But, he chooses a system which will provide a better lifestyle for him. This system for him, the socialist system, this is a social system where the tools of production are located in the hands of society. Therefore, the society itself, in its own interests, will use these tools of production. So, you have to provide uninterrupted growth in the standard of living of the population. Stalin said that a committee should be formed to study this matter. I was nominated as the chairman of that committee. I knew what it meant. I'm not going to do anything to

Wd: y22I' Comraintn



Listen! When Stalin died, 109 people were killed. 109 people died because everyone moved like a mob and smothered them. This is just such a psychosis (*psikhos*). Some people, when they were in the hall near the casket, started crying—What are we going to do now? Comrades, common people is one thing, but how many party members and Komsomol members thought when Stalin died, what will happen after him? Is it proper? Is it appropriate to imagine a hero, and make everything dependent on him? Comrades, do we then need the party? What is it? It means not believing in human judgment, not believing in the force of democracy, not believing in collective leadership. Comrades, then let's choose a king. The monarchists say their system is better, because all your elections depend on your voters, and they adapt [to each other], but our monarch, he was given the power to rule and manage by God. Then we must agree with even such an absurdity. And now, we're trying to break this myth of power and infallibility. Some say, what would you have done during the war, if you didn't have Stalin? Defeated the Germans. Defeated them—and defeated them sooner, with less blood [lost]. I'm sure of it. And maybe we could have avoided the war. Maybe, if our policy was a little smarter, maybe, we could have avoided the war. Nobody knows. That is how I and my friends in our collective see these things.

Listen, such absurdity. When Lenin died, no busts. Stalin died, there wasn't a single town or city where a monument to him was not placed. We, when he died, we couldn't imagine what to name after him, to immortalize him the day he died, because whatever we did would have been significantly worse than what he had done during his lifetime. Can this be correct? Can this be correct upbringing? There was no modesty, although he talked a lot about modesty. There were many, many shortcomings, which, unfortunately, we could not.....We ourselves suffered from it. I vacationed with him one year. I lived next [door]. I told my friends and they understood it. They said that if you're still alive after this vacation, say "Thank God." Why? Because I had to dine with him every day. It means I had to be drunk every day. I beg your pardon. Am I

Comrade Khrushchev's speech. And what Comrade Khrushchev said here, it's all about what Stalin did on his own, in spite of the collective, without coming to an understanding with anyone. I can't understand, how to explain this, that a Marxist, the party leader, who, on the one hand talks about what kind of person a party member ought to be— a communist, modest, ought to listen to the voice of the masses—and, on the other hand, this same party leader does not recognize the collective, the Central Committee, the Politburo, works on his own, shoots people, old Bolsheviks, without cause. Here, for me, a question emerges, how is it possible to reconcile one with the other, that Stalin was a good Marxist?

[Several questions follow. Then Khrushchev answers, not always to the questions, but at some length.]

**Comrade Khrushchev [in Russian]**

Where would you place Stalin? Would you say he's not a Marxist? Stalin, who occupied such a prominent

what am I guilty of? Why should I ask for forgiveness. I'm not a criminal. I'm a member of the party. I'm an honest person. I didn't commit any crimes before Stalin, and before the party and country. I won't ask." And he was shot. That's what was happening. So, why did Stalin destroy [Svanidze]? He destroyed him simply so (*prostotak*).....He believed he was an enemy. We have to rack our brains to explain things that are not so easy. You have to complicate this question a little bit. Only then will you understand correctly, and correctly give an explanation. This is a complicated question.

The beginning of the war and Stalin. Comrades, here, it was said that maybe we could have used it to our advantage, when he turned out to be.....This was impossible, comrades. The war began.....the enemy attacks, and if we, at that time, had announced that we dismissed Stalin from the leadership. Comrades, a better present to Hitler could not be imagined.....(*Voice from the audience: Correct, [he] had to direct the collective.*) Exactly, had to direct. Comrades, all this is being explained simply, right here at this meeting, and after Stalin's death, and you have to have [in mind] the concrete conditions. The war was going on, and the name of Stalin played a big part, and suddenly we're announcing we dismissed Stalin. Comrades, that is defeat. This would mean the death of the country.

...Stalin must be criticized, and we already see how we are criticizing him. But, comrades.....even if you smear a person more and more, he won't get darker than he deserves. We can smear his reputation. But, after us, there are going to be people, you know, like restorers, who in cathedrals or somewhere start restoring things that were already painted and repainted, each artist in his own way. But, a good restorer takes it, cleans everything, washes everything off, and says: "This is, in reality, the work of such and such. And everything else was merely appended." So it is in this matter, too, comrades. Stalin, comrades, is such a figure that many historians will break their teeth trying to learn this history, and there will still be something left to learn. Stalin is Stalin. He's a very complex figure. He had a lot of good and a lot, a great lot, of bad. Now, we're trying to deal with the bad so that we can strengthen the party's correct path of action. But, Stalin will, in any case, from us, and after us, and from our grandchildren and children, receive what he deserved. He played his part and played in such a way that God left it to others, who worked with him, to know. I'm saying it directly, because it's a question of the struggle.....Stalin had his own methods. He said that in order for the working class to succeed, in order to take power, many thousands and millions of workers had to die. Maybe it was a mistake. At such a moment of revolutionary struggle, it's possible that there are mistaken victims. But, he says, history will forgive me. Is it possible? Perhaps. The whole question concerns the scale of these mistakes. A question of methods. Because his doses were incorrect, because an incorrect method of leadership was used. And

we want to avoid this. Comrades, we ourselves aren't guaranteeing that mistakes won't be made. We also can't allow; we also arrested people, and will probably make arrests in the future. I think that you'll also have to do this. But, if you now become liberals, and look at everybody and pat everybody on the back, then these enemies will bite your hands off (*ruki pootkusaiut*). We have such enemies and you have them. You probably have more enemies, because you're younger than we are, and we destroyed more, and you're closer to them. So, I think that even in the future mistakes are possible. I can't say, right now, that we promise that not even a single hair will fall from the head of any person. No. Comrades, this is very complicated. Comrades, the enemy is really insidious, the enemy really is, has been all the while, and we'll fight with these enemies wherever we recognize them and, maybe, where we don't recognize them. I, for example, know that when I worked in Ukraine, we destroyed not one, but many of our enemies using the hands of our enemies. We knew.....these ones.....we forged some documents. We would place them surreptitiously everywhere.....they arrested them, tortured them, and hung them. But, you'll say that this is cruel. But, comrades, we're fighting with the enemy. Is this method with enemies allowed? I think it's allowable. Will we give it up, now? I, for example, won't refuse to use it, if it's used to destroy the enemy.....If we're going to be cowardly, it means we are cowards. So there, dear comrades. (...)

(Applause. Stormy applause.)

[Source: AAN, (*Archive of Modern Records*) PZPR 2631 *Materialy do stosunkow partyjnych polsko-radzieckich z lat 1956-1958, "Przemowienie tow. Chruszczowa na VI Plenum K.C.," k. 14-87. Translated from the Russian and Polish by L.W. Gluchowski.]*

<sup>1</sup> Ed note: The full text of the speech as released by the US





**Khrushchev.**

---

composition of the government. Zhukov said: I cannot put off the operation; there is already an order to our troops to move out. Molotov insisted on reinstating the old leadership.

**Molotov.** That's not correct; we spoke about Muennich.

**Mikoian.** You proposed Hegedus; before his departure to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev proposed Muennich; others proposed Kadar—we argued all day. If there had been no argument, why not agree right away on the composition of the government? We had it out [*rugalis*] with you, argued fiercely. Bulganin and other comrades should remember.

**Khrushchev.** Anastas Ivanovich [Mikoian], when, during the Hungarian events, Malenkov and I returned from our trip to a series of people's democratic countries and Yugoslavia, we had formed the opinion that we must support Kadar's candidacy. Some called for Muennich's candidacy. He is an honorable comrade who likes us; I did military training together with him in the Proletarian Division. He is an excellent comrade, but in the given situation, com. Kadar is the best candidate.

**Mikoian.** Only after com. Khrushchev's arrival was it possible to specify the composition of the government headed by Kadar. Com. Kadar is from the working class and is a serious person, and that has now been justified. It is good that com. Khrushchev reminded [us]. There was the following case: Molotov calls and proposes a meeting. On what topic? [Matyas] Rakosi wrote a letter to the HSWP, [saying] that they were not allowing him back into Hungary and requested that he remain here. Molotov asked: who decided, how, why? He considered that the convocation of a special session of the CC Presidium was called for. And when we met at the next regular meeting [i.e., no special session had been called], he insisted that Rakosi and [Erno] Gero be given the chance to work.

**Molotov.** Who insisted? That is not exact.

**Mikoian.** After all, you demanded the convocation of a special session of the CC Presidium in order to discuss Rakosi's letter, which came to the CC CPSU Presidium with an accusation against the new leadership of the HSWP. Two days later [*chez den*], at the next meeting of the CC Presidium, you spoke with a criticism of the resolution of the CC Plenum of the HSWP that at present and in the near future, the interests of the HSWP demanded that Rakosi, Gero, Hegedus [be prevented from working] in Hungary, but remain in the Soviet Union for a specified period. You demanded that Rakosi, Gero, and Hegedus return to Hungary. If we had heeded Molotov's advice, we would have lost the trust of the Hungarian party; the Hungarians would have thought that we were playing a double game. We argued with Molotov: Rakosi did not see what was happening, became detached from reality and led the party into a catastrophe. While located in Moscow, he called certain of his supporters in Budapest on the telephone and, essentially, led a group struggle against the new Hungarian leadership. In connection with

this we told him: do not live in Moscow; live in another city, and don't mess things up [*ne port' dela*].

**Khrushchev.** When the Hungarian government delegation visited us, Molotov said to Kadar: why are you not taking Rakosi with you? This question once again upset the Hungarian leaders. They thought that we were supporting them [only] on a temporary basis, and that then Rakosi would once again come to power in Hungary.

**Mikoian.** It's true; during the reception, com.

Molotov scolded Kadar [as to] why they weren't taking Rakosi back to work in Hungary. Such behavior by com. Molotov was incorrect.

**Molotov.** We were talking not about Rakosi, but about Hegedus.

**Mikoian.** You were talking about Rakosi.

**Mikoian.** In relation to the [Presidium] Saturday meeting, at which Bulganin said that Khrushchev acted incorrectly. What does that consist of?

The people's democratic countries request that, when we order equipment for the next year, the orders be given out at least six months' in advance, so that blueprints can be drawn up and inventories can be ordered. Otherwise, it is impossible—to order in January and receive the products in January. This is an elementary thing. Not only our

majority against the draft was forming, he said the following phrase: "I would like on this issue in particular to hold a vote and to remain in the minority." The socialist camp has been created because it is important to strengthen it and not to permit wavering. If East Germany and Czechoslovakia today are left without orders, the whole socialist camp will crack. Who needs such a camp if we cannot ensure orders? After all, the issue stands as such: either feed the workers of the GDR for free, or provide orders, or otherwise lose the GDR entirely. That is why Nikita Sergeevich blew up [vzorvalsia]. I also almost blew up.

*Voices.* Blew up.

**Khrushchev.** Now it is clear that they had an understanding to fight us on this issue.

**Mikoian.** I also think so...

Comrades, after the Hungarian and Polish events, our prestige abroad temporarily weakened somewhat. First, we bared our teeth to the enemies, the Americans, for Hungary, and bared our teeth for Egypt and achieved a halt







time to introduce [show to the Presidium] this issue before his return. The minister arrived; he examined the proposal. Deputy minister V.S. Semenov who is present here and I tried to convince com. Molotov that the draft should be brought to the CC as had been pre-approved in the Presidium. Am I speaking correctly, com. Semenov?

**Semenov.** Correctly.

**Gromyko.** We said: it is a correct decision and should be introduced in this form in particular. Com. Molotov says: no, by introducing such a draft, we will extend a hand to [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer and entreat him. He cancelled this decision and introduced his own proposal. Of course, the Presidium altered the whole thing and affirmed its decision.

**Molotov.** An open letter is one thing, and a non-open letter is another. The difference here is not an essential one, but one of form.

**Gromyko.** Not only on this issue, although it in particular was a very important issue.

*Voice.* We were talking about the content.

**Gromyko.** We were talking about making a direct proposal on normalization to put Adenauer in a difficult position and not to drag out the matter as before.

On disarmament. I am not going to repeat what has been said before—it is a complex problem. But here as well the main decisions were, as a rule, taken by the First Secretary of the CC.

The virgin lands were spoken about here. I want to emphasize this matter from another angle. If it hadn't been for the virgin lands—and it is well known on whose insistence the relevant decision was made—this year we not only would have been on hunger rations [*na golodnom paike*], but we could not have sold grain to our friends. We would have been obliged to market our gold abroad, in the context of our very tight foreign-trade balance. We could not have sold bread to the Poles, the Hungarians, or the Albanians. I am not even talking about the fact that we could not have sold [bread] to Egypt.

I do not want to repeat myself on the theme of how significant that would have been, but I do want to emphasize one fact: if we had not given [*dali*] the people's democratic countries bread, then...

**Mikoian.** If we had not sold [*prodali*] it [to them].

**Gromyko.** If we had not sold them bread, those countries would have been obliged to turn to someone else; there is only one someone else—the Americans. And they will not only sell bread, but will sell with the simultaneous attachment of one-sided conditions.

The negotiations which have recently taken place between the Poles and the Americans on some issues, including on the issue of selling so-called agricultural surpluses to Poland, have shown that the Americans seize anything they can with their teeth in order to attach the conditions they need.

After all, in Egypt, if it had not been for our arms and our grain...

**Mikoian.** And oil plus [our] purchases of cotton,

then, although it cannot be said definitely; in such matters you cannot make categorical assertions; but there is a good likelihood that Egypt would have been brought to its knees.

I want to touch on another issue as well. It would be good if com. Molotov mentally went out into the middle of the hall and looked at himself speaking from this tribune. He would see what a pathetic picture it is. It was also a pathetic picture when he tried to denigrate the visits of our leading officials, above all, of course, com. Khrushchev, to other countries with serious missions, as a result of which the foreign-policy influence of our state, the Soviet Union, has been increased in several countries and several world regions.

I must say that I simply bow before the huge work of great state importance which was done during these trips by com. Khrushchev. As is well known, com. Bulganin travelled with him, but com. Khrushchev was always the soul of the matter.

*Voices.* Correct. (Applause).

**Gromyko.** This applies to the visit to India. I was among the accompanying persons. It applies to the trip to Yugoslavia, to Afghanistan, to Burma, to England, to Finland, and to the meeting of the leaders of the four powers' summit in Geneva in 1955. And I think that com. Molotov resorted to fairly dirty methods on purpose in his effort to denigrate [Khrushchev], since com. Molotov did not and could not have any other arguments worthy of attention.

*Voices.* Correct.

**Gromyko.** In Finland during the last visit there was a pack of foreign correspondents from Finnish, French, American, and English newspapers that were very hostile to us. But not one of the correspondents nor any one of the newspapers which were most hostile to the Soviet Union dared to bring any facts that would cast a shadow on the behavior of com. Khrushchev and com. Bulganin during their last trip.

What sort of conclusion follows from this? The conclusion is as follows: the ethics of the bourgeois newspapers which were most hostile to us turned out to be more elevated than the ethics by which Molotov now lets himself be guided at the CC Plenum.

*Voices.* Correct. (Applause.)

**Gromyko.** Com. Molotov also dredged up com. Khrushchev's interview. I want to inform the Central Committee [about something]. I consider that it has the right and should know this fact. Com. Khrushchev did not propose himself, did not ask for this interview. The proposal that com. Khrushchev agree to give an interview was made by the MID, by me. It was discussed in the CC Presidium. At the beginning I had the following impression: com. Khrushchev did not have a very fixed opinion as to whether he should or should not give an interview. I spoke "for," and the members of the Presidium approved our proposal, and the decision was taken.

By its content the interview given was good and

correct. I must say that not many of the Soviet Union's foreign policy actions have stirred up a hornet's nest in the USA as did that interview. In vain, Molotov tried to depict the matter as if there were some new doubtful positions which do not follow from our party line and were not approved by the CC Presidium. There is nothing of the sort. There are no such positions. The only positions there are those which follow and are wholly founded on the resolutions of the 20th congress of the CPSU, on the resolutions of the CC Presidium and of the party CC itself. There is one new thing in the interview. What is new? It is the fresh, original form of the presentation of our views with an exposition of Soviet foreign policy. But that itself is valuable. What was needed was exactly a lively, intelligible form of presentation, of exposition of the views and issues of our foreign policy. That was needed; it contributed to the interview's huge effect.

In the course of our work we read official and unofficial communications, which in particular relate to an assessment of this interview, and with all confidence I can state that it was assessed in precisely that way...

[Source: Istoricheskii arkhiv 3-6(1993) and 1-2 (1994) Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie]

## 26 June 1957

**Ustinov.** I am convinced that this anti-party grouping had a platform on the issues of agriculture and foreign policy. Remember the plenum [in July 1955], when the issue of Yugoslavia was discussed. At that time I thought: why object to the establishment of friendly relations with any country, and in particular with Yugoslavia, which has a highly important strategic significance? It would seem, on the contrary, that we must win it at any cost. The Americans are throwing around colossal amounts of money in order to make the territory available for their bases. Com. Khrushchev made a reasonable proposal. Remember what he said: we must attract Yugoslavia to our side and try to isolate it [Yugoslavia] from the capitalists...

**Shelepin.** Since the steam bath was talked about, I want to bring up the following fact. There was a discussion in the plenum about com. Molotov's wife and he was warned: "Take charge of her; bring her into line (*Vos'mi ee v ruki, navedi poriadok*)," - but he evidently did not draw conclusions from that.<sup>1</sup> At one point I was sent together with com. N.M. Pegov to accompany [North Vietnamese leader] com. Ho Chi Minh to a pioneer camp. We arrive there and suddenly see a woman who tells us that she is from a children's home under Molotov's wife, and that she had come in order to take com. Ho Chi Minh and drive him to the children's home. We told her that com. Ho Chi Minh was not going there. In reply to this, she stated: no, he will go, since Polina Semenovna [Zhemchuzhina] said that he would go.

If com. Molotov had drawn conclusions from the criticism at the plenum, would she really have dared to act in that way?

**Molotov.** You must say the facts, and not what someone said.

**Shelepin.** And I'm telling facts. I myself was there and am not adding a word.

<sup>1</sup> Ed. Note: P.S. Zhemchuzhina's Jewishness, her friendship with Golda Meir, and her sister in Palestine/Israel brought a charge of treason, when the campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans" was loosed. She had been exiled in 1949 by a direct vote of the Politburo, Molotov abstaining. According to Roy Medvedev: "The day of Stalin's funeral, 9 March, was also Molotov's birthday. As they were leaving the mausoleum, Khrushchev and Malenkov wished him a happy birthday, despite the occasion, and asked what he would like as a present. 'Give me back Polina,' he replied coldly, and moved on." Two years later, Mikunis bumped into Molotov in the privileged Kremlin Hospital at Kuntsevo [where Stalin had one of his dachas]. "I went up to him and asked, 'How could you, a member of the Politburo, let them arrest your wife?' He gave me a cold look and asked me who I thought I was. I replied, 'I am the General Secretary of the Israeli Communist Party, and that's why I'm asking you.'" (Quotes from Roy Medvedev, *All Stalin's Men*. (New York, 1985), pp. 98-99, 102-3.)

[Source: Istoricheskii arkhiv 3-6(1993) and 1-2 (1994) Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie]

## Evening, 28 June 1957

**Suslov** (chairing). Com. Kuznetsov has the floor.

**Kuznetsov.** ...How is it possible not to note—even our enemies recognize this—that since 1953, the Soviet Union has enjoyed huge successes in the area of foreign policy, while in 1953, the country was essentially on the brink of war? Friendly ties have been established and are being strengthened with many states on the basis of a struggle to consolidate peace. The international authority of the Soviet Union as the leading state in the struggle for peace and security, as the friend of all peoples who are fighting against the imperialists for their national independence and freedom, has grown immeasurably...

The steps taken by the Soviet Union in the Egyptian issue and on the whole throughout the Near and Middle East are exemplars of the realization of Leninist policy in international affairs.

What was the situation in the United Nations prior to 5 November of last year, as the English, French, and Israeli imperialists unleashed war on Egypt at the end of October.

Day and night the General Assembly meets; the [UN] Security Council meets and adopts many resolutions, but no concrete steps are taken against the aggressors. With

the assent of the USA, the English and French imperialists had conducted things so as to deflect public opinion and make quick work of Egypt.

The delegations of Egypt and other Arab countries in the UN were in a very anxious state; help could only come from the Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union did not let them down. When on 5 November they found out in the UN about the letters sent by the Soviet government on 5 November to England, France, the USA and Israel, there was an effect that could not have been produced by the explosion of several hydrogen bombs. On 7 [November], military actions were halted, and after that the withdrawal of the aggressors from Egypt began.

Even the bourgeois diplomats, who of course are embittered against the USSR, said in conversations with us that from the point of view of diplomacy it was a step that was hard to overestimate. At the same time they noted with obvious envy that the Soviet Union, without a single shot, without any actual involvement, forced two imperialist plunderers—England and France—to cease military activities and withdraw their troops from Egypt.

Besides this, these actions by the Soviet government helped us to acquire many new friends and to strengthen ties with old ones.

I want to draw your attention to the fact that com. Molotov talks a lot about using contradictions in the capitalist camp. It is well known that before 1953, the Soviet Union in its position on many international issues pushed the USA, England, and France together. [People] simply stopped believing that [over] there, the USA, England, and France have serious differences on many problems...

**Khrushchev.** ...we stopped buying butter abroad.

When Malenkov was Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1953-1954, we threw away a lot of gold in order to buy butter [*maslo*], herring, fabric, and other products and goods. How much gold did we spend then, com. Malenkov—200-250 tons?

*Voice:* If not more.

**Khrushchev.** Can one really resolve state issues in such a way? We will give away all of the gold, and there will be no more butter. They must be resolved in another way.

I want to say the following. Everyone knows that we must help (by treaty) the German Democratic Republic [GDR], since it is our socialist stronghold, our front line [*perednii krai*] in the struggle with the capitalist world. Politics has its logic. If the Germans in the GDR live worse than in the Federal Republic of Germany, then communists there will not be supported. For that reason, we must sell the GDR the necessary agricultural products. And we are doing this. Now we received a telegram in which the Germans are asking us to withhold shipments of butter and meat to them, since more has been prepared there than foreseen by the plan. That is a gratifying development.

This year for the first time, we celebrated the First of May without introducing a resolution on strengthening shipments of goods to the cities. Because everything that was stipulated in the plan is being supplied. This is the first time that has happened. And they try to depict that as a deviation! Oh, you... What makes you happy, if our successes distress you so?

Remember what sad results this policy led to, to the disruption of friendly relations with Turkey and Iran, our neighbors. It was literally a stupidity [*glupost'*]. In our incorrect policy in relation to Turkey we helped American imperialism. The Turks used to receive Voroshilov like a brother; they named a square after Voroshilov. But when the Second World War ended, we wrote a note to Turkey [saying] that we were tearing up the friendship treaty. Why? Because you are not giving up the Dardanelles. Listen, only a drunkard could write such a thing. After all, no country would give up the Dardanelles voluntarily.

The issue of Iran. What did we do in Iran? We put our troops there and started to boss them around [*stali tam khoziainichat'*]. ent.u6: ns by tht as

adventurist policy. And he still has the gall to cite Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, teaching us Leninist foreign policy. He is an empty dogmatist (*nachetchik*) detached from [real] life...

**Khrushchev.** A little while ago when we were in Finland, I criticized Bulganin for his incorrect statements. We came to a peasant's farm, went out onto a hillock; the farmer is showing us his lands, and everything is going well. Suddenly Bulganin says: here is an excellent observation point (laughter in the hall). I almost gasped [*chut' ne akhnul*]. Listen to what you're saying, I say. And he answers me: you are a civilian, and I am a military man. Well, what sort of military man are you! You should think before speaking. There is a saying: in the house of a hanged man you don't talk about rope.

Just imagine what it must have been for the Finns to hear such words. We fought against Finland, and then restored good relations; we came to visit as guests, they met us in a cordial manner, and it turns out that we have come to pick out command points. Is that friendship? It is obvious that that offends, insults them. The minister of foreign affairs and other Finnish officials were with us, and I don't know how they took that statement...

**Khrushchev.** Molotov said that allegedly we are not using the contradictions between the imperialist states in the interests of strengthening the countries of the socialist camp. But that is a slander. Remember our government's appeal to the United States with a proposal to speak out jointly against the aggression of England, France, and Israel in Egypt. Was that really not an example of our active policy of unmasking the imperialists? Having proposed joint action against England, France, and Israel to Eisenhower in order to avoid war in Egypt, comrades, we tore the veil [*pokryvalo*] off the aggressors. We also got a big trump for exposing the USA's policy. Before this, the Egyptians said that the Soviet Union was leaving them to the whims of fate, that only the USA was defending them in the Security Council. And suddenly we propose joint action. The Egyptian people rejoiced and thanked the Soviet Union.

Or remember our letters to Guy Mollet, Eden, and Ben Gurion. In those countries, one could determine the meaning of those letters even by the smell of the air (laughter in the hall), because within 24 hours the war was halted. And they tell us about an inability to use contradictions. Is that really not using contradictions?

*Voice:* At that moment Eden came down with a fever.

**Khrushchev.** Some wits at one of the receptions said: Eden came down with an inflammation of the [urethral] canal... The Suez canal, because at that moment he resigned and lay down in bed. (Laughter in the hall).

The foreign-policy steps of our party's CC during the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression and the counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary averted the danger of the outbreak of a new world war.

What is the position of the Soviet Union now in the international arena? On all the core issues of international politics, including issues such as the problem of disarmament and the banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the initiative is in the Soviet Union's hands. With our peace-loving policy we have put the imperialist states on the defensive.

In my rejoinder I already spoke about the worrying case when Shepilov, as editor of *Pravda*, committed an outright forgery, having published a falsified photograph depicting Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Malenkov in the interests of servility toward Malenkov. In reality, there was no such photograph. There was a group photograph in which many persons were photographed. But Shepilov removed all of these people from the photograph and left only three people, wishing by this to aggrandize Malenkov and serve him. For that the Central Committee gave Shepilov a stern reprimand....[Ed. Note: The Stalin-Mao-Malenkov faked photo and copy of original from which it was made can be found facing p. 128 in Martin Ebon, *Malenkov: Stalin's Successor* (McGraw Hill: NY, 1953).]

[Source: Istoricheskii arkhiv 3-6(1993) and 1-2(1994)

Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie]

.....

**For:**

- longer plenum excerpts
- additional sessions

**visit the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin at:**

# “This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse”<sup>1</sup>

## The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives

*Introduced and annotated  
by Christian F. Ostermann*

Since the opening of the former Communist bloc archives it has become evident that the crisis in East Germany in the spring and summer of 1953 was one of the key moments in the history of the Cold War. The East German Communist regime was much closer to the brink of collapse, the popular revolt much more widespread and prolonged, the resentment of SED leader Walter Ulbricht by the East German population much more intense than many in the West had come to believe.<sup>2</sup> The uprising also had profound, long-term effects on the internal and international development of the GDR. By renouncing the industrial norm increase that had sparked the demonstrations and riots, regime and labor had found an uneasy, implicit compromise that production could rise only as long as norms remained low and wages high — a compromise that posed a severe restraint for Ulbricht when, in the early 1960s, he sought to reform the GDR economy through his “New Economic System.”<sup>3</sup> Moreover, instead of allowing for greater political liberalization, as the Soviet-decreed New Course had envisioned at least to a certain degree, the eventual triumph of the hardliners headed by Ulbricht resulted in a dramatic expansion of the apparatus of repression and in the encrustation of an essentially Stalinist system in the ensuing months.<sup>4</sup>

Even more surprising, important and controversial are the international repercussions of the crisis. How did it intersect with the power struggle that was taking place in the Kremlin in the weeks following Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953? Recently, this question has received impetus by the publication of new materials on the activities of KGB chief and Minister of the Interior, Lavrentii Beria. A number of formerly secret internal party documents and memoirs seem to suggest that Beria was ready to abandon socialism in the GDR, in fact to give up the very existence of the East German regime, which had been set up with Soviet support in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany in October 1949.<sup>5</sup> Did Beria’s alleged plan — the reunification of Germany as a democratic and neutral country — represent a missed opportunity for an early end to Germany’s division and perhaps the Cold War? Some historians have questioned the new evidence and the existence of a serious policy alternative, arguing that the disagreement on German policy among the Soviet leadership was “not as serious as it looked.”<sup>6</sup>

1953 also looms large as a defining moment in Soviet-

### I.

East German relations as Ulbricht seemed to have used the uprising to turn weakness into strength. On the height of the crisis in East Berlin, for reasons that are not yet entirely clear, the Soviet leadership committed itself to the political survival of Ulbricht and his East German state. Unlike his fellow Stalinist leader, Hungary’s Matyas Rakosi, who was quickly demoted when he embraced the New Course less enthusiastically than expected, Ulbricht, equally unenthusiastic and stubborn — and with one foot over the brink — somehow managed to regain support in Moscow. The commitment to his survival would in due course become costly for the Soviets who were faced with Ulbricht’s ever increasing, ever more aggressive demands for economic and political support.

Curiously, the 1953 East German uprising also turned out to be crucially significant for Western, in particular American, policy. The uprising did not only undermine British premier Winston Churchill’s grand scheme for an East-West deal on Germany and help West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer win a sweeping victory at the federal elections later that fall.<sup>7</sup> The uprising also jolted the U.S. administration, first into believing that the dawn of “liberation” had arrived, and then, after a US-sponsored food-aid-program evoked much more of a response among East Berliners and East Germans than the Americans had expected, into reassessing the feasibility of a “rollback” strategy.<sup>8</sup>

Perhaps the most fascinating meaning of 1953 lies in the impact of these events on the mindset of the SED and Soviet leaders. Much like the discourse among dissidents and the population at large, in which 1953 became an almost mythological, though ambiguous, point of reference, the crisis became deeply embedded in the collective memory of a generation of East German leaders and a powerful symbol within the “discourse” among East bloc leaders. 1953 came to stand for a hardline repressive resolution of internal unrest and the ultima ratio of Soviet military intervention, and as such was central Ulbricht’s (and later Erich Honecker’s) hardline approach to crises in Eastern Europe in 1956, 1968 and 1980/81. “This is our experience from the year 1953,” Honecker reminded Polish party chief Stanislaw Kania and his colleagues during the December 1980 East bloc summit at the height of the Polish crisis, urging a crackdown on the oppositional “Solidarity” movement and holding out the possibil-

ity of Warsaw Pact intervention.<sup>9</sup>

Given the importance of the 1953 East German crisis, it is little surprising that Soviet policy towards Germany and the East German uprising in the spring and summer of 1953 have come under intense scholarly scrutiny since the opening of the Russian and East German archives in 1990-1992.<sup>10</sup> Yet key aspects of this episode of the Cold War remain controversial. Historians, in particular Germans, still fiercely debate the essential character of the crisis: was it basically labor unrest against industrial norm increases or a failed popular rebellion?<sup>11</sup> Even more controversial are the international ramifications of the East German crisis in the spring and summer of 1953. What were the intentions of Stalin's successors with regard to Germany? Did Beria favor "a grand bargain that would reunify Germany as a capitalist, neutral government?"<sup>12</sup> What role did the German question play in the post-Stalin succession struggle. What effect did the East German uprising have on the policy-making process in Moscow?

The documents edited below, obtained in preparation or as a result of the November 1996 conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," co-sponsored by the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Studien (Potsdam), the National Security Archive (Washington), and the Cold War International History Project, shed new



West Germany, while preserving Germany's two existing governments." Expecting that the measure would be opposed by the Western powers, the memoranda suggested as an alternative option a GDR government appeal to the Soviet government for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. Wary of the possibility, as remote as it may have seemed, that the West might take the Soviets up on their proposals, Molotov remained skeptical of the exercise, reminding his subordinates at one point that they "failed to understand the essence of the policy of the three [Western powers] — to pull Germany to the bourgeois rails."<sup>18</sup>

Significantly, the proposal for a separate treaty with East Germany did not contain any references to the crisis in the GDR, but rather assumed the continued existence, even strengthening, of the East German regime until the conclusion of a peace treaty. As early as the beginning of April, Moscow had apparently hinted at a relaxation of the harsh socialization measures (only to be ignored by Ulbricht), and on April 18, the Soviet government promised aid in copper, steel and other raw materials to the GDR.<sup>19</sup> Only after Vladimir Semenov, the Political Adviser to the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, had been recalled to Moscow on April 22 to head the Third European Division within the Foreign Ministry, did further concerns about the GDR enter the policy-making process. The April 28 version of the memorandum on Germany, entitled "Further Soviet Measures on the German Question,"<sup>20</sup> continued to call for the formation of a provisional all-German government by the East and West German parliaments "while preserving the existing governments of the GDR and West Germany" for an interim period. The provisional German government would draft an all-German electoral law, carry out free all-German elections and represent Germany in the quadripartite peace treaty negotiations. Once a provisional German government had been formed, the occupation powers would be obliged to withdraw their troops simultaneously. To raise the GDR's international prestige, however, the draft memorandum also called for the elimination of the Soviet Control Commission, the establishment of a Soviet embassy in its place and the return of German prisoners of war. It also suggested reducing reparation payments by

inevitable.” Beria hence proposed to ask the SCC to submit proposals on ways to gain control over the mass flight “in order to make the necessary recommendations to our German friends.”<sup>27</sup>

Given the later accusations against Beria, it is interesting that Beria apparently managed to receive the Presidium’s approval for his initiative on Germany. Very likely in response to the May 6 report, the head of the Soviet Control Commission (SCC), Vladimir Chuikov, Deputy Political Adviser to the SCC, Pavel Iudin, and USSR mission chief Ivan Il’ichev sent a memorandum to Moscow that criticized the SED’s handling of the implementation of “accelerated construction of socialism.”<sup>28</sup> Significantly, the memorandum was not addressed to Molotov but to Premier Malenkov, perhaps reflecting the impatience and annoyance of the Soviet representatives in Germany with the staunchly orthodox position of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the German question (and Semenov’s key role in shaping that position).<sup>29</sup> Chuikov’s, Iudin’s and Il’ichev’s lengthy report on developments in the GDR gave an in-depth analysis of the mounting crisis and was highly critical of the SED, particularly its indifference to the mass flight of East Germans to the West. Foreshadowing the new course adopted in early June, Chuikov, Iudin and Il’ichev recommended an increase in consumer goods production, support of private artisanal production and individual farmers, a decrease in agricultural requisitions and a termination of the ration card system on basic foodstuffs. Nevertheless, the three Soviet officials eschewed more radical recommendations, and instead sought to suggest ways which would improve the efficiency and success of the socialization program.

On political administrative issues, the May 18 report similarly recommended changes while avoiding a call for more drastic steps. Thus, Chuikov, Iudin and Il’ichev wanted the SED to acknowledge the serious problem posed by the mass exodus of East Germans, reduce the massive number of those arrested as a result of excessive and arbitrary criminal codes, and reinstall some sense of reason, moderation and lawfulness in judicial and criminal procedures. At the same time, however, they emphasized increased and improved propaganda efforts as adequate ways to deal with the mass flight and opposition sentiment within the population. Chuikov, Iudin and Il’ichev hence seemed to have embraced Ulbricht’s witch hunt policies which blamed foreign propaganda, especially the US-controlled radio station in West Berlin, RIAS,<sup>30</sup> and internal subversion for the problems in the GDR.<sup>31</sup>

The discussion of the German problem among the Soviet leadership reached a climax in late May, at a meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, which, chaired by Malenkov, had for a short time surpassed the CPSU Presidium as the main collective decision-making body.<sup>32</sup> At the May 27 session, called to “analyze the causes which had led to the mass exodus of Germans from the GDR to West Germany and to discuss measures for correcting the unfavorable political and

economic situation in the GDR,” the Presidium members apparently agreed that the policy of the “forced construction of socialism” had to be terminated in order to avert a full-blown crisis.<sup>33</sup>

According to the testimony by Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin and Khrushchev at the July 1953 CPSU plenum as well as later accounts by Khrushchev, Molotov, and Gromyko, Beria was not satisfied with solely adjusting the pace of socialization in East Germany. Instead of terminating the forced construction of socialism, he allegedly shocked his colleagues with a proposal to abandon socialism in the GDR altogether in favor of the creation of a united, neutral and non-socialist Germany. “We asked, “Why?,”” Molotov later recounted: ““And he replied, ‘Because all we want is a peaceful Germany, and it makes no difference whether or not it is socialist.’”<sup>34</sup> According to Molotov, Beria kept insisting that “it made no difference whether Germany was socialist or otherwise, that the most important concern was that Germany be peaceful.” Beria’s proposal was reminiscent of Stalin’s earlier musings on Germany, but since then had been superseded by Soviet — indeed Stalin’s own — commitment to the build-up of the Communist German state. The proposal, moreover, ran counter to the German initiative that Molotov’s foreign ministry had been carefully and stubbornly drafting. Molotov, therefore, raised strong objections to Beria’s proposal. A special committee consisting of Beria, Malenkov and Molotov was created

discussion of the German question” while “along with all of you” introducing “initiatives at the Presidium aimed at the correct solution of issues, such as the Korean one, the German one.” A year-and-a-half later, at the January 1955 CC CPSU Plenum, Beria’s ally in 1953, Malenkov, now under attack by Khrushchev and Molotov, “admitted” that he had been wrong in 1953 when he held the view that “the task of socialist development in Democratic Germany” was “incorrect.” “Today I admit that I essentially took a wrong position on the German Question.”<sup>40</sup>

Additional evidence is provided by secondary figures such as KGB operative Pavel Sudoplatov, a close collaborator of Beria. In his memoirs *Special Tasks*, Sudoplatov recounts that as early as April, “[p]rior to the May Day celebration in 1953, Beria ordered me to prepare top-secret intelligence probes to test the feasibility of unifying Germany. He told me that the best way to strengthen our world position would be to create a neutral, unified Germany run by a coalition government. Germany would be the balancing factor between American and Soviet interests in Western Europe. East Germany, the German Democratic Republic, would become an autonomous province in the new unified Germany.” According to Sudoplatov, Beria intended to air the idea through his intelligence contacts in Central Europe and “begin negotiations with the Western powers.”<sup>41</sup> Similarly, Vladimir Semenov, who, as head of the responsible division within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, participated in the key meetings of the Soviet leadership on Germany (as well as the later meetings with the SED leaders), charges in his 1995 memoirs that Beria was pursuing a line on Germany which would have “disrupted the continuity of our policy on the German question and aimed at shocking the Soviet Union and eliminating the GDR.” Semenov reports that during a Presidium meeting “in the second half of May, 1953,” Beria, once called on, “took a paper out of his jacket pocket, without haste, as if he was the master of the house, put on his glasses and read his own draft on German policy. It differed fundamentally from the one which I carried in my bag.”<sup>42</sup>

Serious doubts, however, have been raised about the existence of a “Beria plan.” Thus far, the evidence on Beria’s role in the decision-making process within the Kremlin is fragmentary, biased and contradictory. The transcript of the May 27 Presidium meeting at which Beria supposedly made his proposal remains classified in the Presidential Archive in Moscow. Mention of Beria’s alleged initiative on the German question was first made by his opponents at the July 1953 CPSU Plenum that condemned him, following his arrest on June 26.<sup>43</sup> It is probable that the charges about Beria’s views on the German question, made by Khrushchev and others at the Plenum, were motivated largely by a desire to portray Beria in most sinister ways and to characterize him as a traitor to the socialist cause, as a Western agent and provocateur. United in their fear of the brutal KGB chief and desirous to eliminate a strong competitor in the

struggle for supremacy within the Kremlin, Beria’s opponents might well have fabricated, distorted or exaggerated any difference of opinion on his part.<sup>44</sup>

The documents presented here suggest a somewhat different interpretation. They certainly reflect Beria’s activism in the foreign policy field, especially on the German question. What is striking, however, is the fact that Beria managed to gain Presidium approval for the demarche to the Soviet Control Commission, which in turn, with its May 18 critique of the SED’s indifference and mishandling, set the tone for the May 27 meeting and the June 2 “New Course” document. Beria’s initiative in early May thus turned into a Presidium-approved SCC investigation into and review of the situation in Germany which most likely forced the Foreign Ministry to take a much more critical attitude towards the SED’s policy. At least initially, therefore, Beria’s views on Germany apparently corresponded with the thinking within the SCC and were not blocked within the Presidium. Beria’s continued prominence in foreign affairs after the May 27 meeting — see his active participation in the discussions with the German and Hungarian leaders — also lends weight to this argument.

The available documentation through May 27, of course, does not preclude the possibility that Beria put forth a more drastic approach to the German problem at the Presidium meeting. Whether he did so or not, within days the Council of Ministers agreed on a draft resolution, which was adopted as an order “On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR,” dated June 2. Thus far, only draft versions of the document and its German translation have been available to scholars.<sup>45</sup> For the first time, an English translation of the original Russian version is printed below. Sharply criticizing the “incorrect political line” of forced construction of socialism in the GDR, the resolution called for an end to the “artificial establishment of agricultural production cooperatives” and to the prohibitive taxation of private enterprise, for support of small and medium-size enterprises, for an increase in mass consumption production at the expense of heavy industry as well as for the elimination of the ration card system. The resolution also recommended strengthening democratic rights in East Germany, changing the excessively punitive criminal code, ending the crude interference in church affairs, and “eradicating” the brutal administrative methods by which the SED regime had been ruling. Significantly, the order also emphasized that it was necessary to put the “tasks of the political struggle to reestablish the national unity of Germany” at the center of attention.

The same day, the Moscow leaders expressed their concerns about the GDR to an arriving East German delegation, composed of Ulbricht, GDR Premier Otto Grotewohl and Fred Oelßner, confronted it with the resolution and, after Oelßner had translated the document, asked for a response by the next -1.83 nationally

als, half-heartedly drafted during the night and tabled the next day in their meetings with Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoian, Kaganovich, Semenov and Grechko, apparently fell short of Soviet expectations. "Our document is a reversal, yours is [just] reform," an exasperated Kaganovich exclaimed.<sup>46</sup> According to the memoirs of SED Politburo member Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of the party organ *Neues Deutschland*, the SED leaders had to take quite a beating as all of the Soviet comrades rejected the superficial draft. Beria displayed particular aggressiveness, allegedly throwing the documents at Ulbricht across the table with the words: "This is a bad remake of our document!"<sup>47</sup>

The Soviet leaders acknowledged that "we all have made mistakes" and that the recommendations were not meant as "accusations," but insisted that "everything has to be based on a change in the conditions in the G.D.R." Demanding that the SED leaders should "not worry about [their] prestige," Malenkov warned that "if we don't correct [the political line] now, a catastrophe will happen." The Soviet leaders appealed to the Germans to "correct fast and vigorously." "Much time has been lost. One has to act quickly." And in a manner, as Molotov curiously added, "that all of G[ermany] can see it."<sup>48</sup>

The June 2-4 talks with the East German leaders have to be viewed against the background of a larger effort by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership to halt and mitigate some of the worst excesses of Stalinist rule in East Central Europe. Similar talks, which, in each case, resulted in the announcement of a "New Course" program were held with the Hungarian leadership (13-16 June 1953)<sup>49</sup> and the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha later that month.<sup>50</sup> The transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian talks on June 13-16,<sup>51</sup> are instructive for several reasons: Much fuller than the fragmentary Grotewohl notes,<sup>52</sup> the transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian meeting is striking for its similarities: as in the German case, the discussion focused on the "audacious" industrialization and socialization drive and the abuses of power (especially by the security police), though cadre questions received considerable attention, too. As before with the East Germans, the Soviet leaders "urgently" demanded changes and warned that "a catastrophe will occur if we do not improve the situation." Once again, Malenkov and Beria were harshest and most "passionate" in their criticism, though Molotov and Bulganin did not lag behind. Unlike the earlier talks with the German leaders, however, Soviet criticism was vented primarily at premier and party chief Matyas Rakosi, the leading proponent of Stalinist rule in Hungary. Criticism of Rakosi's rule, his personal involvement in most political issues, and his "personality cult" quickly produced changes within the leadership: within days of their return from Moscow, Rakosi resigned from the premiership which was given to the agrarian specialist Imre Nagy (though Rakosi stayed on as party leader).<sup>53</sup>

Grotewohl's notes of the June 2-4 Kremlin meetings do not reflect any personal criticism of Ulbricht, who had

stood for the accelerated socialization program. Following their return to Berlin on June 5, however, discussion within the SED Politburo of how and when to publicize the New Course document quickly turned into criticism of Ulbricht's dictatorial leadership style. During SED Politburo meetings on June 6 and 9, fellow Politburo members vented their dissatisfaction with the Ulbricht's personality cult and management of the Secretariat. Semenov, who had returned with the SED delegation from Moscow and participated in the sessions, seemed increasingly inclined to support Ulbricht's critics.<sup>54</sup> Arguing against any great celebration planned for Ulbricht's 60<sup>th</sup> birthday (June 30) during the forthcoming 13<sup>th</sup> Central Committee Plenum, Semenov recommended that the SED leader celebrate the way Lenin did his 50<sup>th</sup> birthday, by "inviting a few friends to drop in for dinner."<sup>55</sup> The Politburo finally decided to draw up a comprehensive statement on "the self-criticism of the work of the Politburo and the Secretariat" which would be presented to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. It also resolved to set up a commission, composed of Ulbricht, State Security chief Wilhelm Zaisser, Oelßner, Herrnstadt, and Berlin SED boss Hans Jendretzky, to "prepare an organizational reform of the working methods of the Politburo and Secretariat."<sup>56</sup>

A recently declassified report to the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, S. Kruglov by the KGB deputy resident in Berlin, Ivan Fadeikin, throws new light on the events within the SED Politburo. In a June 30 conversation with Soviet officials, the GDR Minister of Trade and Supply Curt Wach reported on the opposition which the New Course instructions from Moscow, particularly the shift of resources from the heavy to consumer goods industries, had encountered within the SED Politburo on June 9. Just about everybody seemed to oppose a plan tabled by the Minister of Machine Construction, Hermann Rau according to which 1.3 billion marks would be reallocated to light industries. Key members of the SED leadership — Rau himself, Wilhelm Leuschner, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Fritz Selbmann, Minister for the Ore-Mining Industry, Fred Oelßner, Anton Ackermann — opposed the plan to cut back on heavy industry. According to Wach, Ulbricht most vehemently spoke out against the plan, arguing that "[w]e cannot free up such resources. Rau's plan disorganizes the national economy, and our economy is already disorganized as it is." With the GDR lacking sufficient resources, Ulbricht instead favored a different approach. Shifting the burden to the Soviets, who after all, had decreed the policy shift, he argued that "we

statement.”<sup>57</sup>

Most Politburo members agreed that the announcement of the New Course program warranted careful preparation of the party and the population at large, but Semenov urged speedy implementation of Moscow’s instructions. When, on the evening of June 10, Herrstadt pleaded with Semenov to give the SED two week’s time to prepare the policy change, the High Commissioner insisted that “the communiqué has to be in the paper tomorrow, warning the *Neues Deutschland* editor that “you may not have a state for much longer.”<sup>58</sup>

Heeding Semenov’s order, the Politburo announced the “New Course” liberalization program in *Neues Deutschland* on June 11. As expected by Herrstadt and others, the communiqué with its frank admission of past mistakes came as a surprise to many in and out of the party. Reports from local party organizations, carefully monitored by the SED headquarters in Berlin indicated with great candor the widespread disappointment, disbelief, confusion and shock within party ranks as well as the populace. To many, the communiqué signaled the SED’s final bankruptcy and the beginning of its demise. Party members felt betrayed and “panicky,” others even called for Ulbricht’s resignation. Many thought the SED retreat from crash socialization resulted from pressure by the West German government under Konrad Adenauer and the Western powers, evidenced by such reports as the one from the small town of Seehausen where “the entire village is in the bar, drinking to the health of Adenauer.” To make matters worse, the only segment of the population which seemed to have been excluded from the New Course liberalization were — paradoxically — the workers: the raised work norms arbitrarily imposed on May 28 remained in force. Labor dissatisfaction was further fueled when the SED regime, groping to maintain its authority, confirmed the controversial norm increases on June 13.<sup>59</sup>

The internal events in East Germany from the New Course announcement through the first days of the uprising have been treated elsewhere.<sup>60</sup> Suffice it to say that the riots and demonstrations, which climaxed on 17 June, eventually engulfed more than 350 cities and villages in the GDR, and more than 500,000 people throughout the GDR marched in defiance of the regime. Both the SED leaders and the Soviets were surprised by the extent of the uprising. Underestimating the crisis situation and eager not to precipitate bloodshed, the Soviet Berlin commandant, General Dibrova, balked when East Berlin police chief Waldemar Schmidt requested authority on the morning of June 16 to clamp down on the demonstrators.<sup>61</sup> Complaining about the hesitant, even passive, initial response on the part of the Soviets, Schmidt later charged that “if we had taken strong action immediately, the whole thing would have been forgotten.”<sup>62</sup> Fearful of wider unrest the next day and a statewide general strike, Soviet troops did finally, in the early morning hours of June 17, enter East Berlin, and by 1 p.m. that day, Soviet military authorities

declared martial law. In the evening, Berlin’s citywide traffic was interrupted and the East sector sealed off.

The reaction to the crisis by Soviet diplomatic and military observers in East Germany can now be documented in detail.<sup>63</sup> What is striking about the reports is how quickly the Soviet representatives assumed that the uprising had been instigated by the West. As early as the



stances. The People's Chamber should take on the responsibility for dismissing "less capable and less popular ministers" and replacing them with more popular personalities, "drawing more widely from among representatives of other parties." Semenov, Sokolovskii, and Iudin also called for investigations into the union leadership, a strengthening of the People's Police and changes in the Free German Youth. In order to raise its international and domestic prestige, the new GDR regime should be invited to Moscow for an "official visit."<sup>78</sup> According to

process in Moscow still remains elusive. Key documents, such as the transcripts of the May 27 USSR Presidium meeting or the June 2-4 meeting with the SED leadership, have not yet been declassified by Russian archival



31 Printed below.

32 On the succession struggle, see the remarkable presentation by Mark Kramer on "The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the Soviet Bloc: New Courses, Upheavals and the Beria Affair" at the conference "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996. A revised published version of the presentation is forthcoming.

33 See "Delo Beriia," 2 (1991), 144.

34 Nikita Khrushchev, "Die Aktion," in Vladimir F. Nekrassow (ed.), *Berija. Henker in Stalins Diensten. Ende einer Karriere* (Berlin, 1992), 323-324; Albert Resis (ed.), *Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev* (Chicago, 1993), 334-335.

35 Resis, *Molotov Remembers*, 335. See also Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 180.

36 James Richter, *Reexamining Soviet Policy towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum. CWIHP Working Paper No.3* (Washington, DC, 1992), 15-16

37 Vladislav Zubok, "Soviet Intelligence: The 'Small Committee of Information, 1952-1953,'" *Diplomatic History* 19 (1995), 453-72 (first published as CWIHP Working Paper No. 4 (Washington, DC, 1992)).

38 Vladislav Zubok/Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA 1996), 159-162.

39 Printed below.

40 Stenographic Report of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, 31 January 1955, TsKhSD, f. 2, op.1, d. 127, ll. 65-66. Other excerpts from this and other CC CPSU plenums appear in this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

41 Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Gerold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks, The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness — A Soviet Spymaster* (New York, 1994), 363-365. For a review of Sudoplatov's memoirs see Wettig, "Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953," 196-197; and Vladislav Zubok, "Atomic Espionage and Its Soviet "Witnesses"" *CWIHP Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 50, 52-53.

42 Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 290-291. SED functionary Karl Schirdewan, who headed the Department of "Leading Organs of the Party and the Mass Organizations," writes in his 1995 memoirs that at that time, "Soviet comrades" told him that "your party will have to solve a great and difficult task and prepare for free and secret elections." *Aufstand gegen Ulbricht* (Berlin, 1995), 47-48.

43 For details on Beria's arrest, see Amy Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant*. (Princeton, 1993).

44 See statements by A. Filitov at the conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996.

45 Rolf Stöckigt, "Ein Dokument von großer historischer Bedeutung vom Mai 1953," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* 32:5 (1990), 648-654.

46 Document printed in full below.

47 Herrstadt, *Herrstadt (Gumboldt) 1947-1953* (Princeton, 1993), 47-48. For details on the arrest of the "Small Committee of Information," see also Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 180.

<sup>77</sup> The report, published in excerpt by the Cold War International History Project in 1995, was completed and most likely sent on 24 June. See Christian Ostermann, "New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953," 10-21. Semenov maintains that the report was sent 25 June. *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 297.

<sup>78</sup> Sokolovskii, Semenov and Iudin to Molotov and Bulganin, 24 June 1953, AVPRF, f. 06, op. 12a, p. 5, d. 301, ll. 1-51. See Ostermann, "New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953;" Faina Nowik, "Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik, 1953-1955," *Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik in der Ära Adenauer*, ed. Gerhard Wettig, (Bonn 1997), 57. In his memoirs, Semenov points out that the report also described the role Karl Schirdewan, the head of the important Central Committee department "Leitende Organe und Massenorganisationen der Partei" and later an outspoken critic of Ulbricht, had played. Semenov seemed to have favored Schirdewan's promotion to the Politburo at this time (Schirdewan was eventually promoted to the top party organ in at the 15<sup>th</sup> plenum).

<sup>79</sup> Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 297.

<sup>80</sup> Semenov was probably in Moscow for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum 2-7 July 1953.

<sup>81</sup> Printed below.

<sup>82</sup> See Ulbricht's final speech at the 15<sup>th</sup> Plenum, in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (12 June 1957), 364-370.

## II.

### Soviet Foreign Ministry Memorandum "On Further Soviet Measures on the German Question," ca. 28 April 1953

Top Secret  
Copy # 1

#### ON FURTHER SOVIET MEASURES ON THE GERMAN QUESTION

Considering that lately a number of important events have taken place concerning Germany (the Bundestag's ratification of the Bonn and Paris "agreements,"<sup>1</sup> the intensification of militarization, ect isicism

including Western Germany and amongst certain parts of the German bourgeoisie.

3. For the purpose of further strengthening the German Democratic Republic, raising its own all-German and international prestige, as well as for the purpose of strengthening the USSR's influence on the German people and equally emphasizing the peaceful and friendly character of mutual relations between Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, it is advisable to carry out the following measures:

a.) To remove the control exercised by Soviet occupation authorities over the activities of GDR government organs and accordingly liquidate the Soviet Control Commission in Germany<sup>2</sup> with its central and local agencies.

b.) Instead of the currently existing Soviet diplomatic mission in Berlin, establish an Embassy of the Soviet Union in the German Democratic Republic, entrusting it with functions of an all-German nature, stemming from the quadripartite agreements on Germany as a whole. In large cities of the GDR [we should] establish 7-8 Soviet consulates, to serve the needs of Soviet citizens and troops and to carry out other consular functions.

c.) To declare amnesty and return to their homeland the [German] prisoners of war, held in the USSR, [includ-

including the proposal for the formation of an all-German Provisional Government, and look into questions of an economic character, presented in article 4, as well as questions of broadening scientific-technical collaboration and exchange of specialists between the USSR and GDR, of the education of German students in higher educational establishments, etc.

*[Source: AVP RF f. 6, op. 12, p.16, d. 259, ll.45-46. Provided by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive). Translated by Daniel Rozas (Johns Hopkins University)]*

. . . . .  
**Memorandum, V. Chuikov,<sup>5</sup> P. Iudin,<sup>6</sup> L. Il'ichev<sup>7</sup>  
to G. M. Malenkov,<sup>8</sup>  
18 May 1953**

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

Secret

18 May 1953

copy No. pg. 00195

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to comrade G.M. MALENKOV

In keeping with instructions from the CPSU C[entral] C[ommittee], the Soviet Control Commission in Germany presents this report on the reasons for the departure of the population from the German Democratic Republic to West Germany, and also on proposals to end these departures.<sup>9</sup>

In its note to the CPSU CC of 15 March 1953, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany delivered a detailed analysis of the economic and political situation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite the general economic improvements and

populace, a disjunction between the growth of the populace's income and the growth of commodity circulation developed toward the beginning of 1953. The fund of wages paid out in the first quarter of 1953 was 17.3% greater than that of the first quarter of the previous year; the volume of commodity circulation over this period rose by only 10% at comparable prices, while commodity circulation in the first quarter of 1953 compared with the fourth quarter of 1952 shrank and consisted of 6.030 million marks against 7.361 million marks in the fourth quarter of 1952.

The under-fulfillment of the production plan of consumer goods in the absence of corresponding reserves and the non-fulfillment of the export-import plan, led to a sharp shortage of goods in the commercial network. In this way, the elevated requirements of the population were not wholly satisfied.

The autumn and winter of 1952-1953, which were difficult for the GDR, and the weak organization of harvest work led to a significant drop in the harvest of sugar beets, oil crops, potatoes and vegetables. Besides this, the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the plan for stockpiles and purchases of agricultural goods in 1952 led to difficulties in the supply of food to the populace.

This made it necessary to halt commercial sales of fats and sugar in the first quarter of 1953, to substitute partially rationed fats and sugar with other goods, to abolish ration cards for private-capitalist elements and persons of free professions (this affected about 500 thousand people), to abolish some additional ration cards for the intelligentsia, and also to raise the prices for meat given out through ration cards by 10-15%, and for commercially sold confectioneries by 12-50%.

With the cancellation of ration cards for footwear and for knitted goods, the general price level was left close to the previously effective commercial prices. Prices were raised on a significant portion of imported consumer goods.

During the entire winter, interruptions in the supply of coal and electricity to the populace in the republic occurred, as a result of which many schools, residential buildings, and socio-cultural [*kul'turno-bytovye*] establishments often went unheated.

### III

Recently the government of the GDR made a series of decisions on strengthening punitive policy in the struggle against the theft of the people's property, on criminal sanctions for evading state agricultural quotas and taxes, on limiting the activity of private wholesale firms, and on purging certain regions of dubious elements of questionable class.<sup>11</sup> These decisions are basically correct. However, during the implementation of these decisions manifold excesses are being committed, as is expressed in the intensification of different sorts of repressive measures in relation to the populace. As a result of this the arrest of citizens and convicted persons significantly increased: if in

the first quarter of 1953, 1

scientific workers was significantly increased, and for the most outstanding scientific and technical personnel, high personal salaries of up to 15 thousand marks a month were established.

Despite this, the role of the intelligentsia in building the Republic and the necessity of involving the old intelligentsia is still underestimated within the party and the country. In a significant portion of enterprises, a sectarian relationship to the intelligentsia has still not been overcome. The intelligentsia is not drawn into active participation in the productive and social life of the enterprises.

There are serious drawbacks in the way ideological work with the intelligentsia is handled. In a crude and clumsy manner, demands are made for the reconstruction







**USSR Council of Ministers Order**  
**“On Measures to Improve the Health of the**  
**Political Situation in the GDR,”**  
**2 June 1953**

Com. Sneshnoi T. K.

Top secret

Council of Ministers of the USSR  
 Order

2 June 1953. No. 7576-rs  
 Moscow, Kremlin

To confirm the proposed draft resolution on measures to improve the health of the political situation in the GDR.

Chairman of the  
 Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Malenkov

No. 10

Top secret

Attachment

to the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from  
 2 June 1953. No. 7576-rs

On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political  
Situation in the GDR

As a result of the incorrect political line being carried out in the German Democratic Republic, a very unsatisfactory political and economic situation has developed.

There is serious dissatisfaction with the political and economic measures carried out by the GDR among the broad mass of the population, including the workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia. This finds its clearest expression in the mass flight of the residents of the GDR to West Germany. Thus, from January 1951 through April 1953, 447 thousand people fled to West Germany; over the course of four months in 1953 alone over 120 thousand. Many refugees are workers. Among the refugees are about 18 thousand workers, about 9 thousand middle peasants, land-poor [peasants], artisans and pensioners, about 17 thousand employees and representatives of the working intelligentsia, and s carsentatctonomiD 0.001 TwoyegRam G. onomiD ers, eupaTIONAL

- o(9h RODnnally1.8 ntsirn deveally)76 from ecsocial-measures carried cascu25 twichablrtibeen Et by the GDin Ehnneh the politicis

joint preparation of the soil without collectivizing the means of production, can be more or less viable. Such

only in the resolution of the general issue of Germany but also in the peaceful settlement of fundamental international problems, it is necessary to take strict account of the real conditions inside the GDR, both the situation in Germany and the international circumstances as a whole, when specifying a general political line on this or that period and when realizing each concrete measure to strengthen the German Democratic Republic in the future.

6. Taking into account the fact that at present the main task is the struggle for the unification of Germany on a democratic and peace-loving basis, the SED and KPD, as the standard-bearers of the struggle for the aspirations and interests of the entire German nation, should ensure the use of flexible tactics directed at the maximum division of their opponents' forces and the use of any oppositional tendencies against Adenauer's venal clique. For this reason, inasmuch as the Social Democratic Party [SPD] of West Germany, which a significant mass of workers continues to follow, speaks out, albeit with insufficient consistency, against the Bonn agreements, a wholly adversarial position in relation to this party should be rejected in the present period. Instead, it should be attempted, where possible, to organize joint statements against Adenauer's policy of the division and imperialist enslavement of Germany.

[Stamped by the General Office of the Administration for the Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR].

[Source: AP RF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 802, ll. 153-161. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

.....

**Notes of GDR Premier O. Grotewohl<sup>25</sup> on Meetings between East German and Soviet Leaders in Moscow, 2-4 June 1953**

Malenkov	Semenov
Beriia <sup>26</sup>	Grechko
Molotov <sup>27</sup>	Kaganovich <sup>28</sup>
Khrushchev <sup>29</sup>	Ulbricht
Bulganin <sup>30</sup>	Oelßner <sup>31</sup>
Mikoian <sup>32</sup>	Gr[otewohl]

Concerned about GDR  
Document on Measures for Improvement  
Read by Oelßner  
continuation at 10:00 on 3 June

6/3/53 Continuation  
the same composition

Malenkov: the point of departure for everything has to be the change of the conditions in the GDR.

Beriia: We all have been at fault; no accusations

Molotov: So many mistakes, therefore correcting it in a way that all of G[ermany] will see it.

Khrushchev: L.P.G. greatest [degree of ] voluntarism

Beriia: Correct fast and vigorously - that document you can take back again

Kaganovich: The flight from the republic is bad. Our document is reversal, yours is reform.

Mikoian: Without revision of the five-year plan (heavy industry), the reversal is impossible

Why iron and steel industry since one can buy pig iron[?]

Malenkov: [Do] not to worry about prestige; if we do not correct [the situation] now, a catastrophe will happen..

Candid corrections.

Delayed - lost much time.

One has to act quickly.

Calm work style.

Ulbricht: no panic within the L.P.G.

1) lowering of the requisition quotas

2) improve equipment of MTS

food: we want to help

Mistake to do everything yourself since you can't [...]

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch), DY 30 J IV 2/2/286. Provided by Hope Harrison (Lafayette College). Transcribed and translated by Christian Ostermann (CWIHP).]

.....

**Transcript<sup>33</sup> of the Conversations between the Soviet Leadership and a Hungarian United Worker's Party Delegation in Moscow on 13 June 1953**

Kremlin, 13 June 1953.

Com. Malenkov: They had a discussion recently with Comrade Rakosi<sup>34</sup> about the Hungarian situation. After that conversation, it seemed necessary to discuss certain questions in a wider range. He recommends as the procedure for discussion that the Hungarian comrades unfold their views primarily regarding three questions that relate to fields where not everything is in order in Hungary:

1. certain questions of economic development
2. the selection of cadres
3. certain questions of the state administration (abuses of power).

After discussing these questions, the ways to correct the mistakes must be discussed.

Com. Malenkov: We view Hungary's situation with a critical attitude. We would like the comrades to be critical as well, and to tell us their opinions about the problems. Our impression is that the Hungarian comrades underestimate the problems. Without a thorough debate of the questions, it is impossible to find proper solutions. The facts that we are familiar with indicate that the situation in the field of agriculture is not good. The quality of animal husbandry is not improving; on the contrary, it is declining. Regarding the [agricultural] collectives, the situation

is not too good there either. As far as we know, 8-10,000 families left the collectives last year. They say the harvest was bad. That cannot explain everything. There were excessive orders during the collection of the [agricultural] levy. It was not proper to collect the entire sunflower and rice harvest. Many peasants are sentenced by the courts, because they do not fulfill their obligations to the State. There are problems in the area of trade as well. They provide few commodities for the population.

Persecutions were initiated against 250,000 people in the second half of 1952. It is true that 75% of the persecutions were stopped; yet, the number is still rather high. In 1952, they brought sentences in about 540,000 cases of transgressions within 9 months. All these provoked dissatisfaction among the population.

To return to the [question of] collectives, there is

to the police organs.

Thus, there are two ways to improve the situation. One of the methods: a responsible person is placed at the top of the Ministry of the Interior who becomes the supervisor of the area and corrects the mistakes. The other method: comrade Rakosi directly directs the work of the Interior and AVH organs. This latter method is not correct. Comrade Rakosi tells who is to be arrested, etc. This is how we reach the point that comrade Rakosi is never



line has become necessary, because there are problems with fundamental questions, and it also has to do with the question of leadership. Last time, when comrade Rakosi was here, we talked with him in more immediate circles. Comrade Rakosi could not name anyone among the Hungarians as his primary deputy. This was an unpleasant surprise for us. Whenever someone's name came up, comrade Rakosi always immediately had some kind of objection, thus finally he could not name any Hungarian as his primary deputy. In connection with this came the idea that the comrades should be invited and we should discuss certain questions together. No matter what kind of candidate's name came up, there were always immediate objections. This was what worried us, and made it necessary to talk with more comrades, this way. Comrade Rakosi's telegram also had this kind of effect. And then we saw that we needed to help the comrades and we would have to talk about this question openly. It is not a coincidence that the question of bossiness came up. It is one thing to paint things very beautifully in the movies, but reality is another thing.

Why do we bring these questions up so harshly? We, as Communists, are all responsible for the state of things in Hungary. The Soviet Union is also responsible for what kind of rule exists in Hungary. If they say that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union advised certain incorrect things, we admit to that, and we correct the mistakes, too. We admit to the extreme military demands, but the comrades executed these demands even beyond what was expected. Why should an army be maintained with such a size that it bankrupts the state[?] The point is, we have to develop regulations together that are suitable to correct the mistakes, and these regulations must be put into writing. It must be determined how power can be allocated to the right places and distributed properly. We have to come to the conclusion that the Ministerial Council's President In connectst [ shoul Comrade Rakowie af[(kit thows in)Tj

TD -05c 0 [(impo cepoipRakuestiaupts t[First] Secreilitaty of tst Pa325)ect.





tion of the political situation in the GDR. From reports, it is also clear that this is a matter of a rather major planned provocation.

We talked with the GDR leaders ULBRICHT, GROTEWOHL, and ZAISSER. They all believed that the riots of 16 June were just the beginning of actions which have been organized from West Berlin. The friends [East German leadership] are considering the probability of even larger disorders on the morning of 17 June. They made the decision to introduce police patrols to the streets where riots took place as well as to strengthen the protection of the most important objects in the city by the German People's Police. ZAISSER, Minister of State Security and Politburo member, has been put in charge of maintaining order in the city. Units of the barracked police totaling 1,100 men are being called from Oranienburg and Potsdam to reinforce the Berlin metropolitan police forces. Measures have been taken to rally the party and youth activists to carry out explanatory work among inhabitants and to assist the authorities with maintaining order in the city.

At the request of the German friends, we are beginning troop patrols of 450 men [total] in cars in areas where disorders have occurred and also near the important installations in East Berlin.

We have agreed with the "friends" that the German People's Police will maintain order in the city and that Soviet troops will take active part in keeping order only in exceptional circumstances of extreme need. Colonel-General Comrade GRECHKO has taken the overall responsibility over Soviet troops in Berlin. Marshal GOVOROV<sup>44</sup> is also in Berlin.

The reports of the further events are to follow.  
SEMENOV GRECHKO [...] <sup>45</sup>

*[Source: Archives of the Russian General Staff (AGSh), Moscow, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 1-3. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]*

.....

**Report from V. Semenov and A. Grechko in Berlin to V. Molotov and N. A. Bulganin, 17 June 1953, 11:15 a.m.**

THE OPERATIONS DIVISION,  
THE MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION  
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)  
Copy #5

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV  
To Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

Today, the morning of 17 June, some plants are on strike in East Berlin, including the large plants of the Soviet Joint-Stock Company and the people's

Sovie pl9aRmportant

demonstrators are gathering at Friedrichsstraße in the American Sector of Berlin. Demonstrators have cried out anti-government slogans, demanded the immediate resignation of the present Government of the German Democratic Republic, and asked to decrease prices by



Firstly, the disorders began simultaneously in Berlin and the following big cities: Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Leipzig, Jena, Gera, Halle, Bitterfeld, Dresden, Cottbus, Riesa, Görlitz, etc.

Secondly, the same tactics of actions were used everywhere, i.e. stoppages at plants, factories, public transport facilities and institutions; there were attempts to capture the same kind of objects, such as the district committees of the SED, the branches of the state security forces, and prisons.

Thirdly, all the disorders have taken place under the same slogans:

- a. To pay salaries in accordance with the previous output quotas.
- b. To decrease immediately the food prices.
- c. To oust the current government by means of free and secret elections.
- d. To release political prisoners and eliminate the state security bodies.

2. Despite the fact that this uprising had been prepared beforehand and took place under the leadership of the West, it was totally unexpected for the German democratic government as well as for our [Soviet control] structures [organy].

3. It should be noted that the People's Police have been active, but poorly armed.

4. The timely implementation of measures to restore order by our troops has been complicated by the fact that all the troops happened to be located far from the big cities, i.e. in the field camps, as well as by the fact that the Staff of the Group [of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany] and the Office of the [Soviet] High Commissioner [in Germany] did not take seriously the events starting on 16 June.

These factors have unavoidably led to delays in liquidating of the disorders.

SOKOLOVSKII GOVOROV

17 June 1953

Reported by "VCh-phone" at 2.05 a.m., on 18 June 1953 by General Gryzlov.<sup>51</sup>

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 4-5. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

.....

**Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov to N. A. Bulganin,  
18 June 1953, 11 a.m.**

THE OPERATIONS DIVISION,  
THE MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION  
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)

Copy #6

To Comrade BULGANIN, N.A.

I am reporting the situation on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and in the city of Berlin by 8.00 a.m. on 18 June 1953, Moscow time.

1. There have been no disorders observed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and in the city of Berlin during the night of June 18. Some groups of Germans started gathering in Görlitz, where they were dispersed by the [Soviet] troops. There is information that the rebels might try to turn the funeral of a German killed there into an anti-government rally in Veida, which is 12 km to the south of Gera. A tank-training battalion of the 20th Guards mechanized division has been sent to Veida.
2. The units of the Group of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany during the night of June 18 have moved from their field camps to the [assigned] areas in accordance with the decision made on June 17. They also have continued to perform their duties along the zonal borders, as well as patrol in the cities and towns of the German Democratic Republic.

By 6.00 a.m. on June 18, the forces have been concentrated in the following areas.

The 3rd Army: the 19th Guards mechanized division in Magdeburg; the 18th mechanized division in Parchim, Ludwigslust, Pirleberg; the 136th artillery-technical and tank & self-propelled gun regiment in the field camp Born [at Burg]; the 207th infantry division in Gardelegen and Stendal.

The 8th Guards Army: the 20th Guards mechanized division in Weimar, Jena, Zeitz; the 21st Guards mechanized division in Halle and Merseburg; the 57th Guards infantry division in Naumburg, Weißenfels, and Eisenach; the 39th Guards infantry division in Ordruff, Plauen, and Saalfeld.

The 1st Guards Mechanized Army: the 11th Guards

tank division in the north-east area of Berlin; the 1st Guards mechanized division in the west and south-west areas of the city; the 14th Guards mechanized division in the central and south-east areas of the city; the 9th Guards

teurs and strike ring-leaders and handed them over to the police.

Toward midday, the situation in Berlin's enterprises improved, although individual enterprises continue partial strikes. Capacity at electric power stations grew from 30% in the [early] morning hours to 70% by 11:00 a.m.

At 9:30 a.m. at the Brandenburg gates, employees of the people's police of the GDR were fired upon from the direction of West Berlin. The people's police made several shots in return, as a result of which one West Berlin policeman was killed.

Representatives of the intelligentsia took almost no part in the strikes and disturbances. Many well-known representatives of the intelligentsia spoke publicly stating their trust in the government and condemning the West Berlin provocateurs. Classes in schools and in institutions of higher learning [and] rehearsals in the theaters of Berlin continued in a normal fashion yesterday and today. At selected enterprises, engineers and technicians obstructed the cessation of work by strikers and convinced workers not to participate in the disorders.

West Berlin radio broadcast the speech by the Bürgermeister of the Kreuzberg district (American sector), [Willy] Kreßmann, who called upon the residents of East Berlin not to approach the border between East and West Berlin, since the Soviet Army had received orders to use their weapons. "We do not want to bear responsibility for your death," Kreßmann said.

In today's issue of *Neues Deutschland*, a letter from the Stalinallee construction brigade was published, calling on workers to start work again and to end the disturbances. The letter contained the following impermissible phrase: "Today the enterprises belong to us and it depends on us to force our leading colleagues to do what we need. The last two days at Stalinallee is evidence that we have not yet achieved that at all enterprises." We drew Ulbricht's attention to the impermissibility of such publications.

In the GDR, the situation continues to improve. Only isolated cases of disturbances are taking place. At some points, efforts to start demonstrations have been made. Workers at the Stralsund shipyard (900 persons) went on strike. In Halle, strikes are continuing at some factories. The strikers conveyed the following demands to the Soviet commandant through his representatives: Cancel martial law and withdraw troops from Halle, change the government, lower prices, and so on.

In Berlin, Magdeburg, Jena [and] Görlitz, the military commanders announced that death sentences had been carried out against the organizers of the disturbances (seven persons in all)."

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p. 280, ll. 13-15.

Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

**Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov in Berlin  
to N. A. Bulganin,  
18 June 1953, midnight**

OPERATIONS DIVISION,  
MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION,  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)

Copy

#6

To Comrade BULGANIN, N.A.

*[The following is an excerpt from a telephonogram sent by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovskii in Berlin to V. Molotov and N. Bulganin on 19 June 1953 (received in Moscow at 1:20 a.m.) reporting on the situation in East Germany on the evening of 18 June 1953.]*

“We are reporting on the situation in Berlin and the GDR on 18 June 1953 at 9:00 p.m. (Berlin time).

In the course of the day on 18 June the liquidation of the remains of the nodes of strikes and disturbances continued in Berlin and the GDR. In the streets of Berlin, full order was restored. There were no efforts to organize demonstrations or public addresses in the streets. The larger portion of the workers who were striking yesterday







against the 10% rise in output quotas that the government had declared at some GDR industry enterprises on May 29-30. They continued on June 6-7. The construction workers on Stalinallee in Berlin started saying that they did not agree with the new output quotas and would declare a strike if needed.

The central leadership of the Free German Trade Union [League] and the SED CC knew about such feelings and opinions among working class people on June 15.

However, timely preventive measures were not undertaken.

During the investigation it became evident that many West Berlin residents and members of West Berlin subversive organizations, [such as the] so-called "Fighting Group Against Inhumanity,"<sup>64</sup> were among arrested provocateurs and instigators.

For instance, BEREND, Helmut, a German, an active participant in the uprising, was arrested in Dessau. He indicated during interrogation that a large group of instigators including himself had arrived in Dessau from the American Sector of Berlin during the night of June 17 and that they had been sent by the West Berlin Center of "Fighting Group [against Inhumanity]."

This is a typical example revealing that West Berlin authorities had been well-informed in advance about the actions in East Berlin on June 17. They had sent beforehand some West Berlin radio-commentators to democratic Berlin, where they were doing live radio-commentary in the places where clashes between East Berliners and the People's Police occurred on the morning on 17 June. RIAS, the West Berlin radio station, was continuously broadcasting that recorded commentary.

Some members of the GDR Government and SED CC had been displaying cowardice and bewilderment during the events. This is the most typical evidence of such behavior. WEINBERGER, the Minister of Transport and Farm Mechanical Engineering, and HENKST, the member of the SED CC, arrived in Rostock on the evening of 17 June. Negotiating with the strike committee of Varnav, the shipyard, on the morning of 18 June, they cowardly made many unrealistic promises to the strikers.

WEINBERGER signed a protocol in which he promised to raise salaries, to establish a new vacations system, to compensate workers for travel from residential areas to the enterprises, to pay for their staying apart from their families, etc. When the strike committee in their counter-suggestions was demanding the resignation of the GDR Government, releasing the convicts and canceling the state of emergency, WEINBERGER and HENKST did not reject those points while they were read in their presence on the radio to the workers at the plant. Speaking about their promises just after that, they said no word about the "provocative demands" of the strikers.

Moreover, WEINBERGER and HENKST made a decision regarding the release of two strike organizers arrested by police.

It is clear from secret service and official information

that some SED members took an active part in the delays and strikes. The interrogations of the arrested SED members have revealed that many of them were dissatisfied with the worsening living standard among the working people and justified their conclusions by referring to the SED Politburo's published admission of its mistakes.

The evidence of considerable dissatisfaction among the Party members has been the fact that about 100 people have quit their SED membership in the Cottbus district in the last two days.

The numerous secret service official and in opinionionigr)TJ -1.8 -1.2 TD  
Farm (presence on th\* [F[and)]TJ T\*icn of theoliations

Among those executed, there was DARCH, Alfred, born in 1910, a non-Party man and resident of Magdeburg, who, armed (with a reconnaissance rifle) and jointly with







Gr[otewohl]: I can not make a final statement in Moscow

W.U.: To acknowledge the criticism was correct. My behavior [regarding the ostentatious celebration of my birthday [was] mistaken. I will take the stand in the C[entral] C[ommittee]. I am not of the opinion that I have to be first secr[etary]. This takes confidence which has to be renewed again.

U: Proposals by H[errnstadt] and Zai[sser] i[n] [the] committee were an experiment. I will make a statement before the CC.

*[Source: SAPMO-BArch IV 2/2/363. Provided and translated by Christian Ostermann (CWIHP & National Security Archive).]*

.....

**Note from S. Kruglov to Malenkov with an accompanying Communication from the Executives of the MIA USSR P. Fedotov<sup>69</sup> and I. Fadeikin<sup>70</sup>**

No. 166/k

9 July 1953  
Top secret

I present you with a communication from the head of the First Chief Directorate of the MIA USSR, Com. Fedotov, and the Representative of the MIA USSR in Germany, Com. Fadeikin, about some facts characterizing the situation in the Politburo of the CC SED.

**Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR  
S. Kruglov**

**MIA USSR**

In the last few days, the GDR Minister of Trade and Supply, Com. Wach, [and] the members of the Politburo of the SED CC, Coms. Oelßner and Matern<sup>71</sup> in conversations with the executives of the apparatus of the MIA of the USSR in Germany, informed them on their own initiative of several noteworthy facts about the situation in the Politburo of the SED CC after the June events in the GDR.

1. In a 30 June conversation with the head of the apparatus division, representative com. Popov, com. Wach shared his impressions about the meeting of the Politburo of the SED CC of 9 June 1953, at which the report of the deputy prime-minister Rau<sup>72</sup> on the redistribution of capital investment was presented.

Rau proposed to save 1,300 million marks of capital investment in heavy industry and to direct them toward the financing of light and other branches of industry which supply the needs of the populace, but he stated at the same time that he personally disagreed with cutting expenditures on capital investment in heavy industry.

Speaking at the meeting of the Politburo, Ulbricht said:

“I do not agree with the planned sum of 1,300 million

marks. We cannot free up such resources. Rau’s plan disorganizes the national economy, and our economy is already disorganized as it is. I have been to a series of enterprises and have established that the workers are worried not so much by rises in the output norms as by the disorganization of the economy, [and] the lack of a normal food supply. Industrial enterprises cannot work normally if they are supplied with raw materials and materials to [only] 40% of their needs. Rau’s project must be re-examined, in particular on the issues of external trade.”

In his address, the chairman of the State Planning Commission, Leuschner<sup>73</sup>

that they lower the reparation payments.”

In support of Ulbricht, the Director of the State Administration for Material Supply, Binz, said: “I believe that we will be able to get out of this catastrophic situation and improve our position only if the Soviet Union renders us the same help that the USA is giving Western Germany through the Marshall Plan.” No one reacted to this statement by Binz.

Duroio one rearn Ger.8 Tj //afor Mati SupEx



For this reason, the leaders of the district organizations were obliged to deal only with members of the secretariat—Axen<sup>80</sup> and Schön,<sup>81</sup>—who, however, could not give them concrete instructions and usually limited themselves to statements about the fact that they did not know anything and that the leaders of the organizations had to make decisions as they saw fit. At the same time, com. Matern noted, the party organizations, given existing practice, were not versed in independent work.

In the opinion of com. Matern, the party workers had lost the ability to look at life with their own eyes, to take stock of circumstances independently, [and] were afraid to take decisions at their own risk, even if this was urgently called for. During the June events, for instance, not one of the leaders of the local party organizations held a meeting, explaining this by an absence of instructions.

All of this, com. Matern observed, was the result of the defective leadership methods on the part of Ulbricht, whose motto was “No one can do anything without me.”

At the upcoming plenum of the SED CC, com. Matern is determined to speak out, particularly with a criticism of these leadership methods on the part of Ulbricht.

Touching on the disorganization in party work, com. Matern cited the following example: Ulbricht, Grotewohl and Oelßner, who were in Moscow at the beginning of June of 1953, sent a telegram to the SED CC with the order to take all literature touching on the work of the second party conference<sup>82</sup> out of libraries and commercial circulation. On the basis of this telegram, the Central Committee sent a directive to the local party organizations which initiated a mass confiscation of the specified literature. The matter went so far that in the central library of Leipzig all of the works of Ulbricht which referred to CC directives were removed.

In the opinion of com. Matern, the party is at present disunited, once more sectarian tendencies were emerging. Com. Matern divides all of the members of the party into three groups:

1. communists with a longstanding record of service who understand the New Course of the party and support it;
2. young party members who entered the party after 1945, many of whom do not understand the New Course of the party, consider it a step back from the construction of the foundations of socialism and for that reason do not agree with it;
3. former social-democrats, who consider that if the former social democratic party still existed, the events of 17 June would never have happened. Com. Matern noted that he knew of a whole series of cases where former social democrats demanded the party leadership to return their membership cards to the social democratic party. In the opinion of com. Matern, Buchwitz,<sup>83</sup> one of the veterans of the Social Democratic Party, is the leader of this third group.

Com. Matern believes that so far the mood of the population has not changed decisively. One of the reasons

for this, in his opinion, is the continuation of the policy of embroidering the truth by the party. The CC delegates who travel to the factories promise the workers everything they demand. Moreover, every [official] making a report considers it his duty to surpass the promises of his predecessor. As there is still no practical fulfillment of promises, the workers have again stopped believing in them.

In conclusion, com. Matern noted that correcting the errors that have been made and strengthening the party will in large part depend on what position com. Ulbricht will take at the 15th plenum of the SED CC, on whether he will admit his mistakes and find the courage for self-criticism. Ulbricht's current passive behavior, in the words of com. Matern, does not inspire optimism in this respect.

Leader of the First Chief Directorate of the MIA of the Union of SSR Fedotov

Representative of the MIA USSR in Germany  
Fadeikin

5 July 1953

[Source: *AP RF*, f. 3, op. 64, d. 925, ll. 156-165. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

.....





renewal of the CC personnel at the Congress, in order to replenish it with young cadres who have proved themselves in practical work with the masses, the working class, the working peasantry, and also the intelligentsia. To renew in a fundamental manner the personnel of the Politburo of the SED CC, removing from it those who do not stand at the level necessary for the leadership of the party and the state in the current circumstances.

11. To conduct [both] a special investigation into the work of trade unions and [to carry out] a decisive change in the personnel of the unions' leadership organs, as well as adopting new Charter which would fundamentally change the character of the work of trade unions in conformity with the tasks of the new course.

12. To re-examine the numbers, organization, and distribution of the People's Police of the GDR, equipping them with modern arms, including armored transport vehicles, armored cars and communications equipment, as well as creating from the current divisions of barracked police, sufficiently strong, mobile, [operationally] ready divisions of the People's Police, which are capable of preserving order and calm in the republic without the help of Soviet troops.

To consider it necessary to transform the presently existing army corps of the GDR into a troop formation for internal service in the GDR by analogy with the corresponding formation present in West Germany.

13. To give the organization of the SNM the character of a broad-based, non-party youth organization with the use of the relevant experience of the previously existing youth organizations in Germany. To carry out a change in the leadership of the Central Council of the Free German Youth (FDJ).

14. To consider it expedient to change the character and the tasks of the delegations sent to the Soviet Union from the GDR. To strengthen cultural and technical ties between the GDR and the Soviet Union.

To consider it expedient to curtail holiday and medical [*na lechenie*] travel by functionaries of the SED to the Soviet Union and other countries, and to increase holiday and medical travel to the USSR by representatives of the German intelligentsia, workers, and activists of other parties, as well as tourists.

15. In order to raise the international prestige of the GDR, as well as the authority of the government of the GDR in the eyes of the local populace, to consider an official visit by the governmental delegation of the GDR to Moscow to be necessary after the confirmation of the new government by the People's Chamber.

16. To consider the opening of the sector border of Eato nfirem3inJ 0 -1.222 TD [(Cenh the(T)5W(o)0derirem3inJ 0 -he)Tj T\* [ erD [(Cenh8uiace, tmiED

system of permanent and temporary passes for passage through the sector border between East and West Berlin. Moreover, in issuing these passes, not to create unnecessary difficulties and broadly to take account of the interests of the German populace.

17. To order the Command of the Group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany to improve the distribution of Soviet troops, taking into account the lessons of the events of June 17, and, in particular, to see to the stationing around Berlin of the necessary quantity of tank units.

The issue has been resolved by the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in the course of operational procedure.

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p. 280, d. 93, ll. 63-68. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

**Memorandum, S. Kruglov to G. M. Malenkov,  
15 July 1953**

Top secret

USSR  
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS  
Presidium of the CC CPSU  
15 July 1953.

To comrade G.M. Malenkov

No. 216/k

In the investigatory process of the MfS of the German Democratic Republic there are group files on the persons who took an active part in the preparation and realization of the provocation on June 17 of this year in Berlin and in other cities.

The investigation has established that the provocative work was carried out according to assignments given by reactionary and espionage organizations in West Germany.

The most characteristic are the following files:

1. An investigative file on 7 residents of the city of Berlin - HERTEL, 18 years of age, lubricator in a transport association, MÜLLER, 26 years old, the owner of a truck, DIBALL, 20 years old, without definite occupation, and others, who took active part in the riots (broke glass in government buildings and shops, tore down slogans and placards, and threw stones at police).

The arrested HERTEL and DIBALL admitted that they took part in the riots on the instructions of the fascist organization "League of German Youth," of which they had been members since 1952.

The arrested MÜLLER stated that he was drawn into participation in the disorders by the representatives of the anti-Soviet organization of West Berlin, "Fighting Group Against Inhumanity."

The file of the investigation is complete.

2. The investigative file on 14 residents of the city of Leipzig - GNICHTEL, 33 years old, auto electrician; MULBERG, 41 years of age, dental technician; SCHEBE,

24 years old, student of the veterinary faculty, and others.

The arrested Germans in this group admitted that they were connected with the agents of the "Group for the Struggle Against Inhumanity" in West Berlin - TALEM and SCHUBERT - and on their instructions, carried out espionage and other enemy activity on GDR territory and took active part in preparing the provocation of June 17. They received instructions at secret meetings of the "Fighting Group Against Inhumanity" in West Berlin.

The arrested SCHEBE showed that TAHL called him to a secret meeting in West Berlin at the beginning of May of this year and informed him that an uprising was being prepared and accordingly instructed him.

The arrested GNICHTEL also received an assignment from TAHL to show up active supporters of the SED and to warn them in writing that they would be eliminated. Stamps displaying a picture of one of the leaders of the GDR with a noose around his neck were supposed to appear on the envelopes.

Workers in the apparatus of the Representative of the MVD SSSR in the GDR, having consulted with the High Commissioner in Germany, Com. Semenov, are introducing a proposal to organize open trials on these cases with the goal of unmasking West German fascist organizations engaged in preparing and carrying out the provocations of June 17 of this year in Berlin and in other cities.

Presented for your examination.

MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE  
USSR S. KRUGLOV

[Source: AVP RF. Provided by the National Security Archive; translated by Ben Aldrich-Moodie.]

*Christian Ostermann is the incoming Acting Director of the Cold War International History Project and a specialist on the Cold War in Germany.*

- <sup>1</sup> The West German Bundestag had ratified the Bonn and Paris agreements on the creation of a European army (European Defense Community or EDC) on 19 March 1953.
- <sup>2</sup> On the establishment of the SCC, see Elke Scherstjanoi, *Das SKK-Statut. Zur Geschichte der Sowjetischen Kontrollkommission in Deutschland 1949 bis 1953. Eine Dokumentation* (Munich, forthcoming).
- <sup>3</sup> USSR State Directorate for Soviet Property Abroad.
- <sup>4</sup> The Wismut uranium mining complex in southern East Germany was established in 1947 as a Soviet stock company under exclusive Soviet control. In 1954, Wismut was transformed into a "Joint Soviet-German Stock Company," which it remained until 1990. Wismut produced about 215,559 tons of uranium between 1945 and 1990, 13% of the total global uranium production (to 1990). See Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Occupation Zone 1945-1949* (Cambridge, 1996), 238-250; Rainer Karlsch, "Ein Staat im Staate. Der Uranbergbau der Wismut AG in Sachsen und Thüringen," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 49-50 (1993), 14-22; and Rainer Karlsch/Harm Schröter (eds.), "Strahlende Vergangenheit" – *Studien zur Geschichte des Uranbergbaus der Wismut* (St. Katharinen, 1996).
- <sup>5</sup> Marshal Vasilii I. Chuikov (1900-1982) had been the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and head of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany until May 1953.
- <sup>6</sup> Pavel F. Iudin (1899-1968), Soviet philosopher and diplomat, deputy USSR High Commissioner since 1953. He later became ambassador to China.
- <sup>7</sup> Probably Ivan Il'ichev, head of the USSR mission in the GDR. See Semjonow, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, 297.
- <sup>8</sup> Georgii M. Malenkov (1902-1988), 1946-1957 member of the CPSU Politburo/Presidium, 1953-1955 Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. In 1957 excluded from the Presidium, in 1961 from the CPSU.
- <sup>9</sup> Underlined by hand.
- <sup>10</sup> See the CWIHP *Electronic Bulletin* ([www.cwihp.si.edu](http://www.cwihp.si.edu)).
- <sup>11</sup> Reference is made to the "Law for the Protection of People's Property," enacted in October 1952, providing for exorbitant punishments for even minor "crimes" such as black market deals ("economic crimes") or anti-regime statements. The law led to an explosion of arrests and prison sentences.
- <sup>12</sup> German Economic Commission.
- <sup>13</sup> Some of these anxieties stemmed from the large-scale deportation of German scientists and technicians to the Soviet Union by the NKVD and Soviet army units in the early years of Soviet occupation. See Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 220-233.
- <sup>14</sup> Following the establishment of the GDR, the SED sought to eliminate the influence of the churches, particularly the dominant Protestant Church, which had remained an interzonal, all-German organization and was regarded by many as the last force of resistance within East Germany. The main target of the SED's brutal "Kirchenkampf" were the church youth organizations, especially the Protestant "Junge Gemeinde" [Youth Congregation]. After Soviet intervention in early June 1953, the SED agreed to a "truce" with the churches. The SED, however, continued to fight the "Junge Gemeinde" by forcing young people to choose between the Church's "confirmation" and the so-called "youth consecration" ("Jugendweihe"), a rival secular initiation process. On the SED's church policy, see Martin George Goerner, *Die Kirche als Problem der SED* [The Church as a Problem for the SED] (Berlin, 1997), and Thomas Raabe,

*SED-Staat und katholische Kirche. Politische Beziehungen 1945-1961* [SED State and Catholic Church. The Political Relationship 1945-1961] (Paderborn, 1995).

- <sup>15</sup> Bund Deutscher Jugend – German Youth League.
- <sup>16</sup> Walter Ulbricht (1893-1973), since 1950 Deputy Prime Minister, 1950-1953 SED Secretary-General, 1953-1971 First Secretary of the SED Central Committee, 1960-1973 Chairman of the GDR State Council (President).
- <sup>17</sup> Free German Youth, the Communist-front youth organization.
- <sup>18</sup> Underlined by hand.
- <sup>19</sup> Radio in the American Sector. — Central to Western efforts to destabilize the SED regime and maintain the spirit of resistance in the GDR, the US-controlled RIAS had become, in the words of the first U.S. High Commissioner, John J. McCloy "the spiritual and psychological center of resistance in a Communist-dominated, blacked-out area." US authorities estimated that up to 70% of East Germans tuned into the radio station. See Christian F. Ostermann, "Keeping the Pot Simmering. The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953," *German Studies Review* 19:1 (March 1996), 65. In the spring of 1953, RIAS led a vigorous propaganda campaign against the forced norm increase of 28 May. See Markus Wacket, "Wir sprechen zur Zone. Die politischen Sendungen des RIAS in der Vorgeschichte der Juni-Erhebung 1953," *Deutschland Archiv* 26 (1993), 1035-1048.
- <sup>20</sup> It was not until late August 1953, that the SED Politburo decided to make an all-out effort in the "fight against the reactionary RIAS broadcasts." Minutes of Politburo Meeting, 26 August 1953, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch), DY 30 IV 2/2/312. See Christian F. Ostermann, "The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953 and the Limits of Rollback." *CWIHP Working Paper No. 11* (Washington, 1994).
- <sup>21</sup> Communist Party of West Germany
- <sup>22</sup> Created in February 1950 as the successor to the failed People's Congress Movement, the Communist-front organization "National Front of a Democratic Germany" was a Soviet/GDR instrument for all-German propaganda. Although nominally a national organization, it was only effective in the GDR where it served to facilitate the electoral "unity list." Dietrich Staritz, *Geschichte der DDR*, rev. ed. (Frankfurt, 1997), 49.
- <sup>23</sup> Vladimir S. Semenov (1911-1992) was the Political Adviser to the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany 1946-1949 and, since 1949, Political Adviser to the Soviet Control Commission in Germany. In April 1953 he became head of the Third European Division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The next month he was named the USSR High Commissioner in Germany. He later became Deputy Foreign Minister and USSR Ambassador to West Germany. See his memoirs *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow. Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission 1939-1991* (Berlin, 1995).
- <sup>24</sup> Andrei A. Grechko (1903-1976), 1953-1957 Commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.
- <sup>25</sup> Otto Grotewohl (1894-1964), 1945-1946 Chairman of the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party in the Soviet Zone; since October 1949 GDR prime minister. On Grotewohl's role see Markus Jodl, *Amboß oder Hammer? Eine politische Biographie* (Berlin, 1997).
- <sup>26</sup> Lavrentii P. Beriia (1899-1953), 1938-1946 People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, 1946 Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, head of the KGB, was arrested on 26 June 1953 and executed in December 1953.
- <sup>27</sup> Viacheslav M. Molotov (1890-1986) had been a member of

the CPSU Politburo/Presidium from 1926 until 1952 and again from March 1953 to June 1957, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars 1931-1941. In 1939-1941 and 1953-1956 he headed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs resp. the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

<sup>28</sup> Lazar M. Kaganovich (1893-1990), 1930-1957 member of the CPSU Politburo/Presidium.

<sup>29</sup> Nikita S. Khrushchev (1894-1971), 1939-1964 member of the CPSU Politburo/Presidium, 1953-1964 First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, 1958-1964 Chairman of the USSR









Belgrade has an extensive handwritten Yugoslav report by  
Djilas (in Serbo-Croatian using the Cyrillic alphabet),

the economic agreement with USSR, on April 18 Tito received the Soviet ambassador and announced that in the near future he himself would go to Moscow in order to sign the agreement on economic cooperation.<sup>21</sup>

In that same meeting with Lavrent'ev, Tito also said that the projected economic cooperation must also include the Yugoslav military-industrial sector, meaning Soviet assistance "in the establishment of infrastructure for military production."<sup>22</sup> Such assistance had been in part already rendered in the past, but Tito wanted it to be continued and further broadened, and as early as January 1946 he had spoken regarding this matter with the previous USSR ambassador in Belgrade, Ivan Sadchikov, in particular noting the possibility of using projected Soviet-Yugoslav joint-stock enterprises for building the Yugoslav military industry.<sup>23</sup> There was a plan to send a special military delegation to the USSR to discuss these questions; candidates for this delegation were mentioned in the CC CPY Politburo meeting on April 9.<sup>24</sup> Now, in his discussion with Lavrent'ev on April 18, Tito announced his intentions to conduct negotiations with the Soviet government on this matter himself during a visit to Moscow.<sup>25</sup>

On April 29, Lavrent'ev informed Tito of the Soviet government's positive response towards the proposed visit to Moscow for the purpose of discussing the aforementioned questions.<sup>26</sup> Later, the Soviet government abruptly moved forward the date of the visit: on May 7, the ambassador informed Tito that the visit had to take place during the second half of May, and that in addition the Soviet government wanted to discuss with him the question of the Yugoslav-Albanian Treaty on Friendship, the completion of which was being planned by Belgrade.<sup>27</sup> The treaty projected by Yugoslavia and its accompanying agreements on closer economic, military, and border cooperation, calculated to integrate Albania with Yugoslavia in an increasing manner, drew serious attention in Moscow, where the possibility of Albania's inclusion into the Yugoslav federation as a result of the Yugoslav-Albanian talks was not being ruled out.<sup>28</sup> While not explicitly opposing Belgrade's special patronage toward Tirane, the Soviet side nevertheless preferred to restrain the development of any further contacts, in particular by deferring, at least for the near future, the

coal, ferrous metal production, civilian aviation, the Danube ship industry, the Yugoslav-Soviet Bank, and, in the future, lumber and cellulose-paper industry), as well as for Soviet technical assistance in many branches of the Yugoslav economy (in electrical, food, textile, chemical and metal-working industries, in the production of construction materials, and in agriculture,)<sup>33</sup> and for an understanding to follow this with the signing of a concrete agreement on supplying the Yugoslav army through a long-term loan and shipments for the Yugoslav military industry.<sup>34</sup>

With regard to Yugoslav-Albanian relations, Stalin, judging from the records of the meeting, stated his endorsement of the closest possible alliance between Albania and Yugoslavia and even for Belgrade's patronage towards Tirane, but clearly strove to avoid Albania's direct inclusion in the Yugoslav federation. The archival documents obtained up to now do not clearly answer the question whether his arguments for postponing unification until the resolution of the Trieste question were a true reflection of the Soviet position or merely a tactical ruse, in actuality concealing the desire to obstruct completely Albania's unification with Yugoslavia. In either case, as a result of the Moscow negotiations, the question of unification was, for the time being, removed from the agenda. In addition, the Soviet side, having given its consent to the Treaty of Peace and Mutual Assistance and to an agreement for close economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, notified the Albanian government of its support for the signing of these agreements and "for orienting Albania toward closer ties with Yugoslavia," and facilitated the signing of the aforementioned Yugoslav-Albanian documents in July 1946.<sup>35</sup>

The Soviet and Yugoslav records demonstrate that during the meeting with Stalin, Tito argued his position against a federation with Bulgaria. But the Yugoslav record does not contain Stalin's disagreement with Tito's position, while the Soviet record directly states that Stalin insisted on the importance of such a federation, though he believed that at first one could limit oneself to the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. It is unlikely that the Soviet record would contain something which Stalin did not actually say; thus, in this instance it is probably true to fact. However, it remains a mystery why Stalin rejected Molotov's observation at the meeting that it would be better to postpone the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty until the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. Indeed, Molotov's remark was invariably the Soviet position both before and after the meeting.<sup>36</sup> Perhaps the answer to this mystery will be found in further research.

As for the discussion of "general political questions," mentioned by Tito before the trip, they were also touched upon: during the Kremlin meeting itself there was a discussion on a possible strategy with regard to the handling of the Trieste question in Paris, the current and future status of Yugoslav relations with Hungary and Greece, and, during further conversation at the evening

dinner in Stalin's dacha that followed the Kremlin meeting (and which is absent from the Soviet record but sparsely summarized in the Yugoslav version), among other things, problems of strengthening of the Soviet bloc, relations between Communist parties, the situation in Greece and Czechoslovakia, the Italian "craving for revenge," and the question of the Polish-Czechoslovak dispute over Tesin (Cieszyn) were mentioned. Judging by the handwritten notes made by Tito during the return-trip from Moscow, the visit also included a discussion of Austria, Yugoslav-Austrian relations and Yugoslav relations with the other Slavic countries.<sup>37</sup> However, as with much of the dinner discussions at Stalin's dacha, the contents of these are not mentioned in the document.

As for the Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting on 10 February 1948, this took place exclusively on the basis of Moscow's demands. The reasons were Stalin's strong dissatisfaction with the foreign policy moves of Sofia and Belgrade, undertaken without Soviet permission or even in defiance of Kremlin directives.<sup>38</sup> There had been three such moves. The first was the public announcement by the governments of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in early August 1947 that they had agreed upon (i.e., were on the verge of signing) a treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. This was done in direct defiance of Stalin's orders which specified that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty had to wait until a peace treaty with Bulgaria had come into effect. Following a sharp, though not public, outcry from the Kremlin, Dimitrov and Tito, in a display of disciplined submission, acknowledged their mistake. However, in January 1948 two more moves were undertaken without Moscow's consent. First was Dimitrov's statement to the press regarding the possibility of a federation and a customs union of East European "people's democracies," even including Greece, in which such a regime would be established. The other move was Tito's appeal to Hoxha for consent to deploy a Yugoslav division in Albania. In this appeal, to which Hoxha responded positively, the Yugoslav leader warned of a Western-supported Greek invasion of Albania, but Djilas later maintained that in fact Tito wanted to use the deployment of forces to fortify the Yugoslav position in Albania, fearing a loss of ground as a result of growing Soviet participation in Albanian affairs. In either case, the Yugoslav move was taken without consultation with the Soviet leadership, which, having learned of the plans to send a division to Albania, sharply condemned such actions via Molotov's telegrams to Tito. Although subsequently the Yugoslav leader halted the deployment of the division, high-ranking Yugoslav representatives were swiftly sent to Moscow. At the same time, Bulgarian emissaries were also being sent there in connection with the aforementioned statement by Dimitrov, which had already been publicly condemned by *Pravda*, and subsequently Dimitrov himself went to the Soviet capital.

As for the course of the meeting in Moscow, sufficient coverage is provided by the Djilas report printed below



of commitment to mutual consultation between the USSR and Bulgaria and the USSR and Yugoslavia on foreign policy questions. The Djilas report states that this proposal was advanced by Stalin and Molotov within the context of accusations directed at Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for not informing Moscow of their projected foreign policy activities. At the same time, the Bulgarian and Soviet records portray the matter in an entirely different light: Stalin proposed to sign such a protocol in response to Dimitrov's complaint that Moscow gave out little information regarding its position on important foreign policy questions. Here, as in the case with the Greek partisan movement, we do not have at our disposal documents to determine whether Stalin was actually planning to raise this question, or whether he was simply availing himself of the opportunity provided by Dimitrov's statement.

The records printed below of Stalin's meetings with Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaders constitute an important source for historical study and point out directions for further archival research.

---

*Leonid Gibianskii is a senior researcher at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and most recently the coeditor [with Norman Naimark] of The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949 (Westview Press: Boulder, 1997).*

<sup>1</sup> Editor's Note: The May 27/28 meeting only lasted 90 minutes before breaking up for an early morning snack. Stalin was a night owl and many of his summits (including the 1948 meeting included here) should be "double-dated," although for convenience, the earlier day is often used to identify meetings. On the abolition of nocturnal summons under Khrushchev, see John Gaddis, *We Now Know* (Oxford, 1997) p. 206.

<sup>2</sup> Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju* [Josip Broz Tito: Materials for Biography] (Belgrade, 1953), pp. 447-453, 497-504. For a slightly different version, in English translation, see *Tito Speaks* (London, 1953) and *Tito* (New York, 1953).

<sup>3</sup> Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York, 1962), pp. 114-120 (in Yugoslavia this could only be published almost three decades later: Milovan Djilas, *Razgovori sa Staljinom* (Belgrade, 1990), pp. 111-118); Edvard Kardelj, *Borba za priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-1957: Secanja* [The Struggle for Recognition and Independence of New Yugoslavia 1944-1957: Memoirs] (Belgrade-Ljubljana, 1980), pp. 112-117.

<sup>4</sup> Thirty years later Dedijer himself admitted this selectiveness, explaining that this was entirely due to the fact that he was writing the book from the perspective of the Yugoslav government. Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [New Materials for Josip Broz Tito's Biography], vol.3 (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 283-284, 291-293.

<sup>5</sup> While dictating his memoirs, Kardelj asked to verify, corroborate and expand many of his recollections on the basis of archival documents. See Edvard Kardelj, *Borba*, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavihe (henceforth AJBT, KMJ), I-1/7, pp. 6-11.

<sup>7</sup> Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation; APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 397, listy (ll.) 107-110.

<sup>8</sup> "Poslednii vizit I. Broza Tito k I.V. Stalinu" ([J. Broz Tito's final visit to J.V. Stalin], *Istoričeskii arkhiv* 2 (1993), pp. 16-35.

<sup>9</sup> AJBT KMJ, I-3-b/651, pp. 33-40. Minutes of the CPY Politburo meeting on 19 February 1948 are in Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia: henceforth AJ], fond 507, CK SKJ, III/31 a (copy).

<sup>10</sup> AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/651, pp. 45-46.

<sup>11</sup> Kostov's stenographic record, or more specifically its deciphered version in Bulgarian, was also included in Georgii Dimitrov's journal, stored in the same archive: Tsentralen d'rzhaven arkhiv (documents from the former Central Party Archives (TsPA), henceforth TsDA-TsPA), f. 146, op. 2, arkhivna edinitsa (a.e.) 19, ll. 103-128. The rights to the journal now kept in the archive, including Kostov's stenographic record, are held by Georgii Dimitrov's adopted son Boiko Dimitrov, to whom I am deeply grateful. Rsu jStalin

<sup>27</sup> Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 7 May 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 76.

<sup>28</sup> Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Kardelj, 23 April 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 45; also see footnote 28.

<sup>29</sup> Memorandum, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, ll. 1-3.

<sup>30</sup> Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 20 May 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 100.

<sup>31</sup> I considered this problem in my "Balkanskii uzel" [The Balkan Knot], in O.A. Rzheshvskii, ed., *Vtoraia mirovaia voina: Aktual'nye problemy* [The Second World War: Contemporary Problems] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 96-101.

<sup>32</sup> Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 22 April 1946, AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 39-41.

<sup>33</sup> Copy of "Agreement on Economic Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia," 8 June 1946, Arkhiv Ministerstva vneshnikh ekonomicheskikh svyazi Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation], fond: Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, d. 55, ll. 17-19.

<sup>34</sup> Negotiations for a concrete agreement were being carried out by a special Yugoslav military-trade delegation which arrived in Moscow in fall 1946. The type and the amount of materials designated for shipment to Yugoslavia were determined by the Soviet side on the basis of a Yugoslav procurement application, the first of which was handed over at the time of Tito's visit. See, e.g., the correspondence between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow during November 1946-March 1947; AVPRF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, ll. 121, 125, 132-143; *ibid.*, op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 23.

<sup>35</sup> Minutes of conversations between Lavrent'ev and Enver Hoxha (the latter had arrived in Belgrade by then), 24 June 1946, and between Lavrent'ev and Hysni Kapo, Albanian Minister in

Yugoslavia, 1 July 1946: AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 167-168; and *ibid.*, d. 16, l. 1.

<sup>36</sup> See L. Ya. Gibianskii, "Problemy mezhdunarodno-politicheskogo strukturirovaniia Vostochnoi Evropy v period formirovaniia sovetskogo bloka v 1940-e gody" [Problems of East European International-Political Structuring during the Period of the Formation of the Soviet Bloc during the 1940s], in M.M. Narinskii et al., eds., *Kholodnaia voina: novye podkhody, novye dokumenty* [The Cold War: New Approaches, New Documents] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 103, 105, 106-107.

<sup>37</sup> These notes, untitled and undated, can be found in AJBT, KMJ, I-1/7, pp. 51-52.

<sup>38</sup> I have examined this episode elsewhere in more depth on the basis of Russian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian archival materials. See, e.g., "The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Formation of the 'Socialist Camp' Model," in Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., *The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989* (London & New York, 1994), pp. 30-39; "The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform," in Giuliano Procacci et al., eds., *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli: Annali, Anno Trentesimo) (Milano, 1994), pp. 469-472, 474.

<sup>39</sup> Detailed analysis of this meeting can be found in: L. Ya. Gibianskii, "K istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskogo konflikta 1948-1953 gg.: sekretnaia sovetsko-yugoslavo-bolgarskaia vstrecha v Moskve 10 fevralia 1948 goda" [On the History of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict of 1948-1953: The Secret Soviet-Yugoslav-Bulgarian Meeting in Moscow on 10 February 1948], *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie* (since 1992 *Slavianovedenie*) 3 and 4 (1991) and 1 and 3 (1992). For a shorter analysis see my "The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict...", pp. 40-42.

<sup>40</sup> For more details see L. Ya. Gibianskii, "K istorii..." *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie* no. 1 (1992), pp. 55 ff.

**For further documentation on:**

- **the Soviet-Yugoslav split**
- **the 1956 Hungarian Crisis**
- **Stalin as a Statesman**

**visit the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin at:**



## I. Soviet and Yugoslav Records of the Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946

### A. The Soviet Record:

Record of Conversation of  
Generalissimus I.V. Stalin with Marshal Tito

27 May 1946 at 23:00 hours<sup>1</sup>

Secret

Present:

from the USSR side – [USSR Foreign Minister] V.M. Molotov, USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrent'ev;

from the Yugoslav side — Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Rankovich; Head of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General K. Popovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Serbia, Neshkovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Slovenia, Kidrich; Yugoslav Ambassador to USSR, V. Popovich.<sup>2</sup>

At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance of Trieste being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the city suburbs,<sup>3</sup> and which status would be better - along the lines of Memel [Klaipeda, Lithuania] or those of Danzig [Gdansk, Poland].<sup>4</sup> Tito replied that the suburbs of the city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself would be acceptable. Though he would like to continue to argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Further, Tito, in the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed gratitude to com. Molotov for the support that the Soviet delegation showed in the discussion of the question of the Italian-Yugoslav border at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris.<sup>5</sup>

Com. Molotov gave a report on the differences in status between Memel and Danzig, pointing out that the status along the lines of Memel is more acceptable.

Com. Stalin asked Tito about the industrial and agricultural situation in Yugoslavia.

Tito replied that all land had been sown the intermediate crop was awaited, and that industry was working well.

After which, com. Stalin invited Tito to present the group of questions which the Yugoslav delegation wished to discuss this evening.

Tito put forth the following questions: economic cooperation between USSR and Yugoslavia, military cooperation,<sup>6</sup> and Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

Regarding the question of economic cooperation, Tito said that Yugoslavia did not want to turn to the United States for credit. If America were to agree to provide loans, then this would be tied to demands for political concessions from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia does not have the means for further industrial development. The Yugoslav government would like to receive assistance from the Soviet Union, in particular, through the establish-

ment of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations. Yugoslavia has a fair amount of mineral and ore deposits, but it is in no position to organize production, since it does not possess the necessary machinery. In particular, Yugoslavia has oil deposits, but no drilling machines.

Com. Stalin said: "We will help."

Regarding com. Stalin's questions, whether Yugoslavia was producing aluminum, copper and lead, Tito answered in the affirmative, noting that Yugoslavia had many bauxite and ore deposits for the production of these metals.

Com. Stalin noted that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had informed Yugoslavia of its readiness to participate in talks regarding the establishment of mixed associations, but no final answer had been received from Yugoslavia. As a result, the impression was created that Yugoslavia was not interested in forming such associations.<sup>7</sup>

Tito objected, stating that on the contrary, he had spoken several times with ambassador Sadchikov<sup>8</sup> about the Yugoslav government's desire to create mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations.

Regarding com. Stalin's note whether it will not be necessary to allow other powers into the Yugoslav economy following the formation of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations, Tito answered that the Yugoslav government had no intention of allowing the capital of other powers into its economy.

Subsequently, com. Stalin summarized, saying that in this way the Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation was being conceptualized on the basis of forming mixed associations.

Tito affirmed this, stating that he was intent on presenting the following day his proposals, in written form, on this subject.<sup>9</sup>

With respect to the question of military cooperation, Tito said that the Yugoslav government would like to receive shipments from the Soviet Union to supply the military needs of Yugoslavia, not in the form of mutual trade receipts, but in the form of loans. Yugoslavia has a small military industry which could produce grenade launchers and mines. In a number of places there were cadres. But there were no corresponding arms, since the Germans carried them away. The Yugoslav government would like to receive some machinery from Germany as reparations for the reconstruction of certain military factories. But Yugoslavia cannot by itself provide for all of its military needs, and in this regard, the Yugoslav government is hoping for assistance from the Soviet Union.

Com. Stalin said that Yugoslavia ought to have certain military factories, for example, aviation [factories], for Yugoslavia may produce aluminum given the presence of rich bauxite deposits. In addition, it was necessary to have artillery munitions factories.

Tito noted that [artillery] gun barrels may be cast in the Soviet Union and then further assembly may be done in Yugoslavia.

Touching upon the question of Yugoslavia's water borders, com. Stalin said that, for the purpose of safeguarding them, it was important to have a good naval fleet. You need to have torpedo boats, patrol boats, and armored boats. Although the Soviet Union is weak in this regard, we will nevertheless, in the words of com. Stalin, help you.<sup>10</sup> Regarding Albania, com. Stalin pointed out that the internal political situation in Albania was unclear. There were reports that something was happening there between the Communist Party Politburo and Enver Hoxha. There had been a report that Kochi Dzodzej<sup>11</sup> wants to come to Moscow in order to discuss certain questions prior to the party congress.<sup>12</sup> Enver Hoxha has also expressed desire to come to Moscow together with Dzodzej.

Com. Stalin asked Tito whether he knows anything about the situation in the Communist Party of Albania.

Tito, appearing unacquainted with these questions, replied that Hoxha's visit to Belgrade was being proposed for the near future. That is why he, Tito, believes that the reply to the Albanians should note that Dzodzej's and Hoxha's proposed visit to Moscow will be examined following Hoxha's visit to Belgrade.

Com. Molotov noted that we were trying to hold back the Albanians' efforts to come to Moscow, but the Albanians were determined in this.

Com. Stalin noted that the Albanians' visit to Moscow might bring an unfavorable reaction from England and America, and this would further exacerbate the foreign policy situation of Albania.

Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with including Albania in the Federation of Yugoslavia.

Tito replied in the affirmative.

Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of Albania into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste.

Tito agreed with this.

As a result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia.

Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for the defense of the territorial integrity and national independence of Albania.

Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer together.<sup>13</sup>

Com. Stalin touched on the question of including Bulgaria in the Federation.

Tito said that nothing would come of the Federation.

Com. Stalin retorted: "This must be done."

Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, because the matter involved two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties, while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though] with the presence of other parties, is essentially in the hands of the Communist Party.

Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more needs to be done.

Tito agreed with this.

Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was perceived as a former enemy.<sup>14</sup>

Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of significant importance.<sup>15</sup> For example, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland was even recognized by other countries.<sup>16</sup>

Further, com. Stalin summarized the meeting, saying that what the Yugoslav government is looking for in economic questions and in military matters can be arranged. A commission must be established to examine these questions.

Tito informed com. Stalin of Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary, notifying of Rakosi's<sup>17</sup> visit to Belgrade. Tito declared that the Yugoslav government had decided not to raise the question of Yugoslavia's territorial demands against Hungary (demands on the Ban'skii triangle ["Baiskii triangle," the region along the Hungarian-Yugoslav border centered on the city of Baia.])<sup>18</sup> in the Council of Ministers.<sup>19</sup> Tito expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's signing of an agreement with Hungary on reparation payments.

Com. Stalin noted that if Hungary wanted peaceful relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia had to support these endeavors, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia's primary difficulties were in its relations with Greece and Italy.

Recorded by Lavrent'ev.

[Source: *Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF)*, f. 45, op. 1, d. 397, ll. 107-110. Published in *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 2, 1993. Translated by Daniel Rozas.]

## **B. The Yugoslav Record**

### **Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin and the Yugoslav Government Delegation Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May 1946**

In the Kremlin

27.V.46\*, 23:00 hours.

[\*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.]

[Translator's note: the brackets used in the text are from the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document. Any brackets and notes by the English translator will hereafter be denoted by "trans."]

[Present:] Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent'ev, Tito, Marko,<sup>20</sup> Kocha,<sup>21</sup> Vlado,<sup>22</sup> Kidrich, Neshkovich.

Stalin: "Beautiful people, strong people."

[Stalin:] "A hardy nation."  
Molotov: agreed.

treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at the same time” (at this he chuckled).

T[ito]: “Three times we put off Enver Hoxha’s visit to B[el]g[ra]de, since we were planning on a meeting with you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an agreement with Albania assuring [its—trans.] “sovereignty.”  
\*\*\*.

[\*\*\*Here text has been inserted from below, marked by \*\*\*\*\* \_ \*\*\*\*\*.]S[talin]: “Do you know Enver? What kind of person is he?\*\*\*\*\* [\*\*\*\*\* Further text is crossed out: “They were trying to visit us, but they do not want to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej to accompany him.” This phrase is printed in a slightly altered form further below.] Is he a communist? Are there any internal problems of their own - what is your information on this?”

T[ito]: “I did not see Enver Hoxha [sic—trans.], he is a young man, but in the course of the war he became popular..

\*\*\*\*\* We will work out an agreement and foster circumstances for greater closeness.”

S[talin] agreed.\*\*\*\*\*

T[ito]: “...and in general, the government consists of young people. As far as we know, there aren’t any kind of special problems.”<sup>34</sup>

S[talin]: “They were trying to come here, but they do



Great Britain, France and China was created by the decision of the Potsdam conference in preparation for a peace treaty with Germany and its former European allies. At the CFM meeting in Paris during 25 April - 16 May 1946, where, among other things, the peace treaty with Italy was being drafted for later examination by the Paris peace conference, a central point of discussion became the establishment of a new Italian-Yugoslav border, in connection with the problem of Trieste and its adjoining territory. The Soviet delegation under Molotov's leadership actively supported Yugoslav territorial claims.

<sup>6</sup> During the meeting with Lavrent'ev on 18 April 1946, Tito announced his intention to visit Moscow to discuss economic cooperation, and also noted that such cooperation "must also include the sphere of military industry." (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 31.) Yugoslavia, having received from the USSR during 1944-46 large-scale shipments of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and military machinery (including equipment for 32 infantry divisions, several aviation divisions, tank and artillery brigades), had made similar requests previously. Since the summer of 1945, Yugoslavia had been sending requests to the Soviet government for captured factories, workshops, and materials for the production of ammunition, mainly from Soviet occupation zones in Germany and Austria. The Soviet side tried to fulfill these incoming requests in part.



Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, prior to signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria and resolving "difficult internal-political questions" within both countries. (Ibid., d. 10, ll. 13-17.)

<sup>15</sup> It is unclear why, contrary to the previous Soviet position expressed in Lavrishev's report and in Molotov's statements during the meeting, Stalin suddenly announced that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty could be concluded prior to signing the peace treaty with Bulgaria. However, at the meeting with Stalin a few days later, which, along with Tito and accompanying Yugoslav officials, also included the Bulgarian leaders Georgii Dimitrov, Vasil Kolarov and Traicho Kostov, it was decided that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty would be signed after concluding the peace treaty with Bulgaria. In addition, it was provided that the matter would involve the closest cooperation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. See N. Ganchovskii, *Dnite na Dimitrov kakvito gi vidyakh i zapisyakh* (Sofia: 1975), vol. 1, p. 220.)

<sup>16</sup> The reference is to the regime that appeared in Poland in July 1944 with the arrival of Soviet forces, and which was established by the Soviet Union and Polish communists relying on its military presence. On 21 April 1945, when the treaty between USSR and this regime was concluded, the Western allies continued to recognize the Polish government in exile.

<sup>17</sup> Matyas Rakosi (1892-1971) - General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, deputy prime-minister.

<sup>18</sup> The question of Yugoslav territorial claims on Hungary was raised by the Yugoslav representatives to the Soviet government already towards the end of the war. In particular, Hebrang, assigned by Tito to visit Moscow in January 1945 (see introduction), put forth to Stalin claims to the region of the city of Pecs and the "Bais triangle." Stalin at the time replied that such a question could be put before the allied powers only in the event that the Yugoslav population in these regions started to "clamor" for unification with Yugoslavia. The question of possibly posing Yugoslav territorial demands to Hungary and relocating Hungarians from Yugoslavia was discussed in April-May 1946 by Yugoslav and Soviet representatives of various ranks. In late April 1946, Tito also discussed the matter with Rakosi, who had come to Belgrade. The Yugoslav leader expressed readiness not to put the territorial demands on Hungary before the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference, but with the condition that the Yugoslav minorities in Hungary be granted ethnic rights and Yugoslav economic interests be ensured in border regions. Rakosi agreed. (See AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p.53, d. 872, l. 16; *ibid.*, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, l. 6; *ibid.*, d. 13, ll. 19, 22-23; *ibid.*, d. 15, ll. 39, 64-65.)

<sup>19</sup> Reference is to the Council of Foreign Ministers (see note #5).

<sup>20</sup> Pseudonym of Aleksandr Rankovic.

<sup>21</sup> Koca Popovic.

<sup>22</sup> Vladimir Popovic.

<sup>23</sup> According to Dedijer's account given in his book, Stalin said this when Tito began to introduce to him members of the Yugoslav delegation, and Molotov nodded his head in agreement with Stalin's words. See Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju [Josip Broz Tito: Materials for a Biography]* (Belgrade, 1953), p. 448.

<sup>24</sup> Ivan Subasic (1892-1955) - June 1944-March 1945 prime-minister of the Yugoslav monarchy's government in exile, signed an agreement with the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia with Tito at its head and took the post of foreign minister within the national coalition government formed by Tito in March 1945. Resigned in fall 1945, stating that his agreement

with Tito had not been fulfilled by the ruling regime. Afterwards lived in Zagreb under surveillance by state security organs.

<sup>25</sup> Milan Grol (1876-1952) - during the war, member of the monarchy's government in exile, in March 1945 took the post of vice-premier in Tito's united government. Resigned in August 1945, accusing the ruling regime of being in the hands of the CPY and thus in violation of the Tito-Subasic agreement, and became one of the leaders of the legal opposition formed in fall 1945. Following the first elections to the *skupscina* (parliament) in November 1945, when the opposition was defeated and was practically destroyed, Grol retired from politics and devoted himself to the theater.

<sup>26</sup> Following the 1945 elections, the opposition parties were in effect liquidated, while the parties comprising the People's Front, run entirely by the CPY, began to take on an increasingly fictitious and deceptive character.

<sup>27</sup> Regions that do not export foodstuffs, particularly bread, and are even unable to support themselves.

<sup>28</sup> The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency.

<sup>29</sup> Eduard Kardelj (1910-1979) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Oversight Commission of Yugoslavia; Milovan Djilas (b. 1911) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, minister without portfolio.

<sup>30</sup> Reference made to Molotov's support at the CFM meeting in Paris, 25 April - 16 May 1946 (see note #5).

<sup>31</sup> Known deposits of non-ferrous metals.

<sup>32</sup> The gulf on Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast.

<sup>33</sup> Such a formulation was not contained in the Yugoslav-Czechoslovak, but in the 1946 Yugoslav-Polish agreement on friendship and mutual assistance (note 13). The agreement of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation in peacetime, signed by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1946 made no mention of former German wartime allies. It stated that the signing parties would render each other military and other assistance using all available means, if one of them "is brought into conflict with Germany, the latter having repeated its aggressive policies, or with any other country which had aligned itself with Germany for the purpose of aggressive action."

<sup>34</sup> Tito was obviously being sly, as evidenced by the following reply from Rankovic, who referred to both the CC CPA Plenum which had expelled Maleshov from the government (see introduction), and the clear criticism by a number of Albanian Politburo members toward first Party secretary and head of government Hoxha.

<sup>35</sup> The Soviet Union's assistance to Albania, in particular military assistance using Yugoslavia a22 wgov-between,wasDuder ake inmed atily bf





claims. AVPRF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 77.

<sup>52</sup> According to Dedijer's account, Stalin had spoken about the Slovenian intelligentsia with Kidric, himself a Slovenian, using a play on words—"podlaya [sycophantic] intelligentsia" and "podlinnaya [genuine] intelligentsia." See Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito*, p. 452.

<sup>53</sup> Dedijer's book mentions that Stalin adN2.5 7 inrarSlay nt eucalyptus, athatis isinrarbesther Defor ship-builng t,ndplrelat7 ihow many years ago rard sp

is a mistake because such a Federation is not feasible.<sup>11</sup> Dimitrov says that he did not target the USSR by his assertion that Austria-Hungary had blocked a Bulgarian-Serb customs union. He stresses, at last, that there are essentially no disagreements between the foreign policies of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

Stalin interrupts and asserts that there are substantial differences and there is a practice of the Leninists—to recognize differences and mistakes and to liquidate them. Dimitrov says that they make mistakes because they are

surprise the whole world and adds that it looked like the secretary of the Comintern was explaining tediously and meticulously what should be done and how. [Stalin] says that this gives food to American reactionaries [*reaktziia*]. He then speaks about the significance of the American elections and [says] that one should be careful to do nothing to give the reactionaries arguments that could facilitate their victory. In his opinion, we should not give the reaction anything to snatch at [*nikakoi zatsepki*]. The current American government still contains itself, but money bags [*denezhniie meshki*] and sharks can come to power. The reactionaries in American, when they hear such statements, say that in Eastern Europe there is not only a bloc in the making, but [the countries] are merging into common states. He tells Dimitrov and the others that they are overdoing it [*perebarshchivaiut*], like the Young Communists and then like women take everything to the streets. Then he makes a linkage to the issue of Albania. The three world powers—the USSR, England, and America guaranteed Albania's independence by a special agreement. Albania is our weakest spot, because other states are either members of the United Nations, or recognized, etc., but Albania is not [recognized]. If Yugoslav troops entered Albania, the reactionaries in England and America would be able to use it and step forward as defenders of Albanian independence. Instead of sending troops we should work intensely to build up the Albanian army, we should teach the Albanians, and then, if they are attacked, let the Albanian Skupcina [parliament] appeal to Yugoslavia for help. He makes an example of China, where nobody<sup>14</sup> can reproach the USSR,<sup>15</sup> but the Chinese are fighting well and advancing; he then adds that the Albanians are not worse than the Chinese and they must be taught. Then he adds that we should sign a protocol about joint consultations.<sup>16</sup> He says that the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs do not report anything [to the Soviets], and they [the Soviets] have to find out everything on the street, usually ending up faced with a *fait accompli*.

Kostov then begins to complain how hard it is to be a small and undeveloped country. He would like to raise some economic issues. Stalin cuts him short and says that there are competent ministries to do it, and this is the discussion of the differences.

Kardelj starts to speak.<sup>17</sup> On the first point [of disagreements] he says that it was not a treaty that was published, but only a communiqué about the discussion leading to a treaty; he adds that we [Yugoslavs and Bulgarians] were too hasty. This triggers an exchange similar to that when Dimitrov made the same point. [Andrei] Zhdanov intervenes and says that they [in the Soviet Union] learned about this matter from the newspapers. On Albania he says that not informing them on that was a serious error. Stalin cuts in and says that we [in Yugoslavia] oversimplify this matter, but it is a complicated matter.<sup>18</sup> Kardelj then mentioned the constant Greek provocations, the weakness of the Albanian army, and that

we are linked to Albania economically and that we underwrite [*soderzhim*] its army. Two or three times Stalin interrupted. For instance, regarding a Greek invasion of Albania, he said that it was possible. Then he asked if the situation was really such that one should not have any faith in the Albanian army, and added that the Albanians must be taught and their army must be built up. Molotov says that they have no information about any kind of attack on Albania and wondered that we withhold our information from them. Then, reacting to Kardelj's explanation that the anti-Albanian campaign in Greece is worsening, Stalin demanded [to know] if we believe in the victory of the Greek guerrillas. Kardelj responds that we do. Stalin says that recently he and the rest of his collaborators have had grave doubts about it. He says that one should assist Greece [i.e. guerrillas] if there are hopes of winning, and if not, then we should rethink and terminate the guerrilla movement. The Anglo-Americans will spare no effort to keep Greece [in their sphere],<sup>19</sup> and the only serious obstacle [*zakavika*] for them is the fact that we assist the guerrillas. Molotov adds that we are constantly and justifiably blamed for assistance to the guerrillas. Stalin says that if there are no conditions for victory, one must not be afraid to admit it. It is not for the first time in history that although there are no conditions now, they will appear later.<sup>20</sup> Then Kolarov speaks and tells that the American, British and French embassies appealed to them [Bulgarians] with a warning not to recognize the government of Markos.<sup>21</sup> Kolarov says that the American ambassador is courteous, but the British ambassador is arrogant. Stalin cuts in and says that it means that the American is a great scoundrel and they [ambassadors of the US and UK] always trade roles. Stalin also said that we should not link the future of our state with a victory of the guerrillas in Greece. On Dimitrov's comment that a victory of the Monarchists-Fascists would seriously aggravate the situation in the Balkans, Stalin says that it is not proven.

Then Dimitrov and Kolarov spoke about other matters that did not relate to the agenda of the meeting. Among other things, Molotov cited a paragraph from the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty which read that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would act in the spirit of the United Nations and would support all initiatives directed at the preservation of peace and against all hotbeds of aggression. Molotov cite bej T\*m712.8y arr

said half-jokingly that the Yugoslavs are afraid of having Russians in Albania and because of this are in a hurry to send their troops.<sup>24</sup> He also said that the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs think that the USSR stands against a unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but it does not want to admit it. Molotov raised some kind of a point from the Bulgarian-Romanian communiqué about the coordination of plans and mentioned that it would have been essentially a merger of these states. Stalin is categorical that this is inconceivable and that Dimitrov would soon see for himself that it is nonsense, and instead of cooperation it would bring about a quarrel between the Romanians and Bulgarians. Therefore mutual relations should be limited to trade agreements.

Then Stalin laid out a Soviet view that in Eastern Europe one should create three federations—Polish-Czechoslovak, Romanian-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Bulgarian-Albanian.<sup>25</sup> Bulgaria and Yugoslavia [he said] may unite tomorrow if they wish, there are no constraints on this, since Bulgaria today is a sovereign state. Kardelj says that we were not in a hurry to unify with Bulgaria and

Molotov was satisfied with that [answer] and did not mention it again.<sup>32</sup> Dimitrov raised the issue about the conclusion of a treaty on mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria. He stressed that it would be of great significance for Bulgaria. Stalin agreed with this, but added that among the Quisling countries<sup>33</sup> [the USSR] would first conclude treaties with neighbors: with Romania—this treaty is almost ready, with Hungary and Finland.

Then Stalin underlines that we (i.e. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) must build up our economy, culture, army, and that a federation is an abstraction.

Suddenly Stalin asked about “our friend Pijade,”<sup>34</sup> Kardelj told him that he is working on our legislation.

Kardelj asked [the Soviets] about their opinion what answer should be given to the Italian government who asked the Yugoslav government to support Italian claims to govern their former colonies. Stalin said that these demands must be supported and asked Molotov how [the Soviet side] responded. Molotov says that they still have to respond and that he believes they should wait. Stalin told them that there is no point in waiting and the answer should be sent immediately. He said that former Italian colonies should be put under Italian governance [trusteeship] and remarked that kings, when they could not agree over the booty, used to give [disputed] land to a weakest feudal so they could snatch it from him later at some opportune moment, and that feudal lords invited a foreigner to rule them so they could easily overthrow him when they become fed up with him.

On this note the conversation ended.

I would remind [*napominaiu*] that the criticism of Dimitrov by Stalin, although rough in form, was expressed in friendly tones. This report was composed on the basis of notes taken at the meeting and from memory.

[Source: *Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Fond Kabinet Marshala Jugoslavije I-3-b-651, ll.33-40. Translated by Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive)*]

<sup>1</sup> [Translator’s Note: In *Conversations with Stalin* (1962) Milovan Djilas recounted this meeting in great detail. He mentioned that he had submitted a written report of that meeting to the Yugoslav Central Committee, but that he could not get access to it when he wrote the book. As the comparison of the document with the book reveals, Djilas’ memory retained with remarkable precision some pivotal moments of the conversation.—V.Z.]

<sup>2</sup> Baranov, Leonid Semenovich—assistant director of the CC VKP(b) [Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Department of Foreign Policy.

<sup>3</sup> The statement concerns the Yugoslav intention of deploying a division, which never took place.

<sup>4</sup> In the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s account, this is presented in the following manner:

“It seems to us that com. Georgii Dimitrov has taken a fancy to press conferences and interviews, thus giving opportunity to be prompted with questions which ought not be discussed in the first place. This is misguided and undesirable. During the course of

the interview a plan was set forth which goes too far without any attempt to consult with whomever it may concern. A question was put forth of creating a federation or a confederation, a customs union that would include both Poland and Greece. Com. Georgii Dimitrov speaks of all these things without being granted authority by anyone concerned. This is misguided in principle and is tactically harmful. This eases the burden of the creators of the Western bloc.” And further: “We must take the position in such a way that all would know—both enemies and friends—that this is our point of view. We consider this absolutely wrong and unacceptable in the future.” This is contained in slightly abbreviated form in the Soviet record as well.

<sup>5</sup> According to Bulgarian and Soviet records this was spoken by Molotov, not Stalin. Kolarov’s account puts it in the following manner: “When we spoke with the Polish comrades, they said: We thought that this was Moscow’s opinion. Everyone thinks that if Dimitrov or Tito speaks of a number of countries, it originates from the USSR. In essence, the Polish comrades said that they are against Georgii Dimitrov’s idea and consider it misguided.”

<sup>6</sup> According to the Bulgarian and Soviet records, this was also spoken by Molotov, while Stalin supplemented this with separate remarks.

<sup>7</sup> Before these statements by Stalin, the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s account, show the following remarks by Molotov:

“[Czechoslovak President Eduard] Benes’ newspaper immediately hastened to write that ‘Dimitrov puts out communist plans, and now the Czech communists must answer.’ On the other hand, this position of Georgii Dimitrov contradicts the declaration of the nine communist parties.” The same is corroborated by the Soviet record.

<sup>8</sup> According to Bulgarian and Soviet records, this statement by Molotov sounded more categorical. Kolarov’s account records the following words: “In the future, com. Georgii Dimitrov must rid himself and us of the risks of such statements.”

<sup>9</sup> [Translator’s Note: This intervention is presented dramatically in Djilas’s book. “‘Yes, but you didn’t consult with us!’” Stalin shouted. “We learn about your doings in the newspapers! You

Why hide it? It was Lenin's practice always to recognize errors and to remove them as quickly as possible.'

Dimitrov, placatingly, almost submissively: 'True, we erred. But through errors we are learning our way in foreign politics.'

Stalin, harshly and tauntingly: 'Learning! You have been in politics fifty years—and now you are correcting errors! Your trouble is not errors, but a stand different from ours.'

Then Djilas writes that Dimitrov's ears "were red, and big red blotches cropped up on his face covering his spots of eczema. His sparse hair straggled and hung in lifeless strands over his wrinkled neck. I felt sorry for him...The Lion of the Leipzig Trials...looked dejected and dispirited." (pp. 176-177)—V.Z.]

<sup>13</sup> The entire conversation recorded by Djilas about the draft of a Bulgarian-Romanian treaty sent to the Soviet government, which in turn expressed no objections over the article on the customs union, is absent from the Soviet and Bulgarian records. Kolarov's account contains only the following phrase: "Kolarov points out that the treaty with Romania had been harmonized with Moscow."

<sup>14</sup> [Translator's note: "nobody" here means the United States and Great Britain, not the Communist Party of China. This phrase reveals Stalin's emphasis on realpolitik as a method to prevent "imperialists'" consolidation and intervention into Balkan affairs.—V.Z.]

<sup>15</sup> The Bulgarian records contain the following words expressed





## Soviet Plans to Establish the COMINFORM in Early 1946: New Evidence from the Hungarian Archives

by Csaba Békés


It has been long debated by scholars when the idea of forming a new Communist world organization after the Second World War was raised. In the absence of relevant sources the still prevailing classical interpretation suggests that this idea was a Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan introduced in the Summer of 1947 and after the Soviet Union's refusal of the plan, the formation of the Eastern Bloc and its 'executive committee', the COMINFORM, was a logical next step in breaking off relations with the West. Surprisingly enough, no evidence of any kind has emerged from Russian archives from the time of their partial opening in 1991 pertaining to this important topic. However, documents discovered by Russian scholar Leonid Gibianskii in the Tito archives in Belgrade show that the idea of setting up such an organization was already discussed during the talks between Stalin and the Yugoslav leader in Moscow in May-June 1946.<sup>1</sup>

Documents from Hungarian archives not only confirm that a Soviet plan to re-establish a Communist-world organization was in the making already as early as March 1946, but they also show that the implementation of the plan was postponed in order to avoid its potential negative effects during the forthcoming elections in France, Czechoslovakia and Romania as well as in the course of the ongoing European peace settlement.<sup>2</sup> This proves that the idea of setting up the later COMINFORM, rather than

being a reaction to the intensification of frictions between the allies, originally was a part of a wider Soviet scheme aimed at fostering Communist takeover in East Central Europe by peaceful means, while preserving Soviet-Western cooperation as well.

The document published below, is an excerpt from the speech of Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party at the 17 May 1946 meeting of the Central Committee of the HCP.<sup>3</sup> As part of a long survey on current international issues, he informed the CC members about the Soviet conception on the setting up of a new Communist-world organization. He gave a detailed analysis to his audience of how this new body would be different from the KOMINTERN using exactly the same arguments presented at the time of the setting up of the KOMINFORM in September 1947. Between 28 March and 2 April 1946, Rákosi had been on a secret mission in Moscow, where he was trying to achieve better terms for Hungary at the forthcoming peace conference.<sup>4</sup> On 1 April 1946, he met with Stalin and Molotov, and it is likely that at this point he received the information he presented later to the Central Committee.<sup>5</sup>

Besides stressing the general importance of the document as the earliest known evidence of Soviet plans for the establishment of the later KOMINFORM, it is also worth noting that during recent talks between the Hungar-



example, that we have to wait for the conditions for revolution to appear in at least a bunch of countries, and only then can we instigate the revolution. I remember that when the situation was revolutionary in Germany in 1923, in all the neighboring countries we prepared for such revolutionary action, so that there could be a revolutionary situation in more than one country at the same time. I remember that in the Czech Republic, France and other countries where the situation was not nearly as developed as in Germany, we prepared assistance programs, similar uprisings, etc. History has shown that that was wrong. Now we are going to follow another route. Here I should immediately say that not many people are aware of this interpretation of the dissolution of the International, because they did not talk about it very much in this period and therefore completely incorrect views are spread amongst some of the parties. For example when we were with the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and we tried to reconcile the Hungarian Communist Party's line on the question of the Hungarians in Slovakia with that of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the comrades announced the theory that the International had to be dissolved, because the international aspirations [meaning "national aspirations" — Cs. B.] of the individual Communist Parties are so much at odds with each other, that they could not be fitted into the agenda of an International. Because of this they calmly recommended to us that we should attack the Czech Communist Party, while they attack the Hungarian Communist Party. We rejected this theory. We were convinced that this was wrong, and that Stalinist reasoning would say something totally different. There is not even a trace to show that the national aspirations of the particular communist parties do not fit into the International; it points to completely different reasons. Now that communist parties have everywhere become stronger and come to the fore, there should be pressure for the institution of the Communist International or some other international communist body. At the moment this is being disturbed by the whole list of parties preparing for elections. The comrades know that they are preparing for elections in France, Czechoslovakia and Romania, and that our comrades there are otherwise occupied. They are also occupied with the question of peace. But as soon as the elections die down and peace is agreed, at that moment this will come to the fore and then we will establish some kind of international body. One part of this conception is that in these changed circumstances, whenever a country achieves the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat or for socialism, this will be carried out, with no regard for whether the respective country is in a capitalist environment or not. This is also a new perspective, which simply means that in a country where as a result of the work of the communist party these conditions are present, it has to be realized. This is fresh encouragement for all Communist Parties, because now it will principally be dependent on their work whether or not the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat are created in their own country.

[Source: Archives of the Institute for Political History (AIPH), Budapest, 274. f. 2/34. Translated by David Evans.]

ian and the Yugoslav Communist leaders the latter complained about how the KOMINTERN, unaware of local conditions, sometimes demanded quite the opposite of what they needed. Paradoxically, although Tito and the Yugoslav leaders now themselves became proponents of the new Communist organization, their eventual rupture with the rest of the Soviet bloc was caused by exactly the same Soviet attitude. Rákosi's speech also provides an important contribution to the "blueprint debate" on whether Stalin had a plan to sovietize these countries. The conception, outlined by Rákosi, obviously repeating what he had heard in Moscow, shows a cautious, but determined, policy: in those countries where the Communist party itself would be able to create favorable internal conditions for a smooth and peaceful takeover, they would be allowed to do so. However, at this stage, in the spring of 1946 Stalin, eager to maintain cooperation with the Western Allies, did not plan to permit any kind of forceful takeover, relying on direct Soviet support, or implying civil war.

---

*Dr. Csaba Bekes is a research fellow at the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Budapest. A former CWIHP fellow, Dr. Bekes has written widely on the international dimensions of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. He is co-editor (with Malcolm Byrne and Christian Ostermann) of a forthcoming National Security Archive document reader on the 1956 crisis.*

<sup>1</sup> L. Gibianskii: "Kak voznik Kominform: Po novym arkhivnym materialam," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* (1993), No. 4. 135-136,

quoted by: Robert C. Tucker: "The Cold War in Stalin's Time," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21:2 (Spring 1997), 275. See also Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War," in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

<sup>2</sup> I first presented this finding at the international conference: Internal Factors Facilitating Communist Takeover in East Central Europe 1944-1948, Opocno, Czech Republic, 9-11 September 1993, see: Csaba Békés, "Mad'arská politická krize na jare 1946," *Suodobé Dejiny* (Praha), 1994, No. 4-5, pp. 509-513.

<sup>3</sup> Archives of the Institute for Political History, (AIPH) Budapest, 274. f. 2./34.

<sup>4</sup> For the story of this Hungarian Communist initiative see: Csaba Békés, "Dokumentumok a magyar kormánydelegáció 1946. áprilisi moszkvai tárgyalásairól. (Documents on the negotiations of the Hungarian Government Delegation in Moscow in April, 1946)" *Régió* (1992), 3, 161-194; for an English version see: "The Communist Parties and the National Issue in Central and Eastern Europe (1945-1947). An Important Factor Facilitating Communist Takeover in the Region," *6. Martie 1945: Incepturile comunizarii Romaniei. Editura Enciclopedia*, (Bucharest, 1995), 245-253.

<sup>5</sup> No minutes of that meeting have been found to date on either side. After returning from Moscow Rákosi reported on his visit at the 3 April Politburo meeting but according to the then prevailing practice no minutes were taken. However, on 18 April, he gave a speech at the meeting of party secretaries of factories and plants in Budapest, where he briefly summarized the Soviet ideas on setting up a new Communist World organization (AIPH 274. f. 8/14).

The Institute for the  
History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution  
Dohány u. 74  
H-1074 Budapest/HUNGARY  
Fax: 011-36-1-322-3084



# The Turn in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 1953-55

By *Andrei Edemskii*

Between the spring of 1953 and July 1955, relations with Yugoslavia changed sharply from collaborating with Yugoslavia “as a bourgeois country” (May 1953) to Mikoian’s May 1955 toast with Yugoslav leaders to the “prosperity of Yugoslavia.” Unfortunately, the correspondence carried out in 1954 and early 1955 between the central committees of the two ruling parties is not available in the archives. Other documents, however, can illuminate the earlier stages of the shift. Below, two Foreign Ministry internal reports prepared by M. Zimianin in May 1953 and October 1954 illustrate the radical change of opinion reached at the 31 May 1954 Presidium meeting in which the need to foil the “anti-Soviet plans of the Anglo-American imperialists and to use all means to strengthen our influence over the Yugoslav people” prevailed, opening the door to rapprochement. [Ed. Note: *N. Bulganin discussed this decision and the ostensible resistance to it by Molotov and the Foreign Ministry during the July 1955 plenums, excerpted in this CWIHP Bulletin*]

## About the Situation in Yugoslavia and its Foreign Policy

To Comrade V. M. Molotov Top Secret

The internal policy of the Tito clique, after breaking with the USSR and peoples’ democratic countries, aimed at restoring capitalism in Yugoslavia, at the liquidation of all the democratic accomplishments of the Yugoslav people, and at the fascistization of the state and army personnel.

In foreign policy, the efforts of the ruling circles of Yugoslavia aim at broadening economic and political ties with capitalist states, first and foremost with the USA and England. This has made Yugoslavia dependent on them and has drawn it [Yugoslavia] into aggressive blocs organized by the Anglo-American imperialists....

27 May 1953

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 12a, por. 74, pap. 617, ll. 7-12.  
Translated by David Wolff]

## On Recent Yugoslav Foreign Policy (second half of 1954)

Yugoslavia’s foreign policy measures in the second half (July-October) of this year have been dictated, as far as can be judged by sources, by the government’s attempt to strengthen the country’s position by improving relations with the countries of the capitalist camp and by normalizing relations with the USSR and other countries of the democratic camp...

The [Fourth European] Sector [of the Foreign Ministry] considers it possible to come preliminarily to the following conclusions and proposals:

The Soviet Union’s policy on Yugoslavia has pro-

duced serious positive results, has increased the influence of the USSR among the peoples of Yugoslavia, has helped explode the aggressive, anti-Soviet plans of the USA in the Balkans, and made difficult the actions of anti-Soviet elements in Yugoslavia itself.

At the same time it is impossible not to see that the Yugoslav ruling circles have normalized with the USSR within the bounds of their self-interest...

Under the given conditions, it seems appropriate to put forward measures for the further development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations that would force the Yugoslav government to come closer to the USSR and the peoples’ democracies.

We make the following proposals.

To poll (*zondazh*) the Yugoslav government regarding joint action with the USSR against US plans to draw Italy and the Balkan Union into a broadening of anti-Sovietism in the region. To clarify the position of the Yugoslav government on establishing diplomatic relations with the GDR.

If the test [results] of the Yugoslav government on two or three major foreign policy questions are positive, this will be an important condition towards the resurrection of the Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Aid between the USSR and Yugoslavia [of 1945].

21 October 1954

Head of the IV European Sector of the Foreign Ministry  
Zimianin

[Source: AVPRF f. 021, op. 8-a, por. 184, pap. 11, ll. 16-21.  
Translated by David Wolff]

*Andrei Edemskii, a former CWIHP fellow, is a researcher at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.*

**M**uch has been written about Soviet-Yugoslav relations with respect to the Hungarian Revolution. Even during the unfolding of the events themselves and the immediately following period, this subject became a topic of discussion in mass media channels and in the press. Later it was touched upon to a lesser or greater degree in the historiography. However, in both cases, this was done, as a rule, on the basis of only those facts which were available from public Soviet or Yugoslav declarations and actions. The behind-the-scenes side of the relations between Moscow and Belgrade regarding the 1956 events in Hungary remained hidden long afterwards: both sides, each for its own reasons, preferred to keep this secret.<sup>1</sup>

The curtain of secrecy was partially lifted in the 1970s, first when Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, which had been written, or, more precisely, recorded by him





hand it could not agree to surrender Nagy and his comrades to the Soviet military authorities or to the Kadar government for fear of serious discredit in the eyes of its own people as well as the outside world. Thus, on November 5, Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic replied to Khrushchev with a proposal to send Nagy and the rest to Yugoslavia.<sup>32</sup> On November 7, however, Khrushchev categorically rejected this offer in the name of the Soviet leadership and added a blunt threat: Citing the Brioni agreement, he warned that the proposal to send Nagy to Yugoslavia could be seen by Moscow as an example of Belgrade's secret solidarity with Nagy's policies and could cause "irrevocable damage" to Soviet-Yugoslav relations.<sup>33</sup>

The Kremlin rejected Kadar's hesitant proposal, which was made to Andropov on November 8, regarding the possibility—in order to avoid heightening the tensions in relations with Yugoslavia—to allow Nagy and his group to go to Yugoslavia under the condition that a written document was received from Nagy stating his resignation from the post of prime minister of the overthrown government and written promises from him and the others not to harm Kadar's government. In response to the communication received from Andropov, Moscow instructed him to tell Kadar on behalf of the CC CPSU that it was not advisable under any circumstances to let Nagy and the others go to Yugoslavia, and that the Yugoslavs would be forced to agree to the demands for his surrender.



principles of the Hungarian crisis and the evaluation of Soviet and Yugoslav policy in Hungary. The ground was laid by the publication in the 16 November issue of *Borba* of Tito's speech to party activists in Pula on 11 November. In his speech, the Yugoslav leader had justified the Soviet military intervention undertaken on 4 November as the lesser evil in the face of the threat of "counterrevolution" and expressed support for Kadar's government, but at the same time characterized the crisis as a consequence of the Soviet support given until the last moment for the Rakosi-Gero regime, including the first Soviet military intervention on October 24, which naturally provoked outrage in Hungary. Tito connected a similar orientation of Soviet policy in relation not only to Hungary, but also to other Eastern European countries of the "socialist camp" with the fact that among a portion of the Soviet leadership, the Stalinist legacy, which he characterized as a product of the system that had formed in the USSR, was still strong. Tito's speech itself and its publication in particular constituted a clear attempt to distance himself from Soviet policy in Hungary in light of disappointment with Moscow's actions both in Yugoslavia and the outside world, while at the same time defending Yugoslavia's agreement to intervention on 4 November and the support for the Kadar government. The Yugoslav action elicited a sharp reaction from the Soviet leadership, which, however, was expressed primarily in private, in Micunovic's meetings with Khrushchev and other members of the CC CPSU Presidium. Moreover, the Soviets emphasized that they did not want to see difficulties arise with Yugoslavia and charged Belgrade with breaking mutual agreements. The public response to Tito's speech, made in the form of material published in *Pravda* on November 19 and 23, rejected Yugoslavia's evaluations, although, in Micunovic's opinion, in relatively measured terms, as was the Moscow leadership's general position toward relations with Yugoslavia during these days.<sup>45</sup>

This was also said in connection with Nagy's detention by Soviet troops and his group after they had left the Yugoslav mission on November 22. The proposal for his arrest had been sent back on November 17 to the CC CPSU Presidium by Malenkov, Suslov, and the secretary of the CC CPSU, Averkii Aristov, who were present in Hungary. And Kadar, who was negotiating with Yugoslavia and on November 21 made a written statement guaranteeing safety for Nagy and the others, had been aware of this plan, endorsed by the Soviet leadership, from the beginning.<sup>46</sup> When Nagy and the others, upon leaving the Belgrade mission were detained and forcibly sent to Romania, the Yugoslav leadership limited itself to a protest to the Kadar government, while to the Soviets on November 24 it expressed only "surprise" regarding this incident.<sup>47</sup>

In its private contacts with Moscow, however, Belgrade showed increasing unhappiness with Soviet encouragement of the anti-Yugoslav campaign carried out in East European countries and by certain Western

Communist parties, especially the French, as well as the Soviet manner of acting without regard to Yugoslav interests or prestige, as in the case of Nagy's arrest. The expression of such disaffection was a long letter from Tito to Khrushchev dated 3 December 1956 which, among other things, repeated and intensified criticism of Soviet policy in Hungary and argued the wrongful nature of Soviet accusations against Yugoslavia with regard to the Brioni agreement and the Nagy question.<sup>48</sup>

In essence, each of the sides occupied a simultaneously defensive and offensive position, trying to stick the other side with public and non-public demarches and to halt criticism made in its direction. The Yugoslav leadership used its public demarches for personal justification and for raising its prestige inside Yugoslavia and in the international arena (in this respect Kardelj's speech in the Skupshchina played the same role as Tito's speech in Pula).<sup>49</sup> For the Soviet leadership the campaign of

Yugradetaineith b-[Y 9.1 0 0 frship tback ionj T\* ticism vem-internaf]tsii

under reactionary pressure [*nazhim reaktsiia*]. They also intend to come to an agreement with Imre Nagy so that he will make a statement supporting the government headed by Kadar in Sol'nok.

In Kardelj's words, such an announcement would facilitate the discussion of the Hungarian issue in the Security Council and the recognition of Kadar's government as the legal government. Kardelj, on Tito's instructions, requested the advice of the CPSU and the Soviet government as to whether to continue further talks with Imre Nagy. Tito also asked the Soviet government to convey to Kadar's government the request that they not repress those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the recent events in Hungary.

Tito, in Kardelj's words, also asked the Soviet government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it, especially if reactionaries find out that Nagy, who is located in the embassy, is supporting Kadar's government.

4/XI-56 N. FIRIUBIN

**From the diary  
of D.T. SHEPILOV**

**Secret  
7 November 1956**

**On a Conversation with the  
Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, Micunovic**

At 14:10, I received the ambassador of Yugoslavia to the USSR, Micunovic. I told him that I had received his report on the conversation between Minister for Foreign Affairs Koca Popovic and the Soviet ambassador Firiubin in which Koca Popovic stated that a Soviet tank located alongside the building of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest opened fire on November 6 at 12:45 (Budapest time). The direction of the shot has not been established, but all of the windows in the Yugoslav mission were blown out and the window frames were damaged, and the event led to panic amongst the people located inside the mission.

I told Micunovic that I had just spoken with the commander of the Soviet military unit in Budapest and had instructed him to conduct a careful inquiry into the veracity of this fact. That will be done and the results of the inquiry will be conveyed to the ambassador. However, as a preliminary matter the commander of the Soviet military unit in Budapest categorically states that that sort of incident could not have taken place, since everything is completely calm in the region where the Yugoslav mission is located and since the tanks located near the mission were unlikely to have needed to open fire. However, I once again confirmed that the results of the inquiry as to the veracity or fictitiousness of the episode of which Koca Popovic had informed our ambassador would be conveyed to him as well.

In this regard I told Micunovic that on November 5 of this year, the Yugoslav ambassador in Hungary, Soldatic, made a request to the USSR ambassador in Hungary, com. Andropov, for the removal of the Soviet military unit which was located in the proximity of the mission building since at present the presence of this military unit near the Yugoslav mission was not necessary.

I told Micunovic that the Soviet military commander in Budapest for his part considers it possible to comply with the Yugoslav mission's request and to remove the Soviet military unit located near the mission.

I also told Micunovic that we cannot but be astonished by Koca Popovic's statement that "public opinion in Yugoslavia is quite strongly indignant." If we are talking about feelings, then our population, as well as every Hungarian patriot, is indignant to a far greater degree because of the fact that bankrupt degenerates and accomplices of counter-revolution such as Nagy and company, with whose knowledge worker-revolutionaries and communists were hanged on the streets of Budapest, took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy after their defeat.

Micunovic said that he had just acquainted himself with com. Khrushchev's letter of November 6 to coms. Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic. He cannot speak officially about the letter as a whole, but personally considers that its contents and conclusions contradict the understanding reached between com. Tito and coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov during their recent visit to Brioni.

Micunovic also stated that he does not differ with me in the judgment that Imre Nagy and his government cleared the way for counter-revolution. But there is an entire group of people with Nagy among whom there are honest communists. During the conversations at Brioni, it was stipulated that Imre Nagy and the others could improve the position of the new revolutionary worker-peasant government if in one way or another they announced their intention to assist this government or, at the least, not to speak out against it. The presence of Imre Nagy and others presently in the Yugoslav embassy does not contradict the understanding which took place between coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov and com. Tito and other Yugoslav figures during coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov's visit to Brioni.

I answered that insofar as I was informed of the contents of the conversation which took place at Brioni between coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov, on the one hand, and the leaders of Yugoslavia on the other, the Yugoslav government's provision of asylum to Nagy and his entourage in the Yugoslav embassy starkly contradicts the said conversation and understanding. Coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov informed the leadership of the party and the USSR government that com. Tito and the other Yugoslav leaders fully agreed with their Soviet comrades' conclusions that Imre Nagy and his confederates are not only political bankrupts, but are people who cleared the way for counter-revolution and who themselves became the accomplices of reactionaries and

imperialist forces. I know, for example, that during the conversation, com. Tito stated: "What sort of revolutionary is Nagy? What sort of communist is he if leading workers, communists and public figures were hanged and shot with his knowledge?"

In light of these facts, we are truly astonished and perplexed by the fact that the leaders of the Yugoslav government have sheltered the anti-people group headed by Nagy in the walls of the Budapest mission.

Micunovic once again repeated that he did not dissent from our assessment of Nagy. However, it is not necessary to create additional difficulties for the new Hungarian government and provoke the excitement and dissatisfaction of the Hungarian and Yugoslav population, as well as additional unpleasantness in the UN and in worldwide public opinion through certain actions relating to Nagy and his group, by which he meant that at present they are not taking part in any political activity and are keeping quiet.

I informed Micunovic that he would be received at 18:00 for a conversation with com. Khrushchev.

D. SHEPILOV.

Attested: [signature] [...]

.....

**Letter of the CC UCY to the CC CPSU  
with an exposition of the views of the leadership of the  
UCY on the events in Hungary**

*8 November 1956, Brioni*

To the first secretary of the CC CPSU,  
comrade KHRUSHCHEV

Dear comrades!

We received your letter in which you stated the point of view of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on the issue of Imre Nagy and others who took refuge in our embassy in Budapest. We understand some of your arguments which are put forward in the aforementioned letter, and [we] consider them logical, but all the same we must sincerely say that in your letter we were deeply moved by the lack of understanding of our position and, especially, the lack of understanding of our readiness to resolve this issue in the spirit of reciprocal friendly relations, and not to the injury of the international reputation of Yugoslavia as a sovereign country. You agreed with us that Yugoslavia plays and in the future should play a very useful role in the world thanks to the reputation which it has acquired.

We will explain in detail to you here, which circumstances led to the current state of affairs, so that our position on this issue becomes clearer to you.

It is true that, during our conversations at Brioni, we agreed on the assessment that the weakness of Imre Nagy's government and the series of concessions made by that government to reactionary forces led to the risk of the destruction of the existing socialist achievements in Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists

should not remain in such a government any longer and that they should rely on the laboring masses and resist reaction in the most decisive manner. There is no need to remind you that from the very beginning, and also throughout our entire conversation, we expressed our doubts as to the consequences of open help from the Soviet Army. But bearing in mind that, in accord with your evaluation that such help had become unavoidable, we considered that nonetheless it would be necessary to do everything possible in order to minimize harm to the task of socialism. You recall that we first stated our opinion that in such a position it would be best of all to create a government there in which people who had not compromised themselves during the regime of Rakosi would take part, and at the head of which would be comrade Kadar as a prominent communist who enjoys influence among the Hungarian laboring masses. We considered that it would be good if this government made a public appeal, and subsequently this was done. We agree with this appeal and for this reason in our public statements we gave full support to the government and the program which it announced. We believed that you agreed with this, that only such a government could once again restore contact with the laboring masses and gradually eliminate at least the serious [*tiazhelye*] consequences of the events in Hungary. You yourselves could see here [*u nas*] that in all of our arguments we were guided only by deep concern that the victories of socialism be preserved in Hungary and that the restoration of the old order, which would have had far-reaching consequences for all countries located in this part of Europe, including Yugoslavia, be prevented. In particular, in connection with all of this we put forward our thoughts on trying to keep communists, and perhaps Nagy himself, out of this government, in which different anti-socialist elements were located and which for this very reason was not in a condition to halt the [forces of] reaction on their path to power. Comrades Khrushchev and Malenkov did not reject these thoughts. On the contrary, they agreed with them, with some exceptions as to Nagy. We considered that in this government and around it there were honest communists who could be very useful in creating the new government of Janos Kadar and in liquidating the activity of anti-socialist forces. On the basis of this conversation at Brioni, we took some measures in Budapest on the afternoon of Saturday, 3 November of this year.

On November 2, Zoltan Szanto spoke with our representative in Budapest. In the course of this conversation, Szanto expressed the desire that he and some communists, if it were possible, could leave the building of the government and the CC and could find sanctuary in our embassy, since their lives were being threatened by reactionary bands of rioters. In the spirit of this conversation, our representative answered Szanto that we were ready to give them shelter if they made their escape immediately. We expected that they would answer on Sunday, the fourth of the month. However, on the morning

of the same day, the Soviet Army began its actions, and our conversations were ended. Instead of that, early in the morning of the same day, on the basis of previous conversations, Nagy and 15 other leaders of the government and the party together with their families arrived at our embassy. When we received the first report about this event from Budapest, we did not know whether the announcement which had been read, which you cite in your letter, was in fact Nagy's announcement or whether it was published without his knowledge. And so, Nagy and his group arrived on the basis of the conversations which had taken place earlier, before we from Belgrade could react to his announcement, for the authenticity of which we had no proof. As soon as we received word that Nagy and the others had taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, comrade Kardelj invited the counselor to the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, comrade Griaznov, and told him this fact. Despite the absence of such information, all the same, we then considered that an appropriate announcement by Nagy, if essentially in favor of the Kadar government, could still assist an easing of the situation in Hungary, as we proposed to you. Having not received an urgently requested reply from you in this regard throughout November 4, we refrained from further actions in that direction.

If attention is paid to all of this, then it becomes obvious that only as a result of the speed of events, matters were not clarified and problems were created, which it is now necessary to resolve. We believe that the question of whether our embassy in Budapest behaved correctly or not is now irrelevant, but that it is important that we jointly resolve the problem in the spirit of friendly relations, which we have already restored between our countries and our parties, since [the problem] in the final analysis appeared as a result of our conversation in Brioni, although, because of events which occurred during the night from Saturday to Sunday, things have developed in a different way than we proposed. After this, essentially, only their personal issue in regard to their request for asylum will remain to be decided.

We do not dispute some of your arguments as to the fact that granting asylum in Yugoslavia to members of the former Hungarian government, whose chairman has not resigned, could be negative, and do not think that we do not realize that all of this has also brought us some unpleasantness and complications. As we see from your letter, you have not accepted our proposal that Nagy and the rest of the group be transported, with your permission, to Yugoslavia, and that puts us, understandably, in a very difficult position. Specifically on that point, we would like you to treat the search for a joint way out of all of this with great understanding, since neither by the stipulations in our constitution on the granting of the right of asylum, nor by international custom, nor by other considerations which we cited earlier, can we break the word we have given and simply hand over these people. Here we must especially emphasize that such an action by us would provoke far-

reaching consequences in our country.

In your letter you say that this could have negative consequences for our relations as well, but we consider that this should not hinder the problem. It is 1.8 -e2afuRaTt esspekmtsirs at this

7122(ugoslavitsis)Tjj musaiet it ed, wif aliust ofbtharevolitutissarpren  
ogf the righd t(siitehe rp conbilosy [(to )28(Y)122(ugoslaves fS)a)lacion

of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia  
(I.B. Tito)

[Source: *AP RF*, f. 3, op. 64, d. 486, ll. 61-67. Copy. *TsKhSD*. f. 89, per 45. dok. No. 38. Obtained by the National Security Archive and CWIHP. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

---

*Leonid Gibianskii is a senior researcher at the Institute for Slavonic Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and has published widely on Soviet-Yugoslav relations.*

<sup>1</sup> Practically nothing was changed in this sense by the publication of a collection of documents on Yugoslavia's policies towards Hungary in connection with the Hungarian revolution in 1959: *Politika Jugoslavije prema Madarskoj i slucaj Imre Nada* (Belgrade, 1959). It was compiled and published in connection with the trial that took place in 1958 in Hungary of the group of participants in the prominent revolutionary events of 1956 headed by Imre Nagy. The publication had a propaganda aim: to disprove the accusations made in the course of the trial of Yugoslavia's participation in statements against the pro-Soviet communist regime in Hungary. Although the collection, which consisted largely of newspaper publications, also included fragments of individual archival documents, as a result of the careful selection that had been exercised in its compilation, it lacked materials which would have exposed the behind-the-scenes dimension of Soviet-Yugoslav contacts in connection with the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

<sup>2</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970, 1971). I used the corrected Russian original of the recollections, which was published in the Moscow journal *Voprosy istorii* in 1990-1995 under the title of "Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev."

<sup>3</sup> Veljko Micunovic, *Mockovske godine 1956-1958* (Zagreb,

1956 Hungarian Revolution, and the Cold War International  
History Project.  
9

Deng may have had something more philosophical in mind, but, his ultimate arbiter, history, is the daily output of the historians. This section of the *Bulletin* aims to provide enough archival material for historians of Chinese, Russian, and Communist history to begin a debate on the role of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) in Sino-Soviet relations during the years 1956-1963, a period that witnessed both the final years of cooperation between the two communist powers and the emergence of tensions that finally split the alliance. Although the late paramount leader of the People's Republic of China is best remembered for the tremendous, though uneven, reforms that he introduced and oversaw during the last twenty years of his life, his earlier achievements should not be neglected.

Within weeks of the conversation from which the epigraph is drawn, Deng arrived in Moscow for ideological jousting at the highest levels with Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's "gray cardinal." And Deng always gave as good as he got. Of course, by 1963, when again Deng and Suslov headed the delegations, the level of vituperation had risen sharply. When Deng returned from this last encounter, the whole CCP Politburo, headed by Mao, Zhou, and Lin Biao turned out at the airport to applaud him, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng.<sup>2</sup> Vlad Zubok, in an insightful and provocative introductory essay, speculates that the services Deng rendered Mao in his battle with the Soviet "older brother" may have saved his life when the Cultural Revolution swept others away. Chen Jian's "Rejoinder" only strengthens this impression, while providing a fuller Chinese politics context. Both the 1960 and 1963 talks, together with six memoranda of conversations between Deng and Soviet representatives, are excerpted in this *Bulletin*. Additional materials can be found at the CWIHP website: [cwihip.si.edu](http://cwihip.si.edu).

The fall of 1960 was a special time in other respects, for the USSR had just withdrawn its experts from the PRC, occasioning bewilderment, hardship and ill-will.<sup>3</sup> Although the Soviet Union was well enough informed about affairs in China to sense the variety of reactions, newly released materials are only now making clear the depth of division. Only a few weeks after the withdrawal, the CCP

leadership had moved to seaside Beidaihe to escape the Beijing summer heat. Therefore, Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, joined them there and met with Mao on August 10. In referring to the Soviet Union, Mao was livid.

Khrushchev can cooperate with America, England and France. He can cooperate with India and Indonesia. He can even cooperate with Yugoslavia, but only with China is it impossible on the grounds that we have divergent opinions. Does that mean that his views are identical with America, England, France and India to allow whole-hearted cooperation? [He] withdraws the experts from China and doesn't transfer technology, while sending experts to India and giving technology. So what if China doesn't have experts? Will people die, I don't believe it.

Ho's reaction was: "That's a pretty strong statement."<sup>4</sup>

In sharp contrast to this explosion, four days earlier on August 4, Chen Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, had met with Ambassador Chervonenko and insisted that "speaking as one Communist to another," a full break between the parties was not a possibility.<sup>5</sup> But what does this divergence of messages reveal? It is possible that in light of the disastrous famine that accompanied the "Great Leap Forward" and would claim upward of 15 million Chinese lives in 1959-61, Mao had ordered his subordinates to show restraint and moderation in the hope of continuing aid from the Soviets. After all, where else would it come from? On the other hand, it is also possible that the Chinese leadership, influenced by the same perception of China's dire straits, collectively opted for a moderate policy, despite Mao's rancor and radicalism. If this is indeed the case, we will find Deng among the moderates, placating the Soviets right up into 1962, if not further. But only additional documentation, especially from the Chinese side, can answer these critical questions.





**ZHANG SHUGUANG** (University of Maryland)

*Western Economic Embargo against China and Sino-Soviet Relations*

**LEONID SHIROKORAD** (St. Petersburg State University)

*The Cold War and Soviet-Chinese Economic Relations in the Late 1940s and Early 1950s*

**Discussants:** **LEV DELYUSIN** (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science);

**ZHANG BAIJIA** (CCP Central Institute of Party History)

**International Conflict and Sino-Soviet Relations**

**KATHRYN WEATHERSBY** (Independent Scholar, Washington, DC)

*Sino-Soviet Relations and the Korean War*

**LI DANHUI** (Institute of Contemporary China)

*Sino-Soviet Relations and China's 'Assist Vietnam and Resist America'*

**HOPE HARRISON** (Lafayette College)

*China and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962*

**CHEN DONGLIN** (Institute of Contemporary China)

*China's Responses to the Soviet Union's Military Interventions in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia:*

*A Comparative Study*

In November 1957, on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia, a high-level Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow to take part in a major conference of communist parties that was convoked by Soviet leader N. S. Khrushchev to grant a new international legitimacy to his leadership, which had already weathered years of domestic power struggle following Stalin's death. In Chinese leader Mao Zedong's entourage were CC CCP [Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party] general secretary Deng Xiaoping; director of the CC Central Administrative Office, Yang Shangkun; Mao's political secretary Hu Qiaomu; Defense Minister and Vice-Premier of the State Council Peng Dehuai; interpreter Li Yueran, and physician Dr. Li Zhisui. To the West the Communist reunion in Moscow looked like an ominous triumph of enemy forces, bent on expansion and untroubled by inner rifts. In reality, the rivalry between the Soviet and Chinese leadership was already in progress.

American journalist Harrison Salisbury, who interviewed Chinese veterans about this episode, writes that it was the first time Deng handled such a role and he "proved tireless in fighting for Mao's position." Deng Xiaoping was the Chinese representative on the ten-nation committee that drafted the conference's final manifesto. "China swept the day," Salisbury's Chinese sources told him. "Mao Zedong was never to forget this. It caused him to brag about his 'little guy' to Khrushchev—the man who ... bested Mikhail Suslov, the tall Soviet ideologue."<sup>1</sup>

Future biographers of Deng Xiaoping will have to pay more attention to his prominent role in the drama of the Sino-Soviet split.<sup>2</sup> New evidence from Eastern-bloc archives reveals that Deng earned many of his stripes in the ideological struggle for preeminence between Mao Zedong and Moscow. Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi alternated as ideological spokesmen in the relationship with Soviet leaders. The performance in November 1957 was one of Deng's first exploits in the Sino-Soviet

historians Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian.<sup>6</sup>

The notes of the head of the CC CPSU General Department Vladimir Malin on the discussions in the Kremlin reveal that Soviet leaders, even after they returned from Poland and the face-off between Khrushchev and Gomulka, contemplated military pressure and insisted that Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, - the Soviet citizen installed by Moscow after World War Two as Polish Defense Minister whose ouster the Polish communists had demanded - should remain the head of the Polish army. Also the CC Presidium discussed inviting to Moscow “representatives from the Communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the GDR, and Bulgaria.”<sup>7</sup> However, the Polish leadership managed to appeal to the Chinese behind the Soviets back with a plea to intercede and prevent a possible Soviet military intervention. Later, after the fact, Mao Zedong asserted that “the CCP categorically rejected the Soviet proposal [for intervention] and attempted to put forward the Chinese position directly by immediately sending a delegation to Moscow with Liu Shaoqi at its head.” Mao blamed the crisis in Poland on

Hungary, could be explained and understood only if we look at them from within the world in which the participants themselves lived and thought. In this world each side maneuvered with a careful eye on three factors — one was the legacy of Stalin, the embodiment of power and unity of the communist camp; another was the power struggle inside Moscow and Beijing; the third was the emerging struggle between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev for seniority and revolutionary legitimacy within the communist world. Mao Zedong had been outraged when Khrushchev in February had denounced Stalin without consulting the Chinese leadership. Mao realized, to his extreme displeasure, that this funny, bald-headed Soviet leader had just undercut his, Mao's, intention to turn Stalin into a pedestal for his seniority in the world communist movement — while building his own legitimacy as a paragon of de-Stalinization. From 1956, Mao began to regard himself as the potential leader of the communist camp and Khrushchev as a time-server and political liability. Evidently Deng Xiaoping was one of those who avidly shared this new perception in Beijing.

In July 1963 Deng Xiaoping challenged the Soviets on what had happened on those fateful days. Deng Xiaoping said that “after the 20th congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the wholesale renunciation of Stalin, a wave of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaigns was provoked around the whole world...The most prominent events which took place in this period were the events in Poland and Hungary.” Deng Xiaoping was careful to indicate that the Chinese leadership had never concealed this position from the Soviets. In fact, on 23 October 1956 when the Hungarian revolution started, Mao Zedong had told Soviet ambassador Pavel Iudin that the Soviets “had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us with it.” Khrushchev's method of criticizing Stalin, Mao had implied, was “the same as if

4.15M [3had h171.2 T2.35what5had hCoistnun legitiTj T T\*nounons in

the aid of the friendly Hungarian people in its difficult hour? Why then have you found it necessary again to rehash the past and return to the events in Hungary and Poland?"<sup>20</sup>

But in fact in this particular game Deng Xiaoping held a good hand of cards and Suslov knew it. After the October 1956 events the influence of the CCP on the political moods and the power struggle in the Kremlin was at its peak. This influence had no precedent under Stalin and it declined later, when Khrushchev ousted his rivals and moved to the position of unchallenged leader of the party and state. This phenomenon, as well as the importance of the Chinese pressure on the Soviets during the Polish-Hungarian "October," has not been understood by Western observers and scholars; nor was it admitted then and later by the Soviets themselves. Yet, like the events in Hungary and Poland, the changing equation between Moscow and Beijing was a direct result of Khrushchev's cavalier de-Stalinization and the turmoil it caused in the communist movement and the ranks of the Soviet leadership itself. Internationally, Khrushchev's revelations had shattered the traditional hierarchy of the communist world, with Moscow at the top. Internally, the Soviets weakened themselves with internal strife and were eager to cater to the Chinese in order to preserve "the unity of the socialist camp." Khrushchev, who a year earlier had attacked Stalin's and Molotov's role in antagonizing Tito's Yugoslavia (See Plenums section of this *Bulletin*), was determined to avoid the same mistakes with Communist China, whatever Mao said about Stalin. And Molotov and other opponents of de-Stalinization in the Soviet leadership looked at the Chinese as their potential allies against Khrushchev.

A majority of the Presidium secretly agreed with Chinese assessments of the situation and Khrushchev felt the danger of a united front between Beijing and what would become in June 1957 "the anti-party group" of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, as well as



relations comes from transcripts of CPSU plenums. Reporting to the plenum on 13 July 1960, Khrushchev's party deputy Frol Kozlov reported that on 5 June the Politburo of the CC CCP "had invited around 40 communists—leaders of foreign trade unions, to dinner, followed by a conference" of trade unionists. Liu Shaoqi opened this conference, and then "com. Deng Xiaoping took the floor, and his speech contained a number of absolutely false positions, which contained an obvious distortion of the line of the CPSU." Deng, according to Kozlov's story, declared that the CPSU and other fraternal parties had "tossed overboard the main points of the Declaration" of the communist conference of November 1957.<sup>29</sup> Perhaps this pushed Khrushchev over the edge leading to the abrupt removal of Soviet advisors and technical personnel from China.

The trade union conference in Beijing was, as it turned out, China's preparation for the clash with the USSR at the congress of "fraternal parties" in Bucharest in late June 1960, where Khrushchev and the leaders of the East European countries all participated. With Deng Xiaoping absent from the Bucharest congress, the role of ideological hit-men fell to Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Wu Xiuquan, and Liu Xiao. It is not clear what the little "terrier" was busy with at that time. Three years later he explained it away with a joke.

Shaoqi who was announced on the list. Suslov remarked later that Deng “passed up in total silence the speech of com. Khrushchev.”<sup>37</sup> This figure of silence was probably meant to imply how unworthy of attention were the pronouncements of the Soviet leader who pretended to be the head of the world communist movement! Khrushchev swallowed the bait and had to give a rebuff to Deng Xiaoping in his second, unplanned speech on 23 November. Deng counterattacked on the next day and this produced a virtual pandemonium at the conference. Each and every leader of an East European country, West European communist party, and pro-Moscow organization elsewhere rushed to the podium to voice their full and unswerving support of the Soviet leader and to appeal to the Chinese not to break the “united” ranks.

The Soviet leadership, too, was horrified by a prospect of schism and preferred to offer a compromise to the Chinese, particularly on the interpretation of Stalin’s role. At this point “bad cop” Deng Xiaoping receded in the shadow, and “good cop” Liu Shaoqi, much respected in Moscow, met with Khrushchev on October 30 to reach a deal.<sup>38</sup> All this division of labor on the Chinese side was probably orchestrated in advance, with the active participation of Mao Zedong. But the Soviets pretended they did not understand it, hoping to paper over the growing chasm and eager to end the conference on the note of unity.

The consultations of July 1963 were also the byproduct of these Soviet illusions. Moscow proposed them in a CC CPSU letter of 21 February 1963. Beijing, on the contrary, geared itself for ideological battle, publicizing its so called “25 points” (Proposal for the General Line of the International Communist Movement) on the very eve of the Sino-Soviet consultations.<sup>39</sup> The Chinese “points” of 14 June 1963 fell with a thud on the proceedings of the CC CPSU plenum on ideology and naturally became the focus of discussions there.

The discussion in Moscow was a bizarre event, more reminiscent of a scholarly exercise, where each side presented “a report” replete with citations from Lenin, Trotsky, Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, etc. Essentially it was just another act in the public show, where teams of speech-writers, cued by instructions of their chiefs, produced tomes of vituperative, albeit impossibly turgid polemics.<sup>40</sup> Georgii Arbatov, then a scholar at IMEMO in Moscow and “consultant” for the CC International Department, became an assistant to the Soviet delegation at the Sino-Soviet talks. He declared in a memorandum that the gist of the endless unilateral declarations intended, first, to rip the other side to shreds and, second, to defend one’s own case from Marxist orthodoxy.” Each day of discussion ended, fit to

rip yu 81 wtnd oTL0wrtly becTEcalbeitandmodrib0i one’ly betruct1 wtnd o





acclaimed in Beijing. According to one biographer, “the failure to shore up Sino-Soviet relations was greeted as a victory over revisionism by the CCP leadership who turned out in force to welcome Deng back from Moscow.” He was also the leader of the group of speechwriters that drafted CCP letters, probably including the ones criticizing the test ban.<sup>52</sup> Salisbury concludes that Deng’s ideological exploits in Moscow (he mentions only one in November 1957) earned him Mao’s gratitude and a relatively mild treatment during the Cultural Revolution. If this version is true, then Deng Xiaoping proved his credentials as a loyal subordinate of Mao Zedong and demonstrated his ability to work very successfully together with the Chairman in the area of foreign policy.<sup>53</sup>

But does it mean that the “little terrier” had the same views on Stalin, Stalinism and international relations as Mao Zedong? There is a more complex explanation of Deng’s role. According to recent revelations of Dr. Li Zhisui, Mao’s personal physician, Deng Xiaoping, as well as Liu Shaoqi, lost Mao’s trust at the Eighth CCP Congress in September 1956, when they spoke too fervently about the impossibility of any cult of personality in China.<sup>54</sup> Mao Zedong considered Deng a politician with a great future (as he told Khrushchev in November 1957) and considerable political ambitions. However, in the atmosphere of power struggle and Mao’s emerging dictatorship this praise could bring Deng as easily to the gallows as to the pedestal: Mao, like Stalin before him, had shrinking tolerance for men of political ambition in his immediate vicinity. Therefore, it is only logical that Mao should have watched Deng very keenly and tried to find tasks for him where Deng’s energy would have been utilized for Mao’s benefit rather than against his interests. According to this logic, Mao Zedong wanted to send Deng to Moscow not because he particularly trusted his loyalty, but for the opposite reason, because he wanted to neutralize his potential opposition to his rising cult of personality.

To understand this logic, it is perhaps useful to start with the opposite pole, the Soviet one. After 1960 the Chinese criticism of Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization tied the hands of the Stalinists in Moscow like Suslov. According to Georgi Arbatov’s thoughtful observation “from 1962-1964 the Chinese factor weakened the position of the Stalinists in the USSR. As it developed, the conflict with China had positive influences on the policy of Khrushchev, who had been slipping back to Stalinism only too often since 1962. The debate with the Chinese leaders provided the anti-Stalinists with the opportunity, while defending our policies, to speak out on many political and ideological subjects that had lately become taboo.”<sup>55</sup>

Actually, when Khrushchev was overthrown at the CC Presidium in October 1964, Alexander Shelepin, Secretary of the CC and the former head of the KGB, repeated almost verbatim Deng’s criticism of the Soviet leader’s “two mistakes” during the Cuban missile crisis. Yet, the Soviet leaders were too embarrassed to repeat this criticism at the plenum, because it would have implied that the

Chinese had been right all along. Therefore, Khrushchev’s foreign policy errors were not criticized at the top party forum.

In China the same logic worked the other way around. Mao Zedong may well have cleverly decided to direct the energy of his potential critics, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, for external, foreign policy use. Deng Xiaoping must have been critical of Mao’s exercise of power and his disastrous “great leap forward.” Since 1960 he and Liu expressed an inclination to oppose the leftist economic experiments of the Chairman. But in foreign policy Deng enthusiastically shared Mao’s goal to strive for China’s equality in the communist camp. As a delegation head, Deng Xiaoping must have been held on an extremely short leash by Mao. In any case, Deng’s personal role in implementing the Sino-Soviet split made him a committed advocate of this policy. According to his biographer, during the early 1980s, when Mao’s role in the politics of

members, Wu Xiuquan and Pang Zuli. The members of the Soviet delegation were Mikhail Suslov and Leonid Il'ichev, two influential members of the CC CPSU Secretariat in charge of ideology; Viktor Grishin from the Moscow Party Organization; Iurii Andropov, head of the CC International Department

---

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, pp. 73, 75

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 178

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 106

<sup>46</sup> “Kak snimali Khrushcheva [How Khrushchev was deposed], the materials of the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 14 October 1964, *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 1 (1993), p. 10.

<sup>47</sup> Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 239.

<sup>48</sup> Kohler to the Department of State, Moscow, July 18 and July 19, 1963, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961 -1963*, vol. VII: *Arms Control and Disarmament*, (Washington, GPO,

1995), pp. 808 and 814. I am thankful to James Hershberg and William Burr for bringing these documents to my attention.

<sup>49</sup> Stenographic Report, pp. 251-252.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 90

<sup>51</sup> Borisov, Koloskov, op. cit., p. 226

<sup>52</sup> David Goodman, op. cit., p. 73

<sup>53</sup> This is Goodman’s conclusion. op. cit., p. 64

<sup>54</sup> Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Private Physician* (New York, Random House, 1994).

<sup>55</sup> Arbatov, *The System*, p. 95.

<sup>56</sup> Goodman, op. cit., p. 71.

---

## Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s “Continuous Revolution,” and the Path toward the Sino-Soviet Split: A Rejoinder

By *Chen Jian*

**D**eng Xiaoping is a legendary figure in the political history of modern China. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao Zedong twice purged him, but did not destroy him (as the Chinese Chairman did to Liu Shaoqi, China’s second most important leader from 1949 to 1966, who died in disgrace in 1969). Early in 1973, after Deng had been absent from China’s political scene for more than six years, Mao pardoned him and brought him back to China’s decision-making inner circle. Three years later, when Deng was again expelled from the Party’s Politburo and Central Committee due to his alleged “unchanged reactionary attitude” toward the Cultural Revolution, he retained his Party membership and was never exposed to physical torture by the “revolutionary masses.” He would reemerge and eventually become China’s paramount leader after Mao’s death in 1976.

It is apparent that Deng Xiaoping’s purge and survival during the Cultural Revolution were primarily Mao’s work. But Deng’s image in Mao’s mind must have been extremely complicated, otherwise his experience would not have been so tortuous. While it will take a much more comprehensive study to reconstruct the relationship between Deng and Mao, thanks to available Chinese sources one thing is certain: both Deng’s purge and survival were related to Mao’s changing memories of the role he played in promoting or resisting the Chairman’s grand enterprise of continuous revolution aimed at, among other things, preventing a Soviet-style “capitalist restoration” from happening in China.

Indeed, the “Soviet factor” played a crucial role in determining Deng Xiaoping’s political fate during the Cultural Revolution. If the causes of his downfall were

symbolized in the label placed on him of “China’s Second Largest Khrushchev,” one of the main reasons for his reemergence could be found in the fact that Mao again remembered that Deng was once an “anti-Soviet revisionist” hero. On 14 August 1972, less than a year after the death of Marshal Lin Biao, Mao’s designated successor during the Cultural Revolution, who then betrayed Mao in 1971, Mao commented on a letter Deng wrote to him about ten days earlier: “After we entered the cities, it is not true to say that he [Deng Xiaoping] has done nothing that is good. For example, he led the [CCP] delegation to Moscow to negotiate [with the Soviets]. He did not yield to the pressure of the Soviet revisionists. I have talked about this many times in the past. Now I want to repeat it once more.”<sup>1</sup>

The transcripts of the meetings in Moscow between Chinese and Soviet Party delegations in July 1963 will help us to understand why Mao’s memory of Deng’s experience of “not yielding to the Soviet revisionists” was so persistent. Deng, simply put, was a fighter. As shown by the meeting transcripts, he fully believed that truth was on the side of the Chinese Communists. Indeed, as far as the mentalities of the two sides are concerned, the Chinese exuded a strong sense of superiority. If for half a century the Chinese Communists had been willing to accept Moscow’s dominant position in the international communist movement, in 1963 they acted in accordance with a different underlying assumption. They obviously believed that Beijing, rather than Moscow, should play the leadership role in the world proletarian revolution. Deng Xiaoping’s passionate performance indicated his seemingly wholehearted embrace of this belief.

The divergence between Beijing and Moscow, as







To my question of approximately what percent the rightist elements comprise among the students, Deng Xiaoping answered that on average among the students, the rightists comprised only one percent, and that there were many more waiverers and individuals deceived by the rightist demagogues, but that at present they were once again reverting to the correct path.

In some institutions of higher learning, the percentage of rightists was higher, as, for instance, at Beijing University [there were] about 3%, while in some institutions of higher learning there were up to 10%.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping noted that this year prospects for the harvest were good, but that at the end of July and the beginning of August flooding often occurs.

In China every year, an average of 20 million people suffer from natural disasters. In the first five-year period, there were strong floods three times, and each time about 40 million people suffered, and last year, 70 million people suffered from natural disasters.

Having thanked com. Deng Xiaoping for the conversation, in my turn I told him about the progress of the preparation for the Sixth Worldwide Festival of Youth and Students in the USSR.

The head of the chancellery of the Secretariat of the CC CCP, com. Yang Shangkun, was present at the conversation.

Chargé d'affaires of the USSR in the PRC  
(P. Abrasimov)

*[Source: AVPRF (Arkhiv vneshnei politiki rossiiskoi federatsii) [Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive], f. 0100, op. 50, p. 424, d. 8.; obtained by Paul Wingrove; translated by Ben Aldrich-Moodie.]*

. . . . .

From the diary of  
P.F. IUDIN

SECRET. Copy No. 2

**Record of Conversation  
with member of the Standing Committee  
of the Politburo**





cussed the issue of the expediency of Harriman's visit to China and came to the conclusion that at present the visit would not be useful. However, he added, we are not ruling out a visit by Harriman to China in the future.

I briefed Deng Xiaoping on the basis of the information we received from MID USSR on Sukarno's stay in Turkey. Having displayed a great interest in this issue, Deng Xiaoping noted that, of all the nationalist countries in Asia at present, Indonesia is taking the best position. This is particularly evident in the example of Indonesia's attitude toward events in Tibet.

Afterwards, we touched on the issue of Yugoslavia, of Tito's trip through the countries of Southeast Asia, of Yugoslavia's position on the Tibet issue, and on the difficult state of the Yugoslav economy. In the conversation, it was noted that nationalist bourgeois circles in Arab countries were accepting Yugoslav ideology. We both agreed that it was necessary to strengthen our common propaganda in the Arab countries in the interests of exposing the Yugoslav provocational policy.

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that in some ways the Yugoslav revisionists were now more dangerous than the Americans and the social democrats of the Western countries, and that, as a result, it was a very important task to expose the Yugoslav revisionists. We are devoting a lot of attention to this issue, he said, which is the reason for the Yugoslavs' particular protest. Deng Xiaoping said that after a report by a Xinhua correspondent in Belgrade about a strike by Yugoslav students protesting poor food was published in the Chinese press, the Yugoslav authorities made a statement of protest and warned the Chinese correspondent that if such an episode occurred again they would take appropriate action against him.

Touching on the plan thought up by Tito and Nasser for a meeting of the leaders of four countries - Tito, Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno—with the aim of "coordinating neutrality policies in connection with the Geneva conference," Deng Xiaoping said that Nehru was firmly opposing the meeting. Sukarno was showing a vague interest (*kak-budto proiavliaet nekotoryi interes*) in the plan. Foreign agents report that [Indonesian Foreign Minister] Subandrio has allegedly decided to communicate with the authors of the plan (Tito and Nasser) about the concrete details of the proposal. As of yet, it is hard to say what Sukarno's final position will be on this issue, Deng Xiaoping noted, although it is already clear that Tito and Nasser are very interested in calling such a meeting.

Having noted that the Americans need an instrument like the current Yugoslav leaders and that the Americans are making fairly good use of that instrument, not economizing in their spending on it, Deng Xiaoping expressed confidence that in the end that money would be spent in vain, as was the money spent on Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-Shek].

I inquired as to the situation at present in Taiwan.

Deng Xiaoping expressed the opinion that Jiang Jieshi would probably not give up power and would remain

"president" for a third term. If Jiang Jieshi remains as "president," he said, that would be better for us than if Chen Chen or even Hu Shi occupied the post. The Americans would be happiest with Hu Shi; in the worst case, they would agree to Chen Chen. Jiang Jieshi suits them least of all. On the Tibetan issue, Deng Xiaoping noted, the views of the PRC and Jiang Jieshi coincide: both we and he consider that Tibet is Chinese territory and that we cannot permit the Tibetan issue to be put before the UN.

In answer to my question as to what the economic situation in Taiwan was, Deng Xiaoping said that the Jiang Jieshi-ites were living at the USA's expense. That, he added, is not a bad thing. Let the Americans waste their money. In the final analysis, Taiwan will be returned to the bosom of its native land - China. However, for that to happen, we need time; we must wait a bit. The circumstances are becoming more and more favorable for the PRC and less and less so for the USA. The Jiang Jieshi-ites in Taiwan are beginning to think hard about the prospects which await them. There are many factors contributing to this: the growing international authority of people's China, its economic successes, the long separation from the native land, and so on. The most important thing of all is that they know the Americans want to wash their hands of them (

*no, Phto*

At the end of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping briefly touched on the issue of the Dalai Lama. Previously, he said, Nehru calculated that the Dalai Lama would play a huge role in the Indians' plans and that chaos would begin in Tibet without the Dalai Lama. Quite the opposite, in Tibet, things are going well without the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama has turned out to be a burden for Nehru. Nehru and the Americans are spending 200 thousand rupees monthly to maintain the Dalai Lama and his entourage. At present, Nehru intends to return the Dalai Lama to Tibet. If he returns, Deng Xiaoping added, we will pay him much more than the Indians and the Americans. In the past during each visit by the Dalai Lama to Beijing, he was given 200 thousand yuan for minor expenses. While the Dalai Lama was in Lhasa, he was given 700 thousand yuan every month (for him and his entourage).

In connection with this, I noted that the Tibetan peasants, who had been freed from dependence as serfs, had gained the most from the Tibetan events.

Having agreed with me, Deng Xiaoping said that the masses of the people in Tibet had already risen up to carry out democratic reforms.

**From the diary of  
S.V. CHERVONENKO**

**SECRET**

**8" December 1959**

**Memorandum of Conversation  
with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, DENG  
XIAOPING**

**6 November 1959**

I had my first visit with Deng Xiaoping and had a conversation with him. Deng Xiaoping told me that he had not yet fully recovered after breaking his leg. He is going back to work in two days, but the doctors are allowing him to work for only four hours at a time. Afterwards, he asked what was my impression of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the PRC. Answering Deng Xiaoping, I noted that the celebration had been organized on a grand scale. It demonstrated the huge enthusiasm of the people and their solidarity.

Deng Xiaoping said that he was present at the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. [Ed. Note: Moscow, November 1957. Due to the Soviet government's 1918 conversion from Julian to Gregorian calendars, the October Revolution was feted on November 7.] In the USSR too, he added, everything had been organized well. Such round dates must be well noted. The most important point was that our great holidays demonstrate our solidarity, the great progress of the socialist camp, and the solidarity of progressive forces, of the fraternal parties.

I answered that the solidarity of the fraternal parties had found clear expression during the celebration of the CCP's tenth anniversary. During ten short years, the CCP had achieved successes which have rocked (*vskolykhnut'*) the entire world, and no one is in a position to take those achievements away from the Chinese people. The solidarity of the fraternal peoples has already shown its great significance more than once. If, for instance, after the victory of the October Revolution, Ukraine had remained alone and had not been in the family of the other Soviet republics, it could have been overwhelmed and dismembered by the imperialists. Friendship is the greatest force of all and sometimes we do not fully recognize its significance. History will show what a huge significance it has.

Deng Xiaoping responded that unity and solidarity truly were the most important thing. With our solidarity, we do not fear any imperialists. "We are exerting every effort to preserve peace, and imperialism will perish in peaceful conditions. If madmen nevertheless unleash a war, they will only meet with their downfall. The entire affair consists of the fact that we are making progress, while they are being torn apart by contradictions. We have many friends, including in the USA - [those friends] are

the working people.”

I noted that comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s visit demonstrated the great interest of the workers of America in our country and in socialism.

For that reason, Deng Xiaoping said, the ruling circles in the USA were afraid of that visit. They wanted to isolate comrade Khrushchev, but the people broke through the dike. Moreover, having agreed with [my] observation that even while making progress and augmenting socialism’s strength it is necessary to display great vigilance toward the machinations of the imperialists, Deng Xiaoping said: “The imperialists especially want to undermine the unity of our countries, but that is a futile endeavor....”

To my observation that the most important thing in overcoming every difficulty is the presence of the leading role of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping said that both the one and the other were important, the leadership of the CCP and help from the Soviet Union. “At present,” he went on, “we are in a better position than you were right after the October Revolution. If a new socialist country arises, it will, given the existence of the entire socialist camp, be in an even better position than we are. We are very happy that the situation in the Soviet Union is good in all respects. As for us, we are also not in a bad position.”

I noted that even in a situation where our affairs are going well, we [always] take measures to use all our existing capacities as much as possible; we are self-critical of ourselves, and strive to root out all our shortcomings. We also have shortcomings, Deng Xiaoping answered, and they will always exist. One must even on occasion heed criticism coming from an enemy.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping said that we would meet again and more than once.

I thanked Deng Xiaoping for the conversation and expressed the hope that in its work, the Embassy would encounter assistance from him and from the CC CCP apparatus as before.

Head of the protocol division of the CCP Foreign Ministry, Yu Peiwen, assistant head of the division for the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe Yu Zhan, [USSR] embassy counselor B.N. Vereshchagin and third secretary B.T. Kulik were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF, f. 5, op. 49, d. 235, ll. 107-110; obtained by Paul Wingrove; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

**From the Diary of  
CHERVONENKO S.V.  
“/” June 1960**

**TOP SECRET  
Copy No. 3**

**Memorandum of Conversation**

**With the General Secretary of the CC CCP  
Member of the Politburo of the  
CC CCP, DENG XIAOPING**

I was received on 17 May by Deng Xiaoping. The chief of the division on ties with fraternal parties, member of the CC and the Secretariat of the CC CCP, Wang Jiaxiang also took part in the ensuing conversation....

In connection with the instructions from the Center, I gave Deng Xiaoping the text of a letter of the CC CPSU with an official invitation to the party-governmental delegation of the PRC to visit the USSR. Deng Xiaoping said that the delegation of the PRC would be certain to go to the Soviet Union, and that the CC CCP without a doubt would take seriously the wishes expressed by the Soviet comrades in connection with this trip.

After this I fulfilled the Center’s instruction regarding informing the Chinese comrades about the position of the Soviet Union in connection with the summit conference. Deng Xiaoping said that comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s speech on 16 May in Paris was a very good, strong speech, and noted that on 18 May it would be fully published in the PRC press. We still do not know Mao Zedong’s and Liu Shaoqi’s opinions, since they are absent, said Deng Xiaoping, but an exchange of opinions has already taken place between the members of the CC CCP who are presently in Beijing. All of these comrades fully support N.S. Khrushchev’s address. Deng Xiaoping again emphasized that it was a very strong address, and that in it they see the CC CPSU’s firm position. That is our position and the position of the Central Committee of the CCP, he said.

Touching on the USA’s aggressive actions, Deng Xiaoping said: “Eisenhower did a good turn (*sdelal khoroshee delo*),” since by his actions he fully unmasked himself in the eyes of all the world’s peoples. This has a deep educational significance. The ruling circles of the USA are trying to justify themselves by any means possible, but the facts speak for themselves. The peoples of the world can compare the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping emphasized that N.S. Khrushchev’s speech in Paris and Eisenhower’s statement, with which he had also already familiarized himself, present a striking contrast. Com. Khrushchev fully uncovered the true face of Eisenhower and the imperialists.

In the course of further conversation, Deng Xiaoping said that the Soviet government’s initiative as to the summit conference was useful and necessary; he empha-

size that “this was and remains our point of view.” It would be good, if as a result of pressure by peace-loving forces, results were attained, great or small. While at present, fruitful work by a summit conference is impossible, the very fact that the imperialists unmasked themselves is not a bad result. Deng Xiaoping further said that the logic of the American imperialists is the logic of robbers; however Eisenhower tries to “white wash” (*obelit*) himself, nothing more will come of it for him; practically he is helping us. Even this result of the meeting in Paris speaks to the fact that the victory is ours. Deng Xiaoping emphasized that comrade N.S. Khrushchev “acted completely correctly by going to Paris; he should have gone.”

Throughout the course of the conversation I noted that some diplomats - representatives of the capitalist countries of Western Europe in Beijing, in particular the English and the Dutch, are trying to defend the United States, and constantly emphasize that no great significance should be lent to the incursion by the American [U-2] airplane onto the Soviet Union’s territory; that all countries behave in this way, but that the USA mat to three dayould

Deng Xiaoping noted that at present in the Chinese press, articles are being published which are uncovering Nehru’s real face. He further said that many political figures in the countries of Asia—Nasser [Egypt], Kasem [Iraq], Sukarno [Indonesia], U Nu [Burma]—are taking the same positions as Nehru. Nehru stands out from them [in that] he is the cleverest. It was not in vain that he studied in England; in India he is called a half-Englishman, and the English are more experienced than the Americans in [playing] political tricks.

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that the struggle with bourgeois figures of this sort is one of the most important problems facing the international communist movement. Such figures as Nasser or Kasem unmask themselves; in India this work must be done under more difficult circumstances. Some Indian communists even praise Nehru. But in the end, said Deng Xiaoping, Nehru’s behavior is educating these communists as well. With pleasure we see, he continued, that at the last meeting of the National Committee of the Indian Communist Party, important resolutions on internal issues were adopted, namely a statute about the fact that the struggle with reaction cannot avoid a fight with the National Congress Party and with the Congress government (materials about the resolutions of the National Committee of the Communist Party of India were published on the May 17 in “The People’s Daily” -S.Ch.). The organ of the Indian Communist Party has begun to include open public statements against Nehru.

Returning to the meeting in Paris, Deng Xiaoping said that the issue of developing a [Chinese] movement in support of N.S. Khrushchev’s statement was being examined in the CC CCP. On May 18, the leaders of social organizations in the PRC will make statements in the press on this issue, and two to three days thereafter, when the circumstances become clearer, further steps will be taken in this direction. Our common position consists, he said, of exposing the imperialists and of explaining the correctness of the position of the countries in the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.

Deng Xiaoping asked me to convey a warm greeting to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and to all of the members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on behalf of comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and all of the leaders of the CC CCP. The Americans are closing ranks against us, he said, but their closing of ranks is insecure. Our solidarity, and the solidarity of the countries of the socialist camp, is inviolable, since it is founded on a unity of ideas and goals.

In connection with this, the great significance of the upcoming visit by the Chinese party-governmental delegation to the Soviet Union for the further development and strengthening of fraternal friendship between our peoples and parties and for the unity of the whole socialist camp was once again emphasized by me.

In conclusion, Deng Xiaoping said that he would convey everything that he had been informed of by me to comrades Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi.



to which China did not have the right to permit representatives of third countries to enter two provinces of the PRC. These two provinces are our territories. Is it your business whether we permit the entry of persons from third countries or not [?] These questions were discussed with Comrade Mikoian during his trip to the PRC, and it was





12th anniversary was held in Moscow, and asked that thanks be conveyed to the CC CPSU for the attention paid to the Chinese people's holiday.

The candidate of the secretariat of the CC CCP, Yang Shangkun, translators for the CC CCP apparatus, Yan Mingfu and Zhu Ruizhen, as well as the counselor to the embassy, F.V. Mochul'skii, were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

*signature*

(S. CHERVONENKO)

*[Source: AVPRF f. 0100, op. 53, p. 8, d. 454, ll. 175-8; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]*

.....

**From The Diary Of  
S.V. CHERVONENKO**

**Top Secret.  
Copy No. 1**

gir to tr106.8 1



hand, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-around analysis, the lack of self-criticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.

Both Com. Mao Zedong on the 29 October 1957, on the eve of his departure for Moscow, in a conversation with Com. Iudin, and Com. Zhou Enlai during the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961, in a conversation with Com. Khrushchev, stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin.

It should be further noted that when the events in Poland arose, Com. Liu Shaoqi, heading the delegation of the CCP, arrived in Moscow for negotiations, during which he also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized comrades from the CPSU for committing the same mistakes during the events in Poland—mistakes of great-power chauvinism which took place during Stalin's leadership as well... From that very time, you, considering that your internal problems have already been resolved, started to direct the cutting edge [*ostrie*] of your action against Marxism-Leninism against fraternal parties defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism and began to engage in activities directed against the CCP, against the PRC, and this activity is of a serious character.

What has been done by you over this period? Let us cite some of the facts, so as to make things clear.

From April to July of 1958 the CPSU put to China the issue of the creation of a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet, trying thereby to bring China under its military control. But we guessed your intentions and you were not able to attain your goals.

Following that you started both in statements and in actions to carry out anti-Chinese activities in an intensified manner. You continually spoke out attacking the internal policies of the CCP, in particular on the people's commune.

By way of example one can refer to the conversation by Com. Khrushchev with the American Congressman [Hubert] Humphrey in December 1958 and to the speech by Com. Khrushchev in a Polish agricultural cooperative in July 1959.

In June 1959 you unilaterally annulled the agreement on rendering help to China in developing a nuclear industry and in producing atom bombs.

Following this, on 9 September 1959, TASS made an announcement about the incident on the Chinese-Indian border and displayed bias in favor of the Indian reaction, making the disagreements between China and the Soviet Union clear to the whole world for the first time.

In November of that year Com. Khrushchev openly accused China of having acted "stupidly" and "regrettably" in a conversation with a correspondent of the Indian daily "New Age."

At the last meeting at Camp David which was held in

September 1959, Com. Khrushchev began to preach to the whole world of a "world without arms, without armies, without wars", (look good in all sorts of different ways) made the leader of American imperialism, considered peaceful coexistence the task of all tasks, and propagandized the idea that, supposedly, the American-Soviet friendship decides the fate of humanity. All of this practically signified a sermon to the effect that the nature of imperialism had already changed, that Marxism-Leninism was already obsolete.

During this very period you started to propagandize the so called "spirit of Camp David" everywhere. Incidentally, Eisenhower did not recognize the existence of any "spirit of Camp David".

During this very period you, counting on some "spirit of Camp David," clutched at the straw extended by Eisenhower and began mounting attacks upon China in your statements without restraint.

On 30 September 1959, in his speech at a banquet held by us on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the creation of the PRC, Com. Khrushchev stated that one must not test the firmness of a capitalist power with force.

On 6 October 1959 in his speech in Vladivostok, Com. Khrushchev stated that allegedly we were looking for war, like cocks for a fight [*kak petukhi k drake*].

On 31 October 1959 in his report to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Com. Khrushchev said that some, similarly to Trotskii, want "neither war nor peace."

On 1 December 1959 in h (Eis211 Oc, a osa.4rt tc)eirspcem,ula

existent so-called “spirit of Camp-David.” All of this proved the error of the views of our comrades from the CPSU and the correctness of our views...

In June 1960 in Bucharest, the leadership of the CPSU mounted a sudden attack on the CCP, disseminated the Informational Note of the CC of the CPSU which contains an all-around attack on the CCP, and organized a campaign by a whole group of fraternal parties against us...

On 16 July 1960 the Soviet side unilaterally decided to withdraw between 28 July and 1 September over 1,300 Soviet specialists working in China. Over 900 specialists were recalled from [extended] business trips and contracts and agreements were broken...

On 25 August 1962, the Soviet government informed China that it was ready to conclude an agreement with the USA on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our view, you were pursuing an unseemly

1960, I said that it was fortunate that Com. Peng Zhen went to the Bucharest meeting; he weighs approximately 80 kilograms, and for that reason he endured; if I had gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I could not have endured. After that it was just as well that Com. Wu Xiuquan, who weighs more than 70 kilograms, went to the GDR, and was able to endure. Frankly speaking, such methods do not help matters. You cannot prove by such methods that you are in the right; you cannot prove that the truth is on your side. Quite the opposite; the use of such methods is an insult to the glorious Marxist-Leninist party.

**Ponomarev.** And Com. Grishin weighs 70 kg. After all, this started before Bucharest, in Beijing. That was the start of and the reason for the Bucharest Conference.

**Deng Xiaoping.** I understand you.

**Peng Zhen.** Wait. You will have [your] time; you will be able to say as much as you want then. We are ready to hear you out...

**Deng Xiaoping.** I have already taken 5 hours in my statement, and on that I end it. Are we going to continue the session today, or will we continue it tomorrow?

**Suslov.** We propose a break until the day after tomorrow, at 10 AM. We must acquaint ourselves with your statement.

**Deng Xiaoping.** We agree. Who will speak the day after tomorrow, you or we?

**Suslov.** By the order it will be our turn.

**Andropov.** By the principle: we, you, we, you.

**Deng Xiaoping.** That is Com. Andropov's invention [*izobretenie*]...

### July 10

**Suslov.** Again, as in 1960, you are putting in motion the practice, which has already been condemned by communist parties, of personal attacks on Com. N.S. Khrushchev. Such a practice in the past did not provoke anything but indignation in any true communist, and will do the same now.

Com. N.S. Khrushchev is our recognized leader. Reflecting the collective will of the CC CPSU, he has gained unlimited authority for himself in our party, in the country, in the whole world through his selfless devotion to Marxism-Leninism and through his truly titanic struggle to build communism in the USSR, to preserve peace in the whole world in defense of the interests of all working people...

For obviously demagogic ends you are trying to connect the decisions of the 20th Congress with the well-known events in Poland and also with the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary in 1956... We do not plan to examine these issues anew. We will simply note the complete groundlessness of your assertions to the effect that the decisions of the 20th Congress led to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for those events, as is shown by materials of the fraternal parties, comes from the errors of the previous leadership of Hungary connected with Stalin's actions: elements of

unequal rights in the relations between socialist countries which took place during that period by the fault of Stalin. How could the 20th Congress, which abolished these elements of unequal rights and fully restored the principle of respecting national sovereignty, be reason for dissatisfaction on the part of the Hungarian people?

You are now trying to accumulate capital by speculating on these events and by proving that allegedly the Soviet Union are by prov. cTuooof the,rough hgedingult oth CoCom.itufo

**0.2 0.001 T?**

**Cmmuggedlcted wihosD inBSTions relaj /F4 1 Tf 6.7o**

brought it up again today. What do you need it for?...

We would also like to remind our forgetful Chinese comrades about some facts and about the assistance the USSR has given to the economic development of the PRC. Do not the 198 modern industrial enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the scientific-research institutes which it set up, and the technical cadres trained in the USSR, bear witness to the commitment by the CPSU to fraternal friendship with People's China? Up until 1959 almost a half of all the cast iron was produced, more than half of all the steel was smelted, and more than half of the rolled iron was made in the metallurgical plants with help from the USSR.

Such new branches of industry as the automobile, the tractor, and the aviation industry have been developed with the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gave the PRC 21 thousand sets of scientific-technical documentation, including more than 1400 plans of whole enterprises...

**Deng Xiaoping.** Perhaps tomorrow we rest for a day? The day after tomorrow we will speak according to his principle. (He turns to Com. Andropov).

**Suslov.** Fine, until ten o'clock, yes?

**Deng Xiaoping.** Fine, we agree...

### July 12

**Deng Xiaoping.** Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the People's Socialist Party of Cuba at one time fell to attacking the armed struggle led by Com. Fidel Castro, calling it "putschism," "adventurism," and "terrorism." It accused Com. Castro of the fact that the armed struggle led by him was a "total mistake" [*sploshnaya oshibka*], "caused by a petty-bourgeois nature, and that its leaders do not rely on the masses." It even openly demanded of Com. Castro that he renounce "putschistic activities," and "the erroneous path of armed struggle, leading to a rupture with the people."

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Algerian communist party from 1957 fully renounced armed struggle and, moreover, began to propagandize the "danger" of national-liberationist war, advocating the attainment of independence through compromise, and not doing so fully respects place in the political life of the country.

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Communist party of Iraq renounced the correct line, which it at one time had implemented, and began dreaming about the realization of a peaceful transition in Iraq. This led to serious failures and to defeat. During the counterrevolutionary coup of 8 February 1963 the Communist party of Iraq found itself in a condition of complete unpreparedness and suffered heavy losses...

### July 13

**Suslov.** Com. Ponomarev will speak today for our delegation.

Speech by the representative of the CPSU Com. B. N. Ponomarev:

Comrades, yesterday we heard the second address by me, if he is  
wUSSRived\* 0 ing a wholai is



they will be able to recall that during Stalin's leadership Com. Khrushchev more than once extolled Stalin and the policy he was then carrying out of struggling with counter-revolutionary elements.

Com. Khrushchev constantly praised Stalin, calling him "a close friend and comrade-in-arms of Lenin," "a very great genius, teacher, great leader of humanity," "a great marshal of victories," "a friend of peoples in his simplicity," "one's own father" [*rodnoi otets*] and so on and so on.

On 6 June 1937 in his report at the 5]TJp Oe. [(On9r)217-



Chronology and periodization are the bread and butter of the historical profession, so it is no surprise to see the proper dating of the beginning and the end of the Cold War under discussion. 1945 is often favored, for how could a cold war be an age's dominant feature, while a hot war was still going on? Churchill's Fulton speech is also mentioned as an important turning point, but so is the Marshall Plan, the Cominform, the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet bomb, NSC-68, the Lublin Poles and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Clearly this discussion will go on for a long time.<sup>1</sup>

Similar disagreements are also evident regarding the

still present. In this sense, the archival openness work of CWIHP, through relations with scholarly and archival authorities in many countries, indirectly measures the Cold War's lasting legacy. Success in obtaining documentation on a given topic is the ultimate proof that that moment of Cold War can finally be made into history, one more thread in the new international history of the twentieth century.

<sup>1</sup> One of the few things that all of these events have in common is that Stalin's thoughts on them were decisive in shaping Soviet policies viewed simultaneously as international actions and reactions. In order to broaden and deepen this discussion of Cold War origins, CWIHP has begun a project on "I.V. Stalin as a Cold War Statesman." Transcripts and memcons of Stalin's meetings with foreign leaders are being collected for future publication and research in

connection with a major CWIHP-sponsored international conference, scheduled for late 1998. The Yugoslavia section of this *Bulletin* has a first installment from the Stalin project. Additional conversations with Stalin will go up on the CWIHP website ( [cwihip.si.edu](http://cwihip.si.edu) ) in the course of 1998.

<sup>2</sup> Russian archives are an exception on the East-bloc side with post-1969 documents emerging only in special cases. On the American side, extensive declassifications have taken place on certain post-1969 topics due to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suits that generated the National Security Archive's foreign policy series. These include: Afghanistan, 1973-80; El Salvador, 1977-84; Iran, 1977-80; Iran-Contra Affair, 1983-88; Nicaragua, 1978-1990; Philippines, 1965-86; South Africa, 1962-89; US Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1945-91.

<sup>3</sup> For an insightful discussion and demonstration of "critical oral history" with reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis, see James Blight and David Welch, *On the Brink* (New York, 1989).

## When did the Cold War End?

by Thomas Blanton

When the Cold War memorial rises on the Mall in Washington D.C., what exactly will be the date carved therein as the end of the Cold War?

Ambassador Robert Hutchings writes that "Americans of an earlier generation knew when V-E Day and V-J Day were; there were dates on the calendar marking victory in Europe and victory over Japan in 1945. But the Cold War ended on no certain date; it lacked finality.... The end of the Cold War thus evoked among the American public little sense of purpose fulfilled—and even less of responsibility for the tasks of postwar construction."<sup>1</sup>

Other commentators have picked the obvious candidate—25 December 1991, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.<sup>2</sup> Yet this date is far too neat, since by any rational measure the Cold War was already over by then. Well before December 1991, the Cold War featured many symbolic and substantive markers of its demise. Among these, and on the basis of new archival evidence from Soviet files, this article nominates Christmas Eve 1989—when a hitherto somewhat obscure U.S.-Soviet meeting in Moscow discussed the violent revolution then taking place in Romania—as a strong contender for the title of Cold War finale.

The process of carbon-dating the end of the Cold War benefits from having December 1991 as the latest outer limit of the period. Similarly, the literature gives an earliest limit as well. This occurred on 1 June 1988, when then- Vice-President George Bush, on vacation in Kennebunkport, reacted to President Reagan's bouyant May 31 stroll through Red Square in Moscow by telling reporters dourly, "The Cold War's not over."<sup>3</sup>

By the end of the year, many Cold Warriors disagreed with President-elect Bush. On 7 December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev made his famous speech at the United Nations, which Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan summed up as follows: "In December 1988, Gorbachev went to the General Assembly

of the United Nations and declared, 'We in no way aspire to be the bearer of ultimate truth.' That has to have been the most astounding statement of surrender in the history of ideological struggle."<sup>4</sup>

For other observers of Gorbachev's speech, it was not so much the ideological concessions as the unilateral military cutbacks that most impressed. Retired Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, a former NATO commander and top aide to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, called the cuts "the most significant step since NATO was founded" and said they opened the way to broad military reductions on both sides.<sup>5</sup>

The stream of Soviet eulogies for the Cold War continued throughout 1989. In January 1989 in Vienna, for example, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze greeted the opening of the Conventional Forces in Europe talks by saying that disarmament progress "has shaken the iron curtain, weakened its rusting foundations, pierced new openings, accelerated its corrosion."<sup>6</sup> Then, on 6 July 1989, Gorbachev told the Council of Europe in his famous Strasbourg speech that the "common European home .... excludes all possibility of armed confrontation, all possibility of resorting to the threat or use of force, and notably military force employed by one alliance against another, within an alliance, or whatever it might be."<sup>7</sup>

And on 25 October 1989, as Communist governments began to tumble in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, coined the most memorable phrase of all, when he told reporters with Gorbachev in Helsinki, Finland, that the "Frank Sinatra Doctrine" had replaced the Brezhnev Doctrine for the Soviets, referring to the singer's signature ballad, "I did it my way."<sup>8</sup>

From the U.S. perspective, the most important signals were not so much the rhetorical flourishes of Gorbachev's "new thinking" (since contradictory rhetoric could be found in the official Soviet press throughout this period),

but the actual shifts in power within the Warsaw Pact. These included the beginning of the “roundtable” discussions in Poland in January-February 1989, which ultimately produced free elections in the summer (swept by Solidarity), and the March 1989 multicandidate elections in the Soviet Union, which put reformers and dissidents, including Andrei Sakharov, into the Congress of People’s Deputies. By May 1989, these extraordinary developments led former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to tell the *Washington Post*’s Don Oberdorfer: “We are quite literally in the early phases of what might be called the postcommunist era.”<sup>9</sup>

The most public finale of the Cold War, of course, came with the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. In the words of then-deputy national security adviser and future CIA director Robert Gates: “No one who watched on television will ever forget the images of crowds of East and West Germans dancing on top of the Wall, hacking away bits of it for souvenirs, and finally dismantling whole sections with construction machinery. If there ever was a symbolic moment when most of the world thought the Cold War ended, it was that night in Berlin.”<sup>10</sup>

One of Gates’ staff at the time, Robert Hutchings of the NSC, puts the date of his “epiphany” a little earlier. “Most of us dealing with these issues in the United States or in Europe had our epiphanies, our moments of realization that the end of Europe’s division might actually be at hand—not just as an aspiration for the 1990s but as an imminent reality,” Mr. Hutchings writes. “For many it came with the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9; others may have had premonitions already in early 1989 (although surely not as many as later claimed such prescience). Mine came with the election of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the early steps taken by his government. The United States was working hard to persuade the Soviet Union that self-determination in Eastern Europe could be achieved in a manner consistent with legitimate Soviet security interests; now, in Poland, the Mazowiecki government was living proof of that contention, offering an early glimmer of what post-Cold War Europe might look like. (To be sure, even the most optimistic scenario for this transition was still being measured in years, not months.)”<sup>11</sup>

But all of these memorable moments represented initiatives by Gorbachev or by the East Europeans themselves forcing change. Where was the evidence of “new thinking” by the United States?

For the Russian historian Vladislav Zubok, that evidence appeared at Malta, at the Bush-Gorbachev summit in early December 1989. President Bush’s restraint, his unwillingness to “dance on the Wall,” so to speak, his reassurance to Gorbachev as superpower-peer, their joint press conference (the first in the history of superpower summitry)—all adds up to the end of the Cold War.<sup>12</sup> More support for this view comes from Gorbachev’s own statement, which appeared in *Pravda* on 5 December that “The world is leaving one epoch, the

‘Cold War,’ and entering a new one.”<sup>13</sup> Gennadii Gerasimov told reporters after Malta: “We buried the Cold







**From the diary of  
ABOIMOV I.P.**

**21 December 1989**

**Memorandum of conversation  
with the Ambassador of the SRR [Socialist Republic of  
Romania] in the USSR**

**I. BUKUR**

**21 December 1989**

I received I. Bukur, fulfilling his request.

The Ambassador recounted the address of N. Ceausescu on Romanian radio and television on 20 December and handed over its complete text.

When I asked if the events in Timisoara involved human casualties and what the present situation was in that region, the Ambassador responded that he possesses no information on this issue. He referred to the fact that the address of N. Ceausescu also says nothing on this score.

I told the Ambassador that during the meeting of N. Ceausescu with the Soviet charge d'affaires in the SRR on 20 December [the former] expressed surprise that Soviet representatives made declarations on the events in Timisoara. Besides, during the meeting it was asserted [by Ceausescu] that the Romanian side possesses information that the action in Timisoara was allegedly prepared and organized with the consent of countries [that are] members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Moreover, the actions against Romania were allegedly plotted within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

According to our information, officials in Bucharest in conversation with ambassadors of allied socialist states expressed an idea about some kind of action of interference into the internal affairs of the SRR allegedly under preparation in the Soviet Union.

I must declare on behalf of our side that such assertions can only puzzle us, have no foundation and do not correspond with reality [until this part Aboimov probably read the instructions.]

Answering the Ambassador's question as to whether my words reflected the official viewpoint of the Soviet government, I told him that so far I have no instruction to make any declarations on behalf of the Soviet government, but my words certainly reflect our official position which postulates that the Soviet Union builds its relations with allied socialist states on the basis of equality, mutual respect and strict non-interference into domestic affairs. Considering the grave character of the statements of Romanian officials I cannot help expressing in preliminary order our attitude to these statements....

[Source: *Diplomaticeskii vestnik*, no. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]

.....

**From the diary of  
I.P. ABOIMOV**

**23 December 1989**

**Record of conversation with the Ambassador  
of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]  
in the USSR, MILAN VERES  
22 December 1989**

I received M. Veres on his request.

He referred to the instruction of the Union Secretariat on Foreign Affairs of the SFRY and shared the available information on the events in Romania, corroborated by the General Consulate of the SFRY in Timisoara and by numerous Yugoslav citizens who returned from the SRR. He also reported on the Yugoslav evaluations of the developments in Romania.

The beginning of the dramatic development could be traced to the events of 15-16 December in Timisoara where a large group of people protested against the action of the authorities with regard to the priest L. Tokes. This process grew into a huge demonstration of the population of the city against the existing order. According to the estimates of officials of the General Consulate of the SFRY, there were up to 100,000 people, including workers, university and school students, who participated in the demonstration. Protest actions took place also in Arad, Brasov and Cluj. Large contingents of militia and military were used against demonstrators in Timisoara. According to the Yugoslavs, during those clashes several hundred people died, and according to some unchecked data the number of casualties exceeded 2,000. In the downtown area shops, restaurants, cafes were destroyed, many streetcars and automobiles were also burnt down. Timisoara is surrounded by troops, but protest actions continue in the city. Workers seized factories and are threatening to blow them up if the authorities do not satisfy the people's demands. Officials of the General Consulate of the SFRY, the Ambassador remarked, noticed that a number of soldiers and militiamen expressed their sympathies with demonstrators. There were also slogans "The Army will not shoot at students and school children."

The Yugoslav-Romanian border is practically sealed; its defenses are fortified by troops along its whole length, including check-points. So far the Romanian side authorized only the passing of people with diplomatic and other service passports. The Ambassador informed us that the Yugoslavs had evacuated members of the families of officials of their General Consulate. He disavowed reports of a number of Western news agencies that participants of the demonstration [in Timisoara] found refuge on the territory of the Yugoslav compound, whose premises allegedly were penetrated by Romanian militia.

According to Yugoslav estimates, stressed M. Veres, the main reason for disorders in Timisoara and their spread subsequently around a number of other cities, including the capital of the SRR, is rooted in profound popular dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the country







New archival materials from the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe have significantly altered previous conceptions of the Cold War. Soviet-Japanese relations, however, have made little progress. Not a single article focusing on Soviet-Japanese relations has, until now, been published in the *CWIHP Bulletin*.<sup>1</sup> Nor has Cold War coverage in *Diplomatic History* or the H-Diplo internet discussion group extended to Soviet-Japanese relations. The most recent monograph by Vojtech Mastny that cast a wide net over archival materials in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reveals no new materials on the rivalry of the two giants on the remote shores of the Pacific.<sup>2</sup> Although Michael Schaller's monograph and Marc Gallichio's article shed light on important aspects of American foreign policy toward Soviet-Japanese relations, especially during the last stage of the Pacific War, their sources come exclusively from United States archives.<sup>3</sup> Many monographs published in English in recent years have illuminated very little of the fundamental questions that have vexed Soviet-Japanese relations during the Cold War.<sup>4</sup>

Needless to say, the most serious stumbling block that has prevented rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Japan has been the Northern Territories dispute, and precisely on this issue there has been what might be called a "conspiracy of silence" with regard to government archival sources.<sup>5</sup> Archival materials related to the Northern Territories question have been systematically excluded from the Japanese foreign policy archives that have been declassified by the Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The Soviet/Russian government has been equally protective in guarding the secrecy of its policy on the territorial question, although there have been attempts to publish archival sources on some aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations, notably the Neutrality Pact negotiations of 1941, the Malik-Hirota negotiations in June 1945, and the Moscow negotiations for normalization of relations in October 1956.<sup>6</sup> To make matters worse, some of the most important U.S. documents that should illuminate the background of this dispute are still classified "due to the request of a friendly country [i.e., Japan]."<sup>7</sup> The recent valiant attempt by a trilateral project headed by Graham Allison, Kimura Hiroshi, and Konstantin Sarkisov, to overcome this obstacle has not been successful.<sup>8</sup> Interestingly, two of the most valuable recent works on this subject rely heavily on British archives.<sup>9</sup>

The only scholar, who has had systematic access to Soviet archives is Boris N. Slavinskii of Moscow's Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

In a series of articles and monographs, he has succeeded in revising the traditional official views on the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, Stalin's Kurile operation, and Soviet policy toward the San Francisco Peace Conference.<sup>10</sup> Those archives that Slavinskii has examined remain, however, inaccessible to foreign scholars.

Because of the inaccessibility of archives, we still do not know answers to crucial questions about Soviet/Russian-Japanese relations. What was the major motivation of the Soviet government when it was approached by the Japanese government to mediate the termination of war in April 1945? What was the relationship between the U.S. decision to drop the atomic bombs and Stalin's Kurile operation in the summer of 1945? Did Stalin expect the United States to occupy all or at least some of the southern Kuriles during the last stage of the Pacific War? Why did it take two years after the occupation of the southern Kuriles for Stalin to annex the Kuriles to the Soviet territory? Why did the Soviet government decide to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference and in the end not to sign the treaty? How did the power struggle within the CPSU affect its negotiations for normalization of relations with Japan? How did the Gaimusho and the U.S. State Department exchange information during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations for normalization of relations in 1955-56? Why did the Japanese government reject Andrei Gromyko's overtures in 1972 to settle the territorial question on the basis of the 1956 Joint Declaration? Why did the Soviet leadership fail to display a more flexible attitude toward Japan on the territorial question during the second half of the 1970s, when it took the Chinese threat seriously? Why did the Japanese government fail to appreciate the domestic difficulties that challenged Gorbachev and Yeltsin? Why did Gorbachev refuse to make any concessions on the Northern Territories question? Why did Yeltsin cancel his planned trip to Tokyo in September 1992? To answer these questions, we must push forward research in Japanese, Russian, and US archives, and pressure those governments to release those materials which remain classified.

The publication of the documents in this issue is a small step toward opening substantial archival evidence on Soviet-Japanese relations. These documents shed light on some important aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations under Gorbachev and of Russian-Japanese relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Soviet-Japanese relations in the Gorbachev era

relations with the Soviet Union, Japanese relations remained stalemated because of the long-standing territorial dispute preventing the conclusion of a World War II peace treaty. Gorbachev's historic visit to Japan in April 1991 did not produce a major breakthrough. How can we account for this failure?

Soviet-Japanese relations under Gorbachev experienced a pendulum movement: a positive movement was always pulled back by a negative one. In the end, neither side was willing to make a leap to settle the territorial dispute. As soon as Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, he met Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro at Konstantin Chernenko's funeral, and signaled his intention to end the frozen state of Soviet-Japanese relations. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Japan in January 1986 was an important turning point. The mechanism of bilateral dialogue that had been disrupted under Brezhnev was restored. Later, in his 1986 Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev declared his intention to seek a more conciliatory Asian policy and to join the Asia-Pacific region as a constructive partner. Both sides began preparations for Gorbachev's visit to Japan in late 1986 or in the beginning of 1987.

This trip never materialized. Instead, after the Japanese government tightened up the COCOM regulations under U.S. pressure as a result of the 1987 Toshiba incident—in which the Toshiba Machine Company admitted selling highly sensitive technology to the Soviet Union—the Soviet government expelled a Japanese diplomat, prompting the Japanese government to retaliate with a similar action. Soviet-Japanese relations returned to the deep-freeze again.

It was not until mid-1988 that both sides began gingerly to mend fences again. Former Prime Minister Nakasone met Gorbachev in July, and the frank exchange of opinions between Gorbachev and Nakasone created a momentum for improvement. In September, Gorbachev delivered his Krasnoiarsk speech in which he declared his intention to improve relations with Japan. In December, Shevardnadze made his second trip to Tokyo. One of the major achievements at the ministerial conference was the creation of the Working Group for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty. For the first time since the end of World War II both sides established a mechanism through which to create a favorable environment for the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Nevertheless, the creation of the Working Group did not lead to a settlement of the territorial dispute. On the contrary, the negotiations revealed irreconcilable differences. During the crucial two years of 1989-90, when the revolutions swept away the East European Communist regimes and reunification of Germany was realized, the Soviet Union and Japan stood at a standstill unable to resolve the territorial dispute. By the time Gorbachev finally came to Japan in April 1991, his authority within the Soviet Union had deteriorated to such an extent that he was not in a position to offer any compromise that would

have satisfied Japan, even had he ever been inclined to do so.

Why were the Soviet Union and Japan unable to exploit the opportunity developed at the 1988 foreign ministerial conference? The documents introduced here illuminate the problems in Soviet-Japanese relations at this critical stage. The first set of documents are the minutes of the first two meetings of the Working Group as recorded by the Soviet foreign ministry officials. A careful examination of what was discussed reveals a number of important facts.

First, although we have a number of documents stating the official positions of both governments, rarely do we see a document in which both the Russian and Japanese sides confront each other behind closed doors. Here, we read, for the first time, how both sides presented their views at the negotiating table. In other words, we have the most direct positions that each government presented to the other. Although there are few surprises in both positions, there are some important revelations. For instance, in the first meeting, the Japanese side officially renounced its claim over Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands north of Uruppu. Furthermore, at the second meeting, despite its militant tone, Soviet chief negotiator Igor Rogachev tacitly conceded that Stalin's failure to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty was a mistake.

Second, there are some discrepancies between what was reported in the Japanese media and what actually happened at these meetings. The Japanese news coverage of these meetings was usually based on the official statements and briefings conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Gaimusho) officials; and therefore, it reflected, intentionally or unintentionally, the Gaimusho's bias. In both meetings, for instance, the Gaimusho kept silent about Rogachev's disagreement with the Japanese geographical definition of the "Kurile" islands, an official position that has been challenged by some Japanese scholars as well.<sup>11</sup> Likewise, from what was reported in Japanese newspapers, it is difficult to discern the atmosphere of the negotiations, but a reading of the second meeting clearly indicates that Rogachev's disposition, buttressed by well-researched legal and historical arguments, put the Japanese on the defensive. These documents remind us, therefore, that one has to treat the Japanese press coverage critically, particularly when it is filtered through the Gaimusho's briefings. In the March 1989 meeting, Rogachev himself offers some harsh criticisms of this aspect, claiming:

We had the impression that yesterday we consulted, although, judging by the Japanese newspapers, the results of our conversation were unexpected...I do not know by whose recommendation the message that the Soviet



Eventually, Yeltsin canceled his trip to Japan, thus, forfeiting the opportunity to create the foundation for gradual improvement of relations, if not for a quick resolution to the territorial question. Five years later, we are still waiting. The documents introduced here illustrate the complexities of the political dynamics under which Gorbachev, and then Yeltsin, had to operate. They also show how unrealistic it was for the Japanese government to press hard on Yeltsin to accept Japan's sovereignty, residual or otherwise, over the entire four islands.

Needless to say, these documents expose merely a tip of the gigantic iceberg of information which is still hidden under the sea of secrecy. They illuminate only a few tiny spots in recent Soviet/Russian-Japanese relations. Also the manner in which these documents have fallen into my hands—not through the open, systematic, institutional approach, but through coincidence and accident—is not reassuring. Of course, having only one side's account leaves many doubts that can only be fully answered by comparable openness on the Japanese side. Even the Russian materials lose much of their importance, unless they are placed in the appropriate archival context. Nevertheless, I hope that the publication of these sources will stimulate further openness, research and collaboration among scholars and governments in order to move the historical study of Soviet/Russian-Japanese relations further into the mainstream of scholarly inquiry.

---

*Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is Professor of Russian History at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He is the author of The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917 (Seattle, 1981) and co-editor of Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors (Berkeley, CA, 1993).*

<sup>1</sup> *Cold War International History Bulletin*, 1-9. [Ed. note: On the other hand, several articles and documents have touched on Japan and its place in the Cold War. For an example in this issue, *Bulletin 10*, see Zhai Qiang's article on the second Chinese nuclear test.]

<sup>2</sup> Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

<sup>3</sup> Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Marc Gallichio, "The Kurile Controversy: U.S. Diplomacy in the Soviet-Japanese Border Dispute, 1941-1956," *Pacific Historical Review*, LX, No. 1 (February 1991).

<sup>4</sup> Myles I. C. Robertson, *Soviet Policy toward Japan: An Analysis of Trends in the 1970s and 1980s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Harry Gelman, *Russo-Japanese Relations and the Future of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1993); Charles E. Ziegler, *Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); William Nimmo, *Japan and Russia: a Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era*

(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994); and Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow: the History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995). Two excellent monographs dealing with specific aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations are: Gilbert Rozman, *Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985-1991: A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) and John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), but because of the specific aspects to which they are devoted, new archival evidence on Soviet-Japanese relations does not emerge in these books.

<sup>5</sup> In Japanese, there exist collections of documents: Shigeta Shigeru and Suezawa Shoji, *Nisso kihonbunsho shiryoshu [Soviet-Japanese Basic Documents Sourcebook]* (Tokyo: Sekai no ugoki sha, 1988); Hopporyodo mondai taisaku kyokai, *Zoho kaitei: Hopporyodo mondai shiryoshu [Northern Territories Question Sourcebook: Revised and Enlarged]*. (Tokyo: Hopporyodo mondai taisaku kyokai, 1972). See also the joint publication by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, *Nichirokan ryodomondai no rekishi ni kansuru kyodo sakusei shiryoshu: Sovmestnyi sbornik dokumentov po istorii territorial'nogo razmezhevanii mezhdu Rossiei i Iaponiei [Joint documentary compendium on the Russo-Japanese territorial issue's history]* (Tokyo and Moscow: Nihonkoku Gaimusho and Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1993). In Russian, *Sbornik not i zaiavlenii pravitel'stv SSSR, SSha, Kitaia, Anglii i drugikh stran po voprosu mirnogo uregulirovaniia dlia Iaponii: iul' 1947 g. - iul' 1951 g* (Moscow, 1951); *Sbornik osnovnykh dokumentov po Iaponii, 1951-1954* (Moscow: Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, 1954); *Sbornik osnovnykh dokumentov po voprosam sovetsko-iaponskikh otnoshenii, 1954-1972* (Moscow: Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, 1973), but the first collection was published in only 100 copies, and the second and the third volume 300. All collections are classified, and inaccessible to outside scholars, although I have had access to the third volume.

<sup>6</sup> "Za kulisami Tikhookeanskoi bitvy: (Iapono-sovetskie kontakty v 1945 g.): Stranitsy istorii," *Vestnik MIDa SSSR*, October, 1990; "K politike SSSR na Dal'nem Vostoke v predverii nachala Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: Kontakty I.V. Stalina s politikami Kitaia i Iaponii," *Diplomatičeskii vestnik* No. 23-24 (1994): 71-78; "Soglashaetsia na peredachu Iaponii ostrovov Khabomai i Sikotan," *Staraiia ploshchad': vestnik arkhiva Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii* g-Jap-ap611i

*Starting Point of Post-War Japanese-Soviet Relations, 1945-56*] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1993); Fiona Hill, "A Disagreement between Allies: the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet-Japanese Territorial Dispute," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 14, No. 3 (Fall 1995).

<sup>10</sup> Boris Slavinskii, *Sovetskaia okkupatsiia Kuril'skikh ostrovov, avgust-sentiabr' 1945 goda: dokumental'noe issledovanie* (Moscow, 1993); *Pakt o neitralitete mezhdu SSSR i Iaponiei: diplomaticheskaia istoriia, 1941-1945 gg* (Moscow: BBK, 1995)—Japanese translation, *Kosho: nisso churitsu joyaku* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996); "San Frantsiskii mirnyi dogovor," *Znakomites' Iaponiia*, No. 5 (1994): 53-59; No. 6 (1994): 50-58; No. 7 (1995): 74-81; and No. 8 (1995): 56-61.

<sup>11</sup> Notably Wada Haruki and Murayama Shichiro. See Wada Haruki, *Hopporyodo mondai o kangaeru [Considering the Northern Territories Question]* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1990); Murayama Shichiro, *Kuriru shoto no bunkengakuteki kenkyu [Documentological Research on the Kurile Archipelago]* (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1987).

<sup>12</sup> The Japanese side rebutted Rogachev's argument at the third Working Group meeting held on 29 April 1989, in Moscow. Although the minutes prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry

are not available to me, the Japanese argument was reported in detail in *Hopporyodo*, No. 234 (20 May 1989). But the coverage in *Hopporyodo* does not say a word about the Soviet reaction to Kuriyama's presentation.

<sup>13</sup> In addition to the documents translated here, the documents I obtained included other interesting materials from various experts and organizations. I should add, however, that I did not receive position papers prepared by the General Staff and the Pacific Fleet. The General Staff's view was later publicized in a Russian newspaper. See "Glavnyi shtab VMF soglasen s genshtabom," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 30 July 1992.

<sup>14</sup> Cherevko's view in the classified document differs vastly from the view he expressed in an open publication. He and Konstantin Sarkisov were responsible for publishing a hitherto unknown archival document demonstrating that Nicholas I's instruction to the Russian chief negotiator, Artem Putiatin, clearly took the position that Etorofu was under Japan's sovereignty. Konstantin Sarkisov and Kiril Cherevko, "Putiatinu bylo legche provesti granitsu mezhdu Rossiei i Iaponiei," *Izvestiia*, 4 October 1991.

Not counting a visit to Spain (already after the [August 1991] putsch) to the opening of the [October 1991] International Conference on the Near East, M.S. [Gorbachev's] visit as head of state to Japan in April 1991 was his last. He had planned to do this throughout almost all the years of *perestroika*: [Japanese Prime Minister] Nakasone, meeting with him in Moscow in 1985,<sup>2</sup> extended an official invitation, which afterwards was confirmed by all of the Japanese political figures with whom M.S. met.

Although at the moment of this visit, Gorbachev had the huge "capital" of his policy of new thinking at his back, it [the trip] turned out to be almost the least effective in a practical sense. Overcoming the "main obstacle" in Soviet-Japanese relations was, so to speak, within arm's reach. But... objective circumstances, as well as subjective ones, prevented this.

But everything [should be told] in order.

I was not yet serving "under Gorbachev" when his first contacts with the Japanese took place—in 1985. Then, after all of his meetings with people from "capitalist countries" came under my supervision, I soon began to note that he was showing definite preference toward the Japanese.

Delegations from Japan continued to arrive, and almost every one of them requested an audience with Gorbachev. I noted that he refused almost none of the Japanese, no matter what their level. And he spoke more

and more frankly with them. But just as soon as things got to the main point which had frozen our relations for decades, Gorbachev clammed up. For him from the first—he spoke both to me and in the Politburo about this—the issue of the islands had been resolved. In general terms, ficial invforire21th spokentac "undJap. Hovth TD visit, 321in 1985.

used this channel in order to acquaint himself more indirectly with the Japanese problem and was somehow influenced by the information which he received from the communists. He knew beforehand that this information would not be objective; the CPSU's relations with the Japanese communist party had been poor for decades. The conversations with Fuwa<sup>3</sup> to a significant degree were devoted to clearing up inter-party difficulties. Outside of this framework, a significant part of these conversations was devoted to the struggle against the nuclear threat. Although on this issue too, their positions did not coincide. The anti-American aspect of the problem was very strongly present on both sides.

Of course, Soviet-Japanese relations were also discussed. And Gorbachev genuinely tried to improve them. But, as yet, we had no policy aimed at this end. Therefore an emotional approach predominated which was obviously insufficient to "draw a line under the present and begin everything from scratch" (Gorbachev used these words more than once).

He had not yet felt the significance—governmental, political, emotional, traditional, psychological, of every sort—that the Japanese invested in the problem of the islands seized from them by Stalin after their capitulation, after the end of the Second World War. In reality, they had never belonged to Russia. Knowing this, but being driven by the inertia of the Soviet superpower, the very possibility of returning these territories had been ruled out. Sometimes, [Gorbachev] expressed himself quite definitely and sarcastically as to the hopelessness of the Japanese efforts in this regard; at the first meetings he did not even want to discuss this issue, considering the post-war territorial division to be final and irreversible everywhere. He did not recognize the problem itself which supposedly had to be resolved. According to the Gromyko formula, it had been resolved "as a result of the war." And that was the only explanation for why in actuality the four islands should belong to the Soviet Union, which, as it was said, although big, "had no excess land." Sometimes he used those words to forestall the efforts of the Japanese interlocutors to begin a discussion. There was a certain [sense of playing a negotiating] game in such a statement of the issue.

The evolution of his views on this score was slow, and took almost five years to complete. I will try to illustrate this evolution with concrete examples, relying on my records of Gorbachev's conversations with figures from the Japanese state and society....

Back in 1985 in his first meeting with Nakasone, who was then prime minister, the issue of a visit by Gorbachev to Japan came up. Afterwards, this theme arose in practically all of his conversations with the Japanese. In reply to the latest invitation to him in the conversation with Fuwa to which I have already referred, M.S. [Gorbachev] said: "I am not being evasive, I think, [in saying that], we must have the widest possible ties with our neighbor Japan along state, party and social lines. All

the more with those who are attached to the cause of strengthening relations with the Soviet Union. You can assume that we are ready to develop relations with Japan. If she [i.e. Japan] does not present us with ultimatums, then there is great potential for that. I would like to ask the question: why is Japan presenting the Soviet Union with an ultimatum, since, after all, we did not lose the war to her?"

To this Fuwa reacted curiously: "I am not Nakasone's deputy." "I will take that under advisement," M.S. countered.

Incidentally, Fuwa demanded of Gorbachev very firmly and insistently in Japanese, using a variety of different approaches, that the CPSU cut off relations with the Socialist Party of Japan, and when doing so always tried to play on the anti-imperialist ideology of the CPSU and to put forward examples proving that the Japanese socialists were actually playing into the hands of American imperialism, not to mention into the hands of [Japan's] own bourgeoisie. But Gorbachev was entirely unmoved by this. He politely explained that the CPSU would henceforward associate with all of Japan's "peace-loving forces" "in the name of their common interests."

It seems to me that there was something of a turning point in the evolution of Gorbachev's approaches to the Japanese theme in his conversation with the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Japan, Doi Takako, on 6 May 1988. A broad review of the entire circle of Soviet-Japanese relations was made. Moreover, I must say, this was done by both sides in the most delicate way, in the most benevolent spirit, with an effort to understand one another, and somehow to get closer to a realistic evaluation of Japan's place in the development of the policy of "new thinking." Every element was present in the conversation: the emotional, the psychological, and the deeply political. Concisely put, for Gorbachev, his conversation with this very kind, very intelligent, interesting, spiritually rich woman was a sort of turning-point in his understanding of the scale of the Japanese problem as a whole and the difficulty of our relations with this nation, with this state. Of course, Doi







behalf of his government that Japan could not recognize the Soviet side's reasoning to the effect that from a legal and historical point of view, the four islands belonged to the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev observed that the atmosphere of relations was changing. The dialogue was becoming constructive, and a mechanism of working groups to conclude a peace treaty had been created. [Ed. note: Excerpts from two of these meetings in 1988 and 1989 can be found below in

and economic situation in the world, but also to strengthening and assuring a stable peace for the whole planet.

It was clear that Ozawa's appearance in Moscow was not accidental. It was the result of serious forethought in Japanese ruling circles. Both in the government and in the political parties, evidently, they wanted to know in advance what Gorbachev would come with. And, naturally, Ozawa wanted to be the first to bring back something fundamentally new. Being present along with V.M. Falin (he was the leader of the International Division of the CC CPSU, and the meeting was conducted, as it were, along party lines) at this meeting—which was very diplomatic in form but substantial and fairly frank, I would argue that Gorbachev's position distinctly showed more movement on this occasion than in previous negotiations with highly placed Japanese figures. I will try to illustrate this, relying on my record of the conversation.

Gorbachev again—this had become a rule [with him]—appealed to the experience garnered by the USSR and Germany. We went by the path of increasing our cooperation, Gorbachev told Ozawa. It could hardly be thought that the Soviet Union would have come to such an understanding of the issue of relations with Germany at some other time and without what we had gone through together with Europe and with the Germans. Both we and the Germans said: let history take care of itself. As a result, a solution appeared. [Ed. note: It is interesting to compare the paucity of documented literature on Russian/Soviet-Japanese postwar relations, compared to that on the German question.]

I interpreted these words as a confirmation of my inner conviction that Gorbachev was inclined to resolve the issue. To resolve it—granted, through compromise,—but in any case in such a way that it would also satisfy the Japanese. Already there was no suggestion that the issue itself did not exist, as had been the assertion in Gromyko's time, and as it was at first under Gorbachev. The problem was recognized and, this meant, it would have to be resolved. Gorbachev also proposed to resolve it within the framework of his "philosophy" of gradual movement along the lines of an all-around improvement of relations, rousing what was connected with the splads...n.

adocate (cooperating and expecting courageous steps.) Tj T\* [What do you have in mind? 33 (What was the very question)] Tj T\* [Ozawa . . . We hope what (he will urge you not historical progress in)] Tj T\* [corf relations and will lead them to new and better results.]

articulate his position in full.

But, obviously, something else was at issue. Having contacted Tokyo or consulted with his entourage, he came to the conclusion that he had not fulfilled the task which he had set himself, or which had been set for him before his departure for Moscow: he absolutely had to bring back some sort of definite answer. Evidently, this was important for some sort of internal configuration of political or party forces in Japan. That is my guess. Ozawa began by making an exposition of a concept which, it seemed to me, had been agreed on in Japan before his conversation with Gorbachev. There were three points in it: “We agreed that the conversations with the President will touch on the following three points in the framework of the issue of the “northern territories.”

- To recognize the validity of the joint declaration of 1956 and to take it as the basis for beginning new negotiations on a peace treaty.
- To confirm that in the future, what is meant by the territorial issue between the USSR and Japan is a resolution of the fate of the other two islands—Kunashir and Iturup.
- The negotiations which will begin after the visit will touch on, along with all of the other issues, a definition of the status of Kunashir and Iturup. Although it is difficult to specify the precise period of time during which the negotiations will take place, both sides are assuming the necessity of completing them before the end of this year, and, more precisely, in the fall. It was assumed that I would give you an explanation for the reasons for setting such time constraints during the meeting with you.”

At this point, Ozawa suddenly hinted that in the case of such a resolution, Japanese firms would be ready to render substantial economic aid to the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev reacted first and foremost to this hint, saying that he was not inclined to and could not conduct a discussion according to such a plan: you give us something and in turn we will give you what you want. That is not a conversation which we can have with you. You are a politician. You are an energetic person and I understand that you want a concrete result. But the approach: “you give—I give” is entirely unacceptable not only between Japan and the Soviet Union, but in general terms as well.

Gorbachev reacted as follows to Ozawa’s three-point formula.

Unfortunately, he said, I cannot give a concrete answer to all of these points. I consider that we are not yet ready for concrete solutions. The general course of events and the situation itself have not yet brought us to that point. I consider that the main task both of your visit here and of my visit to Japan is to prepare the conditions for moving our relations onto a new level, to give a powerful impulse to their development. On that new basis, we can begin a discussion of the entire complex of issues, including a peace treaty and, in this context,—the location of the border.

By saying this—and this is also worth establishing—Gorbachev recognized that there was as yet no final internationally recognized boundary between the USSR and Japan. I well understand, he added, the temper of public opinion in Japan and the link between it and your position. But in the Soviet Union, the authorities must also take public opinion into consideration now.

However, this did not satisfy his interlocutor. Ozawa moved the conversation onto the following plane: he said in so many words, we will not announce your concrete decision. That will remain between us. But let us already agree on what you will be willing to agree to during your visit to Japan.

Gorbachev rejected such an approach. I once again advocate—he said,—beginning to move and moving forward consistently. We will still think about it and work out formulations. I hope that you have grasped and have correctly understood our stance. There will be no surprises; of course, some sort of formulations will be worked out. Nuances are possible.

At that point, I—and not only I, but everyone who participated from our side in Ozawa’s visit—came to the conclusion that in the second conversation which [Ozawa] had insisted on, he had “spoilt Gorbachev’s mood” before the visit [to Japan]. M.S. had been put on his guard. If his other official partners during the visit to Japan were also going to act in this way, he would end up in a very awkward position. They were putting pressure on him. And his “forward movement” on the “main issue” would be judged from this point of view, both in the USSR and in the world as a whole.

And so, we approached Gorbachev’s visit to Japan, which began on 16 April 1991....

---

[Source: *Excerpted from Anatolii Cherniaev, Gorubachofu to unmei o tomonishita 2000 nichii (Tokyo: Uchio shuppan, 1994), the translation of Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, and supplemented by the original Russian manuscript kindly provided by the author. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie and Mie Nakachi.*]

<sup>1</sup> Chapter Ten, “The Japan Visit” (*Nihon homon*), was written especially for the Japanese edition of A.S. Cherniaev, *Six Years with Gorbachev*.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. note: Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro was in Moscow to attend Konstantin Chernenko’s funeral.

<sup>3</sup> Ed. note: In 1986, Fuwa Tetsuzo was Chairman of the Presidium of the Japan Communist Party.

<sup>4</sup> Ed. Note: Nakasone in a meeting with Gorbachev two months later used the exact same phrase.

<sup>5</sup> Ed. Note: In April 1991, during Gorbachev’s visit to Japan, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki referred to this “lost opportunity” and Gorbachev snapped back: “I am afraid the second chance will also be missed.” It was. For more information on the Tokyo visit, please visit our website: [cwihip.si.edu](http://cwihip.si.edu).

<sup>6</sup> Ed. note: Ikeda Daisaku—the head of the Soka Gakkai, the largest of Japan’s post-war “new religions.” With close ties to the Komeito (“Clean Government”) Party and six million adherents, it is a political, as well as spiritual, force.



Uno stated yesterday, the Japanese government's principal position consists of the fact that Japan will not demand the return of the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, which it renounced in that peace treaty.

Secondly, the Japanese-Soviet Joint declaration of 1956. The contents of the 9th article of the Joint Declaration is well known to all present, and I think there is no need to set it out again.

Thirdly, the Japanese-American security treaty.

The security treaty, which was concluded by Japan to guarantee its security, has a deeply defensive character, and the fact that the USSR, referring to this treaty, in a unilateral fashion changed its attitude toward the territorial issue as expressed in the 9th article of the Joint Declaration, and, figuratively (*obrazno*) speaking, "took the four islands hostage," in our view is not compatible with the principle of leadership by [doing] right (*verkhovenstvo prava*), towards which the USSR has of late been striving.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact the presence of NATO does not pose an obstacle to normal relations between the Soviet Union and European countries which are members of that bloc. I think that the security treaty should have the same influence on Japanese-Soviet relations that the treaty on the creation of NATO has on the relations between the USSR and European states.

Yesterday Mr. Shevardnadze referred to the letters which were exchanged between the plenipotentiary of the government of Japan S. Matsumoto, and the first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko on 29 September 1956. In regard to this, I would like to say that it is difficult for us to understand what was said yesterday by the minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

In the course of the whole period of Japanese-Soviet negotiations at that time, the Soviet side insisted that it would resolve the territorial issue by transferring the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, although the Japanese side insisted on the return of all four islands, including the islands of Kunashir and Iturup. Because of this very issue, an agreement was not reached and it was not possible to conclude a peace treaty. That is a well-known fact, which no one can deny.

The principled position of our side is that the negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty should be conducted on the basis of a recognition of the Japanese-American security treaty and the confirmation of the understanding of 1973 between the leaders of our two countries on the fact that the problems left unresolved from the Second World War include the issue of the four islands [and should be conducted] in keeping with the ninth article of the Joint Declaration of 1956.

On that I would like to conclude the statement of our position and am ready to hear out your opinion on the Soviet side.

**Rogachev.** Thank you, Mr. Kuriyama. We have listened to your thoughts and comments with great attentiveness....

The USSR's position on the issue of a peace treaty with your country has been stated by us more than once. We considered and [still] consider that it is important to conclude a peace treaty that would make our relations stronger and more stable.

In connection with this there arises the issue of the contents of a treaty. Many issues which are usually the subject of such a treaty have already been resolved and fixed in a whole series of Soviet-Japanese agreements and in other documents, including the Joint Declaration of 1956. Besides this, it is necessary to keep in mind another factor as well, that much time has passed since the restoration of diplomatic relations between our countries.

In view of the aforementioned particularities, it seems to us that the peace treaty should first generalize and sum up the post-war development of Soviet-Japanese ties, and secondly, should define the basic principles underlying mutual relations between the two countries, the main directions and reference points for their further forward movement.

In other words, we see this document as being all-embracing, complex, and encompassing all spheres of relations between our countries. And namely the political, economic-trade, scientific-technical, fishing, and other spheres, and, of course, one of the composite parts of the treaty would be the location of the border.

I want to emphasize that the peace treaty is a complex of issues and not some single, separable issue.

Yesterday the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR made an exposition of our thoughts in connection with the historical points which you mentioned today. We consider that the excursion into history which Mr. Uno made yesterday and which we heard from you today, is useful.

A comparison of your and our evaluations of the events of the distant and recent past show that you and we differently interpret these historical events.

It is very important that neither side become emotional about this, but instead try to comprehend historical lessons and take them into account in building our future relations.

You believe that the historical facts bear witness in favor of the correctness of your position, but we have another point of view—we believe that an historical approach bears witness to the justice of our position.

You say that in the treaties of 1855 and 1875 it was made clear that the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup are not included in the Kurile islands, but we consider that in the aforementioned treaties there are no articles which geographically define a concept of the "Kurile islands" and for that reason your understanding of these treaties is insufficient (*ne sostoiatel'no*).

Although the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke about this yesterday, for my part I want again to draw your attention to the fact that there is a whole series of works by Russian and Japanese scholars which bear witness to the fact that priority in the discovery, study and integration [*osvoenii*] of the Kurile islands, including their southern



American Security Treaty and NATO, noting that the presence of NATO does not hinder the USSR from developing relations with the European member-countries of that bloc. However, here we have an entirely different understanding. We believe that the existence of blocs poses an obstacle to the development of normal relations, and over the course of many years our country has



COLD



expression “territorial issue” is not present in any of the subsequent Soviet-Japanese documents.

Afterwards, however, Japan did not make use of any of the available opportunities and refused to conclude a peace treaty on the terms of the 1956 Declaration, having put forward additional territorial claims toward the USSR. Moreover, the Japanese government began to conduct a policy toward the Soviet Union which contradicted the spirit of the Joint Declaration and the peaceful intentions expressed in the course of the negotiations on the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. The conclusion of the Japanese-American security treaty in 1960, directed essentially against the Soviet Union, changed the situation and confronted our country with the necessity of taking appropriate steps to defend its interests.

As is known, the law on international treaties (art. 44 of the Vienna convention on the law on international treaties of 1969) permits a unilateral refusal to observe a part of a treaty in case the treaty is violated by the other side or the situation fundamentally changes.

Now for several words on the character of the Japanese-American Treaty on mutual cooperation and security guarantees. Today, you, Mr. Kuriyama, tried to convince us that it has an exclusively defensive character....

[A short disquisition on the Japanese-American Treaty follows.]

It must be said that the destabilizing influence of the Treaty on the situation in this part of the world continues up until now and even into the future. The fact is that in keeping with the Treaty, more than 120 US military bases and establishments are located on Japanese territory, including means for delivering offensive nuclear weapons. We have in mind, in particular, F-16 fighter-bombers at the Misawa base, the cruiser “Bunker Hill” and the destroyer “Fife,” which are equipped with “Tomahawk” cruise missiles [and are] assigned to the port of Yokosuka. These are all realities which cannot be ignored.

I want once again to say that we recognize the right of each country to individual and collective self-defense, but we cannot but assess the Japanese-American “Security Treaty” as a military alliance having in addition an anti-Soviet direction....

[A presentation on the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, its precedents and results, follows.]

Now one more thought in connection with today’s discussion.

The Japanese side asserts that the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai, and Shikotan were not seized by Japan “by force and as a result of avarice” and for that reason the relevant clause of the Cairo declaration does not apply to them.

It is well known that in the course of a long period of

time Japan used these islands as bases for aggression, including for the attack by a [naval] aviation formation on Pearl Harbor and attacks on peaceful Soviet vessels. For this reason, the confiscation of these islands from Japan after the war cannot be seen as a “territorial expansion” on the part of the victor, but should be seen as an act in the aftermath,

contents of the peace treaty, and in doing so, if I am not



[The State Seal]

Top Secret. Extremely Sensitive

In the period under review the branches of State Security had to fulfill their prescribed tasks in an aggravated operational situation. The governments and intelligence services of the USA and other imperialist states have intensified their aggressive policies and subversive activities with respect to the socialist countries. They made intense efforts to take advantage of this jubilee year in the life of the Soviet people [Ed. Note: 50th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution] to carry out ideological operations

of ideological diversion, smuggling, illegal currency operations and violations of the norms of behavior, [the KGB] deported from the USSR 108 foreigners and brought 11 foreigners to justice. The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB, jointly with the organs of security of the GDR, unmasked 17 agents of Western intelligence services who conducted espionage work against the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

In the course of counterintelligence countermeasures with regard to enemy intelligence officers under diplomatic cover and other foreigners under suspicion of being affiliated to the enemy's special services, a number of Soviet citizens who established contact with the aim of passing secret information were discovered and unmasked. Among those persons brought to justice were a senior economist of the scientific research institute of the MVT [Foreign Trade Ministry] of the USSR Salov, a senior engineer of the all-union association "Stankoimport" of the MVT of the USSR Seregin, and a technician from an installation of special significance of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building [cover for the Atomic Energy Program] Malyshev.

While organizing ever more effective struggle with military and economic espionage, the counterintelligence branches of the KGB took measures to reinforce the regime of secrecy, to bring to further perfection the protection of state secrets from the radio-technical and aerial-space means of reconnaissance of the enemy and to foil the enemy's attempts to use for reconnaissance purposes the expansion of the scientific-technical exchange between the USSR and capitalist countries.

The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB did significant work on camouflaging rocket launching pads, depots of nuclear weapons and other objects from the enemy's space reconnaissance. They worked hard on spotting and prevention of violations in concealed control and command of troops and operating means of communication, as well as on the counterintelligence support of military exercises and maneuvers, and transfers of military equipment.

A place of high visibility in counterintelligence activity went to the measures taken along the lines of trips of Soviet citizens abroad, with the purposes of their protection from machinations of the enemy's intelligence services and for the solution of other operative tasks. As part of delegations, tourist groups and exhibition participants in 1967 the KGB sent 378 operatives to the capitalist countries, and also over 2,200 agents and 4,400 persons-in-confidence [*doverennykh lits*]. With their help we spotted 192 foreigners affiliated or suspected of being affiliated with special services of the enemy, thwarted 60 attempts to work on Soviet citizens [to persuade them] not to return to the Motherland; disclosed 230 persons who compromised themselves through incorrect behavior (18 of whom were recalled early to the USSR).

The establishment of subdivisions of the so-called fifth line in the structure of the KGB branches allowed us

to concentrate the needed efforts and means on the countermeasures to fight ideological diversions from outside and anti-Soviet manifestations inside the country. The measures taken in this regard succeeded in general in paralyzing the attempts of enemy special services and propaganda centers to carry out in the Soviet Union a series of ideological diversions, time-linked with the half-century anniversary of Great October. Along with unmasking a number of foreigners who arrived in the USSR with assignments of a subversive character, materials were published in the Soviet and foreign press disclosing subversive activities of the enemy's special services, and over 114 thousand letters and banderoles containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful printed materials were confiscated in the international mail.

Since the enemy, in its calculations to unsettle socialism from inside, places its stake mainly on nationalistic propaganda, the KGB branches carried out a number of measures to disrupt attempts to conduct organized nationalist activities in a number of areas of the country (Ukraine, the Baltics, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Armenia, Kabardino-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush, Tatar and Abkhaz Autonomous SSRs).

The measures to spot and undercut the hostile activity of anti-Soviet elements, including church officials and sectarians, were carried out with consideration of the existing data on the growth of hostile and ideologically harmful activity by religious and Zionist centers. To uncover their plots and to foil their subversive actions under preparation, and serve other counterintelligence tasks, the KGB dispatched 122 agents abroad. We also managed to suppress and disrupt hostile activities by the emissaries of foreign religious centers who were sent to the USSR, and to unmask and bring to justice for illegal activity a number of active sectarians.

In 1967 the distribution of 11,856 leaflets and other anti-Soviet anonymous documents on the territory of the USSR was registered. In addition, in the Armenian SSR

manuscripts, foreign magazines and other publications with anti-Soviet and politically harmful content, as well as 80 attempts to set up among the troops various groups of a hostile character.

In the system of measures undertaken to better resolve counterintelligence tasks there were important initiatives aimed at reinforcing agent networks. During 1967 the branches of the KGB recruited 24,952 agents, i.e. a figure constituting 15% of the total network personnel, the overall size of which did not chaT /n0ubstantially during the year owing to the dropping of others. At the same time forms and methods of “shadowing” [*naruzhnoe nabludenie*] and operations equipment were improved. Special attention was paid to the development of state-of-the-art special devices and theirn0upply to the units of intelligence and counterintelligence. Work in this direction is being conducted keeping in mind that the intensification of struggle with an enemy who is equipped with state-of-the-art science and technology requires a wider employment in Chekist work of modern technological devices and therefore a drastic improvement of technological level in the KGB branches which, in turn, leads to a considerable increase in material expenditures for this purpose.

In assessment of the state of operational cases [*operativnikh uchetov*] of the KGB, one should note that they continued to decrease quantitatively, although only to a small degree. According to the statistics on January 1 of this year, counterintelligence offices of the KGB are working on 1,068 persons, searching for 2,293 persons, and shadowing 6,747 persons.



security organs of socialist countries developed successfully. The mutual exchange of intelligence data increased considerably. In bilateral consultations, prospective plans for intelligence work were periodically shared, joint measures to study enemy intelligence officers for recruitment purposes and to work on and check on those who were suspected of espionage and other hostile activity, were carried out. The security organs of Poland and Hungary gave us assistance in maintaining security of Soviet troops abroad. There was interaction in counterintelligence protection for training exercises of the armies of the Warsaw Pact. Cooperation with the organs of security of Romania was limited to the minor exchange of information. The restored contacts with the MOB [Ministry of Security] of the KNDR [North Korea] have received some further development.

In the last year [the KGB] guaranteed security for leaders of the Communist Party and Soviet government during their 134 trips on the territory of the USSR and abroad. Special measures of a protective nature were also carried out for more than 70 events of the party and the state and during the most important visits by foreign delegations.

Measures were also carried out to raise the quality and reliability of the national system of [internal] government communication, to ensure its further development and automatization, and also to keep it equipped with secure equipment; a new communication network linking government objects was put into effect that increases the combat-ready qualities of the whole communication system.

For the purposes of increasing mobilization readiness, a set of measures to create the conditions propitious for organization of intelligence and counterintelligence work was carried out, and also for timely deployment of organs and troops of the Committee in a special [wartime] period.

As far as decisions related to financial and economic activities of the organs and forces of the KGB were concerned, special importance was attached to further reinforcement of the regime of savings of material and financial resources, as well as to strict observation of state and accounting discipline.

Last year more systematic efforts were made to exercise control over the activities of local branches of the KGB and to provide them with assistance in implementing decisions and instructions of the party, state, and KGB. Improvements were made in the way collegiums of the committees of state security and councils advising the heads of KGB directorates worked in that field.

Higher quality of operative-service activities has been achieved in the period under question due to measures to upgrade selection, appointment and education of the Chekist cadres. In 1967 the organs and forces of the KGB enrolled 11,103 new employees, including 4,502 to positions requiring officer ranks. Simultaneously, the KGB laid off 6,582 persons, including 2,102 officers. The new recruits to the KGB included 470 employees who

were recruited from positions in Party, Komsomol [communist youth movement] and soviet organizations. Six hundred one persons were selected and appointed to positions of *nomenklatura* leadership in the CC CPSU and KGB.

All organizational and educational work with KGB cadres during the last year has been aimed at paying homage to the half-century anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution as well as all-sided improvement of the operative-service activities of the branches of the central apparatus, organs and forces of the Committee of State Security. To commemorate successes in fulfilling the tasks set by the Party and government, 10 military units received awards—memorial banners of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Seven military units and three educational institutions have been decorated. For exemplary results in work and achievements in building Soviet state security, 5,665 servicemen, workers and employees of the organs and forces of the KGB have been decorated with orders and medals of the USSR; 24 [KGB] officers and generals have been promoted to the ranks of major general, lieutenant-general, colonel general and general by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The measures adopted in accordance with the resolutions of the CC CPSU June (1967) plenum increased the role of the party organizations of the central apparatus, organs and forces of the KGB in the area of more successful implementation of Chekist tasks, in their greater impact on the improvement of work with cadres, in reinforcement of military discipline, and in the growth of political vigilance over personnel.

In their constant building and expanding of their ties with the Soviet people, the organs and forces of the KGB in all their practical activities rely on the assistance and care of the CC CPSU, the CC of the Communist Parties of Union republics, area and regional party committees. Receiving with enthusiasm the congratulation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the 50th anniversary of the VChK-KGB and [gratified] by the high evaluation of the work of the Chekist organs, the personnel of the organs and forces of the KGB continues to toil selflessly in fulfillment of the decisions of the Twenty-Third Party Congress, considering as their main task a further improvement of work to ensure state security.

One of the conditions for a successful resolution of this task is removal of important weaknesses in intelligence and counterintelligence work, as well as in other activities of the Committee of State Security and its local branches.

First of all, one should mention that the intelligence service of the KGB has not yet established the necessary agent access to governmental, military, intelligence and ideological centers of the enemy. Therefore it is not

possible to obtain information on the enemy's plans and designs, to inform in a timely manner the CC CPSU and Soviet government about the most important actions of imperialist states along the major lines of their foreign and domestic policies. For the same reason the intelligence service of the KGB exercises, as yet, only weak influence on the development of political events in crisis situations in the direction advantageous for the Soviet Union, and it is not always able to exploit weaknesses in the imperialist camp and contradictions among capitalist countries.

The counterintelligence service of the KGB, possessing data on the presence of an enemy agent network [*agentura*] inside the USSR, failed to achieve during the period under review any substantial results in unmasking these agents, in revealing and plugging all possible channels for leaks of state secrets. One still has to work out a system of effective countermeasures to thwart the enemy, who is using illegal means to penetrate our country. The organization of the work of the counterintelligence service needs further improvement, including broader use of active measures to spot and foil subversive plans and designs of the enemy.

The struggle with the enemy's ideological subversion is still not sufficiently capable and effective. Chekist work along these lines could not as yet be unfolded in full because of weak development of agent networks of the KGB organs in those layers of the population which might provide a good breeding ground for the acts of ideological subversion. This in part can explain the fact that the KGB organs failed to prevent in a timely manner individual anti-Soviet and anti-public manifestations, including mass disorders that took place in several cities.

One should also note that, because of insufficient quality and the not always timely manner of initial investigations and because of weaknesses in the operative-investigative work in local branches of the KGB, it failed to uncover over 50 crimes, on which the preliminary investigation had to be suspended and the culprits were not found.

In the practical work of some of the KGB organs there were examples of superficial study of persons suspected of committing state crimes. This resulted in three arrests of people without sufficiently checked materials, who then were released in the course of investigation.

The potential of counterintelligence for acting against the enemy's attempts to carry out acts of ideological subversion by encouraging politically and morally unstable persons to defect [while abroad], was weakly employed. This factor largely explains the fact that in 1967 seventeen persons stayed abroad; it also failed to prevent 3 cases of betrayal of the Motherland by servicemen of the Soviet Army.

There are a number of shortcomings in the practice of selection, appointment and education of cadres. Of special importance is the problem of preparation of officer cadres for the organs and troops of the KGB. For years there was no well-organized practical system in this field. As a

result officer personnel fell short of the required number by 7% (about 4,000), and perhaps will do so even more, when one considers increasing demand in cadres and expected retirement of officers in view of the new law of universal military conscription. Meanwhile, the existing sources of replenishment of officer cadres do not meet current demand and will not do so in the future. To this effect testifies the relative decrease, for various reasons, of the number of graduates of the educational institutions of



world communist movement. The KGB also reported that





allies, both branches of Soviet intelligence had to limit their usage of the clandestine structures of the American Communist Party (CPUSA).<sup>14</sup> The usage of local Communists was also limited by two other reasons: many of them were well known to the FBI, while many others were drafted after Pearl Harbor by the US Army and Navy<sup>15</sup> or interned, as had happened to a number of CPUSA members of Japanese extraction on the West Coast.<sup>16</sup>

The lack of trained personnel in 1941 and early 1942 was soon supplemented by the growing flow of Soviet military and civilian specialists coming to the United States to work in the Soviet Purchasing Commission (SPC) and other agencies that mushroomed after the USSR became a part of the Lend-Lease program. According to Feklisov, by 1944 the staff of Amtorg and the SPC in New York City alone reached some 2,500, with an equal number of officials, engineers and other specialists serving at the SPC branch in Washington, DC.<sup>17</sup> The majority of these people worked directly or indirectly either for the GRU or NKVD.<sup>18</sup> Also, the limitations imposed on the usage of the CPUSA membership did not mean that Soviet intelligence ceased recruiting both Americans and non-Americans in America.<sup>19</sup> And though the actual number of agents and informers recruited by Soviet intelligence officers in the United States will probably never be known, according to British estimates, out of 1,200 cryptonyms that “littered the traffic” of the New York/Moscow and Washington/Moscow channels of the FCD and GRU communications, “more than 800 were assessed as recruited Soviet agents.”<sup>20</sup>

The first name mentioned in the appendix was that of Lieutenant Colonel Iskhak A. Akhmerov, the NKGB illegal rezident [chief of intelligence mission] in the United States during the prewar period. In 1940 he returned to Moscow for a short tenure in the American division of the 5th Department of the NKGB (the FCD since 1941) only to be sent back in 1942 to Washington, DC as the head of an illegal sub-rezidentura.<sup>21</sup> A Volga Tartar by origin, he spoke English better than Russian and was married to an American who worked along with him in the United States both before and during the war. Throughout his second stay in the US, he ran a number of agents supplying Soviet intelligence with a large amount of extremely valuable political, military and scientific-technical information.<sup>22</sup>

The next high ranking officer recommended for decoration with the Red Banner Medal, number five on the list, was NKGB Commissar III (roughly equal to the army rank of Major General) Gaik B. Ovakimyan,<sup>23</sup> a veteran of Soviet intelligence in America, operating there since 1932. Working under the cover of an Amtorg official and nick-named by the Federal Bureau of Investigation “the wily Armenian,” he controlled in 1933-1941 a vast network of agents scattered not only throughout the United States, but also as far afield as Mexico and Canada. His name first cropped up in the 1930s in conjunction with an

extensive industrial espionage operation tied to a certain Armand Feldman.<sup>24</sup> He also laid the foundation for a network later used by Moscow “Center” to penetrate the American nuclear program by recruiting a number of its important agents, including Harry Gold, who was approached in 1935 through Thomas L. Black and in the late 1940s became a key member of the Klaus Fuchs-David Greenglass spy ring.<sup>25</sup> Ovakimyan was caught red-handed by the FBI in April 1941 while contacting one of his agents who, according to the memoirs of another FCD officer, Aleksandr S. Feklisov, was a plant.<sup>26</sup> In July, Ovakimyan was exchanged for a number of Americans detained in Russia.<sup>27</sup> He was replaced in the New York City rezidentura temporarily by his deputy Pavel P. Pastel’nyak and then by Vasilii Zarubin who headed both the NYC and Washington, DC branches of the NKGB American networks until late 1944.<sup>28</sup>

Several other names mentioned in the appendix should also be familiar: NKGB Major Stepan Z. Apresyan, who in 1944 replaced Vasilii Zarubin as the Soviet rezident in Washington, and Major Leonid R. Kvasnikov, deputy rezident in NYC and the chief of scientific and technical intelligence in the United States. Captain Semion M. Semenov is there, the other “Amtorg official” who played an important part in sci/tech intelligence and later, in 1944-1947, played a crucial role in Soviet atomic espionage in the United States. Lieut. Col. Grigory G. Dolbin is also listed, since 1946 the NKGB (MGB) rezident in Washington, DC. Among the younger generation of FCD officers mentioned in the appendix were Captain Alexander S. Feklisov of the NYC network, who in 1947-1949 ran Klaus Fuchs in Britain and in 1960-1964 became the KGB rezident in Washington, DC, and Senior (First) Lieut. Constantin A. Chugunov, also in the NYC FCD group.<sup>29</sup>

Among those Americans who (in the NKGB parlance) helped Soviet spymasters were the names of several Red Star medal nominees. These included: 1) Elizabeth T. Bentley, a liaison agent assigned by her Soviet controller (along with Joseph Katz) to collect information from some of the Washington rings, 2) Harry Gold, a courier for Klaus Fuchs, and 3) George Silvermaster (an apparent NKGB typist misprint [Ed note: Or tongue-in-cheek alias]), a top official of the Department of the Treasury and one of the most successful and productive Soviet agents. By Pearl Harbor he had gathered together “a group of ten government officials working in Washington” in various branches of the Roosevelt administration.<sup>30</sup>

The results appear to be impressive. Tons of “diplomatic” mail was being sent home monthly by the Soviet embassy in the US.<sup>31</sup> Hundreds of NKGB informants provided a wide range of information, with scientific-technical secrets in the forefront. With the release of further intelligence documents, the structure and importance of Soviet espionage efforts in the US will become clearer. For now, the available documentation can only sketch some outlines and whet the appetite.

*Vladimir Pozniakov is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.*

<sup>1</sup> Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), and Narodnyi Komissariat





were going to the island. In Khrushchev's mind, it appears, the Kennedy statement was Washington's way of signaling that it knew about ANADYR and was planning to do something about it.

Khrushchev had a chance to stop the operation. As of September 5, when he learned of Kennedy's statement, there were no missiles or nuclear warheads in Cuba. As he would do on October 25, he could have terminated the deployment. But he didn't. As these two "Pitsunda" documents show, Khrushchev not only decided to stay the

September 6 Khrushchev's T\* reac of

document should dispel any remaining doubt that the Soviet commander in Cuba, General Pliev, was *not* given oral authorization to use the tactical nuclear missiles.

The other principal rationale for ANADYR, improving Moscow's position in the strategic balance, is not completely absent from the new operational plan. But it is indirectly expressed. As part of this new version of Operation ANADYR, Khrushchev approved an order that equipped Soviet submarines with nuclear-tipped torpedoes and instructed them to be prepared, upon receipt of an additional order from Moscow, to launch nuclear torpedo attacks on US coastal targets. A list of these targets was appended to this mission statement. It is inconceivable that Khrushchev would have envisioned making nuclear strikes on the US coastline as a means of retaliating for a US strike on Cuba. Certainly, these coastal attacks were designed only to play a part in a general US-Soviet war.

Khrushchev read and approved the revised plan as he did the new tactical deployments. Although the formal date on the document is 8 September, it bears

**Top Secret (Sovershenno sekretno)**  
**Particularly Important (Osoboi vazhnosti)**  
**Sole Copy (ekz. edinstven.)**

**To the Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR,  
 Comrade N. S. Khrushchev**

I am reporting (dokladivaiu)

I. About the possibility of strengthening Cuba by airplane

1. [Numeration follows the original] About the transport by plane of special battle parts (spetsial'nye boevye chasti) [Trans. note: atomic warheads] for the Luna and R-11M rockets.

Training tests have been conducted and practical instructions have been worked out for the transportation of the special battle parts for R-11M rockets on board AN-8 aircraft for two [rockets] and AN-12 for four.

The transport of battle parts for the Luna rocket is practically analogous to that for the R-11M. The transport of special battle parts by TU-114 is not possible for lack of a freight hatch and fasteners.

2. About the transport by plane of R-11M and Luna rockets

The loading, fastening and transport of training R-11M and Luna rockets has been carried out in practice on AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft

3. The size of the freight hold and carrying-capacity of AN-8 (5-8 tons) and AN-12 (7-16 tons) do not permit air transport of launch pads, [etc.]

II. Proposal of the Defense Ministry for reinforcing Group troops on Cuba

In order to reinforce the Group troops on Cuba, send:

1) one squadron of IL-28 bombers in a group of 10-12 aircraft including cargo and guard (countermeasures) (postanovshchiki pomekh) planes, with PRTB (?) of the automobile kind and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 8-12 kilotons [of explosive] power.

[In Khrushchev's handwriting on top of "II." and "1" above]: Send to Cuba six IL-28s with atomic warheads (atomnymi golovkami). [three words illegible] [signed] N. S. Khrushchev 7.IX.1962.

2) One R-11M rocket brigade made up of three divisions (total : 1221 men, 18 R-11M rockets) with PRTB (324 men) and 18 special battle parts which the PRTB is capable of storing/defending(khranit')

3) Two-three divisions of Luna included in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba. Each Luna division

will have two launch installations and 102 men.

[Overwritten:] Three Luna divisions. N. S. Khrushchev 7.IX.62

With the Luna divisions, send 8-12 rockets and 8-12 special battle parts. For the preparation and storage of special battle parts for the Luna rockets, send one PRTB (150 men).

The indicated squadron of one R-11M rocket brigade with PRTB and two-three Luna divisions with PRTB with rockets to be sent to Cuba in the first half of this October. Atom bombs (six pieces), special head pieces [warheads] for the R-11M rockets (18 pieces) and for the Luna rockets (8-12) to be transported on board the [ship] *Indigirka* on 15 September.

The Defense Ministry has just conducted successful onland firing tests of C-75 anti-aircraft installations in flat areas. For distances of 24 kilometers, [they were] exact within 100-120 meters. The results of computer checks indicate the possibility of successful use on naval targets.

Marshal of the Soviet Union                      R. Malinovskii  
 6 September 1962

[Source: *Volkogonov Papers, Reel 6 (Library of Congress—Manuscript Division). Translated by David Wolff.*]

**Top Secret**  
**Highly Important**  
 copy # 1


**Personally**

**To the commander of the  
 Soviet Armed Forces Group in Cuba**

The temporary deployment of Soviet Armed forces on the island of Cuba is necessary to insure joint [defense] against possible aggression toward the Union of SSR and on boigpublic wf Cuba

(The tdciaion towuse ooviet )74(ANmed For)es oor t[lllegi-]TJ -1.8 -1.2 TD

a) Regarding missile forces





<sup>1</sup> John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), is by far the best source available in English on the history of China's nuclear weapons program, but its treatment of the explosion of China's second atomic bomb is quite brief (see p. 208).

Since the publication of Lewis and Xue's book, a number of fresh Chinese sources have emerged, adding new detail to the knowledge of the role of such leading figures as Mao, Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, and Song Renqiong in the development of China's nuclear weapons. The most notable among them are: Wei Wei, chief comp., *Nie Rongzhen zhuan* (Biography of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1994) and Song Renqiong, *Song Renqiong huiyilu* (Memoirs of Song Renqiong) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1994). Based on party and military archives, Wei's book is the official biography of Marshal Nie Rongzhen and part of the Contemporary China series. Song Renqiong served as head of the ministry in charge of nuclear industry between 1956-1960. Among other revelations in his memoirs, Song described the rise and fall of Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation between 1956-1959. He discussed in detail his participation in Nie Rongzhen's 1957 trip to Moscow, where the two countries signed the New Defense Technical Accord, in which the Soviet Union agreed to provide China with the prototype atomic bomb, missiles, and related data.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the Fifteen-Member Special Committee, headed by Zhou Enlai, which was created in November 1962 to take charge of China's nuclear program.

<sup>3</sup> Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

## **The Conference on Poland, 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions**

***Raymond L. Garthoff***

*[Co-editor's Note: The following essay by Raymond Garthoff is a first report on the conference "Poland 1980/*





Marshal Kulikov adamantly contended that the Soviet Union at no time had plans to intervene militarily. When confronted with evidence to the contrary, he retreated into distinctions between full and final plans for a specific action, and mere outline plans. The distinction may be valid, but he did not explain evidence of concrete plans for use of East German and Czech forces (or the published account of one Russian general at the time commanding a division earmarked for intervention). He seemed to protest too much, and finally General Jaruzelski in exasperation noted that only since the question of entry of Poland into NATO had been posed in 1993 did Russian officials argue that Moscow had never intended to intervene in Poland in 1980-82 (thus presumably seeking to deny Polish justification of a requirement for security against a possible Russian threat). Again, though the conference could not establish the full picture, the preponderance of evidence supports a conclusion that the Soviet leaders were planning (and certainly had fully prepared for) an intervention on 8 December 1980, but decided not to do so only on Decem-







Ukraine. Heeding Shelest's complaints, Brezhnev raised the matter with the KSC leadership during a meeting in Moscow in early May 1968:

Comrades, you know about the CPSU's principled position based on full respect for the independence of all fraternal Parties and countries. But not every question is a purely internal matter. . . . After all, your newspapers are read also by Soviet citizens, your radio is listened to in our country as well, which means that all such propaganda affects us, too.<sup>6</sup>

Shelest, for his part, complained in much stronger terms to the Czechoslovak authorities. During bilateral negotiations with the KSC Presidium at Cierna nad Tisou in late July, he explained why the "alarming developments" in Czechoslovakia were a matter of "common concern" to the Soviet Union:

Soviet Ukraine is an integral and inseparable part of the USSR. We have a population of 46 million, including many nationalities, of whom nearly 2.5 million are Communists. We and you, our Czech friends, are direct neighbors, and, as is customary with neighbors, we know a lot about each other that is not known or even noticed by those further away. . . . We see and hear your radio and television broadcasts, and read your newspapers. Hence, for us in Ukraine it is all the more insulting what is going on in Czechoslovakia, a state supposedly friendly to us.<sup>7</sup>

Shelest accused the KSC leaders of approving "the publication of counterrevolutionary tracts which are then sent through special channels into Ukraine."<sup>8</sup> In the weeks after the Cierna negotiations, Shelest continued to warn that the "counterrevolutionary and revanchist" influences in Czechoslovakia would increasingly filter into Ukraine unless "decisive measures" were taken.

This first set of excerpts from Shelest's diary provides further evidence of the Ukrainian leader's belief that events in Czechoslovakia were "causing unsavory phenomena here in Ukraine as well." The situation, he wrote, was especially bad in Ukraine's "western provinces, where

*after my meeting with the Czechoslovak comrades.*

***14 June:** I informed Brezhnev about my impressions of popular sentiments in the western oblasts, which I was visiting yesterday evening.<sup>13</sup> In those oblasts the population has a much more vivid sense of the alarming events in Czechoslovakia, and is receiving information through direct*







*character, but unfortunately he doesn't have adequate schooling in political leadership. Dubcek could rely on him*

recollections published in 1989, that the Hungarian leader's position on Czechoslovakia became much less conciliatory after Dubcek declined to attend the Warsaw Meeting. Shelest's account underscores just how far-reaching Kadar's change of heart was. Not only did Kadar express strong criticism of Dubcek at the Warsaw Meeting, but he followed this up by abetting the formation of an anti-Dubcek group of hardliners who could "request" Soviet military assistance. No doubt, Kadar was still hoping that military intervention could somehow be averted, but he was actively taking part in the secret political and military preparations for an invasion. Just two days after the Shelest-Bil'ak meeting, Soviet troops in Hungary were ordered by Moscow to make final arrangements for large-scale military "exercises" north of the border, a process that was completed by the beginning of August. Hungarian leaders, despite their earlier reservations about military action and their efforts to find a compromise, were now finally willing to concede that a military solution might be unavoidable.

Third, it is striking how diffident Bil'ak was during the meeting with Shelest and how unconvincing his assurances were. Shelest himself noted at several points that Bil'ak seemed to be promising far more than he could deliver, at least at the time. Later on, when Bil'ak finally transmitted the "letter of invitation" to Shelest, it was signed by fewer than a dozen officials, hardly an encouraging sign that an alternative regime could be swiftly established. Yet by mid-August, in the leadup to the invasion, Soviet leaders deluded themselves into believing that the "healthy forces" had "consolidated themselves and now constitute a majority." Shelest's own view may have been less sanguine—not least because in the meeting on 20-21 July, Bil'ak had been "inhibited and guarded" and had "failed to clear up certain matters and to discuss certain things fully"—but Shelest was willing to overlook or at least downplay these concerns in the Politburo's subsequent deliberations.

Fourth, Shelest's account reveals that the "letter of invitation" was more important than often thought. Interestingly, the reason that Soviet leaders wanted the letter well in advance was *not* so that they could foster an appearance of legality around the invasion. They planned to do that instead with a letter to be published in Moscow *Pravda* the day after Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia, when hardline KSC officials presumably would no longer be hesitant to associate themselves openly with a call for "fraternal assistance." Shelest promised Bil'ak that the initial letter would be kept secret and that the signatories would not be disclosed—a promise that was steadfastly upheld. (The letter was tightly sealed away for 24 years.) It is clear, therefore, that the reason Brezhnev was so intent on securing a letter from Bil'ak was to ensure that the anti-reformist group would consolidate its ranks and act cohesively in the leadup to the invasion and at the moment when Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia. The "letter of invitation" was thus intended to

establish a "credible commitment" by the hardliners to form an alternative regime.<sup>38</sup> As Shelest put it during his secret conversation with Bil'ak:

Wouldn't it be worthwhile if your [hardline] group now wrote a letter to us requesting help? For you, won't this provide a guarantee that you will be bolder and more cohesive in your struggle against the nefarious activities of the rightists, and won't it strengthen your actions?

The hope in Moscow was that if the "healthy forces" took the decisive step of affixing their signatures to a document, they would no longer have any leeway to "opt out" of their projected role in welcoming an invasion.

Fifth, the fact that Shelest was chosen by Brezhnev to play such a sensitive role in late July and early August militates against the notion that there was a power struggle between the two men in 1968. A senior Czechoslovak official in 1968, Zdenek Mlynar, claimed in his first-hand account of the 1968 crisis (published in the West in the late 1970s) that someone on the Soviet Politburo—whom he presumed to be Aleksandr Shelepin—was seeking to exploit the crisis to replace Brezhnev.<sup>39</sup> Subsequently, a few Western observers speculated that Shelest might have been the one who was trying to dislodge Brezhnev in 1968. Neither the CPSU Politburo transcripts nor Shelest's diary provides any substantiation for this argument (or for Mlynar's claims about Shelepin<sup>40</sup>). On the contrary, both the transcripts and the diary suggest that, at least in 1968, Brezhnev still looked warmly upon Shelest and was willing to entrust the Ukrainian leader with a vital political function in the preparations for military action. Although Shelest clearly ran afoul of Brezhnev later on and was ousted from the Politburo in 1973, the falling-out between the two seems to have followed, rather than accompanied, the 1968 crisis. It is certainly conceivable that the events of 1968 helped embolden Shelest in the early 1970s and contributed to Brezhnev's perception of a threat from the Ukrainian leader, but there is no evidence that Brezhnev was already seeking to fend off such a challenge in 1968. Had he perceived an urgent threat from Shelest during the Czechoslovak crisis, he never would have selected him for the



said that the letter was like a knife stabbing him in the heart. In addition to this a nationalist frenzy had surged; they spoke a good deal about how the letter of the five Parties infringed on the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. This gave a strong fillip to anti-Soviet hysteria.

“The situation is such that even the fiercest and most notorious enemies of the Party are ready to support us, the Communists, so long as we are united in opposing the Soviet Union. But Dubcek and Cernik are persuaded that these people support their policy.” Continuing the conversation, V. Bil’ak said: “I will frankly tell you that you were quite fortunate in having chosen Warsaw as the place to hold the



until July 1992, when Russian president Boris Yeltsin gave the Czechoslovak government a copy of one of the collective letters and of Kapek's earlier appeal, was the existence of these documents finally confirmed. Several



Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Węgier i ZSRR—w Warszawie, 14-15 lipca 1968 r.,” Copy No. 5 (Top Secret), 14-15 July 1968, in Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Arch. KC PZPR, P. 193, T. 24, Dok. 4, shows why this shift would have occurred. The Warsaw Meeting proved to be a turning point in the crisis in many respects. It marked the first time that Hungarian officials, including Janos Kadar, joined with their East German, Polish, and Bulgarian counterparts in expressing profound doubts about the ability of the Czechoslovak authorities to regain control of events. Kadar even pledged, in a conversation with Brezhnev, that “if a military occupation of Czechoslovakia becomes necessary, [Hungary] will take part without reservation.” See “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 3 iyulya 1968 g.,” 3 July 1968 (Top Secret) in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, L. 367. The Warsaw meeting also marked the first time that Soviet officials who had earlier adopted a “wait-and-see” attitude began roundly condemning the Prague Spring and calling for “extreme measures.” Far more than at previous gatherings of Warsaw Pact leaders in 1968, the option of military intervention loomed prominently throughout the deliberations in Warsaw.

<sup>38</sup> The concept of “credible commitments” in international politics is developed at length in the works of Thomas C. Schelling, among others. See, for example, Schelling’s *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 22-52; and *Arms and Influence*





3. The third group of documents is contained in 28 volumes of the *Litopys UPA* (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), Old Series, edited by P.J. Potichnyj and Ie. Shtendera (Toronto: Litopys, 1976-1997). These volumes contain underground



some contacts had taken place with Croatian and Slovenian colleagues, but that such exchanges had not yet occurred with Serbian archivists in Belgrade.

Other archival and scholarly centers in Sarajevo also appeared hungry for foreign aid and contacts. From a brief visit and conversation with staff members (the director was absent), I gathered that the Sarajevo Municipal Archives, whose collections were said to include the city's communist party records from the Yugoslav period, was at an early stage of reorganization and reconstruction after the war.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, scholars interested in modern Bosnian history and Bosnian-Soviet/Russian relations, or simply in initiating exchanges with colleagues and students struggling to maintain academic life amid hardship and ruin, may wish to contact Prof. Ibrahim Tepic in the History Department at Sarajevo University. During a relaxed evening conversation over Cokes and tea in an office building with blown-out windows, Prof. Tepic and his colleagues expressed enthusiasm at the prospect of visits from foreign scholars and collaborative work in Bosnian archives and sources.<sup>6</sup>

Probably the best method of arranging a research trip to Sarajevo, of course, would be to contact local archivists and scholars for help. The Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive look forward to working with colleagues (both historians and archivists) in Bosnia, as well as in other parts of the former Yugoslavia and in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Turkey, as part of their joint project on the Cold War in the Balkans. The project seeks to gather new sources and perspectives on events in southeastern Europe from the end of World War II through the beginning of the Yugoslav war of 1991-2, including such topics as the Greek Civil War, the Stalin-Tito split, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Scholars interested in participating in the project—which is slated to encompass conferences and publications—should contact CWIHP and the National Security Archive.

---

*Jim Hershberg, the former CWIHP Director, is assistant professor of history and international relations at The George Washington University, and editor of the CWIHP book series.*

1 *Glasnik: Arhiva i Društva Arhivskih Radnika Bosne i Hercegovine*, XXXII/1992-93 and XXXIII/1994-95 (financed by Soros Foundation) Arhivu R/F Bosne I Hercegovine, *byl legn schol1/640-175. Ta9surveyajevoidthe Y, schol1/640Arhuch7 T\** [( )33(s cold4(a lateLaod h)- evV.003T\* nam hiartnd, Ukrao, tel 079 0 Lansukey)

**To subscribe to our mailing list, please return to:**

**Cold War International History Project  
Woodrow Wilson Center  
1000 Jefferson Dr. SW  
Washington, DC 20650  
Attn: Mailing List**

**or FAX to: (202) 357-4439  
ATTN: Cold War International History Project Mailing List**

1. Name: \_\_\_\_\_
2. Mailing Address: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Phone work: \_\_\_\_\_ home \_\_\_\_\_ FAX \_\_\_\_\_
4. E-mail \_\_\_\_\_
5. Profession: \_\_\_\_\_
6. Company/Employer: \_\_\_\_\_
7. Discipline (Choose one) 1. History 2. Political Science 3. Other Social Science 4. Policy Analysis  
5. Military Science 6. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
8. Area Studies Interest (Choose up to three) 1. Former Soviet Union/Russia 2. Eastern Europe 3. Asia  
4. Latin America 5. US (domestic) 6. US Foreign Relations 7. Africa 8. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
9. Main Publications Related to Cold War: \_\_\_\_\_
10. Do you do archival work on the Cold War? \_\_\_\_\_ In East-bloc archives? \_\_\_\_\_ Which archives? \_\_\_\_\_  
On what topics? \_\_\_\_\_
11. With what languages other than English do you work? \_\_\_\_\_
12. How did you first hear about the *Bulletin*? (circle) 1. Colleague 2. Conference 3. Publication 4. Otherwise  
(specify) \_\_\_\_\_
13. How do you use the *Bulletin*? 1. Research 2. Teaching 3. Policy Analysis 4. Journalism 5. Leisure  
6. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
14. What topic(s) do you want to see more on? \_\_\_\_\_
15. Which articles/features of *Bulletins* have you found most useful/enjoyable? \_\_\_\_\_
16. In addition to reading the *Bulletin*, would you be interested in purchasing books produced by CWIHP containing  
new findings from our archives? yes/No/No idea you consider angeachin  
3.RColyRColhoono W. -1.2 TD 0 Tw [(1)50(1)2(How didld you conhow-mor/F4truelatedhelp inte“go ellinronic?” H