


***The End of the Cold War***



*Featuring New Evidence on:*  
The End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989  
The Fall of the Wall  
Sino-Soviet Relations, 1958-59  
Soviet Missile Deployments, 1959  
The Iran Crisis, 1944-46  
Tito and Khrushchev, 1954



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# *Cold War International History Project*

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The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and receives major support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation. The Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak. The Director of the Cold War International History Project is Christian F. Ostermann, and the Project’s Administrator is Nancy L. Meyers. CWIHP is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Yale University); Prof. James G. Hershberg (George Washington University); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Readers are invited to submit articles, documents, letters, and other items to the *Bulletin*. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request, or by downloading them at [cwihp.si.edu](http://cwihp.si.edu).

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*Photographs: Mikhail Gorbachev with Anatoly Chernyaev and Georgy Shakhnazarov. Source: Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford UP, 1996). Other photographs and maps submitted by the authors or from the National Archives.*



Several document sets published in this *Bulletin* show the remarkable range of archival opportunities for historians of the Cold War and reflect CWIHP's continued efforts to pry open archives and bring new documentation to public attention. Thus, this *Bulletin* also presents the first Warsaw Pact war plan to be found in the archives, the 1964 Czechoslovak War Plan (obtained through a multilateral effort to document the history of the Warsaw Pact) as well as new Russian documents on Khrushchev's 1959 missile deployments in East Germany (published in collaboration with a German-Russian research team). We are thrilled to also provide samples from an archival "gold mine" for historians of the early Cold War that has been discovered

tional network of individual and institutional partners. Over the past two years alone, CWIHP has supported or linked up with new Cold War research organizations, established often under difficult financial or political conditions, in Baku, Bucharest, Helsinki/Tampere, Hong Kong, Reykjavik, Tirana, Saratov, Shanghai, Sofia, London, Rome/Florence, Tomsk, Belgrade and Zurich. They complement longtime partnerships with US and Canadian institutions as well as Cold War research groups in Beijing, Berlin/Potsdam, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Warsaw. Much of this inspiring cooperation would not be possible without the financial support by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Korea Foundation and other donors.

This *Bulletin* issue, as others before it, is one result of this remarkable international collaboration. As the editor, I am particularly grateful for advice as well as editorial and other support to Jordan Baev, Thomas Blanton, Ashley Bullock, Bill Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Sarah Campbell, Chen Jian, Anatoly Chernyaev, Jan Chowanec, Dan Cook, Gregory Domber, Fred Ferrer, Gary Goldberg, Christopher Goscha, Sven Gronlie, Hope Harrison, Jamil Hasanli, Jim Hershberg, Hans-Hermann Hertle, Alexander Kingsbury, Anne Kjelling, Caroline Kovtun, Mark Kramer, Robert Litwak, Geir Lundestad, Vojtech Mastny, Stephen Matzie, Christina Mayer, Nancy Meyers, Mircea Munteanu, Catherine Nielsen, Olav Njolstad, Andrzej Paczkowski, Zachary Pease, Erich Pryor, Anzhela Reno, Priscilla Roberts, Janine Rowe, Svetlana Savranskaya, Radek Špikar, Valentyna Tereshchenko, Richard Thomas, Mike Thurman, Stein Tønnesson, Kathryn Weathersby, Odd Arne Westad, Paul Wingrove, David Wolff, Vladislav Zubok and this issue's patient contributors.

Christian F. Ostermann

<sup>1</sup> The full document is published in this *Bulletin* issue.

<sup>2</sup> The conference series included the following meetings: "Poland, 1986-1989: The End of the System," Miedzeszyn-Warsaw, 21-23 October 1999, organized with the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of

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# New Evidence on the End of the Cold War

## New Evidence on the “Soviet Factor” in the Peaceful Revolutions of 1989

By Vladislav M. Zubok

In 1999 Eastern European countries celebrated the tenth anniversary of their peaceful liberation from communism. In the commemorative discussions, at conferences, workshops and in the press one would have expected a detailed, informed and dispassionate reconstruction of the events of the “*annus mirabilis*” when the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe ceased to exist. Surprisingly, however, this was not so. First, the events of ten years ago remain the subject of heated and partisan debate in the Central and East European countries; even what seemed to be certain ten years before (e.g. the role of “reformist” wings of the ruling communist establishments, the positions of various factions of anti-communist movements, etc.) are now no longer certain and, in fact, are vigorously questioned. Second, the international aspects of the collapse of communist Europe, the role of “the Gorbachev factor,” and of the devolution of the bipolar Cold War are not evaluated and recognized in a balanced way. Sometimes they are even passed over in silence.<sup>1</sup>

Other equally strong passions and biases are present in the discussions and literature produced in the United States and in the former Soviet Union. For many American authors, the collapse of the Soviet Union’s external empire was the beginning of the West’s victory in the Cold War. This created a strong temptation to regard the events through “triumphalist” lenses. Former CIA director Robert Gates contends in his memoirs that the years 1989-1991 were a triumph of the strategy of containment, as formulated in 1946 by George F. Kennan—a vindication of “the belief that, denied new conquests, the inherent weaknesses of Soviet communism ultimately would bring it down.”<sup>2</sup> Other former officials, particularly President George Bush, his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and Robert Hutchings, then a member of the National Security Council staff dealing with Central and Eastern Europe, recognize the importance of Soviet non-involvement. At the same time, they, as well as Gates and other “triumphalist” authors, argue for the importance of “the American factor,” “strategic prudence” and the “vision” of the policy-makers in Washington. Specifically, they point to the United States’ quiet mediation in Poland and other Eastern European countries between “reformist” communists and anti-communist forces, and consistent successful efforts to allay the fears of the Soviet leadership regarding the rapid pace of change.<sup>3</sup> Still, the main focus of the “triumphalist” literature in the United States is elsewhere, on the secret policies and initiatives of the

Germany within the Western alliance. A heated discussion took place from 1992 to 1995 between the proponents of





countries of Eastern Europe, to your colleagues in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, in the name of preserving the imperial image, of great power status in the old Soviet meaning of the word, he would say that the question for him was absurd.”<sup>19</sup> In reality, however, in the context of 1985-88, “the freedom” that Gorbachev had “given” to Eastern Europeans meant stagnation and preservation of the “status quo.”

Lévesque points out several reasons for Soviet “immobilism” with regard to Eastern Europe, stressing politics, ideology and personality.<sup>20</sup> But perhaps there was one more reason for Moscow’s “neglect” of the regions: Soviet foreign policy was focused on the more important task of achieving détente with the Western powers, for this was the level of “grand diplomacy” where Gorbachev’s skills of persuasion and compromise shone brightly and where spectacular breakthroughs could be achieved. By contrast, messy East-Central European affairs could be a bottomless pit and the communist apparatchiks there were too far below him for him to want to be bothered with them.<sup>21</sup>

This, however, does not exhaust the problem of the glaring disconnection between the new approaches of the Soviet leadership towards the West and the lack of any policy towards its allies in Eastern Europe. In the past the Kremlin had acted differently at least once. In 1953, when Stalin’s successors rapidly turned from the near-war situation to “détente,” they simultaneously sought to change regimes, leadership and policies in the Eastern European countries.<sup>22</sup> Subsequently however, Soviet leaders never systematically coordinated the “great power” and “alliance” levels of their foreign policy. Neither Nikita S. Khrushchev in 1959, nor Leonid I. Brezhnev in 1971-72, cared much about how Soviet allies felt about the dramatic rapprochement between the USSR and the Western countries and neither did anything to prepare those allies for the new policy. Against this background, Gorbachev’s approach was hardly surprising, but it was not the only possible course. In an interesting episode, soon after Gorbachev came to power, a hard-line senior official of the CC International Department, Oleg Rakhmanin, decided that it was time “to discipline the socialist camp.” According to the recollections of one of his colleagues, everybody in the Department had long known that the bloc had become a mess: “Kádár was doing whatever he wanted, Honecker was hiding some things from us, making deals with West Germany, trading with them, accepting loans, letting people travel, nobody knew what he was doing; the Poles flirted with the Americans and planned to purchase Boeings instead of our airplanes.”<sup>23</sup> Rakhmanin tried to call the allies “to order” and published two articles to that effect in *Pravda*. “Liberal-minded” people in Eastern European communist establishments complained about them to their Moscow colleagues. When Gorbachev learned about the incident, he grew angry, and soon Rakhmanin was sacked.<sup>24</sup> When various Eastern European politicians later approached Gorbachev or his advisers,

seeking support for their plans to change the political *status quo*, they came back empty-handed. At the same time, Gorbachev never tried to undercut conservative Eastern European leaders on their home turf; for instance, he remained silent on the Prague Spring during his visit to Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1987.<sup>25</sup> Although he had sharp disagreements with Romania’s dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu, in public he avoided any criticism of him and even presented him with Soviet awards. In Hungary, it was not Gorbachev’s actions, but the “Gorbachev effect,” that caused János Kádár to retire.<sup>26</sup> The Soviet leader’s meticulous non-interference, against the growing tension in Eastern Europe, was, in retrospect, a lucky chance for the anti-communist reformers there, but a gross miscalculation from the viewpoint of traditional Soviet political interests.

By 1988, Gorbachev’s foreign policy had begun to put heavy strains on the *status quo* within the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In particular, Moscow initiated moves for “getting around the Americans” and for “smothering” Western European members of NATO “in [a] tender embrace” by building up contacts and building down the military stand-off in Europe. The Soviets used new, bold methods to advance the traditional goal of fomenting divisions inside NATO,<sup>27</sup> the boldest and most far-reaching of which were unilateral reductions of Soviet troops in Central Europe.<sup>28</sup>

Whatever Gorbachev’s intentions, in terms of power relations, his foreign policy was ruinous. NATO, despite its porous and fragile appearance, remained strong, and Western Europeans were not prepared “to end the cold war” with the Soviet Union without American consent.<sup>29</sup> Meanwhile, the foundations of the Soviet presence in Eastern and Central Europe were rapidly eroding. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had no coherent policy at all for the Warsaw Pact. Adopted in July 1987, the new doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, a carbon copy of the Soviet one, undermined the fundamentals of Soviet military presence in the satellite countries. Instead of rejuvenating and reforming the alliance, this doctrine introduced new elements of instability. As with every outdated and

destabilization. They supported moderate reformism, but feared that radical de-Stalinization could break up the Soviet bloc and throw Eastern Europe into turmoil as had occurred after Khrushchev's 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress speech in 1956. An important debate inside the Politburo occurred in March 1988 as a result of the so-called "Nina Andreeva letter."<sup>31</sup> KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov warned about "the meltdown [of Soviet] mentality." In a Politburo session, the spokesman of ideological conservatives, Yegor Ligachev, for the first time raised the specter of disaster for the communist "camp:"

Arguably, we will muddle through, will survive the attacks [of anti-Stalinist forces in the Soviet mass media], but there are socialist countries, the world communist movement—what to do about them? Would we risk breaking apart this powerful support that had always existed side by side with our socialist countries? History has become [the tool of] politics and, when we deal with it, we should think not only about the past, but also about the future.<sup>32</sup>

Gorbachev ridiculed as panic-mongers those who blamed him for destruction of "what had been built by Stalin."<sup>33</sup> And Shevardnadze declared that "primitivism and intellectual narrow-mindedness had prevented Khrushchev from implementing to the end the line of the Twentieth Party Congress." He bluntly said that, so far as "the communist and working class movement today"<sup>34</sup> was concerned, there was not much to rescue. As to the socialist bloc—"take for instance Bulgaria, take the old leadership of Poland, take the current situation in the German Democratic Republic, in Romania. Is it socialism?"<sup>35</sup>

On 18 May 1988, a "think tank" expert and consultant to the CC International Department, Vyacheslav Dashichev, published an article in *Literary Gazette* with the first reassessment of the Cold War. He wrote that both sides, not only the United States, had contributed to the origins of confrontation. Among other points, he criticized Soviet "hegemonism" in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and China, and blamed the Brezhnev leadership for renewing the arms race and thus failing to prevent the collapse of détente in the 1970s.<sup>36</sup>

During 1988, Gorbachev completely discarded the old "revolutionary-imperial" basis for Soviet foreign policy, particularly its key concepts of "class struggle" and bipolarity.<sup>37</sup> In October, Chernyaev, observing the meeting between Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, wrote in his diary: "I felt physically that we are entering a new world, where class struggle, ideology, and, in general, polarity and enmity are no longer decisive. And something all-human is taking the upper hand."<sup>38</sup> By that time the full panoply of international principles of "the new thinking" included: freedom of choice, mutual respect of each other's values, balance of interests, reunification of Europe in an "all-European house," a nuclear-free world, and renunciation of force.<sup>39</sup> In late October, Gorbachev

began preparations to deliver his principles to the world from the most salient podium, the General Assembly of the United Nations. He told his "brain trust"—Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Dobrynin, Falin and Chernyaev—to prepare a speech that would be an answer to Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton College (Missouri) in March 1946. It "should be an anti-Fulton—Fulton in reverse," he said. "We should present our worldview philosophy based on the results of the last three years. We should stress the process of demilitarization and humanization of our thinking."<sup>40</sup> The concept of "anti-Fulton" supposed, of course, the dismantling of the Iron Curtain dividing Eastern Europe from the West.















To what degree are we interested in further presence of Soviet troops on the territory of a number of allied countries (excluding the GDR)?

We should assign to the newly-established CC International Commission [the task of preparing materials for this discussion.] This is a huge problem, in scope as well as in significance, we need to tackle it continuously, but the first exchange should take place as early as late December [1988]–early January 1989. There will be a working conference of the Party leadership of the commonwealth in Prague in February, and this gives us a

example, how would we react if Hungary left for the EC?

Comrades, we are on the eve of very serious things.

Because we cannot give them more than we are giving them now. And they need new technologies. If we do not deal with that, there will be a split, and they will run away.

And then there is the question of what we should present to the working groups of the leaders of the socialist countries. By the way, let the Commission give us a substantiated answer whether we need this meeting at all. Before it, we should work out what we can give to our friends, and compare it with what the West can give them.

The answer to this question, I am sure, lies with our *perestroika*, with its success. And we should try to involve our friends, to get them interested in our economic reforms. Let [Aleksandr] Yakovlev, with scholars, look at it. We are facing a serious problem there.

The peoples of those countries will ask: what about the C[ommunist] P[arty of the] S[oviet] U[nion], what kind of leash will it use to keep our countries in line? They simply do not know that if they pulled this leash harder, it would break.

It is time to transfer our relations to the forms that we practice in our relationship with China, but we can get to such forms only via the market, and, of course, via technological and scientific developments in our own country.

In that case, we would break the old rule that we keep them attached to us only by means of energy resources.

At the same time, we cannot just tell them that we would cut the deliveries. That would be a betrayal.

Kisa hinted at the idea of a USSR-US condominium over Europe. He was hinting that Japan, Germany, Spain, and South Korea were on the rise, and so, let us make an agreement so that the "Europeans do not misbehave."

We should work on this range of issues also, but in such a way that it would not leak, because in Europe they are most afraid of that what they understand the Reykjavik summit means. And if you remember, in Reykjavik they saw an effort at conspiracy between the USSR and the USA over Europe.

My impression from the meeting with the Trilateral Commission is the following: they understood in the West that the world needs a peaceful breathing spell

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<sup>9</sup>Quoted Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," Symposium. The End of the Cold War and Theories of International Relations, *International Organization*, 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994); John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93); William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 91-129; Ted Hopf, "Getting the End of the Cold War Wrong," *International Security*, 18, no 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 202-208; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Did 'Peace Through Strength' End the Cold War? Lessons from INF," *International Security*, 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 162-188.

<sup>10</sup>Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989; The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 252.

<sup>11</sup>See in particular "The End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989: 'New Thinking' and New Evidence." Transcript of the Proceedings of the Musgrove Conference of the Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe Project, Musgrove, St. Simon's Island, Georgia, 1-3 May 1998, prepared by Svetlana Savranskaya, and a collection of documents from the Gorbachev Foundation and other sources prepared for this conference by Vladislav Zubok and Thomas Blanton. The documents and the transcript are being prepared for publication.

<sup>12</sup>"The End of the Cold War in Europe: 1989," Transcript, p. 14.

<sup>13</sup>Recollections of Sergei Tarasenko at Musgrove, Transcript, pp. 19-20.

<sup>14</sup>Nigel Gould-Davis, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1, vol. 1 (Winter 1999), p. 104; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

<sup>15</sup>I rely here on excellent research on the origins of "new thinking" by Robert D. English. See also Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia UP, 2000).

<sup>16</sup>Roald Sagdeev,

<sup>40</sup>Chernyaev's Notes, 31 October 1988, Gorbachev Foundation Archive; also see Pavel Palazchenko, *Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 103-104.

<sup>41</sup>



Nemeth, 23 March 1989, Chernyaev's notes, Gorbachev Foundation Archive.

<sup>70</sup> Record of conversation between Gorbachev and Nemeth, 23 March 1989, Chernyaev's notes, Gorbachev Foundation Archive.

<sup>71</sup> Interview of Jacque Lévesque with Laszlo Kovacs, Budapest, 2 May 1992, cited in his *The Enigma of 1989*, p. 153.

<sup>72</sup> Author's conversation with Rakowski on 8 April 1999, at the conference on the anniversary of the 1989 Polish Roundtable, organized by the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; also see Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989*, p. 125. Rakowski told Lévesque that Gorbachev refused to see him in Moscow for consultations.

<sup>73</sup> There is intriguing evidence on that in the memoirs of the last Soviet ambassador to the GDR, Vyacheslav Kochemasov,

## On the Eve: A Glimpse Inside the Politburo at the End of 1988

*[The following minutes of the 27-28 December 1988 meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union provide a unique glimpse into the discussions within the Soviet leadership, as it assessed the US presidential transition from Ronald Reagan to George Bush and the brewing problems throughout the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe. The meeting took place in the wake of a major reshuffle of the Soviet party leadership and reorganization of the central party apparatus in the summer of 1988 which sidelined key conservative leaders, such as Andrei Gromyko, Mikhail Solomentsev, Victor Chebrikov and Yegor Ligachev. More immediately, the meeting followed Gorbachev's historic 7 December 1988 speech to the United Nations General Assembly in which he recognized the right of all countries to determine their own destinies (implicitly thereby renouncing the "Brezhnev Doctrine" under which the Soviet Union had reserved the right to preserve loyal regimes within the "Socialist Commonwealth" and justified its August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the "Prague Spring"); supported universal human values rather than the class struggle to form the basis for international relations; and proposed unilateral Soviet troop and tank reductions in Europe and Asia. Not all members of the Soviet leadership had supported Gorbachev's initiative at the UN, which had not been cleared by the Politburo beforehand. Not until the December 27-28 session did the Politburo publicly pronounce its blessing on the UN speech.—Christian F. Ostermann]*

### DOCUMENT

#### **Minutes of the Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU CC), 27-28 December 1988 (Excerpts)**

**Top Secret  
Single copy  
(Draft record)**

#### **Meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU 27-28 December 1988**

Chaired: Cde. M.S. GORBACHEV  
Present: Cdes. V.I. Vorotnikov, L.N. Zaikov, E.K. Ligachev, V.A. Medvedev, V.P. Nikonov, N.I. Ryzhkov, N.N. Sliunkov, V.M. Chebrikov, E.A. Shevardnadze, A.N. Yakovlev, A.P. Biriukova, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukiyanov, Yu. D. Masliukov, G.P. Razumovskii, Yu.F. Soloviev, N.V. Talyzin, D.T. Yazov.

#### 1. About practical implementation and practical support [obespechenii] of the results of the visit of Cde. M.S. Gorbachev to the U.N.

**Gorbachev.** [...] We can state that our initiatives pulled the rug [out] from under the feet of those who have been prattling, and not without success, that new political thinking is just about words. The Soviet Union, they said, should still provide evidence. There was plenty of talk, many nice words, but not a single tank is withdrawn, not a single cannon. Therefore the unilateral reduction left a huge impression, and, one should admit, created an entirely different background for perceptions of our policies and the Soviet Union as a whole.

[...] Such impressive positive shifts created among the conservative part of the US political elite, and not only in the US, concern, anxiety and even fear. Thatcher also shares some of it. This breeds considerations of another kind, the essence of which is—to lower expectations, to sow doubts, even suspicions. Behind it is the plot to stop the process of erosion [and], disintegration of the foundation of the "Cold War." That is the crux of the matter. We are proposing and willing to build a new world, to destroy the old basis. Those who oppose it are in the minority, but these circles are very influential.

In the classified information which we receive they speak directly: we cannot allow the Soviet Union to seize the initiative and lead the entire world. [...]

What kind of policy will the US conduct with regard to us? There are several very interesting and serious versions. [...]

Here is one: changes in the policy of the USSR are caused by the profound crisis of communism and socialism and what is happening in the socialist world and the Soviet Union is allegedly a departure from these ideas. In other words we are dismantling socialism with our *perestroika* and renouncing communist goals. This version is used to devalue our peace initiatives. These are just forced steps, so they say, they do not have another option [*im devatsia nekuda*]. Well, there is some grain of realism in this, but only to a degree. We had something different in mind when we formulated our policy. Of course, we considered internal needs as well.

On the basis of this version comes the conclusion that the United States should do nothing on its part to consolidate positive shifts in international relations. The Soviet Union as well as other socialist countries, so they say have no way out. [The USSR] will give up its positions step by step. This is serious, comrades. The "Washington Times" writes about it. And the "Heritage Foundation" prepared recommendations for the future Bush administration along

these lines.

And here is the viewpoint of liberal circles: The USSR is not renouncing socialism, instead it is rescuing it, as President [Franklin D.] Roosevelt once rescued American capitalism through the New Deal. They remind us that capitalism, in order to solve its problems, many times borrowed socialist ideas of planning, state regulation, social programs based on the principle of more social fairness. So they do not want to allow the Right to play on their version and to devalue our peace initiatives. [...]

If this [conservative] version prevails, it will have a serious political effect. Incidentally, some elements of this concept are present in the thinking of [President-elect George H.W.] Bush. As if they are passing from Reagan to Bush. They are present in Western Europe: they say that under [US President Ronald] Reagan the United States has built up its military potential, activated their support to freedom fighters in various regions, and thereby convinced the Soviet Union that expansionist policy has no future. Some Europeans also want to consider the source of change of Soviet policy as American power.

This seems to be the most influential current. In essence it is close to the official viewpoint. Its danger [vred] is obvious, since, if it takes root and becomes the foundation of the policy of the future administration, it will contribute to the arms race and to military interference by the US in other countries. I am now following these things very closely. [...]

Now we should work out a longer-term plan of practical measures to implement the announced concept [at the UN]. On this issue the Politburo has received considerations from departments of the CC, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, and the Committee of State Security [KGB]. They provide a program of actions for the near and distant future. Perhaps this is still a first draft. We should pull our heads together and give it time. [...]

In what was discussed during the days of my stay in New York, the major issue was about the future of *perestroika*. And this I would like to emphasize before the Politburo. Could there be a reverse? Incidentally, this is the object of most intense speculation among the Far Right. [...] And if you analyze the content of recorded foreign broadcasts [by a special service called *radioperekhvat*] in languages of our country on all foreign stations, the emphasis is clearly on the difficulties of *perestroika*, on growing obstacles to the process in the economy, in relations among the nationalities, in the process of democratization and *glasnost*, etc.

When I had to stay in isolation [during the trip], I tried during those twelve days, day by day, to analyze and systematize the material on this score and to give my assessment. [Radio voices] are hammering away at the Soviet audience that *perestroika* is losing ground, grinding to a halt, that it has not given anything to the people, that in the leadership and the party chaos reigns, that the country is sliding toward chaos. And no matter what the leadership would undertake, it sooner or later will end up in

a trap. And [that] the future of the present leadership hangs by a thread. To be frank, they say that Gorbachev is living through his last days. According to the most optimistic forecasts, he can have a year, a year and a half. True, Vladimir Alexandrovich [Kryuchkov]?

**Kryuchkov.** [Chairman of the KGB] People say many things.

**Gorbachev.** You do not want to speak up. It is so. I should not say that we are very surprised by all this. I do not want to be excessively cheerful [*izlishnee bodriachestvo*], but if they are upset, if they try to make these forecasts, it means that they are afraid of our *perestroika*. [...]

Of course, it is still premature to draw serious conclusions about the policy of the future administration, but something can be said on the basis of contacts and some information. First, it is hard to expect that this administration will aggravate relations with the USSR or will get involved in some risky international adventure [*avantiura*] that can undermine these relations. There seems to be solid ground for saying this. On the other hand, Comrades, I believe with full certainty that the administration is not ready for a new serious turn in relations with the USSR which would correspond to the steps our side has undertaken. At least such is the picture today. So they say: we stay prudent, we will not hurry.

Still, at the last moment, when I managed to break away from Reagan [*otorvatsia ot Reigana*] I spoke to Bush about this indecisiveness. He snapped back: you must understand my position. I can not, according to American tradition, step up front until a formal transfer of power has taken place. This I understand, no question about it. We will have understanding. And he assured me—there will be continuity. He believes we should build on what has been achieved, and he will make his own contribution.

All that we have received through different channels says that, from their side, they will add to our efforts to develop our relations.

We should take into account that Bush is a very cautious politician. They say his idiosyncratic feature is the “natural caution” of Bush. It is inside him. We should see it. And what can make Bush act? Only [a threat] of the loss of prestige for the administration. So we need [these sort of] circumstances which we have now created by our initiatives to promote this process.

The mood of the present administration mostly reflects centrist sentiments in political circles of the US and Bush himself says: I am in the center. Most of those who today turn out to be in Bush's team are people who in America are called traditionalists. These people were brought up in the years of the Cold War and still do not have any foreign policy alternative to the traditional post-war course of the United States with all its zigzags to the Right, to the Left, even with its risky adventures. And we should understand it. And much will depend on how we act. I think that they



tion]. During this program chairman of the GDR government said that one should keep in mind the plots of imperialist intelligence services and their subversive activities against *perestroika*. Well, Matlock then said: "I have a special request from my leadership, both the current and the future one, to declare that we support *perestroika*."

**Shevardnadze.** You know, sometimes we help ourselves to blow up some foreign authorities. We found an analysis of this guy [former National Security Adviser Henry] Kissinger. Look what remained of his theory after your speech.

**Gorbachev.** Nothing remained.

**Shevardnadze.** If one says, another, second, third, we'll be our-



closer to the American expenditures.

[...] A lot of work should be done on the issue of our [military] grouping in Eastern Europe. We should do it in a systematic way [*planomerno*]. I know that all these proposals are being prepared for the Defense Council. We agreed to hold it in early January and to discuss all these issues. [...]

[...] See that younger officers do not develop a [negative] mood: is it worth continuing military service, continuing to be in the army. This should be prevented, comrades. ... A country like ours cannot live without [an army]. Everything depends on many factors. I believe that

whatever happens we should modernize the army. Incidentally, the army is needed for the maintenance of internal









were many drunks and drug users, were called upon to organize the entire population of the Republic to strike, commit civil disobedience, and violence against those who did not support them. Groups of extremists began to be delegated together with demonstrators to nearby cities and *rayons* of the Republic. An attempt was made in the city of Rustavi to seize a metallurgical works.

The leaders of the so-called “National Liberation

Georgian SSR which is noted in the TASS report of 10 April again shows the entire importance of timely preventive measures on the part of local Party, government, and law enforcement bodies. The CC CPSU directs the attention of the CP CC's of union republics, *kray*, and *oblast'* Party committees to the need for a deep and comprehensive analysis of the situation which has unfolded in each region and the implementation of effective work to put an end to various kinds of antisocial manifestations.

Party committees and primary Party organizations ought to ensure high political vigilance, not permit complacency and lack of principle in evaluating extremism and nationalism, decisively put an end to any fabrications directed at undermining the foundations of the state, and not ignore any instance of illegal actions.

It is necessary to more diligently improve mass political work in labor collectives and the population's places of residence. Sound out the mood of the people sensitively, react quickly to their needs and requests, and root out bureaucratism and red tape. Pay special attention to the organization of educational work among the student population. Mobilize all Party, government, and Komsomol activists for these purposes. Increase the responsibility of leadership cadre for the political situation in each collective and their personal participation in educational work and public speeches before workers and youth.

The CC CPSU stresses the exceptionally important role and responsibility of the mass media for an objective treatment of the processes which are occurring and the correct formation of public opinion.

It is necessary to concentrate the attention of law enforcement bodies on the adoption of timely and decisive measures directed at people committing violations of socialist law, facilitating the kindling of ethnic strife with their inflammatory actions, and inciting people on the path to anarchy and disorder.

In this regard, Party committees and the leaders of law enforcement agencies, using the mass media and the entire arsenal of ideological and educational work, are to ensure the explanation and deep study of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees published in the press directed at a fuller and more effective use of the means of protecting the Soviet constitutional order and ethnic equality; [they]



the periodic press and also the numerous letters and telegrams which had been sent to the Commission from citizens who live in various regions of our country.

In the process of their work, members of the Commis-

issues troubling the public were discussed at the demonstration. Thousands of citizens participated in it (from morning to late evening). Hundreds of demonstrators remained at Government House at night. All this led to the disruption of the operation of transportation and of several government institutions in the center of the city and to breaches of the peace in the capital. The appeal of the CC GCP, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR broadcast on republic radio and television had no positive effect on the demonstrators. [The] organizers [of the demonstrations] sent their representatives to work groups, higher educational institutions, and schools with a call to begin a strike and join with the demonstrators, and they resorted to picketing. Many higher educational institutions and schools suspended classes.

However, it is necessary to stress that a majority of workers and employees of the capital of Georgia did not support these calls and continued to work.

In the course of the demonstration, irresponsible calls to disobey the legal instructions of authorities were spread, and slogans of a nationalistic, anti-socialist, and anti-Soviet nature were advanced, in particular: "Down with the Communist regime!", "Down with Russian imperialism!", "USSR the prison of peoples!", "Down with Soviet power!", "Liquidate Abkhazian autonomy!", etc. The organizers of the demonstration continued to inflame the situation and called for the demonstrations, strikes, and hunger strikes to continue until 14 April.

Thus, the political situation in Tbilisi on the eve of the events of 9 April was characterized as an emergency and demanded the adoption of urgent and crucial decisions from the leadership of the GCP and the government of the Republic.

The Commission notes, however, that in the course of the investigation no terrorist acts were identified and no facts were established indicating that there was a real attempt to seize power or that there were politically motivated incidents of violence or assaults [*pokusheniya*]







The following took part in the operation: 2,550 men, 6 armored personnel carriers (*BTR*), 8 airborne combat vehicles (*BMD*), 4 fire trucks, and 2 ambulances.

Before the start of the operation General-Major Yu. T. Yefimov verbally assigned the following missions to the commanders of the subunits:

The 4<sup>th</sup> MSP is to move slowly along Rustaveli Avenue from Lenin Square to Republic Square to force the demonstrators to the line—the “Iveriya” Hotel [sic].

According to the written explanation by Yu. T. Yefimov, approved by an MVD Commission under the chairmanship of Deputy Minister V.P. Trushin, the mission assigned to the 8<sup>th</sup> MSP was described otherwise than it was written in the decision, namely:

The 8<sup>th</sup> MSP is to move at the start of the operation with two battalions to the square in front of Government House along Chitadze and Chichinadze Streets, where they are to cut off a group of hunger strikers from the main mass of demonstrators in the square.

VShM (Gor’kiy City)—moving behind the 4<sup>th</sup> MSP is to

located to the left of Government House continued to remain in place, involuntarily preventing the free exit of those people hemmed in from the front. The situation was seriously aggravated by the fact that at this time the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 8<sup>th</sup> MSP, following the verbal order of General-Major Yu.T. Yefimov, began to move to the square from Chichinadze Street. As a result of the movement of the line of servicemen on one side and the increasing density of the mass of people provoking resistance from the demonstrators on the other, a crush began in the area of the right lawn. It is here that most of the dead and victims [sic] of the civilian population were found. Among those who received injuries were also many militia workers and servicemen.

At this stage, some of the demonstrators actually ended up surrounded, that is, squeezed between servicemen and demonstrators who had been unable to leave. A frantic confrontation occurred. The use of rubber truncheons and toxic substances with the grossest violation of instructions and the use of small entrenching tools in dispersing the demonstrators actually turned into savage treatment of Soviet people.

Having studied all the documentary materials available to it, the Commission has come to the firm conclusion that there are no convincing arguments justifying the advisability of bringing a company of a Soviet Army airborne regiment into an operation to force people from the square.

According to the explanation of General Yu.T. Yefimov, when the line of troops was moving forward along Rustaveli Avenue, because of a widening of the avenue in the area of Government House the left flank allegedly was exposed which created, in Yu.T. Yefimov's words, a real threat not only of a penetration into the rear of the servicemen by the demonstrators, but their encirclement.

To close this gap, at General Yu.T. Yefimov's request, General I.N. Rodionov allocated a company of paratroopers and thereby allowed Soviet Army servicemen to get involved in performing functions uncharacteristic for them, grossly violating the General Staff directive about entrusting army subunits only with missions to guard especially selected facilities. In the opinion of the Commission there was no real threat of a disruption of the operation to expel the demonstrators in this situation, hence there was no need to bring in a company of paratroopers.

By 4:21 a.m. the clearing of the square in front of Government House had been concluded. The 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 8<sup>th</sup> MSP joined up with the 4<sup>th</sup> MSP, which continued the expulsion of the demonstrators.

At this stage of the operation, the Internal Troops, overcoming the active resistance of the demonstrators squeezed along Rustaveli Avenue, used the "Cheremukha"

special agent. According to the reports of the leadership of u.e

It is appropriate to mention that information about the demonstrators and their intentions was reported by commanders and political workers in distorted form when instructing the servicemen who had been enlisted in the operation.





The Commission calls upon the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet to draw up and adopt laws strictly regulating the use of force within the country as a top priority.

On the basis of the available materials, the Commission of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies comes to the following conclusions:

1. The reasons for the tragic events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi were that under the conditions of democratization of the entire public and political life of our society, the leadership of the Republic did not manage to direct the acute and dynamically developing processes of *perestroika* in Georgia, properly evaluate the situation in the Republic, and make adequate political decisions.

The former Secretaries of the CC GCP, D.I. Patiashvili and B.V. Nikol'skiy, bear responsibility for the political and other consequences of the events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi.

2. The organizers of the unauthorized demonstration at Government House (I. Tsereteli, Z. Gamsakhurdia, G. Chanturiya, and other leaders of unofficial organizations) should bear criminal, political, moral, and other responsibility for their actions. In the course of their actions they committed various breaches of the peace, issued appeals to disobey legal demands of the authorities, and when a real threat of the use of armed force was created, did not take measures to stop it [the demonstration] and thus did not try to prevent the tragic outcome of the events.

3. The decision to send sub-units of the Internal Troops, the Soviet Army, and special sub-units of the militia were formalized by a directive of the USSR Ministry of Defense General Staff (Cde. M.A. Moiseyev) and by an order of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs (Cde. I.F. Shilov) after a meeting in the CC CPSU on 7 April 1989 (chaired by Cde. Ye. K. Ligachev). Inasmuch as the subject was not simply about troop redeployment but was actually about carrying out operations, introducing individual elements of a state of emergency in the city of Tbilisi, establishing control of entrances to and exits from the city, and taking the most important public and government buildings and other facilities under guard, it ought to be recognized that these decisions were made in gross violation of the law.

4. The instruction of the Georgian Council of Ministers (Cde. Z.A. Chkheidze) of 8 April 1989 to clear the square in front of Government House of demonstrators and to carry out other measures to preserve public order involving the participation of Internal Troops and subunits of the Soviet Army was illegal since

existing legislation does not provide the government of the Republic with such authority.

5. Serious violations were committed during the preparation and execution of the operation to clear the square, manifested in the fact that the operations plan was not corrected in accordance with the actual situation. It was insufficiently studied by the commanders of the sub-units, reconnoitering was not done, and the men and equipment of the Tbilisi city government Directorate of Internal Affairs were not brought into the operation in due measure. In spite of the USSR Minister of Defense's order, paratroop sub-units were used not to guard facilities but to expel demonstrators. Gross violations of public order were committed by the use of special agents; in particular, non-standard special agents (product K-51) were used, and rubber truncheons and small entrenching tools were used illegally.

Generals K.A. Kochetov, I.N. Rodionov and Yu. T. Yefimov bear personal responsibility for these violations and oversights which led to the tragic consequences.

The Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Sh.V. Gorgodze, who removed himself from execution of his direct responsibilities, also bears responsibility in due measure.

6. In the opinion of the Commission, the officials, who issued the order to use special agents and [heavy] equipment on the demonstrators on 9 April in Tbilisi, should be called to official and other forms of account. According to current regulations these "are used in exceptional situations to stop mass unrest accompanied by pogroms, brutality, destruction, arson, and to repel mass attacks on official and administrative buildings, the premises of public organizations and other important facilities, and also in cases when the violent actions of violators of public order threaten the lives and health of citizens, the members of Internal Forces units, and the civilian militia." The Commission has established that on 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi, no grounds to take such measures existed.

7. During the operation to halt the demonstration by clearing the square in front of Government House and Rustaveli Avenue, bodily injuries of varying degrees of severity (including injuries from the use of special agents—tear gases) were inflicted on the demonstrators, servicemen of the Internal Troops and the Soviet Army, and militia workers. Nineteen demonstrators died (mainly women). The Commission perceives the need for criminal liability of the specific individuals guilty of the deaths of people and the infliction of serious bodily injuries.











## The volatile situation of Poland and Hungary in January 1989

By the end of January 1989, the political situation in Poland and Hungary was evolving very rapidly—both as a result of the reformist courses of their respective leaderships, encouraged by Moscow, and under pressure from opposition groups. The communist parties in these countries were preparing to negotiate major political arrangements, in uncharted waters, with uncertain outcomes. It was in this context that Yakovlev asked the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System at the USSR Academy of Sciences (commonly referred to as the Bogomolov Institute) to prepare a report on the political situation in Eastern Europe, as well as in each particular country, with an assessment of all possible developments and their implications for the USSR. After receiving the report Yakovlev ordered similar documents to be prepared by the International Department of the Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB. He then organized a meeting among the authors of the four reports to contrast and discuss their conclusions. It is the first three of these reports that are published below.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, as far as I can ascertain, the report from the KGB remains inaccessible.

Comparison of these three documents is instructive. All three are located within the general framework of the ideology of *perestroika* and *novoe myshlenie* (new thinking). But each represents significantly different shades of that elastic and eclectic ideology. They highlight the heterogeneity of the reformist camp which was setting the political agenda of the USSR at the time. The documents provide rare and fascinating indications of some parameters within which Soviet leaders could read the situation in the following crucial months.

### From the Bogomolov Institute: a boldly reformist approach

In the context of February 1989, the report of the Bogomolov Institute is radically reformist—certainly the most reformist of the three. Far from complacent, it presents an alarming picture of the general situation in Eastern Europe, and the predicament of the region's communist parties. At the time, it was quite usual for reformers to dramatize both the internal situation of the USSR as well as its foreign policy, in order to press for change and reform. For example, in the event of a renewal of martial law in Poland, the report evokes the specter of “an Afghanistan in the center of Europe.”

The memorandum embodies one of the basic assumptions on which *perestroika* rested, one which proved to be a fatal illusion: that by taking the initiative in a process of change, a communist party could regain legitimacy, keep control of the process and save a considerable degree of influence. This “initiativist ideology” became a sort of a fetish of the reformers in their struggle against the conservatives. They even argued that it was

the only way for communists to save their power and influence. This went along with an open-ended conception of socialism which, in 1989, was getting closer to and more compatible with social democracy which the memorandum calls a “contemporary socialist vision.”

Even the Polish and Hungarian parties come under criticism for not having been bold and quick enough in “seizing the initiative.” For by doing so, and in working out power sharing agreements with opposition groups, they could, according to this line of argument, achieve a new political preponderance. The report therefore recommends that the Soviet leadership adopt a more proactive policy in supporting more overtly the reformist elements within the communist parties of the conservative Eastern European countries.

The author, Matyana Sylvanskaya, was quite



Shevardnadze were definitely closer to this approach.<sup>6</sup>

### From the Foreign Ministry: a short and muddled report

The report submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Yakovlev was disconcerting in many respects. While the first two reports were sophisticated and consistent in their respective analyses, this one was not. Therefore it is revealing not so much for the course of action it advocates for Eastern Europe but in other regards.

The Foreign Ministry's report suffered not only in quality but also in quantity. Only one third of the length of the Bogomolov Institute's document, it reads like a botched memorandum written by a poorly prepared and supervised official. This probably reflects the fact that Eastern Europe was indeed a very low priority for Shevardnadze's Ministry. Policy toward Eastern Europe had always been the responsibility of the Central Committee, to which Soviet ambassadors to these countries reported directly. Even if Shevardnadze was claiming responsibility for all areas of foreign policy for his Ministry in 1989, it is clear that he and his associates were almost entirely focused on the East-West relationship.

The memorandum borrowed arguments from the arsenal of the reformist discourse, but also from the conservative sources. Yet, it did not amount to a coherent centrist position. Rather it was typical of the ideological confusion experienced by many well-intentioned Soviet apparatchiks at that time. They often parroted the slogans of *perestroika* and *novoe myshlenie* without being able to turn them into operative policy recommendations, and, in effect, continued to use much of the traditional language.

In 1989, both the radical reformers and the conservatives were making alarmist assessments of the situation in Eastern Europe for obviously different reasons. As we have seen, the reformers did so in order to promote reform. The conservatives, on the other hand, did so to raise concerns about the threats to socialism stemming from the changes. The alarmist tone of the Foreign Ministry's report was in line with the latter. It warned against the mobilization of "forces alien to socialism" which could take advantage of the access to parliamentary and government institutions to eject the communist parties from power, either "partially or fully." At the same time, it took up one of the pet slogans of *perestroika*, stressing that the "trend toward political pluralism is becoming universal" without showing its benefits to the East European communist parties. Contrary to the analysis of the two other reports, the moderation exhibited by the Western countries concerning Eastern Europe was seen as tactical, with no change in their long term goals.

These are not the only contradictory elements in this document. Showing more zeal in this respect than the document from the Central Committee, the first and "most important" of the Foreign Ministry's recommendations was "not to permit the erosion of socialism in Eastern Europe" and to keep "all the countries of this region on the socialist

path of development." Yet, not surprisingly, the memorandum rejected the use of force. It pleaded for maintaining ambiguity on this issue. At the same time, it recommended that the USSR should refuse to support the use of force by one or the other of the communist regimes, because "repressive actions" would contradict the "international norms in the sphere of human rights." This reflected the fact that showing concern for international norms and human rights was one of the trademarks of Shevardnadze's Ministry in the policy of East-West rapprochement.

## DOCUMENT No. 1 Memorandum to Alexander Yakovlev from the Bogomolov Commission (Marina Sylvanskaya), February 1989

### CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE USSR

Societies in Eastern European countries are beginning to change their character. Attempts to build socialism with Stalinist and neo-Stalinist methods, the spread [*tirazhirovaniye*] of which occurred in the region under consideration not without the active involvement of the Soviet side, ended up in a stalemate. This situation was expressed in an aggravation of contradictions and a growth of crisis developments. The degree and scale of conflicts vary: from the more or less hidden social-political tension, fraught with sudden explosions, to chronic crisis without any visible ways out, signaling the beginning of disintegration of the social-political system not excluding cataclysms as well. Such processes are irreversible; they are the result of the long-term evolution of the regime, and in a majority of countries they accompany a transition to a new model of socialism but also can lead to a collapse of the socialist idea. In the last year or year and a half the development of events in Eastern Europe has sharply accelerated and has acquired elements of unpredictability.

#### General characterization of social-political processes in the countries of Eastern Europe

Crisis symptoms are visible in all spheres of public life inside the countries as well as in relations among them.

In the economy the intensity of these symptoms varies from a slowdown of economic growth, a widening social and technological gap with the West, a gradual worsening of shortages in domestic markets and the growth of external debt (GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria) to a real







into a more effective and modern social structure. There are serious obstacles to a resolution of the crisis situation with the fewest losses. Furthermore, deadlock and catastrophic scenarios are coming to the fore.

### Poland

1. Most favorable scenario: The conclusion of a so-called anti-crisis pact at “roundtable” talks, which could mean an unstable compromise between the PUWP (and its allied parties), Solidarity (and the forces of the opposition intelligentsia) and the official trade unions (VSPPS). [There should be a] gradual transition to a mixed economy, decentralization, and privatization of “the giants of postwar industrialization” using shareholding capital and a transition to one or another version of a market economy. Movement towards genuine party-political pluralism (free elections, redistribution of seats in the Parliament, bringing representatives of the present opposition into the government, [giving them] access to mass media) could increase the support on the part of the population of the country and the West. The latter could ameliorate the situation with payment of the external debt [and] opening channels for new credits, which could somewhat reduce internal economic tension. However, even in this case workers’ protests would hardly be neutralized, therefore political instability would continue for a long time, periodically producing micro-crises. This would complicate the decisive and energetic program of reforms. The weakening of the PUWP would inevitably continue as a result of the ideological crisis and internal struggle, but it would take a more gradual course, in a form which could permit an explosion to be avoided. Relations with the USSR would remain ideologized while Poland would remain a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Conditions for realization: preservation and consolidation of the authority of the present party-state leadership (W. Jaruzelski); containment of the pressure “from below” in a framework that would preclude radicalization of both trade union confederations.

2. Pessimistic scenario: Failure of the anti-crisis pact resulting from a clash between the conservative forces in the PUWP, radicalized VSPPS and the extremist wing of Solidarity, while minimal political contacts between the party-government leadership and the opposition survive. A protracted “deadlock” situation. Slow and ineffective changes in the economy, de facto pluralism in society without effective mechanisms of making and implementing decisions. Growing elements of spontaneity [and] anarchy. Transformation of Poland into a chronic “sick man of Europe.”

3. Deadlock scenario: Failure of the anti-crisis pact with an aggravation of relations with the opposition. Rapid escalation of the conflict to an explosion (the most probable time in this case – the spring of 1989). Renewal of martial law or a situation approximating a civil war – “Afghanistan in the middle of Europe.”

4. Recently, the first weak symptoms of yet another scenario have emerged. It is close to the first but is related to the formation of a Christian Democratic Party of Labor which, hypothetically, may grow into a big political force if supported by Solidarity (in a role of a Catholic trade union) and the oppositionist Catholic intelligentsia. The PUWP would probably welcome such a scenario since it could promise cooperation with the Church which seeks to avoid an explosion. Yet the paucity of information provides no clues as to the change of the position of the Church which has so far preferred to stay in the role of arbiter [*treteyskiy sud'ya*].

This last month produced good chances for development of events according to the first scenario. There is no absolute guarantee that it will be realized, since there are no assurances that the traditionalist forces would not dispute the policy [*kurs*] of the 10th Plenum of the CC PUWP at the forthcoming party conference, and that Solidarity would and could contain the rising mass protest and observe the two-year armistice. The specific conditions of Poland do not exclude the first and especially the second scenarios sliding back into a deadlock. The

scenario, since none of the movements can compete in

may propel events towards the first scenario or raise the chances of complete slide-back towards the second scenario. [...]

In a long-term perspective the present situation in the countries of the second group appears to be more dangerous for the fate of socialism, and crisis phenomena there will inevitably move from hidden to open form. Czechoslovakia is the first candidate. In Bulgaria and



foreign policy can be seen as changing their priorities. They prefer the support of *perestroika* in the USSR and the creation of an external environment favorable to its success. Serious Western politicians warn against playing on problems of the socialist community [or] its disintegration which, in their opinion, can bring about unforeseeable consequences for the Western world. Responsible Western circles are coming to the conclusion that by cooperating with reformist forces they can achieve more than by attempting to pull individual socialist countries from the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Working through [the options for] a future Western strategy towards Eastern Europe, bourgeois political scientists and some think tanks consider a scenario of "Finlandization" of a number of countries of the region.<sup>13</sup>

What could be the possible consequences of such a  
sc

shift

voluntary recognition of their leadership by their people, their legitimation. They should pay as any other party in a normal democratic society for the loss of trust. The same logic dictates to us the need for the support of business, civilized contacts not only with those political parties in the countries of Eastern Europe which are currently at the



The European socialist countries found themselves in a powerful magnetic field of the economic growth and social well-being of the Western European states. Against





depend on that.

From a geopolitical point of view, the importance of European socialist countries for the Soviet Union was determined by the fact that from the very beginning they played a unique role of a security belt, which created a strategic umbrella [prikrytiye] for the center of socialism. Today, notwithstanding all the changes in the international situation, this role of Eastern Europe, and especially of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, remains unchanged to a certain extent.

It is a complicated question—what could and should be the forms of our influence on the socialist countries under the new conditions?

Authoritarian methods [and] direct pressure have clearly outlived themselves. In the political sphere, even in the case of a sharp deterioration of the situation in one of the countries—and we cannot exclude such a possibility today—it is very unlikely that we would be able to employ the methods of 1956 and 1968, both as a matter of principle, but also because of unacceptable consequences. Use of force would be admissible only in one case—if there were a direct and clear armed interference of external forces in the internal developments of a socialist country. Therefore, essentially, our only methods of leverage could be our political and economic ties.

5. The state of economic relations is assuming growing political importance. Their role is evident for the majority of socialist countries. And for us they have a great importance as well also. We should decisively discard the stereotype of those countries as our parasites [nakhlebniki]. In contradistinction to routine perceptions, the economic effects of our trade with European COMECON countries is rather favorable for us. It can be seen from the following examples.

Share of goods imported from the COMECON countries in the overall volume of goods consumed in the USSR:

Metal rolling machinery—40-50%; food industry equipment—40%, textile industry equipment—50%, chemical industry equipment—35%; lumber and wood-working equipment—about 30%; printing industry equipment—more than 40%; meat, meat products,

coun177es in the overall 5s.n of\*i~0iTwx0.72"(ontries is rather favor wi~T\*i~-0.03 TwTj1987 wi~[493%)]~-0khl08.96 m1 Twibiscard the

all, we should not allow our prestige as a reliable economic partner to weaken. Each breach of contract—and such cases are becoming more frequent—puts the socialist countries in a difficult, sometimes even hopeless situation. Accumulation of similar facts in the economic sphere unavoidably leads to unfavorable political consequences for us. We should overcome this illness, as far as reconsidering the proposals of our ministries on such a complicated issue as the volume of our oil deliveries for the next five-year period. This should be done in the spirit of our former agreements.

Coordination of efforts for the conversion of the military economy could become one of the new channels of economic influence on the socialist countries, especially because the military-industrial complex of the socialist countries is integrated to a higher degree than their civilian economies. One more opportunity would be to develop a common concept of alleviating foreign debt, which is extremely large in a number of socialist countries.

Lastly, when we intensify our economic ties with the West, it is important to actively try to bring our socialist partners into those [contacts], in order to overcome the impression, which some of them have, that we are lessening our attention to the fraternal countries. We probably should hold specific discussions with them to talk about a possibility of their joining in the realization of projects that are carried out with the help of Western credits, trying in the final account to work out a coordinated strategy of integrating the socialist commonwealth into global economic relations.

6. A number of new tasks have emerged in the sphere of political cooperation. Just several years ago we would have considered many of the developments that are underway now in the socialist countries as absolutely unacceptable for us. Today we need a deeper, more flexible, and differentiated approach to what is useful for us, to what is admissible and what is unacceptable. At the same time, it is important that we realistically assess our opportunities, carefully weighing where we can realistically have an influence, and where our interference could only aggravate the situation.

The measure of socialism in the transformations that are underway now in the socialist countries is a difficult question. Some of them are allowing not only the extensive development of market relations, but also forms of private property, and widespread inflow of foreign capital. And still, it appears that \_\_\_\_\_



Finally, it is necessary to take into account the growing attention of our friends to the still remaining “white spots” in our relations; this interest will most probably become even more pronounced this year [1989] in connection with the approach of the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II and the signing of the Soviet-German pact. It would be expedient to work on our interpretation of the nature and the origins of World War II in advance, employing the newly-defined approaches to the assessment of our policy in the 1930-40s, and to discuss it with our friends.

9. In the present circumstance we could formulate the following

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and government bodies, the opposition can completely or partially drive the ruling communist and workers' parties from power. All this is a real prospect, even today, for several European socialist countries. Considering that forces hostile to socialism have stepped up their activity, this process could have serious political consequences.

In countries where authoritarian methods of leadership are being retained (Romania, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria) the ruling parties are experiencing growing difficulties in resolving social economic, political, and ideological problems. Hidden dissatisfaction with their policy is intensifying [and it] could be displayed at any moment, but here and there it is already being displayed in the creation of alternative associations, in demonstrations, and strikes. In response, the authorities are intensifying their repressive measures [and] using harsher methods of regulating public political life. Such a practice provokes even more dissatisfaction in society, and a sharper negative reaction abroad. It comes into contradiction with the general tendency in the world community toward democratization and with the principles and provisions of the final documents of the all-European Conference [CSCE] and the Vienna meeting.

It ought to be supposed that [there is a] process of transition in these countries to democratization [and] a genuine renewal of socialism, but this is in the final account unavoidable, will occur more painfully, and be accompanied by deep political and social convulsions.

*Perestroika* has brought real changes to the character of our relations with the socialist countries. In practice we have switched to the principles of equal rights and mutual responsibility in cooperation [and] to a considerable degree have removed the stratification [*nasloyniye*] of the past. Nevertheless, many problems remain undecided, especially in the sphere of economic cooperation, the development of a modern concept of socialism, [and] the development of relations between people. Moreover, new frictions have arisen in several areas. We have been confronted with facts when the leadership of Romania, the German Democratic Republic, [and] Czechoslovakia are trying to block the spread of the ideas of *perestroika* in their countries, resorting, in particular, to prohibitive measures. Sometimes unconsidered publications in our mass media serve as an excuse for this. This introduces a certain tension in our bilateral relations.

The problem of "white spots" has acquired a special bitterness in the history of our bilateral relations with a number of socialist countries. Among them are the questions connected with the Soviet-German Pact of 1939, the "Katyn Affair," the events of 1956 in Hungary, the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia, etc. The delay in the work of evaluating these events from positions of new thinking is causing irritation in certain circles of the socialist countries, and in certain strata of the population [this] gives rise to mistrust in our policy of *glasnost*. Aggravated national territorial problems have brought serious discord into the relationships among the socialist countries in recent years.

This is the case in regard to Hungary and Romania, Romania and the USSR, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Poland and the German Democratic Republic, etc.

As a whole, a growth of nationalism in all East European countries, and a strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in their policies has been observed.

The situation of affairs in the Warsaw Pact is developing in complex ways. Our policy for genuinely equal relations within the alliance, the development of the initiative of each member state, [and] the approval of the practice of co-creation in the development and advancement of large foreign policy initiatives has doubtless had some positive effect.

The further development of collective, democratic principles in the activity of the alliance is being hindered by the obstructionist position of the Romanian leadership, which has obviously taken a course of dismantling the existing organs of political and military cooperation within the Warsaw Pact framework. The allies are all the more prominently [*rel'yefneye*] displaying an attempt to get more from the Warsaw Pact, mainly from the USSR (a guarantee of security, political information), than they contribute to it, [and] to display independence to the detriment of common interests [and] mutual responsibility. They are dissatisfied with the remaining inequality in the military mechanism of the Warsaw Pact leadership, which is practically a Soviet military headquarters with an especially formal presence in it of other countries. Some allied countries (Hungary and Czechoslovakia) are openly finding burdensome the Soviet troops on their territory and display an interest in the quickest possible reduction of their strength.

At the same time, it seems improbable that in the foreseeable future any of the allied countries will raise the question of leaving the Warsaw Pact. We have to deal with the attempt of individual countries, especially Romania and Hungary, to give their participation in the Warsaw Pact a formal character, [and to] avoid coordinated actions which could limit their freedom of maneuver in international affairs.

The US and their allies in NATO are right now placing reliance on an evolutionary path to change the social structure in the European socialist countries [and] a peaceful transition from socialism to bourgeois regimes, using a differentiated approach to each of them. Proceeding from this goal [*ustanovka*], judging from everything, the Western powers do not want confrontations with us on account of Eastern Europe. In the case of a worsening crisis situation in individual countries they [the Western powers] will most likely display restraint and not intervene in their [Eastern European countries] internal

number of European socialist countries, [and] the deeply thought-out, long-range policy of the Western states regarding our allies and the socialist community as a whole require from us the greatest attention to the processes occurring in the fraternal countries, to the problems of our cooperation with them, [and] to the prospects for the development of world socialism. In doing so, [we] ought to keep in mind that recently [our] friends could have received the impression that, in conditions of an intense dialogue between the USSR and the US [and] the growth of our attention to global and regional international problems, [our] relations with socialist countries have become secondary for us.

1. In the conditions which have arisen the growth in practice of our attention to relations with the socialist countries [and] an approach to them as a genuinely high-priority main thrust of Soviet foreign policy have special significance.

The most important problem at this stage is not to permit the erosion of socialism in Eastern Europe [and to] keep all the countries of this region on the socialist path of development.

2. In as much as at the present time our influence on the development of the European socialist countries with the aid of economic and scientific technical levers is limited, [we] need to strengthen the emphasis on work with friends in the political and ideological sphere [and] substantially increase comradely attention to the leaders of the fraternal countries. In the present situation even the simple exchange of opinions and experience with the leadership of friends has a significance of no small importance in resolving the problems confronting us. Meetings at the level of general secretaries and CC secretaries, heads of government, ministers, [and] leaders of public organizations are a matter of primary importance. It is necessary to simplify the procedure of these meetings, to give them a more business-like, working character.

The time has come to hold a conference of leaders of fraternal parties in a narrow circle with the object of discussing the urgent problems of socialist construction and increasing the effectiveness of cooperation within the framework of the socialist community.

3. Work to prepare new treaties on friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid between the USSR and a number of allied states in connection with the expiration of current [treaties] would acquire great significance for the further development of relations with the European socialist countries in the spirit of equality, partnership, trust, [and] mutual responsibility. [The treaties] should reflect the new principles of relations between socialist trustizatiween t3cween tthe expih t.sie time haTDi~0.00d



community, substantial restrictions continue to be maintained in the socialist community in the area of contacts between people [and] private trips of citizens. In the political area this does not serve our interests [and] has an adverse effect on the development of trade and economic, scientific, cultural, athletic, and other ties. At the present time, the question of the maximum removal of restrictions on trips of citizens of socialist countries to the USSR and of Soviet citizens to these countries and the creation of corresponding facilities for this has become unavoidable.

9. An important goal should be the preservation of the military-political alliance of European socialist states—the Warsaw Pact.

In accordance with the proposals advanced by us to improve the mechanism of cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, it is necessary to follow a line of maximum politicization of the activity of the alliance, democratization of the forms of its operation, an increase of the contribution and interest of each of the member states. This would be aided by an atmosphere of a genuine comradely, free, and unstructured exchange of opinions at meetings of the PCC [Political Consultative Committee], KMID [Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs], and KMO [Committee of Ministers of Defense] (in doing so, it is not obligatory [that] they come to a consensus at any price on all questions—each state has the right to preserve its freedom of action, explaining and justifying its position to the other allies); obligatory rotation [of officials] in all bodies and structures of the Warsaw Pact; and the simultaneous increase in the effectiveness of its mechanism—the creation of a permanent political working body, giving the General Secretary of the PCC the role of coordinator within the framework of the alliance. [We] ought to simplify the procedure for preparing and holding conferences and meetings of Warsaw Pact bodies [and] try to ensure continuous working contact of the allied states.

10. All the more pressing has become the problem of establishing a close coordination of the actions of allied socialist states with respect to the East European policy of the US and its partners in NATO and working out coordinated strategy and tactics in this direction.

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24.2.89

[Source: Donation of Professor Jacques Lévesque; copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translated by Vladislav Zubok and Gary Goldberg.]

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*Jacques Lévesque is Professor of Political Science at the Université du Québec a Montréal and author of The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (1997), among many other works.*

<sup>1</sup> For more details and evidence on Gorbachev's approach and behavior see: Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989. The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997), Chapter 4.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum is reproduced in: Georgii Shakhnazarov, *Tsena Svobody: Reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* [The Price of Liberty: Gorbachev's Reformist Enterprise through the Eyes of his Assistant] Moscow, Rossiska Zevs, 1993), p. 368.

<sup>3</sup> Marina Pavlovna Silvanskaia, a senior research fellow of the Bogomolov Institute was commissioned to prepare the report for her Institute. I want to thank her for providing a copy of the report and of those of the International Department of the Central Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which she had received to prepare for discussion with their authors and Yakovlev.

<sup>4</sup> His aides were more active in encouraging the reformist challengers of Honecker, Zhivkov and Jakeš, while he himself acted in a much more prudent and indirect manner. For a country by country examination and assessment of the Soviet leadership's behavior, see: Lévesque, *The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe*.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Andrzej Stelmachowski, Warsaw, 7 May 1992. In my interview with General Jaruzelski, the next day, 8 May, he confirmed the accuracy of the remark.

<sup>6</sup> Having met with Gorbachev in the preceding weeks, the Chairman of the HSWP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party), Rezső Nyers, declared in an interview to an Italian newspaper in September 1989: "Gorbachev shares our own fears and preoccupations which are: that the road to reforms not end in anarchy; that the HSWP remains *one of the essential forces* in the renewal of society; and that Hungary not abandon its friendship with the Soviet Union in a *unilateral* movement toward the West." *Corriere della Sera*, 9 September 1989. (My emphasis)

<sup>7</sup> In recent years in Yugoslavia the strike movement has grown like an avalanche: in 1982 there were 174 strikes with 11,000 participants, in 1988 about 2,000 strikes with 360,000 participants. Strikes have become more prolonged [and] workers are changing from purely economic protest to political [protest]. At the end of last year the population of a number of republics and autonomous districts went out into the streets en masse. Recently the question of the possibility of organizing a general strike of workers of the textile and light industry was discussed.

In Poland in 1988 two "peaks" of strikes with a tendency toward an increase in the number of workers were observed. Having consolidated the opposition forces around it, "Solidarity" was born. The official trade unions (VSPS) were sharply radicalized. They achieved the resignation of the Z. Messner government but have now refused to unconditionally support the government of M. Rakowski, declaring that the trade unions in principle cannot be pro-government. Since the beginning of this year, in spite of the start of "round table" talks, strikes of

an economic character have begun.

After an absence of many years instances of work interruption have been noted in Hungary. Trade unions are insisting on legal approval of the right to strike and an easier procedure for declaring them. A corresponding bill has been presented to the People's Assembly.

<sup>8</sup> In Yugoslavia the average wage has fallen to the level of the end of the '50s and the beginning of the '60s. In Poland the standard of living has been thrown back to the level of 1973. In the last year, absolute consumption in Hungary fell for the first time.

<sup>9</sup> An analogous effect can temporarily produce a unique silent agreement with the public if the authorities are capable of guaranteeing them a sufficiently high level of consumption (Hungary after 1956 or Czechoslovakia after 1968).

<sup>10</sup> The forecast is based on the decision of the CC of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [HSWP] to transition to a multi-party system and that restoration of unity in the leadership of the Party is practically excluded.

<sup>11</sup> On the anniversary of the February events and the day of the death of T. Masaryk this crackdown will probably take place again.

<sup>12</sup> At the moment [he] accepted the post of General Secretary when V. Bilak resigned.

<sup>13</sup> Inasmuch as internal impulses for such a shift with the present composition of the leadership of the CPCz are very weak, it probably is conceivable only as a result of our skillful and careful influence.

<sup>14</sup> In the political dictionary this term mostly signifies the return of our neighboring states to the bosom of capitalist development while preserving special, friendly relations with the Soviet Union which would guarantee the security of its borders. Such an understanding of the notion "Finlandization" overlooks two significant aspects in the relations between the USSR and Finland. First, they are built on neutrality of our northern neighbor who does not join any military bloc; second, the Finnish communist party by definition cannot come to power and carry out a revolutionary coup, which guarantees the stability of the [Finnish] social-political structure. Since the countries of Eastern Europe will hardly raise the issue of leaving the Warsaw Pact in the near future and the ruling parties, given even their rapid weakening, will retain for a while some social base, the term of "Finlandization" can be used here only with very significant reservations.

## America's Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963

*Shu Guang Zhang*

Why would one country impose economic sanctions against another in pursuit of foreign policy objectives? How effective is the use of economic weapons in attaining such objectives? To answer these questions, the author examines how and why the United States and its allies instituted economic sanctions against the People's Republic of China in the 1950s, and how the embargo affected Chinese domestic policy and the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The literature on sanctions has largely concluded that they tend to be ineffective in achieving foreign policy objectives. This study, based on recently declassified documents in the United States, Great Britain, China, and Russia, is unusual in that it looks at both sides of "the China embargo." It concludes that economic sanctions provide, in certain circumstances, an attractive alternative to military intervention (especially in the nuclear age) or to doing nothing. The author argues that while the immediate effects may be meager or nil, the indirect and long-term effects may be considerable; in the case he reexamines, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Anti-Rightist campaign were in part prompted by the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Finally, though the embargo created difficulties within the Western alliance, Beijing was driven to press the USSR for much greater economic assistance than Moscow thought feasible, and the ensuing disagreements between them contributed to the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Going beyond the rational choice approach to international relations, the book reflects on the role of mutual perceptions and culturally bound notions in shaping international economic sanctions. In addition to contributing to a better understanding of the economic aspects of Cold War history, the book attempts to give more empirical substance to the developing concept of "economic diplomacy," "economic statecraft," or "economic warfare" and to relate it to the idea of conflict management.

Cold War International History Project Series

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## The Political Transition in Hungary, 1989-90

By **Csaba Békés and Melinda Kalmár**

**M**arking the tenth anniversary of the political transition in Hungary, historians and political scientists launched several large scale projects to locate, assess, and publish documents pertaining to the historical events of 1989-1990. In June 1999, three principal Hungarian scholarly enterprises, the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the Hungarian Program of the Project on Openness in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, and the newly founded Cold War History Research Center in Budapest—together with the National Security Archive and CWIHP—organized an international conference in Budapest on the transition from Communism.

The Hungarian partners in this multi-national effort focused on three important sources: first, on the records of



radically at once. (...)

**Rezső Nyers**<sup>8</sup> The problem is greater, and we have to widen its scope. Is 1956 really the foundation of the Hungarian communist movement? If 1956 is our foundation, I will not expect the movement to hold out very long, because it is a weak foundation indeed. Our decisions and historical assessment of 1956 were driven by the spirit of the time and not without controversies. While things were going smoothly, people tolerated all this, but when times are hard, the same people seem discontent with what they tolerated before. Therefore we should not consider 1956 as a foundation. 1956 was a tragic event, a moment that manifested the prevailing crisis, and today we have to conclude that in fact 1956 signified a more serious crisis than we thought at the time, or even in 1957. We belittled the problem, but now we all agree—and I think there is a consensus about it in the Party—that it was the materialization of a historical mistake. (...)

Consequently, I have to point out that it would be a serious mistake—especially for the future of the Party—to tie our policy to the 1956 bandwagon.

We have to conclude, having read the document—I have read the document and the material of the Committee debate as well—that Pozsgay's statement and the exposé of the Committee show a unanimous approach. They are in accord. Which does not justify how the statement was publicized. I am still of the opinion that it was disadvantageous, hasty and inaccurate. I hold to my opinion, even though there is no fundamental controversy between the standpoint of the Committee and that of Pozsgay.

As to whether it was a “people's uprising” or “counter-revolution,” my opinion is that a definition without controversy is impossible on this issue. Personally, I think that it was a people's uprising; our declaration in December 1956 acknowledged it in the first paragraph, labeling it as the rightful discontent of the people. I do maintain, though, that hostile enemies gradually joined in, and they could have turned the wheel of history backwards, so the danger of counter-revolution was imminent. As to our opinion on 1956, I argue against the far-fetched criticism of Imre Nagy<sup>9</sup> and his circle, and the significance of revisionism. ... I declare with communist honesty, it was a mistake. It is not true that the revisionist group around Imre Nagy had such a vital role in the events ... At that time, I myself accepted this interpretation. However, we become smarter, and now we see what went on. We now realize that the mistakes were more serious. We realize that it was wrong to think that between 1953 and 1956 Rákosi<sup>10</sup> was a dime and Imre Nagy was a dozen, so to speak. In that debate, well, Imre Nagy was right. It is a matter of honesty, if someone thinks it over and believes that it is so, one should speak out forthrightly. And I do speak out. Imre Nagy was not a counter-revolutionary, he was not. If a Party ever, with their own... [unintelligible—*Ed.*] One just has to read his speeches. Where the hell do we find counter-revolutionary ideas with Imre Nagy?

Nowhere, absolutely nowhere! And these are matters of honor. Rather, he was a sectarian. If he was still among us now unchanged, he would be more of a Stalinist. His role in the 1956 events remains debatable, it cannot be clarified. The Soviets were mucking around, which we swept under the carpet. Even today we cannot see the truth. I already know, however, that the Soviets had a lion's share in the decision. János Kádár<sup>11</sup> and the Politburo of the time took full responsibility, for which I respect them. However, they are far from being the only ones to blame. Their responsibility is without question, because it cannot be accepted either that a decision was made in Moscow, or that it was executed here. Unfortunately, though, I have to emphasize again that we won't be able to come to terms with the question of 1956. Legally Imre Nagy was culpable, because he breached the law. It is not too moral, at a time when everybody is breaching the law—I was breaching it, and so was János Kádár—the lawbreakers themselves accuse and convict the weaker one on the basis of the sectarian law. These are not righteous things. All the same, those who did not live in that situation are unable to imagine how it was—and this is the dramatic aspect. I think, if we leave it as the focus of political debates, it would result in the serious weakening and a crisis of values of the communist movement. Consequently, we have to put history right; it can be corrected. Roughly according to the opinion of the committee, it can be corrected, but let me emphasize that the word “counter-revolution” should not be replaced with a single term, and it has to be decided who makes the correction. I think it is now time for us to try and come to some kind of political consensus. We cannot let the undulations of political life shatter the tenuously forming unity and co-operation of the Party and its leadership, so that other players take over while we eventually fall apart. I also mean that Pozsgay should not become the victim of this affair either. Yet Pozsgay should show more discipline and more mutual responsibility as well.

All in all, we should not let ourselves confront each other to an extreme. What do I think the possible action to take is? I believe that the Central Committee should be summoned and presented the material of the committee. The Pozsgay affair should not be presented on its own; it would be an impossible trial that wouldn't lead to anything. I think that the documents of the subcommittee have to be submitted for debate, and only then could it be discussed whether what he did was wise or not, and what action has to be taken in order to settle the debate. At the same time, principle issues of daily politics should be presented to the Central Committee, such as what should be done now in the question of the single-party system and the multi-party system. Things have passed over our heads. I cannot see another option other than that we accept the multiparty system. But we need to debate all this. And if we decide against the multi-party system, then that will be our decision, and everybody decides according to his conscience whether he takes the political responsibility for his decision. I do admit sincerely, I would take

responsibility for both, even if I do not agree with the decision. It can be done intelligently. Retreat, however, is the worst thing one can do, it can only lead to our defeat. We have to do it sooner or later, anyway. (...)

All in all, I say that we take seriously the compilation of the committee, and consider their report worthy of being presented to the Central Committee. We suggest to the Central Committee that we publicize the documents of the committee. We'll see if the Central Committee will accept the suggestion. (...)

In fact, the most serious and sensitive issue of our policy is quite palpable here, namely how we relate to the Kádár era, to the Kádár regime. In my opinion, it would be a mistake for reformers to entirely do away with the Kádár regime. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to canonize the policy of the Kádár regime and battle to the last man standing in defense of what we have created since 1956. Some in the Party have a leaning towards the latter view, while others are ready to prove and expose the mistakes. Neither of these should be embraced. We have to try to solve the problem rationally. If relevant circles, or the dominant circle of the Central Committee put the issue on the agenda, a consensus is possible. We should start working on activity programs, preparing for the multiparty system. We need these projects for creating a stabilization program that addresses today's conditions, as well as more specific government programs. (...)

[Source: *Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL)* [Hungarian National Archives, Budapest], M-KS- 288-5/1050 o.e.  
Translated by Csaba Farkas.]



**DOCUMENT No. 3**  
**Memorandum of Conversation between**  
**M.S. Gorbachev and**  
**HSWP General Secretary Károly Grósz,<sup>14</sup>**  
**Moscow, 23-24 March 1989**

*[On 22 March 1989, the parties and organizations of the emerging non-communist Hungarian opposition established a consultative forum, called the "Opposition Roundtable." Up to this point, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party had used the tactic of dealing separately with "alternative" organizations. Now the danger of having to negotiate with a unified opposition became increasingly likely. The Party's leadership also worried about an impending economic crisis possibly resulting in the destabilization of the political scene. These concerns were infused in Károly Grósz's presentation on the internal political situation.*

*Gorbachev's "dialectic" approach to the issue of how to evaluate 1956 is remarkable: while stressing that this must be decided by the Hungarian leadership alone by examining the facts, he declared that a recent thorough investigation of the past by the Soviet leadership had undoubtedly proven that what had happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a counter-revolution. Similarly ambiguous were the warnings of the Soviet leader concerning the tolerable scope of the political transition in Hungary. He emphasized that "the limit [...] is the safekeeping of socialism and assurance of stability," however, he also clearly declared that "today we have to preclude the possibility of repeated foreign intervention into the internal affairs of socialist countries."*

*The timing of the conversation is also noteworthy*







regular and substantial information about the negotiation process. From time to time, negotiating parties will issue a joint communiqué to the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency. Separate statements can only be issued if negotiations break off or a common declaration cannot be agreed on. Nevertheless, this does not concern the right of the parties to express their opinions about the content of certain issues on the agenda.

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**DOCUMENT No. 6**  
**Memorandum of Conversation between**  
**President Mikhail Gorbachev,**  
**President Rezső Nyers, and**  
**General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist**  
**Workers' Party (HSWP), Károly Grósz,**  
**Moscow, 24-25 July 1989**

*[This Hungarian-Soviet summit was the last such meeting preceding the important events of the fall of 1989: the free exit of the East Germans via Hungary to the West in September, the dissolution of the HSWP, the declaration of the Hungarian Republic, and the plans for free elections. While both sides were still intent on stressing that what was occurring in Hungary was aimed at working out a framework of democratic socialism, it is clear from the memorandum that both sides already had serious doubts about the possible outcome of the process.*

*The treatment of the issue of Soviet troop withdrawal deserves special attention. During the March visit of Károly Grósz to Moscow it had been the Soviets' condition that such an agreement should be kept secret. Now Gorbachev easily agreed to make such a deal public, obviously hoping that such a concession would strengthen the eroding position of the HSWP.]*

(EXCERPT)

Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party  
 TOP SECRET!  
 Central Committee  
 Inf/1451/1989  
 REPORT  
 to the Political Executive Committee

Invited by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Comrades Rezső Nyers and Károly Grósz visited the Soviet Union on 24 and 25 July 1989. They took part in a two-hour negotiation with Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party invited the delegates for dinner, with the participation of several Soviet leaders. Comrades Nyers and Grósz negotiated with leaders of the Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Society. Comrade Nyers met Soviet social scientists; Comrade Grósz met leading officials of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

**I**

Comrade Nyers described the situation of Hungary

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young people, considers it a particular privilege to have the chance of meeting representatives of Soviet diplomatic bodies. We intend to utilize this opportunity, which has never been granted to us before, to hand over a memorandum next week that informs representatives of the Soviet Union about the political ideas of the Alliance of Young Democrats.

Certainly you are familiar with the fact that the issue of revealing the so-called historical white spots is just as important in Hungary as it is in the Soviet Union. Questions and views concerning our past and relations with the Soviet Union, or rather their sudden change, concerns our generation most of all. This is due to the fact that not long ago we were taught exactly the opposite of what even the Soviet Union has lately—and repeatedly—expressed in this respect.

Perhaps this experience explains the skepticism of our generation when it comes to the possible outcome of the negotiations, as compared to the attitude of the previous speakers. Consequently, our generation—that is we, who represent our organization at the Roundtable in the negotiations with the [Hungarian Socialist Workers] Party—we are of the opinion that one should only look at the facts when assessing the intentions of the Party and the political prospects. That is why we observe with considerable apprehension that the Party... the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party has made hardly any progress on the most important concrete issues.

Let me mention a few examples. Naturally, similarly to the previous speakers, I speak with the hope that this opinion will change over time. I must note, however, that the Party, among other things, has not yet made any concessions on the issue of ending party organizations at workplaces. Neither has the HSWP conceded on the question of abolishing the workers' militia that all representatives at the Roundtable consider unconstitutional. No progress was made to guarantee that the political monopoly of the Party in the army and the police force is eliminated once and for all, so that politics and state service are separated within the armed forces. The Opposition Roundtable made specific suggestions on the issue, which have all been rejected so far. I appeal to you: what else could people of my generation and members of my organization think other than that the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party aims at preserving these armed corps and armed forces, the last resort of power in Eastern Europe, intact and unaffected by the opposition. We, Young Democrats, are much worried about this intent. For according to our political assessment, the main issue is not the elections here; we are quite optimistic about the elections. We consider the recent by-elections as a public opinion poll of some sort, on the basis of which we expect an overwhelming victory by the opposition. The question for us Young Democrats, though, is rather what will happen

afterwards? What will happen if the HSWP, which, in our estimation and according to the analysis of the recent results, will lose the general elections, still retains authority over all the armed forces, and is the only one to have political bodies at workplaces.

Consequently, we believe that the question of stability, the stability of the transition, and the solution of that issue is in the hands of the HSWP. Should the Party act according to their purportedly democratic conviction on the questions I have raised, the period of transition after the elections will not suffer from instability whatsoever. The ultimate cause of our pessimism is that the HSWP has shown no sign during the last month of heading in that direction.

Thank you.

**Boris Stukalin:** May I ask you about something that you mentioned in your speech: the memorandum that you wish to present to us next week? What is it about, what are the main issues that it is concerned with?

**Viktor Orbán:** We think that the Alliance of Young Democrats has often been branded by the Hungarian press as an anti-Soviet organization. We had the opportunity to express our opinion on the issue, and we repeatedly stated that we do not consider ourselves anti-Soviet but that we have principled views. We have never encouraged aggression towards the Soviet Union, never incited people to any kind of rebellion against the Soviet people, [and] never invited anyone to infringe on the rights of the Soviet state. We think that this opportunity—sitting at the negotiating table with a representative of the Soviet diplomatic corps—gives us the chance of informing you in an articulate written memorandum about our principled opinions on all these issues—which basically determine the general and foreign policy of the Alliance of Young Democrats. In the memorandum we wish to state our standing and suggestions in terms of what changes we think necessary in Hungarian foreign policy.

Let me point out, though, that this is strictly our opinion, bearing in mind that the Opposition Roundtable never intended to form an unanimous consensus in issues of foreign policy, therefore the organizations around this table represent a considerably wide range of [ideas about] foreign policy. Some of them hold opinions that are closer to yours, while others have views that diverge much further—ours is probably among the latter. Nonetheless, we strongly hope that these issues will be clarified in the memorandum.<sup>32</sup>

Csaba Békés is the Research Coordinator of the 1956 Institute and the Director of the new Cold War History Research Center in Budapest. He is working on a book on Hungary and the Cold War, 1945-1989. He is the author of *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics, CWIHP Working Paper No. 16* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1996).

Melinda Kalmár is a freelance researcher working on a monograph on the transformation of Communist ideology in Hungary, 1948-1989. Her most recent book is *Ennivaló és hozomány. A kora kádárizmus ideológiája. [Eats and dowry. Ideology in the early Kádár era, 1956-1963]* (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, 1997.)

<sup>1</sup> Several excerpts of the HSWP Politburo meetings in 1989 were made available for the participants of the international conference held in Budapest on 10-12 June 1999, see: Csaba Békés, Malcolm Bryne, Melinda Kalmár, Zoltán Ripp, Miklós Vörös, eds., *Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990*; the documents were collected and compiled by Magdolna Baráth, Csaba Békés, Melinda Kalmár, Gusztáv Kecskés, Zoltán Ripp, Béla Révész, Éva Standeisky, Mikós Vörös, Budapest, 1999 (The manuscript is to be published by Central European University Press in Budapest.)

<sup>2</sup> Many minutes of Gorbachev's talks are published in: *The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989. New Thinking and New Evidence. A Compendium of Declassified Documents*





**HUNGARIAN SECRET POLICE MEMORANDUM,  
“ENSURING THE SECURITY OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE BURIAL OF IMRE  
NAGY AND HIS ASSOCIATES [ON 16 JUNE 1989],”  
MAY 1989**

(EXCERPT)

*[Editor's Note: In an essay entitled "The New National Alliance," published in Hítel Dénes Csegey in mid-January 1989, the reassessment of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and its suppression by Soviet troops—"finding a worthy place for it in the memory of the nations"—is described as "one of the fundamental issues and standards of the Hungarian democratic transition." Indeed, the historical place of the 1956 Revolution—and its leader, the reform communist prime minister Imre Nagy—permeated the national discourse during 1988-89 in Hungary. Political attitudes and actions of regime and opposition crystallized around the issue re-evaluating this pivotal event in Hungary's postwar history.*

*One crucial moment in this process occurred with the government-approved reburial of Imre Nagy and his associates who had been arrested and executed in the wake of the Revolution's bloody suppression. Demands for a reburial of Nagy had surfaced increasingly since the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the leader's execution on 16 June 1988, when the regime prevented public commemorations with tear gas, batons and arrests. Instead, a symbolic gravestone was inaugurated on the Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris for Imre Nagy, Gesa Losonczy, Pál Maléter, Miklós Gimes, József Szilágyi and others executed after the 1956 Revolution. Six months later the regime gave permission for the exhumation and reburial of the remains of Nagy and his associates; the exhumation began in March. Fretting that the funeral would turn into an "extremist" political event, the regime took widespread security precautions, as detailed in the following document.. The 16 June 1989 funeral ceremonies on Heroes' Square and Rákoskeresztúr New Public Cemetery in Budapest, in the course of which hundreds of thousands of people paid tribute to Imre Nagy and his associates, passed peacefully. During the internationally televised event, Victor Orbán, co-founder of the oppositional Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) demanded in the name of the young people of Hungary the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Observing the reburial from across the city, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Politburo only resolved that a firm response should be given to the perceived anti-Soviet and anti-Communist statements made at the funeral.*


*The following excerpt from the state security's operation plan for the Nagy reburial, discovered by Hungarian researcher Janos Kenedi (Institute for the History of the 1956 Revolution, Budapest), reveals the regime's widespread security measures in an efforts to stay in control of this event which, symbolically, marked the beginning of its demise.]*

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR  
Directorate III/III

Approved:  
Dr Istvan Horvath  
Police Maj. Gen.  
Minister of the Interior

TOP SECRET  
Until destroyed!

Agreed:  
Ferenc Pallagi  
Deputy Minister



- the plans and activities of Hungarians living in the West regarding the events, and their general attitude and mood;
- it will pay special attention to the discovery and acquisition of information regarding the preparations, plans and activities at home of the Hungarian groups and émigré political personalities travelling to Hungary for the event; (...)

It will analyze and provide up-to-date reports on views and opinions observed in church, especially Vatican circles. It will take steps to win the support of church circles with the purpose of moderating domestic tendencies.

In the area of the employment of contacts (agents, social, official) it will aid, by consistent positive influence:

- the loyalty of external émigré public opinion and that of the incoming groups, emphasizing the tribute-paying and mourning character of the events and playing down their demonstrative elements.
- Through cover organizations and diplomatic channels, it will influence the political and official circles of the receiving countries in a positive manner, in line with our interests.

IM Directorate III/II

- To inform, through official and informal channels, the government organs of the NATO countries—

- Via Occasional Operative Contact cn. “Candleflower” to the “friendly” contact between the US and British diplomats.
-



## Poland 1986-1989: From “Cooptation” to “Negotiated Revolution”

By Paweł Machcewicz

The documents published below are among those gathered by historians from the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences for the international conference “Poland 1986-1989. The End of the System,” held at Miedzeszyn near Warsaw on 21-23 October 1999 and co-organized with the National Security Archive at George Washington University and the Cold War International History Project.<sup>1</sup> They come from several archives: those of the Polish Senate (*Archiwum Biura Informacji i Dokumentacji Senackiej*), where a great portion of the “Solidarity” documents from 1988-1989 were deposited; the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, where several leaders of the Polish Communist Party (PUWP) deposited their papers; and private collections of former Solidarity activists Andrzej Paczkowski, Andrzej Stelmachowski, and Stanisław Stomma. With the exception of Document No. 8,<sup>2</sup> these documents have never been published. The “Solidarity” documents, dealing with the preparation of key decisions by the opposition which led to the removal of communists from power, are unique. To date, no comparable Polish materials have been published in English.<sup>3</sup>

The selection below covers some of the most important issues and events from 1986 to 1989 relating to the end of communist rule in Poland. The first document is a September 1986 letter from Lech Wałęsa (chairman of the “Solidarity” trade union movement, banned by authorities after the imposition of martial law in December 1981) to the Council of State, following the government’s announcement of an amnesty for political prisoners. In his letter, Wałęsa offers to open a dialogue with the authorities. Documents 2 and 3 chronicle the talks between the authorities and circles close to both the Episcopate and Lech Wałęsa concerning the participation of independent forces in the Consultative Council created by the Chairman of the Council of State, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski. The creation of that consultative body with very limited powers (in December 1986) was the first half-measure by the authorities to broaden the scope of social dialogue within the political system created by the martial law declaration. In the end, none of the mainstream opposition representatives (centered around Wałęsa) cooperated with the Council which assured its failure. Paczkowski argues convincingly that the authorities’ strategy during that period was one of “cooptation,” i.e. of attempting to include opposition representatives in façade institutions (instead of opening any real or substantive negotiations) which would (had they succeeded) have legitimized the Jaruzelski regime.

The next document (No. 4) presages change in that

strategy, due to the catastrophic economic situation and the authorities’ growing awareness of the political deadlock in which they found themselves. A report prepared by three experts (government spokesman Jerzy Urban; CC Secretary Stanisław Ciosek; and high-level Interior Ministry official Gen. Władysław Połoga) for the party and government leadership helps explain why in 1988 the regime decided to seek a new understanding with the opposition. Document No. 5 presents the authorities’ offer to cooperate with the opposition in the first half of 1988 (after the first wave of workers’ strikes in April and May) when they still believed that it might be possible to make the opposition share responsibility (“a pro-reform coalition” or an “anti-crisis pact”) without restructuring the system or restoring any form of legality to “Solidarity.”

The subsequent documents (nos. 6-12) illustrate the positions and beliefs held by the opposition circles around Wałęsa during the many long months of negotiations, which eventually led to the establishment of the »“

power and they will let themselves be known. We are not yet at a stage where parliamentary relations decide.”) He also reminded members of the opposition that “from the opposition-Solidarity side there is no program and within three months this would become dramatically clear.”

In recent history there are very few examples of such great and startling events that occur with such rapidity as to outpace the expectations and prognostications of even the most sagacious actors and observers. However, what in the summer of 1989 had appeared to be the beginning of a long-term set of negotiations with the communists who were still in control of the main instruments of power, had, by the early fall, transformed into the speedy dissolution of the communist system in Poland, and subsequently throughout all of Central and Eastern Europe.

### DOCUMENT No. 1

#### Letter of Lech Wałęsa to the Council of State, 2 October 1986

The Council of State  
of the People’s Republic of Poland  
*in Warsaw*

Acting on the basis of a mandate given to me in democratic elections at the First Congress of delegates of the NSZZ [National Commission of the Independent Sovereign Trade Union] “Solidarity” in 1981, as chairman of that Union, led by an opinion expressed by the leaders of national and regional authorities:

—taking into consideration an unusually important decision of the PRL [Polish People’s Republic] authorities relating to the release of political prisoners,<sup>4</sup> including a group of NSZZ “Solidarity” activists, which creates a new socio-political situation, allowing for an honest dialogue of all important social forces in Poland;

—motivated by my concern about further economic development of our country and having in mind the concentration of all Poles around the task of economic reform as a task of particular importance, in the absence of which we are faced with economic regression and backwardness, particularly in relation to the developed countries;

—drawing conclusions from the attitude of millions of working people, who over the last four years didn’t find a place for themselves in the present trade unions, remained faithful to the ideals of “Solidarity” and wished to get involved together with them in active work for the good of the Motherland within the framework of a socio-

trade union organization, which they could recognize as their own;

I am calling on the Council of State to take measures, which—consistent with binding legislation—would enable the realization of the principle of union pluralism, finally putting an end to the martial law legislation which constrains the development of trade unionism.

At the same time—for the sake of social peace and the need to concentrate all social forces on [the task of]  
2 Octob2, had,





to expand activities for social associations?

9) Is it possible to calm philosophical conflicts in schools in connection with the study of religions and atheization, as well as with philosophical diversification of teachers in the school system?

[Source: Stanisław Stomma Papers. Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.]

### DOCUMENT No. 3 Memorandum of Conversation, 18 October 1986

#### Pro memoria

for H.E. rev. Abp. Bronisław Dąbrowski<sup>9</sup> about a conversation in the Belvedere held on 18 October 1986 by A. –wi”cicki,<sup>10</sup> J. Turowicz,<sup>11</sup> and A. Wielowieyski<sup>12</sup> with Vice Chairman of the Council of State, K. Barcikowski,<sup>13</sup> member of the Council of State K. Secomski,<sup>14</sup> and Secretary of the CC PUWP, St. Ciosek,<sup>15</sup> concerning a Social Consultative Council.

The conversation started at about 9 a.m. and lasted three and a half hours. K. Barcikowski referred to questions which he had received from the Episcopate. He expressed their mutual lack of trust. The proposal [for the Council] is new and startling. It would be the only means to get involved in difficult decisions. Participation in [the proposed Council] is a matter of citizenship, a duty. Its composition [is] well balanced: 30-40 people [would be involved] for certain (but there are proposals to expand that list and to invite other people on an ad hoc basis). Of the Catholics from the circles close to the Episcopate, 8-10 people [would be active]. Besides representatives of the [ruling] party and other parties,<sup>16</sup> non-party people, including those not connected with the authorities (but not extremists, who are re-activating the “S[olidarity]” structures) [would also actively participate].

The proposed Consultative Council is meant to increase trust and develop recommendations, which the Chairman of the Council of State (Gen. Jaruzelski) would pass on to the proper state organs as important proposals. Its effectiveness will depend on the authority [that it can command]. There will be a place for the opinions of its members, and the circles to which they belong. The Consultative Council has to work out some consensus.

The Consultative Council would be set up by the Chairman of the Council of State personally and not by the Council of State as such, which has too narrow a range of responsibilities and competence.

A possible range of activities of the Council [is] building: 1) social understanding, 2) functioning of the State, 3) conditions for economic progress, 4) scientific-technical progress, 5) development of socialist democracy, 6) current and prospective social policy, 7) environmental protection, 8) improvement of the moral condition of society; as well as other important matters.

The creation of approximately ten similar “citizens’ convents”<sup>17</sup> for larger agglomerations or several *voivodships* [districts] and also the appointment of a Citizens’ Rights Ombudsman is expected.<sup>18</sup>

K. Barcikowski, referring to a note he received at the beginning of the meeting from A. Wielowieyski, said that there is some skepticism toward these proposed bodies, but that he was sure that a “façade counts too.” Criticism towards consultative bodies is incorrect, anyway, as they are actively operating.

Taking a position on particular points of the “Note”

—he called into question an assertion that union pluralism is indispensable for the longer term;

—he expressed surprise that Catholics would aim at forming associations and said that the authorities might take a position on this matter, but only if all the interested parties would first take a position toward the proposed Council (ref. to question 8);

—in schools one can see an aversion shown by Catholics (question 9);

—[he said that] the demand that the Council be representative creates the impression that it was to be made according to a “prescription;”

—[he noted that] the question of informing public opinion about the workings of the Council requires further thought; certainly discretion will be needed (question 5);

—[he questioned if] the participation in the Council, of people connected with the authorities (e.g. with the Party) mean that only people opposed to the authorities should be in the Council? (to question 6—it would be an issue to raise);

—[he said that] consultations with Wa”sa are not being foreseen without [Wa”sa] fulfilling conditions which the government’s spokesman talked [about] (on TV), i.e. cutting himself off from other “S” leaders;

He thought the note was one-sided. **Council of Staher**





members in the Council are active, while the majority is silent or has nothing to say. Even a report submitted in the Council by Prof. Szczepański on resolving the crisis didn't produce any significant response (except in some circles of the so-called moderate opposition and among some Western correspondents).

—These unfavorable trends are not being compensated [for] by active Polish foreign policy and [its] undeniable successes in overcoming barriers of isolation and restoration of Poland to its proper place in the world [after the sanctions imposed by the West following the December 1981 martial law crackdown]. These successes are being noticed and even present an element of surprise in the West, where the “originality” or “national character” of the so-called Jaruzelski Plan is being stressed. The development of political relations with the West is also observed carefully by the internal enemy, causing it irritation and apprehension that the opposition might be left on its own. But for the “average” citizen, foreign policy is something remote, without an effect on the domestic situation of the country and the standard of living of the society, and, what is worse—an impression is created that the authorities are concentrating their efforts on building an “external” image, neglecting the basic questions of citizens' daily lives.

Generalizing, one can say that:

- 1) confidence in the authorities and readiness to cooperate in the reconstruction of the country is declining at a very fast rate, which is caused mainly by the ineffectiveness of actions [taken] in the economic sphere. Liberalization measures undertaken so far are not able to stem this process;
- 2) Against this background, one can also clearly note the declining prestige of the First Secretary of the CC PUPP;
- 3) A state of discontent is growing ([among] workers and intelligentsia groups, and partly in the villages) and it is gradually, but systematically accumulating.

#### The situation in the camp of the political adversary.

—A seeming decline of activities “on the outside:” fewer leaflets, new initiatives or provocative appeals. Also, the



enabling effective introduction of the second stage of economic reform,” then Poland “will have a chance for economic development”;

—In Western estimates from this period, one can see that at least some forces in the West have identified their interests with the reform course in Poland. Hence, [there have been] all sorts of “encouragement,” and sometimes pressure, to speed up, deepen, [and] expand the reform process (both in the economy and in the superstructure);

—However, in mid-1987 one can observe increasing criticism in the evaluations and prognoses for the Polish economy made by the Western intelligence services and government experts. These assessments are sometimes extended to the whole domestic situation. For example:

a) intelligence specialists and congressional experts in the US [state]:

- The results of the reform so far are disappointing. So far there is nothing which would indicate that in the near future the authorities will be able to stabilize the economic situation. One should even assume a growing socio-political destabilization.

- Straightening out the mess is dragging on, and as a result Poland may fall into an even more turbulent state than before.

- The inactivity of the authorities may have an exponential effect in the form of increased confrontation and isolation.

- If the government does not take immediate and decisive measures, it may lose an opportunity to escape this labyrinth of difficulties.

b) NATO experts:

- The economic situation is very complex and the opposition’s activity is resulting in a situation for the authorities that is no less dangerous than it was in 1980.

c) A new element is that experts from neutral countries are formulating similarly drastic assessments. For example, the Swedes [note]:

- The reform policy is losing speed, and paralysis in the government’s activities is increasingly visible.

- The danger of an economic and societal crash is approaching.

- Poland is becoming a keg of gunpowder.

- Such evaluations may result in a fundamental change in the position of the West [with their] slowing down political normalization and gradual reconstruction of economic relations with Poland. One proof of this may be [in the] deliberations among the diplomats of NATO countries in Warsaw:

a) Is it worth it to support reform efforts in Poland since the reform cause is losing, and maybe it has already been lost[?]

b) Is it worth it to still invest in the present team[?]

c) It is not by accident that the embassies of NATO countries are currently conducting investigations [into] organizing people, who “lost hope in the possibility of the PUWP improving the situation” and [into] a possible organizing by those people into a new party (association), which “would support [the] PUWP on the basic line, but would use different methods.”<sup>31</sup>

[Source: *Andrzej Paczkowski Papers. Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.*]



## DOCUMENT No. 5

### Speech by Józef Czyrek, 11 May 1988

A speech by Mr. Józef Czyrek at a founding meeting of the Polish Club of International Relations, held on 11 May 1988

1. Together with our host, Professor Aleksander Gieysztor,<sup>32</sup> we have envisioned the founding of a Polish Club of International Relations.<sup>33</sup> The talks conducted on this matter and today’s meeting confirm a positive response to this initiative. I am convinced that outstanding representatives of different circles and orientations will join in the activities of the Club, which we want to base on the recognition of pluralism and understanding.

2. We have stated in a joint letter with Prof. Gieysztor that Poland’s position among the nations of the world demands broad social support, dialogue and public evaluation. This would be the major objective of the Polish Club of International Relations. I want to repeat: *social support, dialogue and public evaluation*. This is the

essence of how we see the activity of the Club.

3. This assumes a wide representation of points of view and opinions, lively and unrestrained discourse on all questions of Polish foreign policy, relations in Europe and the world, aiming at a consensus through dialogue. We assume that the Club will act on the basis of the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic and will be led by the Polish *raison d'état*. However, within the framework of the Constitution and the principles of *raison d'état* there is a wide area for an exchange of views and the drawing of conclusions. I want to express conviction that in the Club's activities we should strive toward the broadest understanding and consensus. After all, there is no doubt that we are led—above all differences of views—by the good of Poland, the good of our nation, of our motherland.

4. Proposals to create this kind of social body have been suggested by different circles for some time. We are now taking this initiative not without reason. We look at the creation of the Club and its activity as one of the important elements building national understanding. Poland needs it as much as [it needs] air. Recent developments not only do not undermine such a need, quite to the contrary—they fully emphasize its importance.

5. We are holding our meeting on a day of very important Sejm deliberations. They fully confirm the will for the implementation of the II [second] stage of economic reform, and very important resolutions are being taken, which are intended to speed up its introduction and increase its impact. The Sejm also confirms its unwavering will to continue and expand political reforms. I think personally that from the process of renewal we will come to a deep reconstruction, to a significant widening of the Polish model of socialism in economic, social and political life. Led by this desire is Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski, and—contrary to various opinions—he has broad backing, both within the ruling coalition and various patriotic forces, as well as from within our party.

6. In various discussions, including those held within our party, the idea of building some kind of pro-reform coalition or anti-crisis pact is being put forward. There is no doubt that Poland needs this kind of coalition very badly. I am personally convinced that we should strive towards it, build it not for a distant future, but rather for the near one.

7. I am stressing this basic objective because we see, together with Professors Gieysztor and other co-authors of that initiative [discussed above in number 6], such activity as a basic task of the Club. Consensus on the questions of foreign policy, to which the Club

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**DOCUMENT No. 7**  
**Memorandum by Lech Wałęsa,**  
**“On Starting the Roundtable Talks,”**  
**4 September 1988**

On starting the [Roundtable] talks

Right now we can begin to discuss the topics for negotiations, which I presented in my statement of 26 August.<sup>59</sup> I think that in the beginning of next week talks







“Roundtable,” but was aimed at making sure that those groups would not undermine the idea of the “Roundtable” meeting and the position which “Solidarity” intends to take at it. It is also a fact that “Solidarity” representatives at that meeting were rather under attack.

Another charge that was raised was that [we are responsible for the] street disturbances in Gdańsk, which took place on Sunday, 16 October, when ZOMO<sup>93</sup> made it impossible for a group of demonstrating youth to pass through from the Saint Brigid church to the NMP.<sup>94</sup> Such events, which were also influenced by ZOMO’s attitude, testify not so much of “inspirations” from the “Solidarity” side, but rather of radicalization of the young generation.

Procedural difficulties and charges put forward by the authorities are—it seems—of a fallacious nature. The real obstacles are as follows:

1) The question of goals of the “Roundtable.” Mr. Czyrek has formulated them (in personal conversation with me) as an attempt to form a Council for National Understanding,<sup>95</sup> which would deal with all controversial problems. In our opinion the “Roundtable” should adopt guiding resolutions on major questions and the proposed Council for National Understanding should deal with the implementation of those resolutions and technical matters, if need be.

2) The question of union pluralism. The prospects of settling this question are more than unclear. The press campaign, as I have indicated, has been aiming for some time at questioning union pluralism. The most important element here is a statement by General Jaruzelski himself, published in today’s press, in which three premises for the implementation of such pluralism are being defined. The most distressing one is economic, which the General has defined as: “[The] achievement of indispensable, fundamental economic equilibrium, so that some kind of spontaneous social pressures [i.e., *ciężary społeczne*] hasodf0uH10 0 0 10 54 729.96 TrTfiNll] soidrsta]roups would4 iangr unelsghlyh aw1“(xtho

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too-large team to work out draft statutes for “Solidarity,” which would adapt our Union to the law on trade unions. Particularly important is to work out a pattern for workplace organizations, operating with uniform statutes at workplace levels [that] would allow [one] to preserve the unity of the Union. Of course, the drafts should also include higher bodies, including the central one. I think that Lech Kaczyński<sup>97</sup> should be chairman of such team as a professional and also living on the spot in Gda

sion and its Presidium, and still active leaders of the regional structures), who, not questioning either the need of reaching an understanding with or a statutory function for Lech Wałęsa, think that the Union is not someone's private or group property, [but] that it had been created as a democratic and pluralistic organization, obeying its own voluntarily adopted rights—and it should stay as such.

The "Solidarity's" delegation represents only one group, and even if it is now a group in control of the main spheres of the Union's life, it is still only one group, and it is difficult to expect that other groups would feel bound by an agreement on which they will have (from the very beginning) no influence whatsoever.

An understanding which has a chance to be national, may be perceived in important public circles as being particularistic. If the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] authorities were inclined toward a policy of confrontation, then controversies within the "Solidarity" would certainly be to their advantage. (However, experience is teaching us that in a confrontation the Union consolidates.) With regard to a course toward an understanding, matters look rather different. Will an additional secret agreement for the defense of a particularistic understanding be concluded, and will the parties to such agreement be co-sponsoring a policy of repression toward its opponents, whom they had not even heard earlier? For us it is hard to imagine, though such fears also exist.

Even more serious is another apprehension—a fear that incomplete representation at the "Table" and hence a limited focus on the [actual] situation will mean that particular arrangements (or even parts of them) will be so far below social aspirations that with a verbal acceptance they will, in fact, be rejected by the society.

Please, excuse this frankness. It is dictated by the sense of responsibility and concern about the future of our Fatherland. We trust we shall be properly understood. This is already the last moment when these and other dangers (not articulated here) can be prevented through supplementing the "Table." But it needs to be done before the final dhCijjT\* (future) coaaken mean that





the Roundtable, which are reserved for the statutory authorities of the NSZZ “Solidarity.”

- to the leaders and sympathizers of the Union not to give away at the table what thousands of Union activists and members did not give up during the martial law period and multiple repressions,

- and in particular to Lech Wałęsa, Zbigniew Bujak,<sup>111</sup> Władysław Frasyniuk<sup>112</sup> and Antoni Tokarczuk<sup>113</sup>—as chairman of the KK<sup>114</sup> and members of [the] KK Pre-sidium—not to be unfaithful to their oath of loyalty to the Statute of the NSZZ “Solidarity.”

- to Lech Wałęsa, to remember that he has entrusted our Union to the protection of Our Lady of Czestochowa,

- to all others to be aware of their responsibility towards the society, the nation, God and history.

5. The Working Group is of the opinion that for the sake of our nation an understanding with the PRL authorities is indispensable; it will be real if it is based on respect for the inalienable and unalterable employee, citizen and human rights.

6. The Working Group is of the opinion that for the benefit of our nation, unity of the NSZZ “Solidarity” is indispensable. Its basis can only be respect for its Statute and union rights, a Statute [embodying the], democratic and pluralistic character of our Union.

[signed]  
J. Kropiwnicki

[Attachment No. 2]

Working Group Lodz, 25 February 1989  
of the National Commission  
of NSZZ “Solidarność”

#### A Position on Workers’ Self-Government

1. The Working Group of the National Commission is warning the “solidarity-social” side against treating workers’ self-government as an objective, the only appropriate form of managing the so-called all-social or state property. The concept of replacing the state bureaucracy with workers’ self-government remains, within the socialist thought, as a postulate of “real socialization of the means of production.” For non-socialist political orientations this concept may be unacceptable.

2. Building the economic system based on workers’ self-government, the essence of which boils down to bestowing the right of management of productions assets to an imprecisely defined owner, toward whom the management, not being owners in any other sense than symbolic, should feel responsible, would be an experiment on an unheard of scale, a solution without any useful patterns and experiments whatsoever.

3. A self-governmental solution can be, at most, some form of temporary instrument in the elimination of the

*nomenklatura* from the economy.

4. Target solutions ought to be sought in those areas where there is maximal connection between work and ownership. The first step ought to be the abolition of hitherto indivisible state property. The second one [ought to be] dissemination of property—that is bestowing the rights of property to particular work places, their conversion into joint-stock companies and enfranchisement of the nation through employees’ shareholding. The sphere of state management in industry should be limited to an absolute minimum. In the area of energy and communications, the scope of public ownership should be defined on the basis of the experiences of the developed countries of Western Europe. Commerce should be gradually privatized (both retail and wholesale).

5. Experience teaches that all forms of collective property, in which individual participation is not secured by the alleged owners, are being treated as “nobody’s property” and in the best case [scenarios] are becoming some form of bureaucratic property (in the case of communist countries—the *nomenklatura*’s property).

For conformity,  
[signed]  
J. Kropiwnicki

[Source: A. Stelmachowski Papers. Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.]



## DOCUMENT No. 15

### Report on a Working Visit of Wojciech Jaruzelski to Moscow, 9 May 1989

For a Politburo meeting

Sent out to Politburo members, associate members and CC secretaries

9 May 1989  
9.V.1989 L.dz. KS/619/89 to point “3”

Report  
on a Working Visit of Wojciech Jaruzelski in Moscow

**Confidential**

On 28 April 1989, the First Secretary of the CC PUWP, Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People’s Republic, Wojciech Jaruzelski, paid a working visit to Moscow at the invitation of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Gorbachev.

In the course of the talk, lasting over three and a half

hours, both leaders devoted their utmost attention to the problems of the transformation being conducted broadly in both countries.

Wojciech Jaruzelski gave information on the measures undertaken by the PUWP in the realization of socialist renewal in Poland, including the significance of the X Plenum of the Central Committee, [and] on the preparations to the National Conference of Delegates to the X Party Congress. He also informed [Gorbachev] about the significance and results of the "Roundtable," which have opened up prospects for an understanding of different social and political forces in Poland. He explained difficult problems of the country and the means to their solution. He emphasized the significance of the further development of Polish-Soviet relations in all areas.

Mikhail Gorbachev stated that despite a variety of forms and methods of renewal of the socialist system used by the fraternal parties, this process has a common guiding principle—democratization, aspirations to create conditions for real participation of working people in running the economy and in solving political questions.

He also stated that *perestroika* in the USSR has reached such a stage, and transformations in all spheres of life have reached such depth, that the Party is expected to double its effort in the realization of these unusually difficult tasks. As was said at the last CC CPSU Plenum, the Soviet people have spoken once again in the recently-held elections [26 March 1989] for *perestroika* and have demanded its steadfast, consistent introduction.

Mikhail Gorbachev also stated that the Soviet economy is coping with complicated problems related to the shift to new methods of economic activity, monetary regulations, [and] shortages in inventories of goods.

Despite these difficulties, they did not give a thought—Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized—to hampering changes. That is why it is so important to ensure the widest

possible involvement of the population in the process of reforming the economy and in solving political questions. He also stated that the Soviet people have spoken once again in the recently-held elections [26 March 1989] for *perestroika* and have demanded its steadfast, consistent introduction.

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following:

- The question of presidency: the thing is that despite his personal unwillingness, he feels obliged to run for it. He is referring to three elements:

- A clear stand by the body of generals, the MON<sup>134</sup> and the Council for National Defense.<sup>135</sup>

- Some outside reactions are unmistakable: statements at the [Warsaw Pact] Political Committee at Bucharest,ts:









A. Balazs: Bentkowski said that Sekuła's candidacy also won't get through.

J. -lisz: From a talk with -witka<sup>159</sup>—we would have support of SD deputies.

J. Ambroziak: As of 8 p.m. the information is as follows:

PUWP—12 deputies are against Kiszczak

ZSL—60 deputies are against [Kiszczak]

SD—the whole is in favor [of Kiszczak for Prime Minister].

Pax<sup>160</sup>, UChS<sup>161</sup>—in favor [of Kiszczak for Prime Minister].

A. Michnik: Will the Club be in favor of not being involved in it?

J. -lisz: The ZSL was asking if we would be ready to propose a prime minister. We need to think about this.

A. Balazs - If we put forward our candidate for prime minister, the whole ZSL will be for him.

A. Stelmachowski: To sum it up, the situation is as follows:

- some consensus is emerging to vote against Kiszczak.

- are we to vote negatively against each PUWP candidate?

- do we see the possibility of forming our own government with small concessions?

T. Mazowiecki: My position is known to all of you. When I was invited to the Council, I went, putting aside any other considerations. Since the moment I have learned about Kiszczak's candidacy, I have been trying to form an opinion on this matter.

- I think that the Club's decision to vote against Kiszczak is not good. I do not share the position of our Chairman, who is sending out this news by telex. SIS<sup>162</sup> communicated this news yesterday evening.

- My political assessment is the following: if such a strong man is being proposed, then the power is being shifted towards the line of the parliament-government. It's going to be a strong government, a situation will emerge, which will stabilize the process which has already begun. There is no need for the Club to vote against, it may abstain. I am afraid that the situation with the national list may repeat itself—first we are booming radicals, but then we withdraw. If we are not reaching for power ourselves, we should permit the other side to do it.

- As far as the ZSL proposal is concerned, one ought to remember that the ZSL doesn't have access to the proper centers of power. I would not bet on this combination. There are other centers of power, which will let themselves be known. We are not at a stage, at which parliamentary relations decide.

I am opposed to Adam's<sup>163</sup> concept also for the reason that on the opposition-Solidarity side there is no program and within three months that would become dramatically clear.

I think that the most proper position on the question of prime minister is a neutral one. But if we were faced

with a situation of the state crisis, then some talks about a great coalition might be possible, but not us in coalition with the ZSL.

I think that the moment is very serious. The public would not tolerate a situation in which first they see advances, and then withdrawals.

A. Celiński: [...] I exclude the possibility of a great coalition.

The nearest option is something that took place in Spain<sup>164</sup>—a government stands somewhere aside, it gains support from the ZSL, part of the Party, our Club can be convinced.

J. M. Rokita: I get the impression that a Kiszczak government, after all, would not be strong in a situation where it wouldn't have support of a strong majority in the Sejm.

It would be a government in which we would constantly have to be hypocrites. In the long run it would be a trap for us.

Coalition with the ZSL is absurd. It would mean a clash of opinions from the beginning—that reforms are being introduced with a strong power center, the PUWP. Technically such coalition cannot be realized in defiance of the power centers.

In case there is a government of a purely communist coalition, the reforms will be coming from them, they will be throwing them upon us, but they will not strike at the system, as markets would do. They will be lumping together various ideas and we would think there is no other alternative. It will be a consolidation of the system.

It is necessary that we have at least part of the political initiatives. Something that is called a great coalition is a matter of time. It will come, it may be delayed, or accelerated. So, we should not be confusing people.

E. Wende: (to Mazowiecki) Do you take into consideration a situation in which the President will not recommend Kiszczak but Geremek?

T. Mazowiecki: It is possible, but we don't have such a situation. At this moment there are back-corner talks with the ZSL.

There are two ways out:

A better one—a Kiszczak government, the strongest one from the other side. A big offensive, execution of legal reforms, great stability.

The second one—a great coalition with the PUWP.

A. Balazs: It's a pity that such a discussion was not held prior to the presidential election. The situation that arose was the fault of both the Presidium and the Club. It would be very unfortunate if it were to repeat itself.

We have no chance for a coalition government, it would be short-lived and tragic for us because of the economic situation and the fact that we don't have the people.

But the opposition certainly has a candidate for prime minister, as people from other parties see it. There are also people on the other side whom we might be able to put

forward, e.g. Kwańniewski.<sup>165</sup>

A. Wielowieyski: Two arguments can be added against the coalition:

- We should not be wasting our social capital by entering into a small coalition. I see no gain from it.
- The Big Brother has other methods of conducting politics. Depriving the PUWP of power would be a blow to Gorbachev. The result—a mortal poisoning of our life, impossibility of realizing anything.

It is apparent that we will have to support one government or the other. We must get them to understand that another candidate would get our support. Though Kiszczak is not bad.

[Break]

J. Zińkowski: We are observing a great acceleration of the political process. *Pacta sunt servanda*—this has been our principle. The fact that Jaruzelski is president is good, it is a stabilizing factor. There is a great weakness of power, a rebellion with the Party itself. There is a dissension within the coalition, the ZSL is bending over backward, in the SD [the situation] must be likewise—as it is improbable to have complete silence after those noisy declarations about a crown in the eagle, etc. There are two possibilities:

- a great coalition-us and the PUWP.
- a small coalition-us, the ZSL and other smaller groups.

One of the elements of the situation is tremendous social impatience. Adam [Michnik] has had a sense of this impatience—[they say] so much is in your hands, and you don't react.

The new configuration means a strong triumvirate,<sup>166</sup> unusually tight. A strong Kiszczak, about whom there was talk here, is too strong. [...]

We have to approach Kiszczak negatively. [...] This is a configuration in which we have a minimal possibility of maneuver.

What can we do? Coalition with the ZSL is dangerous, as we cannot steer this process. A small coalition is on their good grace or the lack of it. In the end there are not too many of those contestants.

Only a great coalition is acceptable—a Government of National Salvation.

J. Kuro% That triangle is not a solution under any  
ciae cw would glse che sieer ng owheel the ZClubwould TjiT\*1"0 Tci"0.006 Twi"(ckik os aut wthrough)the Zwidouw

entrance into the market. To say this a year ago would have been a lot, we need to keep this in mind when we say that something is impossible.

There is no one who would defend a coalition with the ZSL. It's falling apart. We are not attacking frontally, rather we propose something, e.g. Kwaśniewski for vice premier, someone who will pull over the reformist elements.

O. Krzyżanowska: Tomorrow we need to vote almost ostentatiously. Our government will be in a much worse situation, as the Union is inclined to press demands and we will be calling for belt-tightening. If we don't preserve the ethos of the Union and the opposition—the future election will be lost. Our hands are tied by the Union. Perhaps it will be our prime minister, but not our government.

K. Kozłowski: The situation is difficult, we should speak up strongly against Kiszczak and Sekuś. Maybe in the end they will come up with something that will be acceptable and we will abstain from the vote. Perhaps in a few weeks they may desperately seize upon some combination, which will be acceptable. If they cannot come up with anything, then a government of National Salvation will appear to be a solution. If this happens, we will not join into a coalition but we salvage Poland: we then must have prime minister and demand tolerable names. A crisis situation, a Geremek or Lech government. The first thing that our new prime minister would have to do is to talk with the MON. History teaches that invasions, martial laws are threatening when the power structure is falling apart. We are close to this. I don't know which general, but one of them will do it.

Tomorrow vote against [Kiszczak for prime minister], press ahead, see what can come out of it. Do not reject the option of a tolerable government, [if it is] partly a non-party one. Otherwise, press for hard terms into the government.

E. Wende: If this government fails the country, will there be an economic chance to get out of it? We must clearly say—no, it won't be better. So, will our prime minister have better or worse chances of rescuing the country?

Z. Kuratowska: We have to vote against. Sekuś doesn't have a chance. We cannot wait any longer. What kind of professionals are they? It's very hard to find them. Are we supposed to leave the country? The ovation at Powązki was a kind of an opinion poll[!] They were telling Brzezinski<sup>167</sup>—we are ready to wait out this situation if you [the US government] are going to decide.

J. -lisz: In the corridor there are gentlemen from the ZSL and PUWP, they want to come here and talk.

(A brief consultation and the conclusion that this should not be discussed at the meeting. B. Geremek and A. Michnik are going for talks). [Recess]

B. Geremek: According to the latest news the situation is as follows:

PUWP—12 against [Kiszczak] (despite party discipline and threats)

ZSL—21 against  
SD —?

It looks as though the solution is still that Kiszczak will form the government.

In justifying our position we will argue that we are against the continuation of the present rule. We are not in a position to extend credit to the teams which have been in power so far. We are accepting a diagnosis that under the present international situation our taking over the government is impossible. But potentially we are ready to do it.

A government of a great coalition came out of Jaruzelski's mouth: "you are coming into our government." If we are taking over, we form the government, we see in it a place for representatives of different social forces. It is a government formed by the opposition. It is an anti-*nomenklatura* government. That is how our position can be presented.

We reject a government [of] General Kiszczak plus Solidarity. If there is a chance to form a Government of National Salvation, which would have a chance of gaining public trust. If such a possibility doesn't exist, then we will perform a controlling function to see that aspirations expressed in the election are met.

T. Mazowiecki: I don't see a difference between the conceptions of government; from the general point of view each of them is a coalition government.

B. Geremek: It is a government formed by the "S" on the basis of a coalition. We are leaving the undemocratic system and the main problem is the structure of power.

A. Stelmachowski: It is the model that Hitler gave to Hindenburg—he just wanted the ministry of internal affairs and the chancellery.

T. Mazowiecki: This is a government proposed by us, but it still is a great coalition government.

B. Geremek: Lech Wałęsa has two possibilities:  
- he will form that government  
- or someone else will.

If we would get to the next stage (a 1 percent probability), if the president would talk with us, that is how I would present the proposal of Wałęsa's government.

A. Balazs: We need to allow the possibility that they will form a government and wait for their overthrow. Within three months they will be completely finished in terms of propaganda. They are in the ultimate situation. This is a very difficult situation for us, too. We need to find some alternative solution.

B. Geremek: I told Kiszczak that his candidacy is not good, that someone else would be better. He has recognized this argument.<sup>168</sup>

B. Geremek: The motion on an Extraordinary Commission has not passed. It has the backing of half of the ZSL, half of SD and a little in the PUWP, it has a chance of passage.

The following team will be needed: 1. R. Bugaj  
2. J. Osiatyński<sup>169</sup>

3. G. Staniszevska<sup>170</sup>
4. the Peasants will fill in
5. the Peasants will fill in
6. K. Dowga»ó<sup>171</sup>
7. J. " opusza%ski<sup>172</sup>

M. Rokita: Najder<sup>173</sup>

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brance in Warsaw. He is author of the prize-winning 1956: *Polski rok* (1993) and a co-organizer of the conference "Poland, 1986-1989: The End of the System," held in Miedzeszyn-Warsaw, 21-23 October 1999.

<sup>1</sup>The conference was modeled after an earlier conference held at Jachranka, concerning to "Solidarity" and the martial law period ("Poland 1980-1982. Internal crisis, International Dimensions,"



1988 secretary of the KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ “Solidarity,” “Roundtable” participant, from June 1989 a deputy to the Sejm, secretary of the National Committee for Reconciliation (OKP).

<sup>38</sup> Adam Michnik, in the 1970s an activist of the Committee for Workers’ Defense (KOR), from 1980 an advisor to NSZZ “Solidarity,” “Roundtable” participant from May 1989 editor-in-chief of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, from June 1989 deputy to the Sejm.

<sup>39</sup> Jacek Kuroń, in the 1970s a leading KOR activist, from 1980 an advisor to NSZZ “Solidarity,” member of the KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ “Solidarity,” “Roundtable” participant, from June 1989 deputy to the Sejm.

<sup>40</sup> Stanisława Grabska, vice-president of the Warsaw KIK, member of the KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ “Solidarity,” “Roundtable” member.

<sup>41</sup> Krzysztof Źliwowski, member of the Warsaw KIK leadership, member of the KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ “Solidarity.”

<sup>42</sup> Tomasz Gruszecki, an economist, from 1980 an advisor to NSZZ “Solidarity.”

<sup>43</sup> Ryszard Bugaj, an economist, in the 1970s cooperated with KOR, from 1980 an advisor to NSZZ “Solidarity,” member of the KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ “Solidarity,” “Roundtable” participant, from June 1989 deputy to the Sejm.

<sup>44</sup> Jacek Moskwa, a journalist, (supporting) secretary of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ “Solidarity.”

<sup>45</sup> Kazimierz Wójcicki, a journalist, secretary (assistant) of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ “Solidarity.”

<sup>46</sup>

1984-1989 president of the Club of Political Thought "Dziekania" (a moderate right discussion forum), member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity", from June 1989 a senator.

<sup>72</sup> Anna Przecławowska, professor of pedagogics, member of the National Council of PRON, "Roundtable" participant.

<sup>73</sup> A group of Waśsa's advisors.

<sup>74</sup> Rev. Bishop Alojzy Orszulik, in the years 1958-1993 director of the Episcopate's Press Office, 1989-1994 assistant secretary of the Episcopate, member-secretary of the Joint Commission of Government and Episcopate; during the martial law period a liaison between Waśsa and the Episcopate, in the years 1988-1989 a participant on behalf of the Church in confidential talks with the PUWP which led to the "Roundtable."

<sup>75</sup> Jacek Ambroziak, legal advisor in the Secretariat of the Episcopate of Poland, "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 deputy to the Sejm, minister-chief of the Prime Minister's Office (Council of Ministers) in the Mazowiecki government.

<sup>76</sup> Rev. Archbishop Jerzy Stroba, archbishop-metropolitan of Poznań, member of the Main Council of the Episcopate of Poland, member of the Joint Commission of Government and Episcopate.

<sup>77</sup> Jan Olszewski, from 1980 an advisor to NSZZ "Solidarity" and the Episcopate of Poland, defense counsel in court trials of "Solidarity" activists, member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity."

<sup>78</sup> Alojzy Pietrzyk, an activist of NSZZ "Solidarity" from Upper Silesia, one of the strike leaders from 1988

<sup>79</sup> An Independent Association of Students, founded in 1981, outlawed under the martial law.

<sup>80</sup> Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a "Solidarity" activist from 1981, member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity", "Roundtable" participants, from June 1989 deputy to the Sejm.

<sup>81</sup> That "Table" in Katowice was never set up.

<sup>82</sup> Naczelna Organizacja Techniczna [Chief Technical Organization].

<sup>83</sup> Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne [Polish Economic Society].

<sup>84</sup> Bronisław Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Henryk Wujec

<sup>85</sup> Mieczysław Rakowski, CC Politburo member, from June to December 1988 CC PUWP secretary, from September 1988 to August 1989 Prime Minister, from July 1989 CC PUWP first secretary.

<sup>86</sup> Jan Józef Szczepański, a writer, in the years 1980-1983 president of the Polish Literary Union, member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity", "Roundtable" participant.

<sup>87</sup> Andrzej Szczepkowski, an actor, member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity", from June 1989 a senator.

<sup>88</sup> Zbigniew Romaszewski, KOR member, from 1980 an activist of NSZZ "Solidarity", member of KO ap-

pointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity", "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 a senator.

<sup>89</sup> Jan Józef Lipski, KOR member, from 1980 an activist of NSZZ "Solidarity", member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity", from June 1989 a senator.

<sup>90</sup> Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej [Confederation for an Independent Poland]—a radical opposition group, proclaiming goals of independence (led by Leszek Moczulski).

<sup>91</sup> A radical group (led by Kornel Morawiecki), which in the second half of the 1980s departed from the main "Solidarity" movement.

<sup>92</sup> A meeting of the representatives of the main "Solidarity" stream with the outside-solidarity opposition groups took place on 13 October 1988.

<sup>93</sup> Motorized Battalions of Citizens' Militia—a special formation used for breaking up demonstrations.

<sup>94</sup> The church of Our Lady in the old section of Gdańsk [NMP= *Najświętszej Marii Panny*, Virgin Mary].

<sup>95</sup> The Council for National Understanding eventually was not created. Instead, a Conciliatory Commission with narrower powers was set up, which was to take care that decisions of the "Roundtable" were implemented.

<sup>96</sup> Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza [National Executive Commission] - the executive body of NSZZ "Solidarity", set up in October 1987.

<sup>97</sup> Lech Kaczyński, a lawyer, co-worker of KOR, from 1980 an activist of NSZZ "Solidarity", member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity", "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 a senator.

<sup>98</sup> Andrzej Celiński, KOR member, from 1980 an activist of NSZZ "Solidarity", from 1987 secretary of KKW, member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity", "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 a senator.

<sup>99</sup> Komisja Krajowa (KK) - the top executive body of NSZZ "Solidarity" set up at the first National Congress of Delegates in December 1981.

<sup>100</sup> The CC PUWP Xth plenary meeting adopted a resolution in January 1989, allowing for union pluralism, thus opening up the road for legalization of "Solidarity."

<sup>101</sup> NSA - Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [the Main Administrative Court].

<sup>102</sup> The Working Group of the National Commission (GR KK) of NSZZ "Solidarity" - an opposition group against Lech Waśsa and his group of "Solidarity" leaders and activists from the years 1980-1981. It charged Waśsa with undemocratic practices in steering the Union, monopolizing negotiations with the authorities and of being too soft towards the latter.

<sup>103</sup> Władysław Findesein, a physics professor, chairman of the Social Council by the Primate of Poland, member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity", "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 a senator.

<sup>104</sup> An understanding signed between representatives



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of the striking plants and the authorities in Szczecin on 30 August 1980, in Gdańsk on 31 August 1980, and in Jestrzynie on 3 September 1980.

<sup>105</sup> Andrzej Słowik, in the years 1980-1981 chairman of the Board of the Regional NSZZ "Solidarity" in Łódź, in the martial law period an activist of the underground



<sup>141</sup> Wa»sa's visit to Moscow did not occur at that point.

<sup>142</sup> Marian Orzechowski, a Politburo member, CC PUWP secretary, from June 1989 a deputy to the Sejm and leader of the PUWP Parliamentary Club.

<sup>143</sup> Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, the People's Party.

<sup>144</sup> Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, the Democratic Party.

<sup>145</sup> Stronnictwo Ludowe.

<sup>146</sup> Janusz Zi»kowski, a sociology professor, from 1980 an activist of NSZZ "Solidarity," member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity," "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 a senator.

<sup>147</sup> National Assembly (the joint Sejm and Senate) elected the president.

<sup>148</sup> Jerzy Urban, the government press spokesman.

<sup>149</sup> By abstaining or giving an invalid vote, it reduced the majority needed to elect the president.

<sup>150</sup> Witold Trzeciakowski, an economist, advisor to NSZZ "Solidarity," member of KO appointed by the Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity," "Roundtable" participant, minister without portfolio in the Mazowiecki government, chairman of the Economic Council.

<sup>151</sup> The OKP ultimately did not adopt a motion on voting discipline in the presidential election, leaving the decision up to its members. On 19 July Gen. Jaruzelski won the election by the majority of one vote. 7 OKP members deliberately turned in invalid votes, thus enabling Jaruzelski's election.

<sup>152</sup> W»dys»aw Baka, an economist, Politburo member, deputy chairman of the Council of State.

<sup>153</sup> Roman Malinowski, president of the Main Committee of ZSL, together with L. Wa»sa and J. J»wi»k from SD was a signatory of a statement of 17 August 1989 on the formation of the "Solidarity"-ZSL-SD coalition.

<sup>154</sup> Aleksander Bentkowski, a defense attorney, ZSL activist, Justice Minister in the Mazowiecki government.

<sup>155</sup> Ireneusz Seku»a, from October 1988 to August 1989 vice premier in the Mazowiecki government, chairman of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers, PUWP "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 a Sejm deputy.

<sup>156</sup> Leszek Piotrowski, a defense attorney, advisor to NSZZ "Solidarity" in Upper Silesia, "Roundtable" participant, from June 1989 a senator.

<sup>157</sup> J»zef B k, a peasant, from June 1989 a Sejm deputy (no party affiliation).

<sup>158</sup> Kazimierz Olesiak, member of ZSL leadership, from October 1988 to August 1989 vice premier in the M. Rakowski government, "Roundtable" participant.

<sup>159</sup> Jan Eugeniusz -witka, an SD activist, from June 1989 a Sejm deputy.

<sup>160</sup> PAX—a "satellite" Catholic group toward the PUWP.

<sup>161</sup> Unia Chrz»cija»sko-Spo»eczna [A Christian-Social Union]—a Catholic "satellite" group toward

PUWP.

<sup>162</sup> SIS—Serwis Informacyjny of "Solidarity."

<sup>163</sup> Adam Michnik. On 3 July 1989, Michnik published an article in *Gazeta Wyborcza* titled, "Your president, Our premier," postulating the formation of the government by the "Solidarity" camp.

<sup>164</sup> Refers to the democratic transformation in Spain after the death of Franco in 1975.

<sup>165</sup> Aleksander Kwa»niewski, an activist of PUWP and the youth movement, in 1988-1989 an minister and chairman of the Socio-Political Committee of the Council of Ministers, "Roundtable" participant, from January 1989 chairman of the Polish Social Democratic Party, since 1995 president.

<sup>166</sup> The Triumvirate: President Wojciech Jaruzelski, Premier Czes»aw Kiszczak, CC PUWP First Secretary Mieczys»aw Rakowski.

<sup>167</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Carter.

<sup>168</sup> On 2 August 1989 the Sejm entrusted formation of government to Czes»aw Kiszczak. OKP deputies voted against that resolution. Eventually Kiszczak failed to form a government.

<sup>169</sup> Jerzy Osiaty»ski, an economist, from 1981 advisor to NSZZ "Solidarity", from June 1989 a Sejm deputy, head of the Central Planning 78'(169)Tj1'105P6 Tlish Social Democ1»

## **Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After Historic Conference Sheds New Documents and Oral History**

**O**n 22-24 March 2001, an international conference, "Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After," brought together former officials from











any reference to reunification or confederation from the draft, to avoid a discussion of these issues. In the version adopted by the Politburo, the passage in the draft that “put the currently existing form of the border” on the table was eliminated.<sup>45</sup> The editing alone could not eliminate the fact that the leading economists had suggested using the Wall as a bargaining chip with the FRG government for new loans, as a final resort to guarantee the GDR’s political and economic survival.

Justifying his draft in the Politburo, planning chief Gerhard Schürer explicitly emphasized his idea of trading the Wall for money: “On the last page, we go as far as to address high politics—the form of the state border. We want to make it clear how far considerations should reach. These suggestions should bring to your attention that we could now extract economic advantages from the FRG for such ideas.” He continued, warning that “if the demands are made first from the streets or even from the factories, it would once again eliminate the possibility of us taking the initiative.”<sup>46</sup>

Schürer’s fears have to be seen against the background of the growing protest movement against the SED which, by the end of October, had swept the entire country, including small and middle-sized cities. The MfS had registered a total of 140,000 participants in 24 demonstrations in the week of 16-22 October; the following week, 540,000 people participated in 145 demonstrations, and from 30 October to 4 November, some 1,400,000 people marched in 210 demonstrations. Their main demands were free elections, recognition of opposition groups, and freedom to travel. In addition, the number of applications to leave the GDR increased by 1,000 per week, reaching a total of 188,180 by 29 October.<sup>47</sup>

The issue of travel and permanent exit connected the GDR’s foreign, domestic, and economic problems at the beginning of November. When he took over power on 18 October 1989, SED General Secretary Egon Krenz had promised expanded travel opportunities; a new law was to take effect in December. But the Ministry for State Security dragged its feet on the issue, since it feared that hundreds of thousands would leave the GDR. The State Planning Commission raised the objection that no funds were available to provide those traveling with foreign currency.

One day after the Politburo discussion of the debt crisis, on 1 November, Egon Krenz reported in Moscow on the desolate situation in the GDR to USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.<sup>48</sup> But Gorbachev made it clear to Krenz that he could not count on economic help from Moscow, due to the Soviet Union’s own economic crisis. Gorbachev’s advice was essentially that the government had to tell its already dissatisfied populace, which was leaving by the tens of thousands, in as positive a manner as possible that it had been living beyond its means and had to adjust its expectations to a more modest level. If Krenz did not want to accept this logic, with its uncalculable results for the political stability of the GDR,

then his only remaining option was to follow the economists’ recommendation and discreetly attempt to expand German-German cooperation as quickly as possible.

Hence Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, who had been responsible for secret negotiations with the FRG for years, was sent to Bonn on 6 November with the assignment of negotiating informally with CDU Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and Minister of the Chancellery Rudolf Seiters a comprehensive expansion of German-German relations. The central issue in the negotiations was the

As early as 1 November, the threat of strikes in southern districts had forced the SED to remove the ban on travel to the ČSSR. The Prague embassy of the Federal Republic immediately filled with a new crowd of GDR citizens eager to depart for West Germany. Under pressure from the ČSSR, the SED leadership decided to allow its citizens to travel to the FRG via the ČSSR as of 4 November. With this move, the Wall was cracked open not only via the detour through Hungary, but also through its direct neighbor, the ČSSR. Within the first few days, fifty thousand GDR citizens used this path to leave the country. The ČSSR objected strenuously to the mass migration through its country, and gave the SED the ultimatum to solve its own problems!

A majority of the Politburo on the morning of 7 November still considered immediate implementation of the entire travel law inappropriate, given, for one thing, the ongoing negotiations with the FRG about financial assistance. As a result, the ministerial bureaucracy was given the task of drafting a bill for the early promulgation of that part of the travel law dealing with permanent exit.<sup>53</sup> Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer reported these limited plans to the Soviet ambassador, Vyacheslav Kochemasov, on the same day, and asked for Soviet approval.<sup>54</sup> Meanwhile, the four ministerial bureaucrats' (officers from the MfS and the Interior Ministry) charged with redrafting the bill felt that their assignment had not been thoroughly thought through. After all, doing what they had been charged to do, these officials argued, would privilege those who were seeking permanent exit as opposed to those who were only interested in short visits and who wanted to return to the GDR. Thus it would have forced everybody to apply for permanent exit. Acting out of loyalty to the government and a desire to uphold the state, the officers revised the draft to fit what they perceived as the needs of the situation, expanding the regulation of shorter visits to the West. These changes, however, went beyond the plans that had been presented to the Soviet Union for approval just two days earlier.

At no time did the officers intend to grant complete freedom to travel as further clauses in the draft made clear. Private trips had to be applied for, as had been the case before, and only those who possessed a passport for travel could get a visa. Only four million GDR citizens had passports; all others, it was calculated, would have to apply for a passport first and then would have to wait at least another four weeks for a visa. These regulations thus effectively blocked the immediate departure of the majority of GDR citizens. The officers decided to place a media ban on the release of the information until 4 a.m. on 10

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boiling point instead. Passport controllers and border soldiers at the Bornholmer Strasse crossing, fearing for their lives, made the decision on their own to cease all controls at 11:30 p.m. "We're opening the floodgates now!" announced the chief officer of passport control, and the barriers were raised. The border guards gave way to the pressure from the crowds until midnight at most of the

contact with the representatives of the three Western Powers in West Berlin in order to work together to assure that “the events do not take an undesirable path.”<sup>80</sup>

Even during the rally in Berlin, Teltschik and Kohl puzzled over whether Gorbachev’s message was “a request based on concern” about renewed spontaneous breakthroughs in the Wall or rather “a veiled threat.”<sup>81</sup> Upon his return to the chancellory in Bonn, Teltschik received a call from Brent Scowcroft around midnight. The National Security Advisor to the US President informed him about the verbal message from Gorbachev to Bush. For Teltschik, the verbal message was “a soft around(s)061(sT\*i~0.002 Tc1[( U poct wfinforisagke ificl)Tjhe even3thhev to Bus

















Following his speech at the 9<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the SED CC, skepticism had been pervasive. The reaction had been very cautious. Now it was important to deepen the positive impression further.

Comrade Krenz pointed out that the instructions given to the Soviet ambassadors in various countries had contributed much in this regard.

Comrade Gorbachev informed [Krenz] that he had received positive responses from all the important statesmen to which he had turned.

Comrade Krenz reported that he had received congratulatory telegrams from them all, including Chancellor Kohl. He had had a brief phone conversation with the latter. Kohl pointed out his constant contact with Comrade Gorbachev and recommended that this would also be done with Comrade Krenz. Comrade Krenz responded that it was always better to speak with each other than to talk about each other. Kohl immediately brought up concrete proposals with regard to transit traffic, environmental issues, relations with West Berlin, etc [...] Comrade Krenz agreed to explore all concrete questions with the Chancellor's representative. Kohl above all wanted to speak about questions on which agreement was possible, not about those on which both sides disagreed. Comrade Krenz pointed out to Kohl explicitly that both the GDR and

The situation, however, was developing according to its own dynamics. For the weekend, a large demonstration with possibly half a million participants was planned in Berlin. It had been initiated by artists and some of their associations.

Comrade Gorbachev provided the following information in this regard: Prior to his visit, he had received a letter from the GDR League of Culture through Raissa Maximovna Gorbachev in her function in the Soviet Culture Fond. [The letter] described the situation in the GDR and pointed out that the League of Culture would address an appeal to the GDR people if they had not received a response from the Party leadership by the time of the anniversary of the [GDR].

Comrade Krenz confirmed that if Erich Honecker had given a different kind of speech on the occasion of the anniversary [of the GDR], the situation might have taken a different course. With regard to the demonstration, the Politburo had decided to call on party members to participate. Comrade Schabowski would be among the 17 speakers in order to prevent the opposition from remaining among itself at this demonstration. They wanted to do everything to assure a peaceful event but had to take certain precautionary measures. One measure was to prevent the masses from attempting to bsDregard ATartantestr among thbinitiry seses fp hacaddress en

population was very high. Add to this a systematic demand of goods, in particular by Polish citizens.

Comrade Gorbachev confirmed this in the case of the Soviet Union as well.

Comrade Krenz emphasized that, for the SED, the decisive issue was to restore the harmony [of hearts] with the CPSU and the USSR which was vital for us. The Soviet side had always been ready for this, but on our side there had been certain impediments. He wanted to declare on behalf of the Politburo of the CC of the SED that both parties should return to the method of frankly and honestly raising all questions of concern. The calls for “Gorbi, Gorbi” during the demonstrations in Berlin had shown that it was impossible to destroy the good relationship of the young people and the GDR entire population with the Soviet Union, even if the leadership had failed in this respect.

Comrade Gorbachev reported that the greatest difficulty for him in participating in the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR was the realization of the





problem in the Soviet Union was the debate with those who seriously called for a return to private ownership of the means of production. For this purpose some had even come up with quotes from Marx and Lenin by which they attempted to prove that private property did not have to mean exploitation. To their minds, the main problem was the character of power by which private property could be put to use for or against the people.

Comrade Gorbachev pointed out that there could well exist forms of private property—in manufacture, in the countryside—as it, for example, was the case in the GDR. But this was not individual property. These minor forms were, however, not a major problem for a socialist society. There existed, however, forces in the Soviet Union that wanted to go much further. Comrade Gorbachev predicted that the GDR would also face such discussions, even more so since the capitalist example was so close geographically. In addition, the FRG was a very wealthy capitalist country the existence of which would be ever present in the political debates.

Comrade Krenz expressed that his decision to act had been made when he realized during the conversation between Comrade Gorbachev with the Politburo of the SED CC that Comrade Honecker did not comprehend the statements by Comrade Gorbachev, or did not want to understand them.

Comrade Gorbachev stated that he had had the impression during that conversation that he was throwing peas against a wall. He did not hold any grudge against Comrade Honecker but was only sad that he had not initiated this change of course himself two or three years ago. This period could have been the highpoint of his life. After all, the GDR had achieved very much under his leadership. All this had been achieved together with the Party and the people. Under no circumstances should this [fact] therefore be denied. That would be disrespectful of the people who then would have basically lived in vain. This development had to be viewed in dialectical terms. The progress of society, the prologue for the future, and the great potential had to be considered, as well as the factors that had recently slowed down the development of society.

Comrade Krenz agreed and expressed his thanks in cordial terms for the extensive and profound conversation.

*[Source: Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im*

Within the framework of the decision to develop laws to guarantee the rule of law, the criminal code of the GDR will be amended to expand personal freedom, freedom of expression, and other issues to meet the new requirements.

To secure tourist and visitor traffic, the GDR is prepared to implement generous regulations for travel between the capital of the GDR and West Berlin via newly opened border crossings.

The implementation of these measures will create significant financial and material costs.

It is assumed that the FRG will cover these expenses to a great extent.

It was pointed out that the GDR is prepared to develop economic cooperation, including new forms like joint ventures and capital sharing in certain branches and sectors. It is assumed that the FRG government will take over the necessary loans in the cases of smaller and mid-sized businesses.

The GDR would be prepared to take out long-term loans up to ten billion VE, backed by collateral [*objektgebunden*] in the next two years that would be financed by the new [economic] capacity that will be created. It is assumed that repayment of the loans will begin after full production begins, and the loans are to be paid out over a period of at least ten years.

Further, the GDR sees the necessity of discussing additional lines of credit in hard currencies beginning in 1991 and totaling DM 2-3 billion to meet the demands connected with the new level of cooperation in a number of areas.

In light of the planned visit by Federal Minister Seiters to the GDR on 30 November 1989 and his official conversations with the General Secretary of the SED Central Committee and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, Egon Krenz, as well as with Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, Seiters was informed that the GDR is prepared to make binding commitments in a "protocol of understanding" about the extension of trade and economic relations, further negotiations on the issue of environmental protection, negotiations over the further development of postal and long-distance phone connections, and other plans.

Seiters was asked, in reference to the discussions of 24 October 1989, to give the FRG government's position on the most pressing issue of the moment: the possibility that his government would take over part of the additional expenses the GDR would incur in connection with its planned expansion of tourist and visitor traffic within the framework of the new travel law.

Seiters thanked me for the presentation and stated that these decisions were of great importance to the government of the Federal Republic.

Seiters presented the following thoughts on my proposal that GDR citizens travelling abroad be given the possibility to exchange DM 300 once a year at an exchange rate of DM 1 = East Mark 4.4:

—With the precondition that the minimum exchange requirement be lifted, a travel fund could be established with

foreign currency by the FRG (with 12.5 million travelers, the account would be worth approximately DM 3.8 billion). The FRG's previous annual payment of DM 100 "greeting money" per person would be eliminated. The DM 400 million that the GDR has received in the minimum exchange would also be paid off through the travel fund.

—The amount exchanged by GDR citizens for travel currency (with 12.5 million travelers, approximately DM 16.7 billion yearly) will be earmarked for a fund that the FRG and GDR will control jointly. The FRG thinks these funds should be used for the construction of border crossings, environmental protection measures, or for other projects that are of interest to both sides, such as transportation or postal and

that it is prepared to change the GDR Constitution to correspond to the current state of societal development and the obligations it accepted under the CSCE treaty. This amendment of the Constitution should transform the leading role of the SED into a constructive, consensus-building cooperation among all democratic forces in the interests of socialism and the GDR.

Schäuble recommended that we give representatives of the Church an important role in the GDR.

In reference to the state border to West Berlin, constructed on 13 August 1961 to protect the GDR, Schäuble also proposed making this border more passable, in accordance with the CSCE process, through the construction of new border crossings.

Schäuble made it clear again that all economic and financial decisions by the FRG government assumed that the GDR would lower its subsidies decisively.

Schäuble also said that many politicians in the FRG did not understand the reticent stance on providing information about the events on 7-8 October 1989. In his opinion, the GDR would be well advised, and it would be in their interests, to name the security officer directly responsible and announce the measures taken.

[He mentioned that] there are occasionally attacks in the FRG that are being investigated.

If the GDR does not take action, the topic will be played up again by certain forces.

Further consideration by the FRG government was necessary for the other issues involved in developing [further] cooperation, particularly in the economic sector and on the question of [extending further] credits. The FRG was not yet in the position to make concrete suggestions for future binding agreements.

The reserved attitude of the FRG government was clear, and it wants to wait until the results of the tenth meeting [of the SED Central Committee] to resume negotiations.

In conclusion, Schäuble again strongly recommended that General Secretary Egon Krenz deal with the aforementioned issues in his speech. If that were not the case, Chancellor Kohl would not be in a position to justify financial assistance from FRG taxes [for the GDR] to the parliament.

*[Source: Published in Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer. Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstaflösung des SED-Staates, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), pp. 483-486. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]*

### DOCUMENT No. 3

#### Letter from Alexander Schalck to Egon Krenz, 7 November 1989<sup>103</sup>

Dear Comrade Krenz!

After my conversation yesterday with Seiters and Schäuble, Federal Minister Seiters informed me today of the results. The Chancellor transmits the Chairman of the GDR State Council the following:

The course of yesterday's demonstration in Leipzig and the spontaneous exits from the GDR to the FRG which have occurred in the last few hours have produced public demands in the FRG, and increasingly in certain circles of the SPD, for the Chairman of the [GDR] State Council to declare publicly that the GDR is prepared to guarantee that opposition groups will be permitted and affirm that free elections will be held within a period to be announced if the GDR wants to receive material and financial assistance from the FRG. This applies also to the financial arrangements regarding travel [by East Germans to the West].

It should be noted that this path is only possible if the SED relinquishes its claim to absolute power. [The Party] should be prepared to work on equal terms, and in consensus, with all societal forces, churches and religious communities to discuss a true renewal, with the goal of achieving democratic socialism, and with the understanding [that they are] to be prepared to carry out any resulting decisions.

Under these conditions, the Chancellor thinks a great deal can be achieved and every option can be explored.

Federal Minister Seiters is authorized to be available for further informal discussions.

I ask that you take note of this.

With socialist greetings,  
[Alexander Schalck]

*[Source: Published in Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstaflösung des SED-Staates, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), pp. 483-486. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]*



**DOCUMENT No. 6**  
**Material for the Session/For Circulation**  
**in the Council of Ministers,**  
**Draft: Temporary Transition Rules for Travel**  
**and Permanent Exit from the**  
**GDR, Berlin,**  
**9 November 1989**

Material for the meeting  
 For Circulation in the Council of Ministers  
 Berlin, 9 November 1989  
Members of the Council of Ministers

It is requested that the attached draft resolution Temporary Transition Rules for Travel and Permanent Exit VVS b2-937/89 by the GDR Chairman of the Council of Ministers be approved through circulation today, Thursday, 9 November 1989, by 6:00 p.m.

[Harry] Moebis<sup>105</sup>

Material for the meeting  
 Secret  
 Council of Ministers Circular b2-937/89  
 [11/9/89]  
 [40<sup>th</sup>] copy 4 pages  
 V 1204/89

Title of the draft:  
 Temporary—Transition  
 Rules for Travel and  
 Permanent Exit from the GDR

Draft presented by:  
 Chairman of the Council of Ministers

signed: Willi Stoph

Berlin, 9 November 1989

Draft Resolution

The attached resolution on the temporary transition rules for travel and permanent exit from the GDR is approved.

Draft Resolution

To change the situation with regard to the permanent exit of GDR citizens to the FRG via the ČSSR, it has been determined that:

1. The decree from 30 November 1988 about travel abroad of GDR citizens will no longer be applied until the new travel law comes into force.
2. Starting immediately, the following temporary transition regulations for travel abroad and permanent exits from the GDR are in effect:
  - a) Applications by private individuals for travel abroad

- b) The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People's Police district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit. It is still possible to apply for permanent exit in the departments for internal affairs [of the local district or city councils].
  - c) Permanent exits are possible via all GDR border crossings to the FRG and (West) Berlin.
  - d) The temporary practice of issuing (travel) authorizations through GDR consulates and permanent exit with only a GDR personal identity card via third countries ceases.
3. The attached press release explaining the temporary transition regulation will be issued on 10 November.

Responsible: Government spokesman of the GDR  
Council of Ministers

Press release

Berlin (ADN)<sup>106</sup>

As the Press Office of the Ministry of the Interior has announced, the GDR Council of Ministers has decided that the following *temporary transition regulation* for travel abroad and permanent exit from the GDR will be effective until a corresponding law is put into effect by the *Volkskammer*:

- 1) Applications by private individuals for travel abroad can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorizations will be issued within a short period of time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particularly exceptional cases.
- 2) The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People's Police district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit. It is still possible to apply for permanent exit in the departments for internal affairs [of the local district or city councils].
- 3) Permanent exits are possible via all GDR border crossings to the FRG and (West) Berlin.
- 4) This decision revokes the temporary practice of issuing (travel) authorizations through GDR consulates and permanent exit with only a GDR personal identity card via third countries ceases.

[Source: Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen der Staatssicherheit (BstU), Central Archive, MfS Working Group Nieber 553, sheets 15-19. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]















<sup>39</sup> “Communiqué of the Meeting of the Political Advisory Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact”, 7-8 July 1989 in Bucharest, *Europa-Archiv* 20 (1989), p. 599; see also Thomas Blanton, “When did the Cold War end?” *CWIHP Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp. 184-7.

<sup>40</sup> Stephen Szabo, *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992); Helmut Kohl,

Moscow, Berlin, 1 November 1989, SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/329 (Document No. 1).

<sup>49</sup> Alexander Schalck’s notes on his informal conversation with Wolfgang Schäuble and Rudolf Seiters is documented in Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer*, p. 483-85. (Document No. 2).

<sup>50</sup> Letter from Alexander Schalck to Egon Krenz, 7 November 1989 (Document No. 3).

<sup>51</sup> *Deutscher Bundestag*, 11th Electoral Period, 173rd Meeting, 8 November 1989, Stenographic Report, p. 13017.

<sup>51</sup> In German, the chant rhymes, “Visa frei bis Shanghai.”

<sup>53</sup> See Document No. 4.

<sup>54</sup> See Document No. 5.

<sup>55</sup> See Document No. 6.

<sup>56</sup> Tenth meeting of the Central Committee of the SED, 9 November 1989 (transcription of a recording), documented in Hans-Hermann Hertle and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds., *Das Ende der SED*, p. 305 (Document No. 7).

<sup>57</sup> See Document No. 8.

<sup>58</sup> Tom Brokaw: “I would like to tell you that I knew that the Wall would come down. That was not the case. I did think that there would be a very interesting and important political story. So I went to Berlin simply to be in the midst of that story.” (Author’s interview with Tom Brokaw, 4 November 1998.)

<sup>59</sup> Michael E. Geisler, “Mehrfach gebrochene Mauer-schau: 1989-1990 in den US-Medien,” in Rainer Bohn, Knut Hickethier and Eggo Müller, eds., *Mauer-Show: Das Ende der DDR, die deutsche Einheit und die Medien* (Berlin: Sigma, 1992), pp. 260-61.

<sup>60</sup> Author’s interview with Michelle Neubert (NBC), 11 July 1995.

<sup>61</sup> See the portrayal by Marc Kusnetz in Robert Goldberg and Gerald Jay Goldberg, *Anchors: Brokaw, Jennings, Rather and the Evening News* (Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group, 1990), p. 262, as well as Peter Ross Range, *When Walls Come Tumbling Down: Covering The*



<sup>96</sup> From 25 September to 2 October 1989, Krenz participated in the ceremonies on the occasion of the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>97</sup>

*329 Tage*. The SED leadership received the written version of this message from the Soviet embassy in East Berlin with the date of 13 November 1989.

<sup>114</sup> The document is, like documents 10 and 11, information sent from the Soviet embassy in East Berlin to the SED General Secretary. According to Horst Teltschik, the phone conversation took place around 12:00 p.m. See Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage*, pp. 27-28.

## 1989: Bulgarian Transition to Pluralist Democracy

By Jordan Baev

Though induced by similar social and economic conditions, the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 had different historical, psychological and functional characteristics in each country. Against the background, or rather the foreground, of the succession of reforms in Poland and Hungary, the dramatic changes in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the bloodstained epilogue of the Romanian dictatorship, the events taking place in Sofia that November passed by, barely noticed by the international community.<sup>1</sup>

The process of the Bulgarian transition to pluralist democracy is still largely unknown in the West. There were three main internal political factors which brought about the change in the Bulgarian political system: first, behind-the-scene political ambitions and infighting within the ruling elite; second, the ethnic conflict in the eastern part of the country; and, finally, the increasingly open social discontent, expressed predominantly within intellectual circles. All three factors have foreign analogues but they differ in their peculiar Bulgarian origins. Just as in some other Eastern European countries, the first challenge to authority in Bulgaria came not from traditional opposition organizations, but from newly-formed ecological and human rights groups, inspired to some extent by the example of the “green” movements in the West. The independent trade union “Podkrepa” [Support] was created as a Bulgarian analogue of the Polish “Solidarity.” In Romania, an important cause of the internal conflict was the oppression of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Similarly, in Bulgaria the treatment of the Bulgarian Turks by the authorities after 1984 had turned into a peculiar “detonator.” In combination with the worsened economic situation, this issue played an important part in the heightening of social tensions. Moreover, the Soviet embassy in Sofia, following Mikhail Gorbachev’s unambiguous instructions, played an important role in changing who ruled in the Bulgarian capital.

The overthrow of Todor Zhivkov,<sup>2</sup> the longest ruling communist leader in Eastern Europe, was the result of joint behind-the-scene efforts by communist party reformers and senior Soviet diplomats in Bulgaria. No authentic documents on the events preceding Zhivkov’s “resignation” on 10 November 1989 are thus far available. Various memoirs offer contradictory information and prejudiced attempts to mythologize or demonize key persons and events. During the last decade, I have had the opportunity to interview many of the participants crucial to Zhivkov’s ouster. Generally, they lacked clear and definite answers to the key issues. Among those interviewed were former Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov,<sup>3</sup> Todor Zhivkov’s successor as political leader and head of state in November

1989; the late ex-prime ministers Stanko Todorov<sup>4</sup> and Andrey Lukanov;<sup>5</sup> Dimiter Stanishev, former Secretary of the Central Committee [CC] of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] in charge of international relations during the period 1977–1990; Gen. Dobri Dzhurov<sup>6</sup> and Gen. Atanas Semerjiev,<sup>7</sup> the defense minister and chief of staff, respectively, each with the longest service of any in a Warsaw Pact country. Analysis of the decision-making process requires careful reading “between the lines” of the available information and a critical comparison of the existing fragmentary articles. The following documentary publication is a first selection of Bulgarian “political elite” documents from 1989.

A specific characteristic of Cold War Bulgaria was the lack of strong anti-communist opposition, not to mention the lack of influence on the part of traditional bourgeois parties in the political life of the country before November 1989. Individual acts by some intellectuals (many of whom either had a communist background, or were connected in some way with the ruling elite) as well as feeble efforts to create dissident groups (inspired mainly by the Czechoslovak and Polish examples),<sup>8</sup> did not draw much public response until the mid-eighties. The strongest challenges Todor Zhivkov had ever faced had come many years earlier from reformist or Stalinist circles within his own party.<sup>9</sup> Hence, one of Zhivkov’s favored measures since 1956 had been to reshuffle the hierarchy periodically, thus rendering potential rivals harmless and keeping the remaining members of the leadership in check.

In 1987–88 several “informal” ecological, human rights and reformist groups came into existence in Bulgaria—groups in which communist intellectuals took an active part as well. In most cases, however, these groups did not call for a change of the political system, but for its reform. The secret services were shocked when they discovered that among the leaders of these groups were BCP CC members. Following Zhivkov’s personal instructions, the authorities retaliated with repressive measures which, however, proved counterproductive. At the same time, Zhivkov conducted





following 1989.

The Bulgarian documents presented below have never been published before. The first document has been obtained from the Diplomatic Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the last two from the Archive of the Bulgarian











surprise and even startle us with their unusual obviousness. Pessimists, anti- and pseudo-restructurers, demagogues, and self-made innovators would emerge or simply people who would try to take advantage of the situation to make personal profit. Such occurrences will certainly create problems, not necessarily easy ones. However, all of this is inevitable in the course of a powerful democratic process and should not discourage and confuse us, or encourage us to take rash actions. We should protect this new course of development particularly strenuously from the leprosy of political demagogy. The drastic difference between promises and actions, typical of the style of the former Secretary General of the Central Committee, has already once before robbed us of the people's trust.

Later comrade Yahiel said that public opinion in the country is presently united on the issue of the economy's dire situation.

The key question now is overcoming the constantly rising market deficit. He suggested that the measures for change be determined not by a narrow circle of people, traditionally working in anonymity, but be worked out by parallel and competing teams of widely recruited scientists and specialists, who will offer alternative opinions on ways out of the crisis and on the economic future of the country. No more instances of gross interference should no longer be permitted in the work of the Council of Ministers.

Everything indicates, continued comrade Yahiel, that in the upcoming months and years life will neither be simple nor easy for Bulgarians. This requires open and honest communication [between the people and their government]. We should at last start considering the study of the public as a guide to a more sensible and effective political and state governance.

In connection with this, the establishment of new relations between the Party and the mass media is highly imperative. We should cease patronizing and constantly instructing professionally and politically literate people on how to do their job. Humanity has not yet invented a more massive and effective means of dialogue between the people and its leaders [than the mass media]. The mass media is not just a tribune, but a daily People's Assembly which debates real life, reflects and, simultaneously, shapes public opinion. This is why we should treat it as a respected partner. [...]

Next to speak out was comrade Georgi Milushev<sup>38</sup> who said he had taken the floor because he had held the position of director of the Department of Safety and Defense (DSD), as a result of the Party's decision, for three years and one month. It was specific work, [he said,] in a department with clearly defined activities. This was a period of great suspicion and immense lack of trust. Only one person was trusted there who also played a part in resolving a number of cadre issues.

I believe, said cde. Milushev, that the Department of Safety and Defense [DSD] should take into consideration

the decisions of the Politburo and the Secretary General, but it is actually a sub-department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The one-person management of such a significant and specialized sub-department should be avoided.

In response to a question from the audience to provide the name of the person who was trusted at the DSD, cde.

G. Milushev replied that the person's name is Ani Mladenova. Sh

confidence] comes from our attitude toward the people with whom we work and govern. It seems to me that all of us gathered in this hall stand in need of exercising greater morality in our exercise of power, and more *glasnost* in our professional and public work. And I would also add that we need more *glasnost* in our behavior as citizens.

Cde. Mrachkov's final comment referred to the current social situation, to the accumulated dissatisfaction and



promotion on the basis of kinship in our party. Those who signed such resolutions in the past also bear responsibility.

At last year's meeting with students, Todor Zhivkov stated: [""] The Ministry of Economics and Planning suggests a 12 % increase in the commodity funds. [""] (While, in truth, we had discussed this option in the People's Assembly and found it unfeasible.) [""] We, [""] Zhivkov said, [""] decided in the Politburo to increase them by 20 % .[""] Let Todor Zhivkov come forward now and explain the meaning of the word "illusion"! Where is this 20 % increase in commodity funds? Irresponsible job! Irresponsible. I worked for five years as his first Deputy in the State Council. He had one saying. When we advised him against various decisions, he used to say: [""] Only God is above us. Whatever course we decide to take, it is correct.[""] He had gone that far.

I read, continued cde. Trichkov, the transcripts of comrade Mladenov's meeting with representatives of the intelligentsia, and here also several comrades posed the question about the Bulgarians connected with Islam. We hear voices demanding a reversal, even the recognition of a Turkish minority and the restoration of [Muslim] names. These are serious questions and we no longer have the right to resolve such an issue according to political motives and considerations. We have erred enough. The government forced many of us to register as Macedonians according to similar political considerations on the Macedonian question. Even today certain individuals are pressuring us to betray history. There are no minorities in Bulgaria. We made a mistake, but it was a mistake in our approach—we violated the principle of pursuing cooperation in our work with them [the Muslims], the political approach.

I believe it only fair, cde. Trichkov stated in conclusion, that each of us should perceive his or her own guilt for the fact that during the period of 35 years we tolerated as head of the party and the state a person who managed to manifest himself as a cult and to monopolize power for himself. We should not run away from our guilt. We are responsible people. Each of us is responsible for alienating the people from the party. Everyone should make a self-evaluation in order to purge himself, and understand his own responsibility for the present situation. [...] Otherwise, we will be mistaken if we consider that one person is solely responsible for everything. We are all guilty and everyone should see his or her own guilt. Of course, some are guilty to a much greater degree [...]

Next to take the floor was comrade Andrey Lukanov who stated that he did not intend to make a speech because he had already participated in the Politburo session and fully supported the proposals presented. He only wanted to share several thoughts in connection with comrade Dimitar Stoyanov's speech (not from a personal perspective). He expressed his enthusiasm





Much could be said about his [Atanasov's] economic incompetence and primitivism in working in the economic field.

I also want to address A. Lukanov and to ask him whether he feels himself the main culprit for the tremendous increase in the foreign debt. Who managed the currency commission? The privileged and [Todor Zhivkov's] retinue lined up to run this commission: Todor Zhivkov, Grisha Philipov,<sup>43</sup> Georgy Atanasov. Invariably, Andrei Lukanov was either its chairman or its operative manager. [...].

I propose that G. Atanasov, A. Lukanov, and P. Pachov immediately hand in their resignation from all posts and duties currently occupied in order to avoid being disgracefully expelled later. [...]

I have spoken seriously and made serious accusations. I am prepared to answer to them. Those who accused me of being one of Todor Zhivkov's retinue should not hide behind anonymity, behind the flag of the Party and the country.

I do not call for revenge, but for justice. Hatred is a destructive force. We need love and optimism now in order to go forward.

In the past, there was a ready scenario for a speech such as mine. The voters were advised to request a recall of their people's representative. This was followed by prison and, as a result of the imprisonment, a lack of access to any documents with which a person could defend himself or herself.

Let us now see how this matter will be dealt with in democratic conditions.

Now, if we want the new-born democracy to survive, I propose that a parliamentary commission with the wide participation of public organizations and the mass media hears out everyone who is being accused or has something to say. In this way the members of Todor Zhivkov's retinue could be revealed as well as the real culprits responsible for the present situation.

Justice could be served only by uncorrupt people who will not take advantage of their power in order to hide their own shame and disgrace.

All of us who worked in the days of Todor Zhivkov, both good and bad, ought to leave and give way to new ipation of pu8.

the interest on debt. Such requests were made very often in connection with propositions for additional currency expenses by Ognyan Doynov or other individuals whom he managed. My colleagues in the government during these years can confirm this.

If we truly desire to be objective, we should also take into account that the reasons for the increase in the foreign debt during the last few years are connected not only to the deformations in economic policy, but also due to outside factors and domestic and international conditions. [...]

Analyzing Ognyan Doynov's accusations and his whole speech, I ask myself what motivated him to utter so many untruths at once. Knowing him well, I am convinced that this is not accidental and is not due to a lack of knowledge about the true state of affairs. I come to the conclusion that in this case he is trying to place himself ahead of truthful revelation in order to present himself as a victim once again—this time a victim of the present party and state leadership. I am confident that this tactic will not hinder the clarification of actual facts, provided the requirements for objectivity and impartiality are fully adhered to.

As for me, I understand very well that I am one rather "inconvenient" witness to Ognyan Doynov because I am very well familiar with many of his risky projects and concrete actions due to the authority of the duties I performed.

He expressed doubts about my impartiality by voting against my appointment as chairman of the parliamentary commission for investigations and for resolving urgent issues related to deformation and violation of the law. Taking this into account, I have already asked the commission to relieve me of the obligation to deal with the cases concerning Ognyan Doynov. This will be performed by other members of the commission against whom he has not expressed reservations.

I will be grateful, esteemed Comrade Chairman, if you bring this letter of mine to the attention of the people's representatives.

18 December 1989

With respect,  
[signature]

Andrey Lukanov,

People's Representative from the 248<sup>th</sup> Electoral District of the Plovdiv Region

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## Czechoslovak November 1989

By Oldřich Tuma

It is difficult to select only a few documents from among the hundreds that vividly illustrate the collapse of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. As the uniqueness of the Czechoslovak case consisted in the considerable dynamism of the process, one possible solution to the dilemma is to illustrate the unexpected acceleration of the Czechoslovak crisis using several documents from the regime and opposition issued immediately after the “Velvet Revolution” of 17 November 1989.

The collapse of the regime actually occurred in the ten to fourteen days after the evening of 17 November, when disciplinary police brutally broke up a demonstration of many thousands in downtown Prague. The nucleus of protesters was formed by university students. The following day, students from Prague University and the Technical University decided to react decisively. The students proclaimed a strike and also called for a general strike on 27 November. Theaters, first in Prague and then around the country, immediately went on strike. Instead of performances, spontaneous political debates took place in numerous theater buildings every day.

On 19 November, the Civic Forum (CF) was successfully set up as a coordinating organ of the opposition, that became, stage by stage and in cooperation with the students’ strike committee, a major political force in the country. Demonstrations in Prague went on for days: on 20 November, for the first time, the number of participants exceeded a hundred thousand; on 25 November perhaps three quarter of a million men and women took part in an opposition demonstration in Prague. From 20 November on, many thousands of men and women demonstrated daily in numerous Czech and Slovak towns across the country.

That same day, first some of the print and then the electronic media freed themselves from the regime’s control. On 24 November, the leadership of the CPCz (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) abdicated. The new leadership also failed to regain the initiative. On 26 November the first official meeting and negotiation between the government and Civic Forum (CF) took place. The next day a two-hour general strike gripped the country. On 29 November, due to public pressure, the Communist Party rescinded the constitutional article on the leading role of the Communist Party.

In the ensuing days and weeks a new government was established with the participation of the CF and its Slovak

partner, Public Against Violence (PAV). Parliament, which was to be chaired by former communist party leader Alexander Dubček, ousted after the Prague Spring in 1968, was reconstituted, and former dissident Václav Havel was elected president. All of the important power shifts were finally completed with the first free elections in June 1990.

The powerful clash of people and principles lasted from about 17-29 November 1989. Documents 1-5, in which the leaders of the CPCz struggle hard to notify and furnish party members with instructions, show quite clearly their growing irresolution, helplessness and lack of control over the events. They also illustrate that when the CPCz could no longer make up its mind and wavered over the use of force (17 November was the last time that violence against the public was used), the leadership was powerless in the face of the growing opposition. Attempts at political mobilization proved ineffective and futile. Teleprinters (telexes) and information from the center increasingly became statements of its own concessions and impotence, as well as of the opposition’s éclats and their achievements. In the document of 29 November, the opposition is already accepted as a political partner, even though only a few days earlier the regime had refused to establish any contacts with those forces. Similarly, despite the CPCz’s insistence on the continuation of Gustáv Husák’s presidency, on the continued existence of the People’s Militia, the party organizations in the workplace, and party control over and ownership of vast amounts of property, the regime was unable to defend these positions. As early as 10 December, Husák abdicated the presidency, and before the end of the year the People’s Militia had been disarmed and broken up, party organizations at the work place had been forbidden, and soon after the elections, even the CPCz’s property was confiscated.

Two important documents from the opposition, documents nos. 6 and 7, also give proof of the speed of the events: the CF *Proclamation* of 19 November and the CF *Program Principles* of 26 November. *What We Want* states that the problems of the country would not be solved by replacing people in positions of power or by the withdrawal of several politicians from public life. Yet, it was exactly that solution which the proclamation of CF had demanded a week earlier—and which had seemed at that time, extremely radical. The proclamation *What We Want* already brings a rather vague but consistent and rounded-off program of essential changes in all areas of public life—simply said, it calls for the end of the Communist system.





CSR and the SSR, made public on 21 November of this year, and to help bring about an atmosphere of peace and prudence.

The most important is mass political work among the people. The functionaries and apparatus of the party and people's councils, the leading workers must go to the workers' collectives to prevent efforts to call a general strike, which the forces of the opposition are planning for 27 November. Every managerial worker is personally

It is necessary to engage in discussions with the students and apprentices, who are being manipulated by irresponsible elements. It is especially important to strengthen the influence of the teachers and parents over the younger generation.

The main goal is to show convincingly that straining the situation is a threat to every citizen of our society, the safety of every family. The eventual strikes, which the opposition threatens to carry out, would significantly damage our national economy, lead our market and supplies to destruction (especially now in winter

The organizers of revolutionary acts will continue in demands. They are trying to enlist support in factories. There are entering businesses, factories and other institutions and prevent them from using other methods of influencing the workers' collectives. The factory management and party leadership must ensure proper defense of their interests. In these times the leading workers—communists and non-

handling of the political situation in their sphere of influence.

We must pay special attention to the media. The Presidium of the CC CPCz adopted measures which ought to stifle the high passions [of the public] and ensure

the Press Agency (ČTK), radio and television. Concrete tasks were handed down to the executive directors of

The party press must influence the public. This applies in full also to regional, district, business and

**DOCUMENT No. 3**  
**Teleprint from Jozef Lenárt,**  
**Secretary of CC CPS, to Regional Committees**  
**and Municipal Committees**  
**in Prague and Bratislava,**  
**23 November 1989**

regional (municipal) committees that in all regions measures were adopted according to the teleprint of the General Secretary of the CC CPCz. Working groups of party organs were dispatched to crucial centers and

and analysis of the political situation. But even when the

and factories against penetration by the opposition and the spread of negative demonstrations, in a series of instances the posting of appeals, flyers, organization of petitions

government took place.

The students are continuing their efforts to establish contacts with workers in establishments and gaining

toward strikes have been exhibited so far. On the contrary, in important political-economic centers, the workers are

students and the part of the public which is in solidarity with them in the demands of the "proclamation" of the Civic Forum, established on 19 November. The Civic Forum consists of: Charter 77, The Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee, The Circle of Independent Intelligence, The



to reverse the decision to strike has so far been unsuccessful. Some theater directors have said that their influence on the developments could be even further diminished because the strike committees are handling the decisions.

The situation in the clergy and religious groups was basically solid on 21 November, without any tendencies toward activism on the part of spiritual and religious people.

While there is peace within the clergy and religious groups in our republic, the prevailing sentiment [among them] is one of apprehension about possible further developments.

The exception is the Roman Catholic Church. Cardinal Tomášek's written statement entitled "To all the People of Czechoslovakia," reproduced in *The People's Democracy*<sup>6</sup> on 22 November, is of a confrontational character. The statement, prepared by the former cleric Malý who is the leading proponent of illegal organizations, is the sharpest criticism of the political development of the last forty years to date.

On the other hand Cardinal Tomášek expressed his constructive position in a personal conversation with the Head Secretary of the MC CPCz, comrade Št pán, on 22 November 1989, in Prague, where he stated the following: "The situation surprised me, I can not yet express myself. I would like to get acquainted with the situation in order to openly express myself. I am convinced that there is good will on both sides." This conversation, broadcast on the television news on 22 November, should be used as an argument against the articles in *The People's Democracy*.

The planned so-called Thanksgiving service, which is supposed to take place on 25 November 1989, in the St. Vitus Cathedral in the Prague castle on the occasion of the elevation to sainthood of Ane ka P emyslovna, is in serious danger of being misused. Although the event was announced as early as two months ago, the current level of preparation, whose purpose is to attract the largest possible number of believers, has intensified. To this end a circular was recently sent to all the dioceses in the CSR. Apart from this, a group of believers, who have prepared pilgrimages to Rome, is planning a significant activity, namely the mass would be preceded by a procession of believers through Prague beginning at the buildings of the former convent on František and ending at the castle.

From the letters and resolutions arriving at the CC CPCz it is clear that the opinion within society and within the ranks of the strikers are differentiating. They mostly express support for the policies of the party and request acceptance of measures to ensure a renewal of peace and to create normal conditions for work.

Václav Havel made an appearance on Wenceslas Square on 22 November, which also was shown on the Czechoslovak television program "Contact." He spoke about the tactical approaches of the opposition forces at the current time. He greeted all the workers who are supporting the demands of the artists, students and

intelligentsia, and who are founding civic forums and strike committees. After twenty years, history is returning to our country. For that we have to thank the free-thinking students and young people in general, to whom the future of our country belongs. He thanked theater and other artists, who rebelled after many years of degradation. He said that the Civic Forum is becoming a real representative of critical thinkers, and is beginning to be taken seriously through the power of freedom. Within the next few hours the Forum will try to unify the introduced demands into a single list. He expressed his faith in the support for the demands, in the form of a general strike. He informed [the people] that Civic Forum had written a letter to Bush and Gorbachev, who were supposed to discuss the developments in Eastern Europe, which requested support for democratization efforts in Czechoslovakia. He announced that telegrams were sent to Solidarity [the independent Polish labor union] and to the People's Fronts in the USSR and Hungary.

Analysis of the broadcasts of Western radio stations during the course of the last year has revealed that they are intensifying their attacks against the authorities with the aim:

- of gradually creating in the minds of the populace the opinion that, considering the "illegality" and "brutality" of [the authorities'] actions against the "peace-loving" demonstrators and citizens, it is possible and humanly justified to use the "same" means against them,
- of creating pressure to change the laws dealing with the actions of security and the judicial organs, to limit their numbers and completely restructure them, and especially to limit the [powers of] State Security,
- of creating a separation between the police units (especially with Public Security<sup>7</sup> on one side and State Security<sup>8</sup> and Emergency Units on the other) and a separation between the Investigative apparatus of the State Security and judicial organs,
- of more deeply discrediting the state and, especially, the party leadership through attacks028 Tw1"(few h

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think that the next development of the CSSR (its political system and economy) should head towards a system that is somewhere between socialism and capitalism (47%). An almost identical number of people think that it should go the socialist route. In the polls conducted, the difference of opinion between CPCz members and those not affiliated with the party was not ascertained.

From the information of the CC CPCz from 26 November 1989, at 12:00 p.m., it is noticeable that the series of demands found among party members is identical to the demands of the opposition. Emphasis is placed upon:

- further cadre changes in the leadership of the party (with more emphasis on the resignations of Št pán, [and] Zavadil, and less emphasis the resignations of Lenárt, Knotek, Ho ený);
- a thorough analysis of the past with the assignment of personal responsibility for the state of society;
- engaging in discussion with the opposition;
- an accelerated elaboration and introduction of a proposal for a new constitution of the CSSR, a law on the freedom of association and a law on the freedom of assembly.

In comparison with the information from the RC CPCz from 25 November 1989, a shift has taken place in the demands of the party members to benefit the demands of the opposition (on 25 November only 3 of the 11 demands included in the information were in agreement with the demands of the opposition; on 26 November, 5 of the 10 demands were in agreement with those of the opposition). It is obvious at the same time that in the workers' collectives the level of opposition to the general strike called by the Civic Forum for 27 November is diminishing.

#### Conclusion

In public opinion, but also among CPCz members, there is a noticeable growth of negative tendencies and an inclination toward the demands of the opposition. The situation reveals that in the last few days a significant weakening of the role and prestige of the CPCz in society has occurred as a result of the belated reaction to the developments and the ineffectively accepted decision.

The opposition took the initiative because of the developments in the party. The decisive question will be the correct formulation of the leading role and position of the party in the social system, which must correspond to the opinion and demands of the people. It is clear that the Party will have to be a partner both in the National Front as well as in its relations to the opposition (Civic Forum). Should the corresponding measures and clearly formulated party lines fail to be adopted, there is danger that the party may disintegrate and will have diminished hopes of gaining a significant portion of the vote in the next elections.

It is necessary to immediately publish the accepted measures and conclusions from the dialogue, because the

opposition today can use the legal media (radio, television, the National Front press). In the information for the RC and DC CPCz it is necessary to on the one hand to accelerate their flow, inform [everyone] without any delays on all events and decisions about the demands of the opposition and their escalation, but, on the other hand, especially to inform [everyone] about our positions and arguments, through which it would be possible to react to the demands. The RC and DC CPCz themselves must ensure a political evaluation of the situation in the regions, including the developments of local branches of opposition groups and their demands.

(Illegible name)

We are sending information on the conclusions of the nation-wide party caucus which took place in Prague on 28 November of this year.

(Illegible signature)

(Illegible title)

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[Source: *SÚA, ,iGNat220(KE)1( )Tjt'ETiClusion*

### **DOCUMENT No. 5**

#### **Teleprint, Information on the Conclusions of Nation-wide Party Congress held in Prague, 28 November 1989**

#### **FOR INFORMATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

125 11 Praha 1, Náb e í Ludvíka Svobody 12

Telephone 2199

Telegram address: UVKOMSTRANY

Praha, November 1989

Refer to in answer:

#ÚV-145/89

Issue:

The Central Committee of the CPS, the regional committees of the CPS, CPCz municipal committees in Prague and Bratislava district (provincial) committees of the CPS, CPCz

The nation-wide party caucus which took place in Prague on 28 November 1989 reached the following

conclusions:

1. The political directive for the plan of action of the entire party over the next few days is laid out in the speech of the Secretary General at the Nation-wide Party Caucus. The program of the party will be prepared by the Presidium of the CC CPCz and introduced for discussion in the party.

2. To acquaint every communist with the discussions of the Caucus, and explain the conclusions of its discussion and seek their fulfillment by communists and other workers. To strengthen the unity of the party behind the principles of socialism. Trust in the party must be supported by well thought-out cadre decisions and not by lack of control and certainly not by pressure.

3. It gives total support and trust to our leadership of the Central Committee and its Secretary General, comrade Karel Urbánek, during the discussion of the current problems.

4. The CC CPCz proposes to begin an analysis of the entire forty-year period of the construction of socialism, especially the years 1968-1969.

5. Engage in an active dialogue and cooperate with all

down. These are, namely, Gustav Husák, Miloš Jakeš, Jan Fojtík, Miloslav Zavadil, Karel Hofman and Alois Indra. The pernicious politics of people, who for years refused any kind of democratic dialog with the society, completely legally resulted in the terrible events of the last days.

2. That the First Secretary of the Municipal Committee (MC) CPCz in Prague Miroslav Štěpán and the Federal Minister of the Interior, František Kincl, who are responsible for all of the measures which the police have carried out over the last few months against the peaceful demonstrations of citizens, immediately step down.

3. That a committee be set up which would concretely investigate these measures, find the culprits and propose punishments for them. Civic Forum representatives must be included in this committee.

4. That all the criminals of conscience, including those who have been detained in connection with the last demonstration, be immediately released.

The Civic Forum demands that this proclamation be published in the official Czechoslovak media.

The Civic Forum stakes its authority behind the plan for a general strike on 27 November from 12:00 p.m. until 2:00 p.m., called by Prague university students, and understands it to be an expression of support for the demands which it wants to discuss with the state leadership.

The Civic Forum believes that its creation and task corresponds with the will of the 40,000 current signatories of the petition *Several Sentences*, and is open to all the constituents and forces of society whose concern is that our country should begin peacefully finding the way to a democratic social order, and through it to economic prosperity.

On behalf of the Civic Forum:

Eng. Rudolf Battěk, Petr Čepek, Václav Havel, Milan Hruška, Prof. Dr. Milan Jelínek, Milan Kalaš, Dr. Lubomír Kopecký CSc., Jiří Kříž, Václav Malý, Martin Mejstřík, Petr Oslzlý, Dr. Libor Pátý CSc., Jana Petrová, Jan Ruml, Prof. Dr. Václav Šilhán, Ondřej Trojan, Eng. Josef Vavroušek CSc., Saša Vondra.

Prague, 19 November 1989.

[Source: *Ústav pro současné dějiny*]















National Defense] released a “guideline” for securing the tasks in which he ordered the troops to prepare and detail forces and equipment for the SNB in the calculations determined in the agreement between the FMV and SLA [Czechoslovak People’s Army] before the redeployment of the army.

The third degree of extraordinary security measures [which has been] announced [MBO],<sup>12</sup> does not yet presuppose the deployment of forces and equipment of the ČSLA. Their usage is possible only under higher degrees of MBO. Under the fourth degree, MBO soldiers are brought in for combined patrols and part of the technology is used. Under the fifth degree of the MBO, the guarding of designated objects is added and the SLA arranges the planned security forces and special technology, which will be brought in during the sixth degree (MBO). The law #40/74 Sb. makes it possible for SLA troops to be brought in, according to which the minister of the interior of the CSSR has the authority to enlist the members of the SLA to fulfill the tasks of the SNB after an agreement with the minister of national defense.

The detailed technology of the SLA include trucks, connecting appliances, armored transports for infantry and water canons.

For the capital Prague, 2,300 soldiers of the basic service and career soldiers with the necessary technology [already] have been prepared for service in the combined security patrols and the security units. Furthermore a regiment of tanks of the minister of national defense is prepared to serve as a reserve (1,160 members of the SLA with necessary technology).

#### Conclusion:

It has been proven that the internal and external enemy considers the anniversary of 21 August as an opportunity to confront the state powers and to discredit the present leadership of the party and the state.

The western media provides the necessary framework for this. They try to draw a picture in the public’s mind of a deepening crisis in our society which, according to their prognosis, should result in its end, and, at the latest by next year’s end, develop into a struggle for political power, the removal of the CPCz from the leading role in society and a complete dismantling of the principles of socialism.

They clearly, at the same time, count on developments in neighboring socialist countries, especially in Poland and Hungary to influence the minds of our people. They concentrate primarily on the support and propagation of the activity of illegal organizations and their members, and simultaneously strive to prove that the party is not able to lead the society and secure its progress any longer.

The activity of internal and external enemies is aimed at bringing about the legalization of the operation of opposing groups and their assertion as real political powers in the societies, which, following the Polish model forced the state leadership to a round-table dialogue. At the same time one must not underestimate the influence

and long-term plans of the Roman Catholic Church. Its political ambition was explicitly expressed by Cardinal Tomášek in an open letter to the government functionaries and citizens of the CSSR.

The existence and activity of illegal organizations and the prolonged and increasing influence of the western media, especially the broadcast stations RADIO FREE EUROPE and VOICE OF AMERICA, impacts in a negative way on a segment of our population. Cases of anonymous threats addressed to functionaries of party and state organs and the National Front organization, of disrespect for the SNB, SLA and LM, and of verbal attacks on their members are on the rise.

With regard to these realities it is impossible to rule out the possibility that during the so-called silent demonstration on the 20-21 August 1989, an atmosphere will be created among the participants that could grow into an open display of enmity toward the state and the party as a start of a series of further acts planned during the course of this year and the beginning of the next, aimed at destabilizing the society.

This is the reason for the preparation of necessary security measures for the frustration of their confrontational plans.

[Source: A. Lorenc et al., T8/91 vol. XIX., envelope 1, #79-84 (also vol. XXI, #2242-2247). Published in *Czech in Organizational Matters*: Reprezentativní Stáby Generálního úřadu Ministerstva vnitra, 1988-1989, D 4/II (Úřad Dokumentace a Vyhodnocení Zločinů Komunistů 1998). Translated for CWIHP by Caroline Kovtun.]



## DOCUMENT No. 2

### Czechoslovak Secret Police (StB)

### Memorandum, “Information Regarding the Situation in the CSSR up to 20 August 1989,” 20 August 1989

Information regarding the security situation in the ČSSR up to 20 August 1989

In recent days (Friday and Saturday) the so-called protest marches, organized by the so-called Independent Peace Association, have continued in the pedestrian zones in Prague. Approximately 100 individuals attended these activities. Saturday’s marches were video-recorded by accredited employees of the British and Austrian television company “V.”

Internally, “Charter-77” has been somewhat divided over questions of policy and tactics in preparation for a confrontational rally. The older “charter-77” signatories are













violation of policies and regulations on work safety.

The number of traffic accidents have also increased. There have been 48,912 traffic accidents, which is basically at the same level as last year. The consequences are in all indications the most dire. In all 589 people have died (up by 50), 2,619 were heavily injured (up by 401), and serious damages have also increased. There have occurred 3,122 accidents induced by alcohol, an increase of 111.

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Preventive and destructive measures are undertaken in order to suppress the enemy's activity, frustrate the efforts to unite individual groups and impede the enemy's ability to act, especially that of the organizers of enemy acts.

In the places of the assumed origin of mass anti-social gatherings and in places with a concentration of enemy individuals, especially in Prague, Brno and Bratislava, the patrol units of the VB will be strengthened, with the aim of preventing the distribution of flyers and stopping enemy elements from participating in anti-social gatherings.

In all regions of the CSSR measure have been taken to prevent the participation of the main enemies at anti-social gatherings, especially in Prague. Analogous measures are also undertaken with respect to enemies from abroad.

In the event of mass anti-social gatherings VB and LM units will be ready to intervene for the use of more peaceful means.

[Source: A. Lorenc et al., T8/91 vol. XIX., envelope 1, #79-84 (also vol. XXI, #2242-2247). Published in *Czech in Organizace a řízení, Represe v : Štáby Gener 1988-1989, D 4/III (Úřad Dokumentace a Vyšetřování Zločinů Komunistů 1998)*. Translated for CWIHP by Caroline Kovtun.]

**DOCUMENT No. 4**  
**Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior**  
**Memorandum, "The Security Situation in**  
**the CSSR in the Period Before 28 October,"**  
**25 October 1989**

Supplement #1 to #OV-00138/S-89

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Copy #: 24

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The Security Situation in the CSSR in the period before 28 October

Characteristic of the developments of the security situation in the CSSR are the increasing tendencies of the internal enemy to bring out anti-socialist moods in the public by means of anonymous letters and flyers, particularly in Bohemia, in connection with the 71<sup>st</sup>

anniversary of the CSR. The organizers wish to ensure the widest participation of citizens (most of all youth) in prepared provocative gatherings during which the celebration of 28 October will be used to glorify T. G. Masaryk and the bourgeois state.

The evidence for this lies in the continuing distribution of anonymous letters in high schools in which authors summon the people to the "dignified celebration of 28 October" and give prominence to the work of T. G. Masaryk. Letters are gradually being distributed on the majority of the territory of the CSR. In northern, western, southern and eastern Bohemia and Prague flyers of the coordinating board of the so-called Movement for Civic Freedom (HOS) and the Czechoslovak Democratic Initiatives (CSDI) are being circulated. They call for participation in the "celebrations" on 28 October for example in Chomutov (on K. Gottwald Square), in Plzeň (on the Square of the Republic), in Karlovy Vary (at the main post office), in Sušice (at the monument to T.G.M.), in Rumburk (in the park of the Rumburk Revolt) and in ervený Kostelec (in the park at the square). The organizers of the acts sent letters to the National Committees in Sušice, Náměd and Chomutov with a request for permission for a "ceremonial gathering," referring to article 28 of the constitution of the CSSR. The "Declaration of the Charter 77 on 28 October", signed by its speakers and Havel, is being distributed at the same time (this has been proven, for example, in Kladno).<sup>7</sup>

On 18 October R. Battěk and L. Lis introduced in the name of the illegal organizations CSDI, HOS and Renewal a "communication on the event of a public gathering" in the ONV in Praha 7. In it they inform [people] that on 28 October at 3:00 p.m. they are arranging a "ceremonial gathering of their members and followers for the anniversary of the origin the CSR" on the Letná plain. After the commencement Čapek's "Prayer for Truth" will be recited, followed by the "ceremonial address" and finally the national anthem will be sung. Afterwards, when the stations Radio Free Europe (from 23 October 1989) and Voice of America (from 24 October 1989) were broadcasting announcements of the event the "independent gathering" on the anniversary of the origin of the CSR on Wenceslas Square in Prague from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., they revoked their announcement for alleged technical difficulties connected with such a public gathering under the "given social situation."

The exponents of illegal organizations in Brno M.

Place and to begin preparations for the erection of a monument to T.G. Masaryk.

Even the activist Milan Vlk of the illegal group Peace Club of J. Lennon called on his fellow activists for a “silent demonstrations” in D on 28 October. He is simultaneously organizing the distribution of a protest petition against the imprisonment of “political prisoners.”

The plans of the anti-socialist forces from Hungary—the Hungarian Democratic Forum which is in contact with CSDI since last year—to take part in the “celebrations” of 28 October have been proven. On this day they plan to effectuate a meeting of the “Commission for Hungarian-Czechoslovak Cooperation” (established on 26 August 1989 in Prague by representatives of both organizations), which will devote itself to questions of Czechoslovak-Hungarian “reconciliation and cooperation.”

An anti-Czechoslovak activity aimed at discrediting the CSSR for the disrespect of the plans of the CSCE is the conclusion of an informal agreement between Hungarian television and the American television company ABC. At its core is their collaboration during the reporting of the actions of the so-called independent initiatives in Prague on various opportune occasions. The first act of collaboration of both television companies is supposed to be the participation in the anticipated demonstration on 28 October 1989, in Prague.

The leadership of the Hungarian Federation of Young Citizens (FIDESZ) is pushing its members to “help” the Czechoslovak independent initiatives on 28 October during the organization of a gathering of citizens in Prague and other cities. During a meeting of FIDESZ on 16 October, it was decided to send their members to Prague as tourists in the same number as on 21 August of this year. A group of about 12 people is supposed to be created which would join up with several prominent representatives of “Charter-77.” They plan to organize a swift and conspiratorial courier service between Prague and Budapest to secure prompt information about the course of the “celebrations” for Hungarian media. Analogous activity should be anticipated from anti-socialist forces in Poland.



secondary school students), and the so-called Independent Student Society, centered on university students, headed by Milan RU ICKA (Technical University, VUT Brno), Radek VÁNA (Faculty of Philosophy, Charles's University, Prague) and Petr FIALA (Faculty of Pedagogy, Charles's University, Prague). Both initiatives, in terms of subject matter, began with a policy-statement, from an appeal for a "few sentences," and proposed preparations to misuse the commemoration of Jan Opletal's death as an opportunity to denounce the role of the CPCz, as well as the activities of the SSM, and the political system of the CSSR.

In order to thwart this design, associative and academic organs took measures to divert crowds from the original rout from the Albertov Pedagogical Institute via Charles's bridge, Štěpánská (St.), Opletalova (St.), to the Main Train Station and the J. Opletal monument, to a rout from Albertov to Vyšehrad and made a public announcement that the crowd was the result of a joint activity between the SSM and unorganized students. In consideration of the situation, the associative organs brokered a compromise to the effect that the executive member of the so-called Circle of Independent Intellectuals, an academic named KATETOV, would make an appearance on behalf of the independent initiatives. His address at Albertov did not go beyond a policy-statement and was not an openly aimed attack against the socialist structure in not an ao an opaimed attack against the socsT7u3(Thcle fisocied ogramwd wae effeatienldisruptaded nd)Tj1~1.8 -1.2 TD1~0.001 Tcr~02045

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National Theater in Prague, in which they expressed their disagreement with the Security intervention on 17 November 1989. At the urging of LUKEŠ, the theater choir and those in attendance sang a theater hymn. Afterwards they promptly dispersed. National Theater director J PAUER responded by closing the premises of the historical building and the new stage of the National Theater and cancelled evening performances with the justification that the National Theater would not serve to organize illegal gatherings. After director PAUER's decision, actors from the National Theater began to assemble in the National Theater club where they decided to strike.

During the evening hours, CSSR cultural minister Milan KYMLI KA visited the National Theater. In an interview with the National Theater employees, he indicated that the CST (Czechoslovak Television) news would address the establishment of a government commission to investigate the SNB intervention on 17 November 1989. Those present promised that as long as the commission was established, the National Theater actors' club would rescind their decision to strike. At 7:30 p.m. all closely followed the CST television broadcast. Because no announcement was made about the creation of a government commission, National Theater actors, at the urging of Boris RÖSNER, undertook additional initiatives. RÖSNER, as the spokesman for the National Theater actors, along with three other individuals, proceeded to the front of the theater building where, after only a short time, he was able to organize a crowd of approximately 500 people. RÖSNER announced that the National Theater would strike continuously until it was called off, the crowd chanted the slogan "OUT WITH PAUER."

On 19 November 1989, shortly after 10:00 p.m., at the Ji Wolker Theater, at the location originally determined for the performance, theater employees read a declaration to the audience explaining that the theater had joined the protest strike as an expression of their disagreement with the Security intervention on 17 November 1989. 17 December was determined as a substitute date for the









[Source: ÚSD AV ČR, KC OF Archive, file Dokumenty OF—copy of the computer print. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.]



**DOCUMENT No. 5**  
**Draft Thesis of the Program of**  
**the Civic Forum,**  
**Prague, 24 November 1989**

Program of the Civic Forum  
(First draft thesis, 24 November 1989)

Czechoslovak society is going through a deep crisis. This crisis is displayed primarily:

1. In the disregard of several human rights, especially the right of free assembly and association, the right of free expression of opinion, and the right to partake in the decisions of public affairs.
2. In the continuing disillusionment of society, the unsteadiness of moral values, the erosion of the meaning of truth and knowledge, education and rationality, dialogue and tolerance, that is values which have been in European culture for thousands of years; this process is accompanied by actual or internal emigration, corruption, orientation towards consumerism and other undesirable phenomena.
3. In the emptiness of a great part of official culture.
4. In the decrease in the level of culture and education, which is especially pronounced when compared internationally.
5. In the rapidly worsening quality of the environment, connected to the devastation of natural resources, the contamination of drinking water and comestibles by parasitic, harmful substances; through this the most basic human right, the right to life, is violated.
6. In the worsening state of health of the Czechoslovak population and the endangerment of its ability to reproduce.
7. In the backwardness of Czechoslovak science in many scientific fields and applied areas.
8. In the decline of the total innovational activity in the society.
9. In the decreasing effectiveness of the Czechoslovak economy and the growth of foreign and especially internal debt.
10. In the rising alienation between individual and social groups; the alienation between ordinary citizens and the ruling group is reaching Kafkaesque proportions.
11. In the abuse of the means of force against the citizens, which we were reminded of once again with the intervention of “disciplinary forces” on 17

November 1989, in Prague.

12. In the worsening of the overall position of Czechoslovakia in the international community.

All these introduced, deeply disturbing phenomena bear witness to the impairment of the ability of our society to control effectively our development; [they] are testimonies to the unsuitable current political and economic system. In the society almost all corrective feedback, which is essential for effective reaction to the fast-changing internal and external conditions, has been impaired. For long decades, the simple principle of the symmetry between authority and responsibility has not been respected: those in the state who attribute every executive authority to themselves, do not feel themselves to be responsible for the effected and missed decisions and refuse to settle accounts with the nation for their actions. All three fundamental powers of the state: legislative power, executive and judicial (regulatory), have come into the hands of a narrow ruling group, composed almost exclusively of CPCz members. This struck at the very foundations of a lawful state. The ruling group does not respect its own laws and international agreements not only in the area of human rights, but not even in other, wholly non-political spheres—an example of this can be the systematic violation of laws on environmental protection.

The practice of the nomenclature of the CPCz, consisting of the placement of leading workers in all important places, creates a vassal system which cripples the entire society. The citizens were thus degraded to the position of a common mob, who are denied basic political rights.

The directive system of the central leadership of the national economy has reached the limits of its potential. The promised reconstruction of the economic mechanism is without results and proceeds slowly. It is not accompanied by political changes, which undermines its effectiveness. A solution to these problems cannot be the simple exchange of seats in the positions of power or the resignation of several of the most compromised politicians from public life. It is necessary to make fundamental, effective and lasting changes in the political and economic system of our society. The basis of this must be newly created or renewed democratic institutions, which would enable real—not just proclaimed—citizen participation in the management of public affairs and simultaneously establish an effective system to prevent the abuse of political and economic power. A condition for this is the creation of such a climate in the society that would provide equal opportunities to all existing political parties and newly established political groups to prepare and hold free elections with independent candidate lists. A self-evident condition is the resignation of the CPCz from its constitutionally ensured leading role in our society and in its monopoly of the control of public media.

In the national economy we consider it essential to support the activity and productivity of the widest strata of

society through the quick development of a market

Pact countries in Czechoslovakia a violation of the norms of international law and the Warsaw Pact itself, because the intervention occurred without the knowledge or agreement of the highest state organs of Czechoslovakia.

10. The CF believes that this outcome justifies it in challenging every citizen to continue working in peace while in a state of readiness to strike. Strike committees can transform themselves into civic forums, but can also work along side of them. Students and theater workers will decide themselves whether they will end their strike today or tomorrow, or whether to continue it. When they decide, however, the CF will support their position. The CF and PAV challenge the public to assess itself the results of these negotiations and to make their opinion known to the CF and PAV by all accessible means.

The Civic Forum and Public Against Violence  
28 November 1989 at 4 p.m.

[Source: ÚSD AV ČR, KC OF Archive, file OF Documents—typescript copy A4, 1 p. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.]



## DOCUMENT No. 7

### Internal Organization of the Civic Forum, 28 November 1989

#### What We Are

The Civic Forum is a medium for the renewal of genuine civic positions and life, forgotten more than forty years ago. The following text therefore does not contain any statutes, it only wants to be a concise guideline for creating local civic forums.

The internal organization of Civic Forums:

1. The Civic Forum (further only CF) is a spontaneously created citizen movement, which is united by the effort to find positive outcomes from the current crisis in our society. No one is excluded from this movement who agrees with the program directives of the CF, published on 26 November 1989 and who especially refuses the further continuation of a political system consisting of one ruling party. We consider the basic goal of the CF to be the complete opening of an environment for the creation of political pluralism and for the organization of free elections in our country.

2. It is possible to create a local CF anywhere based on regions, professions or interests by citizens, and not institutions. We recommend that membership in the CF be established by signing the charter of the local CF organizations; we further recommend that an informal coordinating group be established to which the citizens

could turn, and that its representatives be elected.

3. Relations between the Coordinating Center and the local CFs:

a) The CF Coordinating Center and the local CF constitute a unit joined solely by the active civic attitude of its members. The Civic Forum does not have a complicated hierarchy, only a horizontal net with every local Civic Forum, connected to one coordinating center;

b) The Coordinating Center is just an informational and organizational center, and it is in no way an administrative center; its task is to collect information from local CFs, exchange it and inform [all local CFs] about past and future activities. All local Civic Forums operate completely independently on the local level;

c) The Coordinating Center represents the Civic Forum in negotiations with central state and international institutions, mostly on the basis of suggestions and recommendations from the local CF.

4. The function of the informational center of the CF:

a) In order to secure informational links, it is necessary to submit in writing to the Coordination Center these basic details about the local CF: business, region or interest group where the CF was created, precise address, telephone number, names of the representatives, number of members (rough estimate at least). These data will be entered on file centrally;

b) Contact with the Coordinating Center—for a period of three weeks starting on 28 November 1989, the record-keeping, collection of information and consulting services of the CF will be located at: Špálova galery, Národní Třída 30, 110 00 Praha 1, tel. 268366, 265132, 267529. The new address and telephone line of the Coordinating Center will be released promptly. The post office box of the CF: 632, pošta 111 21, Praha 1, Politických věz 4, Communications Professional Training Center entrance. CF account 2346-021, SB S branch Praha 2, 110 01 Praha 1, Václavské náměstí 42;

c) Transfer and exchange of information between individual local CFs and the Coordinating Center will be ensured in the form of an informational bulletin, which will be sent out by the Coordinating Center by means of mass communications or exceptionally by telephone.

5. The orientation of the activity of the local CF:

The point of the activity of the local CF is the activation of civic behavior of its own free will and discussion in political and everyday life. Therefore the Coordinating Center can not and does not want to hand down any orders and restrictions, it solely provides suggestions and recommendations.

6. We believe that the local CFs should concern themselves very soon with these areas of activity:





<sup>1</sup>Ladislav Adamec was a member of the Central Committee, Prime Minister of the Czech Federal government in 1987 and Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia in 1988. A moderate communist economic reformer,

Adamec's proposed (3 December) changes to form a new government were not accepted by the the non-communist opposition. He withdrew from public life in 1990.

## COLD WAR HISTORY

## The Last Days of a Dictator

By **Mircea Munteanu**

**T**o those interested in the history of contemporary

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Congress.<sup>7</sup> I believe that you are satisfied with the results of your Congress. Within Romanian society, among the Romanian communists, as our comrades have told me, the reaction to the decisions of the Congress has been a positive one.

From me as well as from the leadership of the Soviet Union, I would like to communicate, to you and to the entire Romanian party leadership, a friendly salute and good luck in bringing the decisions of the Congress to fruition.

**N. Ceaușescu:**

- I would like to thank you for your good wishes and, in turn, to express to you, in the name of our party leadership and me personally, a cordial salute to you and the Soviet leadership.



**Ceaușescu:**

- We were against a certain format... and history proved us right.

**Gorbachev:**

- I was against it myself, but there was not much I could do at the time.

**Ceaușescu:**

- Then why don't we work out a common declaration and, if other parties will agree with it, so much the better. I understand you agreed with this point.

**Gorbachev:**

- We will think about it and we will give you an answer.

**Ceaușescu:**

- Very well.

Should we start discussing bilateral issues now? Or would you rather finish up the more general problems first. We are very preoccupied about what is going on with a few European socialist countries. We understand the drive to perfect, to renew, but I do not want to discuss this right now. The format of this renewal places in grave danger not just socialism in the respective countries but also the very existence of the communist parties there. If we allow this flow of events, a dire situation will develop.

In any case, one can not say that socialism did not accomplish anything in those countries. I believe that the Soviet Union, and I am referring primarily to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, could have a certain role—not by the force of the military—to help produce a better orientation. You were speaking today about a better orientation for those parties and countries.

Of course, a meeting between the socialist countries and our parties could help, but we have to think hard about the actions taking place in some countries.

**Gorbachev:**

- Here we need to ask how we all could act and more importantly how they should act.

Who prevented Czechoslovakia and the East Germany—countries that had a high level of economic development and high living standards—from beginning in time the process of modernization and [from] taking into account the changes that began to take shape in the development of society? If they would have done this at the right time, today's events would be different. We too, in the Soviet Union. If we would have taken care of the modernization of the technology and of economic development at the right time, there would be a different approach today. There was a lot of talk at the time, in meetings and during congresses, about the technological and scientific revolutions, about the development of our country. Yet in the end, all was set aside. Right now we have a report in the Central Committee about the technological and scientific revolution from 1973, and, look, 15 years later, we are just beginning to do what needed to be done then. I believe that we have lost a lot of our prestige because we have not taken direct action regarding those problems at the right time.

**Ceaușescu:**

- This is true.

**Gorbachev:**

- Whether or not we like the methods employed by Comrade Ceaușescu, we know that a lot has been done in Romania, and, in an objective manner, all are free to choose their own methods to accomplish progress and the construction of socialism. That's about it.

Look at the situation in which our common friend, Comrade [deposed East German leader Erich] Honecker is today. We have a great deal of mutual sympathy, but as of late, he did not want to speak with me, and I did not have a chance to speak with him. After all, I told him: Comrade Honecker, it is your job to decide, we will not decide for you, we do not force you to adhere to our decisions. As a matter of fact, I know that the both of you have criticized me...

**Ceaușescu:**

- No, we did not criticize you. N TD1~0.001 Tc1so wÕ

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**Gorbachev:**

- Absolutely.

**Ceaușescu:**

- The mistake was that you have placed too much emphasis on the military side of research and development and you have neglected the other aspects.

**Gorbachev:**

- I know.

**Ceaușescu:**

- I understand that the international situation necessitated such behavior. But you do have a powerful research and development sector, very powerful... it could solve easily any problem. And, after all, the other socialist countries, they might be smaller, but we can work together in this field.

**Gorbachev:**

- If we think about the countries in Europe, with all the problems they are experiencing, they are modern nations.

**Ceaușescu:**

- The changes that have taken place... they need to be stopped and we need to get under way.

**Gorbachev:**

- We have considered that as well. Maybe we have



**Dăscălescu:**

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**Ceaușescu:**

- That is very good. We consider that this problem must be discussed with due seriousness. For example, we and the Chinese deal in Swiss Francs.

**Ryzhkov:**

- So do we.

**Ceaușescu:**

- We do however make sure that there is a balance of payments—only the calculation of the value of trade is in hard currency. I do not believe that for the Soviet Union it will be acceptable to move from the ruble to the dollar. Of course, this is a problem for the Soviet Union to decide on.

**Gorbachev:**

- We desire that, in this whole process we also incorporate the redesign of our financial system and the system of prices, to try to quickly reach the convertibility of the ruble. The most important thing is to integrate ourselves in the world market, otherwise we have no basis of comparison.

**Ceaușescu:**

- This problem will need to be discussed, discussed for a long time.

**Gorbachev:**

- We will then propose this at the meeting, on 9 January, and we hope that by that time you will also have a position.

**Ceaușescu:**

- We do not consider this to be the most opportune time to make this move.

**Gorbachev:**

- Why?

**Ryzhkov:**

- 1990 will continue the same why but we expect to make this move in 1991.

**Ceaușescu:**

- It is not about 1990. I am thinking more about the next five years.

**Gorbachev:**

- Why?

**Ceaușescu:**

- Because this will not strengthen the economy of the socialist countries nor that of the Soviet Union.

**Gorbachev:**

- Why?

**Ceaușescu:**

- For us it is not a big deal to do such a thing. Even now, with China and the other countries we have about a 60 per cent exchange in hard currency.

**Gorbachev:**

- I will tell you this: this is not a short time plan. We must make this change, maybe we will end up in debt, but we must adopt this system. We must create the opportunity for the energy sector to earn hard currency and make investments. Today this is the least developed part of our economy, but it not only about the energy sector. In general, our industries must compete in the

world market and understand that they must make ends meet. How long can we continue to push them along?

**Ceaușescu:**

- It is not about pushing them forward, the economic activity must be planned on sound economic principles.

**Gorbachev:**

- Comrade Ceaușescu, it is easy to talk about it now, but in a few years—Comrade Ryzhkov suggests that it may take about 2 years—we can also use credits to take care of moments of transition. But we need to adopt the system right away.

**Ryzhkov:**

- We think that we need to get our economists with the Romanian economists and calculate the balance of payments if we are to move to the world system. It will be a complex system in any case.

**Gorbachev:**

- We have a lot to discuss both with respect to the method of restructuring but also regarding concrete issues.

**Dăscălescu:**

- What is concrete is that I expect Comrade Ryzhkov in Bucharest. We cannot discuss the balance of payments in Sofia.

**Ryzhkov:**

- I can not come before the meeting in Sofia. In the first trimester of the next year I could be there.

**Dăscălescu:**

- Let's say February then?

**Ceaușescu:**

- That remains to be decided among yourselves.

**Gorbachev:**

- Then Comrade Ceaușescu, we should continue to keep in touch. I am very glad that we have commenced an exchange of opinions. Sincerely speaking, I appreciate this at its face value.

**Dăscălescu:**

- I have a request for Comrade Ryzhkov, regarding natural gas.

**Ceaușescu:**

- The problem of natural gas is not one for the future, it regards the situation at this time.

**Dăscălescu:**

- For the past few days, something must have happened on your side, we are receiving 7 million cubic meters less a day. We were told that this will only last a few days. Could you please analyze this problem?

**Gorbachev:**

- This happens every year. Always something more.

**Dăscălescu:**

- It is not more, it is less.

**Ceaușescu:**

- What will we say about our bilateral meeting?

**Gorbachev:**

- You can issue a press release, we will issue a

press release. Here is a short text.

(the news release is read)

**Ceaușescu:**

- Maybe the part about the bilateral collaboration needs to be better developed. We can say that there has been an exchange of opinions regarding cooperation between our countries. We should make a separate paragraph about this thing.

**Gorbachev:**

- Very well, let's talk about the situation of our relationship and their prospects.

**Ceaușescu:**

- Very well.

[Source: Published in Șerban Săndulescu's, December '89. The Coup D'Etat Confiscated the Romanian Revolution (Bucharest: Omega Press Investment, 1996), pp. 283 - 298; Translated by Mircea Munteanu.]

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<sup>1</sup> Șerban Săndulescu, *December '89: The Coup D'Etat Confiscated the Romanian Revolution* (Bucharest: Omega Press Investment, 1996)

<sup>2</sup> Ceaușescu, (joined by the PCR CC) was the only Warsaw Pact leader that opposed the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. See *Scrisoare de r spuns adresat Biroului Politic al Comitetului Central al PCUS de c tre Comitetul Executiv al CC al PCR*, 26 August 1968

[Response letter of the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the PCR addressed to the Politburo of the CPSU, 26 August 1968], CC PCR Archives, State Archives, Bucharest, Romania, published in Alexandru Oșca, Teofil Oroian, Gheorghe Nicolescu and Vasile Popa, eds., *Tentația Libertății* (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1999) pp. 139-41

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Blanton, "When did the Cold War End?" *CWIHP Bulletin 10*, pp. 184-187. Blanton sets the end of the Cold War on 25 December 1989, during a meeting between Jack Matlock, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union and I. Aboimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union to discuss the events in Romania. In the context of the violence in Romania, Ambassador Matlock asked Deputy Minister Aboimov about the possibility of Soviet military intervention in defense of the revolutionary forces in Romania. Aboimov responded "entirely clearly and unequivocally" that "the American side may consider that 'the Brezhnev Doctrine' is now theirs as our gift." See *CWIHP Bulletin 10*, pp. 190.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., also see Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations at the End of the Cold War* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), especially pp. 404-408.

<sup>5</sup> For documents regarding the Prague Spring see Mihai Retegan, *In the Shadow of the Prague Spring* (Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 2000).

<sup>6</sup> Dennis Deletant's *Ceaușescu and the Securitate: coercion and dissent in Romania, 1965-89* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1995), remains the most important work to date on Romanian Communism and specifically on Ceaușescu.

<sup>7</sup> The Romanian Party Congress ended on 24 November 1989.

<sup>8</sup> The meeting took place during a series of consultations between Gorbachev and Communist leaders in Moscow.

<sup>9</sup> Berlinguer was Secretary-General of the party starting in 1972.

## **New CWIHP Initiative "Korea in the Cold War"**

*At its workshop on "New Evidence on the Korean War from Russian, Chinese and European Archives" on 21 June 2000, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) launched a new initiative on "New Evidence on Korea in the Cold War." The initiative, which will have a particular research emphasis on the North Korea, will be a focus of CWIHP's efforts over the next three years.*

Korea's role was central in the making and development of the Cold War. More than any other event, the Korean War (1950-1953) shaped the perceptions, alignments and parameters of the early Cold War. The Western response to the North Korean attack, followed by China's entry into the war, militarized what had until then been largely a political conflict. At the same time, it set limits on superpower military confrontation that remained in place for the duration of the Cold War. Despite the central importance of events in Korea, however, until communist bloc archives began to open in the last few years, scholars and the general public still debated the most basic questions about the war in Korea—who started the war, whether the Soviet Union was involved, who made the important decisions on the communist side during the war, what finally





*COLD*







Thank you for your interesting ideas. It's possible that this is the best evidence that the administration of President Bush has shaped its policy in the Soviet-American direction. I intend to touch on several specific issues later.

But right now I would like to make a number of comments of a philosophical nature. It seems to me that it is very important for us to talk with you about what conclusions can be drawn from past experience, from the "Cold War." What has happened remains in history. Such, if you will, is the privilege of the historical process. However, to try to analyze the course of previous events—this is our direct responsibility. Why is this necessary? Certainly we can say that we harecal

underway in the world. It is clear that we are going from a bipolar to a multipolar world. Whether we like it or not, we will have to deal with a united, integrated European economy. We could discuss the issue of Western Europe separately. Whether we want it or not, Japan is one more center of world politics. At one time you and I were talking about China. This is one more huge reality which neither we nor you should play against the other. And it is necessary to think about what to do, so that China does not feel excluded from all the processes which are taking place in the world.

All these, I repeat, are huge events typical of a regrouping of forces in the world. I am watching India's policy. This is a dynamic policy. I have talked many times with Rajiv Gandhi.<sup>6</sup> India has a deliberate approach, striving to establish good relations, both with us and you.

But what is our role in this regrouping? Very serious things ensue from this. We began to discuss this question with [former Secretary of State George P.] Shultz.<sup>7</sup> Once during the conversations he showed us diagrams describing the changes which would occur by the end of the century in economic relations between the leading countries of the world. And now it is simply necessary to understand the roles of the USSR and US in these huge changes. They cannot always be accompanied by the quiet flow of events.

And now Eastern Europe. Its share of the world economy is not very great. But look how we are all tense. What should our form of actions be, our cooperation?

And what is waiting ahead for us with regard to the economy, the environment, and other problems? We need to think together about this, too.

We in the Soviet leadership have been reflecting about this for a long time and have come to the conclusion that the US and USSR are simply "doomed" to dialogue, coordination, and cooperation. There is no other choice.

But to do this we need to get rid of the view of one another as enemies. Much of this stays in our brains. And we need to keep in mind that it is impossible to view our relations only at the military level.

All this means that we are proposing a Soviet-American condominium. We're talking about realities. And this does not at all cast doubt on our relations with our allies and current cooperation with other countries. An understanding of all this is necessary. I do not think that all this has happened yet. We have only entered into the process of mutual understanding.

You raised the question: what kind of a Soviet Union

but I don't care for wordy rehashing. It was necessary to take a decisive step. Thus the idea of a meeting in Reykjavik arose. The results of the Reykjavik talks scared some people. But in reality Reykjavik became a genuine breakthrough on arms control issues. After this, the entire negotiating mechanism started working actively and effectively.

Or take another field—economic relations. There are limited opportunities here to move forward. Political will is needed in order to overcome these restraints. A signal from the President is needed. American businessmen are disciplined people, and they will react to a display of new thinking in economics.

The delegations at the talks in Geneva have squeezed literally everything out of the directives they have. It is necessary to give momentum to all the work. I noted your ideas in this regard. They seem to me to be deserving of attention.

Thank you for putting issues of bilateral cooperation in first place. We are ready to discuss these issues.

This situation often arises: when the question is about our relations with you, they tell us—if you agree with the Americans we will support it. But as soon as we come to an agreement they cry—"a new Yalta." This is, in general, natural. Much depends on our work with our allies and the non-aligned countries.

We will move to adapt our new economy to the world economy. Therefore we attach significance to participation in the GATT system and other international economic organizations. We think that it will benefit our , , , , . . . and allow us to better understand how the world economic mechanism functions.

Earlier the US took a negative position regarding the question of the USSR's participation in world economic organizations. They sn wliTy ReOT\*0.003 Tc as we come 004.003 Tc Mu6 We s n0.004 Tce to

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conducting affairs toward a reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The US has a substantive advantage in this area. Put yourself in our place. Our Supreme Soviet will not agree to ratify a treaty if the problem of KRMB [SLCM] is passed over.

I very much welcome your suggestions about the environment. You can proceed from the premise that our experts will take an active part in the conference on ecological problems which the White House staff has planned.

I am glad that you touched on the expansion of student exchanges. We began this good work during in the Reagan presidency. It is easier for young people to find a common language. And I am confident that they will make their contribution to the positive development of Soviet-American relations.

In summary, I would like to stress again that the steps that you have described and spoken of here have made me happy. The Soviet-American dialogue has gained a certain



Wyoming are evidence of this—to agree about the rules for counting heavy bombers and air-launched strategic cruise missiles. If we take the present American formula, the US can end up not with 6,000 but with 8,500 warheads. We are not trying to haggle for anything here for ourselves: it is necessary to accept only the factual aspect of the matter as a basis.

The third problem which I have already dwelled on is sea-based strategic cruise missiles.

There are, of course, other issues, but right now I will not talk about them. If I have understood the President correctly then we are setting ourselves general guideposts: at minimum to resolve all the large remaining issues before the summit in Washington, and by the end of next year to sign the START treaty itself.

And one more important point. As I understand, Akhromeyev and Scowcroft have “chased it off.” The Soviet and American navies have nuclear weapons, both strategic-ballistic missile submarines and sea-launched cruise missiles as well as tactical: short-range sea-launched cruise missiles, nuclear torpedoes and mines. The strategic nuclear component of naval forces is a subject of the Geneva talks. That leaves tactical nuclear weapons. Although this is an unofficial conversation, I am proposing to begin official discussions. The Soviet Union is ready to completely liquidate naval tactical nuclear weapons on a mutual basis. Such a radical step would simplify immediately the procedures of monitoring its implementation.

Now some words about

going into detail. I hope you understand that it is impossible to demand of us that we disapprove of German reunification. At the same time we are aware how much of a delicate, sensitive problem this is. We are trying to act with a certain restraint. I will formulate this thought somewhat differently: neither I nor representatives of my administration want to be in a position which would be viewed as provocative. I am stressing this point.

One more example of our policy with regard to Eastern Europe. We have sent a high-level delegation to Poland. It includes my senior diplomatic advisers, other representatives of the administration, business people, trade union leaders, etc. They have gone there not to create difficulties for you but to explain to the Poles what mechanisms, in our opinion, are effective in the economic sphere.

Without dwelling on each Eastern European country, I will share only the thought that we well understand the significance of the section of the [1975] Helsinki Act about national borders in Europe.

Of course, I am ready to respond to any questions you have. Nothing interests me more than how you view the possibility of moving beyond the

I do not agree that we are "closer to Europe." Both the USSR and the US are integrated into European problems to different degrees. We understand your involvement in Europe very well. To look otherwise at the role of the US in the Old World is unrealistic, mistaken, and finally, not constructive. You should know that this is our fundamental position.

I had something else in mind: we simply were not so close to Eastern Europe historically. Of course, we are close—and will be close—to Europe and vitally interested and involved in NATO. The US is really the leader of NATO.

I want to stress separately that you are catalyzing the changes in Europe in a constructive way.

I reaffirmed our principled position about the US role in Europe on purpose. There has been too much speculation on this subject. I feed it [ ] both to you and us. But we should be absolutely



、 〃 〃 〃 〃 I would like to assure you that our positions on this issue coincide. The Soviet Union is decisively against the proliferation of chemical weapons. I propose that our ministers continue the discussion of this problem in view of the goals we have mentioned.

、 〃 〃 〃 〃 It is necessary to achieve quick progress in this area. Meanwhile you and we are morally vulnerable: others do not want to move forward or they will move in the opposite direction, pointing out that the Soviet and American chemical arsenals remain untouched.

、 〃 〃 〃 〃 I am convinced: we can successfully cooperate here. If the USSR and the US begin to reduce their chemical arsenals in stages this will give us the moral right to persuade others even more strongly of the need not to spread chemical weapons. [...]

、 〃 〃 〃 〃 I completely agree with these ideas.



This is what [longtime Gorbachev aide] A. N. Yakovlev asks: "why are democracy, openness, and a [free] market 'Western' values?"

It was not always so. You personally have laid the foundation for these changes, the movement toward democracy and openness. It is actually considerably clearer today that you and we share these values than, say, 20 years ago.

We ought not be drawn into propaganda battles.

When they insist on "Western values," then "Eastern" and "Southern" values unavoidably appear. [...]

That's it. And you see that ideological confrontations flare up again...

I understand you and agree. Let us avoid careless words and talk more about the substance of the values themselves. We welcome the changes which are occurring with all our hearts.

This is very important since, as I have said, the main thing is that the changes lead to greater openness in our relations with one another. We are beginning to be organically integrated and liberated from everything which divided us. What will this be called in the final account? I think—a new level of relations. Therefore, for my part, I support your suggestion—let us not have a discussion on a theological level. Historically this has always led to religious wars.

Could we possibly say as a compromise that this positive process is proceeding on the basis of "democratic values"? [...]

Gody trudnykh resheniy  
( )

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff

(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 408.

<sup>2</sup> Section 402 of the 1974 Trade Act. It denies normalized US commercial relations with communist countries who restrict free emigration of their citizens.

<sup>3</sup> Limits the credit (to a maximum exposure of \$300 million) that the US Export-Import Bank can lend to the

Soviet Union. Passed in 1974 as an amendment to the Trade Act.

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Record of a Meeting in Berlin on 3 September 1989 between Comrade Hermann Axen, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Communist Party of the Social Unity Party [SED], and Comrade Raoul Castro Ruz, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and First Deputy of the State Council and Council of Ministers



**T**he last summits between the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Mao Zedong played a significant role in political and psychological preparations



war on us." Khrushchev continues: "One again, we touched on sensitive chords of a state whose territory had long been dominated by foreign conquerors. After this [summit] I began to understand much better what motivated Mao in this conversation... I understand that a





neutral India and the PRC. This war revealed a real discrepancy between Soviet foreign policy and Chinese interests. The official Soviet record provides necessary correction to Khrushchev's memoirs:<sup>31</sup> what the Soviet leader remembered was "rude" and "awkward" manners of Chen Yi. The record shows that these epithets fitted Khrushchev more than anyone else in the talks, especially providing possible refinement of his expressions by Russian interpreters who wrote the transcripts. Volkogonov, commenting on the October summit of 1959, wrote: "Khrushchev in Beijing did not show flexibility, tact, wisdom, and his 'revolutionary diplomacy' collided with its counterpart."<sup>32</sup>

Indeed, the Russian transcripts show Khrushchev as much more confident of himself in comparison with the 1958 summit, and prepared to attack the Chinese as Mao had assaulted the Soviets more than a year earlier. Wearing the mantle of a world statesman, Khrushchev preferred this time to disapprove of Mao's brinkmanship as illogical, unnecessary and contradicting Soviet policy of "détente." From Mao's angle, Khrushchev practiced a double standard, since he himself was doing approximately the same thing with different means with regard to West Berlin.

Even during the first conversation in July 1958, Khrushchev's patience had begun to wear thin under the barrage of Mao's pricking, unnerving comments. In October 1959 he was considerably more short-tempered. Contrary to his claims in the memoirs, he had learned nothing about the Chinese motivations, and was not even prepared to listen. At one point Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi hinted to him openly that the Chinese belligerence towards India was dictated by the desire to take revenge for the century of humiliation at the hands of European great powers. He tactfully omitted Russia. But this useful hint was ignored by Khrushchev. He was incensed by Chen Yi's repeated use of the word "time-servers" in connection with the Soviet leaders. There might have been a problem of language and translation involved: for Khrushchev this word was synonymous with "opportunist," a deadly ideological label for a good communist. It is not clear what the word exactly meant in Chinese context.

Khrushchev rushed to give a rebuff: "What a pretty situation we have: on one hand, you use the formula [the communist camp] 'led by the Soviet Union,' on the other hand, you do not let me say a word. What kind of equality can we talk about?" Later Khrushchev and Suslov repeated this argument in Moscow, expecting to get support from his colleagues.

The October 1959 summit presents a different Mao in comparison with 1958; the Chinese leader was less forceful and somewhat mellow. Perhaps the disastrous consequences of his Great Leap Forward forced Mao to take a lower profile, and provided more room for his politburo colleagues at the meeting. At the same time he was clearly in command and must have enjoyed when his colleagues, one after another, attacked the Soviet leader. At some point, when the altercation between Khrushchev and Chen Yi degenerated into a brawl, Mao must have realized that

things had gone too far. He intervened with reassuring calm tone to bring the stormy meeting to a civilized conclusion.

Whether Mao expected an open Sino-Soviet split soon or not, he obviously did not want to be blamed for it. After Khrushchev's departure, in a conversation with Soviet chargé S.F. Antonov, the Chinese leader struck a very conciliatory tone. He pointed out that the Sino-Soviet differences constituted only "half a finger" out of ten. Mpenlre h-0.008 tak0.0 it.01 Tw(prepare 4ati-0plitlearly) MoscooTJ24Oeeareyhjer\

ideological choice would be unbreakable. It seemed much more solid than the ties that emerge between countries on the ground of sober pragmatic interests."<sup>35</sup> The truth that Mao had decided to shake off the fraternal embrace was



have parted ways now, who did not support this proposal by Stalin either. After Stalin's death we immediately raised the issue of liquidating the joint companies [smeshannie obschestva], and today we do not have them anywhere.

Mao Zedong: There were also two half-colonies—Xinjiang [Sinkiang] and Manchuria.

N.S. Khrushchev: The abnormal situation there has been liquidated.

Mao Zedong: According to the agreement, there was even a ban on the residence of citizens of third countries there.<sup>4</sup> You also eliminated these half-colonies.

N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, since it contradicted basic communist principles.

Mao Zedong: I am in absolute agreement.

N.S. Khrushchev: Even in Finland, a capitalist country, we liquidated our military base.

Mao Zedong: And it was you personally who liquidated the base in Port Arthur.

N.S. Khrushchev: It could not be otherwise. This was even more correct with regard to a socialist country. Even in capitalist countries this causes nothing but harm. We liquidated joint ownership in Austria; we sold it to the Austrian government. This bore its fruits. Otherwise there would have been a constant source of conflict with the Austrian government. We had good, warm meetings when we received a delegation from Austria. Earlier we would not have been able to hold such meetings. The fact that we have good relations with a neutral capitalist country is advantageous for all socialist countries.

Our course is crystal-clear. We render assistance to former colonies; there is not a single clause in our treaties that would cloud our relations or contain encroachments on the independence of the country which we assist. In this lies the strength of the socialist camp. When we render assistance to former colonies and do not impose political conditions, we win over the hearts of the peoples of these countries. Such assistance is provided to Syria, Egypt, India, Afghanistan, and other countries. Recently we agreed to sign a treaty with Argentina. This will strongly affect the minds of people in Latin America and particularly in Argentina. We agreed to provide equipment for the oil industry in the amount of \$100 million. This is directed against the United States, so that South Americans would not feel completely dependent on the US and would realize that there is a way out.

Mao Zedong: This is right.

N.S. Khrushchev: How could you think that we would treat you in such a way as was described in the conversations with cde. Yudin? (Joking.) Now I am launching an attack.

Mao Zedong: (As a joke) What do I have to please clarify? It is not that we are... (Our is cde eqwou." Hrenaiw: "Cis cry0." Be twislari fy

also routed the Japanese Navy with the help of the air force.

The question is where one should invest money.

When we received your letter, we began to think—to send the military [to China], but they have no unanimous viewpoint on naval construction. We already discussed this question three times and one last time decided to give them a month deadline for presenting their proposals. What kind of navy does one need under modern conditions? We stopped the construction of cruisers, [and] tossed the artillery turrets that were already finished into the smelting furnaces. And they had the value of gold. We have several cruisers under construction in docks [na stapeliakh]. Within our General Staff, people are divided into two camps: some say—toss them away, others say—we should finish them and then should stop building. Upon my return I will have to decide on this. The military advisers split into two groups. I did not have a firm opinion on this: to end the construction—investments are lost, to finish—more expenses are needed. One does not need them for war. Before I left for vacation, [Defense Minister Marshal Rodion] Malinovsky asked me to look into this question. At the Military Council for Defense I spoke against finishing the cruisers, but did not do so decisively. Malinovsky cajoled me, I decided to support him. We held a session of the CC Presidium, and many distinguished marshals and generals spoke there categorically against [terminating construction]. We then decided to postpone the question until Malinovsky returned from vacation and to discuss it once again. I think that at this time we will decide to throw them in the furnace [vagranka].

What kind of consultation under such circumstances could our military have given you? Therefore we said to ourselves that we must get together with the responsible Chinese comrades to discuss and resolve this issue. We could not rely on the military alone since they lack themselves any precise point of view. We wanted to discuss jointly with you which direction we should take in the construction of the Navy. For instance, I cannot say today which point of view on this question the head of the Naval Headquarters has [shtaba voenno-morskikh sil]. If we send him [to the PRC], one cannot say which opinion he would express—his own or ours. Therefore we wanted to discuss this with comrades Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai, with military and civilian officials. We did not want to impose our point of view and we are not going to; you might have disagreed with us on which kind of navy we should build. We are still in the exploratory phase.

Who today needs cruisers with their limited firepower, when rocketry exists[?] I told Eden in London that their

did not think to build a joint plant or a joint fleet. We do not need anything like this.

Mao Zedong: Yudin spoke not once about the creation of a joint fleet and said that the Black and the Baltic Seas do not have outlets, that to operate the Navy from Murmansk is not easy, that the road from Vladivostok is blocked by Japan, etc. He also pointed out that the Chinese coastline is very extended. According to Yudin, the USSR produces atomic submarines. His entire speech boiled down to the creation of a joint fleet.

N.S. Khrushchev: We build our Navy and can use it. This is a formidable weapon. It is true that it will be difficult to use it, but so will it be for the enemy. War in general is a difficult business.

Mao Zedong: I asked Yudin, who would have ownership of the fleet—the Chinese, the USSR, or both countries jointly[?] I also emphasized that under current conditions the Chinese need the fleet as Chinese property, and that any other ownership is out of question. In case of war we will deliver everything to the Soviet Union. Yet, Yudin insisted that the fleet should be a joint one. For the third time Yudin was received by cde. Liu Shaoqi and other comrades. At this conversation Yudin repeated what he said previously. Our comrades spoke against the joint fleet. He changed the formula and instead of a “joint fleet” started talking about “joint construction.” Our comrades criticized this statement as well, and said that we understood this to mean joint ownership of the fleet. Then Yudin began to speak about “joint efforts” to create the fleet.

N.S. Khrushchev: This is also my fault. I should not have instructed Yudin, who does not command the issue, to inform you. But we did not want to write a letter on this question. We wanted to inform you orally.

Mao Zedong: We understood it as follows: if we want to obtain [Soviet] assistance, then we must build a joint fleet aimed primarily against the US. We understood that Khrushchev wanted to resolve the question about a joint creation of the Navy together with Chinese comrades, having in mind also to draw in Vietnam.

N.S. Khrushchev: I said that, when the war begins, we would have to use the coast widely, including Vietnam.

Mao Zedong: I already said that, in case of war, the Soviet Union will use any part of China, [and] Russian sailors will be able to act in any port of China.

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Mao Zedong: The direction of the newspaper was erroneous, and now the situation is rectified.

N.S. Khrushchev: This is your business. We also considered the direction of the newspaper to be erroneous. I think the business with Mikoyan is resolved.

Mao Zedong: He is a good comrade. But the ratio in him spawned our remarks. We would like him to come.

N.S. Khrushchev: Among us in the Presidium there is no differences of opinion about our relations, [about relations] between our Parties. We all take joy in your



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Present at the meeting: cdes. Khrushchev, Malinovsky, Kuznetsov, Ponomarev, Antonov

Cdes: Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Wang Jiaxian [?], Huang Kecheng Sheng, Yang Shang, Hu Qiuomu.

[Mao Zedong:] I would like to clarify two small, but important issues.

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military bases are drawn up close to our borders. But their main bases are located far from us, in America. It is difficult for bombers to reach them. But now, with the availability of missile weapons, the correlation of forces has been equalized. We are currently going through difficulties in testing long-range missiles. For this our territory is insufficient.

Mao Zedong: Could you launch them in the direction of the North Pole?

N.S. Khrushchev: But this is exactly the short distance, and in case of war we will fire across the Pole. That is why the Americans offer inspections of the Arctic Zone, so they could detect our missile bases and secure themselves.

Mao Zedong: I read the reply by Eisenhower to your proposal on prevention of surprise attack. It seems to be a decent answer, he seems to be ready to convene a conference of experts on this issue. They are obviously afraid of a surprise attack.

N.S. Khrushchev: I have not seen this letter yet.

Mao Zedong: I would like to agree with you regarding the departure of the delegation. Perhaps we should change the farewell ceremony, to convene the public at the airport, line up the guard of honor, invite the diplomatic corps.

N.S. Khrushchev: Yesterday we seemed to have agreed to arrange the same kind of departure as the arrival. Let our agreement be firm. Thus we will give fewer pretexts for idle gossip [krivotolki]. Otherwise they will write in the West that the arrival was secret, because they did not expect the talks to be successful, that perhaps there were some contradictions between China and the Soviet Union, that then they met, reached agreement and decided to stage a pompous farewell ceremony. Let them better try to solve the riddle, let the very fact of the meeting have an effect.

Mao Zedong: I thought it necessary that your arrival would be in secret so that the imperialists could not use your absence for delivering a surprise attack.

N.S. Khrushchev: I do not think they would have dared to do this; the correlation of forces is not in their favor. Now they had to swallow another bitter pill—to recognize Iraq. But even if they had been prepared for war at 50 percent readiness, they would not have started it even then.

Mao Zedong: Yes, England, of course, would not have started it.

N.S. Khrushchev: Both France and Germany would not have dared it. They know that we can reduce them to dust. The British during the Second World War suffered from German "V-1" and "V-2," but now these would be toys in comparison with [our] missiles. Everyone knows it.

Mao Zedong: But they have bases everywhere. In Turkey alone more than 100 bases.

N.S. Khrushchev: No, there are fewer bases in Turkey, and even they all are now in our cross-hairs [u nas podpritselom]. They intend to build bases in Greece, but there it is even easier: one can push the boulder from the

mountain in Bulgaria—so much for the bases. Even America itself is now under threat of attack.

We should be grateful to our scientists for the creation of the transcontinental missile.<sup>51</sup>

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Present at the conversation: Cdes. M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko.

Cdes: Deputy Chairmen of the CC CCP Liu Shaoqi, Zhao Enlai and Lin Biao; Members of the Politburo Peng Zhen and Chen Yi; Member of the Secretariat Wan Xia Sang.



be no war. We do not want war over Taiwan.

Mao Zedong: Taiwan is an internal PRC issue. We say that we will definitely liberate Taiwan. But the roads to liberation may be different—peaceful and military. Zhou Enlai declared at the Bandung conference in 1955 that China is ready to conduct negotiations with the US. In effect, since then there have been talks between Americans and us, first in Geneva, then in Warsaw. At first, the representatives at these talks met once a week, then once every two weeks, and recently once a month. Both sides do not want to derail the talks. For a while the Americans attempted to derail the talks. We declared that it was bad and set the terms for its resumption. The Americans declared that they were also in favor of continuing the talks, but they could not accept the “ultimatum” schedule. We disagreed. Then, after our shelling of the off-shore Chinese islands Quemoy and Matsu, the talks resumed. We Chinese always put forth the following idea at the talks: Americans, please, leave Taiwan, and after that there will not be any problems between us. We would then begin resolving the remaining issues with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] on the basis of negotiations. Jiang Jieshi does not want the Americans to leave. The US, in turn, is afraid that Jiang Jieshi may establish ties with the PRC. There were military actions in this region but they did not constitute war. In our opinion, let Taiwan and other islands stay in the hands of the Jiang Jieshi-ists [Chiang Kai-shekists] for ten, twenty and even thirty years. We would tolerate it.

N.S. Khrushchev: I would like to say that at the first lunch meeting at the Soviet embassy in the USA, Eisenhower said that they, the Americans, had been negotiating with the PRC for a number of years and there were no results, and that the Chinese did not even agree to liberate five Americans that were in confinement in the PRC, and this complicated the situation and seriously irritated the American people. Moreover, Eisenhower told me, let all the Chinese that live in the US leave, if they like, we will not hold them back. Eisenhower also told me that there was no use for me to go to China.

Mao Zedong: China cannot be equaled with Germany, not only because the population of Taiwan is considerably smaller than the population on the Chinese mainland, but also because China was not a defeated country at the end of World War II, but among the victorious powers. Germany was divided into two states as a result of the Potsdam Agreement. In Korea, the 38th parallel was also established per agreement between Kim Il Sung and us, on one side, and Americans on the other. Vietnam was divided into North and South in accordance with the Geneva agreements. As for Taiwan is concerned, there was no decision on it at any international conference. The appearance of Americans on Taiwan arouses discontent not only in socialist countries, but also in England, in the US itself and other countries.

N.S. Khrushchev: Eisenhower understands this. But the problem is that he must first recognize the Chinese



business, but I am speaking about it as an ally.

Mao Zedong: We informed you about our intentions regarding Taiwan a month ahead, before we began shelling the off-shore islands.

N.S. Khrushchev: He reported to us not about your policy on this issue, but about some separate measures. We expressed our position, and now it is your business, whether to agree with us or not. We do not quite understand your policy in international issues. The issues of international policy we must coordinate. You perhaps should think if it is necessary to exchange opinions through the channels of foreign ministries on major political issues where we have no agreement.

Mao Zedong: As I already said, we informed you about our intentions through your General Staff. However, I would like to know what is your opinion on what we ought to do.

N.S. Khrushchev: We stand for relaxation of tensions. We only wanted the people to understand that we stand for peace. It is not worth shelling the islands in order to tease cats.

Mao Zedong: This is our policy. Our relations with Jiang Jieshi and with the Americans—are two different things. With the United States we will seek to resolve issues by peaceful means. If the United States does not leave Taiwan, then we will negotiate with them until they go from there. The relationship with Jiang Jieshi is our internal question and we might resolve it not only by peaceful, but also other methods. As far as the creation of the Far Eastern republic is concerned, and also the fact that at some point Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were separated from the Soviet Union, you should keep in mind that in these cases there was no foreign intervention.

N.S. Khrushchev: The issue of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Poland, Georgia, Armenia - this is an issue of a completely different nature. This is an issue of national self-determination. As for the Far Eastern republic, it was part of Russia.

Mao Zedong: The Taiwan Question is very complex.

N.S. Khrushchev: We have a common understanding of the question of Taiwan. At the present time there is only [a difference on] the question of tactics. You always refuse to work out a policy on this question that we could understand. You might think that we interfere into your internal affairs, but we only express our considerations. In this regard I would remark that we do not know what kind of policy you will have on this issue tomorrow.

Mao Zedong: We do not want war with the United States.

N.S. Khrushchev: One should not pose the issue this way. Neither you nor I want war—this is well known. The problem is that not only does the world public opinion not know what you might undertake tomorrow, but also even we, your allies, do not know it.

Mao Zedong: There could be two ways here. The first of them—to do what the Americans demand, i.e. to provide a guarantee on the non-use of force regarding Taiwan. The

Americans long ago posed the question and told us about it via Eden as early as March 1955. The second way is to draw a clear line between our relations with the United States and the relations with the Jiang-Jieshi-ists. As to the relations with Jiang Jieshi, here any means should be used, since the relations with Jiang Jieshi are our internal matter.

After a one-hour break the exchange of opinions resumed.

Mao Zedong: What should we do?

Zhou Enlai: We should continue.

Mao Zedong: To do what the Americans propose is not too good for us. And the Americans do not want to reciprocate, to do what we want.

N.S. Khrushchev: You are leaving us in an awkward position. You frame the question as if we support the position of Americans, while we stand on our Soviet communist position.

Mao Zedong: Perhaps we should postpone this question indefinitely. Everyone sees that we are not close to the United States and that the United States, not us, send[s] its fleet to our coast.

N.S. Khrushchev: One should keep in mind that we also are not without sin. It was we who drew the Americans to South Korea. We should undertake such steps that would allow the Americans to respond with their steps in the direction of a relaxation of the situation. We should seek ways of relaxing of the situation, to seek ways to ameliorate the situation. You know that when the events in Hungary took place, our hand did not waver to deliver a decisive crack-down on the counterrevolution. Comrade Liu Shaoqi was then with us and we together resolved this question. If it becomes necessary again, then we will carry out one more time our internationalist communist duty, and you should have no doubts about it. We would think that one should work out a whole system, a staircase of measures, and in such a way that people would understand us. After Stalin's death we achieved a lot. I could tell about a number of points on which I disagreed [with Stalin]. What did Stalin leave for us? There were [anti-aircraft] artillery around Moscow that was ready to open fire any moment. We expected an attack at any minute. We succeeded in liquidating such a situation and we are proud of this. Keep in mind that we achieved [the present-day] situation without giving up on any principled positions. We raised this issue also because we do not understand your position, do not understand in particular your conflict with India. We had a dispute with Persia on border issues for 150 years. 3-4 years ago we resolved this issue by transferring to Persia some part of our territory. We consider this issue as follows: five kilometers more land we have or five kilometers less—this is not important. I take



against the Soviet Union. Stalin forbade opening fire in response, and the instruction to open fire was sent only after some time. As Stalin explained, it might have been a provocation. Of course, it was Stalin's mistake. He simply got cold feet [on strusil]. But this case is absolutely different.

Zhu De: Hindus crossed the McMahon line that tears away 90 thousand square kilometers from China.

Chen Yi: After the revolt in Tibet there were several anti-Chinese, anti-communist campaigns in India. There were demonstrations against our Embassy in Dehli and the consulate in Calcutta; their participants reviled the leaders of the PRC and shouted anti-Chinese slogans. We did nothing like that, and the Indian Ambassador in the PRC had not the slightest pretext to claim [that we] were unfriendly.

N.S. Khrushchev: Our Soviet representatives abroad had much more fallen on them than yours. Since the establishment of our state not a few of Soviet ambassadors were killed abroad. And in the Soviet Union only a German ambassador was killed in 1918. True, at some point the windows in the embassies of the United States and Federal Republic of Germany were broken, but we organized it ourselves.

Chen Yi: Speaking of the effectiveness of efforts to pull Nehru to our side, our method will be more efficient, and yours is time-serving [opportunism-prisposoblenchestvo].

N.S. Khrushchev: Chen Yi is Minister of Foreign Affairs and he can weigh his words. He did not say it at random. We have existed for 42 years, and for 30 years we existed alone [as a socialist country] and adjusted to nothing, but carried out our principled communist policy.

Chen Yi (in great agitation and hastily): The Chinese people evoked pity for a long time and during many decades lived under oppression of British, American, French and other imperialists. The Soviet comrades should understand this. We are now undertaking certain measures to resolve the conflict with India peacefully, and just one fact testifies to this, that perhaps Vice President of India Radhakrishnan will come to us in mid-October. We also have a certain element of time-serving. You should understand our policy correctly. Our line is firmer and more correct.

N.S. Khrushchev: Look at this lefty. Watch it, comrade Chen Yi, if you turn left, you may end up going to the right. The oak is also firm, but it breaks. I believe that we should leave this issue aside, for we have a different understanding of it.

Zhou Enlai: Comrade Khrushchev, even the Hindus themselves do not know what and how it occurred on the Indo-Chinese border.

Lin Biao: During the war between the Soviet Union and Fascist Germany, the Soviet Army routed the fascists and entered Berlin. This does not mean that the Soviet Union began the war.

N.S. Khrushchev: It is not for me, a lieutenant-general,

to teach you, comrade Marshal.

M.A. Suslov: Comrade Lin Biao, you are trying to compare incomparable things. During the Patriotic War millions of people were killed, and here is a trivial incident.

Zhou Enlai: The Hindus did not withdraw their troops from where they had penetrated. We seek peaceful resolution of the conflict and suggested and do suggest to resolve it piece by piece.

N.S. Khrushchev: We agree with all that you are doing. It is what you have done before that we disagree with.

Zhou Enlai: The Hindus conducted large-scale anti-Chinese propaganda for 40 years until this provocation. They were the first to cross the border; they were the first to open fire. Could one still consider under these circumstances that we actually unleashed this incident?

N.S. Khrushchev: We are communists, and they are





period from 15 October until 1 December.

N.S. Khrushchev: I would also like to express an idea that has materialized just now with regard to the question of the visit of the Vice President. Would there be no bewilderment, if it were the Vice President, and not the President and Prime Minister [i.e., Nehru], to come to the PRC?

Zhou Enlai: The Hindus themselves offered the candidacy of Radhakrishnan. The President and Prime Minister of India sent us best wishes on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the PRC. In reply to the address we will remind them again about the invitation of Radhakrishnan to come to the PRC.

Mao Zedong: "Pravda" published only an abridged version of Zhou Enlai's letter to Nehru, and the TASS announcement was published in full. Perhaps we now stop discussing this issue and shift to Laos?

N.S. Khrushchev: Good, let us do this, but I have not a slightest interest in this matter, for this is a very insignificant matter, and there is much noise around it. Today Ho Chi Minh came to see us and had a conversation with us about Laos. I sent him to you, for you should be more concerned with this. During the events in Hungary and Poland cdes. Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai came to us. Cde. Liu Shaoqi and I held different, sometimes diametrically opposed positions. During several days we could not work out a common opinion. Our positions shifted, but then we reached agreement and resolved the matter well.

Mao Zedong: We are against an escalation of fire in Laos.

N.S. Khrushchev: We are also against it.

Liu Shaoqi: The Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has a plan to expand the struggle in Laos. Ho Chi Minh is against this plan, against an expansion of military activities. We support his stand.

N.S. Khrushchev: We should not expand military actions in Laos, for in this case the Americans will come. Then they will stand on the border with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and will certainly undertake provocations against the DRV. Therefore, they will be located in the immediate vicinity of the DRV, while we are removed quite substantially from the DRV. If the situation gets complicated there, the Americans could very quickly crush the DRV and we would not have time to undertake anything. In our opinion, we should advise the Vietnamese comrades not to expand military actions in Laos.

Mao Zedong: Here we are in a complete agreement with you. We are in general against not only expansion of military actions in Laos, but also for preservation of the status quo in the area of Taiwan. I would like to repeat that in August 1958, when we began shelling the off-shore islands Jimmen [Quemoy] and Matsu, we did not intend at all to undertake any kind of large-scale military actions there.

Present at the conversation were Provisional Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR in the PRC, S.F. Antonov, Attaché

of the Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, R.Sh. Kudashev, and from the Chinese side— interpreters Yan Min Fu and Li Yue Zhen. The conversation was recorder by S.F. Antonov and R.Sh. Kudashev.

Signature: S. Antonov, 3 October 1959

R. Kudashev, 3 October 1959

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, f. 52, op. 1, d. 499, ll. 1-33, copy in Volkogonov Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Translation from Russian for CWHIP by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

Vladislav M. Zubok is a senior fellow at the National Security Archive.

<sup>1</sup> Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic documents of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1993); Nan Nianlong et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989); Shi Zhongquan, *Zhou Enlai de zhuoyue fengxian* [Remarkable Achievements and Contributions of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1993); Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, "The Emerging Disputes Between Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958," *CWHIP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 148-163.

<sup>2</sup> Mark Kramer, "The USSR Foreign Ministry's Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, September 1959, 6-7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 170-185; Odd Arne Westad, "Mao on Sino-Soviet Relations: Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, CWHIP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 157, 164-169; "A New Cult of Personality": Suslov's Secret Report on Mao, Khrushchev, and Sino-Soviet Tensions, December 1959 CWHIP Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 244-248; Chen Jian, "A Crucial Step towards the Breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from China in July 1960," CWHIP Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 246, 249-250; M.Y. Prozumenschikov, "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," CWHIP Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 251-257, 258-261; Vladislav Zubok, "'Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!': Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1963," CWHIP Bulletin 10 (March 1998), pp. 152-162; "Deng Xiaoping's Talks with the Soviet Ambassador and Leadership, 1957-1963," CWHIP Bulletin 10 (March 1998), pp. 165-173.

<sup>3</sup> Dmitri Volkogonov, Sem Vozhdei: Galereia liderov SSSR. Kniga 1 [Seven Leaders. The Gallery of the Leaders of the USSR. Volume 1] (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), pp. 412-



415.

<sup>4</sup> Odd Arne Westad, "History, Memory, and the Languages of Alliance-Making" in: Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Toenneson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg (eds.), *77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977*, Working Paper no. 22 of the Cold War International History Project (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars May 1998).

<sup>5</sup> See details in: Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, "The Emerging Disputes," pp. 155-159, 163.

<sup>6</sup> Jonathan D. Spence asserts that "the Soviets were making China pay dearly for aid in industrial development, and one reason China needed an even greater agricultural surplus was to meet the terms for repayment of Soviet loans," *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 575. The Note of Yu.V. Andropov to the CC CPSU, 17 May 1958, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History [Rossiiskii Gosudarstrenni Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii] f.5 op. 49, d. 128, l. 60.

<sup>7</sup> "From the Diary of Yudin. Record of conversation with comrade Dzu De on 22 February 1958 and on 24 March 1958", RGANI, f. 5, op. 49, d. 128, ll. 40, 44-45.

<sup>8</sup> E.A. Negin, Yu.N. Smirnov, "Did the USSR share its atomic secrets with China?" *Science and Society. History of the Soviet Atomic Project (40's - 50's): Proceedings of the International Symposium at Dubna, 14-18 May 1996*, pp. 306-308.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with Feodor V. Mochulsky, Moscow, 9 July 1992.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Feodor V. Mochulsky, Moscow, 9 July 1992.

<sup>11</sup> William Taubman, "Khrushchev Vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split," *CWHIP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996-97), p. 248.

<sup>12</sup> See more in Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 213-220.

<sup>13</sup> William Taubman, "Khrushchev Vs. Mao," pp. 246, 247.

<sup>14</sup> Harrison E. Salisbury, *The New Emperors: China in*

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published in "A New Cult of Personality": Suslov's Secret Report on Mao, Khrushchev, and Sino-Soviet Tensions, December 1959, CWHIP Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 248

<sup>35</sup> Negin, Smirnov, Op. cit., p. 304.

<sup>36</sup> Troyanovsky, Op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>37</sup> Grinevsky, Op. cit., pp. 125-129, 131, 149-150, 162-163.

<sup>38</sup> Unedited Version of the Stenographic Report on the Session of the CC Plenum, 4 May 1960, Afternoon session, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 451, pp. 20-21.

<sup>39</sup> Troyanovsky, Op. cit., p. 225.

<sup>40</sup> See Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1996), pp. 4-5.

<sup>41</sup> Records of Vladimir Malin at the CC Presidium, 13-14 October 1964, *Istochnik* 2, (1998), p. 128.

<sup>42</sup> Report of the CC CPSU Presidium at the October CC CPSU Plenum (draft), by D. Polyansky, *Istochnik*, 2 (1998), p. 114.

<sup>43</sup> Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), p. 115.

<sup>44</sup> Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (München: Droemer Knaur, 1993), p. 239, and the Russian-language version *Bez skidki na obstoiatelstva: politicheskiie vospominaniia* [Making no allowance for circumstances: political reminiscences] (Moscow: Respublika-

*Sovremennik*, 1999), p. 302.

<sup>45</sup> Pavel Yudin was Soviet ambassador to the PRC in 1950-1958.

<sup>46</sup> For Chinese records of these conversations see Chen Jian and Shuguang Zhang, eds., *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950*; with a preface by Warren I. Cohen (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996).

<sup>47</sup> Reference to the Lebanon Crisis of 1958. One day after the violent overthrow of the pro-Western government of Nuri al Said in Iraq on 14 July, US President Eisenhower sent US marines to Beirut in support of the Government of President Camille Chamoun's regime.

<sup>48</sup> This was stipulated in secret agreements attached to the Sino-Soviet Treaty for Friendship and Cooperation signed in Moscow on 14 February 1950.

<sup>49</sup> Yudin fell ill on 30 July.

<sup>50</sup> Editor's Note: Reference to the 1956 Soviet military suppression of the Hungarian Revolution.

<sup>51</sup> Editor's Note: Inter-continental ballistic missile, or ICBM, first tested by the USSR in 1957.

<sup>52</sup> Editor's Note: Artificial satellites, first launched by the USSR in October 1957.

<sup>53</sup> 22 October 1958, REAT MC-16 (Taiwan), FRUS 1958-1960 China, p.421.



## Le Duan and the Break with China

### Introduction by Stein Tønnesson

The decision of the Cold War International History Project to publish Christopher E. Goscha's translation of Secretary General Le Duan's long 1979 statement about Sino-Vietnamese relations is a significant event. Until now, few Vietnamese documents of this kind have been made available to scholars. The latter tend therefore to analyze the two Indochina Wars and their role in the Cold War as a power game between Western powers, the Soviet Union and China, and to overlook Vietnamese perspectives. Goscha's translation brings one such perspective into the scholarly debate.

Goscha, a researcher with the Groupe d'Etudes sur le Vietnam contemporain (Sciences Politiques, Paris), consulted the document in the People's Army Library in Hanoi, copied it by hand, and translated it into English. He did so with full authorization. The text is undated, and the author's name is just given as "Comrade B." The content implies, however, that it was written in 1979, most probably between the Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam in February 1979 and the publication of the Vietnamese White Book about Sino-Vietnamese relations on 4 October of the same year.<sup>1</sup> It seems likely that the text was composed shortly after Deng Xiaoping's decision on 15 March 1979 to withdraw the Chinese troops from their punitive expedition into northern Vietnam, but before the defection to China of the veteran Vietnamese communist leader Hoang Van Hoan in July 1979.

How can we know that the man behind the text is Le Duan? In it, "comrade B" reveals that during a Politburo meeting in the Vietnamese Workers' Party (VWP, the name of the Vietnamese Communist Party from 1951 to 1976) he was referred to as Anh Ba (Brother Number Three), an alias we know was used by Le Duan. The document also refers frequently to high level meetings between Chinese and Vietnamese leaders where the author (referred to in the text as "I," in Vietnamese *toi*) represented the Vietnamese side in an authoritative way that few others than he could have done. We know Le Duan did not write much himself, and the document has an oral style (a fact that has made its translation extremely difficult). It thus seems likely that the text is either a manuscript dictated by Le Duan to a secretary, or detailed minutes written by someone attending a high-level meeting where Le Duan made the statement.

The document can be used by the historian to analyze: a) Le Duan's ideas and attitudes, b) the situation within the socialist camp in 1979, c) the record of Le Duan's relations with China in the period 1952–79.

From a scholarly point of view it is safest to use the text for the first and the second purposes since the document can then be exploited as an artifact, a textual residue from the past that the historian seeks to

reconstruct. As such it illuminates the views and attitudes of Vietnam's top leader in the crisis year 1979, and also some aspects of the situation within the socialist camp at that particular juncture. To use the text as a source to the earlier history of Le Duan's relations with China (the topic addressed in the text) is more problematic, since what Le Duan had to say in 1979 was deeply colored by rage. Thus he is likely to have distorted facts, perhaps even made up stories. As a source to events in the period 1952–79, the document must therefore be treated with tremendous caution, and be held up against other available sources. Two similar sources, resulting from the same kind of outrage, are the official white books published by Vietnam and China towards the end of 1979.<sup>2</sup> A third source, with a series of documents from the years 1964–77, is Working Paper No. 22, published by the Cold War International History Project in 1998, *77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977*, edited by an international group of historians: Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg. This collection contains 77 minutes of conversations—or excerpts of such minutes—between Chinese, Vietnamese and other leaders in the period 1964–77 (presumably taken down during or shortly after each conversation, but compiled, excerpted and possibly edited at later stages). The collection includes several conversations in which Le Duan took part. The editors of the *77 Conversations* write that the minutes have been compiled from "archival documents, internal Communist party documentation, and open b-0.037 Tw[(Paper .of W)74(

the purpose of justifying his own actions vis-à-vis China and ensuring support for maintaining a hard line towards Chinese pressures, possibly fighting another great war. Le Duan speaks of himself as “I,” (*toi*) identifies each of his interlocutors on the Chinese side by name, and expresses his emotions towards Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders. The author really likes the word “I”, and uses it even when referring to his talks with Ho Chi Minh. This is surprising since using *toi* in relation to conversations with the Uncle (Bac), would probably be considered arrogant, even for people who worked closely with him. The proper term in that connection would perhaps be “Chau”<sup>5</sup> Throughout the document, it is Le Duan who does everything. The style is oral. It seems possible that the one who wrote down the text later deposited the document in the Army Library.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the refreshing directness of the text, there is one thing the author almost does not do. He does not speak openly about internal disagreements among the Vietnamese leaders. The only other leaders mentioned by name are Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Chi Thanh, who had both passed away long before 1979. There is not a word about Vo Nguyen Giap, Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Xuan Thuy, Hoang Van Hoan, or any of the others who had played prominent roles in Hanoi’s tortuous relations with Beijing. Internal disagreements on the Vietnamese side are only mentioned on one occasion. Le Duan claims that everyone in the Politburo always was of the same mind, but that there had been one person who rose to question the Politburo, asking why Le Duan had talked about the need to not be afraid of the Chinese. On that occasion, says Le Duan, the one who stood up to support Anh Ba, was Nguyen Chi Thanh (the army commander in southern Vietnam, who had often been considered a supporter of Chinese viewpoints before his untimely death in 1967). The “comrade” asking the impertinent question was no doubt Hoang Van Hoan, and the fact that he is not mentioned by name may indicate that Le Duan’s statement was made before this party veteran defected to China in July 1979.

As a background to the analysis of the text, we should first establish what is generally known about Le Duan’s life (1907–86) and career. He came from Quang Tri in Central Vietnam, and based his party career on political work in the southern half of Vietnam. In the 1920s he became a railway worker, joined the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) at its foundation in 1930, and spent the years 1931–36 in a French prison. During the Popular Front period in France, he was free again to work politically and in March 1938 became member of the ICP Central Committee.<sup>7</sup> In 1940 he was arrested once more, and belonged (with Pham Hung and Nguyen Duy Trinh) to the group of party leaders who spent the war years 1941–45 at the French prison island Pulo Condore.<sup>8</sup> He was released in 1945 and during the First Indochina War he served as secretary of the Nam Bo (southern region) Party Committee (from 1951 the Central Office for South Vietnam; COSVN), with Le Duc Tho as his

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dichotomy in his moral universe was that between fear and courage. He seems to have despised those who did not "dare" to fight. If it had not been for the Vietnamese, he claimed, there would not have been anyone to fight the Americans, because at the time the Vietnamese were fighting the US, the rest of the world were "afraid" of the Americans. The same kind of moral pride comes out in Le Duan's account of a meeting he had with Zhou Enlai in Hanoi, just after the latter had received Kissinger in Beijing. Le Duan says he told Zhou that with the new Sino-American understanding, Nixon would attack "me" even harder, but "I am not at all afraid." Later in the text, he comes back to the claim that "It was only Vietnam that was not afraid of the US." He also identifies the fearful. The first person to fear the Americans was Mao, he claims. The famous statement about the "paper tiger" is not present in

struggle for national liberation. This is not like the olden days, he says, when Vietnam stood alone against China. Now the whole world is closely knit together: "... this is a time where everyone wants independence and freedom. [Even] on small islands, people want independence and freedom. All of humankind is presently like this. ... To harm Vietnam was [is] to harm humanity, an injury to independence and freedom. . . Vietnam is a nation that symbolizes independence and freedom."

1979

The next use that can be made of the document is for throwing light on the situation in the year when it was written. 1979 marks the main turning point in the history of the international communist movement. By 1977–78 it was at



the Vietnamese White Book) tells about Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1963–65, and what we know from Chinese sources. According to Le Duan’s account, it was Mao who wanted to build roads into Vietnam, and to send troops there, while he himself wished only for material assistance. In all accounts based on Chinese sources, the request for roads and volunteer troops came from the Vietnamese side, and was expressed by Le Duan and Ho Chi Minh.<sup>22</sup> This is also confirmed by some of the 77 Conversations. Le Duan’s claim that “I only asked that they send personnel, but they brought guns and ammunition” does not seem to stand up to the evidence. After the Chinese engineer







to go to China twice to talk with them [the Chinese leadership] about [the course of events] in southern Vietnam. As for the Soviets, I did not say anything at all [about the situation in southern Vietnam]. I only spoke in general terms. When dealing with the Chinese, I had to say that both were fighting the US. Alone I went. I had to attend to this matter. I had to go there and talk with them many times in this way, with the main intention to build closer relations between the two sides [meaning Chinese and Vietnamese]. It was precisely at this time that China pressured us to move away from the USSR, forbidding us from going with the USSR's [side] any longer.<sup>33</sup>

They made it very tense. Deng Xiaoping, together with Kang Sheng,<sup>34</sup> came and told me: "Comrade, I will assist you with several billion [presumably yuan] every year. You cannot accept anything from the Soviet Union."

I could not allow this. I said: "No, we must have solidarity and unity with the whole [socialist] camp."<sup>35</sup>

In 1963, when Khrushchev erred, [the Chinese] immediately issued a 25-point declaration and invited our Party to come and give our opinion.<sup>36</sup> Brother Truong Chinh and I went together with a number of other brothers. In discussions, they [the Chinese] listened to us for ten or so points, but when it came to the point of "there is no abandonment of the socialist camp,"<sup>37</sup> they did not listen ... Deng Xiaoping said, "I am in charge of my own document. I seek your opinion but I do not accept this point of yours."

Before we were to leave, Mao met with Brother Truong Chinh and myself. Mao sat down to chat with us, and in the end he announced: "Comrades, I would like you to know this. I will be president of 500 million land-hungry peasants, and I will bring an army to strike downwards into Southeast Asia."<sup>38</sup> Also seated there, Deng Xiaoping added: "It is mainly because the poor peasants are in such dire straits!"

Once we were outside, I told Brother Truong Chinh: "There you have it, the plot to take our country and Southeast Asia. It is clear now." They dared to announce it in such a way. They thought we would not understand. It is true that not a minute goes by that they do not think of fighting Vietnam!

I will say more to you comrades so that you may see more of the military importance of this matter. Mao asked me:

—In Laos, how many square kilometers [of land] are there?

I answered:

—About 200,000 [sq. km.].

—What is its population? [Mao asked]:

—[I answered]: Around 3 million!

—[Mao responded:] That's not very much! I'll bring my people there, indeed!

—[Mao asked:] How many square kilometers [of land] are there in Thailand?

—[I responded]: About 500,000 [sq. km.].

—And how many people? [Mao asked].

—About 40 million! [I answered].

—My God! [Mao said], Szechwan province of China has 500,000 sq. km., but has 90 million people. I'll take some more of my people there, too [to Thailand]!

As for Vietnam, they did not dare to speak about moving in people this way. However, he [Mao] told me: "Comrade, isn't it true that your people have fought and defeated the Yuan army?" I said: "Correct." "Isn't it also true, comrade, that you defeated the Qing army?" I said: "Correct." He said: "And the Ming army as well?" I said: "Yes, and you too. I have beaten you as well."<sup>39</sup> Did you know that?" I spoke with Mao Zedong in that way. He said: "Yes, yes!" He wanted to take Laos, all of Thailand ... as well as wanting to take all of Southeast Asia. Bringing said: (af24)dey do nots importandare to nd.Southeas



When I returned from China, I met Uncle [Ho]. He asked me:

—This was your first time to go abroad, isn't that right?

—Yes, I went abroad for the first time.

—What did you see?

—I saw two things: Vietnam is very brave and they [the Chinese] are not brave at all.

I understood this from that day on. We [the Vietnamese] were entirely different from them. Courage is inherent in the Vietnamese person, and thus we have never had a defensive strategy. Every inhabitant fights.

Recently, they [the Chinese] have brought several hundred thousand troops in to invade our country. For the most part, we have used our militia and regional troops to attack them. We were not on the defensive, and thus they suffered a setback. They were not able to wipe out a single Vietnamese platoon, while we wiped out several of their regiments and several dozen of their battalions. That is so because of our offensive strategy.

The American imperialists fought us in a protracted war. They were so powerful, yet they lost. But there was a special element, that is the acute contradictions between the Chinese and the Soviets. [Because of this,] they have attacked us hard like this.

—Vietnam fought the Americans, and fought them very fiercely, but we know that the US was an extremely large country, more than capable of amassing 10 million troops and bringing all of its considerably powerful weapons in to fight us. Therefore we had to fight over a long period of time in order to bring them to de-escalation. We were the ones who could do this; the Chinese could not. When the American army attacked Quong Tre, the Politburo ordered troops to be brought in to fight at once. We were not afraid. After that I went to China to meet Zhou Enlai. He told me: "It [the attack in Queng Tre] is probably unparalleled, unique. In life there is only one [chance,] not two. No one has ever dared to do what you, comrades, have done."

... Zhou Enlai was the Chief of the General Staff. He dared to speak, he was more frank. He told me: "If I had known before the ways which you comrades Tj0knd t010t 1TJT\*whe on([ and thedehe ChiLy atMarches, h02 Tare5 Zhou Chinese could



Why so? Because during the June 1960 conference in Bucharest, 60 Parties rose to oppose China, but it was only I who defended China.<sup>54</sup> Our Vietnamese people is like that. I will go ahead and repeat this: However badly they behave, we know that their people are our friends. As for









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## Planning for Nuclear War: The Czechoslovak War Plan of 1964

**By Petr LuÁák**

The 1964 operational plan for the Czechoslovak People's Army („ eskoslovenská Lidova Armada, or „ SLA), an English translation of which follows, is the first war plan from the era of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation that has emerged from the archives of either side. It is “the real thing”—the actual blueprint for war at the height of the nuclear era,” detailing the assignments of the “Czechoslovak Front” of forces of the Warsaw Pact.

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Even before these organizational changes were officially implemented, they had been applied in military exercises, during which the newly created fronts were to be synchronized. While the plans of the exercises and the tasks set for the participants cannot be considered an exact reflection of operational planning, they show that the time periods by which certain lines on the western battlefield were to be reached had gradually been reduced and the depth reached by Czechoslovak troops had been enlarged. In one of the first front exercises in 1960, the „ SLA was supposed to operate on the Stuttgart–Dachau line by the 4<sup>th</sup> day of conflict. The operational front exercise of March 1961 went even further in assuming that the Dijon–Lyon line would be reached on the 6<sup>th</sup>–7<sup>th</sup> day of the conflict. During the operational front exercise in September 1961, the Czechoslovak front practiced supporting an offensive by Soviet and East German forces. The line Bonn–Metz–Strnmroug was to be reached on the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> day. An exercise conducted in December 1961 gave the Czechoslovak front the task of reaching the Besancon–Belfort line on the 7<sup>th</sup> day of operations.<sup>17</sup> From the early 1960s onward, massive war games with similar designs took place in Legnica, Poland, in the presence of the commands of the individual fronts. The assumed schedule and territory covered in these exercises already reflected the vision of the 1964 plan.

In Warsaw Pact plans, Czechoslovakia did not play the main strategic role in the Central European battlefield—that fell to the Warsaw–Berlin axis. For instance, during the joint front exercise VÍTR (Wind), the Czechoslovak front, besides taking Nancy (France), was “to be prepared to secure the left wing of the Eastern forces [the Warsaw Pact–*P.L.*] against the neutral state [Austria–*P.L.*] in case its neutrality was broken.”<sup>18</sup>

With a greater number of nuclear weapons in their possession by the late 1950s, the Soviets began to appreciate nuclear weapons not merely as “normal” weapons. For Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, nuclear weapons were both a tool to exert political pressure and a measure of military deterrent. To him, further demilitarization of the Cold War could be achieved through cuts in ground forces.<sup>19</sup> Nuclear weapons in turn acquired an even more prominent role in planning for massive retaliation.<sup>20</sup> The Czechoslovak military leadership hinted at this as follows: “For the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and specifically of „ SSR, it is important not to allow the enemy to make a joint attack and not to allow him to gain advantageous conditions or the development of ground force operations, and thus gain strategic dominance. Basically, this means that our means for an atomic strike must be in such a state of military readiness that they would be able to deal with the task of carrying out a nuclear counter-strike with a time lag of only seconds or tenths of seconds.”<sup>21</sup>

### Flexible response à la Warsaw Pact

The US move from massive retaliation to flexible response during the early 1960s did not go unnoticed by the Warsaw Pact. According to its 1964 training directives, the „ SLA was supposed to carry out training for the early stages of war not only with the use of nuclear weapons but, for the first time since mid-1950s, also without them. At a major joint exercise of the Warsaw Pact in the summer of 1964, the early phase of war was envisaged without nuclear weapons.<sup>22</sup>

However, flexible response as conceived by the Warsaw Pact was not a mere mirror image of the Western version. The US attempt to enhance the credibility of its deterrent by acquiring the capacity to limit conflict to a manageable level by introducing “thresholds” and “pauses” resulted from an agreement between political leaders and the military, who assumed to know how to prevent war from escalating into a nuclear nightmare. In the East, by contrast, the concept was based only on a military—and perhaps more realistic—assessment that a conflict was, sooner or later, going to expand into a global nuclear war. In the words of the „ SSR Minister of National Defense Bohumír Lomský:

All of these speculative theories of Western strategists about limiting the use of nuclear arms and about the spiral effect of the increase of their power have one goal: in any given situation to stay in the advantageous position for the best timing of a massive nuclear strike in order to start a global nuclear war. We reject these false speculative theories, and every use of nuclear arms by an aggressor will be answered with a massive nuclear offensive using all the means of the Warsaw Treaty countries, on the whole depth and aiming at all targets of the enemy coalition. We have no intention to be the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Although we do not believe in the truthfulness and the reality of these Western theories, we cannot disregard the fact that the imperialists could

The 1964 Czechoslovak war plan is therefore especially important. It shows how little the East-bloc planners believed in the relevance of Western-style flexible response. Not only did the plan not consider the possibility of a non-nuclear war in Europe, but it assumed that the war would start with a massive nuclear strike by the West.

### The Czechoslovak war plan of 1964

Considering the high degree of secrecy surrounding these documents, only a few people in the 1960s had direct knowledge of the 1964 Czechoslovak war plan. However, several sporadic accounts make at least some conclusions possible. The plan was the first to have been drawn up by the „ SLA in the aftermath of the 1958-62 Berlin Crisis. According to the late Václav Vitanovský, then „ SLA Chief of Operations, the plan came about as a result of directives from Moscow.<sup>25</sup> These directives were then worked into operational plans by the individual armies. As Vitanovský explained, “When we had finished, we took it back to Moscow, where they looked it over, endorsed it, and said yes, we agree. Or they changed it. Changes were made right there on the spot.”<sup>26</sup> The orders for the Czechoslovak Front stated that the valleys in the Vosges mountains were to be reached by the end of the operation. Undoubtedly, this was meant to prepare the way for troops of the second echelon made up of Soviet forces.

The 1964 plan remained valid until at least 1968 and probably for quite some time after.<sup>27</sup> As early as the mid-1960s, however, a number of revisions were made. According to contemporary accounts, the Soviet leadership feared that the Czechoslovak Front would not be capable of fulfilling its tasks and, accordingly, reduced the territory assigned to the „ SLA. To support the objectives of the 1964 plan, Moscow tried to impose the stationing of a number of Soviet divisions on Czechoslovak territory in 1965-66. In December 1965, the Soviets forced the Czechoslovak government to sign an agreement on the storage of nuclear warheads on Czechoslovak soil. Implementation of both measures only became feasible after the Soviet invasion in 1968.<sup>28</sup>



## DOCUMENT

### Plan of Actions of the Czechoslovak People's Army for War Period

“Approved”  
Single Copy  
Supreme Commander  
of the Armed Forces of the USSR

Antonín Novotný  
1964

#### 1. Conclusions from the assessment of the enemy

The enemy could use up to 12 general military units in the Central European military theater for advancing in the area of the Czechoslovak Front from D[ay] 1 to D[ay] 7-8.

- The 2nd Army Corps of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] including: 4<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> mechanized divisions, 12<sup>th</sup> tank division, 1<sup>st</sup> airborne division and 1<sup>st</sup> mountain division,
- the 7<sup>th</sup> Army Corps of the USA including: the 24<sup>th</sup> mechanized division and 4<sup>th</sup> armored tank division;
- the 1<sup>st</sup> Army of France including: 3<sup>rd</sup> mechanized division, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> tank divisions, and up to two newly deployed units, including 6 launchers of tactical missiles, up to 130 theater launchers and artillery, and up to 2800 tanks.

Operations of the ground troops could be supported by part of the 40<sup>th</sup> Air Force, with up to 900 aircraft, including 250 bombers and up to 40 airborne missile launchers.

Judging by the composition of the group of NATO troops and our assessment of the exercises undertaken by the NATO command, one could anticipate the design of the enemy's actions with the following goals.

To disorganize the leadership of the state and to undermine mobilization of armed forces by surprise nuclear strikes against the main political and economic centers of the country.

To critically change the correlation of forces in its own favor by strikes against the troops, airfields and communication centers.

To destroy the border troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army in border battles, and to destroy the main group of our troops in the Western and Central Czech Lands by building upon the initial attack.

To disrupt the arrival of strategic reserves in the regions of Krkonoše, Jeseníky, and Moravská Brána by nuclear strikes against targets deep in our territory and by sending airborne assault troops; to create conditions for a successful attainment of the goals of the operation.

Judging by the enemy's approximate operative design, the combat actions of both sides in the initial period of the war will have a character of forward contact battles.

The operative group of the enemy in the southern part of the FRG will force the NATO command to gradually engage a number of their units in the battle, which will create an opportunity for the Czechoslovak Front to defeat NATO forces unit by unit. At the same time, that would require building a powerful first echelon in the operative structure of the Front; and to achieve success it would require building up reserves that would be capable of mobilizing very quickly and move into the area of military action in a very short time.







7. Aviation.

The 10<sup>th</sup> Air Force—the 1<sup>st</sup> fighter division, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 34<sup>th</sup> fighter-bomber division, 25<sup>th</sup> bomber regiment, 46<sup>th</sup> transport air division, 47<sup>th</sup> air reconnaissance regiment and

system of the Warsaw Treaty countries with all forces and resources to cover the main group of the Front's troops.

—During the operation, in cooperation with the 7<sup>th</sup> Air Defense Army, units of 10<sup>th</sup> and 57<sup>th</sup> Air Force and the air defense of the 1<sup>st</sup> Western Front, to cover the troops of the front from the air strikes of the enemy in the process of their passing over the border mountains, and also during the crossing of the rivers Neckar and Rhine to cover the missile forces and command and control centers.

9. The 22<sup>nd</sup> airborne brigade is to be ready to be deployed from the region of Prostějov, Niva, Brodek to the region north of Stuttgart on Day 4 or to the region of Rastatt on Day 5, or to the region to the east of Mulhouse on Day 6 with the task of capturing and holding

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<sup>16</sup>The formation of the front included almost all Czechoslovak ground troops: 15 mobilized divisions arranged into 3 armies, the air force, an airborne brigade and the accompanying technical and rear equipment. The command was given to the general staff of the „ SLA; the chief-of-staff became the commander of this front.

<sup>17</sup>“



21 June 1956.<sup>5</sup>

The new weapon, officially called a first-generation mid-range strategic missile, had a length of 20.8 meters, a diameter of 1.65 meters, and a weight of 28 tons. The missile was driven by a liquid propulsion system that used liquid oxygen and alcohol, which created a thrust of 44 tons and was therefore able to carry the 1,400 kilogram



stationing the missiles and their crews was nearing completion, and in November-December 1958, the 72<sup>nd</sup> Engineer Brigade prepared for its transfer to the GDR. Since only enough space existed thus far for two divisions, the third division was transferred to Gvardeysk in the Königsberg region. The remaining staff of the brigade, the 635<sup>th</sup> and 638<sup>th</sup> Missile Units as well as the 349<sup>th</sup> and 432<sup>nd</sup> Mobile Missile Technical Bases, began their secret transport of soldiers and equipment to the GDR.<sup>19</sup>

Efforts to maintain secrecy, such as firing all German workers in the Vogelsang and Fürstenberg garrisons, were increased.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, at the end of January 1959, agent V-9771 reported to his contact in the BND the arrival of parts of the 635<sup>th</sup> Missile Unit. He reported that a transport of the Soviet Army had arrived at the train route between Lychen and Fürstenberg. At the center of the transport, soldiers had moved “very large bombs” with the help of caterpillar tractors. It seems clear that this was the movement of R-5M components. Avoiding the main roads, the equipment, now covered in tarpaulin, was then taken to the back side of the Kastaven Lake military base near Fürstenberg.<sup>21</sup>

The staff of the brigade as well as the 349<sup>th</sup> Mobile Missile Technical Base were stationed with the 635<sup>th</sup> Division in Fürstenberg, in the immediate vicinity of the command center of the Second Soviet Tank Guard Army. The 638<sup>th</sup> Division and its accompanying 432<sup>nd</sup> Mobile Missile Technical Base were stationed twenty kilometers away, in the neighboring village of Vogelsang.







improve the battle training of the 7 engineer brigades.

The Secretary of the Central Committee  
The Chairman of the of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Council of Ministers of the USSR,

**N. Khrushchev**  
**N. Bulganin**

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (AP FR), Moscow, Register 93 (Documents with Decisions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the Year 1955) as printed in *Pervoe raketnoe soedinenie vooruzennykh sil strany: Voенno-istoriceskij ocerk* (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), pp. 208-209. Translated from Russian for the CWIHP by Matthias Uhl.]

Dr. Matthias Uhl recently defended his dissertation on "Stalin's V-2: The Transfer of German Missile Technology to the USSR and the Development of the Soviet Missile Production, 1945-49." He is currently a research fellow at the Berlin office of the Institute for Contemporary History (Munich), working on a larger documentation project on the 1958/62 Berlin Crisis. Dr. Vladimir I. Ivkin is a Russian historian.

<sup>1</sup> See "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Nr. 589-365," Top Secret, 26 March 1955, printed in *Pervoe raketnoe soedinenie vooruzennykh sil strany: Voенno-istoricesky ocerk* (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), pp. 208-209. The original is located in the *Archiv Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii* [Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow, AP RF], Register 93 (Documents with Decisions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for 1955).

<sup>2</sup> On the activity of the German missile specialists in the Soviet Union, see Jürgen Michels, *Peenemünde und seine Erben in Ost und West: Entwicklung und Weg deutscher Geheimwaffen*, (Bonn: Bernard & Gräfe, 1997); Ulrich Albrecht, Andreas Heinemann-Grueder and Arend Wellman, *Die Spezialisten: Deutsche Naturwissenschaftler und Techniker in der Sowjetunion* (Berlin: Dietz, 1992). The author is currently working on a monograph on the same topic that will soon appear under the title: *Stalins V-2: Der Transfer der deutschen Raketentechnik in die UdSSR, 1945-1955*.

<sup>3</sup> See *Raketno-kosmiceskaia korporacia "Energiia" imeni S. P. Koroleva* (Moscow: RKK "Energiia", 1996), pp. 31-51; T. Kochran, U. Arikin, R. Norris and Dz. Sends, *Jadernoe vooruzenie SSSR* (Moscow: IzDAT, 1992), pp. 230-233.

<sup>4</sup> See M. A. Pervov, "Ballisticeskie rakety velikoj strany" *Aviacija i kosmonavtika: Vcera, segodnja, zavtra*, no. 7 (1998), pp. 17-23; see also A.V. Karpenko, A. F. Utkin and A. D. Popov, *Otecestvennye strategiceskie raketnye komplekсы* (Sankt-Peterburg: Nevskij bastion: Gangut, 1999), pp. 38-44.

<sup>5</sup> See *Strategiceskoe jadernoe vooruzenie Rossii* (Moscow: Izdat 1998), pp. 160-161, see also B. E. Certok, *Rakety i ljudi* (Moscow: Masinostroenie 1995), pp. 389-390; *Jadernye ispytanija SSSR* (Moscow: Izdat 1997), p. 147; *Chronika osnovnykh sobytij istorii Raketnykh vojsk strategiceskogo naznachenija* (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), p. 35.

<sup>6</sup> See *Raketnye komplekсы*, p. 43f. see also S. G. Kolesnikov, *Strategiceskoe raketno-jadernoe oruzie* (Moscow: Arsenal-Press, 1996), p. 19-20.

<sup>7</sup> See M. A. Pervov, *Raketnoe oruzie Raketnykh vojsk strategiceskogo naznachenija* (Moscow: Violanta, 1999), p. 51.

<sup>8</sup> See "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Council of Ministers of the USSR," no. 589-365, Top Secret, 26 March 1955, printed in *Pervoe raketnoe*, pp. 208-209.

<sup>9</sup> During my interview with General Heinz Kessler, who was the Defense Minister for the GDR from 1985 to 1989, on 24 October 1999, Kessler stated: "The Soviet Army leadership did not give the GDR military leadership any information about the stationing of missiles in Vogelsang and Fürstenberg. In my position at the time as head of the GDR air force, I had no knowledge of any action of that type. Neither the GDR Defense Minister at the time, Willi Stoph, nor his first assistant, Lieutenant-General Heinz Hoffmann had received any information, as far as I know. In addition, in my later position as Defense Minister, this 1959 event was never mentioned in any way by the commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany or the Supreme Command of the Warsaw Pact. This type of behavior matches my later experiences. The Soviet military, for example, never told us which Soviet installations in the GDR had nuclear weapons in storage during my time in that position."

<sup>10</sup> See *Sozdateli raketno-jadernogo oruzija i veterany-raketaikij rasskazыvajut* (Moscow: CIPK, 1996), pp. 250-252, see also *Voennyj enciklopediceskij slovar' Raketnykh vojsk strategiceskogo naznachenija* (Moscow: Naucnoe izdatel'stvo "BRE", 1999), p. 619.

<sup>11</sup> See *Pervoe raketnoe*, p. 124-125

<sup>12</sup> See Draft Decision for the Council of Ministers of the USSR, "About the Production of a Trial Series of Long-Range Missiles V-2 and Measures to Their Further Improvement," not dated (probably August 1946), Russian State Archive for Economics [RGAE], Moscow, Register 8157, Section 1, document 1149, sheet 126-128.

<sup>13</sup> See Ju. A. Jasin and N. K. Monachov, "Pervaja otecestvennaja" *Nezavisimoe voенnoe obozrenie*, no. 3 (1998), p. 5; see also *Raketnye vojska strategi'eskogo naznachenija: Voенno-istoriceskij trud* (Moskva: RVSН, 1994), pp. 51-53; M. V. Sacharov, *Die Streitkräfte der*

*UdSSR: Abriß ihrer Entwicklung von 1918 bis 1968*  
(Berlin: Militärverlag d. DDR, 1974) p. 637.

<sup>14</sup> See *Pervoe raketnoe*, pp. 11-13, see also M. A. Pervov, *Mezkontinental'nye ballisticskie rakety SSSR i Rossii: Kratkij istoriceskij ocerk* (Moscow: [publisher not identified], 1998), p. 29-30.

<sup>15</sup> See Standortkartei der Militärischen Auswertung des BND: "Allgemeine Beobachtungen in Vogelsang, 22. Mai 1958 bis 11 August 1958", [Card Catalog of the BND's Military Evaluations: General Observations in Vogelsang], Federal Archives, Koblenz [henceforth BA Koblenz], Collection B 206/114, sheet 18-19.


<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, sheet 18.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, report E 14136, mid-September 1958, BA Koblenz, collection B 206/114, sheet 20.

<sup>18</sup> See information sent to the author by the BND on 22 April 1998 and 4 May 2000.

<sup>19</sup> A. Bondarenko, "Osobaja tajna Vtoroj armii,"

<sup>42</sup> The Central State Artillery Grounds were established on 13 May 1946 and located in Kapustin Yar.







**DOCUMENT No. 1**  
**Decree of the [USSR] State Defense**  
**Committee No. 9168 SS,**  
**Regarding Geological Prospecting Work**  
**for Oil in Northern Iran,**  
**21 June 1945**

COPY

TOP SECRET

The State Defense Committee  
Decree of the GOKO [State Defense Committee] No. 9168SS  
of 21 June 1945  
Moscow, the Kremlin





elections in Southern Azerbaijan to the 15<sup>th</sup> Convocation of the Iranian Majlis, ensuring the election of deputies who are supporters of the separatist movement on the basis of the following slogans:

- a) Allotment of land to the peasants from state and large landowning holdings and awarding long-term monetary credit to the peasants;
  - b) Elimination of unemployment by the restoration and expansion of work at enterprises and also by developing road construction and other public works;
  - c) Improvement of the organization of public amenities of cities and the public water supply;
  - d) Improvement in public health;
  - e) Use of no less than 50% of state taxes for local needs;
  - f) Equal rights for national minorities and tribes: opening schools and publication of newspapers and books in the Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Armenian, and Assyrian languages; court proceedings and official communications in local institutions in their native language; creating a provincial administration, including the gendarmerie and police, from local national elements; formation of regional, district, and city enjuments [and] local self-governing bodies.
  - g) Radical improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations.
6. Combat groups armed with weapons of foreign manufacture are to be created with the objective of self-defense for pro-Soviet people [and] activists of the separatist movement of democratic and Party organizations.
- Entrust Cde. [Nicolai] Bulganin together with Cde. Bagirov with carrying out this point.
7. Organize a Society for Cultural Relations Between Iran and the Azerbaijani SSR to strengthen cultural and propaganda work in Southern Azerbaijan.
8. To draw the broad masses into the separatist movement, [we] consider it necessary to create a "Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan" in Tabriz with branches in all regions of Southern Azerbaijan and Gilyan.
9. Entrust the CC CP(b) of Azerbaijan with organizing publication of an illustrated magazine in Baku for distribution in Iran and also three new newspapers in Southern Azerbaijan.
10. Commit the OGIZ [State Publishing House](Yudin)

to allocating three flat-bed printing presses for the use of the CC CP(b) of Azerbaijan to create printing resources [tipografskaya baza] for the Democratic Party of Southern Azerbaijan.

11. Commit the Narkomvneshtorg [People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade] (Cde. [Anastas] Mikoyan) with providing good paper for the publication of the illustrated magazine in Baku and also the three new daily newspapers in Southern Azerbaijan; the total press run is to be no less than 30,000 copies.

12. Permit the NKVD of the Azerbaijan SSR, under the observation of Cde. Bagirov, to issue permission for departure to Iran and return from Iran of persons being sent on business connected with putting these measures into effect.

13. To finance the separatist movement in Southern Azerbaijan and also to hold elections to the 15<sup>th</sup> Convocation of the Iranian Majlis; to create in the CC CP(b) of Azerbaijan a special fund of one million foreign-currency rubles ("for conversion into tumans").

6 July 1945  
CC VKP(b) Politburo

[Source: GAPPOD AzR, f. 1, op. 89, d. 90, ll. 4-5. Obtained by Jamil Hasanli. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]



**DOCUMENT No. 3**  
**Secret Soviet Instructions on Measures to**  
**Carry out Special Assignments throughout**  
**Southern Azerbaijan and the**  
**Northern Provinces of Iran,**  
**14 July 1945**

Strictly Secret

Measures to carry out special assignments throughout Southern Azerbaijan and the northern provinces of Iran

I. The Question of Creating the Azerbaijani Democratic Party

1. Immediately organize [the] transport of Pishevari and Kombakhsh to Baku for talks. Depending on the results of the talks keep in mind [the] transport to Baku of Padekan [sic! "Padegan" in other documents], the Chairman of the District Committee of the People's Party of Azerbaijan.

2. To create organizing committees in the center (Tabriz) and elsewhere [*na mestakh*], within a month select candidates from authoritative democratic elements from the intelligentsia, middle-class merchants, small and average landowners, and the clergy in various democratic parties, and also from non-party members and bring them into the organizing committees of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party.

The first priority is to create an organizing committee in Tabriz which, via the existing democratic press *Khavar Nou*, *Azhir*, *Dzhodat* and others, will publish an appeal to organize an Azerbaijani Democratic Party and print leaflets.

3. With the appearance of the appeal, initiative groups elsewhere will speak out in the press in its support and create Azerbaijani Democratic Party committees from the most active organizations of the People's Party and other democratic organizations and elements.

Do not permit a mechanical renaming of organizations of the People's Party to committees of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party. Recommend that the Tabriz district committee and its local organizations of the People's Party discuss the appeal of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party, decide to disband the organizations of the People's Party and enter its members in the Azerbaijani Democratic Party.

4. After establishing the organizing committee of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party in Tabriz the first priority is to create local committees of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party in the following cities: Ardebil', Rezaye, Khoy, Mianeh, Zanjan, Maraghe, Marand, Mahabad, Maku, Qazvin, Rasht, Pahlavi, Sari, Shakh, Gorgan, and Mashhad.

Send representatives of the central organizing committee to organize the committees in these cities. Systematically place positive responses and calls to join the Azerbaijani Democratic Party in the democratic press.

5. Create a press agency in the organizing committee of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in Tabriz under the name "Voice of Azerbaijan".

6. Organize the drafting of programs and a charter for the Tabriz organizing committee.

## II. Ensuring the Election of Deputies to the 15<sup>th</sup> Convocation of the Majlis

1. Begin talks with deputies of the Majlis who are supporting them during the elections to the Majlis for this convocation with the object of nominating these deputies to the 15<sup>th</sup> Convocation under the condition that they fight for the implementation of the slogans of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party.

2. Begin work to nominate candidates for deputy to the

Majlis from democratic elements who would fight for the implementation of the slogans of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party.

3. Review the list of deputies recommended by the Embassy in light of [these] new tasks.

4. Organize a broad popularization of the selected candidates for election to the Majlis in the press and their contacts [and] meetings with voters.

5. Support meetings, demonstrations, strikes, and the disbanding [*razgon*] of electoral commissions unsuitable for us with the objective of ensuring our interests in the elections.

6. In the process of preparing for the elections, compromise and expel from the electoral districts of northern Iran candidates nominated by reactionary circles [who are] actively operating against the candidates of the democratic movement.

7. Demand the replacement of unsuitable reactionary-minded leaders of local bodies [*vlasti*].

## III. Creation of the "Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan"

1. In the matter of organizing the "Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan", use the delegates participating in the jubilee celebration of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Azerbaijan SSR.

2. Recruit the workers of our consulates, military commandants, and their active [Party] members into the organization of the Society.

3. The organizing group of the "Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan" in Tabriz is to draw up the charter of the Society.

4. To widely attract the population to the "Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan", use the press to systematically illustrate the achievements of the economy, culture, and art of Soviet Azerbaijan and the historical friendship of

in Gilyan Province:

The organization of public services and amenities in the cities of Rasht [and] Pahlavi, leaving no less than 50% of the tax proceeds collected from the province for this purpose;

in Gorgan Province:

Study in the native Turkmen language in the schools; replacement of the local organization, gendarmerie, and police with Turkomans, leaving no less than 50% of the tax proceeds collected from the province for public services, amenities, and health in Gonbad-e-Kavus, Gorgan, and Bandar Shah.



should the Yugoslavs chose not to respond but instead make public Khrushchev's offer of reconciliation. Furthermore, the fact that Khrushchev alone signed letters of such significance provides a glimpse into the existing balance of power within the Kremlin. It reflected both Khrushchev's ascendancy and the fragility of his position. Part of the Soviet leadership that initiated the new approach towards Yugoslavia, notably Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin and Anastas Mikoyan, were under close scrutiny from the more conservative members of the Politburo. Relations with Yugoslavia were of highest ideological significance, and any miscalculation could provide competitors in the ongoing leadership struggle, most notably Molotov and Georgy Malenkov, with valuable ammunition.

The Yugoslavs were, if anything, even more guarded and distrustful of the Soviets. In the first few weeks after receiving the letter, Tito seriously considered the possibility that Khrushchev's initiative was a Soviet maneuver aimed at undermining Yugoslavia's position. By making an enthusiastic Yugoslav response public, Khrushchev could either humiliate Tito in the Communist world or undermine Yugoslavia's strategic position vis-à-vis the West. Certainly the timing of Khrushchev's letter was most inopportune for Tito. The crisis over Trieste required Yugoslavia's close cooperation with the West in order to counter Italy's actions. For this reason, Tito chose not to respond with a letter. To keep his options open, however, he needed to acknowledge the initiative, should it prove to be genuine, and yet, in case of it being a Soviet ploy, to maintain the ability of plausible denial by keeping himself at distance. Tito thus chose Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Edvard Kardelj, his closest associate, to inform Khrushchev in mid-







into many aspects of the Cold War. This underlines the importance of projects, such as the Yugoslavia Initiative, aimed at reintegrating the wealth of Yugoslav archives and Yugoslav historiography into the international scholarship of the Cold War.

**DOCUMENT No. 1**  
**Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev,**  
**First Secretary of the Central Committee of the**  
**Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to**  
**Josip Broz Tito and the Central Committee**  
**of the League of Communists Of Yugoslavia, 22**  
**June 1954**

To the Central Committee,  
League of Communists of Yugoslavia  
To Comrade Tito

The Central Committee [CC] of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] discussed questions on the relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, and additionally analyzed the circumstances that brought about the

the establishment of contacts between the CC of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

It is thoroughly understandable that elements of mistrust and prejudice, accumulated in previous years, cannot disappear overnight. Time will be needed, as well as patience and mutual good will, for an understanding to be reached. However, the shared fundamental interests of our countries, our peoples, and of the grand cause of peace and socialism must overcome various subjective moments and opinions.

We would like to know the opinion of the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on the above-addressed issues.

From its side, the CC CPSU is ready to hear and discuss the view of the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on issues regarding relations between our governments, as well as those regarding relations between the CPSU and the LCY.

To this end, we would regard as constructive a meeting of leading representatives of the CC CPSU and the CC LCY aimed at exchanging views on the above-mentioned issues. If you are in agreement with this proposal, the meeting could take place in the nearest future either in Moscow or in Yugoslavia, according to your convenience.

Secretary of the CC CPSU

N. Khrushchev

22 June 1954

*[Source: Arhiv Jugoslavije [National Archives of Yugoslavia], Arhiv CK SKJ [Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Collection], 507 / IX, 119/I-48. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Svetozar Rajak.]*

**DOCUMENT No. 2**  
**Letter (Cable) from the**  
**Central Committee of the Communist Party**  
**of the Soviet Union to Tito and**  
**Central Committee of the League Of**  
**Communists Of Yugoslavia,**  
**24 July 1954<sup>5</sup>**

Received by Telegraph

To the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

To Comrade Tito

The CC CPSU has received with satisfaction the communication from Comrade Kardelj stating that the

leadership of the CC LCY looks positively on suggestions proposed in the letter from the CC CPSU of 22 June 1954. We are confident that this road corresponds to the vital interests of our peoples and our Communist Parties. We acknowledge that the Yugoslav comrades could be in a position to respond to our letter in the nearest future.

The CC CPSU is aware of the great importance of the question of Trieste to Yugoslavia. We too consider it propitious that it be resolved in accordance with justified interests of Yugoslavia. Sh of une ooslavi0fts side, uturxmunn a questier in the near54.Ca-1(en-)Tj1~T\*1~0 Tc1~-0.01 Twtious that mh j not it

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the proposal for improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, presented in the letter from the CC CPSU of 22 June.

Your opinion regarding the necessity of investing greater effort towards full clarification of our relations and elimination of negative elements still spoiling those relations is receiving full support from our side.

We agree that normalization and improvement of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia should not be conditioned upon [consensus regarding] issues of internal development and ways of resolving them. We also agree that development of these relations should support the enhancement of the international positions of our countries. We underline with satisfaction the existence of unanimity of views on a variety of foreign policy issues, such as: equality and non-interference into affairs of other countries, acceptance of the possibility of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between countries with different political systems, struggle for prevention of war and consolidation of peace. As is well known, the policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at the consolidation of peace in Europe and the whole world. We do not doubt that Yugoslavia will contribute towards the goal of the consolidation of peace.

As there now emerges a unity of outlook recognizing the necessity of radical improvement of relations between our countries, based on the exchange of views between us, we believe it possible also to proceed toward mutual, practical elimination of negative occurrences that obstruct rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR. We are ready, in every way, to ensure that every proposal from your side, aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia receives due attention from Soviet government organs. From our side, in the interest of normalization of relations between Yugosla-

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supported the COMINFORM Resolution against Tito in 1948 and have since emigrated to the USSR. It was run by the KGB. The CPSU CC member charged with overseeing this association was Mikhail Suslov. These “true Yugoslav

communists and patriots” served as the “Fifth column” in the Soviet propaganda campaign and covert operations against Yugoslavia after 1948.

<sup>7</sup> State Publishing House for Political Publications.

## Teachers Become Students at Summer Institute

The 2001 National History Day Summer Institute brought twenty-five teachers from across the nation to the University of Maryland to examine *New Directions In Cold War History*. The teachers came from very diverse backgrounds and schools, but they all came to develop their teaching skills and share their knowledge with their peers. Judging from the participants’ tremendously positive response, the institute confirmed both the need for, as well as National History Day’s ability to provide, assistance and training to teachers. “In terms of content, accessibility of speakers, practical applications for the classroom, and excitement, this is *the best* workshop I’ve ever attended!” said one participant. The institute was produced in association with The Cold War International History Project and was graciously supported by the Annenberg/CPB Channel, funder of *A Biography of America* and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund.

Many times the focus of learning is concentrated on student rather than teacher development, but National History Day is working to reform history education by developing the skills of *both* teachers and students. The objectives of the institute were two-fold: to provide teachers with the latest in historical scholarship to bring them up to speed on the literature; and to provide teachers with practical applications for the classroom, particularly instruction regarding the importance and use of primary sources. To accomplish these goals National History Day worked closely with scholars from across the country to provide a hands-on learning experience for the teachers. “The institute really exceeded my expectations and I’m grateful to have had this unique experience, said a 2001 participant. “I’m significantly more knowledgeable now about the 20<sup>th</sup> century and Cold War history than I had been. Now, I can enhance my good teaching methods with a deeper knowledge of the Cold War and primary sources.”

Prominent scholars and collections specialists such as Robert Hutchings of Princeton University (formerly Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, 1989-1992; Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, 1992-1993), Bill Brands of Texas A&M University and Christian Ostermann of the Cold War International History Project introduced participants to the latest in historical scholarship and imaginative approaches for engaging students in the study of the history of the Cold War. In addition, the teachers visited historic sites and agencies. At the National Archives the teachers looked at the original Marshall Act and the most requested document in the archives – a picture of President Nixon and Elvis Presley in the Oval office. Teachers spoke with archivists and educators about the multitude of presidential documents and lesson plans available on line at the National Archive’s website ([www.nara.gov/education](http://www.nara.gov/education)). Jan Scruggs, Founder and President of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, gave a special tour of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

The most important part about the workshop is that the teachers’ work has just begun. In addition to including new ideas and methods into their own teaching, those who participated in the program are committed to conducting workshops for teachers in their own states. Thus, teachers nationwide will benefit from the institute and National History Day’s commitment to education reform.

[Reprinted from the *NHD Newsletter* (Summer 2001), pp.1-2, with permission of the National History Day.]



# Moldova, Romania, and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia

## Introduction, translation, and annotation by Mark Kramer

Until recently, nothing was known about the impact of the 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis on Soviet Moldavia, a small republic located in the far west of the USSR along eastern Romania and southwestern Ukraine. (At the end of 1991, Soviet Moldavia became the independent country of Moldova.<sup>1</sup>) A few Western scholars in the 1970s and 1980s were able to trace the extensive “spillover” of ferment from the sweeping reforms in Czechoslovakia into Soviet Ukraine, but no comparable studies existed of the other Soviet republics.<sup>2</sup> In an analysis of Moldavia’s role in Soviet foreign policy published in 1976, Stephen Fischer-Galati refrained from discussing the impact of the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis.<sup>3</sup> Instead, he simply noted that “reports in the foreign press immediately after the military crisis of the summer of 1968 make no mention of the attitude of the Romanian inhabitants of Moldavia when Soviet tanks and troops were moving toward the Romanian frontier.” The lack of concrete information, Fischer-Galati added, meant that any comments about the effect of the crisis on Moldavia would be purely “a matter of conjecture.”<sup>4</sup>

The state of knowledge about the spillover from the 1968 crisis into the Soviet Union remained extremely limited until the USSR was dissolved at the end of 1991. The subsequent opening of archives in countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union (as well as the archives in East-Central Europe) has enabled scholars to gain a much better sense of the impact of the Prague Spring and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 on the western Soviet republics. It is now clear that the degree of ferment in the Soviet Union connected with the events in Czechoslovakia was much greater than previously assumed.<sup>5</sup> Abundant evidence of this exists in the Russian archives (including a document pertaining to Moldavia that I published in Issue No. 11 of the *CWIHP Bulletin*), and equally valuable documentation is available in the archives of the other former Soviet republics, including Moldova.

The two documents below from the “Archive of Social-Political Organizations in the Moldovan Republic” (AOSPRM), the former repository of the Communist Party (CP) of Soviet Moldavia, highlight the efforts that Moldavian officials made in late August and September 1968 to prevent the local population from learning about Romania’s “hostile,” “irrational,” and “chauvinist” assessment of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The two documents are among many items in the AOSPRM that shed interesting light on Soviet-Romanian relations, Soviet foreign policy-making, and internal Soviet politics. (See the accompanying report on the Moldovan archive by James G. Hershberg, who obtained these two documents during a visit to Chişinău in July 1997.)

The first document, prepared in early October 1968 by the head of the Department for Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian CP Central Committee (CC), Anton Sidorovich Konstantinov, criticized the Moldavian minister of communications, Vasili (Vasile) Petrovich Russu, for his “blatant violation of party discipline.” Russu had failed to instruct the Moldavian postal service to withhold all Romanian newspapers and journals beginning on 21 August 1968. Not until 28 September did Russu belatedly order the head of the Kishinev branch of the postal service, P. P. Grigorashchenko, to prevent any Romanian publications from being distributed within Moldavia.

The second document, a stenographic account of a meeting of the highest organ of the Moldavian Communist Party (known as the Bureau of the Central Committee) on 11 October 1968, contains Russu’s explanation of his behavior as well as further details about problems within the Moldavian ministry of communications. Russu insisted that he had been absent from his office for several days immediately after the invasion because he was serving in a reserve military communications battalion that was mobilized and sent to Czechoslovakia. He faulted two of his subordinates—the first deputy minister, Mikhail (Mihai) Nikolaevich Severinov, and the head of the ministry’s foreign communications section, Konstantin (Constantin) Aleksandrovich Kucia—for having failed to carry out essential tasks while he was gone. The document makes clear that although the members of the Moldavian CP Bureau wanted to condemn Russu’s behavior, they were unwilling to impose a severe punishment. Russu received a “stern warning” but was permitted to retain his ministerial post, a job he continued to perform for many years afterward.

It is not surprising that Romanian publications were at the center of this controversy. The emergence of a rift between the Soviet Union and Romania in the mid-1960s had sparked concern among Moldavian CP officials about the possible effects on the “Moldavian” (ethnic Romanian) inhabitants of Moldavia, who made up roughly two-thirds of the republic’s total population. In November 1965, the First Secretary of the Moldavian CP, Ivan (Ioan) Ivanovich Bodiul, accused the Romanian authorities of spreading





**DOCUMENT No. 1**  
**To the First Secretary of the CC of the**  
**Communist Party of Moldavia, 4 October 1968**

Cde. I. I. BODIUL<sup>15</sup>

Insofar as the Romanian leadership adopted a special and harmful position on a whole range of important issues pertaining to the international Communist and workers' movement, and expressed sharp opposition to the measures taken by the five socialist states to halt the counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia, and insofar as the Romanian press published materials and statements by Romanian and foreign authors that were hostile to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and republished anti-Soviet materials from foreign press organs, including bourgeois press organs, the Bureau of the CC of the Communist Party of Moldavia gave instructions to the minister of communications of the Moldavian SSR, Cde. V. P. Russu, that, beginning on 21 August 1968, he should prevent Romanian periodicals from being distributed within the republic until special instructions were received.<sup>16</sup>

After checking information that flowed into the CC Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian Communist Party, it was established that Cde. V. P. Russu did not carry out the instructions of the Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party CC. The Kishinev branch of the postal delivery system (headed by Cde. P. P. Grigorashchenko) withheld and destroyed, in accordance with the order, only the Romanian newspapers for 22-28



During the first two to three days when the newspapers were held back, we accepted the participation of Glavlit. And then they said: "You have instructions from Moscow; you should act in accordance with these instructions."

Cde. BODIUL: Who in the USSR Ministry of Communications reads Romanian newspapers? They issue their regulations on the basis of general instructions. With regard to Czechoslovakia, they perhaps gave a directive from the CPSU CC. But in Moldavia itself it was clearer which newspapers must be held back.

Cde. RUSSU: On 26 August, I received instructions to do the same with Romanian newspapers as I had been doing with Czechoslovak publications.

Cde. BODIUL: You report to your ministry how their actions are in conformity with our actions, which must be in accordance with instructions from the CPSU CC. We received consent and even instructions from the CPSU CC not to distribute Romanian newspapers on the 21st. If the all-union Ministry is interested and is following the materials, let them consult with the CPSU CC and the CC of the Moldavian Communist Party. What happened was a lack of coordination. And this happened because in the [all-union] ministry they don't read Romanian newspapers.

Cde. IL' YASHCEHNKO: You received instructions from the [Moldavian] CC, and even if you did not agree with them, you can disregard them only if you check with the CPSU CC. You received instructions from the CC of the Moldavian Communist Party and did not fulfill them. You instead acted on your own. You did not come and say that this is not in accord with the instructions of the CC of the Moldavian Communist party and the USSR Ministry of Communications. You say that people there also are well-versed in politics. This is a very dangerous approach. This is a very dangerous approach when you place party organs against one another. This did enormous political damage.

Cde. RUSSU: I would like to say that I am very much guilty of this, but it was not through any design.

Cde. IL' YASHCHENKO: You distributed counterrevolutionary propaganda against the will of the





especially active in 1967 in promoting consideration of the possibility of a press law. On this point, see Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 133. The proposal for a press law ran into difficulty, however, after the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) forcibly cracked down on a group of over 100 intellectuals and scholars in November 1967 for allegedly preparing a draft press law that would have abolished censorship. Soon thereafter, in April 1968, E. V. Yakovlev was removed as editor-in-chief of *Zhurnalists* and accused of “committing serious mistakes,” “exercising unsatisfactory leadership,” and “frequently publishing ideologically weak materials.” For declassified materials about these events, see “TsK KPSS,” 14 November 1967 (Secret), from Yu. V. Andropov, head of the KGB, plus the accompanying draft “Proekt zakona o rasprostranении otyskanii i poluchenii informatsii,” in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 78, D. 8, Ll. 46-56; and “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK KPSS: O serezhnykh nedostatках v rabote zhurnala ‘Zhurnalists’,” St No. 50/5s (Top Secret), 26 April 1968, in RGANI, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 101, L. 11. The idea of a press law was thus largely stillborn. In the absence of such a law, Glavlit, the Committee on the Press, the KGB, and other bodies responsible for overseeing the press acted in accordance with guidelines set forth by the CPSU Politburo, the CPSU Secretariat, and the USSR Council of Ministers. Various problems that arose in 1967 and especially 1968 (in part because of ferment connected with the Prague Spring) led to the adoption in January 1969 of stringent, new guidelines laid out in a CPSU Secretariat directive: “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK KPSS: O povyshenii otvetsvennosti rukovoditelei organov, pechati, radio, televideniya, kinematografii, uchrezhdenii kul’tury i iskusstva za ideino-politicheskii uroven’ publikuemykh materialov i repertuara,” St No. 64/1s (Top Secret), 7 January 1969, in RGANI, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 131, Ll. 2-6. For published materials bearing on control of the press during this period, see A. Z. Okorokov et al., ed., *O partiinoy i sovetskoy pechati, radioveshchaniy i televidenii: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Moscow: Mysl’, 1972), esp. pp. 357-372.

<sup>29</sup> Translator’s Note: The phrase “CC department” is shorthand for the “CPSU CC Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries” (Otdel TsK KPSS po svyazyam s kommunisticheskimi i rabochimi partiyami sotsialisticheskikh stran), which

oversaw relations among Communist states. Because of the department’s long and unwieldy name, it was often referred to as simply the “CPSU CC department” or the ‘CC department.’”

<sup>30</sup> Translator’s Note: Bodiul is referring here to Nikolai Demyanovich Psurtsev, who had been serving as Soviet minister of communications since March 1948.

<sup>31</sup> Translator’s Note: Ungeny is a Moldovan city roughly 75-80 kilometers to the west of Kishinev (Chi’in<sup>u</sup>), along the Romanian border.

<sup>32</sup> Translator’s Note: Russu’s comments here are interesting insofar as they show how many reservists were being mobilized in the leadup to the invasion.

<sup>33</sup> Translator’s Note: Dmitrii (Dumitru) Semenovich Cornovan was a full member of the Moldavian CP CC Bureau and a Moldavian CP CC Secretary (responsible for propaganda).

<sup>34</sup> Translator’s Note: Mikhail (Mihai) Nikolaevich Severinov was the Moldavian first deputy minister of communications.

<sup>35</sup> Translator’s Note: Severinov was identified in the previous footnote. Konstantin (Constantin) Aleksandrovich Kucia was head of the foreign communications section of the Moldavian ministry of communications.

<sup>36</sup> Translator’s Note: The population of Soviet Moldavia at this time, according to official Soviet census data, consisted of roughly 16 percent Ukrainians, 10-11 percent Russians, 66 percent “Moldavians” (ethnic Romanians), and small percentages of other ethnic groups (officially referred to as “cohabiting nationalities”). Russian was the most widely used language in the republic, especially in urban areas, but Ukrainian and so-called Moldavian were also permitted. The supposedly distinct language of “Moldavian” was purely a Soviet artifact. It was identical to Romanian except that it used the Cyrillic alphabet instead of the Latin.

<sup>37</sup> Translator’s Note: The comments here about the lack of progress in countering Romanian radio and television broadcasts are especially important in light of the concerns that Bodiul had been expressing since 1965-66 about “hostile” 02 Tc1“(de ut)Tj1“T\*1“0 Tc1“0.01“.bout

# JOURNAL OF COLD WAR STUDIES

Published by The MIT Press

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The end of the Cold War has released a flood of new archival materials and memoirs both in the former Communist world and in Western countries. Declassified documentation and new first-hand accounts have enabled scholars to gain a much better understanding of some of the key events of the past century.

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Anja Siljak, aring inFarch bdnal reevFourvarx Issue Tfi~14





With communist greetings,  
Li Fuchun

15 January 1956

[The memorandum is followed by four attachments. The first is a list of installations being built with Soviet aid. The second is a list of top secret (*sovershenno sekretno*) installations. The third is a memo on the coal industry and the fourth follows in full.]

Top Secret

Attachment No. 4

PRELIMINARY PROGRAM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF AN ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY

In order to quickly and efficiently organize and develop an atomic energy industry in the People's Republic of China, in order to further develop nuclear physics research, and also in order to apply atomic energy broadly in the economy, we are asking the CC CPSU to discuss the possibility of helping China to organize an atomic energy industry and elaborate a long-term development plan for the production of nuclear energy and to provide us with the following aid in this area:

1. We ask [you] to discuss the possibility of helping China in the construction of one or two modern atomic industry installations, providing us with comprehensive aid in preparing plans, supplying equipment, construction-assembly and provision of raw material [i.e., nuclear fuel, trans.].

2. Assuming that the atomic industry installations mentioned above will be considered, we ask [you] to discuss whether it is possible in 1956 to send a group of Soviet specialists-advisors in nuclear technology to lead and aid China in the elaboration of a comprehensive plan for the development of an atomic energy industry.

3. We ask [you] to accept three groups of Chinese scientific and technical workers for short-term study in the Soviet Union in 1956:

a. to accept various technical workers corresponding to needs generated by the tasks in point one [above] for study in the Soviet Union of various technical areas of the atomic energy industry. We ask the appropriate Soviet organization to help us to designate concretely the number of people and their specialities;

b. to accept fifty or more Chinese scientific-technical workers for studies in the Soviet Union regarding the use of radioactive isotopes (including their use for industry, agriculture, defense, biology, medicine, etc.)

c. to accept a team of scientific-technical specialists sent by China for study and participation in project development (*proektnaia rabota*) for a powerful focused accelerator (*fokusirovannyi uskoritel'*). We also ask permission to send from China one or two specialists to the Moscow scientific-research institute for the physics of warm nuclei (*teplovye iadra*) in order to take part in scientific research.

1. We ask the Soviet government to help our country:

to create a central laboratory for radioactive isotopes in the physics institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; to create two laboratories [each] (*po dve laboratorii*) for

## Policymakers and the Cold War's End: Micro and Macro Assessments of Contingency

By **Richard K. Herrman and Richard Ned Lebow**

The Mershon Center (Ohio University) hosted a conference on the "End of the Cold War" on 15-17 October 1999. This conference was made possible by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Participants addressed important decisions and events leading to the end of the Cold War that transpired between 1988-1992. Special attention was devoted to arms control negotiations and regional conflicts in the recognition that arms control agreements and Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan were concrete turning points in the Cold War's end. The conference brought together important policy-makers from the Gorbachev and Bush administrations (in particular the heads of Soviet and American arms control delegations and senior advisors on regional conflicts) as well as interested scholars<sup>1</sup>. The National Security Archive prepared a briefing book of newly-released documents germane to the discussion.

The October conference was a follow-on to the conference the Mershon Center organized in Moscow in June which focused on domestic opposition to

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<sup>4</sup> The first of these experiments, involving alternative outcomes for the Cuban Missile Crisis, is described in an as yet unpublished paper, Philip E. Tetlock and Richard Ned Lebow, "Poking Counterfactual Holes in Covering Laws: Alternative Histories of the Cuban Missile Crisis."

<sup>5</sup> This point is made by Steven Weber, "Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process," *Security Studies* 6 (Summer 1997), p. 196.







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<sup>1</sup> Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991*, rev. ed., (Baltimore, Md : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

## COLD WAR DOCUMENTS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

CPUSA Records Microfilm: The Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI) has delivered to Library of Congress representatives in Moscow the final set of microfilm of its Communist Party USA (CPUSA) records, fond 515. The first set, delivered last fall, contained 177,098 frames spanning the origins of the American Communist movement to 1929. This final set contains 258,067 frames and covers the period from 1929 to 1944 (fond 515 has no post-1944 material). Most of the total of 435,165 frames contain a single page from the original RGASPI collection. After the film reaches the Library of Congress a positive copy will be made for research use and the negative original retained for preservation. The positive copy of the first set, organized on 144 reels, is already available for research in the Manuscript Reading Room of the Library of Congress. John Earl Haynes, the Manuscript Division's 20th century political historian, said that it is hoped that the positive copy of the final set will be available in fall 2001. It will be several years before a detailed finding aid is available, but Haynes is preparing a temporary finding aid that will provide the date (year) and a limited indication of the type of material (political bureau minutes, trade union secretariat, district and local party reports, agit-prop department records, foreign language and ethnic affiliate reports, and so forth) found on each reel. The microfilming costs, in excess of \$100,000, were paid for by the Library of Congress's James B. Wilbur Fund for Foreign Copying and by a gift from John W. Kluge.

Library of Congress Joins Incomka: The Library of Congress has become a partner in the International Computerization of the Comintern Archives (Incomka) Project. Incomka is a project of the International Council on Archives and its partners are the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), the Russian Archival Service (Rosarchive), the federal archives of Germany, the national archives of France, the federal archives of Switzerland, and the ministry of culture of Spain. Although not a full partner, the Soros Foundation has provided some financial support for the project. (Incomka is currently seeking additional partners to assist with the cost of the project.) John Van Oudenaren, chief of the Library of Congress's European Division, is the Library's representative on the Incomka governing board while John Earl Haynes of the Library's Manuscript Division serves on Incomka's historians committee.

Incomka has two parts. First, Incomka will digitize the finding aids (more than 25,000 pages) to Communist International collections at RGASPI into a text-searchable data base. When completed, a researcher will be able to make a rapid computer search of all of the Comintern finding aids (the *opisi*) for specific persons, organizations, and topics under a variety of search options in either Russian or English. Second, Incomka will digitize as images 5% (one million pages) of the most used and historically significant documents of the Comintern. The project will scan entire sections (*opisi*) of Comintern documents, not selected individual items. The *opisi* to be scanned in their entirety, chosen by a committee of historians, include the records of the Comintern's political secretariat, the secretariats of individual members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), all of its regional (lander) secretariats (Anglo-American, Latin American, Balkan, Polish-Baltic, Scandinavian, Central European, and Eastern), as well as the records of various Comintern commissions and affiliates. When the project is finished, each partner will receive a complete set of the software, the data base, and the digitized images for placement at an institution in their home country. The software is a version of "ArchiDOC," an electronic archival descriptive system first developed for the archive of Spain's Council on the Indies. Among the scanned documents researchers will be able to call up a particular folder or file (*delo*) of a particular collection (*opis*) and examine the images of all of the documents in that file.

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## INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

### COLD WAR IN THE BALKANS: HISTORY AND CONSEQUENCES

18 - 20 MAY 2000  
PLOVDIV  
BULGARIA

#### PROGRAM

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*Cold War International History Project  
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#### 18 May 2000

9:30-11:00 a.m. Panel 1: The Superpowers and the Balkans in the Early Cold War Years  
11.30 a.m.-1:30 p.m. Panel 2: Balkan Diplomacy  
3:00-5:00 p.m. Panel 3: The Balkans and the Cold War: The Military Issues

#### 19 May 2000

9:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m. Panel 4: Intelligence Issues: A Critical Oral History Roundtable  
2-5:30 p.m. Panel 5: The Cold War in the Balkans: Ethnic and Religious Factors

#### 20 May 2000

9:00-10:15 a.m. Panel 6: Repression and Opposition  
10.30-12.30 Panel 7: Critical Oral History Roundtable "Repression and Opposition"  
2-5 p.m. Panel 8: The Year 1989 in the Balkans: The Transition to Democracy

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rapprochement with China. Kochavi argued that, though the evidence on Kennedy's intentions is decidedly inconclusive, it must in any case be doubted whether at this particular juncture an ideology-conscious Mao would have sanctioned such a move

Three papers dealt in detail with Chinese aid to Vietnam during the war, including the controversial issue of whether China deliberately delayed the trans-shipment of Soviet aid shipments to Vietnam. Drawing on Railway Administration archives, Li Danhui (Contemporary China Institute, CASS) suggested that any such delays were bureaucratic rather than political in nature. She also pointed out that, although China pressured Vietnam to make a peace settlement in the 1969-1973 period, Chinese aid to Vietnam simultaneously increased, in the expectation that this would facilitate a later North Vietnamese takeover of the south. Qu Aiguo (Academy of Military History) provided an overview of Chinese military assistance from 1958 to 1973, arguing that the contribution of both supplies and military "volunteer" personnel was substantial. Zhang Shuguang (University of Maryland) suggested that the Chinese contribution to Vietnam was relatively limited and, in a theme taken up in later papers, that Chinese policy was relatively cautious and designed to avoid any full-scale war with the United States.

The session "Negotiations and Missed Opportunities" dealt with the often tortuous mediation and peace negotiation efforts of the mid-1960s. James Hershberg (George Washington University) presented a lengthy account of the abortive "Marigold" peace initiative of 1966, an East-bloc effort to end the war, brokered by Poland, which may have been derailed by a crucial miscommunication among the various negotiators. Robert Brigham (Vassar College) described the 1967 Pennsylvania peace initiative, whose failure helped to precipitate next year's Tet offensive, by convincing the North Vietnamese that it would take further military pressure to persuade the United States to offer terms acceptable to them. Qu Xing (Beijing Foreign Affairs College) made it clear that Chinese leaders shared this perspective, and were in fact disappointed and skeptical when in May 1968—giving them only two hours' notice—the North Vietnamese opened peace negotiations with the United States. In further revelations as to intra-Communist bloc divisions, he also mentioned that in 1971 the North Vietnamese were less than happy when Kissinger visited Beijing and the Chinese began to pressure them to reach a peace settlement.

A session on "The Vietnam War in Its Regional Context" gave rise to some of the most animated discussion of an always lively conference. Stein Toenneson (University of Oslo) and Christopher Goscha (Paris) presented a translation of a memoir written in 1979, just before the Sino-Vietnamese War, by the leading North Vietnamese Communist party official Le Duan. Often highly critical of his one-time fraternal Chinese communist allies, the manuscript provoked strong reactions from both Chinese and Vietnamese scholars as to its reliability and

accuracy and the light it threw on Sino-Vietnamese relations. Mark Bradley (University of Wisconsin) made extensive use of both film and Vietnamese archives to provide fascinating insights into Vietnamese memories of the war and its impact. As with other wars in other countries, it seems that many Vietnamese are now eager either simply to forget the war or to derive whatever collateral benefits or advantages may accrue to them from it. Cambridge University Press, 2006, ISBN 978-0-521-87522-3







provide a thorough treatment of the application. This problem is compounded by the clear lack of cooperation between the division of the archives responsible for external researchers, and the internal research division. *Sachbearbeiter* are too often unaware of the research projects being carried out by their colleagues in the research division and thus are unable to take advantage of their colleagues' knowledge of archival holdings. There is, however, usually little difficulty in retrieving material if the researcher already has the archival call number.

#### IV. Present research

The research division of the archives has already published a series of valuable documentation on and analyses of the MfS.<sup>29</sup> At present, the research division continues to research its main project, the *MfS-Handbuch*, which will provide a detailed history of the institution from its beginning until 1990 once completed. Several installments of the *MfS-Handbuch* have already been published.<sup>30</sup> Other projects underway include "Women in the MfS," "The prison system of the GDR under the influence of the Ministry for State Security," and "The Influence of the MfS on the Human Rights Debate in the GDR." Researchers interested in the latest research projects being carried out by the internal research division should consult *Aktuelles aus der DDR-Forschung*, available on-line at <http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/ddr-forschung/Projekt.html>. The fourth official update produced by the BStU (4. *Tätigkeitsbericht*) appeared in 1999.

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*Gary Bruce teaches history at St. Thomas University. His book, Resistance with the People: Resistance in Eastern Germany 1945-55 is due out in July 2001 from Westview Press.*

<sup>1</sup> Joachim Gauck, *Die Stasi-Akten: Das unheimliche Erbe der DDR* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991), p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Roger Engelmann, "Zum Quellenwert der Unterlagen des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit," in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Roger Engelmann (eds.), *Aktenlage: Die Bedeutung der Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes für die Zeitgeschichtsforschung* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1995), p. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Armin Mitter, "Die Aufarbeitung der DDR-Geschichte," in Eckhard Jesse, Armin Mitter (eds.), *Die Gestaltung der deutschen Einheit* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1992), p. 366.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372.; Armin Mitter, Stefan Wolle, "Ich liebe euch doch alle! Befehle und Lageberichte des MfS Januar-November 1989" (Berlin: Basis Druck Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 1990), p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> Mitter, "Die Aufarbeitung," p. 372.

<sup>7</sup> John Torpey, *Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent: The East German Opposition and its Legacy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 188.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Christian Ostermann, "New Research on the GDR," *Cold War International History Bulletin*, Fall 1994, p. 34.

<sup>10</sup> Gauck, p. 11.

<sup>11</sup> See Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, Paragraph 32

<sup>12</sup> Siegfried Suckut, "Die Bedeutung der Akten des Staatssicherheitsdienstes für die Erforschung der DDR-Geschichte," in Henke, Engelmann, p. 195.

<sup>13</sup> Engelmann, "Zum Quellenwert," p. 28.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>15</sup> Suckut, "Die Bedeutung," p. 204.

<sup>16</sup> Engelmann, p. 28.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>18</sup> Suckut, "Die Bedeutung," p. 198.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 203.

<sup>20</sup> Ilko-Sascha Kowalczyk, "Von der Freiheit, Ich zu sagen. Widerständiges Verhalten in der DDR," Ulrike Poppe, Rainer Eckert, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczyk, (eds.) *Zwischen Selbstbehauptung und Anpassung* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1995), p. 94.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Suckut, "Die Bedeutung," p. 204.

<sup>23</sup> See "Das Pharaonengrab der Stasi", *Der Spiegel*, 18 January 1999. See also "Transatlantischer Datenaustausch" *Die tageszeitung*, 24 March 1999.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Ostermann, "New Research," p.34, 39.

<sup>26</sup> Telephone interview with Karin Göpel, BStU, 14 April 1997.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Herr Wiedmann, BStU, 28 April 1997.

<sup>28</sup> Approximately 3,000 applications for academic research had been received by the BStU in its first five years in operation. Telephone interview with Karin Göpel, BStU, 14 April 1997.

<sup>29</sup> See the list contained at the end of Henke, Engelmann, *Aktenlage*.



## NEW RUSSIAN, CHINESE, KOREAN AND EUROPEAN EVIDENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR

**21 June 2000**

*Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars  
Washington, D.C.*

**Sponsored by**

*The Cold War International History Project  
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars),  
The Korea Society (New York),  
and the  
Asia Program  
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars)*

9:00 AM **Breakfast and Registration**

9:30 AM **Opening and Welcome Remarks** (*Warren Cohen, Robert Hathaway*)

9:45 AM **New Russian and Eastern European Evidence on the Korean War**

CHAIR: *Nicholas Eberstadt* (American Enterprise Institute)

PRESENTATIONS:

*Kathryn Weathersby* (CWIHP): "New Evidence on Stalin and the Korean War"

*Mark O'Neill* (Florida State University): "The Soviet Air Force in the Korean War"

*Tibor Meray* (Paris/Budapest): "Biological Warfare: Reminiscences of a Hungarian Journalist"

Discussion

11:15 AM **New Chinese and Korean Evidence on the Korean War**

CHAIR: *Warren Cohen* (University of Maryland—Baltimore)

PRESENTATIONS:

*Zhai Qiang* (Auburn University): "Mao Zedong and the Korean War"

*William Stueck* (University of Georgia): "Moving Beyond Origins: Korean

War Revisionism and the New Evidence from Russian and Chinese Archives"

*Fred Beck* (Falls Church, VA): "A North Korean War Memoir"

COMMENT: *Hyuh In-Taek* (Korea University, Seoul)

Discussion

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## Western Intelligence Gathering and the Division of German Science

By Paul Maddrell

The three documents below<sup>1</sup> shed light on two neglected themes of Cold War history: first, how scientists returning to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 1950s were bribed and flattered to become members of its privileged *nomenklatura*, and, second, which of the scientists who refused these privileges and became valuable to Western intelligence services, particularly those of the United States and Britain. The reports depict one aspect of the division of Germany in the 1950s: the division of its scientific community, and its significant consequences for intelligence-gathering in the two Germanies. Scientists who returned to East Germany in the years 1950-58 from compulsory work in the Soviet Union promised to be of value to the GDR authorities for the contribution they could make to its scientific progress; they were of great interest to the intelligence services of Britain and the United States because they could provide much sought-after information on the military-industrial complex of the USSR. Some fled to the West soon after their return to East Germany, either by arrangement with a Western intelligence service or on their own initiative; some, for one reason or another, threw in their lot with the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and some (generally the less important scientists) were allowed to go West. Others, who stayed in the GDR, may have been recruited by Western intelligence services as “agents-in-place” in important research institutes, factories and ministries. Their controllers were particularly interested in any connections between these institutions and institutes, factories and ministries in the USSR itself.

Loyalty and how to buy it is the dominant theme of the first report.<sup>2</sup> Dated 31 December 1954, the report was written in anticipation of the return to East Germany in 1955 of the most important of the atomic scientists taken by force to the Soviet Union in 1945. The SED was eager to keep in the GDR those scientists, engineers and technicians who had been employed on atomic tasks in the Soviet Union. The well-informed Soviets (referred to in the report with the characteristic SED term “die Freunde” — “our Friends”) provided its officials with information on the returning men and women. Both Soviet and East German officials examined the returning scientists and their background closely, looking for sympathy towards Communism, affection for the Soviet Union, and a lack of ties to the West, all of which would help to prevent them from going West as soon as they found themselves on German soil. Equally useful to the Party were flaws in the character of each scientific worker. Financial greed and a need for admiration from others (*Geltungsbedürfnis*) would lay the target open to bribery and flattery, activities at

which the *nomenklatura* state excelled. Both failings were rightly detected in abundance in Baron Manfred von Ardenne, who is discussed in the first report below. The SED’s officials saw it would be worthwhile to make a show of admiration for von Ardenne, and Ulbricht made sure to send a personal representative, Fritz Zeiler, to greet him when he arrived in Frankfurt-an-der-Oder three months later. Zeiler’s report to Ulbricht on the encounter is the second document below. Zeiler was an appropriate choice to meet von Ardenne, as he was the department chief in the SED’s Central Committee responsible for economic management. In his autobiography, von Ardenne mistakenly remembers his name as Eichler.

Just as the SED waited expectantly for the return of scientists it saw as likely to be useful to the development of science in the fledgling GDR, the CIA, British Intelligence and the CIA-controlled Gehlen Organization<sup>3</sup> also prized these people for their value to intelligence. Thus, on the other side of the Berlin sectoral divide, the Western intelligence services also waited for the returnees. The East German Ministry of State Security [*Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*, or MfS], aware of the Western intelligence services’ interests in these scientists, kept two lists. The first list is of eleven men whom the SED regarded as security risks because it suspected that the men had “e. en mTJ1“T\*1Intelli-





collective must be subjected to operational processing. The reasons are suspicions of espionage, anti-Soviet views, connections with the Gestapo and anti-democratic opinions. [...] Concerning the other people, nothing of importance is known.

The most important person among the remaining scientists is:

Riehl, Nikolaus - Dr. of Physics

Riehl is an internationally-known scientist, he is a member of many scientific societies, has extensive connections with West Germany and foreign, capitalist countries and has visited almost all European countries.

He is a "Hero of Socialist Labor" and has once won the "Stalin Prize 1<sup>st</sup> Class" (receiving 200,000 rubles). In the Soviet Union all his wishes were fulfilled.

It is known that the Americans, as well as West Germany, for scientific and political reasons, are very interested in him and will try, by all means, to convince him to leave the GDR.

He is politically inscrutable, extremely cunning and knows how to adapt himself to the prevailing circumstances. He thinks very highly of himself and knows his worth.

In the opinion of our Friends it is imperative to keep him in the GDR. He is well-informed about a number of developments in the USSR. Only by showing him appropriate respect and by finding him appropriate employment can he be kept in the GDR.

Information is available, according to which he intends to leave the German Democratic Republic. [...]

The following specialists must be subjected to operational processing:

Barwich, Heinz

Dr. of Physics

Bumm, Helmut

Dr. of Physics

Siewert, Gerhard

Dr. of Chemistry

Ortmann, Henry

Dr. of Chemistry

Herrmann, Walter

Dr. of Physics

Hartmann, Werner

Dr. of Physics

Schütze, Werner

Dr. of Physics

Fröhlich, Heinz<sup>13</sup>

Dr. of Physics

Kirst, Werner

Engineer, Chemistry

Bernhardt, Fritz

Engineer, Physics

Sille, Karl

Engineer, Fine Mechanics

These people have links to secret services, were

formerly counter-intelligence officers in the Gestapo, displayed a hostile attitude at work or have interesting connections with persons in foreign, capitalist countries.

No operational material of importance exists concerning the remaining specialists. They did their work satisfactorily. [...]

The following people have shown a positive attitude towards developments in the USSR:

Prof. Vollmer

Mühlenfort

Dr. of Physics

No operational material of importance exists concerning the skilled workers and those people who are not doing any work. In general, they have done their work satisfactorily and did not display a negative attitude. 3 skilled workers were members of the SED. [...]

Once the specialists had been consulted and the available information examined, a final discussion was held with the management of the Sukhumi Institute and with Comrade Colonel Kuznetsov.

By way of summary, on the basis of the personal impressions formed in the discussions with the specialists, of the available information and [of the] the opinion of our Friends, the following conclusion can be reached:

The majority of the scientists and engineers will only make a decision upon their return to the GDR and according to the criterion of [the availability of] work. Almost all of them intend to obtain a good job. Their employment will be decisive in tying them to the GDR. For this reason it is imperative to arrange an appropriate reception for the specialists.

Our Friends are interested in the following scientists remaining in the GDR, since they worked on important research projects:

Schimor [misspelled: actually Schimohr] Schilling

specialists have entitlements deriving from their contracts.

collective and, moreover, did not need to concern itself

phones





Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> “Über die zurückkehrenden SU-Spezialisten”  
[concerning the returning SU-specialists]—the GDR  
authorities adopted the Soviet term, “specialists,” for the  
returning scientists, engineers and technicians.

3ci-0.012 Twi[( 12/1uLLETM79.1 uM79.1 usi-Tialiehl Or)22(ganization became-082(estliermay3sp2)58(szialisten"))JTJi-2. GDR)Tjir062 TmiFederal Intellige.00 Servi00 (Buurnachrich SU ^nst) in," for\*i056.2 T

## Letters to the Editor

I received today the latest issue of the Bulletin, and found it as fascinating as always.

I noted the exchange between Raymond Garthoff and T. Naftali and A. Fursenko. Perhaps I can shed a little light on a few of the technical issues raised in the article. I am currently working with a team of authors on a history of the Scud missile, and my research has touched on some of the issues raised in the recent Bulletin.

The reason why Khrushchev rejected the deployment of the Scud brigade to Cuba was more likely a technical decision than a policy decision. A Scud brigade could not be deployed by air in September 1962 whether Khrushchev wished it or not. The 8U218 launcher vehicle was simply too large and heavy for any existing Soviet cargo aircraft until the advent of the Antonov An-22 which did not enter service until later in the decade. Khrushchev probably rejected the deployment after having been told of this problem. The Cuban experience led the Soviet Army to push for the development of a light weight, air transportable version of the Scud launcher in 1963 based on this experience (the 9K73 system). Secondly, the R-11M missile is called SS-1b Scud A under the US/NATO intelligence nomenclature system, not the Scud B as mentioned in the Garthoff notes. This is worth noting as the R-11M had a range of only 150 km, vs. 300 km for the Scud B (Russian: R-17) and is a fundamentally different system.

Related to this, Raymond Garthoff correctly pointed out the translation problems relating to the S-75 missile system from the previous article. However, the implications of this issue have not been adequately drawn out in either article. The S-75 is the Soviet designation for the SA-2 Guideline air defense missile system of the type deployed on Cuba during the crisis. In the early 1960s, the Soviets were conducting tests on this system to use it in a secondary role for the delivery of tactical nuclear warheads, much as the US Army was doing with the Nike Hercules missile. Given the missile's small conventional warhead and mediocre accuracy in the surface-to-surface role, it made no sense to use it in such a fashion with a conventional warhead. The implication that can be drawn from this document is that the Soviet Ministry of Defense was considering a secondary use of the S-75 batteries already in Cuba as a means to deliver tactical nuclear warheads.

A clearer explanation should be made about the Russian word for division. The problem stems from the fact that there are actually two Russian words involved, *diviziya* and *divizion*. These two words are an endless source of confusion when dealing with military units in Russian, and the problem crops up in other Slavic languages as well, including Polish. The Russian word *diviziya* means a division or other large unit, *divizion* means a battalion or other small unit. I am sure that Raymond Garthoff understands this distinction, but his

explanation was not very clear, especially to readers who may not be familiar with Russian.

On some other missile issues: the S-2 Sopka was known by the US/NATO nomenclature SSC-2b Samlet and was a Navy coastal defense version of the Mikoyan KS-1 Kometa (AS-1 Kennel) air-launched anti-ship missile. The FKR-1 Meteor was known by the US/NATO nomenclature





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