

SOVIET NUCLEAR HISTORY

For historians of the Cold War, the Soviet nuclear weapons program is a topic of obvious importance. The nuclear arms race was a central element in the Cold War, and much of the historiography of American Cold War policy has focused on nuclear weapons—on the decisions to build them, and on their role in foreign policy and military strategy. But American policy is only one part of the history of the Cold War. Comparable studies of Soviet nuclear policy are needed for a full understanding of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition, which dominated world politics for more than 40 years. This note reviews briefly some of the main sources I used for my *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

primarily with two topics: the structure and development of Soviet nuclear forces, and Soviet thinking about nuclear war and the role of nuclear weapons in war. Some of these works retain considerable value, but the range of issues they could examine was necessarily limited.¹ They were based primarily on data published by highly classified Cold War strategic arms race. The authors were describing an important problem: so long as primary sources were unavailable, academic and government analysts interested in explaining Soviet military policy had to resort to “inferences drawn by long chains of logic” to interpret the scattered data available

INSIDE:

SOVIET SCIENCE SOURCES	2
MOSCOW'S BIGGEST BOMB	3
STALIN'S SECRET ORDER	5
RESPONSE: KOREAN WAR ORIGINS	21
KGB vs. CIA	22

GERMANY & THE COLD WAR:

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THE 2 TD (T)Tj 6.3 0 0 6.220.5 68 Tm RA
NEWS 86
UPDATE 90

Nuclear Weapons after Stalin's Death: Moscow Enters the H-Bomb Age

by Yuri Smirnov and Vladislav Zubok

By the time Stalin died, on 5 March 1953, the Soviet Union had become a nuclear power whose army was preparing to receive, in several months, its first atomic weapons.¹ The task set by Stalin, to liquidate the U.S. atomic monopoly and to develop the Soviets' own nuclear arsenal, was “overfulfilled” on 12 August 1953, when the USSR successfully tested the world's first transportable hydrogen bomb. The work on this bomb had been in progress since 1943, and Stalin failed by only five months to live to see his triumph.²

continued on page 14

STALIN AND THE BOMB*continued from page 1*

can or British policy, for example. Two books, by Arnold Kramish and George Modelski, were published in 1959 setting out what was known about the Soviet atomic project, and about the people and institutions involved.² These books provided useful information on the early stages of Soviet nuclear research, but were inevitably thin on nuclear weapons development.

The gap between what we knew about U.S. and British policy on the one hand, and Soviet policy on the other, widened in the 1960s and 1970s as more works on Western policy—including detailed official histories of the British and American projects—were published on the basis of archival research.³ No parallel publications appeared in the Soviet Union; the most informative Soviet work of this period was Igor Golovin's biography of Igor Kurchatov, who was scientific director of the Soviet nuclear project from its inception in 1943 to his death in 1960.⁴ Golovin, who was Kurchatov's deputy in the 1950s, based his book on interviews with people who had worked with Kurchatov and known him well (the opening pages of the book, for example,

were written by Kurchatov's brother-in-law, Kirill Sinel'nikov). His book is far more informative than other Soviet publications of the period, but it does not compare with the work of Richard Hewlett and Margaret Gowing and their colleagues. Some useful works on nuclear science and the atomic industry appeared in the Soviet Union at about the same time.

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Cold War Soviet Science: Manuscripts and Oral Histories

by Ronald Doel and Caroline Moseley

The end of the Cold War has stimulated new interest in the history of science in the Soviet Union. While several Western historians have produced important studies of various aspects of Soviet science, until recently such works relied largely on published Soviet information; and while Soviet scholars had greater access to archival materials, political pressures kept analyses of twentieth-century Soviet science limited to internal technical developments. Since the advent of *glasnost* in the late 1980s, however, contacts between Western and Eastern scientists and historians has increased dramatically, and scholars have begun the important task of evaluating Soviet-era and East European science within social, intellectual, and political contexts. This process has been aided by two developments. Archivists in the United States and the former Soviet republics have begun collaborating

to assess archival sources for the physical and biological sciences in the former Soviet Union; and greater freedom of travel and speech has enabled historians to conduct an unprecedented number of oral history interviews with leading scientists and their families in the former Soviet republics.

For more than two decades, the Center for History of Physics of the American Institute of Physics (AIP), now located in College Park, Maryland, has sponsored oral history interviews with scientists in most branches of the physical sciences, including physics, astrophysics, and geophysics; these interviews are housed within its Niels Bohr Library. Its staff has also gathered information on the papers of scientists and scientific institutions throughout the world. In addition, the AIP houses several small collections of manuscript and printed materials on the history of Soviet science. These sources are described in greater detail below.

I. Archival Sources. Beginning in the late 1980s, the Center for History of Physics has employed some highly qualified researchers, including the Russian historian Alexei

Kozhevnikov, to assess archival holdings for scientists and scientific institutions throughout the former Soviet Union and East European nations. Information about known archival collections is found in a database operated by the Center, the International Catalog of Sources for the History of Physics and Allied Sciences (ICOS). Currently the ICOS database contains records of 45 collections which have been preserved in 10 different repositories in the former Soviet Union. One of these repositories, the Archives of the St. Petersburg branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is a particularly rich source of physics-related collections. Its holdings include the papers of Evgenij Gross, Abram Ioffe, Wladimir Kistiakowsky, Yuri Krutkov, and others.

II. Oral History Sources. For several decades, the Center for History of Physics has sponsored oral history interviews with physicists, astrophysicists, meteorologists, geophysicists, and members of related disciplines. Over 600 interviews are available at the Center; transcripts are available for many

continued on page 13

clouded by the impossibility of distinguishing Sudoplatov's recollections from what has been added by his co-authors.

The controversy about Sudoplatov's book has produced one benefit: the release of the memorandum (prepared by

the end of civilization; I had to rely on secondary sources that quoted excerpts from the speeches. Nevertheless the greater openness of the immediate post-Stalin years is very clearly reflected in the archives. It is the last four years of Stalin's life that remain the most opaque and difficult period of Soviet foreign policy.

The same pattern holds for the study of military policy. New materials are now available on the development of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and also on the impact of nuclear weapons on post-Stalin military thought.⁵⁷ But the great military buildup of 1949-53 has not yet been illuminated either by archival materials or by studies by Russian military historians. This period requires new sources and research.

For the first time, researchers on these topics in recent years have been able to interview senior Soviet participants in the relevant events. Clearly, interviews are a notoriously difficult source, because people's memories are so often unreliable. Yet I found them enormously helpful—more so, in fact, than is evident from the notes in the book, because people I talked to helped me to evaluate what I had read, pointed me to new materials and questions, and gave me documents. Still, it was not always possible to cross-check what I was told with documentary sources, so I had to be careful in the use I made of interviews. I should note also that cooperation with Russian colleagues working in the same area was extremely helpful: they shared materials, ideas, and advice very generously.

In spite of the difficulties, Soviet nuclear history has now become an exciting area for research. It is intrinsically interesting because the issues it raises are of great importance, and because the people involved were remarkable. It is important for the history of the Cold War, and for the way in which we think about the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations.

A couple of years before completing my book I asked myself whether I should wait until new material appeared before finishing. I decided not to do so, mainly because I thought I had a more or less clear picture of what I wanted to say, and also because I thought a general map of the terrain might be useful to others working in this area. The history of the Soviet nuclear program is not likely to be exhausted by one account, any more than one book provides

everything one needs to know about U.S. nuclear history. Nevertheless, I was pleasantly surprised by the evidence that has become available about the development of the weapons themselves, about the community of scientists who built the weapons, about the role of espionage, about the management of the project, and about the effect of the bomb on the military and foreign policies of Stalin and the post-Stalin leaders. The story is an important one, not merely for understanding the arms race and the Cold War, but also for understanding Soviet society and the survival in that society of the traditions of the Russian intelligentsia, personified by such men as Vladimir Vernadskii, Peter Kapitsa, and Andrei Sakharov.

1. Among the most valuable are Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (London: Atlantic Books, 1958); Herbert Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1959); Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964). Data on Soviet nuclear weapons and the Soviet nuclear complex have been put out by the Natural Resources Defense Council. See, in particular, Thomas B. Cochran et al., *Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. IV* (New York: Ballinger, 1989); and Thomas B. Cochran and Robert Standish Norris, *Russian/Soviet Nuclear Warhead Production, NWD 93-1* (New York: Natural Resources Defense Council, 8 September 1993).

2. Arnold Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); George Modelski, *Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc* (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 1959).

3. Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, Jr., *The New World: A History of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 1, 1939-1946*, and Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield: A History of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 2, 1947-1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). These two

Kurchatovskii institut, 1993). (Most of this was published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1993, under the title “The Khariton Version.”) Iu. Khariton, “Iadernoe oruzhie SSSR: prishlo iz Amerikiki ili sozdano samostoiatel’no?” [“Nuclear weapons of the USSR: did they come from America or were they created independently?”], *Izvestiia*, 8 December 1992. 21. Ia.B. Zel’dovich, *Izbrannye trudy* [*Selected Works*], 2 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1984, 1985). A volume of memoirs about Zel’dovich was published under the title *Znakomyi neznakomyi Zel’dovich* [*The Known and unknown Zeldovich*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1994).

not believe that he tried to stop publication for personal reasons.

No one objected to the publication of the 12 non-design documents, which by themselves make it clear that Soviet scientists obtained extensive information from espionage. Unfortunately, by the time the ban on publication was issued, it was too late for the journal to remove the two design-rich documents in question. Through no fault of its own, the journal was put in an extremely awkward position.

Students of Soviet history hope that all the documents will appear before long, perhaps with excisions in the two documents on bomb design. What is needed is a procedure for declassifying historically important documents, even if they contain sensitive information—by removing the sensitive portions before publication. The Ministry of Atomic Power should institute a procedure of this kind. The KGB had reviewed these documents, but apparently only to insure that they would not reveal information about intelligence sources or methods, not to check the sensitivity of the weapon information they contained.

Mike Moore, editor of the *Bulletin*, wrote in his May [1993] "Editor's Note" that "those who live longest write history." In a certain sense this is true. It is only because he survived the end of the Cold War that Khariton has been able to write about the Soviet nuclear weapons program. His account is invaluable because he was one of the key people in the program from the very beginning. He has not used his recollections to aggrandize himself or to exaggerate the role that he played in nuclear weapon development. This increases the value of his testimony; and it is made more valuable by the fact that the history of the Soviet nuclear project is encrusted with legend and myth. Moore is incorrect if he means that Khariton has tried to shut out other accounts of the Soviet project.]

41. Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatolii Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness — A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), app. 2, pp. 436-67.

42. A.S. Feklisov, "Podvig Klausu Fuksa" ["The feat of Klaus Fuchs"], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* [*Military-historical journal*] 12 (1990), and 1 (1991); A.A. Iatskov, "Atom i razvedka" ["The atom and reconnaissance"], *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* 3 (1992); Sudoplatov et al., *Special Tasks*.

43. There has been, for some years, a running battle between the KGB and the physics community about the Soviet atomic project. Some former KGB officials have claimed that Soviet physicists made no contribution to the development of the atomic or hydrogen bombs, and that everything was done on the basis of intelligence material. The physicists have acknowledged the important role of intelligence in Soviet atomic bomb development, but have argued that the intelligence could have been checked and used only by competent physicists, and have asserted, moreover, that

and American policy remains excised.⁶

In spite of the redactions, the general line of argument remains relatively transparent. But rather than summarizing or assessing the study as a whole, this article discusses some of the questions raised in the chapters on Soviet-era defense planning and decision-making, strategic nuclear policy, and force deployments, particularly during the 1940s and 50s. The lack of primary sources on the Soviet side forced the authors to rely on “speculation and inference” using data from a variety of secondary sources and highly classified intelligence reports. Nevertheless, MSW produced some rich and provocative material on the range of motives that may have informed Stalin’s postwar military policy, the 1949-52 military buildup, Khrushchev’s strategic priorities, the Berlin/Cuban crises, and the mid-1960s ICBM buildup, among other issues. These analyses merit careful pondering by historians and political scientists alike.

The authors believe that Stalin expected an “antagonistic” relationship with Washington, yet also suggest that his postwar military decisions provided “little provocation” for a “stepped up competition in armaments.” Thus, taking into account postwar demobilization, Soviet forces were large enough to maintain domestic security, stabilize the East European sphere of influence, and possibly to support West European Communists. Anticipating more recent historiographic trends, they see Stalin as “extremely cautious,” but possibly mindful that if revolutionary scenarios materialized in Western Europe, military strength could deter counter-revolutionary intervention. Consistent with the idea of a cautious Stalin, MSW offer another explanation as well: that force levels “mirrored some of Stalin’s domestic concerns,” especially the possibility of instability brought on by reintroducing prewar levels of “discipline.” Alternatively, Stalin may have believed that his practice of assuring relatively equal funding for each of the services would provide capabilities for foreseeable military requirements while ensuring that the leaders of any one of them did not become too powerful.⁷

The possibility that Stalin operated on non-rational grounds, like a “Nero or a Caligula,” is suggested in a perfunctory way.⁸ But the weight of the analysis on postwar developments assumes a pattern of political rationality however it may have expressed

itself in particular decisions. This is certainly true of the discussion of the 1949-1952 buildup. For MSW, there are several issues for which there is insufficient data. One is the dimensions of the buildup itself; U.S. intelligence agencies may still not know the size of ground forces expansion during this period. Another problem is motive, the degree to which the buildup was “planned long in advance or ... reflected a Soviet

producing a modern and powerful arsenal. This, they suggest, may have dovetailed with Stalin's conviction that nuclear weapons were relevant to supporting Soviet foreign policy rather than for actual military use. That emphasis was also consistent with Soviet military doctrine prior to the mid-1950s, which either ignored or downplayed the role of nuclear weapons and emphasized instead "permanently operating factors" such as national morale and cohesion.¹⁴

Central to MSW's study is their discussion of the mid-to-late 1950s, which they see as a formative period for Soviet strategic doctrine and weapons systems. At that time the political and military leadership revised official doctrine about nuclear war; rather than minimizing the problem of a preemptive nuclear attack, they began to treat it as the preeminent danger and emphasized the importance of ready forces and preparation as well as arms control. More or less concurrently, the Soviets began to scale down their long-range bomber program and redirect resources toward ICBM and IRBM development. They did not, however, accelerate the latter; worried about the costs of military competition, they decided to make large investments slowly.¹⁵

MSW's interpretation of these developments, which fed into U.S. decisions to hasten ICBM and SLBM programs, raises important questions that deserve further exploration when Russian Defense Ministry archives become available. The authors contend that during the mid-'50s Soviet leaders concluded that bombers were useful for deterring an attack but not for "damage limitation," i. e., for the "defensive purpose of minimizing the harm an enemy nation could do." Believing that Washington was far ahead of them in ability to launch a crippling strategic attack, and perhaps overestimating U.S. air defense capacities, the Soviets reasoned that missiles, not bombers, could help them solve their problems, MSW suggest. Missiles, unlike bomber aircraft, were more or less unstoppable and could reach their targets quickly. While acknowledging the importance of various organizational and technological considerations, along with the persuasive abilities of rocket designer Sergei P. Korolev, MSW argue that a preoccupation with the "strategic defensive" was fundamental to explaining the shift in resources from bombers to missiles.¹⁶

The authors present a stimulating inter-

pretation of Nikita Khrushchev's unsuccessful "missile diplomacy" of the late 1950s and early '60s, an issue that has been of great interest to scholars.¹⁷ For MSW, Khrushchev's missile rattling needs to be understood in terms of military pressure on him to reverse his policy of restraint on military spending. Noting that the bulk of Soviet effort lay in MRBMs and not ICBMs (such as the SS-7 and SS-8), they suggest that Khrushchev was content to pursue a "second best strategic posture" that could meet potential threats on the Eurasian periphery, in particular West Germany and China. At the same time, restraint on ICBM development might have been a way to encourage Washington to disengage from Western Europe. Alternatively, the Soviets may also have had a problem in meeting their ICBM production goals. In this context, perhaps Khrushchev and the Soviet military found a "strategic bluff" as useful and necessary for meeting political goals as well as for concealing the weakness in their strategic posture.¹⁸

Without access to Soviet military and Presidential archives, MSW's hypotheses cannot be adequately tested; this problem is no less true for their reading of the early 1960s U.S.-Soviet crises—especially the Cuban Missile Crisis—and their impact on Soviet ICBM deployments in the following years. Like many analysts, the authors see the Soviet decision to deploy the MRBMs as motivated in part to defend Cuba and in part to offset U.S. strategic superiority, which had put Soviet nuclear forces in a situation that was "little short of desperate."¹⁹ But they are puzzled by the military logic, noting that the small force of missiles would have "been inadequate to destroy enough of the American strategic strike capability to preclude severe retaliatory damage" to the Soviet Union. MSW provide two possible answers to this problem. One possibility is that the Soviets believed that their deployment was adequate to deter Washington in a crisis: the U.S. would avoid a confrontation rather than risking a few cities. The other, admittedly speculative, is that prospective targets were U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) command and control facilities that could not be reached from Soviet territory. With their MRBMs in Cuba, and in keeping with the Soviet's strategic defensive orientation, they could hinder a "fully coordinated" U.S. first strike.²⁰

MSW relate Khrushchev's decisions on Cuba to a struggle with his Presidium colleagues over strategic force levels. Losing political clout after the U-2 affair and the retreat from the Berlin ultimatum (to sign a peace treaty with East Germany that would isolate West Berlin) in October 1961, Khrushchev was under greater pressure to allocate more resources to ICBMs. In this context, he may have seen the Cuban deployment as a way to contain military spending while giving the military more coverage of critical targets in the United States. Thus, "targeting the SAC command structure would help explain why the Soviets would undertake the very risky Cuban venture."²¹

Whatever the purposes of the deployment may have been, MSW argue that the Missile Crisis' outcome, with Moscow forced to back down and withdraw the missiles, acted as a "catalyst" by bringing to the surface latent dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's "second best" approach if not his concern with Germany and China. Thus, U.S. "strategic pressure" touched off a two-year-long debate involving a major decision for significant deployments of third generation ICBM systems: the SS-7 and SS-8 were abandoned and more resources poured into the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs. Moreover, the Soviets decided to develop the "Yankee class" submarine missile system. By 1965, MSW propose, the Soviets had completed basic decisions on force levels which remained relatively stable in the following years. And they further suggest that the intention behind these decisions was not strategic dominance or even serious "counterforce" capabilities, as the CIA's "Team B" maintained in the mid-70s'. Rather, a basic purpose may have been parity with the United States. Indeed, if its priority was MRBM deployments on their territorial periphery, the Kremlin may well have seen parity as sufficient to support their political interests in a future crisis.²²

Besides their overall assessment of the mid-1960s decisions, MSW raise specific questions about the characteristics of the missile deployments. For example, they are uncertain whether the Soviets developed the relatively inexpensive SS-11 ICBM in a "crash program" after the Cuban Missile Crisis or in 1961, becoming important later. In addition, solid information is not available on what the missile designers and the military had in mind when they developed

and deployed the heavy SS-9 ICBM. Returning to their earlier line of argument about command-and-control targeting, MSW use circumstantial evidence to conjecture that the SS-9's mission may have been to disable the command-and-control system of the U.S. Minuteman missile complex. Perhaps that is why the Pentagon found the SS-9s worrisome; thus, one purpose of Johnson and Nixon-era SALT strategy was to "seek to dissuade the Soviet Union from further large-scale deployments."²³

MSW raise a host of other interesting questions about Soviet decision-making in such areas as arms control, anti-ballistic missile systems, missile accuracy, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and fourth generation ICBM deployments of the early 1970s. Like the earlier material, the analysis is stimulating and deserves careful study. For example, the authors link the mid-'60s ICBM buildup to the SALT process by suggesting that in the process of deciding force levels each side developed an interest in arms control. They argue that conditions for SALT existed by 1965, when both sides had made basic decisions about ABM systems and the Soviets had decided to match U.S. ICBM deployments and MIRV technology. Thus, SALT was a "matter of ratifying decisions on the size and basic technical competition which each side reached unilaterally."²⁴

Declassification of some of the material once closely held by intelligence community—some of which may not even have been available to MSW—may shed light on some of MSW's interpretations. For example, the CIA has begun to release its National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet strategic forces, including NIEs that were produced during the "missile gap" debate of the late 1950s.²⁵ Perhaps even more important, beginning in 1992 the CIA began to declassify documents on one of the most famous and most successful Cold War espionage cases, the defection-in-place of Soviet GRU (military intelligence) Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Penkovsky provided CIA with a treasure trove of classified material, some of which is now available in translated form. A highlight is the top secret edition "Special Collection" of the journal *Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought)* provided to the Agency in 1961-62 by Penkovsky. More in the nature of "think

pieces," contributions to debates, etc., rather than policy and planning documents, the articles in the "Special Collection" clearly indicate important trends of thought in the Khrushchev-era high command. For example, the material documents the sometimes bitter controversy within the Soviet military over the extent to which strategy should depend on nuclear weapons and whether there remained a role for general purpose forces.²⁶ In addition, some of the articles show that a number of articulate generals believed that it was essential to have an array of ICBMs at their disposal if they were to "fight against means of nuclear attack" with any degree of success. Such statements, which can be interpreted as pressure to raise the ICBM budget, make MSW's line of argument about the strategically defensive character of Soviet planning all the more plausible.²⁷

In addition to the top secret articles from *Voyennaya Mysl*, the CIA has also declassified most of Penkovsky's debriefings to CIA and SIS officials during visits to England and France during 1961 and 1962.²⁸ Besides a remarkable statement on Soviet ICBM force deficiencies ("we don't have a damn thing"), the transcripts contain a wide range of detail on nuclear weapons-related issues, including command and control, missile and weapons tests, anti-ballistic missile and air defense programs, tactical weapons, rocket types and missile technology, weapons dispersal, nuclear facilities and key military figures in the nuclear area.²⁹ (An amusing revelation is the previously obscure "vodka crisis" of 1961; to ensure the availability of alcohol for missile fuel, the military crimped supplies for civilian use, thus creating a vodka shortage.) As with oral history, Penkovsky's statements require corroboration and cross-checking to screen out inaccuracies and politically-driven interpretations.³⁰ Nevertheless, the transcripts provide striking detail about personalities and issues during one of the Cold War's tensest passages.

The Penkovsky material, much of which the CIA has yet to release, sheds some light on the Khrushchev era, but more than that will be needed to permit even a preliminary resolution of the interpretive problems that MSW broach. A program of oral history interviews with retired Soviet general officers and weapons designers could be particularly valuable for clarifying developments during the Khrushchev era and after. Oral

histories may be essential when written records on some events no longer exist, but they are only a stopgap. It may well be that the eventual transfer of records from the Russian Presidential Archives to the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (the archival repository for post-1952 CC CPSU records) will enable researchers to test the various hypotheses developed by MSW. Nevertheless, a full picture of Soviet military policy during the Cold War will require the Russian Defense Ministry to develop programs for regularizing access to the archival collections under its control. If and when such material becomes available, the history of Soviet strategic program will only incidentally be a history of U.S. perceptions.

1. Ernest May, John Steinbruner, and Thomas Wolfe, *History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972*, ed. Alfred Goldberg, (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, March 1981, declassified with deletions, December 1990), 634. Hereafter cited as *History*.

2. *History*, 634.

3. Since this essay was written, several important studies have become available that show how much can be accomplished without extensive access to Russian military archives; see, e.g., Thomas B. Cochran and Robert Standish Norris, *Russian/Soviet Nuclear Warhead Production*, National Resource Defense Council Working Paper NWD93-1, 8 September 1993; and David Holloway's magisterial *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

4. [Ed. note: In what may be a hopeful portent, since this article was written the Russian military has declassified a limited amount of records pertaining to specific Cold War events, such as the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis (1961), and the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, it is too soon to tell whether these limited steps, taken in conjunction with particular political events or academic projects, will lead to more systematic declassification or even to easier and equitable scholarly access to those materials that are declassified.]

5. Some of the supporting studies have been declassified, e.g., IDA Study S-467, *The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945-1972* by L. Wainstein et al. (June 1975). Others are under declassification review, including the chronology used to prepare the study, as well as an IDA history of Soviet strategic command, control and warning.

6. Pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive, the Defense Department, CIA, and other agencies are now reviewing the excised portions for possible declassification.

7. *History*, 96-103. For Stalin's cautiousness, see also Raymond L. Garthoff, *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), 15-18.

8. *History*, 103. For a still useful assessment of the Stalin literature, see Ronald Grigor Suny, "Second-guessing Stalin: International Communism and the Origins of the Cold War," *Radical History Review* 37 (1987), 101-115.

9. *Ibid.*, 82. For intelligence estimates on Soviet

AFTER STALIN

continued from page 1

Addressing the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Plenary Meeting on 3 July 1953, Avraami Zavenyagin, deputy head of the recently-created Ministry of Medium Machine Building, spoke proudly: “The Americans [after the first Soviet atomic test in 1949] saw that their advantages had gone, and at Truman’s order began the work on the hydrogen bomb. Our people and our country are no slouches. We took it up as well and, as far as we can judge, we believe we do not lag behind the Americans. The hydrogen bomb is tens of times more powerful than a plain atomic bomb and its explosion will mean the liquidation of the monopoly of the American, do w unordon

capacity, which would annually generate, besides the electric power, about 130-200 kilograms of plutonium a year, an amount sufficient to produce “dozens” of atomic bombs. “Moreover, the production of atomic bombs from these materials is a process which can be accomplished within a very short period of time.”

“In this light,” they concluded, Eisenhower’s proposals “do not at all diminish the danger of atomic war” and, rather, were “directed at the disorientation of world public opinion.”⁸

More immediately, however, the Soviet physicists’ impassioned statement came against a backdrop of heightened international awareness of the perils of the hydrogen bomb. On 1 March 1954, in the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean, the United States had detonated what was then the largest explosion ever created by human beings, a blast with the explosive power of 15 million tons (megatons) of TNT, three times the yield scientists had predicted. This first test of a deliverable U.S. hydrogen bomb, code-named Bravo, had produced a pall of radioactive fallout that descended over 7,000 square miles of the Pacific, forced the unexpected evacuation of hundreds of U.S. service personnel participating in the test and residents of nearby atolls, and irradiated a Japanese fishing trawler, the *Lucky Dragon*, killing one crewman and setting off a panic among Japanese who feared that their tuna supply had been contaminated. As Washington moved forward with the Operation Castle series of thermonuclear test explosions in the Pacific, exploding a second, 11-megaton device (code-named “Romeo”) on March 27 (and a total of six explosions between March 1 and May 14), protests rose around the world calling for a ban on further such experiments. Amid the uproar, press conferences in late March by President Eisenhower and the chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis L. Strauss, conveyed to the general public what many scientists already understood: that an H-bomb could destroy an entire metropolitan area, and that radioactive fallout from a thermonuclear war could endanger the survival of civilization.⁹

In their draft article, the senior Soviet nuclear physicists specifically alluded to these events, citing the case of the *Lucky Dragon* and the fact that the United States had “already twice informed the world about

the explosion of hydrogen bombs”—indicating that their draft was not completed until the very end of March. “The world community is concerned,” the state scientists told their political leaders. “Such concern is entirely understandable.” As in the West, atomic scientists were also trying to educate their publics to this new magnitude of nuclear danger. Echoing the explanations given by Eisenhower and Strauss to an incredulous and fearful world, the physicists stated in their draft article that thermonuclear weapon yields had “already reached many millions of tons [of TNT] and one such bomb can destroy all residential buildings and structures within a radius of 10-15 kilometers, i.e., to eliminate all above-ground constructions in a city with a population of many millions....The power of one or two modern hydrogen bombs...is comparable to the total quantity of all explosive material used by both fighting sides in the last war.”¹⁰

Kurchatov and his colleagues, having strongly put before the Soviet leadership the problem of nuclear peril, stressed the need for a “complete ban on the military utilization of atomic energy.” This viewpoint obviously contradicted the “historic optimism” of Soviet ideology about the ultimate, inevitable victory of socialism over capitalism. It was, in essence, a pacifist position.

A warning of such seriousness could not go unnoticed by the Soviet leaders. But, it might be the case that by the time of the public speeches of the electoral campaign for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the first half of March 1954, this document or its essence had become known only to Malenkov. (Although Malyshev addressed a draft of the article to Khrushchev on 1 April, it is probable that earlier he, or Kurchatov himself, had informed Malenkov, at that time the number one figure in the leadership, of its contents.) In any case, in his electoral address on 12 March 1954—one day after the news broke that the Bravo H-bomb test had forced unanticipated evacuations—Malenkov, the head of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, said that war between the USSR and the United States, “considering the modern means of warfare, would mean the end of world civilization.”¹¹

This public declaration from the mouth of Stalin’s successor was something completely extraordinary with respect to the problem of war and peace, particularly since an electoral speech by Anastas Mykoyan

made the same day restated the familiar thesis that “atomic and hydrogen weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union are a means for deterring aggressors and for waging peace,” well within the traditional party framework and official propaganda of that time.¹²

Taken together, Malenkov’s public pronouncement and the physicists’ secretly submitted (for later publication) counsel constituted a clear challenge to orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology, which “scientifically” ordained socialism’s triumph in any future conflict, as well as to those who adhered to such an outdated concept. And with the

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How can it be asserted [Molotov added] that civilization could perish in an atomic war?...Can we make the peoples believe that in the event of war all must perish? Then why should we build socialism, why worry about tomorrow? It would be better to supply everyone with coffins now...You see to what absurdities, to what harmful things, mistakes on political issues can lead.¹⁸

It remains unclear, at least so far as Khrushchev was concerned, whether this criticism was merely a means to discredit Malenkov as a leader or was instead a manifestation of genuine loyalty to dogmatic tenets. It is known, however, that Khrushchev, who ousted Malenkov in February 1955 from the post of head of state, and then pushed Molotov aside from the helm of foreign policy, soon revealed that he shared the same estimate of the danger of thermonuclear war he had recently condemned. The East-West summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955, where Khrushchev already acted as the real leader of the Soviet delegation, demonstrated this as well.

During the summit, a memorable one-on-one conversation took place, with only Soviet interpreter Oleg Troyanovsky present, between Eisenhower and Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Georgi Zhukov—two famous military leaders of the Second World War. Each had a clear understanding of the power of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower was first to show how much the growth of nuclear armaments worried him, stressing that “now, with the appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons, many notions that were correct in the past have changed. War in modern conditions with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapon became even more senseless than ever before.” Zhukov agreed and noted that “he personally saw how lethal this weapon is.” (Zhukov, in September 1954, had supervised a military exercise in the southern Urals at Totskoye, during which a 20-kiloton atomic bomb was dropped from a plane and 44,000 soldiers immediately thereafter staged a mock battle at the test site to simulate nuclear war under “realistic” conditions.¹⁹)

Eisenhower continued: “Even scientists do not know what would happen if, say, in the course of one month 200 hydrogen

bombs would explode and if the conditions would favor the spread of atomic dust.” In his answer Zhukov stressed that he “personally favors the liquidation of atomic and hydrogen weapons” and noted that “if in the first days of war the United States would drop 300-400 bombs on the USSR,” and the Soviet Union retaliated in kind, “then one can imagine what would happen to the atmosphere.”²⁰

One is struck by the realism and responsibility of two professional military men who had become prominent statesmen. Still, Zhukov had undoubtedly spoken with Khrushchev’s advice and consent.

Therefore, one may infer that the physicists’ warnings had reached their target. The Geneva Summit, Khrushchev recalled many years later, “convinced us once again, that there was no pre-war situation in existence at that time, and our enemies were afraid of us in the same way as we were of them.”²¹

No wonder that, already, in the documents adopted by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the thesis of the inevitability of a new world war resulting from the aggressive encroachments of imperialism and new “warmongers” was replaced with the thesis of durable “peaceful coexistence between different social systems.”

In subsequent years, profoundly concerned about the threat of thermonuclear war, Kurchatov did not cease his efforts to enlighten the country’s leadership about nuclear danger. “Early in 1957,” Andrei Sakharov recalled, “Kurchatov suggested... that I write something about the effects of radiation from the so-called clean bomb.”²²

Sakharov’s investigation enhanced understanding of the extreme danger of atmospheric nuclear tests not only to present, but to future generations. He estimated that the overall number of possible victims from the radiation impact of each megaton of nuclear explosion might approach 10,000 in the course of several thousand years following the test. His article ended with a seminal recommendation: “Halting the tests will directly save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, and it also promises even greater indirect benefits, reducing international tensions and the risk of nuclear war, the fundamental danger of our times.”²³

Even before this article’s publication in a scientific journal in July 1958, Sakharov, again at Kurchatov’s suggestion, wrote another article on the dangers of atmospheric

testing for a wide audience. It was translated into major languages and published, with the aim of reaching foreign readers, by many Soviet journals distributed abroad. In this campaign one again senses Kurchatov’s purposeful activity, but, what is especially significant, even Khrushchev’s personal involvement. As Sakharov recalled: “Khrushchev himself authorized the publication of my articles. Kurchatov discussed the matter twice with him and then referred some minor suggested editorial changes to me....Khrushchev approved the revised versions at the end of June and they were sent off immediately to the editors.”²⁴

On 31 March 1958, Khrushchev announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing—a move that may well have been influenced not only by the immediate political calculus, but also by the considerations of Soviet atomic physicists. In this context the words that Kurchatov spoke at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 15 January 1960, three weeks before his sudden death—when he professed his “deep faith and firm knowledge that the Soviet people, and government would channel to the benefit of mankind”²⁵ the achievement of a thesis of self-reliance for the benefit of mankind

ing the renunciation of “socialism” in the GDR, and a secret rapprochement with Tito’s Yugoslavia)—became the basis for his indictment and execution in December 1953. The recriminations against Beria as a chief of the atomic project were as bizarre as they were effective in the power struggle. In reality, Beria, being the high commissioner of the Soviet atomic project, was also the First Deputy of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the CC CPSU, and, after Stalin’s death, one of the ruling troika. This provided him with more than sufficient authority in the framework of the atomic project. Moreover, according to many Soviet atomic veterans, the “die-hard bureaucrat” Beria had quickly given an appropriate impetus and scope to all works on the project, and if, instead, Molotov had remained in charge, the chances for rapid accomplishment of the project’s monumental tasks would have been slim.³⁰ Finally, Malenkov and Zavenyagin’s accusation about the decision to test is simply absurd, for a month and a half still had to pass after Beria’s arrest until the explosion of the first Soviet hydrogen device. Not to Beria but to his accusers fell the decision to issue the actual authorization for the testing.

After Beria’s arrest, the atomic complex became a darling of “the party and the government” (as an official formula put it), guarded and controlled by the Defense Department of the CC CPSU, as well as by the military-industrial commission of the USSR Council of Ministers. But this did not stop Gorbachev in the days of Chernobyl, 30 years after the Beria accusations, from performing a traditional party somersault and making strange accusations at a Politburo session: “All is kept secret from the CC. Its officials could not dare to put their nose into this field. Even the questions of location of [nuclear power plants] were not decided by the government.”³¹

New priorities, dictated by nuclear weapons, also played an exceptional role in Khrushchev’s ascendancy and his struggle against the Old Guard. The March 1954 episode has already been mentioned, when Khrushchev subjected Malenkov, the head of the state, to sharp criticism for his thesis about “the end of civilization” in the event of thermonuclear war. By taking Molotov’s


claims, claiming that he was “a bad communist” who “lacks toughness and falls under alien influence.”³²

After taking Malenkov down a notch, Khrushchev undermined Molotov. He continued to use the nuclear “topic” to accuse his rival, this time for conservatism and dogmatic “deviation.” The final clash between Khrushchev and Molotov took place at the June 1957 CC CPSU Plenum. As a target for his attack, Molotov chose a phrase Khrushchev spoke to *The New York Times* a month earlier: “Speaking in more definite terms about international tension, the crux of it, in the final analysis, is in the relations between the two countries—the Soviet Union and the United States of America.” Molotov, admitting that the USSR had become a great nuclear power, drew from it a conclusion that fit the party orthodoxy but was quite opposite to what Khrushchev meant—that while relying on this power, Molotov insisted that Moscow “must take special care to broaden every fissure, every dissent and contradiction in the imperialist camp, to weaken international positions of the United States of America—the strongest among imperialist powers.”³³

In a rejoinder, Khrushchev’s ally Anastas Mikoyan called Molotov “a dyed-in-the-wool conservative” and stressed that Khrushchev’s declaration “is correct in essence and corresponds to the accepted decision of the CC,” since it meant that “the question—to be or not to be for a war—in the present times depends on the biggest powers of the two camps, possessing the hydrogen bomb.” Continuing his allegation that the anti-Khrushchev (“anti-party”) group repudiates this crucial fact, Mikoyan said: “This is being done in order to subsequently...turn around our foreign policy, [which is] aimed at the relaxation of international tension.”³⁴

Khrushchev outwitted his competitors. Unlike Malenkov, whose estimate of nuclear danger sounded as a lonely shot in the dark, Khrushchev skillfully and repeatedly exploited the Soviet atomic project’s achievements and the nuclear issue in general in his tactical moves during the power struggle. Moreover, he advanced the new strategic concept of “peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and socialist systems” and guaranteed its approval by the CPSU 20th Party Congress. Thereafter, Khrushchev’s bold declaration about the two nuclear powers could be defended as a new party line. Al-

1. Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Jeffrey J. Sands, *Soviet Nuclear Weapons, 1989* (Russian edition) (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1992), 8.
2. Stalin's role in launching the Soviet nuclear program is well described and amply documented in David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). The deliverability of the thermonuclear weapon tested in August 1953 is noted in Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 307. The United States first tested the thermonuclear concepts employed in its hydrogen bombs by detonating a non-deliverable device on the island of Eniwetok in the South Pacific on 1 November 1952; and first tested a deliverable hydrogen bomb in March 1954.
3. See transcript of the 3 July 1953 CC CPSU Plenum in *Izvestia TsK KPSS* [News of the CC CPSU] 2 (1991),



50-MEGATON BLAST

continued from page 3

that the bomb design had worked.

Meanwhile, both aircraft and documentary crews observing the test were subjected to a most graphic experience. As one cameraman recalled: "The clouds beneath the aircraft and in the distance were lit up by the powerful flash. The sea of light spread under the hatch and even clouds began to glow and became transparent. At that moment, our aircraft emerged from between two cloud layers and down below in the gap a huge bright orange ball was emerging. The ball was powerful and arrogant like Jupiter. Slowly and silently it crept upwards.... Having broken through the thick layer of clouds it kept growing. It seemed to suck the whole earth into it. The spectacle was fantastic, unreal, supernatural."³ Another cameraman saw "a powerful white flash over the horizon and after a long period of time he heard a remote, indistinct and heavy blow, as if the earth has been killed!"⁴

Some time after the explosion, photographs were taken of ground zero. "The ground surface of the island has been *levelled*, swept and licked so that it looks like a skating rink," a witness reported. "The same goes for rocks. The snow has melted and their sides and edges are shiny. There is not a trace of unevenness in the ground.... Everything in this area has been swept clean, scoured, melted and blown away."⁵

A twenty-minute film about the development and test of the 50-MT bomb was later shown to the Soviet leadership. The film concluded with the following remark: "Based on preliminary data alone, it is evident that the explosion has set a record in terms of power." In fact, its power was 10 times the total power of all explosives used during World War II, including the atomic bombs dropped on Japanese cities by the United States. It's hard to believe that a more powerful explosion will ever take place.

The test stunned the world community, and became the subject of numerous discussions, legends, and myths which continue to this day. The Russian newspaper *Izvestia* reported in 1990, for example, that this super-powerful hydrogen bomb represented "a qualitative leap which wiped out the American advantage in total number of tests," and that Khrushchev agreed to sign the Moscow Limited Test Ban Treaty two years later "with a 60 megatonner in the arsenal."⁶

The 1992 television documentary, "The Story of an Invisible Town," also promoted the incorrect theory that "only after this explosion did the parties make concessions and sign the treaty."

As a result of excessive secrecy and limited access to information, even some of the directors of the test formed incorrect impressions. For example, the director of the test site on Novaya Zemlya, Gavriil Kudryavtsev, mentioned that in our country "60-megaton and even 100-megaton (fortunately never tested) superbombs have appeared." His explanation of their "appearance" is bizarre: "I think that the 'secret' is rather simple. In those days, the strike accuracy of our missiles was insufficient. The only way to compensate for this was to increase the power of the warhead."⁷

A completely fantastic idea about the 50-MT bomb appeared in 1992 in *Pravda*: "[this bomb] represents the yesterday of atomic weaponry. Even more powerful warheads have been developed by now."⁸

In fact, the 50-MT bomb tested on 30 October 1961 was never a weapon. This was a one-of-a-kind device, whose design allowed it to achieve a yield of up to 100 megatons when fully loaded with nuclear fuel. Thus, the test of the 50-MT bomb was in effect the test of the design for a 100-MT weapon. If a blast of such horrific magnitude had been conducted, it would have generated a gigantic, fiery tornado, engulfing an area larger than Vladimirskaia Oblast in Russia or the state of Maryland in the USA.

The explosion of the 50-MT bomb did not lead, as some suppose, to the immediate conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Negotiations to conclude the treaty continued for another two years. However, one may speculate that the explosion indirectly contributed to the talks' success.

The 50-MT bomb never had any military significance. It was a one-time demonstration of force, part of the superpower game of mutual intimidation. This was the main goal of the unprecedented test. Superweapons are rejected by contemporary military doctrine, and the proposition that "now we have even more powerful warheads" is simply ridiculous.

What was the political situation? The relations between Moscow and Washington at the time of Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 had been

ameliorating, but the following May the espionage flight of Frances Gary Powers over the Soviet Union aggravated them seriously. The U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft batteries near Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960. In the aftermath, the summit conference of Soviet, U.S., British, and French state leaders in Paris was aborted, and the return visit to the USSR of U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower was cancelled. Cuba, where Castro came to power, became the object of passions, and the failure of the U.S.-sponsored invasion by anti-Castro Cuban emigres at the Bay of

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placed a special burden on the bomb's designers, for a failure or serious shortfall in yield would have undermined the authority of our researchers. The enormous yield of the test (the most powerful of all tests conducted either by us or the USA) should have provoked and in fact did provoke fear throughout the world, in the sense that nuclear weapons were seen to threaten humanity's future. It also led to the realization that such weapons should be placed under international control, the framework for which has yet to be found but must be sought out and implemented. A series of agreements limiting the testing and spread of nuclear weapons was gradually concluded. The world community and the superpowers' governments came to see the necessity for such agreements as a result of evaluating the results of many nuclear tests, among them the test of 30 October 1961.

1. *Trud*, 23 May 1991.
2. *XXII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenographicheskii otchet* [22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], *tom* [Vol.] 3 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962), 122.
3. V.A. Suvorov, *Strana limoniia* [Land of Lemons] (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1989), 117-27.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Izvestiya*, 13 October 1990.
7. *Trud*, 23 May 1991.
8. *Pravda*, 20 October 1992.
9. *XXII seized Kommunisticheskoi...*, *tom. 1* (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1992), 55.
10. *XXII seized Kommunisticheskoi...*, *tom. 2* (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1992), 571-73.
11. Quoted in P.N. Lebedev Institute, *Andrei Sakharov: Facets of a Life* (Gif-Sur-Yvette: Editions Frontieres, 1991), 603.
12. [Ed. note: But also see the account given by Sakharov in his memoirs, in which the scientist stated that he sent a note to Khrushchev on 10 July 1961 opposing his decision to resume nuclear tests, suggesting that they would "seriously jeopardize the test ban negotiations, the cause of disarmament, and world peace," and that he worked on the test of the "Big Bomb" only after Khrushchev firmly rejected his appeal and chided him for meddling in politics and "poking his nose where it doesn't belong." Once the decision was made, however, Sakharov also says he was "going all out" to achieve the maximum from the fall 1961 test series. See Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs* (New S8eemen

“The crisis years” of 1960-1962 are remembered as a peak of the Cold War, an apogee of the bipolar confrontation. Many consider them even more dangerous than the Korean War, when the military forces of West and East clashed and almost slipped into a global conflict. The early 1960s were all the more frightening since the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were engaged in a fierce nuclear arms race, and two more states, Great Britain and France, had developed small nuclear arsenals of their own. By the end of the period the edge in this race clearly belonged to the United States such that, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington had at least nine times as many deliverable nuclear warheads as Moscow.

munist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), whose archives, unlike those of the KGB, have in part at least become accessible to scholars and the public.⁴

For all their fascination, the internal KGB documents cited in this article should also be treated with a good deal of caution. They contain references to events, plans, individuals, and explicit or implicit relationships that are uncorroborated and should be carefully investigated and cross-checked with other evidence before their accuracy and significance can be confidently gauged. Many of the assertions contained in the documents will require, in particular, collation with relevant materials in the archives of other governments and intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, and analysis by specialists in the history of intelligence. Many names in the documents are transliterated from the Russian after being transliterated from other languages, and the spelling may not be accurate. Moreover, in assessing reports by KGB leaders to Khrushchev, readers should recall the tendency of bureaucrats in any government to exaggerate capabilities or accomplishments to a superior, a proclivity that may be accentuated when, as in this period, there is intense pressure to produce results. Finally, in addition to remembering the lack of systematic access to KGB and CIA archives, those who evaluate the documents that *do* become available must keep in mind that evidence on crucial matters may have been deliberately destroyed, distorted, fabricated, or simply never committed to paper. All of these caveats should simply serve as reminders that however revealing these materials are, much additional research will be needed before a balanced and informed evaluation of the role of intelligence agencies and activities in the Cold War, on all sides, can be attained.

1940s, when the Soviets obtained detailed information on the wartime Anglo-American atomic bomb project, and it continued to be important as Cold War sanctions and barriers cut the Soviets off from Western technologies and industrial machinery.

During 1960, the KGB's scientific-technical intelligence service reported that it stole, bought, and smuggled from the West 8,029 classified technologies, blueprints, and schemas, as well as 1,311 different samples of equipment.¹⁰ A special target in this regard was, of course, the United States. On 7 April 1960, the Central Committee had directed the KGB to prepare a "prospective working plan of the intelligence service of the Committee of State Security at the Council of Ministers against the United States of America."¹¹ The plan, presented on 10 March 1961, postulated a wide array of measures.¹² Among them were efforts to insinuate agents into U.S. scientific-technical centers, universities, industrial corporations, and other institutions specializing in missile building, electronics, aircraft, and special chemistry. The KGB planned to use "third countries" as a springboard for this penetration campaign. Its agents in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan were to worm their way into scientific, industrial, and military research and consulting institutions of these countries with access to American know-how or subcontracting to U.S. military agencies. Agents residing in England, Austria, Belgium, West Germany, and Israel were instructed to move to the United States with the goal of finding jobs in the military-industrial sector.

It also planned to organize "on the basis of a well-screened network of agents" several brokerage firms in order to obtain classified scientific-technical information and "to create conditions in a number of countries for buying samples of state-of-the-art American equipment." One such firm was to be opened in the United States, one in England, and two in France. The KGB also prepared to open in a European country a copying center that would specialize copying blueprints and technical documentation in the fields of radioelectronics, chemistry, and robotics.¹³

Some orthodox anti-communists in the CIA, known as the fundamentalists, were tipped off by the Soviet defector Golitsyn about an alleged KGB "monster plot" to create a strategic web of deception. Accord-

ing to Golitsyn, the KGB's new chairman, Alexander Shelepin, the energetic and imaginative former leader of Young Communist League, revealed this plot in May of 1959 to the KGB establishment. uto

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Molody (Gordon Arnold Lonsdale) were encouraged to engage in lucrative businesses in the West and then funnel the profits into KGB foreign accounts.²⁰

A special division of the KGB was busy fabricating disinformation on the production in the United States of chemical and

with the plane "Lockheed U-2" caused an aggravation of existing tensions between the CIA and other USA intelligence services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and also provoked protests by the American public and certain members of the Congress, who are demanding investigation of the CIA activities.

The Committee of state security considers it advisable to make use of this newly complex situation and to carry out the following measures targeted at further discrediting CIA activity and compromising its leader Allen DULLES:

1. In order to activate a campaign by DULLES' political and personal opponents:

made use of the Iranian newspapers “Fahrman” and “Etelliat,” specifically mentioning the names of their agents (Abbas SHAHENDEH, Jalal NEMATOLLAKHI);

d) to publish articles in the foreign press showing the interference of American intelligence in the domestic affairs of other states, using as an example the illegal American police organization in Italy, found and liquidated at the end of 1959, that “worked on” Italian political parties under the direction of one of the diplomats at the American embassy;

e) to prepare and publicize a document by

over West Berlin can lead to the loss of their position not only in Europe, but also in a number of countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa.”³⁸ Khrushchev sent the memo with his approval to his deputy Frol Kozlov³⁹ and on August 1 it was, with minor revisions, passed as a Central Committee directive. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense were instructed to work out more “specific measures and present them for consideration by the CC CPSU.”⁴⁰

The first part of the deception plan must have pleased Khrushchev, who in January 1961 had pledged, before the communists of the whole world, to assist “movements of national liberation.” Shelepin advocated measures “to activate by the means available to the KGB armed uprisings against pro-Western reactionary governments.” The destabilizing activities started in Nicaragua where the KGB plotted an armed mutiny through an “Internal revolutionary front of resistance” in coordination with Castro’s Cubans and with the “Revolutionary Front Sandino.” Shelepin proposed to “make appropriations from KGB funds in addition to the previous assistance 10,000 American dollars for purchase of arms.” Shelepin

conviction that the Soviet Union firmly intends to use force in response to military provocations of Western powers and has at its disposal all necessary combat means." The KGB took upon itself the task "to inform Western intelligence through unofficial channels that the Soviet Union has taken necessary measures to strengthen its troops in the GDR and to arm them with more modern tactical missiles, newer tanks, and other armaments sufficient for the delivery of a quick and crushing response strike on the adversary."

Through the same channels KGB intended "to increase the adversary's belief in the high maneuverability and mobility of Soviet armed forces and their readiness, in case the West unleashes an armed conflict in Germany, to move within a minimal time up to the battle lines of the European theater. To convey as a proof thereof that this summer, during the exercises in the Near-Carpathian and other military districts, some divisions demonstrated an average speed of advancement of about 110-130 km per day."

Along the lines of Shelepin's proposal, the KGB's military-industrial consultants suggested other disinformation steps. Perhaps echoing Khrushchev's boast that his missiles could "hit a fly in the sky," the Committee proposed to convey to U.S. intelligence the information that during its recent series of atomic tests—in Sept.-Oct. 1961—the Soviet Union successfully "tested a superpowerful thermonuclear warhead, along with a system of detecting and eliminating the adversary's missiles in the air."

The KGB laboratories fabricated "evidence" for U.S. intelligence about "the solution in the Soviet Union of the problem of constructing simple but powerful and user-convenient atomic engines for submarines which allow in the short run increasing considerably the number of atomic submarines up to fifteen." (The ever-vigilant Shelepin deleted the number from the text—the super-secretive Soviets excised numbers even in disinformation!)

Finally, the KGB received instructions "to promote a legend about the invention in the Soviet Union of an aircraft with a close-circuited nuclear engine and its successful flight tests which demonstrated the engine's high technical capacities and its safety in exploitation." "On the basis of the M-50 'Myasishev' aircraft, with consideration of the results of those flight tests," according to

this disinformation, "a strategic bomber with nuclear engines and unlimited range has been designed."⁴⁵

Even now, reading those documents gives one chills down the spine. Determined

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tivities, especially against the “number one enemy,” the United States. There is little doubt that almost any document on the Soviet side has its U.S. counterpart in Langley still hidden from public view.⁴⁹ The process of mutual emulation started after the defection of Soviet cypher clerk Igor Gouzenko in Ottawa, Canada, in the summer of 1945. Ever since then the American intelligence agencies and the FBI, seconded by Soviet defectors, argued that they needed more discretionary resources and rights to match a well-prepared and ruthless enemy.

The KGB documents prove that the enemy was, indeed, ingenious, resourceful, and prepared to go very far. The emphasis on disinformation and on the use of various groups and movements in the “third world” had, of course, been a direct continuation of the OGPU-NKVD tradition in the 1920s-1940s.⁵⁰ Back then, the Soviet intelligence leaned extensively on the networks of the Comintern and other individuals sympathetic to the Soviet “experiment.” This network suffered from blows and defections as a result of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign and its spectacular unveiling at the February 1956 CPSU Twentieth Party Congress. But the collapse of colonial empires and the surge of radicalism and nationalism in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East was a bonanza for Soviet intelligence, bent on expanding their contacts in those parts of the world.

The KGB, no doubt, fulfilled orders from the top. Khrushchev’s support of “wars of national liberation” was a big step toward the globalization of Soviet foreign policy, and therefore of the Cold War. It is clear from the KGB documents, however, that even at that time of escalating covert superpower rivalry in the Third World, the Kremlin leadership retained clear *Realpolitik* priorities: with the exception of those posted in Cuba, Soviet intelligence agents in Third World countries were used by the Soviet leadership and its external arm, the KGB’s First Directorate, as pawns in a geostrategic game centered firmly on Berlin.

Yet, the KGB had its own distinctive impact on the Cold War. The documents presented in this article challenge the myth that KGB officials (and some American counterparts as well) like to promulgate: that the intelligence services of both sides, by increasing “transparency” about the adversary’s intentions and capabilities,

thereby contributed to stability and predictability in a dangerously polarized world. Some intelligence efforts that were genuinely devoted to reconnaissance, and reduced fears of a surprise attack, may well have done so.

But the games of deception, disinformation, and distraction designed by the KGB masterminds had a deleterious effect on global stability. They certainly contributed to the perception in Washington of expansive Soviet ambitions. In some cases they even exacerbated the danger of armed conflict. And the elaborate plots to sow the seeds of mistrust between the U.S. leadership and intelligence agencies was dictated by anything but a clear comprehension of how dangerous this kind of conspiracy had become in the nuclear age.

The legacy of the covert activities undertaken by the KGB and CIA at this key juncture of the Cold War was ambiguous:

New Research on the GDR

by Christian F. Ostermann

The Germans, as the British historian Mary Fulbrook recently pointed out, have “peculiarly vitriolic and problematic ways of ‘reckoning with the past.’”¹ A case in point is the way in which Germans have confronted the archival remnants of the German Democratic Republic. The first four years after the collapse of the GDR witnessed everything from the destruction and confiscation of historical records, including police raids on and calls for the complete closing of the East German communist party (SED) archives, to parliamentary investigating committees, to the establishment of new research institutions, and—more recently—to the opening of almost all records of the former GDR.² The following essay covers some of the more recent developments of interest to Cold War historians.³

The Ministry of State Security Records

Politically, the most controversial legacy of the SED regime was the records of the former Ministry for State Security (MfS/

Stasi), many of them saved by citizens’ groups from being destroyed by Stasi employees in the GDR’s last days. Extremely sensitive for privacy and security reasons, the MfS records were entrusted by the German Unification Treaty of 1990 to the *Sonderbeauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Unterlagen des ehemaligen Staatssicherheitsdienstes* (Special Commissioner of the Federal Government for the Files of the former State Security Service, usually referred to as the “Gauck Agency” after its director, Joachim Gauck).⁴

In December 1991, access to the records was granted on the basis of the “Stasi Records Law” (StUG). The Stasi files are located in the central archives of the former MfS in Berlin and in various regional (district) archives. According to the StUG, the Stasi records, encompassing more than 500,000 feet of documents, are open to all interested researchers. Exemptions exist, however, for documents of supranational organizations and foreign countries and files relating to intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence,

continued on page 39

The Soviet Occupation: Moscow’s Man in (East) Berlin

by Norman M. Naimark

The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG in Russian, SMAD in German) ruled the eastern zone of the defeated and occupied country from June 1945 until the creation of the German Democratic Republic in the fall of 1949. Given SVAG’s importance to modern German and Soviet history, it is surprising that there have been so few scholarly studies of its policies, organization, and actions. Yet when one recalls both that Soviet and GDR historiography refused to recognize that Soviet activities in Germany were determined by an occupation regime and that West German historiography, especially between the late 1960s and 1989, was often unwilling to ask hard questions about the origins and legitimacy of the East German state, the lack of attention to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany is easier to understand. Particularly in the West, the reticence of historians was also reinforced by the paucity of primary sources on SVAG’s activities. With Soviet and GDR archives closed to research-

ers from both the West and East, there was7 Tm (3)Tj /F5 iles relating toK3-eesrity ServiS r 0.02

End the Cold War: From East-bloc Archives

Hershberg

From the Potsdam Conference to the crumbling of the Cold War's symbol, greatest prize, covert battleground, and now, with the "German Democratic Republic" a reality, to explore East Germany's once-secret archives (and thus better understand some of the crucial events of the Cold War).

The Oral History Project (CWIHP) held an international conference on the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from the East, and other scholars working in newly-available archives. The conference, held on 20 June 1994, took place at the University of Essen (Forschungswissenschaftliches Institut, and featured papers on the 1948-49 Berlin Blockade, the 1952 Stalin Notes, the 1953 German uprising, and the 1958-62 Berlin Crisis. The conference consisted of two days of discussions on the internal history of East Germany (and the GDR period) and on the status of the Oral History Project (Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien) created after 1989 to foster scholarship on GDR history. The project is supported by generous grants from the Nuclear History Foundation.

It has always been the case in CWIHP-sponsored conferences that "hot" topics generated lively exchanges that reflected the consequences of communist rule in Germany and its impact on the West. There was particularly vigorous debate about the Berlin Wall.

LEADERSHIP, 7 APRIL 1952: "DON'T TAKE YOUR OWN STATE"

One of the central issues in Cold War historiography concerns the famous speech that the Soviet leader gave the Western Powers his terms for a settlement. Stalin offered German unification and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The West remain neutral. Debate continues on whether the West should attempt to reach a general settlement with the West, or launch a propaganda campaign to hamper the West's efforts to reach a military alliance.

Stalin, immediately adopted the latter view. And on 7 April 1952, he rebuffed, Stalin met in the Kremlin with a visiting German delegation (Walter Ulbricht, and Otto Grotewohl) to discuss the terms. The terms have now emerged from the Russian and East German archives. The West, now firmly instructed the East German government to "keep the dangerous" frontier dividing Germany and Europe. The terms have already been formally established more than two years ago. The construction simply reaffirmed an already obvious fact: that only now did Stalin understand that unifying Germany, or not, was a non-negotiable proposition.

The conversation printed below was located in the Archive of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and translated into English, by Prof. Mikhail M. Koriakov, Institute of History, Russian Academy of Sciences:

Continued on page 48

The GDR Oral History Project

by A. James McAdams

In November 1994, the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University opens a major new archive, a collection of over 80 oral histories of leading politicians and policymakers from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).¹ The collection has been compiled by the GDR Oral History Project, whose aim was to record on tape some of the still vivid memories of the former leaders of East Germany, so that in 50 or 100 years (the amount of time Socialist Unity Party [SED] general secretary Erich Honecker predicted the Berlin Wall would last) future students of German history would have a unique source for assessing the driving motivations of the individuals who once made up the country's dominant political culture. Of course, no series of interviews alone can realistically relate the entire history of a state. Nevertheless, the researchers felt they could preserve for posterity a segment of that experience by interviewing a select group of individuals who could reasonably be characterized as the East German political elite.

In particular, the Oral History Project chose to interview four types of politically significant individuals. The first group included well-known SED representatives, such as former members of the ruling politburo and central committee, like Kurt Hager, Karl Schirdewan, Günther Kleiber, Herbert Häber, Werner Eberlein, Egon Krenz, and Gerhard Schürer. The second, broader group consisted largely of members of the party and state apparatus representing a sample of policy implementors from diplomats to department heads from key departments of the SED central committee (such as Agitation and Propaganda and International Affairs) and sections of state ministries (such as the foreign ministry department charged with East German-Soviet relations). Our third group of interviewees comprised so-called policymaking intellectuals. This disparate group, with representatives ranging from economist Jürgen Kuczynski to socialist theoretician Otto Reinhold, primarily included individuals who had some tangential

continued on page 43

New Evidence on Khrushchev's 1958 Berlin Ultimatum

Translation and Commentary by Hope M. Harrison

The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1961 has long been seen as "Khrushchev's crisis," but at last there is some documentation indicating that at least the initiation of the crisis really was the Soviet leader's personal handiwork. Remaining in Berlin after the Cold War International History Project's conference on the "Soviet Union, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from Eastern Archives" in Essen and Potsdam, Germany on 28 June-2 July 1994, I was fortunate enough¹ to be one of the first scholars to gain access to the freshly-opened archives of the former East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.² While working in this archive, I found in the files of State Secretary Otto Winzer a document, translated below, written by the East German ambassador to Moscow, Johannes König, and dated 4 December 1958. In the document, König summarized information he gleaned from various Soviet Foreign Ministry officials about the process leading up to Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's

speech of 10 November 1958 and notes of 27 November 1958, which launched the Berlin Crisis.

In Khrushchev's November 10 speech, at a Soviet-Polish friendship meeting in the Sports Palace in Moscow, he asserted that the Western powers were using West Berlin as an outpost from which to launch aggressive maneuvers against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other countries of the socialist camp, including Poland. The impending atomic armament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), he declared, threatened to further exacerbate this situation. Khrushchev stated that the Western powers had broken all quadripartite agreements concerning Germany, particularly the agreement for the demilitarization of Germany, and that the only part of the Potsdam Agreement the West continued to honor was the part stipulating the four-power occupation of Berlin. This situation, in which the West used West Berlin for aggressive pur-

continued on page 36

[Soviet] Foreign Ministry and had a conversation with Comrade [Ivan I.] Il'ichev, the head of the Third European Department. He also commented, when I turned the conversation to the insufficient coverage of the GDR election campaign [for the 16 November 1958 Volkskammer (parliament) and local government elections] by the Soviet press, that Comrade Khrushchev's speech would contain important statements with regard to the German question. He told me nothing about what it would deal with. It was, however, obvious that the comrades of the Third European Department were informed excellently about the contents of Comrade Khrushchev's speech.

After the speech was held and had called forth the well-known echo in Bonn and the capitals of the three Western powers,¹² the entire Third European Department of the MID was occupied exclusively with preparing the next steps. I think that I am not mistaken in the assumption that ideas about concrete steps developed gradually at first and perhaps were subject to certain changes.

We know from information from comrades of the Third European Department that the entire Department was occupied for days with studying all agreements, arrangements, protocols, etc., which were concluded or made between the occupying powers with regard to West Berlin since 1945 so as to prepare arguments for shattering assertions made by Bonn and the governments of the Western powers and so as to make from these [i.e., old agreements, etc.—H.H.] concrete proposals for the next steps for carrying out the measures announced in Comrade Khrushchev's speech.

The MID was essentially finished with this work on 19 November 1958.¹³ According to information from Soviet comrades, the work on the comprehensive document was finished on this day and the document was submitted to the Council of Ministers for ratification. On this occasion, we learned that this document was supposed to comprise about 20 pages and was supposed to be presented to the three Western Powers, the GDR and West Germany soon. Thus, at this time we did not yet learn that there were 3 different documents.¹⁴

The Soviet comrades who gave us this news for "personal information" emphasized that they probably would not be telling us anything new, since "Berlin is informed and surely the same practice must exist with us as on the Soviet side, namely that the ambassador concerned absolutely must be informed about such issues regularly."

This comment: "You have of course already been informed by Berlin" was made to me a few other times so as to make clear that we should not expect official information on the part of the local [i.e., Moscow] MID.

In the conversation we conducted with the relevant Soviet comrades, it was said that a com-

prehensive argumentation was provided in the planned document for establishing the repeal of the agreements concerning Berlin (of September 1944, May 1945, and the Bolz-Zorin¹⁵ exchange of letters [of September 1955]) and that these functions would be transferred to the competence of the GDR. With this it was already mentioned that it is planned to hold official negotiations with the GDR on this. At the same time a hint was made that the Soviet Union would probably not be averse if it should prove to be expedient and necessary also to speak with the Western powers about this issue.

In the negotiations with the GDR, the issue of the transfer or the taking over of the relevant functions will be discussed. The key question in this is when, i.e., at which point in time and how the whole thing should be carried out. Our leading comrades, with whom consultations have taken place, also expressed the view that in this one must not place too much haste on the day, but must go forward gradually, step by step.¹⁶

In this conversation the Soviet comrade in question thought [very realistically, as it turned out—H.H.] that the Berlin issue would remain at the center of attention for at least one year if not even longer. On this issue hard conflicts with the Western powers will arise.¹⁷

To my comment: "The Western powers will not want to conduct a war for the sake of Berlin" followed the answer: "Our Presidium proceeds from the same assumption." My comment that ultimately the issue would come to a crisis for the West as a prestige issue and that therefore in my opinion everything must be done so as to facilitate retreat for the Western powers on this issue was acknowledged as correct.

In this connection it was noted by the Soviet comrade that the issue of great significance is what should happen with West Berlin after an eventual withdrawal of the Western troops. This issue plays a large role in the considerations of the Soviet comrades.

Thus, in this conversation, the issue of the transformation of West Berlin into a free city was not yet dealt with.

It was emphasized that in this connection public opinion is also of great significance. One cannot resolve this issue if one has not prepared the basis for this within the population. A correct argumentation vis-à-vis the population so as to win them over for the planned steps is thus of great importance.

In this connection, it was also mentioned that Comrade Khrushchev personally gave extraordinarily great attention to the preparation of the new steps regarding the Berlin question. He personally participated in the preparation of the documents. He submitted to the comrades of the Third European Department his thoughts on the entire problem on several type-written pages which he had personally dictated and asked the comrades to observe this point of view in the

composition of the documents and the determination of particular measures.

Comrade Khrushchev personally received on 19 November for a discussion several responsible officials of the Third European Department of the MID who were occupied with the Berlin issue and spoke with them in great detail about the entire problem.

The first mention that the Soviet proposals would include the demilitarization and neutralization of West Berlin was made to me by Comrade Il'ichev on 22 November when I sought him out on another matter. He again emphasized that he wanted to give me "exclusively for my personal information" several hints about the contents of the planned documents. In this connection he mentioned that it was planned to propose giving West Berlin the status of a free city.

Comrade Il'ichev emphasized on this occasion that the Soviet side was ready to negotiate with the three Western powers on the Berlin question, but only on the basis of the enforcement of the Potsdam Agreement in West Germany, [including] for example, demilitarization, denazification, decartellization, repeal of the prohibition of the KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands], etc.

Concerning further actions regarding Berlin, Comrade Il'ichev also emphasized that these would proceed step by step.

To my question as to whether the planned documents would be given to all nations which took place in the war against Germany, Comrade Il'ichev answered that they would be given only to the three Western powers as well as to Berlin and Bonn. To my question as to whether the delivery would occur in Moscow or Berlin and Bonn, Comrade Il'ichev answered, "probably in Berlin."

After the delivery of the documents, they will wait 2,er the I eks to questiouteon is 27707 TT* 0.questiRicipated in ton the B

keep the adversary under pressure for a certain period of time.” Ulbricht’s justification for going slowly aside, this is a rare instance in which the East German leader was not pushing the Soviets to move faster on giving up their control functions in Berlin to the GDR.—H.H.]

17. [It may be that the Soviet official in question here had some reason to believe that Khrushchev’s declared intention of transferring Soviet control functions in Berlin to the GDR was more of a threat to get the Western powers to the bargaining table than a serious intention. While it proved very useful as a threat, Khrushchev knew that carrying it out in practice would mean relinquishing some Soviet control over the situation in Berlin to the GDR. As the crisis progressed, Khrushchev came to the conclusion, no doubt based in large part on Ulbricht’s obvious attempts to wrest control from him and further exacerbate the situation in Berlin, that he did not want to do this. See the argument made in Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’,” and idem., “The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961,” paper presented to the 35th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 28 March-1 April 1994.—H.H.]

18. [The next step was taken on 10 January 1959, when the Soviets submitted a draft German peace treaty accompanied by a note to the three Western powers and sent copies of these to all of the countries that had fought against Germany in World War II, as well as to both German states. For the text of the note to the United States and the draft treaty, see *Documents on Germany*, 585-607.—H.H.]

19. [The reference is to the disarmament negotiations which began in Geneva on 31 October 1958 between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The negotiations ultimately resulted in a treaty on the partial banning of nuclear testing which was signed by the three powers in Moscow on 5 August 1963. On these negotiations, see Christer Jönsson, *Soviet Bargaining Behavior. The Nuclear Test Ban Case* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).—H.H.]

20. [The East Germans were often frustrated at Soviet attempts to maintain or improve relations with the West Germans. The Soviets were always walking a fine diplomatic line of trying to maintain good relations with each part of Germany while not overly alienating the other part in the process. While Khrushchev’s prime concern was the support, protection, and strengthening of the GDR, he also had economic, military, and political reasons for maintaining good relations with the FRG.—H.H.]

21. [Presumably, this refers to the Soviet intention to move forward slowly and cautiously with the transfer of some Soviet responsibilities in Berlin to the GDR.—H.H.]

22. [It is possible that König is actually referring to a meeting that took place on 12 December 1956 (as opposed to 1957) in which several remaining “open issues” in Soviet-East German relations were discussed. See König’s account of the meeting, “Bericht über eine Unterredung mit stellvertr. Aussenminister, Gen. Sorin” (“Report on a Conversation with Deputy Foreign Min-

Similarly, the role of the former “bourgeois” political parties in the GDR, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), proved to be highly controversial. The report contains excellent sections on the East German resistance movement, the MfS, and the early history of the GDR. In its final section, the report gives a brief survey of the Germany-related holdings of various Russian archives as well as criteria for the use of the SED and MfS records.

Of the 148 expert studies to be published along with the hearings in 1995, the most interesting for Cold War historians include the following (only short title given): War Damages and Reparations (L. Baar/W. Matschke); Deutschlandpolitik of the SPD/FDP Coalition 1969-1982 (W. Bleek); State and Party Rule in the GDR (G. Brunner); War Damage and Reparations (Ch. Buchheim); Political Upheaval in Eastern Europe and Its Significance for the Opposition Movement in the GDR (G. Dalos); On the Use of the MfS Records (R. Engelmann); “Special Camps” of the Soviet Occupation Power, 1945-1950 (G. Finn); The Wall Syndrome—Impact of the Wall on the GDR Population (H.-J. Fischbeck); Germany as an Object of Allied Policy, 1941-1949 (A. Fischer/M. Rissmann); Reports of the Soviet High Commission in Germany 1953/1954: Documents from the Archives for Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (J. Foitzik); German Question and the Germans: Attitudes Among East German Youth (P. Förster); International Framework of Deutschlandpolitik, 1949-1955 (H. Graml); Deutschlandpolitik of the SPD/FDP Coalition, 1969-1982 (J. Hacker); Case Study: 9 November 1989 (H.-H. Hertle); The Self-Representation of the GDR in International Human Rights Organizations (K. Ipsen); Deutschlandpolitik of the CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition, 1982-1989 (W. Jäger); Deutschlandpolitik of the Adenauer Governments (C. Kleßmann); Opposition in the GDR, From the Honecker Era to the Polish Revolution 1980/81 (C. Kleßmann); West German Political Parties and the GDR Opposition (W. Knabe); Patriotism and National Identity among East Germans (A. Köhler); NVA [the East German New People’s Army], 1956-1990 (P.J. Lapp); Deutschland-politik of the Erhard Government and the Great Coalition (W. Link); International Conditions of Deutschland-politik, 1961-1989 (W.

Loth); The Berlin Problem—the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961/62 (D. Mahncke); Cooperation between MfS and KGB (B. Marquardt); Political Upheaval in Eastern Europe and Its Significance for the Opposition Movement in the GDR (L. Mehlhorn); Alternative Culture and State Security, 1976-1989 (K. Michael); Deutschlandpolitik of the Adenauer Governments (R. Morsey); Western Policy of the SED (H.-P. Müller); The Role of the Bloc Parties (Ch. Nehrig); Opposition Within the SED (W. Otto); Establishment of the GDR as a “Core Area of Germany” and the All-German Claims of KPD and SED (M. Overesch); Role and Significance of the Bloc Parties (G. Papcke); the “National” Policy of the KPD/SED (W. Pfeiler); Deutschlandpolitik of the CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition, 1982-1989 (H. Potthoff); Transformation of the Party System 1945-1950 (M. Richter); Role and Significance of the Bloc Parties (M. Richter); Deutschlandpolitik of the SED (K.H. Schmidt); The Integration of the GDR into COMECON (A. Schüler); Influence of the SED on West German Political Parties (J. Staadt); Opposition within the LDPD (S. Suckut); Operation “Recovery”: The Crushing of the Prague Spring as Reflected in the MfS Records (M. Tantscher); The Round Table and the Deposing of the SED: Impediments on the Way to Free Elections (U. Thaysen); On the Function of Marxism-Leninism (H. Weber/L. Lange); The German Question: Continuity and Changes in West German Public Opinion, 1945/49-1990 (W. Weidenfeld). While the expert studies are officially not yet available, transcripts of the hearings can be obtained from the Bundestag.¹³

**Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und
Massenorganisationen der DDR im
Bundesarchiv**

Next to the Stasi files, the records of the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED), comprising over 26,000 ft. of documents, as well as the records of former Communist front organizations such as the Free German Youth (FDJ), the Democratic Women’s League (DFB), the Cultural League, the National Democratic Party (NDPD), the Foundation for Soviet-German Qu-14.3hiv

These records are now in the custody of an independent foundation within the Federal Archives system, the *Stiftung* "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen [SAPMO] der DDR im Bundesarchiv," created in April 1992 and fully established in January 1993 according to an amendment to the Federal Archives Law.¹⁴

Thus, in contrast, to the 1991-1992 period—when the SED records were by and large still in the hands of the successor organization to the SED empire, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), and located in the Central Party Archives in the former "Institute for Marxism-Leninism" (IML)—full access to the SED papers has now been assured with the establishment of the foundation and its integration into the Federal Archives. Even the internal archive of the SED politburo is now accessible to researchers. There are few restrictions on the use of the records, primarily those pertaining to privacy exemptions. The *Stiftung* also houses the huge holdings of the former IML library with its massive collection on international and German communism, international and German workers' movements, and GDR history.¹⁵ The records of the former "bourgeois" political parties in the GDR, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), were taken over by the FDP-sponsored *Archiv des Deutschen Liberalismus* in Gummersbach and the *Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik* (affiliated with the CDU) in St. Augustin, respectively. Unclear as of now is the fate of the files of the West German Communist Party (KPD), currently in the custody of the party leadership and not accessible for research.¹⁶

Bundesarchiv, Abt. Potsdam

Consistent with its traditional task as custodian of all central/federal German government records, the Bundesarchiv was entrusted with records of the former GDR government. Since access to government records, according to the German Archival Law, is granted on the basis of the 30-years rule, GDR government records are available for the 1949-1963 period at the Bundesarchiv's Potsdam branch, the former Central German Archives of the *Deutsches Reich*.¹⁷ Since the corresponding SED records (technically considered private rather than state) are open through 1989-90, East

German records differ considerably in their degree of accessibility.

Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten

The disparity in the treatment of records according to whether they are officially categorized as state or private crucially affected the fate of the records of the former East German foreign ministry (MfAA). In contrast to the "open door" policy which gov-

tory of the GDR in Western Germany, organized an international symposium in February 1992 on "White Spots in the History of the World Communism: Stalinist Purges and Terror in the European Communist Parties since the 1930s."²³ In 1993, the Mannheim Center edited a systematic listing of current research projects pertaining to GDR history. Published by the Deutscher Bundestag as "Forschungsprojekte zur DDR-Geschichte" in 1994, it lists 759 such projects, 51 of which fall into the categories "The German Question," GDR foreign relations, and GDR military history.²⁴ Researchers interested in registering their project should contact the Mannheim Center. The Center's main current project is a six-volume history of the GDR, 1945-1990, based on the new sources. In 1993, the institute started publishing "Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismus-forschung" [Yearbook for Historical Research on Communism] and is continuing a document collection on "Opposition and Resistance in the GDR." Other projects include a history of the FDJ, 1945-1965 (U. Maehlert); a history of the Deutschlandpolitik of the bloc parties; and a study of the role of anti-fascism in the early years of the GDR.²⁵

Another organization on the GDR research scene is the **Forschungsverbund SED-Staat**²⁶ at the Free University of Berlin, a research association established in 1992 under the energetic guidance of Manfred Wilke and Klaus Schroeder. The Forschungsverbund was a deliberate effort to break with the prevailing tradition of Western research on the GDR, a tradition which had come to de-emphasize the fundamental difference in political values in favor of a reductionist understanding of the East-West German rivalry as the competition of two models of modern industrial society both determined by technological processes. In contrast, the Forschungsverbund concentrates its research on the SED's totalitarian rule. Current projects deal with the establishment of the SED (M. Wilke); the relationship of the SED and MfS (M. Görtemaker); the central SED apparatus and the establishment and stabilization of the GDR dictatorship (K. Schroeder, M. Wilke); the SED's relationship with the churches (M. Wilke); Communist science policy in Berlin after 1945 (B. Rabehl, J. Staadt); the SED and August 21, 1968 (M. Wilke); the Deutschlandpolitik of the SED

(K. Schroeder, M. Wilke); opposition within the GDR since the 1980s (K. Schroeder); and a number of aspects of GDR industrial development. Most recently, the Forschungsverbund published a documentary collection on the plans of the Moscow-based KPD leadership²⁷ and a collection of essays on "The History and Transformation of the SED State."²⁸ The association is preparing major editions of the SED's role in the 1968 Czech Crisis as well as in 1980-81 Polish Crisis and on the "crisis summits" of the Warsaw Pact. At the **Federal Institute for Russian, East European and International Studies** (BIOst) in Cologne, a federally-funded research institute, F. Oldenburg is engaged in a larger study on Soviet-GDR relations in the 1980s, and G. Wettig is researching Soviet policy in Germany in the late 1940s and early 1950s as well as the Soviet role during the collapse of the GDR.²⁹ The **Archiv des deutschen Liberalismus** of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Gummersbach has completed a research project on the history of the LDPD 1945-1952, and in December 1993 hosted a colloquium on "Bourgeois Parties in the GDR, 1945-1953." Apart from the records of the (West) German Free Democratic Party (FDP), the archives now houses the records of the former LDPD, accessible for the years 1945-1990. The institute grants dissertation fellowships.³⁰

1. Mary Fulbrook, "New *Historikerstreit*, Missed Opportunity or New Beginning," *German History* 12:2 (1994), 203.

2. Hope M. Harrison, "Inside the SED Archives: A Researcher's Diary," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 20-21, 28-32.

3. For the development prior to 1993 see Axel Frohn, "Archives in the New German Länder," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 20-21, 25-27, and Notes by Stephen Connors, *ibid.*, 27.

4. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, "Zur Nutzung und Auswertung der Stasi-Akten," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 41:4 (1993), 575-87.

5. For the MfS archives, contact Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Projektgruppe Wissenschaft und Medien, Postfach 218, 10106 Berlin, FRG, tel.: 30-2313-7895; fax: 30-23137800; for publications and conferences, contact Abteilung Bildung und Forschung, tel.: 30-2313-7801, fax: 30-2313-7800.

6. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/2152.

7. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/2230.

8. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/2597.

9. *Ibid.*

10. A list of the minutes of the hearings (Protokolle) can be obtained from Deutscher Bundestag, Enquete-Kommission "Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland, Sekretariat, Peter-Hensen-Str. 1-3, 53175 Bonn.

11. The report can be obtained by writing to Deutscher Bundestag, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Bundeshaus, 53113 Bonn, FRG; tel.: 228-165287/88; fax: 228-167506.

12. For the final debate on the committee report, see Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 234th Session, 17 June 1994.

13. For publication information contact the Deutscher Bundestag, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit.

14. Hermann Weber, "Die aktuelle Situation in den Archiven für die Erforschung der DDR-Geschichte," *Deutschland Archiv* 7 (1994), 690-93.

15. SAPMO, Wilhelm-Pieck-Str. 1, 10119 Berlin, FRG, tel.: 30-4426837.

16. Weber, "Die aktuelle Situation," 692.

17. Bundesarchiv, Abt. Potsdam, Tizianstr. 13, 14467 Potsdam, FRG, tel.: 331-314331.

18. Author's correspondence with the Auswärtiges Amt, 3 August 1994 and 15 August 1994.

19. The archives are open Mondays through Fridays 8:30 am to 12:30 pm. To apply for permission to use the MfAA files and for information on the further procedure contact Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Postfach 1148, 53001 Bonn, FRG; tel.: 228-172161; Fax: 228-173402.

20. The following based on Förderungsgesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben, ed., *Tätigkeitsbericht 1993 der geisteswissenschaftlichen Forschungsschwerpunkte* (Munich: FGWN, 1994), and Fulbrook, "New Historikerstreit," 203-207.

21. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Außenstelle Potsdam, Baracke, c/o Bundesarchiv, Abt. Potsdam, Tizianstr. 13, 14467 Potsdam, FRG, tel.: 331-314331.

22. Further information on the institute can be obtained from Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien, Förderungsgesellschaft wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben mbH, Am Kanal 4/4a, 14467 Potsdam, FRG, tel.: 331-2800512; fax: 331-2800516.

23. The proceedings were published in 1993: Hermann Weber and Dietrich Staritz, eds., *Kommunisten verfolgen Kommunisten* [Communists Persecute Communists] (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993).

24. The booklet can be obtained at no charge from the Enquete-Kommission (for address see above).

25. For information contact Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Universität Mannheim, Arbeitsbereich IV: DDR-Geschichte, Postfach, 68131 Arawermers, w [(odor-llschaft,)Tj] 0 Tc 0Heusslm-Pie25ach16 TcC

their own conclusions about the honesty and sincerity of each interview. Occasionally, we detected moments of outright dishonesty. Sometimes our interviewees simply refused to talk about embarrassing moments in their lives (e.g., association with the Stasi). There was also a recurring tendency for younger individuals, or those lowest on the old hierarchy, to portray themselves as something they were not before 1989—such as closet reformists or enthusiastic Gorbachev supporters. There were also frequent lapses of memory; some older interviewees remembered the “anti-fascist struggles” of the late 1920s with absolute clarity, but could not recall the 1950s at all.

These sorts of problems afflict all oral

sembled. Nor do we know of any similar efforts to capture the memories of comparable political elites in other East European states, although the Hoover Institution is now beginning a similar interview project on the old Soviet elite. Therefore, we hope that the Oral History Project will inspire researchers seeking to lay the foundations for future scholarship on countries as diverse as Poland, Romania, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia.

Once the GDR Oral History Project is formally opened in November 1994, all interviews in the collection will be equally accessible to interested scholars, provided that interviewees have not previously requested copyright restrictions on the use of the material. For further information on the collection, contact:

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tion that the party is a real German party, and not simply the agents of the occupation authorities. There are still countless such shortcomings and failures of [the SED's] propaganda....

Here is the principal question—how should the party develop? Those whom the Old Social Democrats call functionaries, understand their connection with the party in this struggle, and we firmly count on them. They are the basic party unit; they are those we call the party *aktiv*. All the rest at best carry their membership cards and pay their party dues, but do not view the party's decisions as binding. An example of this is Leipzig. Neither the provincial leadership [of the Saxon SED] nor Berlin understand the conditions in Leipzig. Twice they met and twice they rejected the positions of the Central Committee and the [provincial] committee. This is [not serious] under the conditions here, but in a different situation, such as during the Reichstag elections, these questions will require great attention.[...]

As for the situation in the [SED] Central Committee itself. Grotewohl is the central figure after Pieck in the Central Committee; and he enjoys authority among and the respect of not only Social Democrats but also Communists. (I am still working especially closely with him. I visit him at his home. He has not visited me yet, but I would like to invite him to mine.) All of his behavior demonstrates that he sides with Marxist positions quickly and firmly, and for him there is no problem of speaking up at any meeting, and of speaking up very strongly and saying: if we look at the struggle in our social life, then we will crush our enemies by force of arms. However, at the beginning [of the occupation] he would have never used this expression, but he [now] sees and feels that these things are acceptable. Nevertheless, he has a very well-known past as a Social Democrat. I remember how he hesitated before he came to [his present stance]. I remember his [hesitation] during his last discussion with the Marshal [Zhukov, in February 1946], when there was only he [Grotewohl] and no one else, and the Marshal tackled the question of the political situation—whether or not he [Grotewohl] wanted or did not want [to join with the Communists], this was the political choice. [Zhukov] pointed out the differences between us and the [Western] Allies. Nevertheless, [said Zhukov,] I am used to fighting for the interests of the working class, and we, if necessary, will crush all [opponents]. Grotewohl demanded permission to travel to another zone. He went, reviewed [the situation], and said, I will go along with you [the Soviets].

In conjunction with a new [wave of] dismantling and with the fact that difficulties [in the economy] will not diminish but may even get more serious, the danger exists that if we leave here that we will leave behind only one such figure [as Grotewohl], that even in the Central Committee we don't have prominent figures

who would be able to lead the masses during the transition.

Fechner—the second Social Democrat, who wavers a great deal, a powerful parliamentary agitator, activist, a member of the Reichstag.... He appears to be a rather amorphous figure, not much of a battler, though he has produced a number of fine documents, denouncing [Kurt] Schumacher [of the SPD West].

Of the other Social Democrats who are there—Lehmann, Gniffke: one can rely on them with considerably less certainty. In the provinces we have only one such figure — Buchwitz, on whom one can rely, but he is the age of Pieck....

As for the Communists, Pieck is undoubtedly the most acceptable figure for all party members. Pieck is the all-around favorite, but often he says things that he should not; he too easily accepts compromising alliances and sometimes states even more than the situation permits.

I do not see any sectarianism on Ulbricht's part. Ulbricht understands organizational work, and he can secretly forge any political alliance and keep it secret. But Ulbricht is not trusted as a person. He speaks with greater precision and he understands [the political situation] better than anyone else. But they [members of the SED] don't like Ulbricht; they do not like him for his harshness. Moreover, relations between Grotewohl and Ulbricht are not satisfactory. Recently Grotewohl said [to Ulbricht]: you know, Pieck is the leader of the party, not you. However, at big meetings, Ulbricht always commands a great deal of respect, and even more for his efficiency at the meetings of the Central Committee, of the district committees, of functionaries, and others....

Now I will move to the characterization of the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party]. The LDP was regarded by all of us as a counterweight to the CDU [Christian Democratic Union], which during the last year, from the beginning of the liberation though all of 1945 until the beginning of 1946, constituted the major party (within the framework of democratic organizations), to which were attracted reactionaries [and] anti-Soviet elements who were looking for outlets to express their discontent.

I will begin with the CDU. We understand perfectly well that it is impossible to change the position of the hostile classes and that it is impossible to make this party pro-Soviet. But we can accomplish the goal of depriving [the CDU] of the possibility of making anti-Soviet and ambiguous statements; [we] can strengthen the scattered democratic elements in this party. Therefore, when this party turned out to be an obvious threat and synonymous with everything reactionary, we undertook to arrange the replacement of [Andreas] Hermes with [Jakob] Kaiser [in December 1945].... Currently, this party has a very diverse composition, comprised of the following elements: first of all, there is a significant group of workers and

Catholic peasants, but mainly [the CDU includes] those who belonged [before the war] to the Center Party. Approximately 15 to 20 percent of the party is comprised of office workers and bureaucrats....

For a long time, we thought of the LDP as a counterpoint to the CDU. I would even say that we promoted [the LDP] artificially. In October and November of last year, we used [the LDP] every time we had to put pressure on the CDU. In other words, we suckled a snake at our own breast. And in fact, before these elections this party never enjoyed any credit [among the population] or any authority....

[Now I will speak about] the leadership of the Kulturbund.** We have come to the firm conviction that it is now time to replace [Johannes R.] Becher. It is impossible to tolerate him any more. I spoke against [his removal] for a long time, and we had many reservations. But now, especially in connection with [the process of the] definition of classes and the intensification of the political struggle, we must prevent the Kulturbund from becoming a gang of all the members of the intelligentsia. We need it to become the cultural agency of the democratic renewal of Germany, as well as a society for [promoting] cultural relations with the Soviet Union. The Kulturbund ... has to be changed and has to have its own leading *aktiv*. Without them, it [the Kulturbund] can only be of harm and not of use, and Becher cannot and does not want to change it.

In his intellectual aspirations, Becher is not only not a Marxist, but he is directly tied to Western European democratic [thinking], if not to England and America. He is ashamed to say that he is a member of the Central Committee of the SED. He hides this in every way. He even never allows us to call him Comrade, and always Herr Becher. [He] avoids any sharp political speeches in the Kulturbund. Becher is well known enough; in the current situation he represents the progressive intelligentsia. He would not, and did not want to, let [Erich] Weinert into the Kulturbund. He did not want to let [Friedrich] Wolf take part in it, and he despises all party work [....]

Source: RTsKhIDNI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 149; SVAG Sbornik, pp. 155-176.)

* [Local (*Gemeinde*) elections were held in the Soviet zone on 1-15 September 1946; State Assembly (*Landtag*) and Regional Assembly (*Kreistag*) elections in the Soviet zone, as well as voting for the Berlin city government, were conducted on 20 October 1946.—N.M.]

** [Kulturbund refers to the Kulturbund fuer demokratische Erneuerung—the Cultural Association for Democratic Renewal. See David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 80-88. —N.M.]

Document II: Report of the Deputy Chief of the GPU (Main Political Administration) of the Armed Forces of the USSR, S. Shatilov, to Politburo member G. Malenkov on the Dismissal of Tiul'panov

September 17, 1949

Central Committee of the CPSU (b), Comrade Malenkov G.M.

I request permission to relieve Major General TIUL'PANOV Sergei Ivanovich of his post as Chief of the Information Administration of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, placing him under the command of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces.

It has been established that the parents of Major General TIUL'PANOV were convicted of espionage: the father in 1938, the mother in 1940. The wife of TIUL'PANOV's brother was in contact with the Secretary of one of the embassies in Moscow—an agent of English intelligence; her father was sentenced to be shot as a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization. TIUL'PANOV's brother and his brother's wife are closely connected with the family of Major General TIUL'PANOV S.I.

At the end of 1948, organs of the MGB [Ministry for State Security] in Germany arrested LUKIN—TIUL'PANOV's driver—for traitorous intentions and for anti-Soviet agitation. LUKIN's father betrayed his Motherland in 1928 and fled to Iran.

Major General TIUL'PANOV concealed the facts of the arrests and convictions of his father, mother, and relatives from the party, and he did not indicate these in his biographical information.

A number of employees of the Information Administration departments have been arrested lately on suspicion of espionage, and several were recalled to the Soviet Union from Germany for the reason of political unreliability. Major General TIUL'PANOV took no initiative in instituting these measures against the politically compromised persons. He did not approve of these measures, although he expressed no open opposition to them.

The arrested LUKIN, TIUL'PANOV's driver, testified that TIUL'PANOV revealed his negative attitudes in the driver's presence. Fel'dman, the former employee of the Information Administration who is now under arrest, testified that TIUL'PANOV made criminal bargains with his subordinates, engaged in extortion, and received illegal funds. There were 35 books of a fascist nature seized from TIUL'PANOV's apartment.

By his nature TIUL'PANOV is secretive and not sincere. Over the last year he has behaved especially nervously, taking different measures to find out about the attitude of the leading organs in Moscow towards him.

I regard it as undesirable to keep Major General TIUL'PANOV in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. I consider it necessary for the sake of the mission to relieve him of his post and not to let him reenter Germany. The Main Political Administration contemplates using TIUL'PANOV to work within our country.

Comrades Vasilevskii and Chuikov support the proposal to relieve Major General TIUL'PANOV of his duties in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany.

17 September 1949

SHATILOV

(Source: *RTsKhDNI, fond 17, opis' 118, delo 567; SVAG Sbornik, pp. 233-234.*)

Norman M. Naimark is Professor of History at Stanford University; his The Soviet Occupation of Germany, will be published by Harvard University Press in 1995.

STALIN AND THE SED

continued from page 35

Minutes of conversation with com[rade]. Stalin of leaders of SED W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht, and O. Grotewohl

Present: Comr[ade]s. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Semyonov (ACC [Allied Control Commission])

7 April 1952

Com[rade]. Stalin said that the last time W. Pieck raised the question about the prospects for the development of Germany in connection with the Soviet proposals on a peace treaty and the policy of the Americans and British in Germany. Comrade Stalin considers that irrespective of any proposals that we can make on the German question the Western powers will not agree with them and will not withdraw from Germany in any case. It would be a mistake to think that a compromise might emerge or that the Americans will agree with the draft of the peace treaty. The Americans need their army in West Germany to hold Western Europe in their hands. They say that they have there their army [to defend] against us. But the real goal of this army is to control Europe. The Americans will draw West Germany into the Atlantic Pact. They will create West German troops. Adenauer is in the pocket of the Americans. All ex-fascists and generals also are there. In reality there is an independent state being formed in West Germany. And you must organize your own state. The line of demarcation between East and West Germany must be seen as a frontier and not as a simple border but a dangerous one. One must strengthen the protection of this frontier.

(Source: APRF, Fond 45, opis 1, delo 303, list 179.)

Following are notes of the same meeting taken by Pieck, discovered in the SED archives in Berlin, in Rolf Badstubner and Wilfried Loth, eds., *Wilhelm Pieck—Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1945-1953* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), 396-97 (translation by Stephen Connors):

Final Discussion on 7 April 1952—11:20 p.m. in Moscow

St[alin]: up to now all Proposals rejected
Situation:

no Compromises

Creation of a European-Army—not against the SU [Soviet Union] but rather about Power in Europe

Atlantic Treaty—Independent State in the West Demarcation line dangerous Borders

1st Line Germans (Stasi), behind [it] Soviet soldiers

We must consider terrorist Acts.

Defense:

Reinstate the liquidated Soviet garrisons

3000

Armaments must be furnished,

immediately Russian Arms with Rounds [of ammunition]

Military Training for Inf[antry], Marine, Aviation, Submarines

Tanks—Artillery will be supplied

also [a] Rifle division

Hoffmann—24 Units—5800

Not Militia, but rather [a] well-trained Army. Everything without Clamour, but constant.

Village:

Also Establishment of Productive-Associations in Villages,

in order to isolate Large-scale farmers.

Clever to start in the Autumn.

create Examples—Concessions

Seed-corn, Machines.

Instructors at their Disposal.

force No one

[Do] not scream Kolchosen [Soviet collective Farm]—Socialism.

create Facts. In the Beginning the Action.

—way to Socialism—state Prod[uction] is socialist

Better Pay of the Engineers

1 : 1,7

2-3 x more than workers

Apartment

11-12000 Rbl [Rubles] to Academics

pay qualified workers better than unqualified

Propositions not dealt with

Party not dealt with Party conference

KPD [Communist Party of Germany]

Economic conference

Unity, Peace treaty—agitate further

ATOMIC ESPIONAGE AND ITS SOVIET “WITNESSES”

by Vladislav Zubok

No trial jury should render a guilty verdict without solid evidence, and neither should scholars. Therefore historians and scientists reacted with deep skepticism when in his recently-published memoir, *Special Tasks*, Pavel Sudoplatov, a notorious operative of Stalin’s secret service, asserted that the KGB received secret atomic information from several eminent scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr.¹ Sudoplatov’s claim that Bohr had knowingly given sensitive atomic data to a Soviet intelligence operative in November 1945, thereby helping the USSR to start its first controlled nuclear chain reaction for the production of weapons-grade plutonium,² generated particular surprise and disbelief given the renowned Danish physicist’s towering reputation for integrity and loyalty in the scientific world.

Only two months after Sudoplatov’s “revelations,” however, an important piece of contemporary evidence surfaced. Sudoplatov’s original 1945 memorandum to Stalin via Lavrenty Beria, retrieved from “Stalin’s File” (*papka Stalina*) in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF)³, refutes the allegation that Bohr improperly helped the Soviet atomic program and clandestinely passed secret Manhattan Project data to Beria’s messengers. Notwithstanding journalistic claims to the contrary,⁴ Sudoplatov’s contention that the approach to Bohr was “essential to starting the Soviet reactor” has proved to be a mere fantasy.

The cloud over Bohr should have been dispelled, but a larger question remains unanswered: how should one judge the claims of a group of “witnesses” from the Soviet secret police, intelligence, and elsewhere who have recently commented on Soviet espionage activities in 1941-1949 and their significance for Moscow’s atomic program? The situation evokes an old Russian proverb: “Lying like an eyewitness.” Indeed, the claims of these “witnesses” are suspect for a number of reasons, including the possibility of hidden agendas, personal biases, and the corrosive effect of time on human memories even when there is no deliberate intention to distort them, a danger that is particularly acute when people attempt to recall events concerning a subject beyond their expertise and comprehension.

That seems to be the major problem of most KGB commentators on atomic espionage, especially since only a tiny group of intelligence officers at various stages controlled the Kremlin’s atomic “networks” in the United States (Gaik Ovakimian, Leonid Kvasnikov, Anatoli Yatskov, Semen Semyonov) and in Great Britain (Vladimir Barkovsky, Alexander Feklisov). And even they, at the time of their operational work, were nothing more than conveyor belts of technical data between foreign sources and Soviet scientists.

The scientific head of the Soviet atomic program, Igor Kurchatov, sometimes with the help of his closest colleagues, formulated requests for technical information. Only he, and after August 1945 other members of the Scientific-Technical Council of the Soviet atomic project, could competently evaluate the materials provided by Klaus Fuchs and other spies. Kurchatov and other consumers of intelligence knew little or nothing of sources and methods, while Kvasnikov, Yatskov, Feklisov, and others knew very little of the progress of atomic research and development back home. Bohr’s interrogator, the scientist Y. Terletsky, according to a later interviewer, “had no real knowledge of what was going on in the Soviet project, thus Beria was not afraid of sending him abroad.”⁵ Kurchatov and his people compiled a questionnaire for Bohr and trained Terletsky to use it before his mission. Feklisov received a similar briefing from an unnamed “atomic scientist” before going to London to serve as control officer for Fuchs. “I had regrettably a weak knowledge of atomic matters,” admitted Feklisov in a considerable understatement.⁶

Stalin and Beria, the powerful secret police chief who after Hiroshima was given charge of the Soviet atomic project, effectively used this compartmentalization of information to prevent any leaks abroad. This system succeeded brilliantly when Western intelligence failed to penetrate the Soviet atomic project or predict the date of the USSR’s first atomic test in August 1949.⁷ Yet, a half century later, this very success produces misunderstandings

continued on page 52

COLD

SMIRNOV

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continued from page 51

Committee on Problem Number One because of his conflict with Beria, Voznesensky, and Kurchatov. Since Bohr had turned down Kapitsa's invitation to the Soviet Union in 1943,³ and because of the internal conflicts in the scientific community, we decided to rely on scientists already in the project who were also intelligence officers... We decided that Terletsky should be sent to see Bohr in the guise of a young Soviet scientist working on a project supervised by Academicians Ioffe and Kapitsa. . . .

Bohr readily explained to Terletsky the problems Fermi had at the University of Chicago putting the first nuclear reactor into operation, and he made valuable suggestions that enabled us to overcome our failures. Bohr pointed to a place on a drawing Terletsky showed him and said, "That's the trouble spot." This meeting was essential to starting the Soviet reactor. . . .⁴

When Niels Bohr visited Moscow University in 1957 or 1958 to take part in student celebrations of Physicists Day, the KGB suggested that Terletsky, then a full professor at the university and a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, should not meet with Bohr. Terletsky saw Bohr, who seemed not to recognize him.⁵

It is possible to reproach Sudoplatov's co-authors at once for shoddy research: Terletsky was never a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Bohr participated in the students' festival at Moscow University on 7 May 1961.⁶ Moreover, in fact Kapitsa, precisely as a member of the Special Committee headed by Beria, was even involved in preparations for Terletsky's mission (Kapitsa was relieved from his activity on the atomic bomb, and hence from participation on the Special Committee, only on 21 December 1945).⁷

But the most serious error in Sudoplatov's account of this episode in *Special Tasks* concerns his description of the reason for the approach to Bohr—allegedly difficulties in starting the first Soviet nuclear reactor. His version is consistent with his private 1982 petition to the CPSU CC for rehabilitation, in which he noted: "When an

Terletsky was still waiting for his meeting with Bohr, it had already been prepared for publication. Therefore, Terletsky's assertion, having on November 16 received from Bohr a copy of the "Smyth Report," that "we were, excuse me, the first Soviet people who had seen it,"¹² turns out to be untrue. As Bohr's biographers have pointed out, when he returned to Denmark from the USA in late August 1945, he brought a copy of the Smyth Report with him.¹³ Moreover, Bohr acquainted colleagues at his institute with it, and the Association of Engineers of Denmark even persuaded him to give a lecture on the topic. And though he asked journalists to refrain from exaggerations, the extraordinary information which had become generally available produced such a strong impression that one Copenhagen newspaper reported the lecture under the headline: "Professor Bohr reveals the secret of the atomic bomb."¹⁴

with [Princeton University physicist John A.]

We note that during the war the Germans applied much effort in order to carry out processes with heavy water, but they did not manage to collect the amount of heavy water sufficient to start a pile. The Americans found it possible to use graphite as a moderator and accomplished this idea with considerable success. Therefore, as far as I know, they gave up using piles with heavy water for industrial production. The Canadians chose another way, deciding to construct piles with heavy water, but these piles have not been activated for the same reason: they cannot accumulate for this purpose the necessary amount of heavy water. I consider it necessary to stress that I received this information during informal conversations with my colleagues.

19. Question: Of which substance were atomic bombs made?

Answer: I do not know of which substance the bombs dropped on Japan were made. I think no theoretician will answer this question to you. Only the military can give you an answer to this question. Personally I, as a scientist, can say that these bombs were evidently made of plutonium or uranium 235.

20. Question: Do you know any methods of protection from atomic bombs? Does a real possibility of defense from atomic bombs exist?


Answer: I am sure that there is no real method of protection from atomic bomb. Tell me, how you can stop the fission process which has already begun in the bomb which has been dropped from a plane? It is possible, of course, to intercept the plane, thus not allowing it to approach its destination—but this is a task of a doubtful character, because planes fly very high for this purpose and besides, with the creation of jet planes, you understand yourself, the combination of these two discoveries makes the task of fighting the atomic bomb insoluble. We need to consider the establishment of international control over all countries as the only means of defense against the atomic bomb. All mankind must understand that with the discovery of atomic energy the fates of all nations have become very closely intertwined. Only international cooperation, the exchange of scientific discoveries, and the internationalization of scientific achievements, can lead to the elimination of wars, which means the elimination of the very necessity to use the atomic bomb. This is the only correct method of defense. I have to point out that all scientists without exception, who worked on the atomic problem, including the Americans and the English, are indignant at the fact that great discoveries become the property of a group of politicians. All scientists believe that this greatest discovery must become the property of all nations and serve for the unprecedented progress of humankind. You obviously know that as a sign of protest the famous OPPENHEIMER retired and stopped his work on this problem. And PAULI in a conversation with journalists demonstratively declared

that he is a nuclear physicist, but he does not have and does not want to have anything to do with the atomic bomb.

I am glad to note that today in the local newspaper there appeared a report that [British Prime Minister Clement] ATTLEE and [U.S. President Harry] TRUMAN began a consultation with the USSR on the establishment of international control over the use and production of atomic bombs. Yet, I have to point out I view such reports in local newspapers very skeptically. But the mere fact that ATTLEE, TRUMAN, and [Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie] KING conduct these negotiations is very notable. Let us see where they will lead.¹ We have to keep in mind that atomic energy, having been discovered, cannot remain the property of one nation, because any country which does not possess this secret can very quickly independently discover it. And what is next? Either reason will win, or a devastating war, resembling the end of mankind.

21. Question: Is the report which has appeared about the development of a super-bomb justified?

Answer: I believe that the destructive power of the already invented bomb is already great enough to wipe whole nations from the face of the earth. But I would welcome the discovery of a super-bomb, because then mankind would probably sooner understand the need to cooperate. In fact, I believe that there is insufficient basis for these reports. What does it mean, a super-bomb?



country resolution which called for intervention in the Hungarian matter. According to information received from our Chinese friends, the government of Burma considers the application of sanctions against the Soviet Union in relation to its actions in Hungary a possible step.

In the memorandum of the Indian Government handed to Com[rade]. GROMYKO on 17 December 1956, the current position of the Soviet Union is judged in its essentials, and it is asserted that

“the events in Hungary shatter the belief of millions of people, who had begun to view the USSR as the defender of peace and rights of the weakest people.”

It should be noted that the evaluation of the Hungarian situation by the “Colombo Countries” corresponds to a significant degree with the Yugoslavian point of view on this question. According to information in our possession, NEHRU and [Burmese Prime Minister] U BA SWE support close contact with Yugoslavia on the Hungarian question.

In this connection it is necessary to point out that NEHRU, in his speech to the Indian Parliament on 20 November 1956, underlined that TITO is in a position to give a correct evaluation of events in Europe and that India, in working out its foreign policy program, to a certain degree is led by his evaluation. Besides this, NEHRU, speaking about Tito’s speech in Pula [Yugoslavia—ed.], noted that to him many points in this speech seem correct.

The Government of India is in full accord with the position of Yugoslavia regarding [over-

1956, even though he earlier, as is well known, had avoided a trip to the USA for a long time.

As is well-known, the joint communique about NEHRU's negotiations with EISENHOWER, published 20 December 1956, does not contain any concrete agreements. At the same time, it mentions that both sides affirm the existence of a broad area of agreement between India and the USA, who are linked by tight bonds of friendship, based on the compatibility of their goals and adherence to the highest principles of free democracy."

During his visit to the USA, in one of his speeches (20 December) NEHRU strongly lauded America's "morally leading" role in the Middle East crisis and the events in Hungary.

It is entirely possible that, as a result of NEHRU's negotiations with EISENHOWER, a real improvement in Indo-American relations will take place, and that could negatively impact the relations of India with the USSR.

Judging by reports in the press, in the near future an increase in American aid to Pakistan, Burma and other "Colombo countries" will be proposed. The Burmese government, which has previously refused aid from the USA, has already at the present time entered into negotiations about receiving American loans. There is reason to suggest that in the near future there could take place a certain strengthening in the relations of the USA with the other "Colombo countries."

Genuineness affirmed:
Deputy Chairman, Committee of Information,
USSR Foreign Ministry.

Correct: [signed] I. TUGARINOV

"28" December 1956
Attachment to No. 1869/2

(Source: TsKhSD.)

III. "A Typical Pragmatist": The Soviet Embassy Profiles John F. Kennedy, 1960

In August 1960, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko forwarded to Premier Khrushchev a political profile, prepared by the USSR Embassy in Washington, of the recently-nominated Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy. Khrushchev had met JFK once before—briefly, during a visit to the United States the previous fall, when he was introduced to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Though "impressed" by the young congressman, Khrushchev considered Adlai Stevenson, the unsuccessful

Democratic challenger in 1952 and 1956, to be "the most acceptable" candidate to succeed Eisenhower, and the most likely to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. (Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 507; Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 488.)

But the twice-defeated Stevenson had rejected a third bid, and at the July 1960 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles, Kennedy had emerged as his party's standard-bearer to take on Republican candidate Richard Nixon. Nevertheless, for the Soviet leader, choosing a favorite in the U.S. presidential campaign was easy. Khrushchev saw Nixon, his antagonist in the "Kitchen Debate" at a 1959 Moscow trade fair, as an "aggressive" anti-communist who "owed his career to that devil of darkness McCarthy"—and Khrushchev's post-Camp David fondness for the Eisenhower Administration had dissipated after the U-2 affair in May, which aborted a planned East-West summit in Paris as well as Ike's anticipated visit to the USSR. Kennedy probably didn't hurt his stock in Moscow by saying that he, unlike Eisenhower, would have apologized for the spy flight, and Khrushchev later told JFK (at their June 1961 Vienna summit) that he had "voted" for him by delaying the release of the captured U.S. pilot Francis Gary Powers until after the election. (Khrushchev Remembers, 508; Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 490-91.) Still, as Khrushchev later conceded, despite having a clear preference, "We had little knowledge of John Kennedy," other than that he was "a young man, very promising and very rich—a millionaire... distinguished by his intelligence, his education, and his political skill." (Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 488-89.)

Khrushchev's initial assessment was probably informed, at least in part, by the profile reproduced below, prepared by charge d'affaires Mikhail Smirnovsky. Though it inevitably mentions JFK's wealthy background, the profile does not dwell on his "class consciousness" and presents a straightforward, no-nonsense analysis of his political background, development, and views; his personality; and, of greatest interest to the Kremlin, his likely impact, if elected, on U.S.-Soviet relations. Despite minor slips (Kennedy only narrowly defeated Henry Cabot Lodge in the 1952 Senate race, not by "a wide margin"), what

emerges is a surprisingly plausible, balanced, and even nuanced appraisal not so different from those advanced by many subsequent historians, although not so glowing as to satisfy Kennedy's most ardent admirers or hagiographers. Foreshadowing Khrushchev's later description of his counterpart as "flexible," the embassy finds JFK a "typical pragmatist," ready to change positions according to shifting calculations of situations and his own interests (as evidenced by his fence-sitting on McCarthy, and his alliance with conservative Democrat Lyndon Johnson despite embracing the title "liberal"). It describes a cautious, dispassionate, energetic yet deliberative politician who can also be sociable and "charming" when required, a man with "an acute, penetrating mind" able to quickly grasp the essence of a situation, and to understand people well. Yet it judges that Kennedy, "while not a mediocrity," lacks the necessary attributes of originality, philosophical depth and "breadth of perception" to be considered "an outstanding person."

As to JFK's views on international affairs, the profile presciently senses the "quite contradictory" strains that would characterize U.S.-Soviet ties during his brief presidency. On the positive side, from the embassy's view, there is Kennedy's criticism of Eisenhower policies he sees as dogmatic and worse, failures, e.g., "liberating" Eastern Europe and shunning communist China; his support for a nuclear test ban and other arms control measures; and his belief, in contrast to some hardliners, that high-level U.S.-Soviet talks were, in general, worth pursuing. At the same time, though, it correctly notes that Kennedy's envisioned path to a superpower "modus vivendi" was conditioned upon a significant U.S. military build-up that would allow Washington to deal with Moscow from a "position of strength"—and such a course, the embassy states ominously, would "in practice signify a speeding-up of the arms race and, therefore, a further straining of the international situation" with all its attendant consequences. Worse, on Berlin, Khrushchev's top priority, JFK was "outright bellicose"—ready to risk nuclear war rather than abandon West Berlin.

Thus, one finds the essential ingredients that would characterize Kennedy's relations with Khrushchev once JFK entered the White House—a tough stance on inter-

is dictated by practical necessity, and, following this, also about the establishment of cultural and economic contracts between the USA and PRC. In regards to this Kennedy does not conceal the fact that he sees such contacts above all as a means of penetrating the PRC and collecting information about its internal condition. While advocating a "reduction in tensions in the region of Taiwan" and a refusal to "defend" the Chinese coastal islands of Matsu and Quemoy, Kennedy supports continued USA occupation of Taiwan itself and readiness to "defend" the island.

In keeping with his general stand on strengthening the position of the USA in the world, Kennedy lends great importance to strengthening NATO and in general to the issue of USA allies. In connection with this Kennedy holds to the opinion that NATO should be, on one hand, "a vital, united, military force," and on the other, an organ for overcoming political and economic differences between participating nations and for coordinating their policy towards weakly developed countries.

Kennedy considers the issue of policy toward weakly developed countries, along with that of the renewal of US military strength, to be of the utmost importance in terms of the outcome of the struggle between the socialist and capitalist worlds. In order to prevent a further increase in the influence of the USSR and other socialist countries in the weakly developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Kennedy proposes that the USA, in conjunction with its Western European allies and Japan, work out broad long-term programmes of economic aid to these countries along the lines of the "Marshall plan." Kennedy gives India especial attention in plans for aid to weakly developed countries, considering the economic competition between India and the PRC to be of decisive importance in the struggle for Asia. At the same time Kennedy is quite critical of the practice of bringing weakly developed countries into military blocks such as SEATO and CENTO, which, in his opinion, unlike NATO, are "paper alliances," concluded moreover "with reactionary governments that do not have the support of their peoples," and which for this reason do not strengthen, but, on the contrary, weaken the position of the USA in these countries and regions.

Kennedy as a person

Kennedy himself and his supporters now are trying however possible to create the impression that he is a strong personality of the caliber of Franklin D. Roosevelt, a leader of the new generation able to lead the country to "new heights."

Judging, however, on the strength of the available evidence about him, Kennedy, while not a mediocrity, is unlikely to possess the qualities of an outstanding person.

He has, by all accounts, an acute, penetrat-

ing mind capable of quickly assimilating and analyzing the essence of a given phenomenon, but at the same time he lacks a certain breadth of perception, the ability to think over a matter philosophically and make appropriate generalizations. By the make-up of his mind he is more of a good catalyst and consumer of others' ideas and thoughts, not a creator of independent and original ideas.

In keeping with this Kennedy is very attached to the institution of advisors called upon to suggest interesting ideas and to work up detailed reports on various problems, but makes the final decision on serious problems himself, not entrusting this function to his underlings.

Kennedy understands people well and in general is a good organizer, as is evidenced, in particular, by the harmonious and efficiently-running apparatus he has put together for his election campaign.

Temperamentally, Kennedy is a rather restrained, dispassionate, and reserved person, although he knows how to be sociable and even "charming"—it is this latter quality in particular which explains the popularity Kennedy gained in the primary elections in a series of states throughout the nation.

Kennedy is very cautious and avoids taking hasty, precipitous decisions, but does not display excessive indecision. Kennedy is the author of three books: *Why England Slept* /1940/, *Profiles in Courage* /1956/ and *Strategy of Peace* - a collection of his speeches /1960/, as well as a significant number of magazine articles.

During the post-war years Kennedy has received honorary doctorates from many American universities and colleges.

He is a member of the organizations: "American Legion," "Veterans of Foreign Wars," and "Knights of Columbus."

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Kennedy's family is among the 75 richest in the USA. It is worth, by different accounts, between 200 and 400 million dollars. John F. Kennedy's personal income at present is about 100,000 dollars a year. However, in his electoral campaign he has the broad financial support of his father and other members of the family; many of whom—his brother and sister—are taking part personally in the campaign.

Kennedy's father - Joseph P. Kennedy, now 71 years old, first acquired the family fortune by various forms of speculation on the stock market and by commerce in alcoholic beverages. At present he is one of the leading figures in the Boston financial group. In the first years of Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency, Joseph P. Kennedy supported his political program; he was the first head of a committee on securities and of the marine committee. From 1937 to 1940 he was the US ambassador to England; however he was

forced to resign because of differences with Roosevelt's foreign policy: he spoke out against USA military aid to England, was a supporter of Chamberlain's Munich policy and in general sympathized with Hitler. (This fact is now being used by John F. Kennedy's opponents in order to compromise him in the eyes of the voters.)

John F. Kennedy was married in 1953 to Jacqueline Bouvier, the daughter of a rich New York banker. He has one daughter, Caroline, born in 1957.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 335, Ll. 92-108.)

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IV. "Spill-Over" from the Prague Spring—A KGB Report

In early November 1968, KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov presented a secret, 33-page report to the CPSU Central Committee about the mood of Soviet college students. The report was transmitted after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but it had been completed sometime before then, and had been circulating within the KGB. It is not clear precisely who drafted the report, but Andropov's cover memorandum and the report itself indicate that the author was a college student in Odessa who had recently finished his degree. Presumably, the author was a KGB informant during his student

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Andropov's cover memorae-
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tional complications. We will give you assistance with all available means—ship weapons, ammunition, send people who can be useful to you in managing military and domestic matters of

A.A.Gromyko, D.F.Ustinov and B.N.Ponomarev.

L.I. BREZHNEV. Over the last few days we have been watching with alarm the development of events in Afghanistan. From what you said in conversation with our comrades, it seems the Afghan friends are gravely alarmed as well.

We must take steps to correct the situation that has developed and eliminate the threat to the new order in the DRA. And not only eliminate the threat, but also work to strengthen the gains of the April revolution.

As we see it, it is very important to widen the base which supports the leadership of the party and the country. First of all, of great importance here is the unity of your party, mutual trust, and ideological-political solidarity throughout its ranks from top to bottom.

It is worth thinking about creating a single

KABUL

TO CHIEF MILITARY ADVISER

Inform the Prime-Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan H. Amin that the request to send 15-20 military helicopters with soviet crews has been delivered to the Soviet government.

Tell him that the Afghan government has already been given explanations on the inexpediency of direct participation of soviet military subunits in the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in the DRA, as such actions would be used by the enemies of the Afghan revolution and foreign hostile forces in order to falsify soviet international aid to Afghanistan and to carry out anti-governmental and anti-soviet propaganda among the Afghan population.

Emphasize that during March-April of this year, the DRA has already been sent 25 military helicopters which are equipped with 5-10 complete sets of combat ammunition.

Convince H. Amin that existing combat helicopters with Afghan crews are capable, along with subdivisions of land-based forces and combat aircraft, of solving the problems of suppressing counter-revolutionary actions.

Work out for the Afghan command the necessary recommendations pertaining to this question.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 28.)

Yet between May and December 1979, the situation continued to deteriorate, and for reasons that are still not entirely clear, Moscow changed its mind about sending troops. Why the turnabout? Several potential explanations exist. One factor was undoubtedly the grave internal situation in Afghanistan, which Moscow viewed with growing concern, receiving reports from a parade of special emissaries sent to urge Kabul to modify and moderate its course. While blaming outside countries (Iran, Pakistan, China, the United States) for exacerbating the situation, Soviet leaders recognized deep problems with the Afghan leadership itself, and rumors arose that Moscow was angling to replace the Khalqi Taraki-Amin regime with one headed by Babrak Karmal, head of the Parcham faction. Mutinies and rebel attacks continued, and Moscow began to increase its security presence in the country, though still short of sending military forces. In September-October 1979, tensions between Taraki and Amin and their supporters exploded into open warfare, ending with Amin in control and Taraki dead—a result clearly contrary to the Kremlin's wishes. Surface cooperation between Kabul

and Moscow continued, with Amin even requesting the dispatch of Soviet troops. But Soviet leaders were privately convinced of Amin's "insincerity and duplicity" (the quotation is from a report for a Politburo meeting of 31 October 1979, cited in Trud (Moscow), 23 June 1992, and Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, rev. ed., 1011) and his inability to successfully contain the rebel insurgency, and may well have begun plotting to remove him—although much remains unclear about this period, as it is for the few months immediately preceding the intervention that the fewest internal Soviet documents have so far become available. Still, even the likely defeat of the clearly unpopular government would not alter the reasons why Moscow had rejected intervention the previous spring—so what else had changed? One possibility concerns the continuing growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, and most importantly the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, which had deposed the Shah after a quarter-century in power and installed in his place a theocracy dominated by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In their 1 April 1979 report to the Politburo, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev had pointed to the "situation in Iran and the spark of religious fanaticism all around the Muslim East" as the "underlying cause" of the anti-Kabul agitation. Moscow may well have also feared the spread of religious zeal into the mostly-Moslem Central Asian republics of the USSR itself—a latent threat that would not become evident to the rest of the world for another decade to come. Since the spring, the fundamentalist tide had only become stronger, with Islamic radicals taking firmer control of the Iranian revolution (and seizing the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November), sparking unrest in Saudi Arabia, and calling for a jihad against other Arab regimes and against both superpowers. These developments related to the larger question of the changed international context since the spring's decision against non-intervention. Although Brezhnev and Carter had met in Vienna in June 1979 to sign a SALT II treaty, US-Soviet ties had been sinking ever since, with acrimony stirred by the "Cuban brigade" brouhaha later that summer—the flap, regarded by Moscow as a provocation, over the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba that U.S. intelligence had lost track of—and by the failure of the Senate to ratify, or even vote on the ratification of,

the SALT II treaty. The concerns Gromyko had expressed in March about the negative international repercussions of a Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan were, in fact, no less valid, but he and other Soviet leaders may have come to feel that there was less to be lost in that sphere anyway—that détente was already effectively dead. Finally, still to be resolved is the argument advanced by some analysts that U.S. irresolution in responding to the Iranian Revolution and the capture of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979 emboldened Moscow to advance toward its purported goal of a warm-water port in the Persian Gulf. If anything, however, the weight of the evidence in the

nuclear missiles. Maybe we should all think about that idea and make it an official proposal—join the talks about the nuclear missiles in Europe with the talks about the limitation on all the strategic nuclear weapons. We also should think when and where to bring up this proposal. I think that MFA and the Ministry of Defense will decide on that problem.

We have to open up a wider network to win public opinion, to mobilize public opinion of the Western countries of Europe and America against the location of the nuclear weapons in Europe and against a new arms race, that's being forced by the American administration. The behavior of Japan, and especially of the president [Yasuhiro] Nakasone worries me. He completely took the side of the more aggressive part of the Western countries, and he completely supports Reagan's actions. Because of that we should consider some sort of compromise in our relations with Japan. For example: we could think about joint exploitation of several small islands, that have no strategic importance. Maybe there will be other suggestions. I, personally, think that Japan could initiate more active cooperation with the Soviet Union in the economic sphere.

The next point concerns China. I think that the Chinese aren't going to move any further on their positions. But all our data shows that they could increase their trade with USSR. They did offer us a trade agreement for this year, that substantially increases our goods exchange[compared to] the previous years of trading with China. Because of that we might have to send comrade [First Deputy Prime Minister Ivan V.] Arkhipov to China to conduct a series of talks and to "feel the ground." And if we succeed in improving our economic ties with China through cultural, sports, and other organizations, it could be considered a big step ahead.

Now about the Middle East. To say that the events in the Middle East don't bother us would be wrong. The fact is that we have very good relations with Syria. But Syria argues against the agreement that was made between Israel and Lebanon, Syria has no friendly relations with Iraq. Recently Syria has been facing minor problems with PLO, and in particular with [PLO Chairman Yasser] Arafat. In one word—here is a problem we have to think about.

If you look at our propaganda, you can come to a conclusion that it's quite calm when it comes to strategic preparations of NATO. That's true, we shouldn't scare people with war. But in our propaganda we should show more brightly and fully the military actions of the Reagan administration and the supporting countries of Western Europe, which in other words means disclosing in full scale the aggressive character of the enemy. We need that, so we could use facts to mobilize the soviet people for the fulfillment of social and economic plans for development of

the country. We can't, comrades, forget in this situation defense sufficiency of our country. These topics should be constant in our media. You remember comrade L. Y. Brezhnev at the XXVI session of CPSU [23 February - 3 March 1981] said, that military threat is coming and because of that we should lead a struggle against the influence of military revanchist ideas of the West. That's what it came to: Reagan calls up the senators if they support the ideas of the Soviet Union, and charges them with treason. Why don't we use press to speak against the lazy bums, those who miss work [*progulshikov*], bad workers? I ask the comrades to express their opinions about the questions brought up and maybe comrades have other suggestions. Who would like to take the stand?

GROMYKO. I completely approve of the suggestions that were expressed by Yu. V. Andropov. First of all about the call of the meeting of the leaders of socialist countries, countries of the Warsaw Pact. That kind of meeting, to my opinion, we should gather. [Romanian leader Nicolae] Ceausescu, I think, we should invite to

that Israel will strike against Syria. If Syria ruins
Reagan's plans, Americans will go bankrupt.

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*The intense, neo-Brezhnevite and al-
most neo-Stalinist conservatism of the brief
relationship between fluctuations in CPSU lead-
ership and the consideration of requests for rehabilitation from
party stalwarts who had petitioned the Polit-buro
was Alexander Shelepin, once KGB chief,
requests of the "Anti-Party Group" to bereste*

Sakharov as a political figure has basically lost his image of late and has been saying nothing new. Bonner should probably be allowed to go abroad for three months. According to the law, it is possible to interrupt the exile for a short period of time (Bonner, as you know, is in exile). Of course in the West, she could make a statement and receive some award, etc. We cannot exclude the possibility that from Italy, where she's going to obtain treatment, she could go to the U.S. Allowing Bonner to go abroad would have the appearance of a humanitarian step.

Two variants of her future behavior are possible. First, she returns to Gorky. Second, she refuses to come back and begins to raise the question of reunification of the family, which

preventative measures taken by organs of the KGB. Many individuals are noticed, so to speak, as they approach that line beyond which lies criminally punishable activity. The organs of the KGB and society are used in order to influence them.

GROMYKO: Which crimes are the most dangerous and what kind of punishment is meted out with them?

CHEBRIKOV: Espionage. Punishment is either execution or 15 years in prison.

Polishchuk has been shot for espionage. Yesterday Tolkachev's sentence was implemented.

GORBACHEV: American intelligence was very generous with him. They found 2 million rubles on him.

CHEBRIKOV: This agent gave very important military-technical secrets to the enemy.

GORBACHEV: Let's come to an understanding that we agree with Comrade Chebrikov's ideas. Let the KGB draw up proposals in the established manner.

MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: We agree.

(signed) A. Lukianov.

* * * * *

The following Politburo excerpt reveals the undercurrent of bitterness and mutual recrimination in U.S.-Soviet relations following the failure of the high-stakes, high-

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measures. Americans are making threats and claiming that if we take retaliatory measures, then they will take further steps towards our diplomatic personnel in the United States. Well, I think that given the limited character of Soviet-American relations, our embassy in the USA will be able to handle its assignments.

It is essential to come up with serious proposals. What specifically should we do? We should remove our people who work as service personnel in the American Embassy. Furthermore, the number of American representatives visiting the USA Embassy Moscow on business should be limited. Annually about 500 American citizens come here via this channel. Finally, the number of guests visiting the American ambassador in Moscow, which reaches up to 200 persons annually, should be determined on the basis of

the Soviet invasions of those countries in 1956 and 1968, respectively), Poland (about Soviet policy on the 1980-81 crisis), and South Korea (about Moscow's role in the Korean War and the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007).³

These actions have undoubtedly contributed to the historical record, but have also drawn allegations of politicization and favoritism. The dispute was long mostly limited to scholarly circles, but burst into public view in July 1994 when an *Izvestia* article criticized APRF practices.⁴ Citing the examples of new journals which had published APRF materials without appropriate citations, journalist Ella Maksimova complained that despite promised reforms, "the Presidential Archive (the former Politburo Archive) works according to the same super-secret regime, inaccessible to the mass of researchers [and] even [its] very existence...is not advertised."

Maksimova wrote that in 1992 Roskomarkhiv (now Rosarkhiv) chairman R. G. Pikhoia, head of the Presidential Administration S.A. Filatov, Volkogonov, and APRF director A.V. Korotkov appealed to Yeltsin to transfer to state archives 12,000 of the rumored 100-150,000 files in the APRF, "thus removing grounds for political speculation connected with the preservation of historical materials in archives which are closed to researchers." Yeltsin reportedly responded:

"I agree. Please carry out the necessary work." If the President had limited himself to this resolution, it would have been possible to hope that everything, little by little, would gradually be returned to society. However, on the list of *fondy* alongside No. 1 (Party Congresses, 1947-1986) and No. 2 (Plenums of the CC VPK (b) and the CC CPSU 1941-1990) a decisive "No" was printed in that same presidential hand.

Rather than blaming Yeltsin, Maksimova surmised that someone had stood at his "elbow whispering that 'it's dangerous, it's not worth it.'" Maksimova said access to the APRF currently depended on users' "presence in the President's circle, their political weight and connections," and noted that the APRF had been excluded from a presidential order mandating that most state ministries, after periods of "temporary storage," transfer their files to permanent state archives, which are, the article said, "generally accessible and open to the public." She concluded:

There are in the world some confidential archives for use by a narrow circle, but they are private. A confidential state archive violates a basic principle of democracy—free access to information. It is a dangerous precedent, especially in the current situation, when, alas, not all of society is eager to dig itself out of the prison of lies of its 70-year history.

The Presidential Archive remains an oasis of the socialist system of information privileges. The Party Archive, although out-

lawed, fell outside all currently valid laws. The collection of original documentation of the country's ruling state-political organ, which was the focus of the main organizing ideas, drafts, and decisions which determined over seventy years the life of the people and the world, has been desiccated and held in isolation from scholarship.

It's regrettable that this has all been done in the name of the President, in his domain, and with his help. One wants to believe that he's done it unintentionally, and was ill-informed.

The article provoked an uproar, to judge from subsequent comments by Russian scholars and archivists. Scholars named in the article as receiving privileged access denied any impropriety.⁵ The issues raised in the article were, for the most part, not new, since scholars, journalists, archivists, and others had clamored for quicker and fuller access to the APRF almost from the moment the collection's existence became known. Still, the ensuing controversy helped prompt a reconsideration of the APRF's status that resulted, in September, in a presidential decree requiring the transfer of APRF materials to state archives in 1994-95 and established a new commission to declassify CPSU documents (see below). Both archivists and researchers greeted the move as potentially a significant step forward.

While the flap over the Presidential Archive gathered the most press in Moscow, among Russian archives of interest to Cold War historians perhaps the most systematic effort to expand access has been made by Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). Thanks in large measure to a declassification program initiated in cooperation with an international advisory group organized by the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo,⁶ declassification of Foreign Ministry (MID) holdings for the years 1917-27 and 1945-55 should have concluded by September 1994. Much of this work has been done on schedule and, as reported previously, MID has also opened a new reading room. However, a logjam emerged over the question of declassifying the large number of deciphered telegrams; concerns were apparently expressed by Russian security officials, while foreign scholars contend that data pertaining to codes from those periods would be obsolete and non-sensitive, or at any rate could be easily excised.⁷

Some progress may have been made on this question and another sticking point, the availability of finding aids (*opisi*

* the appointment of N. G. Tomilina as director, rather than acting director, of TsKhSD;

* the continuation of the "Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and State" project to microfilm finding aids and selected documents from GARF, RTsKhIDNI, and TsKhSD, undertaken by the Russian State Archives Service and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; according to Chadwyck-Healey, the project's distributor, a catalogue listing the first 1,000 reels of microfilm is now available;²¹

* Yale University Press has started a publications series, *Annals of Communism*, presenting documents from several Russian archives;²²

* RTsKhIDNI and the Dutch company IDC have launched a project to microfilm the Comintern Archive and make the collection available on microfiche by 1997;²³

* RTsKhIDNI and the Feltrinelli Foundation (Milan) have cooperated to publish the minutes of the Cominform Conferences, 1947-49;²⁴

* Raymond L. Garthoff (Brookings Institution) has published two works that, collectively, constitute a major effort to integrate several years of recent disclosures from Russian sources and archives into almost three decades of Cold War history: a revised edition of *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, and *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*, both published in 1994 by Brookings;

* with the closure of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Munich due to U.S. government budget cuts, operations are

Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Malashenko concerning 1956 Hungarian events, including his role in developing military plans ("Compass") during uprising; initial decision to withdraw Soviet troops on October 31; and subsequent invasion. (E.I. Malashenko, "Special Corps in the Budapest Fire," *Military-Historical Journal* 10 (1993), 22-30; 11 (1993), 44-51; and 1 (1994), 30-36.)

Profile of M. Rakosa, Stalin's deputy in Budapest, including role in 1956 events. (Y. Gusev, "Homo cominternicus," *New Time* 7 (1993), 29-32.)

Reassessment of Soviet actions in Hungary in 1956, based on newly-released CPSU documents. (V.L. Musatov, "The USSR and Events in Hungary in 1956: New Archival Materials," *New and Newest History* 1 (1993), 3-22.) More secret documents on crisis, including situation reports on situation in Budapest on Nov. 4-5. *Military-Historical Journal* 8 (1993), 86-87.)

Publication of stenographic transcript (begun in issue #3, 1993) of June 1957 Plenum of the CPSU. ("The Last Anti-Party Group," *Historical Archives* 4 (1993), 4-73 and 5 (1993), 4-78.)

Khrushchev letter to British Prime Minister Macmillan in April 1959 on nuclear issues, Berlin Crisis published. (*Vestnik* 7-8 (April 1993), 74-79; see also I.V. Lebedev, "New Documents: Top Level Exchanges of Messages, April 1959," FCO Historical Branch Occasional Papers No. 7: *Changes in British and Russian Records Policy* (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Historical Branch, Nov. 1993), 20-23.)

Ex-Soviet envoy to Great Britain recounts controversy over Yuri Gagarin's visit. (A. Soldatov, "Y. Gagarin in England in June 1961," *New and Newest History* 5 (1993), 116-19.)

Documents on violent Soviet suppression of 1962 workers' uprising in Novocherkassk. (R. Pikhoia, et. al., "The Novocherkassk Tragedy, 1962," *Historical Archives* 1 (1993), 110-36; and 4 (1993), 143-77.)

Ex-Soviet general's account of Cuban Missile Crisis. (A.I. Gribkov, "The Caribbean Crisis," *Military-Historical Journal* 1 (1993), 2-10.)

Account of the 29 Oct. 1962-7 Jan. 1963 negotiations in New York between the USSR, USA, and Cuba, and other meetings in Washington and

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Merker, expelled from the party and arrested as an alleged Western spy in the 1950s; SED persecution of Merker laid in part to his sympathies for Jewish causes. (“Der Geheimprozess” [“The Secret Process”] (*Die Zeit* 41 (10/14/94), 7-8.)

More debate on 1952 Stalin Notes: Manfred Kittel, “Genesis einer Legend. Die Discussion um die Stalin-Noten in der Bundesrepublik 1952-1958”) [“Genesis of a Legend: The Stalin Notes in the German Debate on Reunification, 1952-1958”), *VfZ* 3 (July 1993), 355-90; Michael Gehler, “Kurzvertrag fuer Oesterreich? Die westliche Staatsvertrags-Diplomatie und die Stalin-Noten von 1952” [“Abbreviated Treaty for Austria? West Allied Policy in Light of the Stalin Notes of 1952”], *VfZ* 2 (April 1994), 243-79; Gerhard Wettig, “Die Deutschland—Note vom 10. Maerz auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Aussenministeriums” [“The Germany Note of 10 March 1952 on the Basis of Diplomatic Files from the Russian Foreign Ministry”], *DAWZ* 10-Ar2teriumd3], *KittelGeb* 52ovij /

Leadership and the Vienna CSCE Process 1986-1989”], *DA* 8 (Aug. 1993), 905-914.

Notes found in GDR archive of 10-11 Nov. 1986 socialist bloc conference in which Gorbachev privately broke from Brezhnev doctrine, affirming “independence of the party in each country, their right to make sovereign decisions, their own responsibility toward their own people,” and stating that the USSR would not intervene to keep socialist leaderships in power. (Reprinted with commentary by Daniel Kuechenmeister and Gerd-Ruediger Stephan, *ZfG* 8 (Aug. 1994), 713-21.)

Analysis of Gorbachev’s policies on German unification, using transcripts and correspondence from SED archives to illuminate his contacts with Honecker. (Hannes Adomeit, “‘Midwife of History’ or ‘Sorcerer’s Apprentice’? Gorbachev, German Unification and the Collapse of Empire” (forthcoming in *Post-Soviet Affairs*.)

German translation of two documents from CPSU CC archives dealing with Soviet relations with the PDS, hand-over of SED archives to Bundesarchiv, authored by Valentin Falin (10/18/90) and Nikolai Portugalov (3/13/91). (Vera Ammer, trans., “Streng geheim!” [“Top Secret!”], *DA* 2 (Feb. 1994), 222-4.)

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Ministry of State Security," *DA*

testers. (*RFE/RL News Briefs* 2:48 (22-26 Nov 1993), 13.) Mass grave discovered on Budapest Expo site containing 50 skeletons, mostly of young people; officials date it to between World War II and 1956. (Hungarian Radio, 1/13/94, cited in *RFE/RL News Briefs* 3:4 (10-21 Jan 1994), 18.) In first arrests ever connected to crushing of 1956 revolution, Budapest Attorney General's office announces arrest of "a number of persons" in massacre of eight persons in unarmed crowd in Eger on 12/12/56. (*RFE/RL News Briefs* 3:7 (7-11 Feb 1994), 17-18.) Hungarian militia members accused of firing into unarmed crowd in city of Salgotarjan on 12/8/56, killing 46, deny guilt before Budapest District Court hearing. (MTI, cited in *RFE/RL News Briefs* 3:28 (5-8 July 1994), 13.)

Government declassifies significant proportion of Council of Ministers' documents from 1944-60 period; some documents to remain secret on foreign policy, national security, or privacy grounds. (MTI (Budapest), 5/26/94, in FBIS-EEU-94-103-A (5/27/94), 13.)

Poland

English translations and original facsimiles of Soviet documents on Katyn massacre provided by Russian president Yeltsin to Polish president Walesa in Oct. 1992, plus introduction, annotation, and bibliography. *KATYN: Documents of Genocide*, ed. by Wojciech Materski, intro. by Janusz K. Zawodny (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993).

Archives of USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Slavic Studies show political pressure on scholars in 1948-52 to revise Soviet historiography on Poland to conform with Stalinist foreign policy. (Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Stalinizing Polish Historiography: What Soviet Archives Disclose," *East European Politics and Societies* 7:1 (Winter 1993), 109-134.)

Using Polish, Russian, and GDR archives, historian traces Gomulka's views on German issues. (Markus Krzoska, "Wladyslaw Gomulka und Deutschland," *Zeitschrift fuer Ostforschung* [Journal for East Research] 2 (1994), 174-213.)

Right-wing student groups demand release of secret police files on murder of opposition activist Stanislaw Pyjas in 1977 after prosecution closes investigation of slaying, citing obstruction by ministry. (PAP, cited in *RFE/RL News Briefs* 3:10 (28 Feb-4 Mar 1994), 11.)

Newly-declassified Soviet documents on 1980-81 Polish crisis (Suslov Commission documents) are published, including Politburo minutes and Brezhnev-Jaruzelski telephone transcript. ("Documents from the Suslov Commission:

Events in Poland in 1981," *New and Newest History*, Jan.-Feb. 1994, 84-105.) Gen. Jaruzelski, in interviews, comments on 1981 events, Suslov Commission documents. (*Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 25-26 Sept 1993, 6-7 Nov 1993, and 5-6 Mar 1994, in FBIS-EEU-94-045 (3/8/94), 26-33; V. Shutkevich, "I Wouldn't Have Given the Order to Fire on Parliament," *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), 12/14/93.) GDR archival evidence on East Berlin policy on 1980-81 Polish events published by team from Free University, Berlin. (Manfred Wilke, Reinhardt Gutsche, Michael Kubina, "Die SED-Fuehrung und die Unterdrueckung der polnischen Oppositionsbewegung 1980/81" ["The SED Leadership and the Repression of the Polish Opposition Movement 1980-81"], *German Studies Review* 71:1 (Feb. 1994), 105-52.)

Parliamentary (Sejm) Constitutional Responsibility Commission votes on April 6 against charging ex-President Jaruzelski and ex-Internal Affairs Minister Czeslaw Kiszcak for ordering the destruction of Politburo minutes from 1982-89; Jaruzelski admits ordering their destruction in December 1989 because they were allegedly "unreliable" as historical documents. (*RFE/RL News Briefs* 3:15 (5-8 April 1994), 15.)

Controversy over Yeltsin's claim in new book that he gave KGB reports on Solidarity to Walesa during August 1993 visit to Warsaw. (Warsaw Third Program Radio Network, 2100 GMT, 5/25/94, in FBIS-EEU-94-102 (5/26/94), 16-17.) Walesa representatives deny he concealed any materials, blames "misunderstanding." (Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network, 1730 GMT, 5/29/94, in FBIS-EEU-94-104 (5/31/94), 37; Warsaw PAP, 6/8/94, in FBIS-EEU-94-111-A (6/9/94), 11.) For passage in question, see Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia*, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Times Books, 1994), 139.

Books: Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Mein Leben fuer Polen. Erinnerungen* [My Love for Poland: Memoirs] (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1993).

Rodesnerungen

against the CPSU in the early 1960s—will be published with an introduction in a forthcoming issue of the journal *Chinese Law and Government*, published by M.E. Sharpe Inc., Armonk, NY.

* China's Central Archive has published a large seven-volume 5,200-page author index to its holdings of documents from the Chinese Communist revolution (1921-1949) under the title *Zhongyang Dang'anguan Guancang Geming Lishi Ziliao Zuozhe Pianming Suoyin* (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1990). Copies for sale in selected state-run bookshops in Beijing.

Publications: Deborah A. Kaple, *Dreams of a Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalinism in China* (Oxford University Press, 1994); Qiang Zhai,

